Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Faizullah Khan Ghazi Marjan vs The State Faizullah Khan and Another1972 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ahmad vs Ghulam Muhammad and Another1972 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-03
  regular second appealpre-emptionnew grounds in second appealdeficient court-feefunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  These three petitions arise from orders of the High Court of Lahore passed in Regular Second Appeals involving common questions of fact and law regarding pre-emption suits. The core legal question is whether an appellant can raise new questions of law and fact in a second appeal that were not argued before the first appellate court, and whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to order the payment of deficient court-fee contemporaneously with passing a decree. The Supreme Court held that points not argued before the first appellate court, and unsupported by an affidavit in the high court, cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal or before the Supreme Court, and that an order for deficient court-fee passed contemporaneously with the decree does not render the court functus officio. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise new questions of law and fact in a second appeal that were not argued before the first appellate court?
  • Does a trial court become functus officio when it orders the payment of deficient court-fee contemporaneously with passing a decree?
  • Will the Supreme Court permit the raising of questions for the first time when they were not presented before the High Court through proper evidentiary support like an affidavit?
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• Elahi Bakhsh vs The State1972 SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-15
  suspension of sentenceinterim bailmurderabetmentcriminal appealspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the Lahore High Court. The appellant was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the abetment of five murders and sentenced to transportation for life, with his main appeal pending before the High Court. The core legal question is whether the appellant was entitled to interim bail pending his appeal before the High Court given the facts and circumstances of the case, including a delayed implication by prosecution witnesses and an apparent lack of motive. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appellant made out a case for interim relief. The appeal was accordingly accepted, and the appellant was granted interim bail to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner, Pakpattan, during the pendency of his appeal in the High Court. The key principle laid down is that interim bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 may be granted pending appeal where ex facie the facts presented—such as delayed witness statements and absence of an evident motive—warrant relief without prejudicing the merits of the main case.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellant convicted of murder entitled to interim bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 pending the disposal of their appeal when there is a delay in implicating them and an apparent lack of motive?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for special leave to appeal into an appeal and grant interim bail to the convicted person?
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• DR. Azizur Rehman Chowdhury vs Chowdhary Muhammad Din1972 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-08-22
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notetriable issueLetters Patent Appealbelated pleaconsideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from a Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court of West Pakistan, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal against a summary decree passed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The respondent had sued the appellant for recovery of dues based on a promissory note. The appellant's application for leave to defend was rejected by the trial court as it failed to disclose facts making it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration. Subsequently, during the Letters Patent Appeal, the appellant filed a belated affidavit raising entirely new pleas, including that the loan was secured by a mortgage and that the promissory note was merely collateral without consideration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that new, inconsistent, and belated pleas not raised before the trial court cannot be entertained on appeal. It reaffirmed that leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can only be granted where there is a bona fide, non-illusory triable issue, which the appellant failed to demonstrate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a defendant raise entirely new and inconsistent factual pleas for the first time in a Letters Patent Appeal that were never raised before the trial court in an application for leave to defend?
  • What is the standard for granting leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a belated affidavit raising illusory and unproven allegations of a lack of consideration is sufficient to establish a bona fide triable issue in a summary suit?
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• DR. Abdul Fateh Ursani vs The State1972 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20
  sanction for prosecutionpublic servantcognizance of offenceSpecial Judgeprevention of corruptioncriminal breach of trustretrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether previous sanction of the appropriate Government was required for the prosecution of a former public servant under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, and at what point a Special Judge takes cognizance of an offence. A case was registered against the appellant, an Assistant Health Officer, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The Special Judge issued summons on 4th October 1965, but the appellant subsequently resigned, and the municipal committee refused sanction for prosecution. The Special Judge discharged the appellant, but the High Court ordered a retrial, holding that prosecution starts only when the accusation is read to the accused. The Supreme Court held that the Special Judge had already taken cognizance when applying his mind to issue summons, and further ruled that the requirement of previous sanction under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1958 applies to protect public servants whose services have terminated if the prosecution relates to their tenure as public servants.

  Questions settled

  • At what point does a Special Judge take cognizance of a case under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958?
  • Does a person lose the protection of requiring previous sanction for prosecution under Section 6(5) of the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, upon the termination of their service as a public servant?
  • Does a Special Judge have jurisdiction to try a person who is not a public servant for offences specified under the Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958?
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• DR. A. R. Khan vs Muhammad Ishaque1972 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-01
  ejectmentbona fide requirementsecond appealfinding of factrent restrictionconjectures and surmiseslandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant from commercial premises in Murree to establish his son in business. The Rent Controller granted the ejectment order, but the District Judge reversed it, drawing inferences of bad faith from the landlord's delay, choice of location, and prior request for rental assessment increase. The High Court reversed the District Judge's decision in second appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, holding that while bona fide requirement is ultimately a question of fact, the District Judge erred in law by basing his findings on pure conjectures, surmises, and personal preferences regarding business location. The Supreme Court clarified that a lower appellate court's finding of fact that differs from the trial court is not immune from second appeal if arbitrary, illogical, or based on conjecture. Furthermore, Section 13(4) of the Ordinance acts as a check against bad faith but does not relieve the landlord of the initial onus to prove bona fide requirement.

  Questions settled

  • When can the High Court in second appeal interfere with a finding of fact reached by the first appellate court that differs from the trial court?
  • Does a landlord's choice of location for setting up a business constitute a valid basis for a court to infer bad faith in ejectment proceedings?
  • What is the effect of the penal provisions in Section 13(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 on the landlord's burden of proving bona fide requirement?
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• Darey Khan and Another vs The State1972 SCMR 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-07
  murderocular evidenceconflict between medical and ocular evidencedying declarationbenefit of doubtacquittalinimical witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death/life imprisonment sentences of two brothers under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The prosecution relied upon the ocular evidence of related and inimical witnesses, a dying declaration by the deceased, absconding by the accused, and bullet piece recoveries. The core legal question was whether the convictions could stand when the medical evidence directly contradicted the ocular testimony and dying statement regarding the number of shots fired. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence established only a single shot (one entrance wound and one exit wound) caused the injuries, supported by the recovery of pieces of only one bullet, whereas the witnesses and deceased alleged that both appellants fired shots that hit the deceased. Additionally, the assailants fired from behind haystacks, concealing their identity. Finding the ocular and dying evidence unreliable due to these glaring contradictions, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted both appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does a glaring contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding the number of gunshots fired create reasonable doubt requiring acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses where physical and medical evidence contradicts their account?
  • Is a dying statement reliable when its details regarding the number of assailants' shots hit are disproved by post-mortem examination results?
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• Dalai vs The State1972 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  confessional statementco-accused confessioncorroborationkidnappingransomleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Dalai against the judgment of the High Court maintaining his conviction for kidnapping under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved whether the conviction of the petitioner could be lawfully sustained on the basis of a confessional statement of a co-accused supported by corroborating evidence regarding ransom demands rather than direct recovery of the abducted child from the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the confessional statement of the co-accused was sufficiently and substantially corroborated in material particulars regarding the petitioner's participation in the offence, and that corroborative evidence need not independently warrant a conviction. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that corroboration of a co-accused's confession requires confirmation of the implicating statements rather than independent proof of every single element.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the confessional statement of a co-accused can be used against an accused if corroborated in material particulars?
  • Is it necessary for corroborating evidence to be sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction?
  • Whether demand for ransom constitutes sufficient corroboration of participation in the offence of kidnapping?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax, North Zone, West Pakistan, Lahore vs Mst. Wazirunnisa Begum1972 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-19
  income taxdividend paymentassessment yeardividend warrantstatutory interpretationtax refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute regarding the assessment year for income tax purposes on dividend income received by the respondent. The core legal question was whether a dividend is considered 'paid' under Section 16(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, at the time of its formal declaration by a company or at the time the dividend warrant is actually issued to the shareholder. The Income-tax Officer contended that the declaration date determined the assessment year, while the respondent argued that the actual payment date was controlling. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the mere declaration of a dividend at an annual general meeting creates a liability but does not constitute 'payment'. The Court ruled that 'payment' occurs only when the dividend warrant is issued and the shareholder is in a position to receive the funds. Consequently, because the warrant was issued on June 1, 1956, the dividend pertained to the assessment year 1957-58. The Court further noted that amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1956, reinforced this interpretation of 'paid'.

