Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore Versus Ghulam Qadir1988 PLD 625 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• W.A.P.D.A. Versus Shujaat Ali Baghdadi1988 PLD 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-02
  civil serviceremoval from serviceretirementstatutory interpretationemployer discretionmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arose from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal which had modified WAPDA's order removing the respondent from service to that of retirement. The respondent, an Accounts Clerk, was removed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958. The Tribunal found no mala fides and sufficient material of misconduct, but altered the penalty solely on the ground of the respondent's long service since 1961. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the respondent's extensive record of misconduct and nuisance left no valid ground for the Tribunal to interfere with the employer's discretion. Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent's interpretation of Section 17(1-A) that WAPDA could only retire, and not remove, its own employees. The Court ruled that the statutory requirement of thirty days' notice or pay in lieu thereof clearly indicates that the power of removal from service applies to WAPDA's own employees as well as deputationists. The appeal was accepted, and the original removal order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the long service of an employee prevent an employer from exercising its discretion to remove him for proven misconduct under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958?
  • Whether the power of removal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 applies to WAPDA's own employees or is restricted to deputationists?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal modify an order of removal to retirement solely on the ground of length of service when there is sufficient evidence of severe misconduct?
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• Asmat Ullah Khan Versus Bazi Khan1988 PLD 621 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Iftikhar Ahmad Versus President N.B.P1988 PLD 53 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-04-15
  Labour Court jurisdictionWage Commission Awardnationalised banksgrievance petitionunfair labour practicestermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  These seventy-five appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan raised a common question of law: whether employees of nationalised banks could approach a Labour Court under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 to seek redress for grievances relating to their termination or removal from service, given that their terms and conditions of service were governed by the Wage Commission Award. The employers argued that the Wage Commission Award was not an "award" under Section 25-A of the Ordinance, and that exclusive jurisdiction vested in the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Supreme Court held that the word "any" preceding "award" in Section 25-A(1) expands its scope beyond the narrow definition in Section 2(ii), thereby including the Wage Commission Award. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 22-B(3)(a) does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the National Industrial Relations Commission for general grievances, as its jurisdiction is restricted to cases involving elements of unfair labour practices. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Courts' judgments, and remanded the cases for determination of the remaining issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Wage Commission Award qualify as an award for the purposes of filing a grievance petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over all individual grievances of bank employees to the exclusion of Labour Courts?
  • Does Section 22-B(3)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 confer general jurisdiction on the Benches of the National Industrial Relations Commission in the absence of allegations of unfair labour practices?
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• Benazir Bhutto (Miss) Versus Federation of Pakistan1988 PLD 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-20
  political partiesfreedom of associationfundamental rightsconstitutional petitionjudicial reviewarticle 270-apolitical parties actregistration of political parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the validity of various post-July 1977 amendments to the Political Parties Act, 1962, as being violative of Fundamental Rights, particularly Articles 17 and 25. The core legal questions involved the scope of the freedom to form and operate political parties under Article 17(2), the extent of the ouster of judicial review and validation under Article 270-A, and whether compulsory registration and audit requirements imposed on political parties constitute reasonable restrictions. The Supreme Court held that while Article 270-A validates the enactment of laws made during the specified martial law period as to legislative competence, it does not immunize sub-constitutional laws from future inconsistency with Fundamental Rights upon their revival. The Court ruled that compulsory registration provisions (section 3-B) and certain unconstitutional constraints in the Political Parties Act are void ab initio as they impose unreasonable restrictions on the right to form and operate political parties, which can only be dissolved upon a final reference to the Supreme Court. The key principle laid down is that political parties form the bedrock of parliamentary democracy, and any statutory restriction curtailing their functioning beyond the explicit confines of Article 17(2)—namely, the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan—is unconstitutional and void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 270-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 renders laws enacted during the martial law period immune from being challenged on the ground of inconsistency with Fundamental Rights?
  • Does the right to form a political party under Article 17(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include the right of the party to function, propagate its views, and participate in elections?
  • Can the legislature require compulsory registration of political parties as a precondition for participating in elections under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether the dissolution of a political party or the imposition of restrictions on its functioning can be validly entrusted to an executive authority or the Election Commission rather than the Supreme Court?
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• Khuda Bakhsh Versus The State1988 PLD 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Versus Allah Ditta1988 PLD 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-23Read full judgment →
• Jamila Begum Versus Abdullah Jan1988 PLD 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-08
  limitationexclusion of timegood faithdue diligenceauction saleexecution of decreesetting aside sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from execution proceedings where shops belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants were sold in a public auction. The judgment debtor filed a civil suit challenging the sale due to fraud and irregularities, which he later withdrew before filing an application under Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the sale. As the application was time-barred, he sought the exclusion of time spent prosecuting the civil suit under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908. The executing Court dismissed the application as time-barred, but the District Judge reversed this. The High Court restored the dismissal, holding that the suit was barred by law and not prosecuted in good faith. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that initiating a separate suit expressly barred by Order XXI, Rule 92(3), Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not constitute due diligence or good faith, as required for the exclusion of time under Section 14(2). The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party entitled under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 to the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting a separate suit when such a suit is expressly barred by law?
  • Does the filing of an independent suit that is barred by Rule 92(3) of Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 satisfy the requirement of good faith and due diligence under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Rafhan Maize Products Co. Ltd. Versus Commissioner of Income-Tax1988 PLD 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27
  super-tax rebateprocessing versus manufacturingincome tax referencestatutory interpretationfinance act rebategrain processing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals against judgments of the Sind High Court concerning the entitlement of the appellant company to a 10% rebate on super-tax under the Finance Acts of 1965, 1967, and 1968, in respect of income derived from processing maize into corn oil, starch, and cattle-feed. The core legal question is whether such conversion constitutes 'processing' of grain within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Finance Acts. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the rebate because the end-products (oil, starch) were distinct commodities and did not retain their identity as 'grain', failing the statutory requirement that income must be derived directly from processing the grain itself. The key principle laid down is that statutory terms like 'processing' must be interpreted in their legislative context alongside associated terms (freezing, preserving, canning), requiring that the raw material retains its core identity rather than being completely transformed into a new marketable product.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a company extracting corn oil, starch, and cattle-feed from maize is entitled to a rebate of 10% on super-tax under the relevant Finance Acts?
  • Whether the term 'processing' in the context of food and grain rebate provisions requires the raw material to retain its identity without being transformed into a completely new marketable product?
  • Whether the High Court has the power to resettle and reframe a question referred under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act 1922 to extract the real issue in controversy?
  • Whether dictionary meanings of statutory words can be applied in isolation from the context in which they are used in a legal provision?
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• Yasmeen Nighat Versus N.B.P.1988 PLD 391 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-17Read full judgment →
• Combined Enterprises Versus W.A.P.D.A. Lahore1988 PLD 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-24
  appointment of arbitratorsuits by firmspartner implied authorityrevisional jurisdictionarbitration awardsigning of pleadingsArbitration Act 1940
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arose from a High Court order annulling a Civil Court's appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940. The High Court had held that the application was incompetent because it was signed by only one partner of the firm and the arbitration agreement lacked proper stamp duty. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that under Order XXX Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, any one partner may sign and verify pleadings filed in the firm's name, which operates as an exception to general procedural joinder rules and Section 45 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court clarified that while a single partner lacks implied authority under Section 19(2) of the Partnership Act 1932 to submit an existing dispute to arbitration without consent, initiating court proceedings to enforce a contractual arbitration clause against a third party falls within a partner's implied agency to collect firm debts. Furthermore, once an arbitrator makes an award, any challenge to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement must be adjudicated by the designated court under Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940, barring premature interference via revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act 1940 filed in the name of a firm be validly signed and verified by a single partner?
  • Does a single partner have authority to initiate court proceedings in the firm's name to enforce an arbitration clause against a third party?
  • Can the High Court exercise revisional jurisdiction to invalidate an arbitration agreement after the arbitrator has entered on the reference and delivered an award?
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• Superintendent of Police, Headquarter, Lahore Versus Muhammad Latif1988 PLD 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-19
  service tribunalwrit jurisdictionconstitutional petitionArticle 212jurisdictional barservice matterjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the jurisdictional limits of the High Court in service matters. The respondent, a police official dismissed for embezzlement, challenged the Service Tribunal's adverse decision via a Constitutional Petition in the High Court, which set aside the dismissal order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising writ jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a High Court can entertain a Constitutional Petition against a Service Tribunal's order, effectively bypassing the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 creates an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of any court other than the Service Tribunal or the Supreme Court in service matters. The High Court cannot pre-judge whether a case involves a 'substantial question of law of public importance' to justify its own intervention. The ratio established is that once a Service Tribunal has adjudicated a matter, the exclusive remedy for an aggrieved party is to petition the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and the High Court possesses no authority to review such orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a Constitutional Petition against an order passed by a Service Tribunal?
  • Is the bar on jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable after a Service Tribunal has already disposed of an appeal?
  • Can a High Court pre-judge whether a case involves a substantial question of law of public importance to justify assuming jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Azizur Rehman Versus Muhammad Nawaz1988 PLD 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-16
  right of pre-emptioninheritance of pre-emption rightsuperior right of pre-emptiondate of saleco-sharercontiguous owner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether the right of pre-emption is heritable under Muslim law and the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, or whether it is a purely personal right that must be possessed by the pre-emptor on the date of sale. The respondent's father, a co-sharer and contiguous owner, died after a sale occurred, and the respondent sought to pre-empt the sale based on inheritance of that status. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption must exist on the date of the sale and cannot be improved or acquired subsequently by inheritance upon the death of the original qualified owner during the pendency of the matter. The Court ruled that the right is governed strictly by the provisions of the statute, which requires the pre-emptor to possess a superior right at the time of the sale, and the right does not survive to heirs by inheritance if the original claimant dies before obtaining a decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of pre-emption is heritable under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950?
  • Must a pre-emptor possess a superior right of pre-emption on the date of the sale?
  • Can a pre-emptor improve their position or acquire a right of pre-emption through inheritance after the date of sale?
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• Govt. of Punjab Versus Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America1988 PLD 382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  review petitionscope of reviewmeaning of vestMartial Law Regulation No. 118proprietary rightsSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition filed under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan, seeking review of the Court's earlier judgment dated 13-5-1987 in Civil Appeal No.253 of 1981. The core legal question involved whether the vesting of a privately-managed school under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 conferred absolute proprietary ownership on the Government or merely transferred management. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the mere incorrectness of a conclusion reached after full consideration of a matter is not a ground for review. The Court reaffirmed the key principle that review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to reargue a settled point or to seek reversal of a considered interpretation, unless the decision was given per incuriam through oversight of an important statute or aspect.

