Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi vs Haq Nawaz1970 SCMR 673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-28
  civil servicepay scaleexecutive ordermistake in pay fixationwrit petitionsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Pakistan against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, passed in Writ Petition No. 1956 of 1966. The respondent, Haq Nawaz, a Lower Division Clerk in the Ministry of Defence, sought implementation of a formal order dated 7th July 1965, issued with the sanction of the President, regularizing his pay scale. The department failed to implement it, contending the order was issued by mistake and subsequently cancelled by the Ministries of Finance. The core legal question was whether an executive order issued with the sanction of the President could be ignored or treated as cancelled without a formal countermanding order issued with equal sanction. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any order countermanding the 7th July 1965 order with the sanction of the President, the High Court was fully justified in directing the department to implement the validly issued order. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that formal executive orders issued under the President's sanction remain enforceable until properly countermanded through competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order issued with the sanction of the President can be ignored without a formal countermanding order issued with similar sanction?
  • Is the High Court justified in directing the implementation of a pay fixation order when no valid countermanding order is brought on record?
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• Gouranga Mohan Sikdar vs The Controller of Import and Export and 2 Other1970 PLD Supreme Court 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to generate a summary, identify statutory provisions, extract keywords, formulate legal questions, or identify the author of the opinion. The request requires the actual text of the judgment to perform the analysis.

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• Goalundo Fishing Industries vs Pakistan and 3 Other1970 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  enemy propertylease terminationmanufacturing leasenotice periodTransfer of Property ActDefence of Pakistan Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration that two notices terminating its lease of two ice factories (which were vested in the Additional Custodian of Enemy Property as enemy properties) were illegal and ultra vires. The petitioner asserted that the lease could not be terminated by a one-month notice and that six months' notice was required under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 because the properties were manufacturing concerns. The respondents contended that the petitioner was a licensee whose interest was validly terminated under the terms of the agreement. The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 operates subject to any contract to the contrary, and since the parties' agreement explicitly provided for termination via one month's notice, the notices were valid. The Court also ruled that the petitioner could not challenge the Custodian's authority to sell the property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory notice period of six months for terminating a manufacturing lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 can be overridden by a contract to the contrary?
  • Can a lessee challenge the validity of a lease termination notice on the ground that the lessor intends to sell the property under the Defence of Pakistan Rules?
  • Does the vesting of enemy property under Rule 182 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules authorize its disposal or sale by the Custodian?
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• Ghulam Qadir vs Member Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 Other1970 SCMR 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-23
  consolidation of holdingsrevenue jurisdictionwrit petitionjoint ownerallotment of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition challenging an order of the Member Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore, passed under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960. The Revenue Authority had reallocated certain land parcels (killas) between the petitioner and the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents during consolidation proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition after finding that the petitioner was a joint owner rather than an exclusive owner of the disputed land, and that no injustice had occurred. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in dismissing the petition, held that the determination of which specific land parcels (killas) should be allocated to parties during consolidation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot sit in judgment as an appellate forum over the factual allocations made by competent Revenue Authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allocation of specific land parcels during consolidation proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities?
  • Can the High Court interfere with factual land allocations made by Revenue Authorities under its writ jurisdiction?
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• Ghulam Qadir vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi1970 SCMR 685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-09
  settlement lawbusiness premisespublic auctionevacuee propertydisplaced personsdivision of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant challenged the Chief Settlement Commissioner's decision to divide a single business premises into two separate units, transferring one to the appellant and ordering the other to be sold via public auction. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authority's power to divide business premises is limited to satisfying the claims of displaced persons or if it extends to creating units for public auction. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner possesses the authority under the Act to divide business premises into separate units. Once divided, these units are treated independently. If a unit cannot be transferred to a claimant or non-claimant, it must be disposed of via public auction to generate funds for the rehabilitation of displaced persons, which is consistent with the Act's objectives. The Court affirmed the division and dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the power to divide is not restricted solely to satisfying specific claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have the authority to divide a business premises into separate units for the purpose of public auction?
  • Is the power of the Settlement Authority to divide property restricted only to satisfying the claims of displaced persons?
  • Can a claimant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 claim more than one business unit?
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• Ghulam Nabi and Another vs Khan Muhammad Afzal Khan, Settlement1970 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  special leave to appealwrit jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesprior possessiontransfer of propertyreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court dismissing a writ petition that challenged the decision of the Settlement authorities regarding the transfer of a disputed house. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the factual finding of the Settlement authorities regarding prior possession of the property. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities rendered their decision after properly considering the record and affording a full hearing, and that the High Court correctly declined to reappraise the evidence in writ jurisdiction merely because an alternative view was possible. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that superior courts exercising writ jurisdiction will not reappraise factual evidence or substitute their own view for that of the competent settlement authorities when the latter have acted within their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise factual evidence in writ jurisdiction to reach a different conclusion than the Settlement authorities?
  • Does the mere possibility of taking another view of the evidence furnish ground for interference in writ jurisdiction?
  • Are findings of fact rendered by Settlement authorities after consideration of record and hearing open to challenge without showing lack of jurisdiction?
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• Ghulam Nabi Alias Allahdino and Others vs Mst. Jiandi and Other1970 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  special leave to appealconcurrent findings of factpardanashin ladiesgift of landmutation in revenue recordsanction of the Collector
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for special leave to appeal against concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the lack of proof of a gift of land allegedly made by female respondents in favour of the first opponent. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in concurrently finding that the gift by pardanashin ladies without consideration and without proof of necessary statements or statutory sanction was invalid. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings were well-founded, noting that the donors were pardanashin ladies with their own children, the alleged statements before a magistrate could not be proved, and the transaction violated statutory requirements under Act III of 1899 necessitating prior sanction of the Collector. Consequently, the Court ruled that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the absence of proof of a gift can be interfered with in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does a gift of valuable property by pardanashin ladies without consideration and without proper proof of statements require strict scrutiny?
  • Is a transfer of land hit by Act III of 1899 when prior sanction of the Collector was not obtained?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and Another vs The State1970 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-29
  murdereye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencemedical evidenceconcurrent findingscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioners, Ghulam Muhammad and Bakhshal, for the murder of Allah Rakhio. The trial court convicted the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and the other to transportation for life, with an additional conviction for Bakhshal under Section 13-D of the Arms Act. The High Court dismissed their appeal and confirmed the sentences. The core legal question was whether the eye-witness testimony, which alleged two gunshots were fired, should be discredited because the medical evidence showed only one gunshot injury on the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the discrepancy regarding the number of shots did not undermine the credibility of the eye-witnesses, as the lower courts had reasonably concluded the second shot may have missed or struck the deceased's bedding. The Court affirmed that natural witnesses, whose testimony was consistent and corroborated by the immediate post-incident arrival of neighbors, were reliable. The petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the number of gunshots reported by eye-witnesses and the number of injuries found on the deceased necessarily discredit the testimony of the eye-witnesses?
  • Are the findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding the credibility of natural witnesses subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses be accepted when they are the inmates of the house where the crime occurred?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and 3 Others vs Mst. Aisha1970 SCMR 70 (1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ex parte decreesetting aside ex parte decreerevisional jurisdictionspecial leave to appealmisrepresentationdiscretionary order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which refused to interfere in revision with a trial court's decision to set aside an ex parte decree. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted correctly in exercising its discretion to set aside the ex parte decree passed against the defendant, an illiterate elderly woman. The trial court had found, based on evidence, that the defendant failed to appear on the date of hearing because the plaintiffs had misled her by claiming the suit had been dismissed for non-payment of court fees. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was justified in declining to interfere with the trial court's order, as the trial court had sufficient grounds to be satisfied that the defendant's absence was due to the plaintiffs' misrepresentation. The principle laid down is that appellate or revisional courts should not interfere with a trial court's discretionary order to set aside an ex parte decree when such order is based on a sound finding of fact regarding the defendant's absence.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court justified in refusing to interfere with a trial court's order setting aside an ex parte decree when the defendant was misled by the plaintiff?
  • Can a trial court set aside an ex parte decree if it is satisfied that the defendant's absence was caused by the plaintiff's misrepresentation?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and 2 Others vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation1970 SCMR 546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-13
  partition of joint khataevacuee propertyrehabilitation schemehissadari qabzaspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the partition of a joint khata held by locals and evacuees in village Channah, Tehsil Rahimayarkhan. The core legal question involves whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities lacked jurisdiction to order partition due to the petitioners' alleged Hissadari Qabza under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the argument regarding Hissadari Qabza was without merit, as findings of fact by the authorities and the High Court established that the land was held jointly and there was no exclusive Hissadari Qabza, and that locals could not take undue advantage of unauthorized occupation of better lands. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the validity of the partition and the concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authority have jurisdiction to partition a joint khata where co-sharers do not have exclusive Hissadari Qabza?
  • Can local co-sharers claim protection from partition on the basis of unauthorized occupation of better quality evacuee land?
  • Will a plea regarding lack of jurisdiction that was not raised before the departmental authorities be entertained in writ jurisdiction?
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• Ghulam Mohayyuddin and Another vs Sher Khan and 4 Other1970 SCMR 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-20
  specific performanceadverse possessionlimitationagreement to sellrevenue recordspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land and an ahata, or in the alternative, claimed ownership through adverse possession, alleging they had the original grant restored and paid government dues. The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance as barred by time, but decreed the suit in part on the basis of adverse possession. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the decree and dismissed the suit entirely, holding the specific performance barred by limitation and finding no adverse possession. The High Court dismissed the subsequent regular second appeal, upholding the findings. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the limitation bar, lack of authority of the co-sharer to bind other heirs, and absence of continuous adverse possession were based on proper appreciation of evidence and revenue records. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land filed long after the refusal of the vendors is barred by limitation?
  • Whether a co-sharer can enter into a binding agreement to sell joint property on behalf of other heirs without established authority?
  • Whether possession originating as a tenant can ripen into ownership through adverse possession without clear and continuous hostile assertion for the statutory period?
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• Ghulam Hussain vs The State and Another1970 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-11
  special leave to appealinterim custody of propertyseized truckcriminal revisionfraudulent inducementquashment of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, which set aside a trial court's interim custody order regarding a seized truck and directed that the vehicle be handed over to respondent No. 2. The core legal question concerns the appropriate interim custody and disposal of property seized during criminal proceedings under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court reviewed the background where the petitioner had filed a complaint alleging offences under sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, leading to the initial seizure of the truck. The holding and key principles regarding interim custody involve balancing the possessory claims and ensuring proper surety pending the conclusion of the trial proceedings, though the specific appellate ratio is anchored in the procedural handling of property under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition against an interim custody order under Section 516-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable before the final disposal of the case?
  • On what grounds can an appellate or revisional court interfere with an interim custody order of seized property passed by a trial magistrate?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in transferring the custody of the seized truck from the petitioner to respondent No. 2?
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• Ghulam Hussain vs Malik Masood Alias Mahmood Masood and Another1970 SCMR 658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationsudden fightcriminal revisionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a criminal revision petition directed against the dismissal of a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent in a murder case involving a stabbing incident outside a college. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in entering upon the merits of the case at the bail stage to consider the possibility of a sudden fight before evidence was recorded, and whether the discretion in granting bail was exercised arbitrarily. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or improper manner by considering the plea of a sudden fight on the facts of the case, and declined to interfere with the bail order, noting that the trial before the Committing Magistrate was nearly concluded and leaving it open to the Magistrate to decide whether to continue the bail upon commitment. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, examining the broad probabilities such as a sudden fight without deep evaluation of evidence is permissible, and trial courts retain the independent discretion to review bail upon the conclusion of committal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court consider the possibility of a sudden fight when evaluating a bail matter before evidence is recorded?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in refusing to cancel bail when the trial is at its closing stage?
  • Is it open to the Committing Magistrate to consider the question of bail upon committing the accused for trial under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Ghulam Fatima vs Syed Zafar Hussain Wasti and Other1970 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-12
  special leave to appealproperty transferestoppelProvisional Transfer Ordersettlement authoritiesdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside a transfer order issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in favor of the petitioner, Mst. Ghulam Fatima, regarding a disputed property. The respondent, a non-claimant displaced person, had successfully challenged the transfer, obtaining a direction for the transfer of the ground floor to himself. The petitioner, a claimant displaced person, contends that the respondent is estopped from challenging the transfer because he failed to object when the Deputy Settlement Commissioner visited the premises, and because she incurred significant renovation expenses on the property in reliance on his conduct. Furthermore, the petitioner challenges the legal validity of the Additional Settlement Commissioner accepting the respondent's transfer form after a Provisional Transfer Order had already been issued to her. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the issues regarding estoppel and the authority of the Additional Settlement Commissioner to accept late transfer applications after the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order merit further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be estopped from challenging a property transfer if they failed to object when the property was initially transferred to another person?
