Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Kashif Aftab Ahmed Abbasi vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2022 SCP 186, 2022 PSC 1584, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 1319, 2022 SCMR 1618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-06
  antedated seniorityPolice Service of PakistanCommon Training Programdeferment of trainingservice tribunalvested rightinter-se seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding the assignment of antedated seniority. The petitioner, initially a Pakistan Navy officer, was inducted into the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) in BS-17 based on Federal Public Service Commission recommendations. Due to continuous requests by the Governor of Sindh for his deferment while serving as an ADC, the petitioner repeatedly deferred joining the Common Training Program (CTP) until he finally joined the 43rd CTP, whereupon his inter-se seniority was fixed with that batch. The core legal question was whether a probationer who underwent continuous deferments from the CTP is entitled to claim antedated seniority from the year of his initial appointment without completing the mandatory training along with his original batch. The Supreme Court held that antedated seniority cannot be claimed as a vested right and that seniority must be regulated in accordance with the applicable rules, specifically requiring completion of training with the batch the probationer actually undergoes the CTP. The key principle laid down is that no officer has a vested right to a particular seniority or antedated promotion without fulfilling mandatory prerequisites such as training, and seniority is governed strictly by applicable service rules and executive policies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an officer can claim antedated seniority from the date of initial appointment without qualifying the mandatory Common Training Program along with their original batch?
  • Does a civil servant acquire a vested right to a particular seniority or promotion under service laws?
  • How is the inter-se seniority of probationers determined when multiple deferments from training are granted?
  • Can seniority be assigned from a date prior to when a probationer actually joined and completed the requisite training?
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• Kanwar Arif Ali Khan, M/s Sukkur Motel Company (Pvt) Limited vs Danish Ali2022 SCP 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-01
  leave to appealnon-partyimpleadmentlocus standicivil petitionSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves civil petitions arising from proceedings before the Sindh High Court, where one of the petitioners was denied impleadment and subsequently challenged the main judgment of the High Court. The core legal question concerns the procedure and maintainability of a petition or appeal filed by a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the High Court. The Supreme Court held that a non-party affected by a judgment, decree, or order may prefer an appeal or petition provided they obtain leave from the appellate court through a separate application. The Court laid down the principle that any person challenging a High Court judgment without being a party to those proceedings must first file a separate leave application to establish locus standi and ensure transparency, endorsing the longstanding practice tacitly part of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the High Court file an appeal or petition against the judgment?
  • What is the procedure for a non-party to challenge a judgment of the High Court before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a separate application seeking leave of the Court mandatory for a non-party challenging a High Court judgment?
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• Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs The President of Pakistan and others2022 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-13
  live-streamingjudicial transparencyright to informationArticle 184(3)open justicefundamental rightsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a miscellaneous application filed by Justice Qazi Faez Isa in pending review petitions, seeking live-streaming of court proceedings. The core legal question was whether the public possesses a fundamental right to access information regarding judicial proceedings conducted under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that Article 19A of the Constitution imposes a positive obligation on State institutions, including the Judiciary, to facilitate public access to information in matters of public importance. The Court determined that cases heard under Article 184(3) constitute matters of public importance, thereby granting the public a fundamental right to observe how these proceedings are conducted. Consequently, the Court directed that audio recordings of the review proceedings be made available on its official website and ordered the Registrar to develop the necessary technological infrastructure for future live-streaming and to propose amendments to the Supreme Court Rules 1980. The judgment establishes that judicial transparency is a constitutional imperative, reinforcing the principle that open justice is essential for maintaining public trust in the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 19A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 impose a positive obligation on the Judiciary to provide public access to information regarding court proceedings?
  • Are proceedings conducted by the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction pursuant to Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 considered matters of public importance?
  • Can a Bench of the Supreme Court order the live-streaming of its own proceedings in the absence of specific rules, provided the technological infrastructure exists?
  • Is the right of the public to access information regarding court proceedings fulfilled solely by the physical openness of the courtroom?