  Questions settled

  • Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be reviewed merely on the ground that the conclusion reached on a legal question is incorrect?
  • Does the word 'vest' under paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No.118 imply vesting in title with full proprietary rights as an absolute owner?
  • What constitutes a valid ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the vesting of privately-managed schools along with their assets in the Government under Martial Law Regulation No.118 amount to confiscation of property or merely a takeover of management?
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• Govt. of Punja Versus Muhammad Mahmood, Advocate1988 PLD 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-25
  judicial appointmentsrecommendation of High Courtproduction of documentsprivilegewrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a writ petition filed in the Lahore High Court by candidates for the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges. The candidates challenged the appointment of several other individuals, alleging that the appointments were not made on the recommendation of the High Court as required by law, since some appointees had failed the written test and were not interviewed. The High Court directed the Provincial Government to produce the original letter of recommendation. The Government resisted, arguing that the document was confidential, that official acts carry a presumption of correctness, and that the writ petitioners lacked standing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that under Article 4 of the Constitution, every citizen has an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law. The Court ruled that where a factual controversy exists as to whether statutory recommendations were followed, the High Court is fully justified in summoning the relevant document to satisfy itself of the legality of the state action, and no privilege could be claimed to shield such a document from judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to summon a recommendatory letter sent by the Chief Justice to the Provincial Government to verify if appointments were made in accordance with law?
  • Can the Provincial Government claim privilege over a recommendatory letter for judicial appointments to prevent its inspection by the Court?
  • Does the presumption of correctness of official acts preclude a court from summoning the primary document upon which the state action is purportedly based?
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• Bisvil Spinners Ltd. Versus Superintedent, Central Exise & Land Customs Circle, Sheikhupura1988 PLD 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-24
  sales taxtax exemptionfiscal statutestatutory interpretationgeneral and special provisionsdelegated legislationnotification
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute regarding the leviability of sales tax on machine-made carpets manufactured from man-made fibre. The appellant contended that because its products fell under the generic category of 'Fabrics of man-made fibre' which was exempted from sales tax under an earlier notification (S.R.O. 666(1)/81), a subsequent notification (S.R.O. 580(1)/83) imposing a reduced tax rate of 5% on 'machine-made carpets' could not apply without first formally rescinding or amending the earlier exemption notification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while tax-imposing statutes must be strictly construed, exemptions are also to be rigidly interpreted against the taxpayer. Applying the principle of statutory construction that a subsequent special provision overrides an earlier general provision, the Court ruled that the specific inclusion of machine-made carpets in the later notification carved out an exception to the general exemption of man-made fabrics, thereby making the reduced tax rate legally applicable without requiring the express rescission of the general exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent specific notification imposing a reduced tax rate on a product override a prior general notification exempting a broader class of goods containing that product?
  • How should tax exemptions in fiscal statutes be construed in the event of an ambiguity or conflict between general and specific notifications?
  • Is the formal rescission of a general tax exemption notification a prerequisite for the Federal Government to levy a reduced rate of tax on a specific sub-category of those goods via a subsequent notification?
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• Habib Bank Ltd. Versus National Industrial Relations Commission1988 PLD 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-04
  Wage Commission Awardpromotion policyclerical cadreofficers gradeIndustrial Relations Ordinancejurisdiction of Wage Commissionwritten examination for promotionFederal Government directive
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by Habib Bank Limited examines the applicability of paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award to promotions from the clerical cadre to the officers' grade, the Federal Government's authority to prescribe promotion examinations, and the extent to which an employer's plenary power to set promotion conditions is limited by statutory instruments. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Wage Commission under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is confined strictly to matters concerning workmen, and that promotion criteria to a higher cadre form part of the service conditions of the higher post rather than the lower post. Consequently, paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award does not govern promotions from clerical staff to the officers' grade, which falls outside the Wage Commission's purview. The Court further ruled that the Federal Government possesses the authority under section 10(6) of the Banks (Nationalization) Ordinance, 1974 to issue directives regarding uniform promotion policies and written examinations for recruitment to the officers' grade based on recommendations of the Pay Commission, and that the employer's power to prescribe qualifications for ensuring efficiency remains unaffected where no statutory prohibition exists. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether provisions of paragraph 237 of the First Wage Commission Award govern promotions from the clerical cadre to the officers' grade?
  • Whether the Federal Government is possessed of authority to prescribe a promotion examination for officers in nationalized commercial banks?
  • Whether the plenary power of an employer to prescribe conditions and qualifications for promotion stands controlled or limited by a Wage Commission award meant for workmen?
  • Whether terms and conditions relating to promotion to a higher post form part of the service conditions of the lower post or the higher post?
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• Punjab Public Service Commission Versus Maruf Ahmad Ali1988 PLD 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-17
  grace markscompetitive examinationcivil judgesaggregate marksviva voce testdepartmental constructioninterpretation of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court allowing the respondent's intra-court appeal regarding eligibility for viva voce and psychological tests in the competitive examination for Civil Judges held in February 1985. The respondent failed to obtain qualifying marks in one written paper and fell short of the aggregate qualifying marks by 0.13 percent. The core legal question concerned the interpretation of the relevant rule governing the grant of grace marks: whether grace marks granted in an individual subject are automatically counted toward the aggregate marks. The Supreme Court held that the language of the rule implies that grace marks granted in respect of an individual subject must be added to the aggregate, provided that such marks shall not entitle the grantee to a better position in the merit list over successful candidates who received no grace marks. The appeal was dismissed, and the Court clarified that while grace marks are granted to really deserving candidates based on performance, any resultant anomaly in the rule should be addressed by appropriate administrative amendment rather than restrictive interpretation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether grace marks granted in an individual subject under the relevant examination rules should also be counted toward the aggregate marks?
  • Does the departmental construction of a rule override the true and reasonable interpretation of that rule by a court?
  • Can grace marks given for an individual subject be used to gain an advantage against other competing candidates in the merit list?
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• Muhammad Shoib Versus Member (Revenue)1988 PLD 355 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-24Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed Versus W.A.P.D.A.1988 PLD 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-24Read full judgment →
• Aman Versus Land Acquistioon Collector1988 PLD 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-12-01
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationdelayed awardpotential valueinflationary factor
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the assessment of compensation for land acquired for the Tarbela Dam. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in May 1967, but the award was announced nearly seven years later in January 1974. The core legal question was whether the sharp rise in land prices during the long delay between the section 4 notification and the announcement of the award is a relevant factor to be considered when determining market value under section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court held that while the factors enumerated in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are not exhaustive and the sharp increase in land prices during an inordinate delay by the Collector in announcing the award can be a valid factor for assessing compensation, the claimants must lay the foundational basis for it by producing relevant evidence on record. The petitions were dismissed because the petitioners failed to bring any evidence regarding the rise in land prices during the interim period.

  Questions settled

  • Are the factors enumerated in section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act exhaustive for determining market value?
  • Can the sharp rise in land prices during the period between a section 4 notification and the announcement of the award be considered when assessing compensation?
  • Is it necessary for landowners to produce evidence of increased land prices during the delay period to claim higher compensation?
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• Sultan Eraj Zama Versus W.A.P.D.A.1988 PLD 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-24Read full judgment →
• Govt. of Punja Versus Muhammad Sarfraz1988 PLD 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-11
  ad hoc appointmentcivil servantsefflux of timeRules of Businessconferment of powersAdditional District and Sessions JudgereinstatementService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine whether a notification issued under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 conferred the status of a regular civil servant on an ad hoc appointee whose initial six-month period had expired.

  The respondent was appointed on an ad hoc basis as an Additional District and Sessions Judge for six months via a notification issued by the Services, General Administration and Information Department. After the six-month period expired, a subsequent notification was issued by the Home Department under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962, posting him to a civil district from the date he took charge. The Service Tribunal treated this second notification as a regular appointment. The Supreme Court reversed the Service Tribunal's judgment, holding that under the Punjab Government Rules of Business 1974 framed pursuant to Article 139(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, only the Services and General Administration Department possessed the authority to recruit and appoint civil servants, whereas the Home Department merely possessed power to constitute courts and confer jurisdictional powers. Consequently, statutory notifications under procedural or jurisdictional laws do not constitute a regular civil service appointment, nor do de facto service or administrative lapses extend an ad hoc appointment beyond its efflux of time.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification issued under Section 9(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 6 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962 constitute a regular appointment to the civil service?
  • Can a department other than the one designated under the Rules of Business framed pursuant to Article 139(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 validly appoint a civil servant?
  • Whether the de facto continuation of work and grant of leave after the expiry of an ad hoc appointment operates to extend the service or reinstate a civil servant?
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• Muhammad Akbar Versus Muhammad Khan1988 PLD 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-11
  injured eye-witnessesmurderacquittal appealcorroborationrecoverycriminal appealmitigation of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which had acquitted six respondents previously convicted by the trial court for murder and murderous assault. The core legal question concerned the reliability and necessity of corroboration for the testimony of injured eye-witnesses who were alleged to be interested and inimical. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in rejecting the testimony of the injured eye-witnesses and disbelieving the recoveries on flawed grounds, noting that the witnesses were natural and present at the scene, and that the police officer's testimony regarding recoveries was untainted. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restored the convictions recorded by the trial court under sections 302/149, 307/149, 323/149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, but modified the death sentences of three respondents to imprisonment for life in view of mitigating circumstances arising from prior cross-enmity and pending litigation. The key principle laid down is that injured eye-witnesses who are victims of the same occurrence are natural witnesses whose testimony cannot be discarded merely due to a previous background of enmity, provided their presence is established beyond doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of injured eye-witnesses can be rejected outright solely on the ground of being interested and inimical witnesses?
  • Can the evidence of recoveries be relied upon through the testimony of an investigating officer even if a private recovery witness is held to be suspect?
  • Whether prior enmity and cross-cases between parties can serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
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• Muhammad Yaqoob Versus The State1988 PLD 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-05
  leave to appealcustodial violenceextrajudicial killingapprover testimonyappraisal of evidencepolice encountermurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions and appeals following a trial for multiple murders and related offenses involving high-ranking police and civil officials, including a Superintendent of Police, Deputy Commissioner, and Station House Officer, alongside private individuals. The core legal question involves assessing the credibility of eyewitness testimony, approver evidence, and the veracity of manipulated official records regarding a fabricated police encounter used to cover up custodial violence and extrajudicial killings. The court held that the evidence against the convicted petitioners, concerning their involvement in the murders, custody manipulation, and concoction of the encounter story, requires a thorough reappraisal consistent with the principles of safe dispensation of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the petitioners in all relevant petitions, dismissed one petition for non-prosecution, and issued non-bailable warrants for the arrest of absconding convicts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an approver requires independent corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted when the evidence on record requires reappraisal consistent with principles of safe dispensation of justice?
  • Whether manipulation of official police files to fabricate a false encounter warrants the conviction of police officials under sections relating to framing of incorrect records and causing disappearance of evidence?
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• Muhammad Arshad Saeed Versus Pakistan1988 PLD 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-02
  review petitioncash securitylimitationcondonation of delayservice mattersSupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was reported to be barred by 348 days. The core legal question concerned whether the requirement of furnishing a cash security of Rs.2,000 for filing a review petition under Order XXVI Rule 7 of the Supreme Court Rules applies to service matters, or whether it is overridden by the special provisions of Order XXIV relating to service appeals. The Supreme Court held that the review petition was indeed subject to the cash security requirement under Order XXVI Rule 7, as review petitions fall under Article 188 of the Constitution rather than Article 212(3) which governs service appeals, rendering the maxim generalia specialibus non-derogant inapplicable. Consequently, finding no sufficient ground for condoning the substantial delay in depositing the required security, the court dismissed the review petition as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that review petitions in service matters are governed by the general security requirements for reviews under the Supreme Court Rules and are not exempt by virtue of special provisions applicable to petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a cash security of Rs.2,000 is required for filing a review petition in service matters under the Supreme Court Rules?
  • Does Order XXIV of the Supreme Court Rules override the requirement of cash security for review petitions under Order XXVI Rule 7?
  • Are review petitions under Article 188 of the Constitution subject to different procedural requirements than petitions for leave to appeal under Article 212(3)?
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• Khushi Muhammad Versus Aziz Bibi1988 PLD 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-13
  abatementdeath of a partylegal representativesSupreme Court Rulesreview of judgmentex parte proceedingsnullity of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This order disposes of three applications seeking the recall of judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in two separate civil appeals, raising the common question of whether a judgment rendered without taking note of the death of a party becomes a nullity requiring mandatory recall. The core legal question revolves around whether the death of a party results in automatic abatement of proceedings under the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, absent explicit provisions akin to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The Court held that the Supreme Court Rules govern substitution of legal representatives to the exclusion of the Civil Procedure Code, and because these rules do not provide for automatic abatement, the Court must exercise judicial discretion rather than treating such judgments as inherent nullities. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court's judgments do not automatically abate upon a party's death without a specific court order, but the Court may review and reopen decisions where a party was prejudiced by a defect in the record without contributory fault.