  • Is it legally permissible for an Additional Settlement Commissioner to accept a transfer form after a Provisional Transfer Order has already been issued to another party?
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• Ghulam Ahmad and 42 Others vs D. C., Gujrat and Another1970 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-13
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealsenior counsel absencecivil matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for special leave directed against an order of the High Court of West Pakistan summarily dismissing a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution. The petition was filed seven days beyond the period of limitation. The core legal question concerns whether the absence of a senior counsel during court vacation constitutes a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a civil petition. The Supreme Court held that the unavailability of a senior counsel is not a sufficient excuse for delay, as a junior counsel or alternative counsel could have filed the petition, and valuable rights accruing to the opposite party cannot be defeated on such grounds. The court dismissed the petition as being barred by time, laying down the principle that courts will not condone delay merely to suit the personal convenience of counsel.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a senior counsel during court vacation constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition?
  • Can valuable rights accrued to an opposite party be defeated on the grounds of counsel's convenience?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs Zafar Ali and 3 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 1075 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  murderinterested witnesscorroborationacquittalspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidenceblood-feud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of interested eye-witnesses due to a lack of independent corroboration in a case marked by long-standing blood-feud enmity. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was justified, noting that the prosecution failed to provide reliable corroborative evidence, such as the Ballistic Expert report, and that the eye-witnesses were close relatives of the deceased. Furthermore, the Court observed that the prosecution had attempted to implicate individuals with no clear motive, and that the eye-witnesses had made improvements to their statements to align with medical evidence. The principle laid down is that where eye-witnesses are interested and there is deep-seated enmity, their testimony requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction, and the appellate court's refusal to rely on uncorroborated evidence in such circumstances is not perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of interested eye-witnesses sufficient for conviction in a murder case without independent corroboration?
  • Can an appellate court reject the evidence of eye-witnesses if they are found to be interested and their testimony lacks corroboration?
  • Does the failure to produce a Ballistic Expert report weaken the prosecution's case in a murder trial?
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• M. A. Chowdhury MD. Ayub Siddique vs Messrs Mitsui O. S. K. Lines Ltd.1970 PLD Supreme Court 373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  exclusive jurisdiction clausebill of ladingouster of jurisdictionContract Act section 28stay of suitforeign jurisdictionarbitration clausediscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals raised a common question of law concerning the validity and effect of exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses contained in bills of lading. The trial court and the High Court had treated such a clause as ousting the jurisdiction of domestic courts, leading to the return of plaints or dismissal. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether such clauses violate section 28 of the Contract Act and whether they completely oust the jurisdiction of municipal courts. The Court held that an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause does not absolutely oust the jurisdiction of domestic courts, but is properly construed as being in the nature of an arbitration clause falling within the exceptions to section 28 of the Contract Act. Consequently, domestic courts retain a judicial discretion to stay proceedings or allow the suit to proceed, applying principles analogous to arbitration stay applications, and the burden lies upon the party seeking to enforce the foreign jurisdiction clause to satisfy the court that it is just and equitable to do so. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the matters remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause in a bill of lading absolutely oust the jurisdiction of municipal courts in Pakistan?
  • How should exclusive foreign jurisdiction clauses be treated under section 28 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Whether domestic courts possess the discretion to stay proceedings instituted in breach of an exclusive foreign jurisdiction clause?
  • Upon which party lies the burden of proof to justify staying proceedings in the face of a foreign jurisdiction clause?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs Zafar Ali and 3 Other1970 SCMR 52 7 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-25
  special leave to appealacquittalinterested witnessescorroborationblood-feudappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a criminal judgment of the West Pakistan High Court, Lahore, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The petitioner, brother of one of the deceased, challenged the acquittal. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the necessity of corroboration for interested and related witnesses in a double murder case arising from a blood-feud, and the evaluation of circumstantial evidence such as recoveries and abscondence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in acquitting the respondents, as the eye-witnesses were closely related and interested, their testimony lacked independent corroboration, and medical and recovery evidence did not support the prosecution case. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order based on a plausible and proper appreciation of evidence unless the conclusions of the appellate court are perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and interested eye-witnesses requires independent corroboration in a murder case?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an appellate court's order of acquittal that is based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the mere abscondence of accused persons for a short duration provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction?
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• Ghazanfar Khan and Others vs Taj Muhammad and Other1970 SCMR 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  warabandiwater rightscanal authoritiesstatutory noticeevacuee landleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute concerning water rights and warabandi alterations. The core legal question is whether a canal order altering water rights, made without issuing the statutory notice required to affected landowners, is binding upon them and whether subsequent construction of brickwork outlets can substitute for such notice. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts and the High Court correctly decided in favor of the respondents, ruling that the 1952 canal order was legally ineffective against the plaintiffs because they were not given the mandatory notice under Section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act before their water rights were curtailed. The key principle laid down is that landowners possessing vested water rights cannot be bound by unnotified administrative orders affecting those rights, and any alteration must be strictly preceded by due notice and process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a canal order altering warabandi binding on landowners when issued without the statutory notice required by Section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act?
  • Does the construction of brickwork outlets in compliance with an unnotified order cure the lack of statutory notice to affected parties?
  • Are allottees of evacuee land entitled to hold their vested water rights intact until disturbed in due course of law?
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• Fazal Muhammad and Another Lal vs THF State- THF State (a) Criminal1970 P Cr. L J 858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08Read full judgment →
• Fazal Muhammad and Another Lal vs The State the State1970 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  criminal appealmurderunlawful assemblyinterested witnessesmedical evidencebenefit of doubtsuppression of injuriesjudicial consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of the appellants, given the reliance on interested witnesses and the presence of significant contradictions in the prosecution's narrative. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was inherently improbable and failed to inspire confidence. Specifically, the court noted that the medical evidence regarding the trajectory of wounds contradicted the prosecution's theory that assailants fired from a rooftop. Furthermore, the prosecution suppressed the fact that members of the accused party also sustained injuries, indicating a mutual confrontation. The Court also criticized the lower courts for ignoring findings from a prior trial that no unlawful assembly existed, leading to inconsistent judicial outcomes. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution suppresses material facts, relies on interested witnesses, and presents a narrative contradicted by physical evidence, the resulting doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution suppresses material circumstances such as injuries sustained by the accused party?
  • Does medical evidence regarding wound trajectories that contradicts the prosecution's theory of the crime create sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal?
  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to ignore findings of fact regarding the existence of an unlawful assembly established in a previous trial involving the same incident?
  • Under what conditions can evidence from a previous judicial proceeding be admitted in a subsequent trial under the Evidence Act 1872?
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• Fazal Din vs Wali Muhammad and 5 Other1970 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-24
  compromise decreewrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appealestoppeljurisdictionproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a property transfer dispute, which was initially decided by the Settlement Commissioner and subsequently brought before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. During the High Court proceedings, the parties reached a compromise, which a learned Single Judge accepted after recording their statements. The petitioner, who was a party to this compromise, later sought to reverse it through review and Letters Patent appeal, both of which were dismissed. The petitioner then sought Special Leave to Appeal from the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to make orders based on a compromise. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner, having been a party to the compromise and having invoked the High Court's jurisdiction to accept it, was disqualified from raising the plea regarding the High Court's competence to pass orders on a compromise in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party to a compromise, accepted by the High Court in writ jurisdiction, later challenge the High Court's jurisdiction to pass orders based on that compromise?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution to make orders based on a compromise reached by parties in writ proceedings?
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• Fazal Din and Others vs Khushi Muhammad and Other1970 SCMR 70 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  special leave to appealexcess landrehabilitation authoritiesjurisdictionwrit jurisdictionquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioners' writ petition challenging departmental orders regarding the resumption of excess land. The core legal questions involved whether the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner (Land) possessed the jurisdiction to pass the order taking away land found in excess of the petitioners' entitlement, and whether a question of fact regarding possession of excess land could be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that since the final authority, the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, admittedly had jurisdiction and upheld the action, the jurisdictional challenge lost substance, and questions of fact not raised before departmental authorities could not be agitated for the first time in the High Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an objection regarding the jurisdiction of a subordinate rehabilitation authority loses substance when the final appellate authority admittedly possesses jurisdiction?
  • Can a question of fact regarding the possession of excess land be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction before the High Court?
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• Fazal Dad vs The State1970 SCMR 682 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-25
  murderdeath sentenceocular testimonydelay in FIRrecovery of weaponappreciation of evidencecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Fazal Dad, under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Sahib Khatoon. The trial court convicted and sentenced the petitioner to death, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the credibility of witnesses, and whether there was inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the delay in lodging the FIR was adequately explained by the transportation of the injured victim and subsequent search for the police station, and that the ocular account, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of blood-stained articles at the instance of the petitioner, was properly appreciated by the courts below. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence and eyewitness credibility by the lower courts will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court where properly supported by corroborative evidence and natural witness presence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delay in lodging the First Information Report is adequately explained when the injured victim is being transported for medical aid and police reporting?
  • Can the testimony of an eyewitness accompanying the victim be relied upon despite allegations of being an interested witness?
  • Does the recovery of blood-stained articles at the instance of the accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
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• Fazal and 5 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 525 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal petitionhouse trespasscommon objectcriminal abductionleave to appealPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of criminal proceedings where the petitioners were convicted by the Sessions Judge under section 452 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with a fine, which conviction and sentence were upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns the legality of the petitioners' conviction under section 452/149 P.P.C. in light of the evidence regarding common object and forcible house trespass, notwithstanding the acquittal under other charges due to witnesses being won over. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was fully justified as the evidence established that the common object of all petitioners was to commit house trespass to forcibly take away the abductee. The court laid down the principle that where a common object to commit house trespass for an unlawful purpose is proved by credible testimony of victims and witnesses, the conviction under section 452 read with section 149 P.P.C. is sustainable even if some witnesses resile or compromise on other distinct charges. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction under section 452 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when the common object to commit house trespass is established by evidence?
  • Can the conviction for house trespass be maintained when witnesses have been won over regarding other charges of abduction and attempt to murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Ali Khan vs Subedar Muhammad Khan1970 SCMR 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-08
  condonation of delaypetition for special leave to appeallimitationsummer vacationpre-emptionLetters Patent Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against a High Court judgment decreeing a pre-emption suit. The office raised an objection that the petition was barred by 186 days. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal, and whether the time spent pursuing an incompetent certificate for a Letters Patent Appeal or the period of summer vacation entitled the petitioner to an extension under Section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that the petition was hopelessly barred by time and no sufficient ground for condonation was made out, observing that time spent on mistaken remedies does not automatically excuse prolonged delay and that Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply when the Court's registries remain open for filing petitions during vacation. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner is only entitled to condonation of delay for the time properly taken in exhausting available legal remedies, and the summer vacation does not extend limitation when registries are functioning for the receipt of matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether time spent in pursuing an incompetent application for a certificate to file a Letters Patent Appeal can be excluded for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Does the summer vacation of the Supreme Court prevent time from running for the purposes of limitation when the registries of the Court remain open for receiving petitions?
  • Can a petitioner claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act when alternative arrangements exist for the transaction of court business during a vacation?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Muhammad vs Fazal Rahman and 13 Other1970 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-01
  res judicataapprobate and reprobateadverse possessionadmissionwillinheritancedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a suit for a declaration filed by the appellant, Faqir Muhammad, claiming to be the sole owner of land left by his father, Rahim Gul, and challenging a mutation in favor of the respondent, Fazal Rahman, who claimed a one-third share under a will. The core legal questions involved whether the prior decision in a suit filed by a co-heir operated as res judicata regarding the will, and whether the appellant's previous admission in court estopped him from challenging the legatee's title. The Supreme Court held that all ingredients of res judicata were complete since the question of the legatee's one-third share was directly and substantially in issue and finally decided in the previous litigation, and further held that the appellant could not approbate and reprobate by resiling from his previous admission. The Court laid down the principle that a litigant is precluded from blowing hot and cold by disclaiming a title previously admitted in judicial proceedings, and that a co-sharer admitting joint possession cannot claim adverse possession against another.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior decision on a will in a co-heir's suit operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between co-defendants?
  • Can a litigant approbate and reprobate by resiling from a formal admission made in previous judicial proceedings?
  • Whether a co-sharer admitting joint possession and enjoyment of usufruct can claim adverse possession against another co-sharer?