  Questions settled

  • Does the declaration of a dividend at an annual general meeting constitute 'payment' under Section 16(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • At what point in time is a dividend considered 'paid' for the purpose of determining the relevant assessment year?
  • Does the issuance of a dividend warrant constitute the actual payment of a dividend for tax assessment purposes?
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• Chiragh Din vs Mst. Amirunnisa and 2 Other1972 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-01
  Displaced Persons ActSettlement of propertyPrior possessionAllotment orderRemand of caseQuestion of factTransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a dispute over the transfer of a property in Lahore under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant challenged the transfer of the property to the respondent, asserting his own entitlement based on prior possession and an alleged allotment order. The lower courts and Settlement authorities had previously dismissed the appellant's claim, primarily focusing on his status as a non-allottee without adequately addressing his plea regarding prior possession under a specific government notification. The Supreme Court observed that the Settlement authorities and the High Court failed to consider the appellant's claim of prior possession, which was supported by certain documents. The Court held that the determination of prior possession is a question of fact that must be decided by the competent Settlement authority. Consequently, the Court set aside the previous orders and remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, to determine which party held prior possession and to scrutinize the validity of the appellant's allotment order and the basis of the respondent's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of Settlement authorities to consider a claim of prior possession under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, warrant a remand of the case?
  • Is the determination of which party holds prior possession of a disputed property a question of fact to be decided by the Settlement authority?
  • Can a High Court or appellate court decide a disputed question of fact regarding property possession without it being first determined by the relevant Settlement authority?
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• Chan Pir Shah vs Hafiz Muhammad Tahir1972 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  evictiondefault in rentdisplaced personscompensation poolsecond appealtenant default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a second appeal by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the eviction of the petitioner from a disputed shop. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was justified in withholding rent under the bona fide impression that the property belonged to an evacuee trust rather than the respondent transferor. The Supreme Court held that the property formed part of the compensation pool and was rightly transferred to the respondent, making the petitioner a lawful tenant who remained in default for failing to pay rent either to the respondent or the trust. The court concluded that the eviction order was rightly passed and dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a tenant who withholds rent on a mistaken belief of ownership without paying it to the claimed alternate authority remains in willful default under rent laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can withhold rent from a transferred property owner on the plea of a bona fide impression that the property belongs to an evacuee trust?
  • Does failure to pay rent to either the respondent transferee or the claimed trust constitute default warranting eviction?
  • Whether a determination by the High Court that property is part of the compensation pool establishes the tenancy of the transferee?
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• Ch. Shah Muhammad vs Abdul Ghafoor and 2 Other1972 SCMR 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-03
  settlement of claimsdisplaced personsundisputed possessiontransfer of propertyejectment proceedingssettlement authoritieslocal entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a house in Tandlianwala, Lyallpur, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The petitioner, claiming entitlement as a local in possession, sought the transfer of the property, which was instead auctioned and purchased by the respondent. The petitioner's claim was rejected by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner due to a failure to file an eligibility declaration and clear rent arrears. Subsequent appeals and revisions were dismissed on grounds of limitation and lack of undisputed possession. The petitioner alleged that prior ejectment proceedings had been dropped by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, but failed to produce evidence of such an order. The High Court, noting the petitioner's failure to contest the department's report and the admission that he was under ejectment orders, upheld the settlement authorities' findings. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that in the absence of proof of undisputed possession, the petitioner could not claim the property as a local under the relevant notification. The petition was dismissed as no grounds for interference existed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner claim property transfer as a local under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 without proving undisputed possession?
  • Is a claim of dropped ejectment proceedings maintainable without documentary evidence of the final order?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding possession made by settlement authorities and the High Court?
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• Ch. Muhammad Nazir Ahmad vs Mirza Mahmood Ali Beg and Another1972 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-30
  land allotmentsettlement departmentwrit petitiontentative confirmationpending inquiryspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by a Settlement Commissioner against the dismissal of his Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld an order directing the tentative confirmation of land allotment in favor of the respondent pending a pending inquiry into his claim. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's interim direction confirming the proposed allotment subject to the outcome of ongoing verification inquiries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was merely tentative and properly safeguarded by making the confirmation subject to the final result of the pending inquiry, thereby removing any legitimate grievance. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that an interim or tentative confirmation of land claims subject to pending inquiries does not warrant interference where subordinate claimants have not contested the matter themselves and the departmental authority lacks personal legal standing to challenge it on their behalf.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can order tentative confirmation of a land allotment pending the result of an inquiry into the genuineness of a claim?
  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner has personal standing to maintain an appeal against an order directing tentative confirmation of land when no affected private claimants have challenged the order?
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• Ch. Abdur Rahim vs Sardar Abdul Aleem and 2 Other1972 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  evacuee propertyallotment disputesettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionproperty divisionremandearmarking scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allotment and division of evacuee property, specifically Units 28, 29, and 30, among various claimants. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority to partition the property itself during writ proceedings, and whether the Settlement authorities had adequately addressed the physical divisibility of the property and the necessity of access for the respective portions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by undertaking the division of the property itself, as such administrative determinations fall within the purview of the Settlement authorities. Consequently, the Court set aside the judgments of both the High Court and the Settlement authorities. The matter was remanded to the Settlement Commissioner with directions to re-evaluate the divisibility of the property, ensuring that any division accounts for practical necessities such as access, rather than imposing a rigid or inequitable partition. The Court emphasized that judicial review should not substitute the fact-finding and administrative functions of specialized settlement tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, undertake the physical division of disputed property instead of remanding the matter to the relevant administrative authorities?
  • Is it a legal requirement for settlement authorities to consider the necessity of access when dividing evacuee property among claimants?
  • Does the failure of settlement authorities to properly apply their minds to the divisibility of property constitute grounds for setting aside their orders?
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• Capt. Saeed Gul Badshah and Another vs Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar and 4 Other1972 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyassociation of claimantssettlement schemecompensation bookstransfer priceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' writ petition challenging the refusal of Settlement authorities to approve an association agreement regarding a transferred evacuee bungalow. Bungalow No. 4 on Domeli Road, Peshawar, was transferred to Hamidullah (appellant No. 2) as a non-claimant displaced person in October 1959. Having failed to pay the transfer price and public dues within the stipulated time or subsequent notices, Hamidullah sought to associate Captain Saeed Gul Badshah (appellant No. 1), a local, to pay the price in exchange for a portion of the property, relying on press notes extending time for utilizing Compensation/Rehabilitation books. The core legal question was whether a non-claimant transferee could associate a local who possessed no compensation books to avail of the extended time concessions for paying transfer prices under the settlement laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that association under the relevant press notes and Settlement Schemes was restricted to associating claimants holding Compensation/Rehabilitation books, and did not permit a non-claimant or local transferee to associate a non-claimant for such purposes. The key principle laid down is that the concession of extended time through association is exclusively meant for the utilization of compensation books held by claimants, and a non-claimant or local cannot be associated to bypass payment obligations where neither party holds valid compensation books.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a non-claimant transferee of evacuee property can associate a local who does not possess Compensation or Rehabilitation books for the payment of the transfer price?
  • Does a press note extending the time limit for utilizing Compensation/Rehabilitation books through association apply to parties who have not satisfied the pre-requisite cash payment requirements?
  • What is the true scope and intent of association under the Settlement Scheme regarding the types of persons who may be associated for paying the transfer price of evacuee properties?
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• C. A. No. 141 Of 1970 Kohinoor Textile Mills (Now Industries) Ltd. Premier1972 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-16
  ultra vires rule-making powercotton controlimport licence feeretrospective validationtaxation by executivestatutory interpretationtextile mills
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges the legality of import fees levied under rule 21 of the West Punjab Cotton Control Rules, 1949, on textile mills importing ginned cotton from outside specified zones. The core legal questions are whether rule 21 was intra vires the parent West Punjab Cotton (Control) Act, 1949, and whether subsequent ordinances retrospectively validated the impugned fee. The Supreme Court held that the unamended section 23 of the 1949 Act did not authorize the levy of import fees, making rule 21 ultra vires to that extent. Furthermore, the validating provisions of the 1966 Ordinances lacked explicit retrospective wording to cure the defect prior to their enactment, following the principle in Muhammad Ismail & Co. v. Chief Cotton Inspector. The Court declared the fee levy illegal for the period prior to 8th May 1966, while allowing it thereafter upon the promulgation of West Pakistan Cotton Control Ordinance No. XX of 1966.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rule 21 of the West Punjab Cotton Control Rules, 1949, imposing a fee on import licences, was ultra vires the West Punjab Cotton (Control) Act, 1949?
  • Can subordinate legislation impose a fee without express substantive authorization in the parent statute?
  • Whether subsequent validating ordinances provided effective retrospective validation for fee levies that were initially illegal?
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• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore vs Ala Ud1972 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-03
  natural justiceright to show causeadministrative lawexamination resultseducational eligibilityestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Controller of Examinations, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore, which quashed the respondent's Intermediate Examination results due to an alleged shortage of lectures. The respondent had initially passed all subjects except Geography, for which he was placed in compartment, and was subsequently permitted by the petitioner to sit for the supplementary examination. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could unilaterally cancel the respondent's examination results after allowing him to sit for the examination, without providing him an opportunity to be heard, on the grounds of lecture shortage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is unjust to cancel a candidate's results after they have been permitted to sit for and pass an examination, particularly when the responsibility for verifying eligibility lies with the educational authorities. The court affirmed that the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to show cause, must be observed even if the relevant rules do not explicitly mandate notice before such adverse administrative action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of educational authorities to verify lecture attendance before permitting a student to sit for an examination preclude them from later cancelling the results?
  • Is an administrative order quashing an examination result valid if issued without providing the affected student an opportunity to show cause?
  • Do the principles of natural justice apply to administrative actions even when the relevant rules are silent on the requirement of notice?
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• Begum Mehrunnisa vs National Building Industries Lid. Karachi and 21972 SCMR 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-08
  impleadment of partiesspecific performancepartnership accountsdiscretionary powercivil procedurespecial leave petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave arises from an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Order I, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be impleaded as a party in a specific performance suit. The core legal question concerns the propriety of refusing to implead a partner in a suit for specific performance of partnership property when a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts has already been passed in a separate partnership suit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion lawfully and reasonably, as the petitioner was not a party to the specific performance contract and her interests would not be prejudiced by the refusal, thereby preventing unnecessary prolongation and complication of proceedings. The key principle laid down is that appellate courts will not interfere with the discretionary powers exercised by lower courts under Order I, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless the considerations are irrelevant or result in a miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a third party can be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after a compromise has been reached in a specific performance suit?
  • Is the discretion exercised by a High Court under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 open to interference by the Supreme Court when based on reasonable considerations?
  • Does the refusal to implead a partner in a specific performance suit regarding partnership property materially affect their pending rendition of accounts suit?
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• Bashir vs The State1972 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-07
  murderassault on public servantocular testimonymedical evidencediscrepancy in distancedeath sentenceconfirmation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a police constable and for assaulting a public servant. The appellant was sentenced to death by the trial court, and his conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether alleged discrepancies between the ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the number of shots fired and the distance from which the shot was fired were sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court observed that the ocular evidence was consistent with the doctor's opinion that the injuries could result from a single shot. Furthermore, minor discrepancies regarding distance were attributable to honest estimation errors by illiterate witnesses testifying long after the incident. Consequently, the Supreme Court maintained the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can minor variations in estimations of distance by eye-witnesses invalidate ocular evidence when supported by medical testimony?
  • Whether an honest mistake regarding distance by an illiterate witness testifying after a considerable lapse of time affects the credibility of eyewitness testimony?
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• Bashir Hussain Shah and 4 Others vs Settlement and Rehabilitation1972 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  leave to appealreverification of landsurplus area cancellationrehabilitation settlement schemechief settlement commissionerassistant rehabilitation commissionerexcess allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This leave petition challenges the jurisdiction of the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner to reduce, upon reverification, land allotments made to the predecessor of private respondents. The core legal question concerns whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner possessed the lawful authority to cancel or reduce surplus land allotments under the relevant statutory framework. The Supreme Court held that the power of cancellation or reduction of an allotment is vested exclusively in the Chief Settlement Commissioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, and subordinate schemes such as the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme cannot override these substantive statutory provisions. The Court laid down the principle that subordinate delegated legislation and administrative schemes cannot confer powers inconsistent with or broader than the substantive provisions of the parent statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner have the jurisdiction to cancel or reduce land allotments on reverification?
  • Can a rehabilitation settlement scheme override the substantive provisions of the parent statute regarding the cancellation of land allotments?
  • Who is exclusively empowered under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act to cancel or reduce excess land allotments?
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• Barkat Ali vs The State1972 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-02
  review petitionSupreme Court RulesAdvocate appearancespecial leaveprocedural requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed seeking review of the Supreme Court's order dated 4th April 1972 passed in Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 262 of 1971, which had been dismissed. The core legal question concerned the procedural requirement for filing and arguing a review petition under the Supreme Court Rules where a different counsel appeared during the original hearing. The Supreme Court highlighted that under Order XXVI, Rule 5 of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules, no application for review can be drawn up by any Advocate other than the Advocate who appeared at the hearing of the case wherein the judgment or order sought to be reviewed was made, unless special leave of the Court is obtained. Furthermore, the rule mandates that the Advocate who originally appeared must be present at the hearing of the review petition unless their presence has been dispensed with. Applying these procedural rules, the Court addressed the competence of the review petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be drawn by an Advocate other than the one who appeared at the original hearing of the case without special leave of the Court?
  • Is the Advocate who appeared at the main hearing required to be present during the hearing of the review petition?
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• Barkat Ali and Other Dilawar Khan and Other Wali Muhammad Awan and Other vs Maula Bakhsh and Other Wali Muhammad and Other and Abdul Ghafoor and Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-28
  Rehabilitation Commissionerland allotmentomnibus orderrevisional jurisdictionRehabilitation Settlement Schemenatural justiceevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that invalidated an omnibus order issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on November 11, 1956, which revised land allotments across several Chaks. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner possessed the authority to issue such a general order, effectively superseding previous revisional orders and altering the "relevant date" for allotment eligibility. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Commissioner acted within the scope of his powers under the Rehabilitation Act of 1956. The Court determined that the Commissioner could issue general orders to correct irregularities and ensure compliance with the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, provided that affected parties were given an opportunity to be heard. The Court further ruled that fixing a new "relevant date" for eligibility did not constitute an invalid departure from the scheme, as the Commissioner had the authority to issue instructions to better implement the scheme's fundamentals. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the Rehabilitation Commissioner's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Rehabilitation Commissioner issue an omnibus order to revise land allotments across multiple estates?
  • Does the Rehabilitation Commissioner have the authority to alter the 'relevant date' for determining eligibility for land allotments?
  • Is an order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner invalid merely because it modifies previous revisional orders?
  • Must the Rehabilitation Commissioner grant an individual hearing to every affected person before issuing a general revision order?
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• Baqri and 4 Other vs Salmon and 3 Other1972 PLD Supreme Court 133 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  pre-emptionwaiver of pre-emptionauction saleco-ownershipestoppelagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 sold agricultural land through a private auction in 1955, where the appellants offered the highest bid of Rs. 30,000. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit to pre-empt the sale based on co-ownership, which was resisted on the ground that his participation in the auction estopped him from asserting his pre-emption right. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the District Judge and the High Court on second appeal decreed it. The core legal question is whether a pre-emptor's mere participation in an auction sale and failure to outbid the purchaser constitutes a waiver of the right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that mere participation in an auction or failure to outbid the highest purchaser does not amount to a waiver. The Court laid down that a right of pre-emption arises upon the completion of a sale, and while it can be waived prior to sale by express refusal or clear conduct showing a lack of interest, mere competitive bidding participation or not outbidding the purchaser does not constitute waiver.