  Questions settled

  • Whether after the death of a party, judgments of the Supreme Court delivered without taking note of such death become nullities requiring recall as a matter of right?
  • Do the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings in the Supreme Court regarding the abatement of appeals?
  • Does the death of a party in an appeal before the Supreme Court result in automatic abatement without an express order of the Court?
  • Can a party seek the recall of a judgment as a matter of right on the ground of a procedural defect in the record arising from the death of an opposing party?
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• Ahmad Nawaz Versus Muhammad Ayub1988 PLD 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-27
  limitationcondonation of delaytime requisitecertified copyrevisionsection 115 CPCsection 12 Limitation Actleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' civil revision, which challenged the dismissal of their first appeal as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the period between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date it is actually delivered can be excluded as of right as time requisite for obtaining the copy under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's ruling, holding that under the existing law, such time cannot be automatically excluded as of right; rather, it can only be condoned upon showing sufficient cause. Finding no error of law or reason to disturb the factual findings of the lower courts, the Court dismissed the petition. The Court noted the long-standing controversy and inconvenience caused to litigants and recommended legislative intervention to clarify Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding time requisite for obtaining copies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date it is actually delivered can be excluded as of right as time requisite under Section 12 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can delay occurring between the readiness and actual delivery of a certified copy be condoned without sufficient explanation?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 where the lower appellate court exercised its discretion in refusing to condone delay?
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• Mashal Khan Versus The State1988 PLD 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-21
  retracted confessionright of private defencemurder convictionappreciation of evidenceinterested witnesscriminal appealjudicial confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, where the High Court judges had differed on the reliability of a retracted confession and the applicability of the right of self-defence. The trial court had convicted the appellant based solely on a retracted judicial confession, rejecting ocular and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether a retracted confession could be the sole basis for conviction and whether the appellant had acted in self-defence. The Court held that if a retracted confession is relied upon, it must be accepted in its entirety. Finding that the appellant acted under a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt due to prior enmity and threats, the Court determined that the appellant's actions fell within the scope of the right of private defence. The Court emphasized that actions taken in a state of panic during the exercise of self-defence cannot be measured in golden scales. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession serve as the sole basis for a criminal conviction?
  • Must a retracted confession be accepted in its entirety if relied upon by the court?
  • Does the exercise of the right of private defence in a state of panic require exact proportionality?
  • Is a conviction for murder sustainable when the only evidence is an uncorroborated retracted confession?
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• Farooq Hassan Versus Mumtaz Khan1988 PLD 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-05
  Senate electiontechnocratprofessionalelection petitiondisqualification of candidatethrown away votesinfructuous appeals
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from cross-appeals concerning an election to fill a casual vacancy in the Senate for a seat reserved for ulema, technocrats, and professionals. The successful candidate, Mumtaz Ahmad Khan, was declared elected after receiving the majority of votes, while Dr. Farooq Hassan challenged his election through an election petition, alleging the respondent lacked the requisite qualifications of a technocrat or professional under the relevant legal framework. The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition, holding that although the successful candidate was not a professional, he qualified as a technocrat. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court considered whether the appeals had become infructuous due to the impending expiration of the appellant's term, and whether the candidate possessed the requisite qualifications. By majority, the Court held that the candidate did not qualify as either a technocrat or a professional, thereby setting aside his election, but ruled that the seat could not be automatically awarded to the runner-up without establishing that the disqualification was notorious and that voters threw away their votes willfully.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election challenge regarding the eligibility of a sitting parliamentarian becomes infructuous simply because the term of office is nearing expiration?
  • When can the votes cast in favour of a disqualified candidate be deemed to have been thrown away so as to declare the runner-up elected?
  • Does a journalist with extensive reporting and editorial experience qualify as a professional or technocrat under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977?
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• Muhammad Bashi Versus Muhammad Firdaus1988 PLD 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-17
  change of forum of appealretrospective operationsubstantive rightprocedural lawcantonment rent restrictionevictionappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition arising from an eviction order under the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963. The core legal question was whether an amendment changing the forum of appeal from the District Court to the High Court operates retrospectively to affect pending appeals, rendering a decision by the District Court a nullity. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal to a particular tribunal is an existing substantive right, and an amendment transferring the appeal to a new forum does not apply retrospectively to pending actions unless express language or necessary intendment manifests such an intention. Consequently, the District Court maintained its jurisdiction to decide the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory amendment changing the forum of appeal operate retrospectively to affect pending appeals?
  • Is the right of appeal to a particular tribunal considered an existing substantive right or a matter of mere procedure?
  • Can an amendment altering appellate jurisdiction divest a District Court of jurisdiction over an appeal pending at the time of the amendment without express legislative intendment?
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• Asghar Ali Imam Versus Muhammad Ali1988 PLD 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-16
  default in payment of rentsecurity depositejectmenttenancy agreementlandlord and tenantstatutory tenancydiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Sind High Court which allowed the respondent-tenant's rent appeal against eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal questions involved were whether the tenancy agreement expired after the initial six-month period ceasing to govern the tenancy, and whether a security deposit could be adjusted towards future or current rents. The Supreme Court held that the security deposit cannot be adjusted against current liability to pay rent and remains to be adjusted by the landlord when the tenant vacates the premises towards unpaid rent, loss, or damages, and that the agreement continues to operate regarding security notwithstanding its expiry. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, ruling that the tenant committed wilful default and was not entitled to discretionary relief, and ordered the tenant to hand over vacant possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the tenancy agreement after the efflux of the first period of six months had expired and did no longer govern the tenancy?
  • Whether the security amount could be adjusted towards future or current rents?
  • Does the nature of a security deposit undergo a change upon the expiry of the tenancy agreement?
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• Mir Salah-Ud-Din Versus Qazi Zaheer-Ud-Din1988 PLD 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  civil suit maintainabilityejectment orderrent restrictionres judicataexecution of decreerejection of plaintpossession dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a civil revision petition and held that a regular civil suit filed by the appellant to claim possession of a property subject to an ejectment order was not maintainable. The core legal question was whether a matter involving a dispute of title or possession, having reached finality in the Rent Controller's forum and its appellate hierarchy, can subsequently be re-agitated through a civil suit before a court of general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that once an ejectment order attains finality under the rent restriction laws, a separate civil suit is barred by the principle of res judicata, section 12(2) and section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and section 15(7) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, unless specific recognized exceptions apply. The key principle laid down is that the finality of orders passed by rent forums cannot be bypassed by third parties or family members collusively initiating separate civil suits to frustrate execution, and appropriate remedies must instead be pursued within the executing court under the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a matter involving a dispute of title or possession that has attained finality in the Rent Controller's hierarchy be re-agitated through a civil suit before a court of general jurisdiction?
  • Whether a separate civil suit is barred after the conclusion of proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • What are the exceptions where the finality attached to orders passed under rent restriction laws can be challenged in a court of general jurisdiction?
  • Does the executing court have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions arising from the obstruction of an ejectment decree under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Federation of Pakistan Versus Public at Large1988 PLD 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-20
  Federal Shariat Courtrepugnancy to Islamfreedom of the pressfreedom of expressionright to livelihoodpress and publicationsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of multiple shariat appeals filed by the Federation of Pakistan and the Provinces of Punjab and Baluchistan against an order of the Federal Shariat Court directing various amendments to the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, after finding certain provisions repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court validly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in ordering amendments to the Statute, and whether the specific provisions declared repugnant actually contravened Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, holding that while freedom of the press and the right to an honest livelihood are protected under Islamic principles of fairness (Adal, Qist, and Ihsan) requiring reasonable timeframes for administrative decisions and rights of appeal, certain procedural matters dealt with by the Federal Shariat Court went beyond its substantive jurisdiction of testing laws against the Qur'an and Sunnah. The Court laid down key principles regarding the protection of fundamental economic and professional freedoms under Islamic law, the necessity of a right to be heard even in emergency administrative actions, and the limits of the Federal Shariat Court's review power over procedural statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Shariat Court can direct amendments to statutory provisions without establishing their specific repugnancy to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah?
  • Does an uncontrolled executive power to indefinitely delay the authentication of a press or newspaper declaration violate Islamic injunctions of fairness and the right to earn a livelihood?
  • Is it mandatory under Islamic law to afford an opportunity of being heard before taking adverse administrative action against a printing press or publisher?
  • Whether procedural provisions of a statute fall within the scope of review of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203-D of the Constitution?
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• Ghulam Haider Versus Nawab Din1988 PLD 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-10-14
  review petitionpre-emption suitabatement of appealdeposit of pre-emption moneyextension of timeinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises out of a judgment dismissing an appeal in a pre-emption matter. The core legal question concerned the effect of an abatement of a second appeal and the subsequent deposit of pre-emption money pursuant to an interim order of the Supreme Court during the leave to appeal stage. The Supreme Court held that where the pre-emptor deposits the balance of the pre-emption money within the extended time granted by an interim order of the Supreme Court, the pre-emption decree is saved and fully effective, notwithstanding the ultimate dismissal of the appeal on the question of abatement. The Court laid down the principle that a party shall not be made to suffer on account of the act of the Court, and compliance with an interim deposit order preserves the rights accruing under the pre-emption decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of the balance pre-emption money pursuant to an interim order of the Supreme Court save the pre-emption decree despite the dismissal of the appeal?
  • Whether the failure to bring legal representatives on record within the period of limitation results in the automatic abatement of an appeal?
  • Can a pre-emptor be made to suffer the loss of benefits under a decree due to an act or omission of the Court?
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• Zarina Khawaja Versus Mahboob Shah1988 PLD 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-02
  tentative rent determinationsecurity deposit adjustmentstriking off defenceexpired tenancy agreementdefault in rent depositrent restriction lawholding over
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sind, which allowed a rent appeal filed by a tenant against an eviction order. The eviction order was originally passed by the Rent Controller under section 16(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, for default in depositing monthly rent after the tenant's defence was struck off. The High Court had held that an existing security deposit with the landlady should have been adjusted against the outstanding rent, thereby obviating default. The core legal question examined was whether such a security deposit could be adjusted against rent required to be deposited under section 16, and whether terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to apply. The Supreme Court held that the determination of rent under section 16 is tentative and approximate, that security deposits cannot be used to absolve a tenant from making mandatory rent deposits unless the agreement specifically permits, and that terms of an expired tenancy agreement continue to operate to the extent they are not repugnant to the rent law. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court judgment and restoring the Rent Controller's eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, rent is to be determined finally or tentatively and approximately?
  • Whether the question regarding propriety or validity of the order of deposit under section 16(1) can be examined in an appeal against the final order of eviction of the tenant?
  • Whether on termination of an agreement of tenancy when the tenant remains in occupation, the terms of the expired agreement become irrelevant for regulating the tenancy?
  • Whether the use of a security amount by the court for absolving a tenant from liability of eviction for non-compliance with an order of deposit is permissible in law?
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• Bashir Versus Muhammad Hussain1988 PLD 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-27
  zinawilfullymens reasecond marriagetalaqnamabona fide beliefhudood ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 494 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question is whether the appellants committed "zina" under Section 4 of the Ordinance when the female appellant contracted a second marriage following an honestly believed, though allegedly forged, divorce deed (talaqnama) executed by her first husband. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the term "wilfully" in Section 4 requires mens rea, a guilty mind, or guilty intent, and an act done with a bona fide belief and without criminal intent does not constitute zina. The Court established that where an accused person acts under a genuine, mistaken belief that a prior marriage has been lawfully dissolved, the requisite intent for the offence of zina is absent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the term 'wilfully' in Section 4 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 requires proof of mens rea or a guilty mind?
  • Can an accused person be convicted of zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 when they contracted a second marriage under a bona fide belief that their first marriage had been dissolved?
  • Does sexual intercourse following a marriage contracted under a genuine mistaken belief regarding the dissolution of a prior marriage constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
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• Security Paper Ltd. Versus Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal1988 PLD 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-09-09
  workman definitionindustrial relationsstanding orderssecurity guardmanual labourlabour lawnature of duties
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a Security Guard employed by the appellant company qualifies as a "workman" under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question is whether the nature of duties performed by a Security Guard, specifically searching employees and guarding premises, constitutes "manual or clerical work" as required by the statutory definition. The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether an employee is a "workman" is a question of fact to be decided based on the evidence of the actual duties performed, rather than the job designation. The Court affirmed that because the evidence established the respondent's duties included manual tasks like searching personnel, he fell within the definition of a "workman." The key principle laid down is that the designation of an employee is not conclusive; the essential test is the nature of the work performed, specifically whether manual or clerical labour constitutes the pith and substance of the employment, which must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