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• Jawad Ahmad Mir vs Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan, Vice Chancellor, University of Swabi, District Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2022 SCP 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  stopgap arrangementlook-after chargeVice Chancellor appointmentwrit of quo warrantouniversities actpublic officeinterim charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal was directed against the Peshawar High Court's judgment dismissing the petitioner's writ petition, which had challenged a notification authorizing the Vice Chancellor of the University of Swabi to look after the affairs of the office of Vice Chancellor of Women University, Swabi, as a stopgap arrangement following the expiry of the previous incumbent's tenure. The core legal questions involved whether assigning a look-after charge to another university's Vice Chancellor violated the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012, and the parameters for issuing a writ of quo warranto. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a Pro Vice Chancellor and permanent faculty, a stopgap arrangement by the competent authority to run day-to-day university affairs pending regular appointment is lawful and does not constitute a usurpation of office. The court laid down key principles regarding the nature of stopgap/acting charges and the conditions necessary for maintaining a writ of quo warranto against public office holders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether assigning a look-after charge to the Vice Chancellor of another university as a stopgap arrangement violates the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012?
  • What are the essential grounds and conditions necessary for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto against the holder of a public office?
  • Does a person holding a public office on a stopgap or acting charge basis hold it in a substantive capacity?
  • Whether a former Vice Chancellor has a vested right to claim an extension in tenure upon its expiry?
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• Javed Iqbal vs The State2022 SCP 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-25
  narcotics traffickingchain of custodyjudicial confessionbenefit of doubtexculpatory statementcriminal appealsafe custody of samples
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 25 kilograms of charas. The core legal questions concerned the prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody for narcotics samples and the permissible use of a judicial confession that contained exculpatory elements. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the safe custody and transmission of the sample parcels, creating a fatal gap in the evidence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a confession must be accepted or rejected in its entirety; it cannot be split to use only inculpatory parts while discarding exculpatory ones, especially when the prosecution's case is otherwise doubtful. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the only remaining evidence is an exculpatory confession, the court must accept the statement as a whole, which necessitates the acquittal of the accused. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court selectively accept the inculpatory part of a confession while rejecting the exculpatory part when no other evidence exists?
  • What is the legal consequence of the prosecution's failure to establish the safe custody and transmission of narcotics samples?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal if the prosecution's evidence is rejected and the remaining confessional statement is exculpatory?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused before the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Javed Iqbal vs The State through Prosecutor General of Punjab and another2022 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-31
  pre-arrest bailbail petitionattempted murdertrespassfalse implicationcivil disputeco-accused bailfurther inquiryconstitutional petitionpersonal liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution seeking pre-arrest bail for charges under sections 324/452/337-L(2)/134, P.P.C., following the rejection of bail by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, accused of attempted murder and trespass without causing injury, was entitled to pre-arrest bail, particularly given a pending civil dispute, allegations of false implication, and the fact that his co-accused son had already been granted post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted pre-arrest bail. The Court held that the possibility of false implication to gain advantage in civil litigation could not be ruled out, emphasizing that personal liberty is a precious constitutional right not to be curtailed on bald allegations. The case fell within Section 497(2) Cr.P.C., warranting further inquiry, and the Court reaffirmed that the merits of a case can be considered when granting pre-arrest bail, especially when a similarly placed co-accused is already on bail.

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• Javed Iqbal vs The State through D.A.G., Islamabad & another2022 SCP 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-01
  post-arrest bailbail conditionssurety bondsfinancial deposit conditionliberty of accusedcyber crime
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court, which granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner under sections 13/14 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 read with sections 420, 468, 471 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, but conditioned his release upon the deposit of Rs.3.5 million in the trial court. The core legal question was whether a court, upon deciding to release an accused on bail, can lawfully impose extraneous financial conditions or riders beyond the submission of bail and surety bonds. The Supreme Court held that once an accused is found entitled to bail on merits, the order cannot be subjected to riders, conditions, or financial deposits meant to secure payments or settlements. The ratio laid down is that bail is an interlocutory arrangement solely intended to secure the attendance of the accused through surety bonds under section 499 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and courts cannot compel an accused to barter freedom or impose conditions foreign to the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court while granting bail to an accused can impose conditions requiring the deposit of money or recovery of alleged amounts?
  • Can the grant of bail on merits be subjected to riders or conditions other than the submission of bail and surety bonds under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Is it permissible to impose a condition upon an accused person in a bail order to desist from the repetition of the offence?