  Questions settled

  • Does participation in a private auction sale by a pre-emptor amount to a waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Whether the failure of a person entitled to pre-emption to outbid the purchaser at an auction constitutes a waiver.
  • When does the statutory right of pre-emption arise in respect of a sale of agricultural property?
  • Can a pre-emption claim be defeated on the ground of waiver without evidence of an express refusal or clear conduct showing disinterest in the purchase?
  Read full judgment →
• Banaras Khan vs Sardar Khan and 8 Other1972 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-08
  occupancy tenancyleasehold rightscivil court jurisdictionappellate court powerscompensation assessmentrepudiation of tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a civil suit for possession of land filed by the plaintiffs-respondents against the defendants-petitioners, involving claims of occupancy tenancy and leasehold rights. The core legal questions concerned whether the defendants' predecessor-in-interest purchased leasehold rights or merely a right to receive compensation, whether the civil court possessed jurisdiction to try the suit, and whether the High Court was empowered to modify the compensation amount despite the dismissal of cross-objections. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, affirming that the evidence established the defendants held the land as lessees under the occupancy tenant. The Court held that the civil court had jurisdiction because the defendant had repudiated the tenancy and asserted title. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, an appellate court possesses broad powers to pass any decree or order required by the justice of the case, including the reduction of compensation, regardless of whether a formal appeal or cross-objection was filed regarding that specific issue.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to try a suit for possession where the defendant has repudiated the tenancy and set up title in themselves?
  • Does an appellate court have the power under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to reduce a compensation award even if the cross-objection regarding that amount was dismissed?
  • Can a court exercise its powers under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in favour of parties who have not filed an appeal or objection?
  Read full judgment →
• Bagu vs The State1972 PLD Supreme Court 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymedical evidence vs ocular evidenceformal witnesshostile police witnessbenefit of doubtmurder appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302/34 and 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to transportation for life and rigorous imprisonment. The appellant argued that he did not participate in the fatal attack on the deceased, relying on minor discrepancies in medical evidence concerning the estimated age of injuries, the alleged site of bloodstains, and favorable statements made in cross-examination by a formal police witness. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's active participation in attacking witnesses to prevent them from aiding the deceased clearly established vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court held that approximate medical estimations regarding injury duration cannot override reliable direct eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the practice of subordinate formal police witnesses attempting to make obliging concessions for the defence during cross-examination, ruling that such testimony carries no evidential value.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused who did not inflict the fatal blow be convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for sharing common intention by assaulting witnesses who tried to rescue the deceased?
  • Does an approximate medical estimate regarding the duration or age of injuries outweigh direct and credible eyewitness testimony?
  • What evidential weight should be attached to obliging concessions made during cross-examination by formal subordinate police witnesses on matters beyond their scope of investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad vs The State1972 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  special leave to appealattempt to murderassault on public servantmedical evidence vs ocular accountcross-examinationreappraisal of evidencecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under sections 307 and 333 of the Pakistan Penal Code for firing at a superior police officer and injuring another during an incident at the police lines. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner suffered prejudice from the alleged denial of cross-examination of a material witness, whether a minor contradiction between medical and ocular evidence warrants acquittal, and whether the Supreme Court can reappraise witness testimony concurrent findings of lower courts. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the failure to cross-examine was attributable to the defence, the medical contradiction regarding charring was immaterial to the core injuries sustained, and concurrent factual findings based on proper appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with in special leave proceedings. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies between medical and ocular evidence do not vitiate a conviction where core facts are established, and failure of the defence to avail cross-examination opportunities creates no legal prejudice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding charring vitiate a conviction when the injury itself is established?
  • Can an accused claim prejudice for lack of cross-examination when the trial record shows the opportunity was given and not availed of?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts regarding the appreciation of witness testimony in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Attorney-General for Pakistan vs Yusuf Ali Khanb, Barrister at Law1972 PLD Supreme Court 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-18
  contempt of courtscandalizing the courtunconditional apologySupreme Judicial Councilpresidential referencejudicial integritypublication of contempt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a contempt of court proceeding initiated against a barrister who wrote a letter to the President of Pakistan making malicious and false allegations against the integrity and impartiality of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court. The core legal questions involved whether sending such a letter constituted contempt, whether publication was necessary, and whether the communication was protected under Article 128(5) of the 1962 Constitution as information given to the President for a reference to the Supreme Judicial Council. The court held that the allegations were maliciously false, constituted gross contempt, required no formal publication to be actionable, and did not enjoy protection under Article 128(5) because bad faith and falsity stripped them of any legal immunity. The ratio decidendi is that while information against a judge may be submitted to the President in good faith under constitutional provisions, making recklessly false allegations to scandalize the judiciary constitutes punishable contempt. The court accepted the respondent's unconditional apology and withdrawal of allegations only in mitigation of sentence, imposing a lenient penalty of imprisonment and a fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transmission of a letter containing false allegations against judges to the President constitutes contempt of court?
  • Is prior publication of an offending document a necessary prerequisite to constitute contempt of court?
  • Does information supplied to the President under Article 128(5) of the 1962 Constitution regarding a judge's alleged misconduct enjoy absolute immunity from contempt proceedings?
  • What is the legal effect of an unconditional apology and withdrawal of allegations in contempt proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Attorney General for Pakistan vs The Chief Editor and Bureau Manager, Pakistan Press International, Lahore and 3 Other1972 SCMR 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-18
  contempt of courtmisrepresentation of court proceedingsnews reportpress responsibilitySupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon contempt notices issued to the respondents, including news editors, printers, and publishers of various newspapers, for publishing a baseless news-story that misrepresented court proceedings and tended to prejudice a pending matter. The core legal question concerns whether the publication of an unverified and incorrect news-report regarding court proceedings constitutes contempt of court. The Supreme Court held that while the publication of the baseless report, originating from a news agency without verifying from the court's Press Relations Officer, betrayed a lack of responsibility, the rule is nevertheless discharged under the circumstances. The key principle laid down emphasizes the necessity for reporters to verify court proceedings through official channels rather than relying on unverified sources to avoid misrepresenting judicial matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the publication of an unverified news-story misrepresenting court proceedings constitute contempt of court?
  • Is a news reporter required to consult the Press Relations Officer of the Court to verify information before publication?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs The State1972 PLD Supreme Court 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-06
  unnatural offencewhipping sentencefear of bodily injurycriminal revisionsentencing enhancementstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a High Court order enhancing the sentence of the appellant, who was convicted under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing an unnatural offence. The core legal question is whether a sentence of whipping under section 4(b) of the Whipping Act, 1909, is legally sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish that the victim was compelled or induced to submit to the offence by a "fear of bodily injury." The Supreme Court held that the imposition of whipping requires specific, affirmative proof that the accused induced fear of bodily injury prior to the commission of the offence. Upon reviewing the record, the Court found no evidence that the victim was threatened with bodily harm, noting that the statutory condition was not met. Consequently, the Court ruled the sentence of whipping illegal and set it aside, while maintaining the conviction and the term of imprisonment. The judgment establishes that the "fear of bodily injury" is an essential condition precedent for the imposition of whipping under the Whipping Act, 1909.

  Questions settled

  • Is the 'fear of bodily injury' an essential condition for imposing a sentence of whipping under section 4(b) of the Whipping Act, 1909?
  • Can a sentence of whipping be imposed for an unnatural offence without evidence that the victim was threatened with bodily harm?
  • Does the general nature of an unnatural offence satisfy the statutory requirement of inducing fear of bodily injury for the purpose of sentencing under the Whipping Act, 1909?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Elahi and Others Rahim Bakhsh and Others vs Muhammad Shaft and Other Muhammad Shafi and Other1972 SCMR 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-20
  land allotmentforgerylachesinformerlocus standiwrit jurisdictiondelegation of power
  Summary & questions settled

  These two petitions arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition. The dispute concerned the allotment of certain land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958. The Settlement Commissioner had upheld an allotment order passed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner (Lands) acting as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 10 of the Act, ruling that the order could not be challenged before other settlement authorities. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of laches, as the petitioners failed to challenge the initial 1963 order, and on findings of extensive fraud, forgery, and tampering with the official land records received from India. Additionally, a cousin's claim as an informer was rejected due to collusion and a lack of locus standi. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to land beyond the reverified amounts and that an informer has no vested interest in the property to invoke writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 can be challenged before other settlement authorities?
  • Can a petitioner invoke writ jurisdiction to claim land when the underlying entitlement is based on forged and tampered official records?
  • Does an informer who colludes with claimants have a vested interest or locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Hussain and Another vs Ashiq Ali1972 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-17
  Muhammadan Lawgiftdelivery of possessionseisinwaqfrevocation of gifttransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the validity of a gift of agricultural land. The donor, after executing a registered gift deed in favor of the appellants, subsequently revoked the gift and created a waqf. The appellants filed a suit for a declaration of ownership, which was decreed by the trial and first appellate courts, finding that the gift was valid and possession had been transferred. However, the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the gift was incomplete due to the absence of actual delivery of possession. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's judgment. The Court held that under Muhammadan Law, a valid gift requires three essentials: a declaration by the donor, acceptance by the donee, and the delivery of possession (seisin). The Court clarified that a mere recital in a gift deed stating that possession has been delivered is insufficient to effect a transfer, especially when the land is in the possession of tenants. A conscious, unequivocal, and distinct act of transferring possession is mandatory to perfect the gift.