  Questions settled

  • Does the designation of an employee as a 'Security Guard' automatically exclude them from the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is the determination of whether an employee is a 'workman' a question of fact or law?
  • What is the essential test for determining whether an employee qualifies as a 'workman' under labour legislation?
  • Does the performance of manual tasks as an incidental part of a supervisory role qualify an employee as a 'workman'?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Versus The State1988 PLD 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-15
  infructuous appeallegal representationFederal Shariat Courtright to counselnon-Muslim advocateconstitutional interpretationmootness
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenged an order of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) that restricted legal representation to Muslim counsel under Rule 2(e) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules, 1981. The central legal question concerned whether the FSC could validly exclude non-Muslim advocates from representing parties in criminal matters, and whether such a restriction conflicted with constitutional guarantees of equality and the right to legal representation. During the proceedings, it was established that the underlying criminal revision petition, which gave rise to the dispute, had already been dismissed on merits by the FSC, and the appellant did not pursue further challenge. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeals had become infructuous, rendering a decision on the substantive legal questions unnecessary. The Court noted that the FSC had already amended the relevant rule to allow non-Muslim advocates to represent non-Muslim parties in cases other than Shariat petitions under Article 203-D of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeals as infructuous without adjudicating the constitutional validity of the original rule.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal become infructuous when the underlying criminal revision petition has already been dismissed on merits?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to adjudicate constitutional questions regarding legal representation when the main proceedings have achieved finality?
  • Should a court decide the validity of a rule when the underlying case has concluded and the issue is no longer live?
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• Abdul Wajid Versus Federal Govt. of Pakista1988 PLD 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Shariat appealwithdrawal of appealbias of judgesUlema judgesAhmadisAnti-Islamic Activities OrdinanceFederal Shariat Courtconstitution of bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a decision of the Federal Shariat Court rendered under Article 203-D, wherein the validity of the Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance 1984 was challenged on the touchstone of Islamic Injunctions. The Federal Shariat Court had declined to declare the law repugnant to Islam. During the hearing before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, the appellants raised various preliminary objections and interlocutory requests, including seeking the expungement of portions of the impugned judgment and alleging bias against the Ulema judges on the bench. The Court overruled the objections regarding the bench's constitution, holding that no party can dictate the composition of a court and that prior tentative opinions or scholarly writings do not constitute legal bias, particularly under Islamic principles of justice and 'Rujoo'. Ultimately, rather than arguing the merits, the appellants abruptly withdrew both appeals. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as withdrawn, leaving the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court to hold the field. The core legal principle affirmed is that preliminary objections regarding bench composition based on prior opinions are untenable when judges confirm their impartiality, and litigants cannot weaponize interlocutory delay tactics to avoid addressing the merits of religious-constitutional appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party to an appeal can claim the right to be tried by a particular judge or judges of their choice?
  • Does the prior expression of an opinion by a judge in a tentative manner or academic writing constitute legal bias disqualifying them from hearing a case?
  • Can appellants in an appeal under Article 203-F of the Constitution insist on the expungement of substantial portions of the impugned judgment prior to the hearing of the main appeal?
  • What is the effect of an unconditional withdrawal of appeals by the appellants before the Shariat Appellate Bench?
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• Muhammad Yasin Versus Ghulam Murtazq1988 PLD 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-09
  Rent Restriction Ordinanceexecution of decreeRent Controllerdeeming clauseobjection petitioncivil suit jurisdictionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from an execution dispute following an ejectment order passed under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. After an eviction order was issued against a tenant on grounds of default, his brother instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration of his own tenancy and an injunction, and also filed an objection petition under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 before the executing Rent Controller. The High Court held that a third party could file a separate civil suit because the Rent Controller was not a Civil Court and could not entertain Order XXI objections. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, holding that under Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, an eviction order is executed by the Controller 'as if it were a decree of a Civil Court'. Applying the deeming provision fully, the executing Controller possesses all necessary powers to entertain and decide objections to the decree's execution, thereby barring an independent civil suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Rent Controller executing an eviction order under Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance have the power to decide objections to execution under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a third party institute a separate civil suit to declare a tenancy in an urban area where rent restriction laws apply?
  • Does the statutory phrase 'as if it were a decree of a Civil Court' confer on the executing authority all necessary powers to effectively execute the order and decide objections?
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• Muhmmad Insha Ullah Versus Chief Conservator of Forests(P*E),Punjab1988 PLD 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-25
  civil servantpromotion rulesvested rightterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunalacademic qualificationsforest service
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether the Punjab Service Tribunal correctly held that promotion rules confer a vested right upon civil servants and cannot be altered to their disadvantage. The contesting respondents, initially recruited as Foresters or Deputy Rangers, challenged a 1976 notification by the Governor of the Punjab altering the academic qualifications required for promotion to Sub-Divisional Forest Officer under section 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Tribunal had accepted their appeal, ruling that service rules create a binding contract protecting career prospects. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that a civil servant's rights are limited to the post currently held and do not extend to a vested right in the continuation of existing promotion rules or future prospects. The Court laid down that the Government possesses the competence to amend promotion rules and prescribe academic qualifications over on-the-job experience in the interest of public service efficiency, and such alterations do not violate the terms and conditions of service unless an existing vested right to a post is impaired.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the rules governing promotion to a higher post confer a vested right that cannot be altered to the disadvantage of a civil servant awaiting promotion?
  • Does the expression 'terms and conditions of service' include future prospects of promotion to higher posts?
  • Can the competent authority amend service rules to give greater weightage to academic qualifications over on-the-job experience for promotions?
  • Are departmental notings and opinions of officers decisive in determining the validity of statutory rules framed by the Governor?
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• Federation of Pakistan Versus Public at Large1988 PLD 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-10
  Review petitionCondonation of delayTime-barredMandatory directionDirectory directionIslamisationSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed by the Federation of Pakistan, which was barred by 285 days. The petitioner sought condonation of delay, citing two reasons: that the previous judgment allowed their appeal and remanded the case, leading functionaries not to consider it necessary to examine its contents for compliance directions; and that a copy sent by the Supreme Court Office for compliance was received late. The Court held that neither reason was sufficient for condonation, emphasizing the duty of functionaries to examine judgments, even remand orders, and to apply for copies in due time. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as time-barred. However, the Court, acting suo motu, clarified a previous direction regarding the process of Islamisation, stating that while the word "may" ordinarily conveys a directory sense, it was explicitly meant to be directory, not mandatory, in the context of the specified date.