  Read full judgment →
• Fajar Ali and Another vs Mst. Jamila and 3 Other1970 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-20
  settlement operationsreview proceedingstransfer of propertyclaimant versus non-claimantjurisdictionpending proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a property dispute over a house in Jhang previously transferred to a claimant, Mst. Jamila, and subsequently divided among claimants and non-claimants by a successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions relate to the competency of review proceedings, the validity of subsequent transfer orders, and the interpretation of saving clauses under amending ordinances governing settlement operations. The Supreme Court held that the initial division of the property without setting aside the original transfer order was a nullity without jurisdiction, whereas the subsequent review order restoring the entire property to the sole claimant was competently passed after obtaining the requisite permission. The Court affirmed that pending review proceedings were lawfully saved under section 7 of Ordinance No. XIII of 1962, as permission to review was granted prior to the bar imposed by Ordinance II of 1962. The key principles laid down affirm that an order passed in review without jurisdiction is a nullity and that pending review proceedings properly instituted and saved by statutory provisions remain competent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of review passed by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner without obtaining prior permission is a nullity?
  • When do review proceedings become pending for the purpose of saving clauses under Amending Ordinance No. XIII of 1962?
  • Does a claimant have a preferential right over non-claimants when a property is found to be indivisible?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizur Rahman Sarkar vs The State and 2 OTHERSs1970 P Cr. L J 844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-04
  bailsuspension of sentencecondition of bailpayment of finecriminal revisionCode of Criminal Procedure 1898
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave addresses whether bail granted under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be made conditional upon the payment of a fine imposed by the trial court. The appellant was convicted under Section 407 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentenced to imprisonment and a fine, and subsequently filed a revision petition in the High Court. The High Court granted bail pending revision but attached a condition that the bail would stand cancelled if the fine was not paid within one month. The Supreme Court held that Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 contains no provision for attaching conditions such as the payment of a fine to an order suspending sentence and granting bail, as bail is fundamentally intended to secure the appearance of the accused. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the bail was confirmed without the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be made conditional on the payment of a fine?
  • Does the High Court have the power to attach terms requiring the payment of a fine to an order suspending a sentence and granting bail?
  • What is the primary legal connotation and purpose of granting bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizur Rahman Sarkar vs The State And 2 Other1970 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-04
  bailsuspension of sentencepayment of finecriminal breach of trustrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave addresses whether bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be made conditional upon the payment of a fine imposed by the trial court. The appellant was convicted of criminal breach of trust by a public servant under section 407 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine. The High Court suspended his sentence and granted him bail, but stipulated that the bail would stand cancelled if he failed to pay the fine within a specified period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 contains no provision authorizing the imposition of conditions, such as the payment of a fine, to an order suspending a sentence or granting bail. The court reaffirmed that bail is fundamentally intended to secure the appearance of the accused and cannot be used as a coercive mechanism to enforce the recovery of a fine. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the bail was confirmed without the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be made conditional on the payment of a fine?
  • Does section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower the High Court to attach terms to an order suspending the execution of a sentence?
  • Can bail be used as a means of enforcing the recovery of a fine imposed upon conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Eruch Maneckji and 2 Others vs Income Tax Officer, Central Circle III, Karachi1970 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-11
  leave to appealpenal interestadvance taxinterim orderdiscretionary jurisdictionstay of recoveryincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an interlocutory order of the High Court, which refused to suspend the recovery of penal interest amounting to Rs. 4,86,186 imposed by the Income Tax Officer under Section 18-A (3) and (6) of the Income Tax Act 1922 for failure to deposit advance tax. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether interference was warranted with the discretionary interim order of the High Court. The Court held that no exception could be taken to the interim order refusing to stay the recovery of money, noting that courts generally do not stay the execution of a money decree pending appeal as no irreparable loss is caused thereby, and observed that the petitioners should have first moved the income tax authorities for redress. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretionary interim order of the High Court refusing to stay the recovery of penal interest?
  • Should a taxpayer approach the income tax authorities for redress before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court against the imposition of penal interest?
  • Does the refusal to stay the execution of a money claim pending final adjudication cause irreparable loss?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Hashmat Ali vs G. Akbar, Special Magistrate (Food)1970 SCMR 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  special leave to appealfood offencespecial magistrateno evidenceconstitutional jurisdictionessential commodities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional petition by the High Court, which had declined to interfere with his conviction and sentence of 20 months' rigorous imprisonment for possessing excess Joshi rice in violation of a notified order, under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956. The core legal questions involved whether the violation of the notified order was punishable under the said Act, and whether the conviction was based on "no evidence" warranting interference under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. The Supreme Court held that the trial was competently held as the relevant orders and notifications were duly saved through successive legislative enactments, and that the finding of the key to the godown in the petitioner's possession constituted sufficient evidence to support the conviction, meaning the case was not one of "no evidence". The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the violation of a notified order issued under the East Bengal Foodstuffs Price Control Order, 1953, is punishable under section 6 of the East Pakistan Food (Special Courts) Act, 1956?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with a conviction under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 on the ground that a case is one of no evidence?
  • Does the possession of the key to a godown from which a prohibited commodity is recovered constitute prima facie evidence of possession of the commodity?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Habibur Rahman vs MD. Mansur and Another1970 SCMR 882 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-12
  small cause courtejectmentlandlord and tenantquestion of titlespecial leave to appealjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which dismissed a revision petition against a decree for ejectment passed by a Court of Small Causes. The respondent sought to evict the petitioner from the disputed property, claiming ownership under a registered deed of lease executed by the Shebait of a Debuttor Estate, while the petitioner contested the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for ejectment of a tenant is triable by a Court of Small Causes and whether such a court has the discretion to adjudicate questions of title under section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The Supreme Court held that the suit was maintainable in the Court of Small Causes, and that the said court possesses the discretion under section 23 of the Act to return or not to return a plaint when a question of title to immovable property is raised. The petition was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for the ejectment of a tenant triable by a Court of Small Causes?
  • Does a Court of Small Causes have the discretion to adjudicate upon questions of title to immovable property under section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887?
  • Can a new question regarding the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, not raised in the trial Court or the High Court, be allowed to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, Karachi vs Abdullah and 2 Other1970 SCMR 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-08
  Evacuee Trust PropertyCharitable TrustSettlement TransferPanchayatReligious InstitutionLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the status of House No. O. T. 3/138, Mithadar, Karachi, which was transferred to the respondents by the Settlement authorities. The petitioner, the Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, claimed that the property was attached to a charitable trust and that the evacuee owner, the Nasarpuri Community Panchayat, was a charitable or religious institution. The core legal question was whether the property constituted trust property under the relevant evacuee laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner failed to lead any cogent evidence to establish that the Panchayat was a religious or charitable institution, or that the property was trust property. The Court noted that no constitutional documents of the Panchayat were produced, and a sale deed of another property acquired for maintaining Hindu widows did not suffice to prove the trust status of the disputed property. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the decisions of the Settlement authorities and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquisition of a separate property for a charitable purpose by a Panchayat automatically prove that the Panchayat itself is a religious or charitable institution?
  • Can a property be classified as evacuee trust property under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 in the absence of cogent evidence or constitutional documents of the owning institution?
  Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad vs The State1970 SCMR 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-10-10
  appeal against acquittalconfessional statementmurdermedical evidenceappraisal of evidenceculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal on special leave by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which set aside the acquittal of the appellant and convicted him under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his brother's wife, sentencing him to death. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of an initial police report made by the accused as a confessional statement, and whether the High Court properly reappraised the ocular and medical evidence in an appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that a statement containing self-exculpatory matter or failing to admit all facts constituting the offence does not amount to a confession, thereby upholding the High Court's view on admissibility, but found that the High Court misread the medical evidence and disregarded well-established principles regarding appeals against acquittal by interfering with the trial court's assessment of unreliable eye-witnesses. The Court laid down the principle that a statement cannot be considered a confession under section 25 of the Evidence Act if it contains self-exculpatory facts that negative the alleged offence, and reiterated the principles governing appellate interference with findings of acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement containing self-exculpatory matter amount to a confession?
  • Can an admission of a gravely incriminating fact by itself be treated as a confession?
  • What are the principles governing the High Court's interference with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Whether minor injuries inflicted by an accused can establish causation of death when medical evidence points to a different cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Dilawar Khan and Another vs Pordil Khan1970 SCMR 636 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  petition for leave to appealpossessionjoint propertyco-sharersmutationJamabanditenant-at-willattornmentfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by the petitioners seeking possession of a two-thirds share in joint lands, claiming that only one co-owner brother had sold his individual one-third share to the respondent. The respondent asserted that all three brothers sold the entire property, or alternatively, that he acquired title by adverse possession. While the appellate court decreed the suit, the High Court in second appeal reversed that decision, upholding the trial court's dismissal of the suit based on a factual finding that the entire property was sold. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that the High Court's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by oral and documentary evidence, including revenue records. Furthermore, entries in the Jamabandi showed that one petitioner was himself recorded as a tenant-at-will under the respondent, confirming attornment to the transferee and precluding the petitioners from denying the sale of the entire property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-owner dispute a sale of the entire joint property after having attorned as a tenant under the transferee in revenue records?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in a petition for leave to appeal with a finding of fact by the High Court based on adequate oral and documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Delwar Hossain vs Maulvi Abdul Jalil Chowdhury and Other1970 SCMR 871 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  amendment of plaintcivil procedurerevisional jurisdictionlimitationvested rightssuit valuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of East Pakistan, which upheld a trial court's decision to allow an amendment to a plaint. The original suit was filed for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession regarding a single plot of land. During the hearing, after the plaintiff's examination, the plaintiff sought to amend the plaint to include an additional plot and increase the suit's valuation. The petitioner opposed this, arguing that the amendment introduced a new case and prejudiced their rights regarding the limitation period. The Supreme Court examined whether the amendment fundamentally altered the suit's character or unfairly deprived the petitioner of vested rights. The Court held that the amendment did not alter the nature of the suit and that the petitioner suffered no prejudice, as they were granted leave to file an additional written statement to raise any limitation defenses. The petition was dismissed, affirming that procedural amendments allowing for the inclusion of property are permissible provided the defendant is not deprived of the opportunity to contest the new claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to a plaint that adds a new plot of land and increases the suit valuation fundamentally alter the character of the suit?
  • Can a defendant raise the issue of limitation in an additional written statement following an amendment to the plaint?
  • Is an amendment to a plaint permissible if it does not cause prejudice to the defendant's ability to raise available defenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Dalmir and Another Mohammad Munir vs The State the State (a) Penal Code (XLV Of 1860),1970 SCMR 840 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-09
  murdercommon intentionocular testimonycorroborationrecovery of weaponbenefit of doubtculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ibrahim. The prosecution alleged that two of the appellants held the deceased while the third appellant, Dalmir, inflicted multiple hatchet blows on his leg, resulting in his death from hemorrhage and shock. The core legal questions involved whether the evidence was appreciated correctly and what offence, if any, was proved against the appellants. The Supreme Court held that Dalmir's conviction was well-founded, being supported by credible ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained hatchet at his instance, and that his act fell under clause thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as the intended injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. However, regarding the other two appellants, the Court held that in the absence of corroborative evidence and given their relationship and enmity with the complainants, the possibility of false implication could not be excluded. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal of Dalmir while accepting the appeals of the other co-accused by giving them the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that while interested ocular testimony may be relied upon if it inspires confidence, safe administration of justice requires independent corroboration, particularly in cases involving multiple accused where false implication of collateral relatives cannot be ruled out.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple blows inflicted exclusively on the non-vital parts of the body with a sharp-nosed weapon can constitute murder under clause thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the uncorroborated testimony of interested and inimical eye-witnesses warrant the conviction of co-accused in a murder trial?
  • Is the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Whether the possibility of false implication of collateral family members requires independent corroborative evidence for safe dispensation of criminal justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Chiragh Din and Another vs Chairman, Thal Development Authority1970 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-10
  mandatory injunctioninterim injunctionrestoration of possessiondeclaration of ownershipcivil procedurependente lite dispossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revisional application by the High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order setting aside a mandatory injunction issued by the trial court. The trial court had directed the respondent authority to restore possession of agricultural land to the petitioners, which land the authority had resumed during the pendency of the petitioners' suit for a declaration of ownership. The core legal question is whether a court can issue a mandatory injunction under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore possession of land resumed by an authority during the pendency of a declaration suit. The Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff is dispossessed during a suit for declaration of ownership, such dispossession does not affect the maintainability of the suit, and restitution can be granted as a consequential relief if the suit succeeds, rendering a mandatory injunction for interim restoration inapplicable. The Court affirmed that interim injunction rules do not empower the court to direct restoration of possession in such circumstances, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can issue a mandatory injunction under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure to restore possession of land resumed during the pendency of a declaration suit?