  Questions settled

  • What are the three essential requirements for a valid gift under Muhammadan Law?
  • Is a mere recital in a gift deed sufficient to prove the delivery of possession when the property is in the possession of tenants?
  • Can a donor revoke a gift after it has been completed by the delivery of possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashfaque Ahmad Sheikh vs The State1972 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-29
  contempt of courtcontempt in facie curiaeright of criticismjudge as prosecutor and judgeapology in contemptreduction of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed as of right under Article 58(2) of the 1962 Constitution, challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan convicting the appellant, an Advocate, of gross contempt of court for interrupting judicial proceedings and inciting disobedience of a court order. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's actions constituted contempt in facie curiae, whether the presiding judge was barred from trying the contempt matter, and whether the law of contempt violated Islamic principles or required prior framing of rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the conviction, holding that the appellant's conduct in challenging the court order in an insolent tone and urging its disobedience amounted to gross contempt and did not fall within the scope of good faith criticism. The Court affirmed that contempt proceedings in facie curiae are an exception to the rule against a judge acting as both prosecutor and judge, and that the power to punish under Article 123 of the 1962 Constitution is absolute and not dependent on rules. However, considering extenuating circumstances including the appellant's youth and junior standing, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate or stranger intervening in court proceedings and publicly challenging an interim order constitutes contempt of court?
  • Does the rule against a judge acting as both prosecutor and judge apply to contempt committed in the face of the court?
  • Is the exercise of the power to punish for contempt under Article 123 of the 1962 Constitution dependent upon the framing of rules?
  • Whether an unrepentant or qualified apology tendered after justifying contumacious conduct can be accepted by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Asal Din vs Mir Bahadur and Another1972 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-23
  criminal appealmurderacquittalself-defencebenefit of doubtirrigation water dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from an order of the Peshawar High Court acquitting the respondent of the murder of the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the respondent shot the deceased following a dispute over the turn of irrigation water. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the conviction and granting the respondent the benefit of the doubt on the grounds of self-defence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the acquittal order was sustainable on sound reasoning and was not arbitrary or fanciful. The Court noted that the respondent sustained injuries during the occurrence, a grappling had taken place between the parties wherein the deceased held a lethal weapon, and the possibility that the respondent acted in the exercise of the right of private defence could not be excluded. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, laying down the principle that an acquittal based on a plausible view of self-defence and the benefit of doubt will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal based on the right of self-defence can be interfered with by the Supreme Court when it is supported by sound reasoning?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the person of the accused in the first information report support a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused where prosecution witnesses were partly found to be false and a grappling preceded the fatal shooting?
  Read full judgment →
• Asad Ullah Khan and 3 Others vs The State1972 SCMR 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-05
  murdermurderous assaultcommon intentionright of private defenceaggressorleave to appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed their criminal appeal and upheld their conviction and sentence for murder and murderous assault. The petitioners were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, and convicted under section 302/34 and section 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that following an altercation regarding the watering of a buffalo, the petitioners and co-accused armed with weapons attacked the complainant party inside their haveli, resulting in the death of one person and injuries to others. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence regarding the place of occurrence, the role of the aggressors, and the availability of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court held that the attack indeed took place near the haveli, that the petitioners were the aggressors, and that no right of private defence was available to them. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's finding regarding the place of occurrence can be interfered with when supported by overwhelming prosecution evidence?
  • Does the right of private defence accrue to an accused party who is established to be the aggressor?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwar Hussain Zaidi vs Atta Ur Rahman and 2 Other1972 SCMR 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-02-16
  hire-purchase agreementallotment cancellationsublettingforfeiture clauserehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan quashing a departmental order that cancelled a hire-purchase agreement and the allotment of a property for alleged subletting in violation of agreement terms. The core legal question was whether the hire-purchase agreement prescribed a penalty or forfeiture clause for the breach of the condition against subletting. The Supreme Court held that the relevant clause of the agreement was directed solely towards default in the payment of instalments and did not provide a penalty for the breach of the condition against subletting, a view further fortified by the subsequent issuance of a departmental correction slip introducing a new clause. The appeal was accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a hire-purchase agreement providing for forfeiture upon default in instalment payments also authorize the cancellation of the agreement for subletting?
  • Whether the High Court correctly quashed the departmental order cancelling an allotment in the absence of a penalty clause for subletting?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir vs The State1972 PLD Supreme Court 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-02
  post-arrest bailright of private defencecross-casebenefit of doubtculpable homicidebail adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had rejected the petitioner's bail application in a murder case while granting bail to his co-accused. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the potential applicability of the right of private defence, arising from a cross-case involving a land dispute where the petitioner allegedly acted after the deceased had killed a member of the petitioner's party. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court failed to consider the statements of witnesses other than the complainant, which might support the petitioner's plea of self-defence. The Court held that while it would not grant bail at this stage, the High Court should re-examine the bail application by considering the entire available evidence. The key principle laid down is that even at the bail stage, the law should not be stretched in favour of the prosecution, and any benefit of doubt arising from the evidence must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Should the benefit of doubt in bail proceedings be extended to the accused?
  • Is the right of private defence a relevant consideration for the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Must a court consider the entire body of available evidence when adjudicating a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Aminul Haq vs Mst. Mustawara Etc.S1972 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-16Read full judgment →
• Allah Noor and 5 Others Ismail and 3 Others vs The State through Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar the State and 3 Other M. Zahural Haq, Advocate Supreme Court Instructed By Nur Ahmad Khan,1972 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-05
  criminal lawtribunal referralright to hearingnatural justiceprocedural illegalityvoid order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two appeals by special leave concerning the procedural requirements for referring criminal cases to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether an accused person is entitled to notice and a hearing before a Commissioner issues an order referring their case to a Tribunal under Section 3 of the Act. Relying on established precedents, the Supreme Court held that the decision-making process by a Commissioner regarding the referral of a case constitutes 'proceedings' under Section 25 of the Act. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the accused has a mandatory right to be heard before such an order is passed. An order issued without providing this opportunity is void ab initio, rendering all subsequent proceedings tainted with illegality. Following the concession by the Advocate-General, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the Commissioners, and directed that the cases be tried before ordinary criminal courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to notice and a hearing before a Commissioner refers their case to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1963?
  • Does the process of referring a case to a Tribunal constitute 'proceedings' under Section 25 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1963?
  • Is an order of reference to a Tribunal void if passed without affording the accused an opportunity of being heard?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Diwaya vs The State1972 SCMR 455 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonymedical evidencerelated witnessescorroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming the appellant's sentence of death under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Noor Muhammad. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular testimony by related witnesses, the necessity of independent corroboration, and alleged contradictions between the medical evidence and the statements of eyewitnesses regarding the level of the assailant. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were well-founded, as the medical evidence was consistent with the eyewitness accounts regarding the relative positions of the assailant and the deceased, and the broad daylight occurrence left no doubt regarding identification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses requires independent corroboration in a murder trial?
  • Does an inconsistency between the entry and exit wound levels and the ocular testimony regarding the assailant's position warrant a rejection of the prosecution case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable on the basis of related eyewitnesses when some co-accused have been given the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Karim Bakhsh and 6 Other1972 SCMR 538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-24
  acquittalleave to appealmisreading of evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealphysical evidenceself-defense
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that acquitted six respondents of charges under sections 148, 302, and 307 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court overturned this, citing doubts regarding the incident's location and the nature of injuries sustained by the accused. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a misreading of evidence or resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court’s conclusions were not perverse. The Court found that the prosecution's case was undermined by the presence of blood in multiple fields and the nature of the injuries on the accused, which could not have been caused by a single sickle as claimed. Consequently, the Court affirmed that it would not interfere with an acquittal that is sustainable on the record and does not constitute a grave miscarriage of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court's findings are sustainable on the record?
  • Does the presence of blood in multiple fields contradict a prosecution case asserting a single location for an occurrence?
  • Can an appellate court reject a prosecution version of events if the injuries sustained by the accused are inconsistent with the alleged weapon used by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad vs Muhammad Nawaz Alias Bagga and Another1972 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-06
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtdying declarationextra-judicial confessionweapon recoveryacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Peshawar, which set aside the conviction of the respondent under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and ordered his acquittal for the murder of Malik Dad. The prosecution case rested on a dying declaration, an extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a blood-stained knife, supported by an alleged motive. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in extending the benefit of the doubt and setting aside the conviction based on the appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court provided cogent and valid reasons for disbelieving the dying declaration, extra-judicial confession, and weapon recovery, and that its conclusions were neither perverse nor unreasonable. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with an acquittal order based on a plausible appreciation of evidence and the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside a murder conviction by giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  • Can a dying declaration be discredited due to the presence of relatives and the possibility of prompting?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession reliable when the witness failed to mention it in earlier police statements?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal order when the High Court's conclusions are based on a reasonable appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs The State1972 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  post-arrest bailmurderunlawful assemblypolice raidsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Ali Muhammad against the refusal of bail by the High Court in a case involving charges under sections 302, 307, and 148/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail on grounds of delay in commitment proceedings, advanced age, and alleged lack of incriminating evidence regarding membership of an unlawful assembly. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing bail, particularly given that the petitioner was apprehended at the scene of the crime inside the raided house. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is arrested directly at the spot during a police raid, bail may be properly refused by the superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused arrested at the spot during a police raid is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does delay in commitment proceedings automatically entitle an accused facing serious criminal charges to bail?
  • Can advanced age alone serve as a sufficient ground for granting bail in heinous offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad and Another vs Raja Muhammad Ziaullah and 3 Other1972 SCMR 299 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-28
  settlement propertycomposite buildingadministrative discretiondivision of propertywrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a composite property consisting of shops and residential units under settlement laws. The petitioners and respondents both claimed the property, leading to a series of administrative orders by settlement authorities. Initially, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the entire property to the petitioners, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner subsequently divided the property between the parties, allocating specific portions to each based on their possession. This division was upheld through subsequent revisions and by the Lahore High Court in writ and Letters Patent Appeal proceedings. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the administrative division of the composite building. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was correct, affirming that the power to divide a composite building under the relevant settlement statute rests with the Settlement Authorities. The Court ruled that it would not interfere with such administrative discretion unless the exercise of power was shown to be arbitrary or capricious, finding that substantial justice had been served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to divide a composite building under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 rest with the Settlement Authorities?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with the division of a composite building made by Settlement Authorities?
  • Is the division of a composite building between parties in possession considered a valid exercise of administrative power under settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Akhtar Hussain vs The State1972 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-01-17
  murderdying declarationbenefit of doubtocular testimonytainted evidencecriminal appealcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the conviction could be sustained based solely on a dying declaration and the testimony of a single witness, both of which were challenged as unreliable. The Supreme Court observed that the investigation was tainted, as the dying declaration included names of witnesses previously discredited by lower courts as stock witnesses. Furthermore, the sole remaining ocular witness was a friend of the deceased and held animosity toward the appellant, necessitating independent corroboration. The Court held that a dying declaration tainted by the inclusion of unreliable witnesses could not serve as corroborative evidence for the testimony of an interested witness. Establishing the principle that one piece of tainted evidence cannot corroborate another, the Court granted the appellant the benefit of the doubt, set aside the conviction, and ordered his immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration that includes the names of discredited witnesses be relied upon for conviction?
  • Does the testimony of a sole eyewitness require independent corroboration when the witness is an interested party?
  • Can one piece of tainted evidence serve as corroboration for another piece of tainted evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad and Another vs Muhammad Fazal and Another1972 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-06
  pre-emptionconsent decreemutationlimitation periodexecution of decreerevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the execution of a consent decree in a pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a mutation of land based on a civil court consent decree could be sanctioned by revenue authorities when the decree holder had failed to execute the decree within the statutory period of limitation. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower court's decision, which had restored a mutation order despite the decree having become time-barred. The Court held that a decree for pre-emption, once it becomes ineffective due to the failure to execute it within the prescribed period of limitation, cannot be used as a valid basis for sanctioning a mutation of land in the revenue records. The key principle laid down is that revenue authorities cannot bypass the law of limitation by sanctioning mutations based on stale or time-barred civil court decrees. Consequently, the Court found the respondent's reliance on the time-barred decree to be legally unsustainable, thereby setting aside the previous order that had allowed the mutation to proceed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mutation of land be sanctioned based on a consent decree that has become time-barred?
  • Does the failure to execute a pre-emption decree within the limitation period render the decree ineffective for mutation purposes?
  • Are revenue authorities empowered to sanction a mutation based on a civil court decree that is no longer executable?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar vs Sadiq and 15 Other1972 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-23
  refugee right-holderrehabilitation schemeinheritance of evacuee landconfirmed allotteecondonation of delaylimitation actsuccession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute over the inheritance of land allotted to a refugee right-holder, Khuda Bakhsh, who died in 1956. The core legal question was whether the deceased was a 'confirmed allottee' at the time of his death, thereby subjecting his estate to Muslim Personal Law, or a mere 'right-holder,' subjecting succession to the Rehabilitation Scheme. The High Court had dismissed the appellant's review petition on grounds of limitation and merits. The Supreme Court held that because the rehabilitation fee was paid in 1959, after the deceased's death, he remained a 'right-holder' at the time of death. Consequently, succession is governed by the Rehabilitation Scheme, specifically paragraph 46, rather than Muslim Personal Law. Furthermore, the Court condoned the two-day delay in filing the review petition, finding the appellant had been pursuing his remedies in good faith. The principle laid down is that until the rehabilitation fee is paid and the allotment is finally confirmed, the deceased remains a 'right-holder,' and inheritance is determined by the Rehabilitation Scheme rather than general personal law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a refugee right-holder before the payment of the rehabilitation fee render the succession governed by the Rehabilitation Scheme rather than Muslim Personal Law?
  • Is a delay of two days in filing a review petition a fit case for condonation under the Limitation Act when the party has been pursuing remedies in good faith?
  • At what point does an allottee under the Rehabilitation Scheme become a 'confirmed allottee' for the purpose of inheritance?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din vs Faiz Ahmad and 2 Other1972 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-24
  acquittalself-defencebenefit of doubtsuppression of injurycriminal appealmurderprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal order passed by the Lahore High Court, which had overturned the conviction of the respondents for the murder of the petitioner's son. The core legal questions were whether the High Court erred in accepting the plea of self-defence and whether the accused exceeded that right. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, finding that the prosecution failed to explain a serious injury sustained by one of the accused, which lent credibility to the defence version. Furthermore, the Court held that the prosecution's suppression of this injury and the existence of a motive on the complainant's side created a strong possibility of the truthfulness of the defence. Regarding the plea of self-defence, the Court affirmed that the right to self-defence cannot be measured in golden scales or modulated step-by-step, and the mere disparity in the number of injuries inflicted does not automatically prove an excess of that right. The petition was dismissed, maintaining the benefit of the doubt extended to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to explain injuries on the accused support a plea of self-defence?
  • Can the right of self-defence be measured by the number of injuries inflicted on the deceased versus the accused?