  Questions settled

  • Can an inordinate delay in filing a review petition be condoned if government functionaries failed to examine a remand judgment or apply for a copy in time?
  • Is a direction in a judgment using the word "may" ordinarily considered mandatory or directory?
  • What is the duty of a concerned functionary regarding examining a judgment, even if it is a remand order?
  • Can a time-barred review petition be dismissed while still granting clarification on a previous judgment's directions?
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• Rehman Gul Versus The State1988 PLD 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-09
  kidnapping of a minorslaverychild traffickingeyewitness discrepanciesspecial court trialextra-judicial confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Punjab Special Court, convicting the appellant under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentencing him to imprisonment for life for kidnapping a minor child. The core legal question revolves around whether minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimonies vitiate the conviction, and whether the intention to sell a two-year-old child satisfies the statutory requirement of kidnapping in order to subject the victim to slavery or similar harm under Section 364-A. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that natural discrepancies in testimonies of independent eyewitnesses do not undermine the prosecution case, and that the intended sale of an infant constitutes subjecting the victim to slavery under the extended meaning of the provision. The key principle laid down is that minor inconsistencies in the statements of straightforward witnesses are normal and do not discredit their core testimony, and the commercial trafficking or sale of a minor child brings the act within the ambit of Section 364-A.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies in the testimony of independent eyewitnesses are sufficient to discredit the prosecution case?
  • Does the intended sale of a two-year-old child constitute subjecting the victim to slavery under Section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether the absence of certain neighbours from the witness box affects the reliability of other eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution?
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• N.-W.F.P. Versus Hussan Pari1988 PLD 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-10
  review petitioncondonation of delaypre-emption lawIslamic injunctionslegislative discretionjudicial reviewZaroorat
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two review petitions filed against the Supreme Court's judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360). The petitions were filed with significant delays of 263 and 334 days, respectively. The core legal question was whether the delay could be condoned and whether the judgment required review regarding the pre-emption rights of tenants and the scope of exemptions under pre-emption laws. The Court held that the petitions were time-barred as the applicants failed to explain the inordinate delay, adhering to the principle that each day of delay must be justified. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. Regarding the substantive issues, the Court clarified that its original judgment already provided sufficient scope for exemptions based on the principle of 'Zaroorat' (necessity). The Court established that such exemptions must be legislated rather than left to executive discretion, must be construed in accordance with Islamic injunctions, and remain subject to judicial review to ensure the necessity is genuine. The Court further dismissed associated applications for impleadment as the main petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party required to explain each day of delay in filing a review petition to obtain condonation?
  • Can the Supreme Court clarify its previous judgment while dismissing a review petition as time-barred?
  • Must exemptions to pre-emption laws based on necessity be legislated rather than left to executive discretion?
  • Are exemptions to pre-emption laws based on necessity subject to judicial review?
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• Province of Sindh Versus Public at Large1988 PLD 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-16
  constitutional appealFederal Shariat Courtrepugnancy to Islamremandlegislative privilegescompensationinheritanceconsistency of judgmentssuo motu jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment concerns appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution against two judgments of the Federal Shariat Court. The Federal Shariat Court, exercising its suo motu jurisdiction under Article 203-D, had declared certain provisions of the Sind Provincial Assembly Members Privileges Act XI of 1975 and the Baluchistan Chief Minister and Provincial Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act III of 1975 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. The core legal questions involved the validity of a provision staying court proceedings when an Assembly Member is a party, and the validity of provisions allowing compensation upon death to nominees instead of legal heirs. The Supreme Court noted that cases involving the same subject-matter had previously been decided and remanded to the Federal Shariat Court. To avoid conflict of judgment, achieve consistency, and ensure observance of rules laid down in the earlier reported judgment, the Supreme Court accepted these appeals and remanded the cases to the Federal Shariat Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a provision staying court proceedings involving an Assembly Member be held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Can provisions allowing compensation upon death to nominees instead of legal heirs be held repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court remand cases to the Federal Shariat Court to ensure consistency with prior judgments?
  • What is the scope of the Federal Shariat Court's suo motu jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution?
  • What is the effect of a Supreme Court decision to remand a case to the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Can a law granting privileges to assembly members that interfere with the administration of justice be considered repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
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• Province of Sindh Versus Public at Large1988 PLD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-13
  Islamic injunctionsnatural justiceright to hearingco-operative societiesrepugnancy to Islamadministrative lawsupersession of management
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Shariat Court judgment declaring Section 6(2) of the Sind Co-operative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982, repugnant to Islamic injunctions due to the absence of a requirement to provide a hearing before the government takes over a society's management. The core legal question was whether a statutory provision allowing the government to supersede a co-operative society without a prior hearing violates the Quranic commands and Sunnah. The Supreme Court upheld the principle that any law permitting action against a person or entity without an opportunity for defense is contrary to Islamic injunctions. However, acknowledging the necessity of preventing the dissipation of assets by unscrupulous management, the Court modified the Federal Shariat Court's directive. It held that while a hearing is mandatory, it may be dispensed with in emergent cases provided it is granted as soon as possible thereafter, and interim orders may be passed to prevent mischief. The Court thus partially allowed the appeal, mandating specific amendments to the Ordinance to balance the requirement of natural justice with the state's interest in protecting public funds.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statutory provision that allows the government to supersede a co-operative society without a prior hearing repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
  • Can the requirement of a prior hearing be dispensed with in cases of emergency when the government exercises its power to take over the management of a co-operative society?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require that a person or entity be given an opportunity of defense before a public authority exercises power involving their rights and liabilities?
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• Fazle-I-Qadir Versus Secretary Establishment Division1988 PLD 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-01-09
  service senioritycivil servantsOffice Memorandumseniority quotadirect recruitspromoteesultra viresservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution regarding seniority disputes among civil servants, specifically challenging the validity of an Office Memorandum (OM) dated 27-1-1975 and the seniority principles applied to direct recruits versus promotees. The core legal questions addressed whether the OM was ultra vires the Civil Servants Act 1973, whether administrative instructions could function as service rules, and whether the seniority principle favoring promotees over direct recruits of the same year was legally permissible. The Supreme Court held that the OM was competently framed and valid, noting that administrative instructions in the ESTACODE possess the force of rules. The Court further held that Section 8(2) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 permits the rule-making authority to establish seniority principles, and the practice of granting seniority to promotees over direct recruits of the same year is not inconsistent with Section 8(4). Consequently, the Court upheld the seniority determinations, dismissed the appeals of the civil servants, and allowed the Federation’s appeal, affirming that the challenged seniority principles were saved under Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Office Memorandum be considered a valid service rule if it lacks the formal appellation of a rule?
  • Is the principle of granting seniority to promotees over direct recruits of the same year inconsistent with Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Does Section 8(2) of the Civil Servants Act 1973 authorize the rule-making authority to determine inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotees?
  • Are administrative instructions contained in the ESTACODE saved by Section 25 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
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• Islamic Republic of Pakistan Versus Ata Hussain1988 PLD 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-06-29
  civil servantcompulsory retirementcompetent authorityService Tribunalmaster and servantpublic interestmartial law order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Federation of Pakistan examines whether the Service Tribunal correctly held that oral orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator were insufficient for retiring a civil servant under section 13, clause (ii) of the Civil Servants Act 1973, and whether the grounds of retirement were open to scrutiny. The Supreme Court considered whether the retirement order of the respondent civil servant, which was processed through an oral directive communicated by an Adviser and recorded by the Establishment Secretary, fulfilled the legal requirements of an order by the competent authority. The Court held that the power to retire a civil servant after twenty-five years of service in the public interest must be exercised strictly by the competent authority or its designated alter ego in accordance with established rules and instruments. Since the procedural requirements and valid channels of communication were not satisfied to establish that the Chief Martial Law Administrator or the President had actually passed or approved the order, the retirement order lacked legal efficacy. The principle laid down is that executive retirement orders of civil servants must strictly emanate from the competent authority through authorized legal channels, and mere departmental processing of unauthenticated oral directives does not satisfy the statutory mandate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral orders of the Chief Martial Law Administrator are sufficient for retiring a civil servant under section 13 of the Civil Servants Act 1973?
  • Can an order of retirement passed under clause (ii) of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 be scrutinized on merits before the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the presumption of truth attached to a duly authenticated official order can be rebutted by a finding of fact that no written order was passed by the competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid Versus Akhtar Hussain Zaidi1988 PLD 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-23
  summary suitpromissory notelocal amendmentscivil procedurejurisdiction of civil courtsreturn of plaintordinary suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the plaintiff arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a demand promissory note. The core legal question was whether the local amendments introduced by the Lahore High Court to rule 1 of Order XXXVII, C.P.C. extending summary procedure to subordinate courts in Lahore stood deleted or revoked by subsequent legislative enactments, notably the Central Laws (Statute Reforms) Ordinance 1960 and the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's local amendments and rules framed under section 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were duly preserved by the savings clauses of the amending ordinances and did not vanish. The Court ruled that Order XXXVII relates to procedure rather than jurisdiction and that local amendments identifying the courts competent to apply summary procedure remain intact. Furthermore, if summary procedure is found unavailable, the proper course is to proceed with the suit as an ordinary suit rather than return the plaint. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rule 1, clause (e) of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 as introduced by the Lahore High Court stood deleted on account of subsequent statutory amendments and adaptations?
  • Whether Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 relates to procedure or jurisdiction?
  • What is the proper course of action when a suit is not triable under the summary procedure of Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the Central Laws (Statute Reforms) Ordinance 1960 revoked the local amendments made by the Lahore High Court to Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Shujaat Hasnain Qureshi Versus Raees Qureshi1988 PLD 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-15
  Senate bye-electiondisqualificationNational Assemblythrown away voteselection petitionre-election