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• Islamabad High Court Bar Association through its President Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Islamabad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-26
  constitutional petitionfreedom of assemblyfreedom of movementright to lifebreach of court assurancecontempt of courttrichotomy of powerspublic order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by the Islamabad High Court Bar Association complaining against the blocking of roads and highways in Islamabad by the Federal Government to prevent a political party's protest march, infringing fundamental rights under Articles 9, 15, and 16. During proceedings, the Supreme Court had earlier arranged a peaceful venue for the rally based on assurances given by the political leadership. Subsequently, the Attorney General for Pakistan filed a miscellaneous application alleging breach of these assurances as protestors moved towards the Red Zone, causing destruction and clashes. The core legal questions involved whether responsibility for mob violence could be attributed to party leadership, the maintainability of seeking executive orders from the Court, and whether contempt proceedings should be initiated. The Court held that proceedings for violation of court assurances are separate, dismissing the miscellaneous application as misconceived, while disposing of the main petition as infructuous since the protest was called off. The key principle laid down is that maintaining law and order is strictly the domain of the executive under the trichotomy of powers, and fundamental rights like freedom of assembly and movement are subject to reasonable, proportionate restrictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can pass prohibitory and regulatory orders empowering law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order?
  • Does a petition regarding blockade of roads and political protests become infructuous once the political party calls off its sit-in?
  • Whether violation of an undertaking or assurance given to the Court requires separate independent proceedings rather than a miscellaneous application?
  • Does maintaining law and order fall within the exclusive domain and mandate of the executive under the principle of trichotomy of powers?
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• Ishaq vs The State2022 SCMR 1422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-27
  Control of Narcotic Substances Actsafe custodysafe transmissionbenefit of doubtchain of custodysample parcelsacquittalnarcotics conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, brought by leave of the Court, challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions pertained to the evidentiary value of narcotics recovery when prosecution fails to establish safe custody and safe transmission of samples, fails to prove vehicle ownership, and fails to produce the recovered vehicle or its remnants. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court held that failure to produce the Moharrar or the constable depositing samples, unexplained delay between recovery and receipt at the laboratory, and absence of evidence regarding safe custody create a clear risk of tampering. Consequently, such fatal prosecutorial defects prevent the prosecution from establishing its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of prosecution to prove safe custody and safe transmission of sample parcels entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can a conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be sustained when neither the Moharrar nor the depositing constable is produced as a witness?
  • What is the effect of an unexplained delay between the recovery of narcotics and their receipt at the laboratory on the prosecution case?
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• Intelligence Bureau Employees Cooperative Housing Society thr. its2022 SCP 50, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 340, 2022 SCMR 877, 2022 PSC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-18
  LimitationAcquiescenceOstensible ownerBona fide purchaserInheritance mutationWaiverCivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over inheritance and subsequent land sales. The respondent challenged a 1970 inheritance mutation in 1990, claiming exclusion from his maternal grandfather’s estate. The appellant society, having purchased the land from the recorded owners in 1986 and 1987, argued the suit was time-barred and that they were protected as bona fide purchasers. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s failure to challenge the mutation for twenty years, despite attaining majority and residing in the same vicinity, constituted acquiescence and waiver of his rights. The Court found the respondent’s claim of ignorance implausible given the visible development of the land into a housing society. Consequently, the Court ruled that the appellant society, having purchased the land for valuable consideration from the ostensible owners, was entitled to protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The judgment reinforces the principle that long-standing inaction and failure to challenge revenue records, coupled with the rights of innocent third-party purchasers, precludes a belated claim to title.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay of twenty years in challenging an inheritance mutation constitute acquiescence and waiver of rights?
  • Can a transferee of land claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, when the transferor is an ostensible owner?
  • Does the presumption of truth attached to land revenue records under Section 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, protect a bona fide purchaser?
  • Can a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court declaring a law repugnant to Islam affect succession that occurred prior to the date specified in that judgment?
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• Inspector General of Police, Quetta and another vs Fida Muhammad and others2022 PLC (C.S.) 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-18
  service tribunalvested rightlocus poenitentiaeprinciples of natural justicecancellation of appointmentcivil servantsdepartmental selection committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal whereby respondents' service appeal was allowed and they were reinstated in government service. The respondents had applied for various vacant BPS-1 posts in the Balochistan Police following a newspaper advertisement, successfully cleared the selection process, and were issued appointment letters upon the recommendation of the Departmental Selection Committee. Subsequently, their appointments were cancelled through an omnibus withdrawal order without a show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing. The core legal question concerned whether the appointments violated Rule 9(6) of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009, regarding local-based appointments, and whether the withdrawal of appointment letters after the creation of vested rights was lawful. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appointments fully complied with the applicable rules and that the authorities could not arbitrarily withdraw appointment letters without observing the principles of natural justice and due process. The Court laid down that once an employee is appointed after fulfilling codal formalities, a vested right is created, and such right cannot be arbitrarily rescinded under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae without proper cause and adherence to natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether appointment letters issued after fulfilling all codal formalities can be withdrawn without a show-cause notice?