  • Does the dispossession of a plaintiff during the pendency of a suit for a declaration of ownership affect the maintainability of the suit?
  • Are foreign decisions regarding easement rights and mandatory injunctions applicable to suits for declaration of ownership and permanent injunction?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, District Council, Jehlum vs Ali Akbar and 2 Other1970 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-02
  taxationBasic Democracies Orderstatutory interpretationlegislative intentDistrict Counciltax on employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from petitions filed by the Chairman, District Council, Jhelum, seeking leave to appeal against a High Court order. The underlying dispute involved writ petitions filed by employees of the Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and railway employees challenging the legality of a tax on "professions, trades and callings" levied by District Councils. The core legal question was whether the District Council had the authority to levy this tax on "employment" under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, given that the term "employment" was explicitly omitted from the Fifth Schedule of that Order, unlike the previous legislative framework under the Government of India Act, 1935. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the conscious legislative omission of the word "employment" from the Fifth Schedule of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, demonstrated a clear intent to exclude "employment" from the scope of taxable activities. The Court affirmed that when a legislature repeals and re-enacts law, it is presumed to be aware of the previous state of the law, and any deliberate change indicates an intention to alter the legal effect.

  Questions settled

  • Does the omission of the word 'employment' from the Fifth Schedule of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, preclude a District Council from levying a tax on employment?
  • Is a legislature presumed to intend a change in law when it omits specific terms during the re-enactment of legislation?
  • Can a tax on 'professions, trades and callings' be interpreted to include 'employment' in the absence of an explicit statutory explanation?
  Read full judgment →
• Chain Rochiram Manghiramalani vs Government of West Pakistan1970 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-14
  disciplinary proceedingsgovernment servantnatural justicedismissal from serviceinquiry committeeshow-cause noticeunauthorized foreign travel
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a government servant, challenged his dismissal from service, which was based on allegations of holding anti-Pakistan views, writing objectionable letters to state dignitaries, and making an unauthorized visit to Iran. The petitioner contended that the Inquiry Committee failed to conduct the proceedings in his presence, denied him access to documents, and failed to provide a copy of the inquiry findings, thereby violating principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the High Court, which had determined that the petitioner was confronted with the evidence, admitted to authoring the letters, and was granted adequate opportunity to defend himself. The Court held that the inquiry was conducted properly and that the petitioner was not condemned unheard. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the petitioner was denied access to the inquiry record, noting that it was available for inspection. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that procedural fairness was maintained throughout the disciplinary process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide a copy of an inquiry report to a government servant automatically invalidate a dismissal order if the servant was otherwise given an opportunity to defend?
  • Is a disciplinary inquiry against a government servant vitiated if the servant admits to the underlying facts, such as authorship of letters, during the proceedings?
  • Can a government servant challenge a dismissal order on the grounds of procedural irregularity if the record demonstrates that they were confronted with the evidence and allowed to respond?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Nazir Ahmad Bhatti vs Ch. Noor Muhammad and 3 Other1970 SC M. R 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionfindings of factrevisionary powersconsent of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee residential property in Lahore. The petitioner, claiming to be an allottee in possession, sought the transfer of the property, which had instead been transferred to the respondent. After multiple rounds of litigation before settlement authorities, the Settlement and Claims Commissioner, with the consent of both parties, decided the case on merits, finding that the petitioner's possession and claim were not substantiated. The petitioner challenged this in the High Court via a writ petition, which was dismissed on the grounds that the findings were factual and not perverse. A Letters Patent Appeal was subsequently dismissed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to decide the case on merits and whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to decide the case on merits in revision, and that findings of fact based on evidence are not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to decide a case on merits while exercising revisionary powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a party who consents to a tribunal deciding a matter on merits subsequently challenge that jurisdiction on appeal?
  • Is a finding of fact arrived at upon consideration of evidence subject to interference by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Jalal Khan vs The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 3 Other1970 SCMR 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07
  necessary partyproper partyLetters Patent Appealtransfer of propertysettlement schemespecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an allottee in occupation of a bungalow, sought leave to appeal against the refusal of the High Court to implead him as a party in a pending Letters Patent Appeal concerning the transfer of the said bungalow between rival claimants. The core legal question was whether the appellant was a necessary or proper party to be impleaded in those appellate proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the Letters Patent Appeal, as the original writ petition and subsequent appeal were confined to the rival claims of other parties to which he was a stranger, and any orders therein would not affect his independent rights or pending proceedings. The court affirmed that the appellant must pursue his own independent remedies, such as his pending appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner and his separate petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an occupant claiming transfer of a property under a settlement scheme is a necessary or proper party in a Letters Patent Appeal between rival claimants to which he was not originally a party?
  • Can a person whose independent claim for property transfer is pending before settlement authorities be impleaded in appellate proceedings concerning a dispute between other parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Mehraj Din vs West Pakistan Province and 8 Other1970 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-05
  ex parte orderland acquisition referenceprocedural irregularitycourt errorinherent powersetting aside ex parte ordersubstantial justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court, which upheld a Civil Judge's decision to set aside an ex parte order passed in a land acquisition reference. The core legal question was whether a court possesses the authority to recall an ex parte order when the default leading to that order was caused by the court's own administrative error or confusion in record-keeping. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings had become separated due to a failure to consolidate connected references as previously ordered, resulting in an inadvertent ex parte order against the Land Acquisition Collector. The Court held that the trial court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to rectify its own mistake, as parties should not suffer due to the negligence or errors of court officials. The principle established is that courts have the inherent power to correct procedural irregularities and set aside ex parte orders when such orders are the direct result of confusion or mistakes committed by the court's own staff, thereby ensuring that substantial justice is served.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court set aside an ex parte order if the default was caused by the court's own administrative error?
  • Does a court have the authority to rectify its own procedural mistakes to ensure substantial justice?
  • Is an ex parte order passed due to confusion in court record-keeping considered legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ghulam Farid vs Ch. Muhammad Sharif and Another1970 SCMR 347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-04
  election petitionballot paper identificationelection disputepleadingselection tribunalunprescribed marks
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an election dispute concerning the office of the Chairman of Union Committee No. 16, Kumharpura, Lahore, where the appellant and respondent polled equal votes, leading to the respondent's victory via drawing lots. The appellant challenged this result before an Election Tribunal, alleging improper ballot marking and counting irregularities. While the Tribunal rejected these specific grounds, it nonetheless invalidated the election because two ballot papers contained unprescribed marks, suggesting potential voter identification. The High Court subsequently set aside the Tribunal's order, ruling that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding on grounds not pleaded in the election petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that an Election Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon issues outside the scope of the pleadings. The Court held that election petitions must contain full particulars of allegations, and evidence cannot be entertained for claims not explicitly raised. Furthermore, the Court clarified that invalidating a vote requires more than a mere surmise or possibility of identification, emphasizing the necessity of strict adherence to pleadings in election disputes to ensure expeditious resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Election Tribunal invalidate an election on grounds not raised in the election petition?
  • Is a mere possibility of voter identification sufficient to invalidate a ballot paper?
  • Must an election petition contain full and complete particulars of the allegations made?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Feroze Din vs DR. K. M. Munir and Another1970 P Cr. L J 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-07
  forgerycriminal proceedingspublic interestevacuee propertysettlement proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal petitions for special leave to appeal directed against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the petitioner's application under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for lodging a complaint against the respondents for allegedly using forged allotment orders during proceedings. The core legal question concerns the propriety of initiating collateral criminal proceedings for alleged forgery while the main dispute regarding the transfer of an evacuee building is pending remand before the Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined to initiate criminal proceedings, as prosecution under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is not a matter of course and should not be used as an instrument for private vengeance or to hamper the main issue. The key principle laid down is that criminal proceedings in respect of offences committed in judicial proceedings must be strictly in the public interest and should not be permitted to be weaponized for private grudges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prosecution under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should be launched as a matter of course for every offence alleged to have been committed in judicial proceedings?
  • Can an application for lodging a complaint for forgery be used by a party to wreak private vengeance or satisfy a private grudge?
  • Is it appropriate to start collateral criminal proceedings that would hamper the main issue pending before a Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ameer Muhammad Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-07
  pre-arrest bailbail refusalFirst Information Reportcriminal liabilityarrest warrantsalibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was charged alongside others under Sections 302, 307, 148, 149, 448, and 382 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, alleged to have fired a shot at a prosecution witness, sought bail on the grounds of false implication to hinder his role in defending co-accused family members and an alibi supported by an affidavit. The High Court declined the relief, deeming it premature to assess defense pleas when the petitioner was specifically named in the First Information Report with an attributed role in the assault. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, emphasizing that the petitioner's specific involvement in the assault precluded bail. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that an application for pre-arrest bail is legally misconceived once warrants for the arrest of the accused have already been issued. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to surrender to the court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application for pre-arrest bail maintainable once warrants for the arrest of the accused have already been issued?
  • Should a court assess defense pleas regarding false implication at the pre-arrest bail stage when the accused is specifically named in the First Information Report?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Co-Operative Bank Ltd., Sargodha vs Ahmad Bakhsh1970 PLD Supreme Court 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-22
  disposal of propertycriminal procedureSection 517 CrPCadmissibility of evidencecollateral proceedingsdisputed titlerecovery of stolen property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court order directing the return of Rs. 16,000 to the respondent, Ahmad Bakhsh, which had been seized by police during a fraud investigation involving the Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. The core legal question concerned the proper exercise of judicial discretion under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the disposal of property where title is contested. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and the applicability of procedural bars. The Court established that proceedings under Section 517 are collateral, meaning strict evidentiary bars like Section 25 of the Evidence Act 1872 and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 do not apply, rendering prior admissions admissible. Furthermore, the Court ruled that where a bona fide dispute of title exists, a criminal court should not adjudicate ownership but should maintain the status quo, directing parties to seek resolution through a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Are the restrictions on the admissibility of statements made to police under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to collateral proceedings under Section 517?
  • Does Section 25 of the Evidence Act 1872 apply to proceedings conducted under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should a criminal court adjudicate disputed questions of title to property in proceedings under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the discretion granted to a court under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the disposal of property absolute?
  Read full judgment →
• Boota and Another vs The State1970 SCMR 762 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  bailmurderproviso to section 497discretionary powerexpeditious trialcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the denial of bail to two petitioners, Boota and Mst. Sardaran, who were charged with the murder of the latter's husband. The petitioners challenged the prosecution's evidence and sought bail, which had been refused by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court correctly identified that the evidentiary weaknesses raised were matters for the trial court to determine. Regarding the female petitioner, Mst. Sardaran, the Court addressed the argument that she should be granted bail under the proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while the proviso confers discretion, this specific ground had not been raised in the lower courts. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with the observation that the female petitioner remained at liberty to move the committing court or the Sessions Court for bail based on her sex. The Court also emphasized the need for expeditious disposal of the trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confer an absolute right to bail for a female accused?
  • Can a ground for bail be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not urged in the lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Birendra Mohan Das vs Aminuddin Malik Represented by 3 Other1970 SCMR 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-07-01
  revenue salearrears of rentarrears of revenuespecial statuteauction purchasemoney suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a money suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant for the recovery of money as the price of barga produce or, alternatively, for compensation for the use and occupation of disputed land purchased under the Revenue Sale Law. The land was originally held in tenancy rights, and its rent-receiving interest was acquired by the Government under the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950. Arrears of rent accrued, and the holding was put to auction and purchased by the appellant. The trial and appellate courts upheld the appellant's title, but the High Court accepted the respondents' revision petition, holding that the land could not be put to auction under the Revenue Sale Law for arrears of rent. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Revenue Sale Law applied to a sale for arrears of rent due to the Government. The Supreme Court held that rent and revenue are not synonymous and that the sale under the Revenue Sale Law for arrears of rent was unwarranted and without jurisdiction. The Court established that when action is taken under a special statute, it must strictly fulfil the conditions of that statute to gain validity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Revenue Sale Law apply to a case of sale for arrears of rent due to the Government?
  • Are rent and revenue synonymous terms when recoverable by the Government?