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two cross-appeals arising from an Election Tribunal's decision regarding a Senate bye-election. The primary appellant, Pir Shujaat Hasnain Qureshi, had contested and lost a National Assembly election under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, before subsequently winning a Senate bye-election. The core legal question was whether a candidate unsuccessful in a general election held under P.O. V of 1977 was permanently or temporarily disqualified from contesting the Senate, and whether the Election Tribunal rightly ordered re-election rather than declaring the runner-up as the returned candidate. The Supreme Court held that the disqualification under Article 10(4) of P.O. V of 1977, read with Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution of Pakistan, validly barred unsuccessful candidates of those specific elections from the Senate until future general elections are held under the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that votes cast for a disqualified candidate are not treated as 'thrown away' unless the disqualification was notorious at the time of the poll. The appeals were dismissed, upholding both the disqualification and the order for re-election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate who unsuccessfully contested an election under the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order 1977 is disqualified from being elected to the Senate?
  • Does Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution of Pakistan make applicable the disqualifications contained in existing laws such as President's Order No. V of 1977?
  • Under what circumstances can votes cast for a disqualified candidate be treated as thrown away in an election contest?
  • Whether an Election Tribunal is justified in ordering a re-election rather than declaring the runner-up as the winner when the disqualification of the returned candidate was not notorious?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman Versus Barkat Ali1988 PLD 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-10Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal Versus Bahir Ahmad1988 PLD 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-28
  specific performanceaudio cassettemodern devices evidencelate production of documentslist of relianceframing of additional issuesexemplary costsre-agitating settled issues
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose from a suit for specific performance of an agricultural land sale agreement filed by the appellants. During trial, the appellants sought to produce an audio-cassette recording, but their application under Order XIII Rule 2 and Order XVIII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was rejected due to non-inclusion in the reliance list and late stage, which rejection was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, after an additional issue was framed, the appellants filed a fresh application under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 to produce the same audio-cassette. The trial court rejected this application as mala fide and frivolous, which order was upheld by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Article 164 makes modern evidence admissible but does not override procedural rules governing late production. The Court further ruled that framing an unnecessary additional issue cannot be used as a device to re-agitate settled evidentiary rulings, imposing exemplary costs of Rs. 10,000 on the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 permit the late production of evidence previously disallowed under procedural rules?
  • Can a party re-agitate the admissibility of evidence previously rejected by court orders upon the framing of an additional issue?
  • Whether the framing of an unnecessary additional issue enables a party to produce evidence that was rejected under earlier procedural orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohabat Khan Versus Hazrat Khan1988 PLD 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-07-28
  redemption of mortgagelimitation periodCollector's ordermortgagor and mortgageesummary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arise from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning the redemption of two mortgages originally created in 1949. The core legal question is whether the dismissal of a summary redemption application by the Collector under the N.-W.F.P. Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1935, on grounds of non-joinder of parties rather than on merits, constitutes a final bar requiring a suit to be filed within one year under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, or whether the mortgagor retains the full statutory period to file a regular redemption suit. The Supreme Court held that where a Collector's order does not decide the matter on merits but merely refuses to proceed due to a technical defect, it does not require a suit to set it aside under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, and the mortgagor may institute a redemption suit within the ordinary sixty-year limitation period. The Court laid down the principle that summary orders not passed on merits do not extinguish the substantive right of redemption or trigger the one-year limitation bar.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a redemption application by a Collector on technical grounds rather than on merits attract the one-year limitation period under Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Whether a regular suit for redemption is barred if a prior summary application under the N.-W.F.P. Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1935 was dismissed without deciding the rights of the parties on merits?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for instituting a suit for the redemption of mortgaged property when a summary redemption order is not passed on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution Versus Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd.1988 PLD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-11-10
  social security contributiondefinition of wagesleave encashmentfestival holidaysovertimestatutory increasesecured personcasual bonus
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Sindh High Court concerning the assessment of social security contributions under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965. The primary legal questions were whether employees earning more than twenty rupees per day should be entirely excluded from contribution calculations, and whether payments for leave encashment and festival holidays constitute 'wages' under Section 2(30) of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that Section 20(4)(a) of the Ordinance does not exclude an employee from contribution calculations merely because their daily wages exceed twenty rupees; rather, contributions remain payable on the wage amount up to twenty rupees, with only the excess amount being exempt. Furthermore, the Court ruled that payments for leave encashment and festival holidays are remuneration for services rendered and thus fall within the definition of 'wages', distinguishing them from 'overtime' which carries a distinct industrial connotation of hours worked beyond standard limits. The Court also affirmed that employers failing to make timely contributions are liable to statutory increases under Section 23.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee is completely excluded from social security contribution calculations under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 if their daily wages exceed twenty rupees?
  • Do payments made to employees for leave encashment and festival holidays constitute 'wages' for the purpose of assessing social security contributions?
  • Can payments for leave encashment or festival holidays be legally equated with 'overtime' to exempt them from the definition of wages?
  • Is an employer liable to pay a penalty increase under Section 23 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 for delay in making contributions during the pendency of a dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Govt. of Pakistan Versus Dada Amir Haidar Khan1987 PLD 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-10
  issuance of passportrefusal of passportright to travel abroadexecutive discretionnatural justiceaudi alteram partemfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a Lahore High Court judgment granting a writ petition filed by a political worker whose application for a passport was refused by passport authorities without assigning any reason. The core legal questions involved whether the Federal Government possesses absolute discretion to refuse a passport to a citizen, whether foreign travel is regulated under public interest, and whether executive discretion to deny travel documents must satisfy principles of natural justice and reasonableness under the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's declaration that the refusal was without lawful authority. The Court held that while the Passport Act 1974 regulates departure and entry, executive discretion to grant or refuse travel documents must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and in good faith. An applicant cannot be denied a passport on vague political grounds, such as holding communist thoughts, nor can refusal occur without giving the affected person an opportunity of hearing and communicating valid grounds, unless public interest sensitivity precludes full disclosure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have unbridled and arbitrary discretion to refuse the issuance of a passport to a citizen without giving reasons?
  • Is a citizen entitled to an opportunity of hearing and disclosure of grounds before a passport application is refused?
  • Can a citizen's right to travel abroad be restricted solely on the basis of their political ideology or political thought?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Khan Versus The State1987 PLD 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-05-27
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptionenhancement of sentencepatwarimitigating circumstancesundue leniencycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and cross-appeal for enhancement of sentence arise from the conviction of a patwari under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code for demanding and accepting illegal gratification. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction and fine but reduced the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone (twenty days), citing the passage of time, trial agony, loss of service, and brief incarceration. The Supreme Court dismissed the accused's appeal against conviction, finding the charge conclusively proven, and allowed the State's appeal for enhancement. The Court held that once a corruption offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, showing undue leniency or reducing sentences on such mitigating grounds is untenable and undermines societal welfare. The Supreme Court accordingly restored the original sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether grounds such as trial agony, loss of service, and passage of time constitute valid mitigating circumstances for reducing a sentence of imprisonment in corruption cases once guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a sentence of imprisonment for accepting illegal gratification under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code be reduced to the period already undergone merely because the accused has served a short duration in jail?
  • Whether courts are justified in showing leniency to public functionaries convicted of corruption on the premise that bribery has become a way of life in society?
  Read full judgment →
• Farrukh Ikram Versus The State1987 PLD 5 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Lala Versus The State1987 PLD 414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ZinaOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinanceburden of proofcriminal appealNikah registrationappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the existence of a valid prior marriage between the complainant and the female appellant beyond reasonable doubt, thereby rendering her subsequent union with the male appellant an act of Zina. The trial court had convicted both appellants based on the complainant's testimony and the testimony of the female appellant's mother. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged marriage, noting that the complainant admitted to falsely implicating another co-accused, rendering his testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the Nikah registrar failed to register the alleged marriage, and the mother's testimony was biased. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases, the burden of proof lies heavily on the prosecution, and where the foundational fact of a prior marriage is not established beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction for Zina cannot be sustained. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted both appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for Zina be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the existence of a valid prior marriage beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a Nikah registrar's testimony when the alleged marriage was not entered into the register?
  • Does an admission by a complainant that they falsely implicated a co-accused undermine the credibility of their entire testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Versus Public at Large1987 PLD 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-11
  premature retirementcivil servantsrepugnancy to Islamshow-cause noticedue processFederal Shariat Courtpublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated batch of appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan relates to the constitutional validity of provisions empowering the premature retirement of civil servants after twenty-five years of qualifying service or upon holding the rank of Additional Secretary or above, under federal, provincial, and cantonment service laws, on the touchstone of Islamic Injunctions. The Federal Shariat Court had declared these provisions repugnant to Islam for lacking procedural safeguards and notice. The core legal question was whether statutory provisions permitting summary premature retirement without a prior show-cause notice violate the Injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Supreme Court, by majority, held that while the executive possesses the power to retire civil servants in the public interest, the absence of a provision requiring a proper show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing renders the impugned retirement provisions repugnant to Islamic principles of justice. The Court laid down the key principle that any law affecting the tenure, rights, and reputation of individuals must incorporate procedural fairness and due process, specifically a right to be informed of the grounds and heard before adverse administrative action is taken.