  • Is the right of self-defence lost simply because the accused inflicted more injuries than they received?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Din and 3 Others vs Town Committee Dipalpur1972 SCMR 205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  withdrawal of suitformal defectliberty to file fresh suitpreliminary issuesestoppelmisjoinder of causes of actioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a civil suit seeking a declaration of ownership regarding specific plots and shops, challenging the Town Committee's authority to collect rent. The respondent raised preliminary objections regarding estoppel, misjoinder of causes of action, and inconsistent pleadings. Subsequently, the petitioners sought to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one, citing technical defects. The trial court allowed the withdrawal, but the High Court set aside this order, ruling that the issues raised were substantive rather than formal. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to allow the withdrawal of a suit with permission to file a fresh one based on alleged formal defects. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the issues raised—estoppel, misjoinder, and inconsistent pleas—were not merely formal but went to the root of the case. The Court affirmed that permission to withdraw a suit with liberty to file a fresh one cannot be granted when the defects are substantive rather than formal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court allow the withdrawal of a suit with permission to file a fresh one if the defects in the original suit are substantive rather than formal?
  • Do issues regarding estoppel, misjoinder of causes of action, and inconsistent pleadings constitute formal defects under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Is a trial court's discretion to permit the withdrawal of a suit with liberty to file a fresh one absolute?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad and Others vs Ghulam Haider1972 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-02
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionstranger vendeeconcurrent findings of factsecond appealproprietary rightsjamabandi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core dispute involved whether one of the seven vendees, who was a tenant in possession without payment of rent, should be classified as an 'owner' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, thereby preserving the superior pre-emption rights of the group. The petitioners argued that this status was a question of law. The Supreme Court held that the definition of 'owner' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act refers to a person possessing full proprietary rights, not the definitions found in land revenue statutes or regulations. Since the jamabandi recorded the Provincial Government as the owner, the lower courts' finding of fact was conclusive and not subject to interference in second appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that when vendees associate with a stranger in a purchase, they lose their superior right of pre-emption, especially where the sale consideration is paid in a lump sum without specified individual contributions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'owner' in the Punjab Pre-emption Act include a tenant in possession without payment of rent?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership status in a second appeal?
  • Does the association of a stranger in a land purchase result in the loss of superior pre-emption rights for the other vendees?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs The State1972 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-05
  criminal petitioncheatingimpersonationmutation proceedingslambardarrigorous imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by the petitioner, a Lambardar, challenging his conviction under sections 419, 420 read with 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's identification of an impostor during mutation proceedings, which resulted in the purchaser being deceived into buying property, constituted an innocent act or criminal culpability. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's identification of the impostor were supported by evidence, specifically the testimony of the purchaser. The Court concluded that the identification was not innocent and that it directly deceived the purchaser. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentences of rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the identification of an impostor before a Patwari during mutation proceedings amount to cheating under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding criminal identification warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a Lambardar liable for abetment and cheating when identifying a fraudulent vendor to a purchaser?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rashid vs Abdul Ali and Another1972 SCMR 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-31
  auction salepublic auctionsuo motu revisionlocus standievacuee propertyrevisional jurisdictionsettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed a writ petition against the decision of a Settlement Commissioner setting aside an auction sale of a share in Qadiria Flour Mills. The core legal questions were whether the auction was invalid due to lack of due publicity and whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the authority to set aside the auction. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, affirming that the question of whether due publicity was given is primarily a question of fact, which had been resolved against the petitioner. The Court held that even if the respondents lacked standing to challenge the auction, the Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction by exercising suo motu revisional powers under the relevant statute once the irregularities were brought to his notice. The key principle laid down is that a Settlement Commissioner, upon becoming aware of irregular auction proceedings, is empowered to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to ensure compliance with prescribed procedures, regardless of the standing of the initial complainants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner exercise suo motu revisional powers upon learning of irregularities in an auction process?
  • Is the determination of whether due publicity was given for a public auction a question of fact?
  • Does a person who is not an applicant for the transfer of evacuee property have locus standi to challenge its disposal by public auction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahman vs Gadat Khan and 3 Other1972 SCMR 676 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-20
  free fightright of private defenceindividual liabilitybenefit of doubtacquittal set asideland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave was filed against a High Court judgment acquitting the three respondents of charges under Sections 302, 307, and 325 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a fatal armed clash over disputed agricultural land. The High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that it was impossible to ascertain which party fired first, thereby extending the benefit of doubt. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether, in a case of a mutual free fight, the inability to determine which party initiated firing entitles the accused to an acquittal or whether participants remain individually liable for their acts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and convicted the respondents based on ocular and medical evidence. The Court held that in a mutual free fight where both parties anticipate resistance and knowingly engage in a trial of strength, no right of private defence arises, and failure to prove who struck first does not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt; each participant is individually liable for their specific criminal acts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence is available to participants in a mutual free fight?
  • Does the inability to establish which party struck first in a free fight entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Whether participants in a mutual free fight are individually liable for their respective acts?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah vs The Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan, Lahore and Other1972 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-12-12
  occupancy tenancyevacuee propertyredemption of mortgagePunjab Alienation of Land Actagricultural tribeusufructuary mortgageCustodian of Evacuee Property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal regarding the redemption of occupancy tenancy lands mortgaged to Hindu mortgagees who subsequently migrated to India, vesting their rights in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an occupancy tenant, could retrospectively invoke the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, to convert existing mortgages into usufructuary mortgages by claiming a change in tribal status to "Gujars." The Supreme Court held that the relief provided by the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, is not available to those who were not members of an agricultural tribe at the time the mortgage was created. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the conversion of a mortgage under the Act is not automatic and requires a formal application, which was not timely filed. Additionally, the Court affirmed that ex parte proceedings conducted without notice to the Custodian of Evacuee Property are not binding on the Custodian. The petition was dismissed, maintaining that the petitioner must redeem the property through payment of dues.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefits of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 be claimed retrospectively by a person who was not a member of an agricultural tribe at the time of the mortgage?
  • Is the conversion of a mortgage into a usufructuary mortgage under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 an automatic process?
  • Are ex parte proceedings regarding property rights binding on the Custodian of Evacuee Property if the Custodian was not given notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Khan and Others vs Khalil Ahmad and Other1972 SCMR 332 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-07-03
  limitationcondonation of delaycivil procedureleave to appealLetters Patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was challenged on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question addressed is whether a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal can be condoned when the petitioner fails to provide a sufficient explanation for the period between receiving the refusal of a certificate under the Letters Patent and the actual filing of the petition. The Court held that the petition was barred by 248 days and dismissed it accordingly. The ratio of the decision emphasizes that while the time spent obtaining a certificate for appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent may be condoned, the petitioner must demonstrate continuous diligence and provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Court established the principle that delay in civil matters is not to be lightly excused, as the lapse of time creates valuable rights for the opposing party that cannot be arbitrarily extinguished. Consequently, without a valid explanation for the specific period of delay, the petition was rejected as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal run from the date of the judgment in second appeal?
  • Can delay in filing a petition be condoned if the petitioner fails to explain the entire period of delay?
  • Is delay in civil matters to be lightly excused by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs THS State1972 PLD Supreme Court 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-25
  interim bailpost-arrest bailscope of Section 498 CrPCcommitment for trialmurderidentification paradereasonable grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an interim bail application arising from a murder case where the appellant was identified solely by the hair of his head during an identification parade. The Supreme Court addressed the legal complexities surrounding the scope of bail after commitment for trial in offences punishable with death or transportation for life, and the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court examined whether Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is merely ancillary and subsidiary to Sections 496 and 497, or if it confers independent, residuary, and supplementary powers upon superior courts. Noting a lack of judicial uniformity and questioning the correctness of the majority view in a prior precedent, the court referred several key questions regarding the scope of bail powers and committing magistrates' discretion to a Full Court for authoritative determination.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct scope of section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whether it is ancillary or subsidiary to sections 496 and 497 in all respects?
  • Does section 498 confer a supplementary and residual power on the superior courts, namely the Sessions Court and the High Court, which is not available to other criminal courts?
  • What precisely is the scope of the phrase that the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial under section 210(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as contrasted with section 497?
  • Does the committing Magistrate have the power to grant bail even after he decides to commit the accused person for his trial for an offence punishable with death or transportation for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rahman vs Khuda Bakhsh and 2 Other1972 SCMR 403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-25
  evacuee propertyauction confirmationcondonation of delayagreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIlimitationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from writ proceedings wherein the High Court set aside an order of the Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal questions pertained to whether an appeal filed after an inordinate delay of five years could be entertained by the Settlement Commissioner without examining sufficient cause for condonation, and whether an agreement of association submitted prior to the confirmation of an auction was legally valid. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the Settlement Commissioner erred in concluding that limitation did not apply and in failing to evaluate whether sufficient grounds existed to condone the five-year delay. The Court further noted that no legal provision prohibited the acceptance of an agreement of association after an auction but before its confirmation, provided it was submitted before the statutory deadline. Consequently, the petitioner's belated challenge after losing ejectment proceedings was unjustified, and the leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate authority under settlement laws can entertain an appeal filed after five years without considering condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is an agreement of association submitted after an auction but before its confirmation legally valid if filed within the prescribed statutory cutoff date?
  • Can a party challenge an auction confirmation in settlement proceedings after failing to raise such objections in prior rent controller proceedings resulting in eviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs The State And 7 Other1972 SCMR 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-09
  transfer of casereasonable apprehensionbias of judgefair trialcriminal procedurejudicial impartiality
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal case pending against him under Sections 376, 368, 346, and 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from the court of a Magistrate in Gujranwala. The transfer application, filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was based on the allegation that the trial Magistrate was the nephew of one Mirza Azam Beg, against whom the petitioner had previously testified. The High Court dismissed the transfer application, finding the allegations unsubstantiated. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court observed that if the petitioner could prove he had indeed testified against the Magistrate's uncle, it would create a reasonable apprehension in the petitioner's mind regarding the fairness of the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the current petition but granted the petitioner liberty to renew the transfer application before the High Court, provided he submits a certified copy of his previous statement against the Magistrate's relative to substantiate his claim of bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does a familial relationship between a trial Magistrate and a person against whom the accused has testified constitute sufficient grounds for the transfer of a case?
  • Can a transfer application be renewed before the High Court if new evidence substantiating the grounds for transfer is produced?
  • What is the standard for determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias exists in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim Moosa vs Mohini Bai and 2 Other1972 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  evacuee propertyspecific performanceCustodian jurisdictionland acquisitionnon-evacuee propertyDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had dismissed his writ petition challenging the Custodian's refusal to approve an agreement for the sale of agricultural land. The petitioner had entered into an agreement to purchase land from respondent No. 1, who subsequently migrated to India without completing the transaction. The core legal question was whether the Custodian retained jurisdiction to approve the sale agreement after the property had been acquired by the Government. The Supreme Court held that because the property in dispute had been acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, via a notification dated 8th June 1960, it had ceased to be evacuee property. Consequently, the Custodian lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity or approval of the sale agreement. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that once property loses its character as evacuee property through government acquisition, the Custodian's authority over it terminates. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Custodian retain jurisdiction to approve a sale agreement regarding property that has been acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does property acquired by the Government under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, cease to be evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim and Another vs Muhammad Salim and 3 Other1972 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-01
  evacuee propertycivil court jurisdictioninheritance of evacuee landrehabilitation settlement schemedisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil petition for leave to appeal regarding the inheritance of evacuee land allotted under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme to a widow, Mst. Bago, who died in 1955 prior to the conferment of permanent rights. The core legal question is whether civil courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance disputes relating to evacuee land held by a deceased allottee before permanent settlement rights are conferred. The Supreme Court held that as long as the land retains its evacuee character, the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under section 12 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1948, and section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that ordinary civil courts have no jurisdiction to entertain inheritance claims over unconferred evacuee properties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance disputes concerning evacuee land held by a deceased allottee before the conferment of permanent rights?
  • Does land allotted under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme retain its evacuee character prior to the conferment of permanent rights under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Is the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts barred in matters relating to evacuee property under the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1948?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Karim Alias Karim Khan vs The State1972 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-04-24
  murder convictionreversal of acquittaleye-witness testimonyballistic evidenceappellate interferenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Abdul Karim, was tried for the murder of Nur Aslam Khan, a Sub-Inspector of Police, following a dispute over the construction of a wall. The trial court acquitted the appellant, disbelieving the prosecution witnesses on conjectural grounds regarding their presence and credibility. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial court had erred in rejecting the testimony of natural eye-witnesses based on hypothetical reasoning. The Court emphasized that the eye-witnesses were truthful and consistent, and their testimony was further corroborated by forensic evidence, specifically the ballistic report confirming that the crime shell matched the appellant's licensed rifle. The judgment establishes that the rejection of eye-witness testimony by a trial court must be based on solid evidence rather than conjecture, and that natural witnesses present at the scene of a crime should not be disregarded merely due to minor discrepancies or the trial court's speculative doubts about their ability to hear or witness the incident.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court reject the testimony of eye-witnesses based on purely conjectural grounds?
  • Is the recovery of a crime empty matching a licensed weapon sufficient corroborative evidence in a murder trial?
  • Are labourers working at the scene of a crime considered natural witnesses whose testimony should be credited?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar Khan vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner (L), Multan and 2 Other1972 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-10-02
  property disputemutationinheritancesettlement commissionercivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a property dispute concerning land allotted to Mst. Ummat-un-Nisa after migration to Pakistan, which was subsequently mutated in favor of the petitioner, Abdul Jabbar Khan, upon her death in 1959. The mutation was challenged by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who claimed to be the real brothers of the deceased. After various proceedings before revenue and settlement authorities, the Additional Settlement Commissioner held that the respondents were entitled to half the property. The petitioner's writ petition and subsequent Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the jurisdiction of authorities under the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the factual determination of heirship. The Supreme Court held that the officers passing the impugned orders exercised jurisdiction under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, rendering the petitioner's technical objection untenable, and that the question of heirship being a question of fact could be agitated through a civil suit. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an officer exercising dual jurisdiction under the Punjab Land Revenue Act is without jurisdiction on technical grounds?
  • Can a disputed question of fact regarding heirship and being real brothers be challenged through a civil suit?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding inheritance by revenue authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hayee vs The State And Another1972 SCMR 473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-14
  quashing of criminal proceedingsparallel civil and criminal litigationstay of criminal proceedingsownership disputecriminal trial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Sections 379 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought to stay criminal proceedings on the basis that a parallel civil suit regarding ownership of the disputed property (a truck) was pending, arguing that the criminal court should stay its hands when the core issues overlap. The High Court, while noting the criminal and civil matters were not identical, directed that the criminal trial proceed but ordered the criminal court to withhold judgment until the civil suit was decided. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings. The holding affirms that where civil and criminal proceedings coexist, the criminal court may continue its trial, provided that the final judgment is deferred until the civil court resolves the underlying dispute, thereby preventing conflicting outcomes while ensuring the criminal process is not prematurely terminated.