  • What are the consequences when action is taken under a special statute without fulfilling its conditions?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashiruddin Hossain vs The State1970 SCMR 807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-22
  special leave to appealdacoitysole eye-witnesscriminal convictiondismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine, which was affirmed by the High Court through a summary dismissal of his appeal. The core legal question concerned whether the conviction based on the testimony of a sole injured eye-witness, promptly named and corroborated by neighbours, was sustainable, and whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal in limine without proper appraisement of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution case was free from embellishments and that no infirmity existed in the evidence to warrant interference. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a conviction based on the testimony of a sole injured eye-witness, when corroborated by prompt naming and surrounding circumstances, is reliable and sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for dacoity be sustained on the testimony of a sole injured eye-witness?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing a criminal appeal in limine when the prosecution case is free from embellishments?
  • Does the prompt naming of an accused to witnesses provide sufficient corroboration for identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Bajor Alias Baziar Rahman and Others vs The State1970 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-09
  criminal appealreduction of sentenceleave to appealappellate dutymerits of the case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a special leave petition filed against the judgment of the High Court regarding the conviction and sentencing of the petitioners under sections 325 and 147 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the High Court is relieved of its statutory duty to consider a criminal appeal on merits when the counsel for the appellant does not press the appeal on merits and prays only for a reduction of sentence. Granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the case requires consideration as to whether the High Court remains obligated to examine the criminal appeal on merits despite counsel's restriction of arguments to the question of sentence. The key principle relates to the mandatory duty of appellate courts in criminal matters to evaluate cases on their merits.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court relieved of its duty to consider a criminal appeal on merits if the counsel presses the appeal only on the ground of sentence?
  • Whether an appellate court must examine a criminal conviction on merits notwithstanding the waiver of merits arguments by defense counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Bajor Alias Baziar Rahman and 0THTRS vs The State1970 P Cr. L J 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-12-09
  criminal appealleave to appealreduction of sentenceduty of appellate courtappeal on meritsconcession of counsel
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a criminal appeal before the High Court, where the petitioners' counsel did not press the appeal on its merits but merely requested a reduction in sentences. Consequently, the High Court reduced the sentences without examining the merits of the convictions under Sections 325 and 147 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioners contended that they had instructed their counsel to argue the appeal on merits. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court is relieved of its statutory duty to consider and decide a criminal appeal on its merits when the appellant's counsel only presses the appeal on the question of sentence. Pending the final disposal of the appeal, the bail granted to petitioners Nos. 2 to 5 was ordered to continue.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court relieved of its duty to consider a criminal appeal on its merits if the appellant's counsel only presses the appeal on the ground of sentence?
  • Can a criminal appeal be disposed of solely on the question of sentence without an examination of the merits of the conviction by the appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bagh Ali vs Iqbal and 2 Other1970 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-27
  special leave to appealacquittalFirst Information Report delayeye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court for the murder of Muhammad Khan under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but were acquitted on appeal by the High Court. The prosecution relied on the testimony of two eye-witnesses and the recovery of a weapon. The High Court rejected the prosecution's case, citing significant delays in lodging the First Information Report, inconsistencies in the timeline of the witnesses' arrival at the scene, medical evidence regarding the state of the deceased's stomach contents, and the absence of blackening or scorching on the body despite the alleged close-range firing. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings and affirmed that the delay in reporting the crime was not satisfactorily explained, particularly given that relatives had arrived at the scene, allowing for the report to be filed promptly. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court's conclusion that the crime was un-witnessed was justified, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report justify the rejection of prosecution testimony in a murder case?
  • Is the High Court's assessment of eye-witness credibility based on physical evidence and timeline inconsistencies a valid ground for acquittal?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal where the High Court has properly appreciated the evidence regarding the circumstances of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Bagh Ali and 3 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-27
  interim bailcriminal revisionconvictionpendency of appealdelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the refusal of interim bail by the High Court during the pendency of a revision petition challenging the petitioners' conviction and sentences under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether interim bail can be granted to convicted persons whose revision petitions against conviction are pending before the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that as long as the convictions stand, the detention of the petitioners is lawful, and the grant of bail at that stage is inappropriate. The Court laid down the principle that while bail during a pending revision is generally inappropriate while convictions stand, petitioners may repeat their prayer for bail before the High Court if inordinate delay occurs in the hearing of the revision petition due to heavy arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Can interim bail be granted to petitioners whose convictions and sentences are currently standing?
  • What remedy is available to a convicted person if there is inordinate delay in the hearing of their revision petition due to heavy arrears in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Bachchu Alias Bocha Alias Badrul Alam vs The State1970 SCMR 828 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-19
  dacoity with murdercriminal transactionidentification of accusedretreating dacoitsSection 396 PPCspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code for dacoity with murder. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was correctly identified as a participant in the dacoity and whether a murder committed by dacoits while retreating with stolen booty constitutes an offence under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses sufficiently established the petitioner's identity and participation. Regarding the legal classification, the Court held that a murder committed by dacoits while in the process of retreating with stolen property occurs during the course of the same transaction as the dacoity. Consequently, such an act falls within the ambit of Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court distinguished this from cases where the dacoity attempt was frustrated and abandoned prior to the killing, affirming that the continuity of the criminal transaction is maintained while the dacoits are in possession of the booty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed by dacoits while retreating with stolen booty constitute an offence under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a murder committed during the retreat of dacoits considered part of the same transaction as the dacoity?
  • Does the offence of dacoity with murder under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply if the murder occurs at a location away from the site of the robbery?
  Read full judgment →
• Babu Khan vs The Crown1970 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-02-23
  criminal breach of trustprevention of corruptionprior sanctionpublic servantcriminal misconductstatutory interpretationGeneral Clauses Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that reversed an acquittal for criminal breach of trust. The appellant, a railway employee, argued that his prosecution under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code was void for lack of prior sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, asserting the conduct constituted 'criminal misconduct' under the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that prior sanction is not required for prosecution under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court reasoned that Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, explicitly mandates sanction only for specific offences, namely those under Sections 161 and 165 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Act. It does not extend to other Penal Code offences, even if the facts overlap with 'criminal misconduct.' Furthermore, under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, an offender may be prosecuted under any applicable enactment, provided they are not punished twice for the same offence, confirming the validity of the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prosecution of a public servant for criminal breach of trust under Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code require prior sanction under Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?
  • Can an offence be prosecuted under the Pakistan Penal Code if it also falls within the definition of 'criminal misconduct' under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?
  • Does the omission of Section 408 of the Pakistan Penal Code from the list of offences requiring sanction in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, imply that sanction is unnecessary for such prosecutions?
  Read full judgment →
• Azmat Ali vs Ch. Ghulam Rasul and Another1970 SCMR 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-06
  election disputesecrecy of ballotmaterially affectedelection tribunalspecial leave to appealelectoral college rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an election dispute where an Election Tribunal declared an election void due to the violation of ballot secrecy by the Presiding Officer, who recorded voter numbers on both ballot papers and their counterparts. The respondent successfully challenged this decision in the High Court, which set aside the Tribunal's order on the basis that the violation did not materially affect the election result, as required by the governing rules. The petitioner, Azmat Ali, sought special leave to appeal against the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, identifying a significant legal question regarding the interpretation of the Electoral College Rules, 1964. Specifically, the Court must determine whether the High Court erred in its application of the statutory requirement that an election can only be declared void if the result was materially affected by the contravention of election rules, even where the secrecy of the ballot has been demonstrably violated. The Supreme Court suspended the High Court's order pending the final hearing of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the violation of the secrecy of the ballot by a Presiding Officer automatically invalidate an election?
  • Must it be proven that an election result was materially affected by a procedural contravention before an Election Tribunal can declare an election void?
  • What is the correct interpretation of Rule 36(1-A) of the Electoral College Rules 1964 regarding the invalidation of elections?
  Read full judgment →
• Awal Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-26Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad vs Khadija Begum and 5 Other1970 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-11
  settlement disputeprovisional transfer orderearmarking listtransfer of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a house in District Sheikhupura under the settlement laws. The core legal question concerned the validity of the cancellation of a provisional transfer order issued in favour of the petitioner after the property had already been validly transferred to the respondent on her C. H. Form due to an erroneous earmarking and subsequent draw of lots. The Supreme Court held that since the property was already lawfully transferred to the respondent, it should not have been included in the earmarking list, and therefore the settlement authorities and the High Court rightly corrected the mistake by cancelling the subsequent allotment in favour of the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that inadvertent inclusion and subsequent lot-drawing of a previously transferred property creates no indefeasible right, and the settlement authorities retain the power to correct such administrative errors.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property already transferred to a claimant on a C. H. Form be validly included in an earmarking list and allotted to another person?
  • Do settlement authorities have the power to cancel a lot drawn by mistake in respect of a property already transferred?
  • Will the High Court interfere in its writ jurisdiction with an order of the settlement authorities correcting a bona fide mistake in property allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Atta Muhammad And 5 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-12
  murder convictiondeath sentenceeye-witness testimonyrecovery of weaponssentencing proportionalitychild witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentences of six appellants for the murder of the deceased, Allah Dia, under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court regarding the appellants' guilt, based on eye-witness testimony and the recovery of blood-stained weapons, were sustainable. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding that the direct evidence of the deceased's family members, corroborated by the recovery of weapons stained with human blood, sufficiently established the appellants' guilt. However, the Court held that the death penalty was not appropriate for all appellants. While the death sentences for the two appellants who lured the deceased and carried deadly weapons were upheld, the Court modified the sentences of the remaining four appellants—who carried less lethal weapons—to transportation for life. The judgment affirms the principle that while direct evidence corroborated by forensic recovery is sufficient for conviction, the nature of the weapons used and the specific role of each participant are critical factors in determining the proportionality of sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of semi-digested food in the stomach of a deceased necessarily invalidate the prosecution's timeline when direct eye-witness evidence is available?
  • Can the recovery of blood-stained weapons from the accused serve as sufficient corroboration for eye-witness testimony in a murder trial?
  • Is the testimony of a child witness admissible and reliable if the trial court has satisfied itself regarding the child's intelligence?
  • Should the death penalty be commuted to transportation for life for co-accused who carried less lethal weapons compared to the principal offenders?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Ullah Khan and Another vs Mst. Ghulam Zohran and Another1970 SCMR 654 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-22
  special leave to appealtemporary injunctionprima facie casejoint possessiondeclaratory suitinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioners' civil revision and upheld the grant of a temporary injunction to the respondents by the District Judge. The underlying dispute involves a declaratory suit filed by the respondents challenging a registered sale deed executed in favor of the petitioners concerning landed property inherited from their late father, alleging the deed to be fictitious, forged, and without consideration. The core legal question concerns whether observations made by appellate courts regarding joint possession while granting a temporary injunction constitute a final determination of the suit's merits. The Supreme Court held that findings rendered at the interlocutory stage regarding a prima facie case do not constitute a final adjudication of the issues, which must be determined by the trial court after recording full evidence. The key principle laid down is that observations made for assessing a prima facie case in temporary injunction matters do not prejudice or finally determine the substantive rights of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does an observation regarding joint possession made while deciding a temporary injunction application constitute a final determination of the suit?
  • Can findings given at the interlocutory stage prejudice the trial court's evaluation of evidence on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad vs Government of West Pakistan and Another1970 SCMR 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-03
  officiating appointmentreversionreduction in rankPublic Service Commissionadvisory capacitywrit petitionspecial leave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's writ petition regarding his reversion from an officiating post of Senior Auditor. The petitioner contended that the Government's reversion order was passed under the compulsive force and dictation of the Public Service Commission rather than independently. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected this argument, holding that the Public Service Commission provides advisory opinions only and cannot dictate orders to the Government. The Court reaffirmed its established precedent that reversion from an officiating appointment does not amount to a reduction in rank so as to attract constitutional protections against adverse service actions. Consequently, the impugned order was validly passed by the Government itself, making the writ petition misconceived. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does reversion from an officiating appointment amount to a reduction in rank under service law?
  • Whether advice tendered by the Public Service Commission has binding or compulsive force on the Government?
  • Can a writ petition lie against an order of reversion from an officiating post?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Muhammad and Another vs The State1970 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-07
  review petitioncriminal appealerror apparent on the face of the recorddeath sentencere-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for review filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 12th November 1969, which had previously dismissed the petitioners' criminal appeal against their convictions and death sentences for the murder of one Allah Dita. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had established grounds for a review of the earlier judgment, specifically whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record. The Court held that the petition was merely an attempt to re-canvass evidence that had already been duly considered and determined in the original appeal. Finding no error apparent on the face of the record as required by the applicable rules, the Court dismissed the review petition. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be utilized as a mechanism to re-argue or re-examine evidence already adjudicated upon, and must strictly demonstrate an error apparent on the face of the record to succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be used to re-canvass evidence already considered and determined in an appeal?