  Questions settled

  • Whether provisions empowering the premature retirement of civil servants without a prior show-cause notice are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Does the absence of procedural safeguards such as an opportunity of hearing in retirement laws violate Islamic principles of justice?
  • Can statutory provisions regarding the terms and conditions of civil service be declared un-Islamic solely on the basis of being capable of misuse?
  • Whether employees of cantonment boards and statutory corporations stand on the same footing as civil servants regarding protections against arbitrary retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry Versus Addl. Sessions Judge Lahore1987 PLD 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-11-11Read full judgment →
• Said Shah Versus The State1987 PLD 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-02-28
  prohibitionillegal transport of liquorpossession of intoxicantdriver liabilityconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the convictions and sentences of the appellants for offences under Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, relating to the transportation of a large quantity of liquor in a Suzuki van. The core legal questions involved whether there was sufficient evidence of possession and transportation, whether drivers or conductors of public vehicles possess a general defence of lack of knowledge regarding passengers' luggage, and whether ownership of the intoxicant is a necessary prerequisite for establishing guilt. The Supreme Court held that ownership of the intoxicant is not strictly necessary to prove an offence under the Prohibition Order, and that the criminal liability of a driver or conductor depends on the facts and circumstances of each case regarding their consciousness of the contents being transported. Finding concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the appellants' knowledge and participation, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ownership of the intoxicant is necessary for proving an offence under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Does a driver or conductor of a public vehicle incur criminal liability if they are unaware of the illicit contents of a passenger's luggage?
  • Is it necessary for the Court to lay down a hard and fast rule regarding the presumptions of knowledge for drivers or conductors of public vehicles carrying contraband?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmodd Alam Shah Versus The State1987 PLD 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  forgerypublic servantspecial judge jurisdictionnexus with official dutycriminal appealappreciation of evidencehandwriting expert
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a public servant, was convicted by a Special Judge for forgery under sections 468 and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the alleged alteration of a cheque. The High Court upheld the conviction. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the evidence and found the prosecution's case regarding the forgery to be unsubstantiated, noting the absence of physical evidence of tampering and the unreliability of the handwriting expert's opinion. Furthermore, the Court addressed the jurisdictional issue, holding that the Special Judge lacked authority to try the case. The Court established that for an offence to be triable by a Special Judge under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, the act must be committed by a public servant "as such," meaning it must have a nexus with their official duties. Since the appellant was acting in a private capacity as an agent for his wife, the trial was vitiated for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Judge have jurisdiction to try a public servant for an offence committed in a private capacity?
  • What is the test to determine if an act is committed by a public servant 'as such' for the purposes of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958?
  • Is a court bound to accept the opinion of a handwriting expert in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the trial court ignores defense evidence and fails to properly evaluate the prosecution's proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali Versus The State1986 PLD 741 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-05-07
  theft liable to HaddTazkiya-al-ShuhoodHirzNisabtheft liable to TazirOffences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979criminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for theft liable to Hadd under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, involving the theft of a wall-clock from a mosque. The core legal questions concerned whether the strict evidentiary requirements for Hadd were satisfied, specifically regarding the process of Tazkiya-al-Shuhood (purgation of witnesses), the definition of Hirz (custody), the valuation of Nisab, and the procedural requirement to examine the victim before eye-witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to meet the rigorous standards required for Hadd. The Court found significant contradictions in witness testimonies, an improper Tazkiya-al-Shuhood process, and a failure to prove the property was removed from the Hirz or met the required Nisab value. Consequently, the Court set aside the Hadd sentence. However, the Court upheld a conviction for theft liable to Tazir under Section 379, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the appellant to the time already served. The judgment establishes that Hadd punishments require strict evidentiary proof, and any reasonable doubt necessitates acquittal from Hadd, though a Tazir conviction may remain permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to conduct a proper Tazkiya-al-Shuhood vitiate a conviction for theft liable to Hadd?
  • Is the removal of stolen property from the Hirz a mandatory requirement for the commission of theft liable to Hadd?
  • Must the victim of a theft be examined before the eye-witnesses in a case of theft liable to Hadd?
  • Can an appellate court convert a conviction for theft liable to Hadd into one for theft liable to Tazir?
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• Allah Bakhsh Versus The State1986 PLD 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-16
  perjuryforgeryhudood lawsfederal shariat courtsummary trialsentencing powersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court convicting the petitioner under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for perjury and forgery, sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment after he falsely claimed to be the husband of Mst. Janet Bibi and exhibited a forged nikahnama in a Zina trial under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions involved whether procedural irregularities vitiated the summary trial, the extent of the sentencing powers of the Federal Shariat Court under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the Federal Shariat Court could be equated with the High Court for sentencing limits under the said section. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Federal Shariat Court possesses sentencing powers comparable to the High Court under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by virtue of the mutatis mutandis application of provisions under Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The key principle laid down is that the Federal Shariat Court functions analogously to the High Court in the hierarchy of the Hudood laws regarding summary punishment for perjury, and severe deterrence is warranted for fabricated accusations against women in marital disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether procedural irregularities in summary proceedings under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate a conviction in the absence of a failure of justice?
  • What is the extent of the sentencing jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court when punishing for perjury under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How does Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 apply the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mutatis mutandis to the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Whether an accused person who chooses to be represented by counsel is bound by the conduct of their counsel during summary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Abu Dawood Muhammad Sadiq Versus Registration Officer1986 PLD 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-16
  National Identity CardIslamic jurisprudencerepugnancy to injunctions of Islamphotography prohibitionstatutory interpretationShariat jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the validity of the National Registration Act (Act LVI of 1973) and its rules, which mandate that male applicants submit photographs for National Identity Cards, arguing such requirements are repugnant to the Qur'an and Sunnah. The core legal question was whether the mandatory use of photographs for identification constitutes an un-Islamic practice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requirement is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The Court reasoned that the Qur'an contains no direct prohibition against photography. While certain Ahadith express disapproval of image-making, the Court determined these prohibitions are context-specific, primarily targeting practices involving shirk (idolatry), worship, or challenges to the Creator. The judgment established that photography used for legitimate social needs, such as the orderly functioning of state affairs and personal identification, is permissible. The Court emphasized that Islamic law is dynamic and resilient, allowing for modern necessities provided they do not conflict with fundamental religious tenets like Tauheed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement of a photograph for a National Identity Card under the National Registration Act 1973 repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
  • Does the Holy Qur'an contain a direct prohibition against the making of photographs or pictures of living beings?
  • Are prohibitions regarding picture-making in the Sunnah absolute or dependent on the purpose and context of the usage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Versus The State1986 PLD 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-15Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P. Versus Said Kamal Shah1986 PLD 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-10-26
  pre-emptionislamic injunctionsrepugnancy to islamfederal shariat courtconstitutional jurisdictionmu'amelatland reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This Supreme Court of Pakistan judgment addresses several appeals filed under Article 203-F of the Constitution, examining the constitutional validity and alleged repugnancy of various provisions of pre-emption laws (including the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913, N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950, and Land Reforms Regulation 1972) to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The core legal question revolves around whether the Islamic law of pre-emption is strictly confined to the three categories recognized by Hanafi jurists (co-sharers, participators in amenities, and neighbours) or if the State can extend, curtail, or exempt certain properties and classes. The majority of the Court held that the Federal Shariat Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain the petitions, and that the pre-emption laws are largely based on mundane social dealings (Mu'amelat) rather than immutable rituals, allowing for legislative adjustments and extensions to prevent public damage, provided they have a nexus with the objects of pre-emption. However, provisions recognizing the right of pre-emption based merely on a successor's spes successionis were held repugnant. The key principle laid down is that the traditional Hanafi categories of pre-emptors are not exhaustive or immutable, and statutory modifications that advance the purpose of pre-emption are valid under Islamic law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of pre-emption laws are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah?
  • Are the categories of pre-emptors recognized by Hanafi jurisprudence exhaustive, or can the State extend or curtail pre-emption rights?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have the jurisdiction to examine the constitutional and statutory validity of pre-emption laws?
  • Whether the right of pre-emption conferred on a successor of the vendor based on spes successionis is repugnant to Islamic Injunctions?
  Read full judgment →
• Pakistan Versus Public at Large1986 PLD 240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-22
  Federal Shariat CourtIslamic injunctionsrepugnancy to IslamShariat Appellate BenchConstitutional jurisdictionIjtihadHoly Quran and SunnahIslamisation of laws
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard five consolidated appeals preferred by the Federation of Pakistan under Article 203-F of the Constitution against judgments of the Federal Shariat Court. In those judgments, the Federal Shariat Court had, in suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution, declared certain provisions of specified laws repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and ordered their amendment. The core legal questions involved the scope, proper exercise, and procedural requirements of the Federal Shariat Court's special jurisdiction under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution, particularly the necessity of grounding decisions explicitly in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court erred by annulling legal provisions without making references to or deriving reasons from the Injunctions of Islam as defined in the Constitution. The Court laid down key principles regarding the methodology of Ijtihad, the paramount status of the Holy Quran and Sunnah as sources of organic law, and the mandatory procedural steps required when examining laws for Islamic repugnancy. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the cases remanded to the Federal Shariat Court for fresh decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Shariat Court is legally required to make explicit references to the Holy Quran and Sunnah when declaring a legal provision repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Can the Federal Shariat Court exercise its jurisdiction under Article 203-D of the Constitution of Pakistan suo motu?
  • What are the mandatory procedural steps and requirements for the Federal Shariat Court when examining and deciding the question of repugnancy of laws to the Injunctions of Islam?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court possess the power to review any decision given or order made by it under Chapter 3-A of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mukhtar Hussain Shah Versus Wasim Sajjad1986 PLD 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-01-27
  senate electionelection petitioninvalid ballot paperssecrecy of ballotidentifying markselection tribunal jurisdictionrecount
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal as of right challenged the decision of the Election Tribunal invalidating seventeen ballot papers for the special seats of the Senate from Punjab and ordering a recount, which resulted in respondent No. 1 being declared elected instead of the appellant. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of the election petition in light of an earlier appeal before the Chief Election Commissioner, the interpretation of mandatory versus directory rules regarding voting procedures, and whether unauthorized markings on ballot papers rendered them invalid due to the possibility of voter identification. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that election petitions cannot be pre-empted by decisions of the Chief Election Commissioner under section 32 of the Senate Act, 1975, and that any deliberate, unauthorized markings or deviations on ballot papers—such as encircling preferences or mixing scripts—violate the secrecy and purity of the ballot and render the votes invalid. The key principle laid down is that ballot papers bearing marks capable of identifying the voter, unless attributable to mere accidental oversight, are invalid under the relevant election laws to preserve the absolute secrecy of the ballot.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of the Chief Election Commissioner in an appeal under section 32 of the Senate Act, 1975 bar a subsequent election petition before an Election Tribunal?
  • Are the requirements regarding voting procedures and markings under the Senate (Election) Rules, 1975 mandatory or directory for voters?
  • Does any unauthorized mark or writing on a ballot-paper automatically render it invalid on the ground that the voter can be identified?
  • Can an Election Tribunal invalidate ballot-papers containing intentional unauthorized markings without positive extrinsic evidence of a pre-arrangement between the voter and the candidate?
  Read full judgment →
• Khushi Muhammad Alias Bogi Versus The State1986 PLD 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-09-14
  Zinacorroboration of evidenceconsentHudood Ordinanceleave to appealsexual assault
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had modified the petitioner's conviction from section 10(3) to section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, reducing the sentence accordingly. The core legal questions addressed were whether the testimony of a woman in a Zina case requires mandatory corroboration and whether the legal principles regarding consent applicable under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, extend to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that no hard and fast rule exists requiring corroboration in all Zina cases, as it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Furthermore, the Court clarified that legal precedents concerning consent under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, are not strictly applicable to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, as consent does not provide a total absolution for the offender under the latter. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of a woman in a Zina case require mandatory corroboration?
  • Are the legal principles regarding consent under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applicable to the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does consent provide a complete defense to an offender under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
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• Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. Versus Assistant Collector (Appraising), Custom House, Karachi1985 PLD 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-06-26
  customs dutyexemption notificationstatutory interpretationexplanation in statuteconstitutional jurisdictiontextile machineryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal filed by various textile mills against a consolidated judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing their constitutional petitions concerning the interpretation of a customs notification. The core legal question involved the construction of an explanation within a statutory notification (S.R.O. 702(1)/80) issued under the Customs Act, 1969, which excluded automatic cone-winders from customs duty exemption on the basis that they were substitutes for locally manufactured cone-winders. The Supreme Court held that the government's power to grant or revoke customs duty exemptions under section 19 of the Customs Act is discretionary, wide in amplitude, and uncontrolled, and that the disclosure of a factual reason or policy motivation in an explanation does not render the exercise of such delegated power justiciable or open to factual inquiry in constitutional jurisdiction. The petitions were accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government's power to grant exemptions under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 is discretionary and wide in amplitude?
  • Can an explanation in a statutory instrument contain a statement of fact or policy motivation that is immune from factual inquiry in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does an explanation in a statute invariably serve only to clarify, or can it contain a legal fiction or basis for differential treatment?
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• Shakir Muhamma Versus The State1985 PLD 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-21
  zinavalid nikahconflicting nikahnamasfamily court suitcriminal re-trialabductionpost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the plea of a valid Nikah raised by the appellants was mala fide and whether the principle laid down in Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal and others (PLD 1984 SC 95) applied. The appellants were convicted under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 for allegedly abducting and having unlawful relations with a married woman, a conviction that was upheld with a reduced sentence by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the trial court decided the crucial and conflicting claims regarding the validity of the marriage and legitimacy of a child without examining the Nikahkhwan, witnesses, or original Nikahnama, and ignored the pendency of a related family suit concerning jactitation or dissolution of marriage. Holding that the defence plea was not mala fide and that a full inquiry or awaiting the family court's decision was required in line with Azam's case, the Supreme Court set aside the convictions and ordered a re-trial, admitting the appellants to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can decide conflicting claims of a valid Nikah without examining the Nikahkhwan, witnesses, or the original Nikahnama?
  • Is a criminal court required to await the decision of a pending family court suit regarding the validity of a marriage in a Zina case?
  • Whether the principles laid down in Muhammad Azam's case apply when determining conflicting claims of marriage in criminal proceedings?
  • Does the failure to conduct a full inquiry into conflicting marriage claims constitute a material defect in the trial warranting a re-trial?
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• Muhammad Sharif Versus The State1985 PLD 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-14
  Zina-bil-jabrbenefit of doubtconsensual relationshipkidnapping and abductionmandatory sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which had modified the appellant's conviction and sentence under sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, enhancing the sentence under section 11 to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant could be convicted of graver offences than charged without amending the charge under the Criminal Procedure Code, whether section 11 of the Ordinance permits a sentence lesser than imprisonment for life, and whether the prosecutrix's long silence and absence of protest under alleged coercion raised a reasonable doubt regarding free will. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that the prosecutrix's conduct—specifically her failure to raise an alarm or escape during a long train journey and extended stay in Sind—created a reasonable possibility that she left and remained with the accused of her own free will. Consequently, the conviction under section 11 and section 10(3) for Zina-bil-jabr was set aside on the benefit of doubt, and the appellant was instead convicted under section 10(2) for Zina liable to Tazir. The key principle laid down is that where the language of a penal statute is clear and mandatory, prescribing imprisonment for life without a lower minimum, the courts cannot interpret the word 'shall' as 'may' or read down the sentence, leaving any perceived legislative drafting anomaly regarding harsh mandatory minimums strictly for the legislature to amend.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 permit a court to award a sentence of imprisonment lesser than imprisonment for life?
  • Can a conviction for Zina-bil-jabr be sustained where the prosecutrix fails to offer any plausible explanation for her long silence and absence of protest during a prolonged period of travel and stay?
  • Whether the benefit of reasonable doubt should be extended to an accused where the evidence indicates a reasonable possibility that the prosecutrix accompanied the accused of her own free will?
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• Sultan Maqsood Versus The State1985 PLD 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-05-18
  Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinancefalse implicationbenefit of doubtsentence reductioncompensation to prosecutrixcriminal appealtestimony of prosecutrix
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through special leave is directed against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which dismissed the appellant's criminal appeal arising from his conviction and sentence under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, while modifying the sentence. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and an absconder committed Zina with the prosecutrix. The defence contended that the appellant was falsely implicated due to election rivalry and enmities involving village Zamindars known as Sardars. The core legal question examined was whether the background enmity rendered the false implication of the appellant probable. The Supreme Court held that the nexus between the background relations and the alleged false implication was too weak, and there was nothing to suggest that the prosecutrix or her family had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant. The conviction under section 10(2) of the Ordinance was upheld, but the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone while increasing the fine to be paid as compensation to the prosecutrix.