  Questions settled

  • Should criminal proceedings be quashed merely because a civil suit regarding the same property is pending?
  • Is a criminal court required to stay its proceedings when a civil suit involving the same subject matter is ongoing?
  • Can a criminal court proceed with a trial while deferring the announcement of judgment pending the outcome of a civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haq vs The Government of Pakistan through the Chief1972 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-05-09
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiesdelegated powerstransfer of propertyfraudsecond appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's second appeal regarding the transfer of evacuee property. The dispute concerns property acquired by the Central Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, an occupant, had previously withdrawn his claim in favour of respondent No. 2 before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, who possessed delegated powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner's withdrawal of his claim was procured by fraud and whether the Assistant Settlement Commissioner lacked the delegated authority to transfer the property. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' findings, concluding that no fraud was proven regarding the petitioner's statement. Furthermore, the Court found that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner was indeed acting with the delegated powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner at the time of the transfer, as confirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the transfer of the property was valid and legally competent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit be maintained to challenge the transfer of evacuee property after the settlement hierarchy has finalized the matter?
  • Does the lack of delegated powers in a Settlement Commissioner vitiate the transfer of evacuee property?
  • Is a statement withdrawing a claim for property transfer binding if the allegation of fraud is not proven?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid vs The State1972 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-03-06
  review petitiongrave and sudden provocationmanslaughterdeath sentenceself-defensegeneral amnestymercy petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a petitioner seeking review of his conviction and death sentence. The petitioner argued that scattered wares in his shop and blood found on the road indicated an offensive intrusion by the complainant party, which constituted grave and sudden provocation, thereby reducing his offense to manslaughter. He also contended that his death sentence was disproportionate given the sudden and unpremeditated nature of the crime. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised to support the new plea of provocation had already been considered and rejected under the pleas of self-defense and sudden fight during the leave petition. The Court observed that no apparent error on the face of the record existed to justify reopening the case in review jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court noted that while the sudden nature of the incident did not alter the offense of murder due to the cruelty of inflicting four knife blows, such factors could be considered by executive authorities in a mercy petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new plea of grave and sudden provocation be raised in a review petition if the underlying factual circumstances were already considered and rejected under other pleas during the leave petition?
  • What constitutes a sufficient ground or error apparent on the face of the record to justify reopening a criminal case under the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction?
  • Does the filing of a review petition before the Supreme Court act as a legal impediment to the executive commutation of a death sentence under a general amnesty?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid vs Mumtaz Hussain and Another1972 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-02-29
  wilful defaultejectment proceedingsstatutory tenantrent controlconcurrent findings of factDisplaced Persons Actnotice to quit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondents against the petitioner, a statutory tenant, on grounds of wilful default in rent payment and personal use. The core legal questions concerned whether the petitioner committed wilful default in paying rent and the determination of the correct rent amount payable for the premises. The respondents had issued notices under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which the petitioner failed to satisfy. Following a series of proceedings, the Rent Controller and the first appellate court concurrently found that the petitioner had committed wilful default, thereby losing the protection afforded by section 30 of the Act. The High Court, in the second appeal, affirmed these concurrent findings of fact regarding the wilful default and the validity of the notices, while adjusting the rent rate based on subsequent revisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the disputes between the parties were concluded by concurrent findings of fact and that no substantial question of law remained for consideration. The judgment reinforces the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding wilful default in rent payment are generally not subject to interference in further appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant lose the protection of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, upon committing wilful default in rent payment?
  • Can a defect in a notice regarding the rate of rent be cured by a subsequent valid notice?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding wilful default in rent payment reviewable by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hamid Khan vs Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division1972 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-15
  settlement of propertylimitation periodrevision petitiondisplaced personstransfer of propertyindependent residential unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner acted lawfully in entertaining and accepting a revision petition filed by the petitioner, Abdul Hamid Khan, years after the original order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 10 December 1959, which had transferred the disputed property as a single unit to other claimants. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the petitioner's revision petition was hopelessly barred by limitation without any valid explanation for the delay. Furthermore, the Court held that the petitioner could not claim preference over the existing claimants because the portion of the property in his possession had never been legally partitioned or treated as an independent residential unit by a competent settlement authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the property remained a single unit and the belated revision was unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revision petition be entertained by a Settlement Commissioner when it is filed years after the original order without a valid explanation for the delay?
  • Does a claimant have a right to claim preference over other claimants for a portion of a property that has not been declared an independent residential unit by a competent authority?
  • Is a property that has been treated as a single unit by a settlement authority subject to being split based on a belated claim by an occupant?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 21972 SCMR 465 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-11-22
  settlement departmenttransfer of propertyestoppellacheswrit petitioncontractual obligation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the transfer of the National Cotton Factory, Khanpur, which was auctioned and subsequently transferred to the petitioner upon his voluntary offer to match the highest bid price. The core legal question is whether the petitioner can retract from a contractual price he voluntarily agreed to pay to the Settlement Department after enjoying possession and making part payments for six years. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner is legally estopped from challenging the price he bound himself to pay and that his challenge was further barred by laches. The key principle laid down is that a party who voluntarily enters into an agreement to purchase property from a government department, takes possession, and remains silent for years cannot subsequently turn around and challenge the agreed price under the guise of statutory violation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the price of a property transferred by the Settlement Department after voluntarily agreeing to it and making part payments for six years?
  • Does a writ petition challenging a voluntary contract with a state department suffer from laches after a prolonged delay?
  • Is a party estopped from retracting from a bid price offered to oust another purchaser in property transfer proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs S. Ali Zulqarnain1972 SCMR 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-02
  in limine dismissalabuse of powersummary trialtransfer applicationprocedural illegalityjudicial misconductconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the High Court’s summary dismissal in limine of a petition filed under Article 123 of the Constitution of 1962. The appellant alleged that a Magistrate, acting in a dual capacity as the complainant and the judge, convicted him summarily for an offence under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, without recording evidence or examining the accused, and ignored a transfer application. The High Court dismissed the petition, characterizing it as a personal grievance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misread the petition, which raised serious allegations of abuse of power and procedural illegality. The Court ruled that where a petition contains substantial allegations of judicial misconduct and disregard for mandatory legal provisions, it cannot be dismissed in limine without investigation. The Supreme Court emphasized that courts must investigate claims regarding the failure to follow mandatory procedural requirements, such as adjourning for a transfer application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the necessity of recording evidence even in summary proceedings. The case was remanded for proper disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court dismiss a petition in limine when it contains serious allegations of abuse of power and procedural illegality?
  • Is a Magistrate required to adjourn proceedings under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon the filing of a transfer application?
  • Does a conviction recorded without examining the accused or recording the substance of evidence in summary proceedings violate the law?
  • Can a Magistrate who is the ex officio Chairman of a Municipal Committee try a case where the complaint was lodged by the Municipal Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Aziz vs Aziz Ul Haq1972 SCMR 296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1972-06-29
  pre-emptiondeposit of zar-e-punjamextension of timevalid tenderdefault in deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision by the High Court, which upheld the trial court's finding that the pre-emptor had made a valid deposit of the pre-emption money. The respondent filed a suit for possession through pre-emption and was ordered by the trial court under section 22(1) of the Pre-emption Act to deposit one-fifth of the probable value of the land. Although the actual physical deposit into the bank occurred one day after the extended deadline due to the bank closing early, the respondent had obtained the challan and made a bona fide effort to deposit the amount within the stipulated time. The core legal question was whether the delayed physical deposit constituted a default under the statute. The Supreme Court held that the respondent made a valid tender and sufficient compliance with the court's order by attempting to deposit the amount in time, thus committing no default. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to physically deposit pre-emption money on the exact date due to early bank closure constitute a default when a valid effort to deposit was made?
  • Whether obtaining a challan and attempting to make a deposit within time amounts to sufficient compliance with a court order under the Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Zil Muhammad and 3 Others vs Mst. Hayat Bibi and 2 Other1971 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-11
  limitationdeclaratory suitoccupancy rightscustomary lawinheritance mutationleave to appealLetters Patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from a dispute over occupancy rights in agricultural land, originally held by a predecessor-in-title under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. Following the death of a co-tenant, his share devolved upon his daughter, the respondent, under customary law, subject to her marriage. Despite her marriage in 1944, she remained in possession and received produce, leading the appellants' predecessor to file a suit in 1957 for a declaration of ownership and ejectment. The trial court decreed the suit, but the District Judge and the High Court dismissed it as time-barred. The Supreme Court examined whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and whether time spent pursuing a certificate for a Letters Patent appeal could be excluded. The Court held that the cause of action accrued in 1944, rendering the 1957 suit time-barred. Furthermore, the Court held that even if time spent in certificate proceedings could be excluded, the appellants failed to explain the delay in filing, resulting in the rescission of the leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the limitation period for a declaratory suit under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When does the cause of action accrue for a suit challenging an inheritance mutation based on a change in marital status?
  • Can time spent pursuing an application for a certificate for a Letters Patent appeal be excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Zarin Khan and Another vs The Crown1971 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-11-01
  murderprivate defensegrave and sudden provocationexcessive forcecriminal appealconfessionevidence-based findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants for the murder of an intruder, Ghulam Jan, whom the appellants claimed they mistook for a burglar. The appellants confessed to the killing, asserting they acted in defense of their property. The lower court had rejected the burglary theory, instead speculating that the deceased was killed due to an illicit affair, and subsequently rejected a plea of grave and sudden provocation. The Supreme Court held that the lower court’s factual findings regarding the motive were based on conjecture rather than evidence. However, the Court affirmed the conviction for murder, ruling that the force employed—repeated rifle shots and multiple weapon injuries—was grossly disproportionate to the necessity of defending property. The Court established that where the volume and degree of force used against an intruder are entirely out of proportion to the threat, the act cannot be mitigated by the right of private defense or exceptions to murder. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the sentences were maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court base its findings of fact on conjecture regarding the motive of the deceased?
  • Does the use of excessive force against an intruder negate the right of private defense?
  • Is the killing of an intruder who is shot multiple times and beaten with weapons considered murder under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  Read full judgment →
• Zardad vs The State1971 SCMR 606 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-25
  private defenceculpable homicidemurdercriminal appealproportionality of forceappreciation of evidencetransportation for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of a police officer for the murders of two brothers. The appellant claimed he acted in self-defence after being attacked by the deceased party. The trial court convicted the appellant for both murders, sentencing him to death. The High Court subsequently altered the conviction regarding one victim to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part 1, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and commuted the sentence for the second murder to transportation for life. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant’s plea of private defence was substantiated. The Court held that the right of private defence is a question of fact and found no evidence of a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt that would justify the use of a firearm against unarmed or minimally armed individuals. The Court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing that the force used was disproportionate to any threat faced. Although the Court expressed reservations regarding the leniency of the commuted sentence, it declined to interfere in the absence of a state appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defence justify the use of a firearm against an unarmed person?
  • Is the determination of the existence of a right of private defence a question of fact?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a commuted sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State?
  • Does the use of force in self-defence require a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahid Ali vs The Crown1971 SCMR 187 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1955-06-03
  circumstantial evidencecriminal conspiracycheatingforgerybenefit of doubtappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave challenged the conviction of the appellant, a government desk clerk at a bank, under sections 120-B and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code for conspiracy and cheating in connection with forged government bills. The core legal question was whether the entirely circumstantial evidence adduced was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish that the appellant had handled the forged bills or that he was involved in any conspiracy, noting that the evidence pointed equally to irregularities by senior bank officers and that the lower appellate court had misconstrued the record by confusing the appellant's case with that of his co-accused. The Court laid down the principle that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained where the links connecting the accused to the crime are mere assumptions and where alternative hypotheses consistent with innocence, such as the oversight of superior officers, are equally plausible. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the appellant acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence be sustained where the missing links in the chain of evidence are mere assumptions?
  • Whether an accused clerk can be held liable for bank fraud in the absence of proof that the fraudulent documents passed through his hands.
  • Does the presence of irregularities in official records by itself justify an inference of criminal conspiracy against a subordinate employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafarullah Khan and 7 Others vs Abdul Rehman and 4 Other1971 SCMR 702 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-18
  mesne profitsinterim ordersecurity for mesne profitsleave to appealreceiversupreme court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, which directed the petitioners to furnish security for mesne profits in the sum of Rs. 5,000 per annum as a condition for setting aside the appointment of a Receiver during the pendency of the suit. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with interim orders regarding the estimation of mesne profits and furnishing of security in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that interim orders of this nature ought not to be interfered with in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, and found no merits to differ with the High Court's estimation of mesne profits. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with discretionary interim orders relating to security for mesne profits passed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with interim orders regarding the furnishing of security for mesne profits in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction?
  • Can an interim order setting aside the appointment of a Receiver subject to furnishing security be challenged through a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Yusuf Ali Khan vs The State1971 PLD Supreme Court 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  review petitioncontempt of courtbias of judgeapologyerror apparent on the face of the recordsupreme court rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two review petitions filed against an earlier decision of the Supreme Court dismissing criminal appeals arising from contempt of court proceedings. The petitioner argued several grounds, including an objection to a member of the bench hearing the review because he had initially signed a show-cause notice in a separate matter, the refusal of an adjournment to engage another counsel, the alleged omission to consider certain precedents, and observations made regarding his suitability as a member of the Bar. The Supreme Court held that a judge issuing a show-cause notice in the administration of justice does not acquire a personal interest disqualifying them from hearing the case under the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, review in criminal proceedings is restricted to errors apparent on the face of the record, and none of the grounds urged warranted a review of the judgment. The Court affirmed that what another bench did in different circumstances is irrelevant, and dismissed both review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge become personally disqualified from hearing a case merely because they previously directed the issuance of a show-cause notice for contempt in a different matter?
  • What are the permissible grounds for reviewing a judgment in a criminal proceeding before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a court bound to refer to every judgment cited at the Bar during the hearing of an appeal?
  • Can the refusal of a High Court to accept an apology in contempt proceedings be interfered with by the Supreme Court where cogent reasons have been provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Yousaf Khan and 10 Others vs Chairman, Border Area Committee, Narowal, District Sialkot and 6 Other1971 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-16
  Border Area Committeejudicial reviewLetters Patent Appealrehabilitation and settlementland restorationimmunity from challenge
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, who originally owned lands in Tehsil Shakargarh that were lost due to river erosion and subsequently restored to Pakistan, sought the restoration of their original lands after having been allotted alternative lands under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme. Their request was rejected by the Border Area Committee, and their subsequent writ petition and Letters Patent Appeal were dismissed by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the premise that the Committee's orders were immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court, relying on established precedents, clarified that while orders passed by the Border Area Committee before June 8, 1962, are immune from challenge, orders passed on or after that date are subject to judicial scrutiny. As the record did not clearly establish the date of the impugned order, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case. The High Court was directed to determine the date of the Committee's order and, if passed on or after June 8, 1962, to adjudicate the matter on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Are orders passed by the Border Area Committee on or after June 8, 1962, immune from judicial review?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to examine the validity of an order passed by the Border Area Committee after June 8, 1962?
  • What is the legal status of orders passed by the Border Area Committee prior to June 8, 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqub Khan vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Lahore and Another1971 SCMR 679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-26
  settlement lawland allotmentfalse pretencequestion of factspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his revision petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the cancellation of land allotted to him under Claim Form No. 10855 by the Settlement Commissioner (Lands) acting under sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Settlement authorities found that the petitioner was not related to the original claimant, Samey Singh, and had procured the land on a false pretence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding the petitioner's relationship with the deceased claimant. The Supreme Court held that the relationship was a question of fact determined on a valid appreciation of the record, notably the pedigree-table from India, and no question of law arose under section 21 of the Act to warrant interference in revision. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the cancellation applied solely to the property obtained via Claim Form No. 10855, leaving other claims intact. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of relationship between a claimant and a deceased landowner is a question of fact?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact regarding land settlement claims where no question of law arises?
  • Does the cancellation of property obtained under a specific claim form affect other independent property claims of the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Road Transport Board, Lahore vs Income Tax Officer, Companies Ward VI, Lahore and 2 Other1971 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28
  writ jurisdictionstay of recoveryseizin of courtfunctus officiotax assessmentpublic utilitydismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for a stay of tax realization filed by the West Pakistan Road Transport Board against the Income-tax Department. The Board, having failed to secure a stay from revenue authorities and having had its writ petition dismissed in limine by the High Court without recorded reasons, sought relief from the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court could entertain a miscellaneous petition for stay of tax recovery while the underlying writ petition remained pending in the High Court, specifically where the High Court had not yet issued a signed, sealed judgment. The Supreme Court held that it could not entertain the stay application because the High Court retained seizin of the matter until it became functus officio upon the delivery of a final judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court cannot interfere while proceedings are pending in the High Court. The key principle established is that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution is triggered only by a judgment, decree, or order of the High Court, and it lacks authority to intervene in ongoing High Court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court entertain a miscellaneous petition for stay of tax recovery while the underlying writ petition remains pending in the High Court?
  • At what point does a High Court become functus officio regarding a pending matter?
  • Is a short order dismissing a writ petition in limine without recorded reasons appropriate in civil matters?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Land Commission, Lahore and 2 Others vs Fateh Ullah1971 PLD Supreme Court 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  land reformsdelegation of powersrevisional jurisdictionretroactive legislationgift under Muslim lawdelivery of possessionsuo motu revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an action under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959 regarding gifts of agricultural land made by a big landowner to his heirs. The Deputy Land Commissioner recommended cancellation of the mutation entries as void under the Regulation, but the Land Commissioner upheld them. Subsequently, the Chief Land Commissioner revised and set aside that order suo motu. The High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition, holding that the Land Commissioner's exercise of delegated authority exhausted the power and could not be revised by a co-ordinate delegatee. During the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVI of 1970 was promulgated with retrospective effect, making orders passed under delegated powers subject to appeal, review, or revision. The Supreme Court held that the amending Ordinance retroactively validated the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the Chief Land Commissioner, thereby neutralizing the High Court's judgment. However, because the Chief Land Commissioner had failed to properly examine the evidence regarding the completion of gifts and delivery of possession to the various donees under Muslim Law, the Supreme Court set aside the matter and remanded the case for a fresh hearing and decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by an authority in exercise of delegated powers under the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation of 1959 is subject to appeal or revision by a co-ordinate authority?
  • Does the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance No. XXVI of 1970 operate retrospectively?
  • Is physical delivery of possession necessary for the completion of a gift of land by a donor to his resident daughters and son under Muslim Law?
  Read full judgment →
• Wasibullah vs The State1971 SCMR 101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  dacoitydying declarationwitness recognitioncriminal appealcorroborationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a conviction and sentence under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a dacoity incident resulting in death. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred in relying on the testimony of a witness whose recognition of other co-accused was doubted, and that the dying declaration was unreliable due to prior enmity and discrepancies in the time of recording. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound. It affirmed that the testimony of a witness regarding the recognition of an accused can be relied upon if corroborated by other reliable evidence, such as a dying declaration. Furthermore, the Court held that a dying declaration, provided by a declarant in full senses, remains credible despite prior enmity, especially when the declarant demonstrates honesty by admitting limitations in their recognition. The Court concluded that the dying declaration, corroborated by earlier statements made to household members, provided sufficient grounds to sustain the conviction, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness's testimony regarding the recognition of an accused be relied upon if their recognition of other co-accused was doubted?
  • Does prior enmity between a deceased and an accused automatically invalidate a dying declaration?
  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by earlier statements made to witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Wasi Ahmed Rizvi vs The Government of Pakistan through the Ministry1971 SCMR 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionservice matterlachespromotiondelay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought review of the Supreme Court's order dismissing his appeal against the High Court's refusal of a writ regarding a service complaint concerning denial of promotion and higher pay scale dating back to 1952. The core legal question was whether the finding of laches should be reviewed in light of new material showing no disruption to intervening departmental arrangements. The Supreme Court held that while additional documents presented in the review petition could have affected the finding of laches, the review petition itself must be dismissed, leaving it open to the Government to reconsider the petitioner's case in accordance with the Court's interpretation. The key principle laid down is that delay or laches may be evaluated against evidence showing that granting relief would not upset settled departmental arrangements, though established court findings on limitation and laches are not casually displaced on review without prior presentation of such material.