  • Does Rule 9(6) of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009 bar the appointment of local residents across districts within the same range?
  • Can low-paid employees be penalized for alleged procedural irregularities committed by the appointing department?
  • What is the scope and application of the doctrine of locus poenitentiae regarding the withdrawal of appointment orders?
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• Inspector General Of Police, Balochistan, Quetta and others vs Mohibullah2022 SCMR 9, 2022 PLJ SC 6, 2022 PSC 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  service lawdate of birth alterationsuperannuationcivil servantservice recordlimitation periodBalochistan Civil Servants Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute regarding the date of birth of a government employee, an Assistant Sub-Inspector in the Balochistan Police. The respondent sought to alter his date of birth in his service record from 20.01.1960 to 20.12.1961, nearly four decades after his initial entry into service, relying on his CNIC. The Balochistan Service Tribunal allowed his appeal, citing the absence of the original Service Book. The Supreme Court examined whether a government employee could alter their recorded date of birth long after joining service. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in law by ignoring the statutory bar. It affirmed that the date of birth recorded at the time of entry into government service is final. Under Rule 11 of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009, any request for alteration due to clerical error must be made within two years of initial entry. Since the respondent failed to adhere to this mandatory limitation, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, upholding the finality of the original service record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government employee alter their date of birth in the service record after the expiry of two years from the date of joining service?
  • Is the date of birth recorded in the character and service roll at the time of entry into government service considered final?
  • Does the absence of a Service Book before a Service Tribunal justify the alteration of a date of birth contrary to statutory rules?
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• Ikram Ullah Khan Yousafzai, Excise and Taxation Officer, Peshawar and others vs Dr. Rizwan Ullah and others2022 PSC (Crl.) 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-10
  revenue collectionwarrant of arrestofficial authorityconstitutional jurisdictionalternative remedycriminal case registrationstatutory immunity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an impugned order of the Peshawar High Court directing the registration of a criminal case against excise and taxation officials who executed a non-bailable warrant of arrest against a property tax defaulter. The core legal question involves balancing the statutory immunity and protection afforded to state functionaries executing official duties for revenue collection against allegations of abuse of authority and wrongful confinement, and whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 should be invoked when alternate statutory remedies exist. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, setting aside the High Court's direction to register a criminal case. The Court held that state functionaries executing warrants issued by a competent authority enjoy statutory presumptions of official acts, and disputed factual controversies regarding the validity of warrants or assessment cannot be resolved through constitutional jurisdiction when alternate remedies such as a private complaint are available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state functionaries executing warrants for revenue collection are subject to criminal liability for inappropriate venue selection without proof of a fake instrument?
  • Can constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 be invoked to resolve factual controversies when alternate statutory remedies are available?
  • Whether the execution of a warrant issued by a competent authority attracts statutory protection under general exceptions?
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• Ijaz Badshah vs The Secretary, Establishment Division, Govt. of Pakistan, Cabinet Block, Constitution Avenue, Islamabad & others2022 SCP 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  civil servantdismissal from servicemisconductdoctrine of proportionalityunauthorized absencepassports actjudicial reviewservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against his dismissal from service for major misconduct. The petitioner, a civil servant in BS-19, had remained willfully absent from duty and travelled abroad multiple times on different passports without obtaining a No Objection Certificate (NOC), while misdeclaring his profession as a business owner. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner abandoned his challenge to the dismissal order on merits and instead sought conversion of the penalty to compulsory retirement, invoking the doctrine of proportionality. The Supreme Court held that while courts may judicially review executive discretion on grounds of reasonableness and proportionality, the gravity of the proven misconduct—possessing multiple passports and travelling without permission—justified the major penalty. The Court ruled that the punishment of dismissal was proportionate to the gross misconduct and refused to interfere with the Tribunal's decision, thereby dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with the quantum of departmental punishment under the doctrine of proportionality and reasonableness?
  • Does the unauthorized foreign travel and possession of multiple passports by a civil servant constitute gross misconduct warranting dismissal from service?
  • Whether a penalty of dismissal from service for major misconduct can be converted to compulsory retirement on grounds of leniency?