  Questions settled

  • Whether previous election rivalry and litigation between an accused's family and third parties are sufficient to establish false implication in a Zina case?
  • Can the conviction of an accused under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 be sustained upon credible testimony of the prosecutrix despite claims of enmity?
  • Whether the sentence of imprisonment can be reduced while simultaneously increasing the fine to provide compensation to the prosecutrix in the absence of an appeal against acquittal for a graver charge?
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• Muhammad Aslam Versus The State1985 PLD 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-02
  murdermitigating circumstancessentence reductionprivate revengeperjuryjuvenile offenderdeath sentence commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by Muhammad Aslam arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court confirming his conviction and death sentence for the murder of his uncle, Mehdi Hassan. The prosecution case was based on eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and motive—specifically, that the appellant committed the murder at the age of 15 or 16 to avenge the suspected murder of his father by the deceased when the appellant was a young boy. While leave to appeal on merits was previously refused, leave was granted regarding the sentence. The core legal question was whether the minority of the appellant and the nature of the motive (avenging a father's death) constituted mitigating circumstances warranting a lesser sentence than death, and whether action should be taken for perjury. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the sentence of death should be commuted to transportation for life, relying on established precedents regarding private revenge and youth, while enhancing the fine. Furthermore, the Court directed the trial court to initiate proceedings for perjury against a prosecution witness and a defence witness.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the age of the accused and a motive of avenging a father's murder constitute mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can the Supreme Court enhance a sentence of fine while commuting a sentence of death?
  • What action should courts take against witnesses who deliberately commit perjury during judicial proceedings?
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• Hazoor Baksh Versus The State1985 PLD 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-03-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafiq Versus The State1985 PLD 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Rafique Versus The State1985 PLD 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1985-02-09Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam Versus Muhammad Iqbal1984 PLD 95 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Saeedullah Kazmi Versus Govt. of Pakistan1984 PLD 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-14Read full judgment →
• Talib Din Versus Cheif Land Commissioner1984 PLD 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-14
  Land Reforms Regulation 1959State landcultivating tenantsresumption of landLand Commission jurisdictionproprietary interestLand Reforms Regulation 1972
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by cultivating tenants challenging the refusal of Land Commission authorities to sell them State land previously resumed from original grantees under the Land Reforms Regulation 1959 and Land Reforms Regulation 1972. The core legal question was whether such surrendered State land became available for disposal to cultivating tenants under the Land Reforms Scheme, or if it reverted to the Government as proprietary land outside the Commission's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Land Reforms Regulations did not apply to the proprietary interests of the Federal or Provincial Governments. Consequently, when State land was surrendered by grantees, it reverted to the Government rather than the Land Commission, rendering the Commission without jurisdiction to dispose of such land via sale to tenants. The Court affirmed that the Land Commission’s authority is limited to the scope of the Regulations, and it cannot exercise dispositive power over proprietary interests of the State. Accordingly, the appellants' claims to purchase the resumed land were untenable, and the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Land Commission have jurisdiction to dispose of State land resumed from grantees under the Land Reforms Regulation 1959?
  • Is Government-owned land subject to the regulatory controls and limitations imposed by the Land Reforms Regulation 1959?
  • Do cultivating tenants have a statutory right to purchase State land that has reverted to the Government after being surrendered by a grantee?
  • Can the Land Commission exercise dispositive power over land that reverts to the Provincial Government?
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• Muhammad Amin Versus The State1984 PLD 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-08-16
  murderdeath sentenceocular evidencemotivecriminal jurisprudenceappraisal of evidencemitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the court arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased following a previous altercation regarding the teasing of school girls. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the presence of motive, and whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a lesser sentence than death due to preceding events. The Supreme Court, by a majority view, dismissed the appeal, upholding both the conviction and the death sentence, holding that the eyewitness testimony was credible, the motive was established, and minor injuries like an abrasion on the shoulder did not mitigate the deliberate nature of the fatal knife attack. The key principle laid down is that innocent social interventions against wrongful acts do not constitute mitigation for the assailant, and a premeditated fatal attack following a cooling-off period justifies capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an intervention by bystanders to stop wrongful behavior operate as a mitigating circumstance for the assailant in a subsequent attack?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained based on eyewitness testimony and medical evidence despite minor unexplained injuries on the deceased?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and High Court regarding the appreciation of evidence.
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• Nazim Khan Versus The State1984 PLD 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24
  murderdying declarationchance witnessesabscondencebenefit of doubtsafe administration of criminal justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of three brothers under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, who were sentenced to death by the trial court, which was subsequently confirmed by the High Court of Peshawar. The prosecution alleged that the appellants shot and killed two individuals following a dispute over an alleged rape. The trial court had disbelieved the three eye-witnesses as unreliable chance witnesses but convicted the appellants by relying on a portion of the dying declaration corroborated by their abscondence. The High Court, however, accepted the eye-witnesses and dismissed the appeal. On further appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the dying declaration lacked integrity, was recorded in the presence of relatives at the police station, and was inconsistent with the eye-witness accounts. Furthermore, the eye-witnesses had material discrepancies in their statements which the High Court erroneously explained away as police misunderstandings. The Supreme Court held that the benefit of reasonable doubt arising from such discrepancies must go to the accused, and abscondence alone cannot substitute for independent corroboration. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration recorded at a police station in the presence of close relatives be safely relied upon without strict scrutiny?
  • Whether the discrepancies in the statements of eye-witnesses can be excused on the assumption of a recording police officer's misunderstanding to the detriment of the accused?
  • Does the mere abscondence of an accused person provide sufficient independent corroboration to sustain a conviction when the primary evidence is unreliable?
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• Ghulam Rasul Versus Muhammad Hayat1984 PLD 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-06-24
  quo warrantodisqualificationstatutory interpretationnoscitur a sociisregulatory controlproprietary controlpublic officeelection petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a registered voter, challenged the election of the respondent to the Zilla Council, Attock, via a constitutional petition in the nature of quo warranto. The appellant argued that the respondent, a full-time employee of Pakistan Oil Fields Limited, was disqualified under clause (aa) of Article 10(2) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Election) Order, 1977, as the company was allegedly controlled by the Government. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that regulatory control by the Government does not equate to proprietary control or management. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the term "control" within the disqualification clause. Applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, the Court held that "control" in this context must be interpreted in light of associated terms like "ownership" and "controlling share," implying a proprietary or management-based interest rather than mere regulatory or statutory oversight. Finding that the Government lacked proprietary control over the company, the Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling that extensive regulatory power does not constitute the "control" required to trigger the statutory disqualification for public office.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term "control" in the context of election disqualification clauses include mere regulatory or statutory oversight by the Government?
  • Can the principle of noscitur a sociis be applied to restrict the meaning of "control" when associated with terms like "ownership" and "controlling share"?
  • Does an employee of a company subject to extensive government regulation fall under the disqualification criteria for holding public office?
  • Is the regulatory power of the State over private enterprise equivalent to proprietary control or management?
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• Ishtiaq Ahmed Alias Kaka Versus The State1984 PLD 380 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-15Read full judgment →
• Nisar Alias Nisari Versus Govt. of Pakistan1984 PLD 373 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Shakir Muhammad Versus The State1984 PLD 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-04-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin Versus The State1984 PLD 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1984-05-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Versus The State1984 PLD 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-19
  zina-bil-jabrtazirfalse implicationparty factionmedical evidencesentence reductionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the petitioner's conviction for the offence of Zina liable to Tazir, with certain modifications regarding the specific provisions. The prosecution case alleged that the petitioner and his co-accused molested and dragged the prosecutrix and another girl to a hut, committing Zina-bil-Jabr. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular testimony, the defense plea of false implication due to village party factionalism, the absence of physical injury marks on the prosecutrix, and the appropriateness of the sentence and refusal of discretionary benefits. The Supreme Court held that the overwhelming consistent ocular and medical evidence established the petitioner's guilt beyond doubt, rejected the plea of false implication, and held that the absence of physical scratches does not negate the occurrence of dragging or assault. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether absence of visible marks of violence on the body of the prosecutrix disproves the allegation of dragging or assault in a charge of Zina-bil-Jabr?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the credibility of eyewitnesses where no misreading of evidence is shown?
  • Whether the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is mandatory for the appellate or revisional court when considering a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Does village party factionalism alone constitute sufficient ground to accept a plea of false implication in a heinous crime without corroborative motive linking the victim?
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• Muhammad Ramzan Versus The State1984 PLD 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  zinaappeal against acquittalchallan caselocus standiperjurybenefit of doubtjactitation of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter consists of two connected appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The first appeal arose from the Federal Shariat Court's dismissal of an appeal against the acquittal of accused persons charged under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance No. VII of 1979. The second appeal challenged the subsequent conviction of the complainant and witnesses under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for making false statements. The Supreme Court held that the appeal against acquittal filed by the complainant in a challan case was incompetent under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as only the State can appeal such acquittals. Regarding the perjury conviction, the Court ruled that where an acquittal in the main case is based on the extension of the benefit of doubt, it implies an equal possibility of the accusation being true or false. Consequently, the same benefit of doubt must be extended to the prosecution witnesses in the perjury proceedings, rendering their conviction unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private complainant have the locus standi to file an appeal against an acquittal in a criminal case initiated via a police challan?
  • Can witnesses be convicted of perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the accused in the main case were acquitted merely on the extension of the benefit of doubt?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a father disputing the validity of his daughter's marriage where a plea of valid marriage is used to defend against a charge of zina?
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• Ghulam Sarwar Versus The State1984 PLD 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  suspension of sentencewhippingZina OrdinanceSupreme Court Rulescriminal procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two miscellaneous applications seeking the interim suspension of the sentence of whipping pending the hearing of petitions for leave to appeal against convictions under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question involves the power and procedure of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court to suspend a sentence of whipping and whether such suspension is warranted. The Shariat Appellate Bench held that due to the element of social disgrace, notoriety, and the irreversible and irreparable loss to a convict even upon a successful appeal, there is ample justification for suspending the sentence of whipping in appropriate cases pending appeal. The Court laid down the principle that sentences of whipping may be suspended pending the hearing of leave to appeal petitions, and if any individual feels aggrieved by the manner of execution of such punishment, they remain free to seek independent legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to suspend a sentence of whipping pending the hearing of a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Whether the sentence of whipping can be suspended in appropriate cases considering the social disgrace and irreparable nature of the punishment?
  • What provisions govern the execution of a sentence of whipping in addition to imprisonment under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Kamal Din Versus The State1983 PLD 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-16Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman Versus The State1983 PLD 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22
  revisional jurisdictionspeaking ordercriminal revisionreasons for judgmentsummary dismissalappellate reviewleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a criminal revision by the Lahore High Court, where the High Court dismissed the petition via a non-speaking, summary order without discussing the contentions raised or providing reasons. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure is required to pass a speaking order addressing the contentions of the parties. The Court held that although revisional power is discretionary and does not create a right in any party, a High Court entertaining a revision must notice relevant contentions and record its reasons for rejecting them to ensure transparency and enable appellate review. Although the Supreme Court criticized the summary nature of the High Court's judgment, instead of remanding the case, it reviewed the record itself, found the ocular testimony reliable, and dismissed the petition on merits. The key principle laid down is that High Courts must render explicit, reasoned judgments or orders in criminal revisions rather than disposing of them in a summary manner.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to write a speaking order when dismissing a criminal revision petition?
  • Can the Supreme Court examine the record directly instead of remanding a case when the High Court passes a non-speaking summary order?
  • Does the revisional power vested in the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure create an inherent right of revision for parties?
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• Allah Bakhsh Versus The State1983 PLD 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13
  dying declarationmurderappellate reviewacquittalsentence reductionPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal appeal and petition against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court concerning charges of murder and assault under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the evidentiary value and reliability of multiple dying declarations made by a deceased victim, and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on such declarations after disbelieving the eye-witnesses and acquitting co-accused persons. The Supreme Court held that the dying declarations were trustworthy, consistent, and corroborated by the medical evidence, justifying the conviction of the main appellant. However, considering that the offense was committed to vindicate family honor following the abduction of a female family member, the Court partly accepted the appeal to the extent of reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while dismissing the petition against the acquittal of the co-accused. The key legal principle laid down is that multiple dying declarations, when found voluntary, consistent, and free from enmity or fabrication, can form a sufficient basis for a conviction if properly sifted, even in the absence of supporting eyewitness testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of dying declarations when eyewitnesses are disbelieved?
  • Whether minor discrepancies between multiple dying declarations affect their overall credibility?
  • Does the vindication of family honor constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with the acquittal of co-accused persons?
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• Muhammad Ilyas Versus The State1983 PLD 66 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
• Razi Versus The State1983 PLD 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-01
  review petitionmurderdeath sentence mitigationfalse motiveappraisal of evidencecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a review petition against the dismissal of an appeal upholding the conviction and death sentences of four petitioners for multiple murders and attempted murders arising from a land dispute. The core legal questions concern whether the failure of the prosecution to establish the alleged motive and the partial disbelief of the prosecution case warrant mitigating the death sentence to imprisonment for life, and whether vicarious liability or common intention applies under the circumstances. The court by majority dismissed the petition, maintaining the conviction, though differing on sentencing considerations. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's alleged motive is false or unestablished and a significant portion of its case is disbelieved, the court must carefully scrutinize the evidence and may consider such circumstances as mitigating factors while determining whether to commute a sentence of death to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to establish the alleged motive constitutes a mitigating ground for reducing a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Does the rejection of a substantial part of the prosecution case against co-accused necessitate corroboration for maintaining the conviction of remaining accused?
  • Whether discrepancies in the ocular testimony regarding the possession of disputed land affect the reliability of the prosecution story in a murder trial?
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• Imam Bux Versus The State1983 PLD 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-16
  common intentionvicarious liabilitymurderbenefit of doubtcriminal conspiracypre-concert
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant and his co-accused brother under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, resulting in a sentence of transportation for life. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held vicariously liable under Section 34 for the murder committed by his co-accused, given that no injury was attributed to the appellant, no incriminating recovery was made from him, and the eyewitness accounts regarding his firing were contradictory. In a split decision, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the appellant's participation, including lying in wait with a firearm, issuing challenges to stop the victims, and fleeing together, sufficiently established a common intention and pre-concert to justify the application of Section 34. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that common intention for joint liability under Section 34 can be inferred from surrounding circumstances such as pre-planning, arming with deadly weapons, lying in wait, and acting in concert.

  Questions settled

  • Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 develop at the spur of the moment?
  • Is the absence of a weapon recovery or physical injury inflicted by an accused sufficient to absolve him from vicarious liability when shared common intention is established?
  • How is common intention to be gathered when direct evidence is not forthcoming?
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• Federation of Pakistan Versus Muhammad Ishaque1983 PLD 273 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-10
  Customary Lawagricultural landalienationancestral propertyinheritancerepugnancy to IslamFederal Shariat Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court concerning whether restrictions on the power of alienation of persons who inherited agricultural land under Punjab Customary Law prior to March 16, 1948, are opposed to the injunctions of Islam. The core legal question is whether such customary restrictions, kept in force by section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 and section 2 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962, violate Islamic law regarding absolute ownership and inheritance. The Supreme Court held that under Islamic law, property vests absolutely in heirs with unfettered rights of disposal, and distinctions between ancestral and non-ancestral property or restricted customary estates are repugnant to the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the declaration that custom allowing collaterals to challenge alienations is void, directing necessary legislative amendments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether restrictions on the power of alienation under Punjab Customary Law for land inherited before 1948 are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam?
  • Does Islamic law recognize any distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property regarding ownership and alienation?
  • Is section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act 1872 void to the extent that it continues customary restraints on property alienations?
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• Muhammad Riaz Ahmad Versus Ajmal Hussain1983 PLD 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-13
  acquittalappeal against acquittalcomplainant appealchallan caserevisional jurisdictionOffence of ZinaFederal Shariat Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court dismissing an appeal against the acquittal of respondents accused under sections 11 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner's wife had left his house, and he subsequently lodged a police report alleging she was enticed away by respondent No. 1. The trial court acquitted the respondents under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, upon finding no probability of conviction after prosecution witnesses were given up. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petitioner's ensuing appeal. The Supreme Court considered the competency of the appeal and the revisional jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. The Court held that an appeal by a private complainant against an acquittal in a police challan case is incompetent under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, read with section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, as private appeals are restricted to cases instituted upon complaints. However, the Federal Shariat Court's order was sustained under its newly conferred revisional jurisdiction, which was exercised lawfully and without perversity. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private complainant file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case instituted upon a police report rather than a complaint?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court possess revisional jurisdiction in criminal matters under the relevant constitutional provisions?
  • Whether the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply mutatis mutandis to cases under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979?
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