  Questions settled

  • Can a finding of laches be reconsidered in a review petition based on new material showing absence of disruption to intervening arrangements?
  • Does the pendency of departmental representations justify a prolonged delay in filing a constitutional writ petition?
  • Is it open to the Government to reconsider a service grievance in light of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court despite the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Wasi Ahmad Rizvi vs Pakistan through the Ministry of Defence1971 SCMR 309 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-07-11
  service lawwrit jurisdictionlachespay fixationattached departmentcivil servantequitable relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a writ petition filed by a civilian employee of the Naval Headquarters challenging the denial of promotion and pay fixation benefits under Rule 8(a) of the Central (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1949. The core legal questions concerned whether the appellant’s department constituted an "Attached Department" and whether he was entitled to the pay scale of an Assistant under the 1949 Rules. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s department was indeed an "Attached Department" and that the 1949 Rules were applicable to his service conditions. However, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal on the ground of laches. The Court determined that the appellant had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in challenging government orders issued in 1955 and 1957. The principle established is that even where a petitioner possesses a valid substantive claim regarding service rights, the court will decline to exercise its equitable writ jurisdiction if there has been inordinate, unexplained delay that would cause irreparable administrative disruption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of laches bar a writ petition challenging service-related administrative orders after a significant, unexplained delay?
  • Can a department be considered an 'Attached Department' for the purpose of service rules based on historical administrative directories despite later definitions in the Rules of Business?
  • Is a government employee entitled to the pay scale of a higher post under Rule 8(a) of the Central (Non-Gazetted) Civil Services (Revision of Pay) Rules, 1949, if they have been approved for promotion but no vacancy exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Waryam and 3 Others vs The State and Another1971 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-19
  bail after commitmentmurder trialdelay in trialseparation of trialsbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, committed to stand trial under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against the High Court's order setting aside their bail granted by the Sessions Judge. The core legal question was whether the delay in the trial caused by waiting for commitment proceedings of a co-accused justifies granting bail to the petitioners after commitment. The Supreme Court held that once a person is committed to stand trial, they are not ordinarily entitled to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as reasonable grounds exist to believe they are guilty of an offense punishable with death or transportation for life. The Court laid down the principle that instead of granting bail on the ground of delay caused by a co-accused, the trial court should either expedite the inquiry against the co-accused or separate their case and proceed with the trial of the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person committed to stand trial ordinarily entitled to bail under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the delay caused by waiting for commitment proceedings of a co-accused justify granting bail to the petitioners?
  • What procedure should a Sessions Judge adopt if the inquiry against a co-accused is likely to be delayed?
  Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad Alias Walia vs Haq Nawaz and 3 Other1971 SCMR 717 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-29
  police investigationjurisdiction of High CourtLetters Patentcriminal investigationtransfer of investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenges two orders of the High Court of West Pakistan, which passed an interim order and subsequently dismissed the appellant's miscellaneous application regarding the High Court's interference in a police investigation. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction under clause 22 of the Letters Patent or any other law to interfere with or direct the transfer of a police investigation conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held, following its precedent in Shahnaz Begum v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, that the High Court possesses no such power under clause 22 of the Letters Patent, the Constitution, or any other law to interfere with an investigation conducted by competent agencies. Consequently, the High Court's interim order was declared without jurisdiction and set aside, establishing that superior courts cannot lawfully interfere with or direct police investigations.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under clause 22 of the Letters Patent to interfere with the investigation of a case by a police officer?
  • Can the High Court direct or influence the transfer of a criminal investigation from the local police to another agency?
  Read full judgment →
• Tufail Muhammad Khan Haq Nawaz Khan, Guard, P. W. R., Khanewal and1971 SCMR 688 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-18Read full judgment →
• Tripura Modern Bank Ltd. (Pakistan Zone), Chittagong vs Khan1971 PLD Supreme Court 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-28
  equitable mortgagemunicipal tax salefirst chargeencumbrancecollusive salemortgagee's remedysurplus sale proceeds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a suit for the realization of money based on an equitable mortgage created by deposit of title deeds. The core legal questions involve whether a sale of property for arrears of municipal tax under the Bengal Municipal Act passes the property free from encumbrances, whether the mortgagee's sole remedy is restricted to claiming the surplus sale proceeds under Section 73(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, and whether the lower appellate court properly evaluated the evidence regarding an alleged collusive sale. The Supreme Court held that the Bengal Municipal Act contains no provision making a tax sale free from encumbrances, meaning a purchaser acquires the property subject to a subsisting mortgage, and Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act does not restrict the mortgagee from following the mortgaged property. Furthermore, the High Court erred in reversing the trial court's finding of collusion without considering material circumstances such as gross undervaluation and continued possession. The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does a purchaser of property at a municipal tax sale under section 525 of the Bengal Municipal Act acquire the property free from all encumbrances?
  • Is a mortgagee's only remedy upon the sale of mortgaged property for public charges restricted to claiming the surplus sale proceeds under section 73(1) of the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Does the first charge created for municipal dues under section 167 of the Bengal Municipal Act extinguish a prior equitable mortgage on the property?
  • Can a mortgagee follow and proceed against the mortgaged property directly when it is sold for arrears of municipal taxes?
  Read full judgment →
• THF State THF State vs Rasool Bakhsh Ghulam Abbas1971 SCMR 817 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-12-02
  briberyillegal gratificationtrap evidencepresumption of guiltadmissibility of evidencecorruptioncriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three appeals against High Court orders that set aside convictions for bribery, relying on an erroneous Full Bench ruling regarding the admissibility of statements made during trap proceedings. The core legal questions addressed whether statements made by an accused to a Magistrate during a trap are admissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and when an investigation formally commences in corruption cases. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reliance on the overruled Full Bench decision was incorrect. The Court ruled that statements made to a Magistrate during a trap are admissible and not barred by Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an investigation does not commence merely upon receiving a complaint of a bribe demand. The key principle laid down is that once the prosecution proves the receipt of money by the accused, the statutory presumption of guilt under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958 applies, shifting the burden to the accused to prove the receipt was not illegal gratification.

  Questions settled

  • Are statements made by an accused to a Magistrate during a trap admissible in evidence?
  • Does the investigation of a corruption offence commence upon the initial complaint of a bribe demand?
  • Does the statutory presumption of guilt under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 apply once the receipt of money is proven?
  • Can a statement made by an accused to a Magistrate during a trap be excluded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• The Workers of Bata Shoe Co., Lahore vs Bata Shoe Co., Ltd. and Another1971 PLC 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-19
  industrial disputeworkman definitionillegal strikelock-outforeman statustermination of serviceindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an industrial dispute between the Bata Shoe Company and its workers, challenging an Industrial Court award that rejected most of the workers' demands. The core legal questions concerned whether Foremen qualify as 'workmen' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whether the dismissal of specific employees was justified, and whether the strike of March 27, 1958, constituted an illegal strike or a response to an illegal lock-out. The Supreme Court held that Foremen, whose primary duties involve supervision and control, do not fall within the definition of 'workman' and thus cannot raise industrial disputes regarding their service conditions. The Court further determined that the strike was illegal, as the company’s disciplinary termination of employees did not constitute a 'lock-out' under the Act. Consequently, the Court affirmed the dismissal of employees involved in the illegal strike but ordered the reinstatement of one employee whose transfer was found improper. The judgment establishes that supervisory staff are excluded from the definition of 'workman,' and that disciplinary termination of service does not equate to a 'lock-out.'