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• Ijaz Ahmed vs The State etc2022 SCP 114, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 239, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 417, 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-19
  murder convictionrobberyocular evidencesingle witness testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner for murder and robbery. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charges of murder and robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, given the alleged contradictions in the evidence and the lack of corroboration for the robbery charge. The Supreme Court held that while the prosecution failed to establish the robbery charge due to unreliable evidence regarding the recovery of looted items and the motorcycle, the ocular testimony regarding the murder was consistent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring. The Court set aside the conviction under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but maintained the conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principles laid down are that the quality of evidence, rather than quantity, determines its sufficiency for conviction, and the testimony of a single witness, if reliable, can sustain a conviction in a murder case. Furthermore, the mere relationship of a witness to the deceased is not a ground to discard their testimony absent proof of enmity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the testimony of a single witness?
  • Does the relationship of a prosecution witness to the deceased automatically invalidate their testimony?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon inconsequential if no crime empties are recovered from the scene?
  • Can a conviction for robbery be sustained without reliable evidence connecting the accused to the looted articles?
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• Ijaz Ahmed vs Noor Ul Ameen2022 SCMR 1522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-04
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadrevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingssuperior right of pre-emptionmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption filed by the petitioner, claiming a superior right based on adjacency and common water sources. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Lahore High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, finding that the petitioner failed to prove the essential requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad, and failed to establish the alleged superior right of pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the failure to prove the performance of Talbs and the lack of evidence for the pre-emption claim warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings, holding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the legal requirements for pre-emption. The Court reaffirmed that revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is limited and cannot be invoked against concurrent findings of fact unless there is misreading or non-reading of evidence or material illegality. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that failure to prove Talb-i-Muwathibat or any requirement of Talb-i-Ishhad renders a pre-emption suit unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a pre-emption suit under its revisional jurisdiction?
  • What is the consequence of failing to prove the performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat in a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a pre-emption suit maintainable if the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad is not served on the vendor through registered post with acknowledgment due?
  • Does the failure to prove any requirement of Talb-i-Ishhad render a suit for possession through pre-emption liable to fail?
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• IGP, Balochistan, Quetta and others vs Mohibullah2022 PLJ SC 6 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  date of birth alterationcivil servantsuperannuationservice tribunalservice recordBalochistan civil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal filed by the Inspector General of Police, Balochistan against the judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which had allowed the respondent police officer's service appeal regarding the alteration of his date of birth. The core legal question was whether a civil servant can seek an alteration of their date of birth after the expiry of the statutory limitation period of two years from entering government service. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed a serious mistake of law in allowing the appeal, reiterating that under Rule 11 of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009, the date of birth recorded at the time of joining service is final and cannot be altered after two years. The key principle laid down is that requests for the alteration of a civil servant's date of birth are strictly barred after the expiration of two years from the date of entry into service, and service tribunals cannot bypass this mandatory rule.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant seek the alteration of their date of birth after two years of entering government service?
  • Is the date of birth recorded in the initial character and service roll at the time of joining service final?
  • Does a service tribunal have the authority to alter a civil servant's date of birth in violation of Rule 11 of the Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 2009?
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• Icc (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Ministry of Energy (Power Division) through its Secretary2022 SCP 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-12
  Public Procurement Rulesbid validity periodbank guarantee encashmentperformance securityNotification of Awardprice escalationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court of Balochistan, which had upheld the encashment of the petitioner's bank guarantee (bid security) by the procuring agency. The petitioner, a private limited company, submitted the most advantageous bid for the construction of transmission lines and consented to multiple extensions of the bid validity period requested by the respondent under the Public Procurement Rules, 2004. Upon being issued a Notification of Award, the petitioner demanded a price escalation, failed to furnish a performance security, and consequently had its bank guarantee encashed. The core legal question was whether a bidder who consents to an extension of the bid validity period can unilaterally condition its consent on a price increase and whether the procuring agency is justified in encashing the bid security upon the bidder's failure to furnish performance security. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's consent to extend the bid validity period was unconditional, that the Public Procurement Rules, 2004 do not permit price increases at the stage of the Notification of Award, and that the encashment of the bank guarantee was lawful upon the petitioner's failure to furnish the performance security. The key principle laid down is that under the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, the substance of a bid and its prices must remain unchanged during extended bid validity periods, and a bidder agreeing to an extension is bound by its original bid terms and estopped from demanding price revisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bidder legally condition its consent to an extension of the bid validity period upon an increase in the prices offered in its initial bid?