  • What is the threshold requirement for maintaining a review petition under the Supreme Court Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Ata Mljhammad and Another vs The State-1970 P Cr. L J 1018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-07
  review petitioncriminal appealconvictiondeath sentenceerror apparent on the face of the recordre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 12th November 1969, which had previously dismissed the petitioners' criminal appeal and affirmed their convictions and death sentences for the murder of one Allah Dia. The core legal question presented was whether the petitioners had established sufficient grounds to warrant a review of the earlier appellate judgment. The Court held that the petition was essentially an attempt to re-canvass factual evidence that had already been duly considered and determined during the original appeal proceedings. Finding no error apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be utilized as a mechanism to re-argue or re-examine evidence already adjudicated upon, and such relief is strictly confined to instances where an error is apparent on the face of the record, as mandated by the procedural rules governing the Court's review jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a review petition be used to re-canvass evidence that was already considered and determined in an appeal?
  • What is the threshold for granting a review of a judgment under the Supreme Court Rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Aslam Alias Khan and 4 Others vs The State1970 SCMR 794 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-22
  post-arrest bailcommitment proceedingsSessions Courthierarchy of courtscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order regarding post-arrest bail. The core legal question concerns the appropriate forum and stage for seeking bail after commitment proceedings have concluded and the accused have been committed to the Sessions Court for trial. The Court held that once commitment proceedings are finished, the proper course for the petitioners is to first move the Sessions Judge concerned to decide the question of bail based on the prosecution evidence, before approaching the High Court or the Supreme Court. The petition was accordingly dismissed as premature, establishing the principle of exhausting remedies before the trial court at the relevant stage.

  Questions settled

  • What is the proper course for seeking bail after commitment proceedings have finished?
  • Can an accused approach the High Court or Supreme Court for bail before moving the Sessions Judge after commitment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashutosh Basak and Others vs S. M. Rahmatullah and Other1970 SCMR 386 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-16
  landlord and tenantmonthly tenancynotice to quittransfer of propertyejectment suittrespasserpermanent lease
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for declaration of title and eviction of respondents from a parcel of land. The plaintiffs alleged the respondents were trespassers, while the respondents contended they were tenants under an agreement. The trial and High Court concurrently found that while a concluded agreement for a permanent lease existed, the absence of a registered instrument meant no permanent tenancy was created. Instead, the relationship constituted a monthly tenancy. The core legal question was whether the landlord could unilaterally terminate this tenancy by refusing rent and whether the respondents were trespassers. The Supreme Court held that once a landlord-tenant relationship is established, it can only be terminated in accordance with law, either by the efflux of the stipulated period or by service of a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court affirmed that a landlord cannot terminate a tenancy merely by refusing to accept rent. Consequently, without a valid notice to quit, the tenancy subsisted, and the respondents were not trespassers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord unilaterally terminate a tenancy by merely refusing to accept rent?
  • Does an oral agreement to lease, coupled with the acceptance of rent, create a monthly tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act?
  • Is a notice to quit required to terminate a monthly tenancy in the absence of a specific contract?
  • Can a permanent lease be created without a registered instrument?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq and Another Ramzan vs The State Abdul Haq and ANOTHERs1970 P Cr. L J 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  bail pending appealjudicial discretionreasons for bailcriminal appealgrievous hurtconvict bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two connected criminal petitions for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding bail pending appeal. The petitioners and respondents were convicted by the trial court for their roles in an occurrence involving two murders and grievous injuries. The High Court had granted bail to two respondents (Abdul Haq and Ashraf) while refusing it to the petitioners (Ashiq and Anwar). The Supreme Court examined the High Court's discretion in granting bail, noting that while the High Court failed to provide explicit reasons for its order, it appeared to distinguish between the parties based on their alleged responsibility for the murders. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with the High Court's discretion in bail matters absent extraordinary circumstances. However, the Court emphasized that it is proper and desirable for High Courts to provide reasons when granting bail to convicts sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The petitions were dismissed, with the Court observing that the petitioner Anwar could renew his bail application if his appeal remained undecided after six months.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary for the High Court to provide reasons when granting bail to a convict sentenced to a long term of imprisonment?
  • Should the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting bail pending appeal absent extraordinary circumstances?
  • Can a convict renew a bail application if the appeal remains pending for an extended period?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq and Another Ramzan vs The State Abdul Haq and Another1970 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-08
  criminal appealbaildiscretiongrievous injuriessupreme court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises connected criminal petitions for special leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court of Lahore, which allowed bail to certain respondents while refusing it to the petitioners in a pending criminal appeal arising from convictions and sentences for murder and causing grievous injuries. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail to convicts sentenced to long terms of imprisonment without recording supporting reasons, and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary exercise of bail powers. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court ought to have recorded reasons for granting bail to respondents convicted under section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code, no extraordinary circumstance warranted interference with the High Court's discretion, and consequently dismissed the petitions while observing that a renewal of a bail application could be made if the appeal is not decided within six months. The key principle laid down is that the High Court should provide reasons when granting bail in serious cases, but the apex court will not ordinarily interfere with bail discretion absent compelling grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting bail without extraordinary circumstances?
  • Is it proper and desirable for the High Court to provide reasons when granting bail to convicts sentenced to long terms of imprisonment?
  • Can a bail application be renewed if the criminal appeal is not decided within a specified period?
  Read full judgment →
• Ashiq Ali and Others vs The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, West1970 SCMR I26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-23
  second reviewfresh evidencesettlement schemewrit jurisdictionallotment cancellationfraud
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought a second review of the Supreme Court's order dated 17th June 1966, which had previously dismissed their petition for leave to appeal against a High Court decision regarding a Settlement matter. The petitioners requested the Court to admit a copy of a pedigree-table as fresh evidence to substantiate their claim to land in Pakistan under the Settlement Scheme, asserting this document proved their connection to the estate in question. The Court noted that the original petition for special leave was rejected because the final order in the Settlement proceedings was not vitiated by any substantial defect, and the initial review had already affirmed the power of cancellation, noting the allotment was vitiated by fraud. The Court held that it could not receive fresh evidence concerning the truth or falsity of the original claim during a second review proceeding. Consequently, the Court dismissed the request, clarifying that the petitioners were at liberty to present the newly procured evidence before the appropriate Settlement authorities for consideration rather than seeking its admission before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court receive fresh evidence regarding the merits of a claim during a second review proceeding?
  • Is the Supreme Court the appropriate forum to introduce new evidence concerning a claim rejected by Settlement authorities?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to review its own order dismissing a petition for leave to appeal based on the introduction of new evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Arab Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-10-06
  joint trialsame transactionmurdertheftcriminal procedurespecial leave appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave against the conviction of the appellant Arab Khan for murder by gunfire and attempted murder, alongside the conviction of another for theft. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the joint trial of the appellant on murder charges with another accused on theft charges was legal, specifically whether the theft and murder formed part of the same transaction. The Court held that the joint trial was entirely lawful, reasoning that the incidents were linked together by a community of purpose and continuity of action commencing from the capture of the co-accused for theft up to the subsequent shooting by the appellant. The key principle laid down is that the legality of a joint trial under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure depends on what appears on the face of the accusation, where multiple incidents are connected by continuity of action and community of purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the trial of persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is legal under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • At what point in the proceedings must the condition prescribed by clause (d) of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be fulfilled?
  • What are the necessary features of a single transaction involving more than one incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Anwarul Haq Alias Ibrat Anwar vs E. W. Randle and 2 Other1970 SCMR 590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-02
  settlement disputetransfer of propertydivisible propertyschool transferspecial leave to appealdisplaced person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of bungalow No. 36, Jail Road, Lahore, under settlement laws. The petitioner initially obtained a transfer order for the entire bungalow, but through subsequent rounds of litigation initiated by respondent No. 1, the Settlement Commissioner remanded the matter, ultimately resulting in an order dividing the bungalow and transferring one half to respondent No. 1 as a school and the other half to the petitioner. The petitioner challenged this division through a writ petition and a subsequent Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court, both of which were dismissed. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned the divisibility of the property and the entitlement of respondent No. 1 to the transfer of a portion as a school. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the property is divisible, that findings of fact regarding the status of the respondent as a non-claimant displaced person cannot be re-agitated, and noting the undertaking that the property will continue to be used as a school without personal claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a settlement property found to be divisible can be split and transferred partly to different claimants?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the status of a party as a non-claimant displaced person be agitated before the Supreme Court?
  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to challenge the transfer of a portion of a property to another claimant when the property is held to be divisible?
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• Andison Co Operative Industries Ltd. Sialkot vs Ch. Nazir Ahmad1970 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  execution of decreeexecuting courtnullity of decreelimitationco-operative societiesarbitration award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition upholding the dismissal of its objection in execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether an executing court or authority can go behind a decree or award on the ground of limitation and refuse execution. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that in the execution of a decree or award, the executing court cannot go behind it unless the decree is a nullity, and an erroneous appreciation of limitation does not render the decree or award a nullity. The key principle laid down is that the question of limitation does not constitute a nullity so as to permit an executing court to look behind a binding award or decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court go behind a decree or award on the ground of limitation?
  • Does an incorrect determination of limitation render an award or decree a nullity?
  • Whether an executing court has jurisdiction to examine the correctness of a decree during execution proceedings?
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• Amirzada and Another vs Mst. Sardar Begum and Another1970 SCMR 361 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1963-10-25
  writ of certiorarierror of law on the face of the recorddisplaced personssettlement authoritiesconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan at Peshawar, which dismissed the appellants' writ petition seeking to quash the order of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. The core legal question was whether a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an alleged error of law regarding the status of the appellants as displaced persons when the error was not self-evident and required investigation of facts and arguments. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a writ of certiorari is only available to quash a decision for an error of law if the error appears manifestly on the very face of the record and does not require a detailed examination or investigation of disputed questions of fact. The key principle laid down is that certiorari cannot be used as an appeal in disguise to re-examine findings of fact or to correct errors of law that are not self-evident on the face of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ of certiorari be issued to correct an error of law that is not self-evident on the face of the record?
  • Whether an error requiring investigation of facts and arguments can be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record?
  • Is certiorari available as an appeal in disguise to rehear issues raised in settlement proceedings?
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• Amir Khan vs The State1970 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-13
  anticipatory bailsuppression of factsclean hands doctrineinterim bailbail cancellationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges a High Court order recalling an interim bail previously granted to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given conflicting police investigation reports and the petitioner's suppression of a prior failed anticipatory bail application. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The Court reasoned that the petitioner had willfully suppressed the fact that his earlier application for anticipatory bail had been dismissed on merits, thereby obtaining interim bail through misrepresentation. The Court emphasized the principle that a party seeking judicial assistance must approach the court with clean hands. Furthermore, the Court found that the material available, indicating the petitioner was present at the scene armed with a firearm and raised a lalkara, did not warrant bail under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regardless of the conflicting opinions among investigating officers regarding the necessity of a challan.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of a previously dismissed bail application by an accused justify the cancellation of interim bail subsequently granted?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 merely because one of several investigating officers opined against challaning them?
  • Can an accused who was present at the scene of a crime armed with a firearm and raised a lalkara claim entitlement to bail?
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• Amanullah Khan and Others vs Khan Attaullah Khan and Other1970 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  pre-emption suitprobable valueland valuationinterlocutory orderrevisional jurisdictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order passed by the High Court of West Pakistan in its revisional jurisdiction regarding the valuation of land in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly assessed the 'probable value' of the land for the purpose of ordering a deposit by the pre-emptor under the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the assessment of the probable value of land at the interlocutory stage is not a function of the Supreme Court. The Court determined that no serious question of law was involved in the petition. The key principle laid down is that where a party disputes the valuation fixed for the purpose of a pre-emption deposit, the appropriate remedy is to raise the valuation as a specific issue within the trial of the pre-emption suit itself, rather than seeking appellate intervention at an interlocutory stage to determine factual assessments of land value.

  Questions settled

  • Is the assessment of the probable value of land for a pre-emption deposit a matter to be determined by the Supreme Court at the leave to appeal stage?
  • What is the appropriate forum for a party to challenge the valuation fixed for a pre-emption deposit?