  Questions settled

  • Does a Foreman, whose duties involve supervision and control, qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
  • Does the disciplinary termination of an employee's service constitute a 'lock-out' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
  • Can workmen raise an industrial dispute regarding the service conditions of employees in a superior category, such as Foremen?
  • Is a strike declared in response to the disciplinary dismissal of employees considered an illegal strike if it contravenes the notice requirements of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Hamtho1971 SCMR 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1968-09-17
  special procedurecustoms offencecriminal procedure codepolice challanspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan upholding the acquittal of the respondent. The respondent was initially convicted by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. The core legal question was whether police officers could challan and send up persons for trial under the ordinary procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code for offences under the Land Customs Act and Sea Customs Act, or if the special procedure requiring a complaint by a Land Customs Officer under section 7(2) of the Land Customs Act applied. The Supreme Court held that where a statute creates a special offence and prescribes a special procedure for its trial, that specific procedure must be followed to the exclusion of the ordinary procedure. Finding no provision in the Sea Customs Act or Land Customs Act authorising police challans under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment empowering police officers as land customs officers confer the power to send up cases for trial in a manner other than that prescribed by section 7(2) of the Land Customs Act 1924?
  • Must a special procedure laid down by a statute for the trial of a special offence be followed instead of the ordinary procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code?
  • Do police officers have the authority to send up persons accused of contraventions of the Sea Customs Act for trial under a challan under the Criminal Procedure Code?
  Read full judgment →
• The State the State vs Qasim Alias Qassu Abdullah Bhatti and 3 Other1971 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• The State Bank of Pakistan, Dacca vs Sk. Mahboobar Rahman and Another1971 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-06-14
  Foreign Exchange Regulation Actexport proceedsrepatriation of foreign exchangebuyer defaultcriminal liabilityacquittaltrade bills
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with an offense under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act regarding the export of hides to India. The respondent had undertaken to repatriate foreign exchange proceeds through a bank, but the foreign buyer defaulted, and the bills were returned unpaid. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s failure to repatriate foreign exchange proceeds constituted a violation of the Act, specifically regarding the conditions of export and payment realization. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was rightly acquitted. The Court reasoned that the undertaking to deliver foreign exchange proceeds was contingent upon such proceeds being earned. Since the evidence established that no foreign exchange was acquired due to the buyer's default, and there was no proof of delay or receipt of payment through unauthorized channels, no offense was committed. The key principle laid down is that where an exporter has acted in good faith and the failure to repatriate proceeds results solely from a foreign buyer's default, there is no violation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to repatriate foreign exchange proceeds constitute an offense under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act when the foreign buyer defaults on payment?
  • Is an exporter liable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act if no foreign exchange is actually acquired from a transaction?
  • Does the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act prohibit an exporter from receiving payment through authorized banking channels?
  Read full judgment →
• The Province of East Pakistan vs The Province of East Pakistan1971 PLD Supreme Court 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-31
  Wakf Estatesofficial gazettepublication of notificationstate acquisitionrent-receiving interestappeal against dead personsubsequent eventslimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved four civil appeals arising from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan concerning the acquisition of rent-receiving interests in various Wakf Estates by the Province of East Pakistan under section 3(1) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. The core legal questions revolved around whether the acquisition notifications were duly published in the official Gazette before their effective dates, whether subsequent events or general notifications could cure defective initial notifications, and whether an appeal filed against a deceased party could be maintained after a prolonged delay in amending the cause title. The Supreme Court held that mere printing of a notification does not amount to publication; actual communication or issuance to the public in the manner usually adopted is required for a notification to take legal effect on the specified date. The Court further held that a delayed amendment of a cause title against a deceased respondent without sufficient cause renders the appeal time-barred, and the appellant cannot introduce a new general notification at the appellate stage to defeat the plaintiffs' suit. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere printing of a notification constitutes publication in the official Gazette under section 3(1) of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950?
  • Can an appellant rely on a subsequent general notification raised for the first time at the appellate stage to cure a defective initial acquisition notification?
  • Whether an appeal filed against a deceased respondent where the cause title is amended after an unexplained delay of over twelve hundred days is barred by limitation?
  • Does the abrogation of the Constitution of 1956 and the advent of Martial Law abate writ petitions challenging the validity of statutes on the basis of fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• The Custodian, Evacuee Property, West Pakistan vs MRS. Doreen Barkat Ram and Another1971 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1964-01-22
  evacuee propertycustodian of evacuee propertycompromise decreejurisdiction of civil courtsadministration suitwrit of certiorarireview jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a writ petition challenging an order by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, which had reviewed and restored a compromise decree in an administration suit. The respondent, a non-evacuee widow, had obtained a compromise decree in 1948 regarding joint family properties, which were subsequently treated as evacuee property. The core legal question was whether the Custodian possessed the authority to validate a compromise decree passed by a civil court during a period when the civil court's jurisdiction over evacuee property matters had been expressly excluded by statute. The Supreme Court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to pass the compromise decree in 1948 due to the West Punjab Protection of Evacuee Property Act 1948, rendering the decree a nullity. Consequently, the Custodian could not validate an inherently invalid decree under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957. The Court affirmed that statutory provisions excluding civil court jurisdiction over evacuee property are absolute, and the Custodian’s power to approve past decrees does not extend to nullities passed without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Custodian of Evacuee Property have the power to validate a decree passed by a civil court that lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter?
  • Can a compromise decree passed by a civil court regarding evacuee property after the enactment of the West Punjab Protection of Evacuee Property Act 1948 be considered valid?
  • Does the power of the Custodian to approve or accept decrees under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 extend to decrees that were nullities from their inception?
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• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, North Zone, West Pakistan vs MR. Manzur Qadir1971 PTD 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-26
  income taxcash system of accountingannuity bondsmoney's worthprofessional incometax assessmentagency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the taxability of professional fees received by an advocate through annuity bonds. The respondent, an advocate maintaining accounts on a "cash system," arranged for clients to pay his fees by purchasing annuity bonds rather than paying lump sums. The Income-tax Department sought to assess the full value of these bonds as income in the year of purchase. The Supreme Court held that the annuity bonds did not constitute "money's worth" for the entire amount because they were non-transferable, non-saleable, and could not be converted into cash. Consequently, the assessee was not liable to pay tax on the full capital value of the bonds in the year of purchase. The Court affirmed that under the "cash system" of accounting, income is taxable only when actually received. The arrangement did not create an agency relationship between the client and the assessee, nor did it represent a receipt of the full fee amount. The Court concluded that only the annual payments actually received by the assessee were subject to taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an annuity bond that is non-transferable and non-saleable constitute 'money's worth' for the purpose of income tax assessment?
  • Can an assessee maintaining accounts on a 'cash system' be taxed on the full value of an annuity purchased by a client in the year of purchase?
  • Does a client purchasing an annuity bond at the direction of a professional constitute an agent of that professional for the purpose of receiving income?
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• Taj Din vs MRS. Razia Begum Alvi and 2 Others1971 PLD Supreme Court 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-15
  evacuee propertyconfirmation of salecustodianprior approvalallotteenatural justiceres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the West Pakistan High Court which quashed orders of the Custodian of Evacuee Property concerning agricultural land in Lahore. The core legal question involved the interpretation and application of sections 19 and 20 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, regarding the necessity of further confirmation for the sale of restored property after prior approval had been granted by the Custodian, and whether mere allottees had a right to notice in such confirmation proceedings. The Supreme Court held that once the Custodian granted prior approval for the sale under the relevant provisions and the transaction was duly completed and confirmed by the competent authority, no further confirmation under section 20 of the Act was required. The Court further held that mere allottees or licensees of evacuee property have no vested rights and are not necessary parties entitled to statutory notice in confirmation proceedings between the Custodian and the transferee. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether further confirmation under section 20 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 is required for a sale transaction where prior approval of the Custodian was already obtained under section 19?
  • Do mere allottees or licensees of evacuee property possess a vested right entitling them to notice in confirmation proceedings under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?
  • Whether the Custodian of Evacuee Property has the lawful authority to reopen questions of ownership and confirmation after the validity of such transfers has been conclusively upheld by the High Court in writ proceedings?
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• Syed Zahirul Hasnain Mallick Khan Mohammad vs The Commissioner of Karachi and Another the Commissioner of Karachi and Another1971 SCMR 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-22
  probationary periodtermination of servicevested rightNaib-Tehsildarservice rulesconstitutional petitionconfirmation of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, appointed as Naib-Tehsildars in the Lasbela district by the Commissioner of Karachi, challenged the termination of their services. Although the petitioners argued that their appointments were valid under the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962, and that they had completed their probation, the Supreme Court held that the petitions were bound to fail. The Court determined that under Explanation I to Rule 10 of the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962, the petitioners' probationary period was deemed extended because no confirmation orders were issued upon the completion of the initial two-year period. Consequently, as probationers, the petitioners had not acquired a vested right to a substantive appointment, rendering their termination unchallengeable under Article 98 of the late Constitution. The Court dismissed the petitions, noting that while the petitioners' arguments regarding the validity of their initial appointments had merit, they lacked the legal status of confirmed employees to enforce their retention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the completion of a probationary period automatically result in confirmation if no express order is passed?
  • Can a probationer enforce a right to appointment in a substantive capacity under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  • What is the effect of the failure to issue confirmation orders upon the expiry of an initial probationary period under the West Pakistan Tehsildari and Naib-Tehsildari Service Rules, 1962?
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• Syed Zahid Hussain and Others vs Dharmumal and Other1971 SCMR 110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-21
  ReceiverEvacuee PropertyStatus QuoPossessionAlienationKhairpur StateAllotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the appointment of a Receiver over disputed land during the pendency of an appeal. The respondents sought this relief, alleging that the appellants were disposing of parcels of the land and had obtained a status quo order based on false pleas. The appellants had been in possession of the disputed land as allottees since 1949. The Court examined the history of the dispute, noting that the Custodian of Evacuee Property had previously rejected a revision petition regarding the land's status based on an erroneous view regarding the applicability of evacuee laws to the former Khairpur State. The Supreme Court held that, given the appellants' long-standing possession since 1949, it would not be just or proper to appoint a Receiver to disturb that possession. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for a Receiver but issued an injunction restraining the appellants from alienating or encumbering the disputed land until the final disposal of the appeal, while also directing them to expedite the appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate to appoint a Receiver to disturb the possession of long-standing allottees of land during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Can the court restrain parties from alienating or encumbering disputed property during the pendency of an appeal?
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• Syed Sibte Raza and Another vs Habib Bank Ltd.1971 PLD Supreme Court 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-22
  service agreementsecurity depositforfeiture of securityliquidated damagespenaltybreach of contractreasonable compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two civil appeals filed by former bank employees against the dismissal of their suits for the refund of Rs. 2,000 each, which they had deposited as security under a five-year service agreement. Both employees resigned due to illness before completing two years of service, leading the respondent-bank to forfeit their security deposits as liquidated damages under the agreement. The core legal question was whether the bank could forfeit the security deposits under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872 without proving actual loss or damage. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872 does not recognize the English law distinction between liquidated damages and penalties, and its scope includes the forfeiture of deposits. The Court ruled that upon a breach of contract, the aggrieved party is entitled to receive reasonable compensation up to the stipulated limit, regardless of whether actual loss is proved. Since the bank established that it incurred training expenses exceeding the deposit amount, the forfeiture of Rs. 2,000 was neither unconscionable nor excessive.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872 apply to the forfeiture of security deposits already paid by a contracting party?
  • Is an aggrieved party required to prove actual loss or damage to claim reasonable compensation under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • How should a court determine the reasonableness of compensation under Section 74 of the Contract Act 1872 when a specific sum is stipulated in the contract?
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• Syed Sadiq Hussain Shah vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore1971 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-24
  disciplinary proceedingsmisconductpatwarijamabandinatural justicebiaswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Patwari, was discharged from service for gross misconduct after being accused of supplying inconsistent copies of a jamabandi to different parties, which facilitated a land sale contravening Martial Law Regulation No. 62. His departmental appeal and revision were dismissed, and the Lahore High Court subsequently dismissed his writ petition in limine. In the petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of defense, that extraneous material was considered against him without notice, that the charges did not constitute misconduct, and that the inquiry was tainted by bias. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had been afforded sufficient opportunity, that findings of fact by the inquiring authorities regarding his status and record were unassailable in these proceedings, and that mere disagreement with factual findings does not amount to legal bias. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the disciplinary action and the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact regarding departmental misconduct reached by an inquiry officer can be re-agitated in constitutional writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the consideration of a confidential report by an inquiring authority to determine an appropriate penalty vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can mere disagreement with factual findings or an adverse conclusion by an inquiry officer be equated with legal bias affecting quasi-judicial proceedings?
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• Syed Riaz Ali vs Shabbir Ahmad Khan1971 SCMR 598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-24
  evictiondefault in payment of rentlease agreementRent Restriction Ordinancecondonation of delayjudicial discretionEvidence Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a High Court judgment ordering the eviction of a tenant. The tenant had admittedly defaulted in paying monthly rent for ten months, contrary to a written lease agreement specifying monthly payment. The Rent Controller and District Judge had condoned the delay on the ground that the landlord periodically accepted lump-sum rent payments for several months. The core legal question was whether the acceptance of rent in lump sum varied the written lease terms or justified exercising judicial discretion under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance to condone a ten-month default. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's eviction order, holding that under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1872, oral evidence or past acceptance cannot vary a written lease agreement. Furthermore, accepting past rent merely condoned past defaults without altering future payment terms, and a ten-month default could not be judicially condoned.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant adduce evidence of past acceptance of rent in lump sum to vary the payment terms of a written lease agreement?
  • Does a landlord's acceptance of rent for several months together alter the written terms of a lease regarding monthly rent payment?
  • Can the Rent Controller validly exercise judicial discretion under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance to condone a rent default of ten months?
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