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• Allah Yar Khan vs Government of Pakistan through Joint1970 SCMR 64 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servicetermination of servicetemporary government employeespecial leave to appealcontractual undertakingnotice period
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Civil Supplies Inspector, challenged the termination of his employment by the Government of Pakistan, which was effected upon 15 days' notice. Having failed in the High Court, he sought Special Leave to Appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the termination of the petitioner's services, based on an undertaking regarding notice periods, violated constitutional protections afforded to civil servants. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the petitioner held a temporary post within a temporary department and had explicitly provided an undertaking allowing for termination upon 15 days' notice. The Court rejected the argument that the undertaking was invalid because it was signed after the initial appointment, holding that it effectively became a term of the employment contract. Consequently, the Court ruled that the termination did not attract constitutional protections, as the petitioner was bound by the agreed-upon terms. The petition for Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed, affirming that contractual terms regarding notice periods in temporary government service are binding.

  Questions settled

  • Can an undertaking regarding the termination of service, signed after the initial appointment, be considered a valid term of employment?
  • Does the termination of a temporary government employee, pursuant to an agreed-upon notice period, attract constitutional protections?
  • Is a finding by the High Court regarding the existence of a signed undertaking binding in a petition for Special Leave to Appeal?
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• Allah Ditta and Others vs The State1970 SCMR 734 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-22
  murderunlawful assemblycommon objectdelay in FIRmedical evidenceinterested witnessesplea of self-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of four appellants for offences including murder, unlawful assembly, and causing grievous hurt under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, motivated by a land dispute, launched a coordinated attack on the deceased and his father, inflicting fatal head injuries and multiple wounds. The trial court convicted six accused, but the High Court subsequently acquitted two of them out of abundant caution, maintaining the convictions of the four appellants. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the complainant party was the aggressor, that there was a delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), and that the site of the occurrence was disputed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the presence of human blood at the scene established the place of occurrence, the delay in lodging the FIR was reasonably explained by the urgent need to seek medical aid for the critically injured victims, and the minor injuries on the accused party indicated they were the aggressors. The Court affirmed that active participation in an unlawful assembly with a common object justifies joint liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a delay in lodging a First Information Report is fatal to the prosecution case if it is explained by the necessity of securing immediate medical attention for critically injured victims?
  • Can the place of occurrence of a crime be established by the recovery of blood-stained earth confirmed to be human blood by chemical analysis?
  • Whether minor injuries on the accused party, contrasted with fatal and grievous injuries on the complainant party, negate the plea that the complainant party was the aggressor?
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• Allah Ditta and 6 Others vs Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation1970 SCMR 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-10-24
  evacuee propertyusufructuary mortgagedispossessionland settlementcharge on propertywrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by mortgagees challenging the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court. The petitioners, who held a usufructuary mortgage over evacuee land, were dispossessed and the land was allotted to respondents by the Collector. The core legal question is whether settlement authorities can dispossess a mortgagee of evacuee land without prior payment of the mortgage amount, and whether the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition. The Supreme Court held that settlement authorities under the Land Settlement Act can dispossess mortgagees to put allottees in possession without immediate payment of the mortgage money, while the mortgage amount remains a charge on the property, and the satisfaction of such charges is governed by the Satisfaction of Charges (Land Settlement) Rules, 1962. Furthermore, any grievance regarding the assessment of the mortgage amount must be pursued through appeal or revision before higher settlement authorities rather than constitutional writ jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can settlement authorities dispossess a mortgagee of evacuee land before the payment of the mortgage amount?
  • Does the mortgage amount remain a charge on the mortgaged property after dispossession by settlement authorities?
  • Are petitioners entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the assessment of a mortgage amount by the Collector?
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• Ali Muhammad and 3 Others vs The Crown1970 SCMR 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-02-06
  criminal appealmurderunlawful assemblyconstructive liabilityprivate defencecorroborationaggressordeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the Chief Court of Sind which convicted the appellants under sections 147, 148, 323, 325, and 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code in connection with a land dispute resulting in murder and rioting. The core legal questions involved whether the failure of the prosecution to detail defence injuries caused prejudice, whether corroboration was necessary for identifying accused persons, and the applicability of constructive liability under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code where an unlawful assembly was heavily armed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the lower courts concurrently found the appellants to be the aggressors, the plea of private defence failed, and that members of a heavily armed unlawful assembly knew that death was likely to be caused in the prosecution of their common object, thereby attracting constructive liability regardless of individual weapon use. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to adduce detailed evidence regarding injuries sustained by the accused prejudices the plea of private defence when the accused are found to be the aggressors?
  • Does the requirement for corroboration of interested witnesses apply equally to an accused specifically named in the first information report with a definite overt act?
  • Is every member of a heavily armed unlawful assembly liable with the knowledge that death was likely to be caused in the prosecution of the common object?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with a death sentence that is neither illegal nor grossly improper?
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• Ali Ahmad vs The State1970 SCMR 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-26
  special leave to appealcriminal mischiefprescriptive rightlimitation actevacuee propertyrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his criminal revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld his conviction under Section 430 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing mischief by raising a wall around a well, thereby depriving local residents of water for irrigation. The core legal questions involved whether the lower courts' concurrent factual findings regarding the public's prescriptive right to the water and the petitioner's lack of a bona fide claim could be interfered with, and whether a prescriptive right under Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1908 was established. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact supported by abundant evidence could not be interfered with in revision, and that the long-term uninterrupted use of water established the villagers' prescriptive right. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent factual findings of lower courts be interfered with in criminal revision when supported by abundant evidence?
  • Whether long-term uninterrupted use of well water for irrigation establishes a prescriptive right under the Limitation Act?
  • Does raising a wall around a well used by the public for agricultural irrigation constitute mischief under the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• Alaf Din vs Mst. Parveen Akhtar1970 PLD Supreme Court 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-11-14
  Summary & questions settled

  The provided judgment text is empty. Consequently, it is impossible to provide a summary of the nature of the matter, the core legal questions, the court's decision, or the key principles laid down. The record contains no information regarding the facts of the case, the arguments presented by the parties, or the reasoning of the court. As the source material is absent, this summary cannot be generated in accordance with the instructions to rely solely on the provided text.

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• Akaddas Ali vs The Province of East Pakistan and Other1970 SCMR 814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17
  disciplinary proceedingsrevisional powersgovernment servantdismissal from serviceleave preparatory to retirementstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Treasurer, challenged his dismissal from service following a shortage of funds in the currency chest. Although initially acquitted in criminal proceedings and subsequently reinstated by the Additional Commissioner after an initial dismissal, the Government later directed the Deputy Commissioner to dismiss the petitioner again. The High Court upheld this second dismissal, relying on Rule 22 of the Bengal Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1936, which grants the Government revisional powers over orders passed by subordinate authorities. The petitioner sought leave to appeal, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted under the East Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, rather than the 1936 Rules, thereby rendering the Government's invocation of Rule 22 inapplicable. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the question of whether the Government’s revisional power under the 1936 Rules extends to proceedings initiated under the 1960 Rules is a matter of public importance requiring judicial determination. The Court also observed that the petitioner had been granted leave preparatory to retirement, which should be honored if the Government maintains he is in service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government possess the power of revision under Rule 22 of the Bengal Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1936, regarding disciplinary proceedings conducted under the East Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960?
  • Can the Government lawfully direct the dismissal of a civil servant after an appellate authority has already ordered their reinstatement?
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• Ainul Huq vs The State1970 SCMR 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  dishonest retentionstolen propertySection 342 examinationprocedural irregularityexclusive possessioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonestly retaining stolen property, specifically a German Patromax Light and a quantity of rice. The conviction, initially upheld by the Sessions Judge and the High Court of East Pakistan, was challenged on three grounds: the inadmissibility of a confession made to a Union Council Chairman, the failure of the prosecution to prove exclusive possession, and the omission of the alleged confession during the petitioner's examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the confession's admissibility, the evidence of the petitioner leading witnesses to the location of the stolen goods in a sugar-cane field sufficiently established his possession. The Court further ruled that in the absence of the record of the Section 342 examination, it must presume the procedure was correctly followed, and any irregularity would not vitiate the trial without proof of prejudice. The petition was dismissed, affirming that Section 411 covers both receiving and retaining stolen property.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 cover both receiving and retaining stolen property?
  • Can a conviction be vitiated by an irregularity in the examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of prejudice?
  • Is a conviction sustainable based on evidence of possession even if a prior confession is excluded?
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• Ahmadullah Khan and Others vs Fazal Bibi and Other1970 SCMR 604 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-28
  adverse possessionco-sharersousterrevenue recordssale deeddeclaration of titleconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land ownership involving 110 kanals and 11 marlas. The petitioners, claiming ownership through a 1926 sale deed, sought a declaration of title and possession, asserting that the name of a co-sharer, Mst. Mehr Tabana, was wrongly included in revenue records. The petitioners argued they acquired title through purchase and, alternatively, through adverse possession. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently held that the petitioners failed to prove ownership regarding Mst. Mehr Tabana's share, as she was not a party to the sale deed. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, holding that a sale deed cannot bind a third party who was not a signatory. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the possession of one co-sharer is deemed the possession of all co-sharers. Absent evidence of a definite act of ouster or denial of title, a co-sharer cannot claim adverse possession against another. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sale deed bind a third party who was not a signatory to the document?
  • Does the possession of one co-sharer constitute possession of all co-sharers in the absence of evidence of ouster?
  • Can a co-sharer claim adverse possession against another co-sharer without proving a definite act of ouster?
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• Ahmad Nawaz vs The State1970 SCMR 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-15
  right of private defenceself-defencemurder convictionaggressorbenefit of doubtcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, Ahmad Nawaz, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of Nusrat, despite the court accepting the defence's version that the complainant party were the initial aggressors who lay in ambush. The High Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that because the deceased was shot in the back, he was retreating and thus the appellant exceeded his right of private defence. The Supreme Court reviewed the matter, focusing on whether the right of private defence was correctly applied. The Court held that once the prosecution's version of the incident was discredited and the defence's version—that the complainant party were the aggressors—was accepted, the firing by the accused occurred during a sudden, concerted assault. The Court ruled that the location of the bullet wound on the deceased's back did not invalidate the plea of self-defence, as the accused was entitled to defend his companion during the heat of the attack. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a gunshot wound on the back of a deceased necessarily negate a plea of self-defence by the accused?
  • Can the right of private defence be invoked when the accused party is subjected to a sudden, concerted attack by the complainant party?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt when the prosecution's version of the incident's origin is rejected by the courts?
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• Agha Ali vs Iqbal and 2 Others1970 P Cr. L J 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-27
  acquittalspecial leave to appealFirst Information Report delayappreciation of evidenceeye-witness testimonyunwitnessed crimecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the acquittal of two respondents by the High Court in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents murdered the deceased due to a suspicion of illicit relations with the sister of one respondent. The conviction by the trial court was based on the testimony of two eye-witnesses and the recovery of a weapon. The High Court acquitted the respondents, citing significant delays in lodging the First Information Report, inconsistencies in the timeline of the witnesses' arrival at the scene, medical evidence regarding the state of the deceased's stomach contents, and the absence of expected physical evidence like scorching or blackening on the body. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's reasoning and found that the delay in reporting the crime was not satisfactorily explained, as witnesses were present at the scene and could have easily reported the matter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's conclusion that the crime was unwitnessed was justified based on the evidence, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay in lodging the First Information Report sufficient grounds to doubt the prosecution's version of events in a murder case?
  • Does the presence of witnesses at the crime scene invalidate an excuse for failing to report the crime promptly?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal based on the High Court's appreciation of evidence when the delay in reporting remains unexplained?
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• Advocate General, Government Op East Pakistan vs Majid Alias Abdul1970 P Cr. LJ 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  circumstantial evidencemurderappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtself-inflicted injuriespolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which set aside the respondent domestic servant's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentence of transportation for life for the murders of a cook and an ayah. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the treatment of minor discrepancies in witness testimonies, and the evaluation of self-inflicted injuries in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in discarding the prosecution's evidence on speculative grounds and misreading the record, and that an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence conclusively established the respondent's guilt. The key legal principles laid down are that minor discrepancies arising from witnesses observing events at different times do not vitiate credible testimony, and that perfunctory police investigation does not automatically demolish a strong chain of circumstantial evidence otherwise proved by reliable eye-witnesses and corroborative facts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to discard an otherwise reliable chain of circumstantial evidence?
  • Can perfunctory investigation by police officers alone form the basis for acquitting an accused when material circumstances establish guilt?
  • Whether self-inflicted injuries sustained during the commission of a crime can serve as an incriminating circumstance against the accused?
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• Advocate General, Government of East Pakistan vs Majid Alias Abdul1970 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1969-06-09
  circumstantial evidencemurderreappraisal of evidenceacquittaldefective investigationself-inflicted injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arose from a judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which had set aside the respondent's conviction and sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murders of a cook and an ayah. The core legal question involved whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution—including eyewitness accounts of the respondent near the crime scene with a weapon, incriminating statements, motive, and subsequent self-inflicted injuries—was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, notwithstanding certain lacunae and deficiencies in the police investigation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court had erred in discarding the prosecution's evidence based on speculative reasoning and minor discrepancies. The apex court restored the trial court's conviction, ruling that the unbroken chain of circumstances pointed unequivocally to the guilt of the accused. The key principle laid down is that minor discrepancies and investigative lapses by the police do not destroy an otherwise credible and robust chain of circumstantial evidence pointing to the accused's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies and investigative lapses by police are sufficient to discard a chain of circumstantial evidence?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal order when the trial court's findings are based on a proper reading of the evidence?
  • Whether self-inflicted injuries can form a relevant circumstance pointing towards the guilt of an accused in a murder case?
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• Abdus Sattar vs Muhammad Yaqub and Another1970 SCMR 786 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-24
  pre-arrest bailbail confirmationmurderpetition for leave to appealcancellation of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court confirming pre-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 1 in a murder case where he was alleged to have caught hold of the deceased while another inflicted a fatal blow. The core legal question is whether pre-arrest bail was properly confirmed by the High Court given the petitioner's presence in the F.I.R. The Supreme Court held that since the accused has been challaned and the matter is pending before the Committing Magistrate, the appropriate remedy is for the petitioner to move the lower court for reconsideration or cancellation of bail based on the record. The Court clarified that the High Court's bail order does not bar such an application. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that trial or committing courts can independently consider bail cancellation or modification once the case reaches them, notwithstanding a prior High Court order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner move the Committing Court for reconsideration of bail after the High Court has confirmed pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the confirmation of pre-arrest bail by the High Court act as a bar to a subsequent application for bail cancellation before the Committing Magistrate or Sessions Court?
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• Abdur Rehman vs Gadai Khan and 5 Others1970 P Cr. L J 1282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  special leave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtmurderre-examination of evidencecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which acquitted three respondents (Gadai Khan, Ashraf Khan, and Ajab Khan) of murder and other charges, despite finding that a fight had occurred between the parties resulting in two deaths. The High Court had concluded that because both parties sustained injuries, including firearm injuries, it was impossible to determine who initiated the firing, thereby granting the accused the benefit of the doubt. The petitioner, representing the complainant party, challenged this acquittal, arguing that the High Court's reasoning was legally flawed and that the accused had no justification for the killings. The Supreme Court found substance in the petitioner's contentions regarding the High Court's application of the benefit of doubt principle in the context of the established facts. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against the three respondents while dismissing the petition regarding the other two respondents, whose acquittal by the trial court was upheld as reasonable. The matter is set for re-examination of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere fact that both parties in a fight sustained injuries automatically entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt regarding the initiation of the conflict?
  • Can a High Court's acquittal be set aside if the reasoning for granting the benefit of the doubt is found to be legally flawed?
  • Is the refusal of a High Court to interfere with a trial court's acquittal of specific co-accused justified when the trial court's decision is based on valid reasons?
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• Abdur Rehman vs Gadai Khan and 5 Other1970 SCMR 614 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-27
  murderbenefit of doubtcross versionmutual fightland disputeleave to appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by Abdur Rehman against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, which set aside the convictions and sentences of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 for murder and other offences, and dismissed the petitioner's revision against the acquittal of respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's approach in extending the benefit of doubt and acquitting the convicted accused on the ground that it was impossible to determine which party started firing first during a mutual fight over land possession, despite injuries sustained by both sides. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the incorrect approach of the High Court in acquitting the convicted respondents warranted a re-examination of the evidence. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted against respondents Nos. 1 to 3 with non-bailable warrants issued, while the petition regarding the acquittal of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 was dismissed as their acquittal was based on valid reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in giving the benefit of doubt to the accused on the ground that it was impossible to determine which party started firing first in a mutual fight?
  • Does an acquittal based on a trial court' warranting evaluation of participation and lack of injuries warrant interference by the High Court?
  • Is leave to appeal properly granted when the appellate court's approach in setting aside convictions for murder in a sudden fight appears contrary to judicial principles?
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• Abdur Rauf Khan and Another vs Firm Babu Munir Ghulam Siddique, Peshawar and Other1970 SCMR 594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-24
  adverse possessionco-sharersagricultural tribemutationpre-emption suitusufructuary mortgage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a land dispute involving a sale deed executed in November 1942, subsequent mutations, pre-emption suits, and revenue proceedings under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. The core legal questions involve the validity of the transfer of land to non-agriculturalists, subsequent amendments to the law, and the claim of adverse possession by co-sharers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal in two related petitions involving the core questions of title and agricultural tribe status, while refusing leave and dismissing the third petition, holding that the petitioners failed to establish adverse possession, particularly as they were co-sharers in the property and the revenue authorities had recognized a usufructuary mortgage. The key principle laid down is that possession by a co-sharer does not readily mature into adverse possession against other co-sharers without clear, hostile, and open ouster, and that revenue determinations regarding mortgage status affect limitation and adverse possession claims.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer acquire title to property by adverse possession against another co-sharer?
  • Whether an amendment to the Punjab Alienation of Land Act has retrospective effect on previously cancelled mutations?
  • Does possession of land subject to a usufructuary mortgage ripen into adverse possession?
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• Abdur Rahim and Another vs Abdul Aziz1970 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-20
  partnership dissolutionrendition of accountscompeting businesspartner's liabilityconcurrent findings of factrival business
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for the dissolution of a partnership and the rendition of accounts regarding a firm known as 'London Picture House'. The appellant, a defendant in the original suit, contended that the respondent (plaintiff) had established a rival business, 'Paris Picture House', and was therefore liable to account for its profits under Section 16(b) of the Partnership Act, 1932. The trial court and the High Court concurrently found as a matter of fact that the 'Paris Picture House' was owned by the respondent’s sons, not the respondent himself. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the respondent was obligated to account for the profits of this rival business. The Court held that while Section 16(b) of the Partnership Act, 1932, does not require proof that a rival business was funded by partnership assets to trigger liability, the provision is only applicable if the partner actually carries on the competing business. Since the lower courts established the business belonged to third parties, the provision was inapplicable. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 16(b) of the Partnership Act 1932 require proof that a rival business was funded by partnership assets to trigger liability?
  • Is a partner liable to account for the profits of a business owned by third parties under Section 16(b) of the Partnership Act 1932?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the ownership of a business in a second appeal?
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• Abdur Rab vs The State and Another1970 SCMR 819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-18
  discharge of accusedcriminal revisionlimitation perioddelay in trialspecial leave to appealfraud and forgery
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner under sections 416 and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code for alleged fraud and forgery. After the prosecution failed to produce incriminating evidence and the complainant remained absent, the trial court discharged the accused under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, the District Magistrate set aside the discharge order in revision and ordered a further enquiry, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the limitation period for filing criminal revisions in East Pakistan, the competency of the District Magistrate to hear the revision, and allegations of prosecution harassment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that although the District Magistrate mistakenly applied a Sind Chief Court rule, courts possess inherent discretion to condone delay, and technical objections regarding endorsement and delay do not warrant interference where a trial can establish guilt or innocence. The Court directed the trial magistrate to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision application in criminal matters in East Pakistan is subject to a strict statutory period of limitation?
  • Does a revisional court have the power to condone delay in filing a revision application beyond the period prescribed for criminal appeals?
  • Whether the discharge of an accused under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be set aside in revision for further enquiry?
  • Does prolonged prosecution without immediate evidence constitute sufficient ground to quash criminal proceedings amounting to harassment?
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• Abdul Shakoor vs The Settlement and Rehabilitation1970 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09
  settlement propertyindivisible unittransfer of propertyclaimant versus non-claimantletters patent appealdiscretion of settlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition and a subsequent Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer of composite property situated in Rawalpindi by the Settlement Authorities. The core legal questions involve whether the Settlement Authorities were bound to divide the property into separate units and whether the transferee was restricted exclusively to the specific portion mentioned in his compensation form. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a property constitutes a single indivisible unit lies within the discretion of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the relevant statutory provisions, and a competent declaration treating it as an indivisible unit cannot be interfered with, particularly when the transferee holds a superior claim as a claimant against a non-claimant. The court laid down the principle that the discretion to treat a property as a single unit or divide it vests in the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and courts will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion or procedural refusals to admit new evidence at the appellate stage without strong justification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner is bound to divide a property capable of division?
  • Does a transferee get restricted only to the portion demanded in his C.S. Form when the property is treated as a single unit?
  • Whether the High Court is bound to allow new proof to be adduced at the Letters Patent Bench stage regarding the extent of a party's claim?
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• Abdul Wahid vs The State1970 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-07
  criminal breach of trustpublic servantmisappropriationentrustmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, a former Sanitary Inspector for the Municipality of Thatta, under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been entrusted with a sum of Rs. 1,500 for purchasing furniture, but failed to pay the full purchase price to the vendor and retained the remaining balance of Rs. 159 for several years before refunding it. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's retention of the municipal funds and failure to pay the vendor constituted criminal breach of trust. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had pocketed the funds meant for the furniture purchase and delayed the refund of the balance without any supporting evidence of timely deposit. The Court affirmed that such unauthorized retention and misappropriation of public funds entrusted to a public servant constitutes criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the retention of public funds by a public servant and delayed refund thereof constitutes criminal breach of trust under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a public servant be convicted of criminal breach of trust if they pocket funds entrusted to them for purchasing official goods and fail to pay the vendor?
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• Abdul Shakoor and 8 Others vs Settlement Commissioner, Lahore1970 SCMR 67 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Special Leave to AppealSettlement authoritiesquestion of factwrit jurisdictionproperty transferHigh Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an unsuccessful writ petition before the High Court of West Pakistan, challenging the orders of the Settlement authorities who decided to transfer a disputed property in favor of the respondent, Ghulam Rasool. The core legal question centered on whether the petitioners or the respondent had reconstructed the premises after it was burnt, and whether the High Court could interfere with findings of fact recorded by departmental authorities. The Supreme Court held that the question of who reconstructed the building was purely one of fact within the competent jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities, and the High Court rightly declined to interfere. Furthermore, the contention regarding an initial joint application was untenable given that both parties subsequently made statements claiming exclusive transfer. The Court affirmed that concurrent factual determinations based on evidence after remands will not be disturbed, and accordingly dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, laying down the principle that factual controversies resolved by administrative authorities fall outside the scope of constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of who was responsible for the reconstruction of a building is a question of fact within the jurisdiction of Settlement authorities?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its writ jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact recorded by departmental authorities?
  • Does an initial joint application for the transfer of property preclude parties from subsequently claiming exclusive transfer?
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• Abdul Salam Mehta vs Chairman, Water and Power Development, Authorityand Another1970 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-10-10
  WAPDAtermination of servicecivil servantdeputationshow-cause noticeconstitutional protectionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional writ petition filed by a former employee challenging the termination of his services. The petitioner, originally a temporary Diamond Driller under the Central Government, was transferred to WAPDA for the Mangla Dam Project before serving on deputation in Saudi Arabia. Upon return, the Chairman, WAPDA, terminated his services with one month's salary in lieu of notice. The petitioner contended that he remained a Central Government servant entitled to show-cause notice protections under Article 177 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, holding that under Section 9-A of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958, staff recruited exclusively for the project became WAPDA employees upon transfer. Consequently, the petitioner ceased to be a Central Government servant and was not entitled to constitutional protections guaranteed to civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a temporary Central Government employee transferred to WAPDA for a specific project ceases to be a Central Government servant under Section 9-A of the West Pakistan WAPDA Act 1958?
  • Is an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority entitled to the safeguards and protection under Article 177 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
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• Abdul Rashid and 3 Others vs Muhammad Nazir1970 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  settlement disputedivisibility of propertyremandverified claimsupreme court petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging an order of the High Court remitting a property dispute to the Settlement Commissioner to determine the divisibility of a house occupied by the rival parties since 20th December 1947. Initially, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had drawn lots won by the respondent, but the Additional Settlement Commissioner awarded the entire house to the petitioners on the ground that their verified claim was slightly higher and they occupied the ground floor, concluding the house was indivisible without assigning reasons or referring to the house layout. Higher settlement authorities upheld this view. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the High Court had already determined the house to be divisible. The Supreme Court held that the High Court made no such determination and that the core issue of divisibility remains to be decided by the Settlement Commissioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the remand for proper determination of divisibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court determined the house to be divisible in the impugned proceedings?
  • Does the issue of the divisibility of a house require determination by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can settlement authorities award an indivisible property without assigning reasons or consulting the house layout?
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