  • Whether the procuring agency is permitted under the Public Procurement Rules, 2004 to accept a request from a successful bidder to increase prices at the stage of the Notification of Award?
  • What is the remedy available to a bidder who does not agree to a procuring agency's request for an extension of the bid validity period?
  • Is a procuring agency justified in encashing a bid security when the successful bidder fails to furnish the required performance guarantee?
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• Hussain Khan vs The State2022 SCMR 1660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  narcoticssafe custody of samplesbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealchemical examinerchain of custodyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the appellant's conviction and sentence under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution established the safe custody and safe transmission of narcotics sample parcels beyond a reasonable doubt when there was an unexplained delay in sending the samples to the chemical examiner and essential official witnesses were not produced. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and acquitted the appellant by giving him the benefit of the doubt. The holding establishes that failure of the prosecution to prove safe custody and safe transmission of sample parcels—specifically through the non-production of crucial witnesses who handled the Malkhana and delivered the parcels—creates a fatal loophole, preventing the prosecution from proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in sending sample parcels to the chemical examiner vitiate the prosecution's case under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Is the non-production of the Malkhana moharrar and the official who delivered the sample parcels fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Whether the failure to establish safe custody and safe transmission of sealed sample parcels entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt and acquittal?
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• Human Rights Commission Of Pakistan through Chairperson and others vs Federation Of Pakistan through Ministry of Education and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-15
  Teri Mandarpublic interest litigationinfrastructure developmentrecovery of fundspolice investigationprotection of minority rightsjudicial implementation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the ongoing implementation of the Supreme Court's directives regarding the destruction of the Teri Mandar. The Court reviewed a report submitted by the Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, detailing partial compliance with previous orders, specifically regarding the recovery of funds from individuals responsible for the destruction. The Court directed full compliance with its prior orders and explicitly mandated that the recovered funds be utilized for the restoration and upkeep of the Mandar, as well as for infrastructure development in the surrounding area. This includes the construction of access roads, the provision of water facilities and drainage systems, and the creation of public amenities like parks and playgrounds to benefit local residents. Additionally, the Court addressed a complaint from Dr. Ramesh Kumar, MNA, regarding alleged death threats and physical assault by a government servant. The Court ordered the Inspector General of Police, Sindh, to investigate the incident, submit a report, and take immediate legal measures to ensure the safety of the complainant and prevent future occurrences.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct the utilization of recovered funds for the infrastructure development of the area surrounding a destroyed religious site?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the Inspector General of Police to investigate alleged threats against a Member of the National Assembly?
  • What is the scope of the Court's power to ensure full compliance with its previous orders regarding the restoration of public or religious property?
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• Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed vs Government of The Punjab through Secretary Health, Department and others2022 PLJ SC 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  proforma promotionretired civil servantstatutory interpretationservice tribunalremandactus curiae neminem gravabitcivil service law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's claim for proforma promotion after her retirement. The core legal question was whether a retired civil servant is eligible for proforma promotion under Section 8(5) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, as amended by the Punjab Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2005. The Tribunal had erroneously relied on an incorrect, incomplete version of the statute that omitted a crucial proviso allowing for such consideration. The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal's decision was based on a patent error regarding the applicable law, which prejudiced the appellant. Applying the legal maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (an act of the court shall prejudice no one), the Court held that judicial bodies have a duty to rectify errors caused by their own reliance on incorrect statutory texts. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits, ensuring the case is adjudicated based on the correctly published law.

  Questions settled

  • Is a retired civil servant eligible for the grant of proforma promotion under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Does the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' require a court to set aside a judgment based on an incorrectly published version of a statute?
  • What is the correct legal position regarding the eligibility of retired civil servants for proforma promotion as per the Punjab Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2005?
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• Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed vs Government of the Punjab through its2022 SCP 150, 2022 SCMR 1546 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-12
  proforma promotionretired civil servantstatutory interpretationgazette notificationactus curiae neminem gravabitservice lawremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Punjab Service Tribunal judgment which dismissed the appellant's claim for proforma promotion on the grounds that Section 8(5) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, as amended in 2005, barred retired civil servants from such relief. The Supreme Court observed a discrepancy between various published versions of the 2005 Amending Act. Upon examining the official Gazette, the Court discovered that the version relied upon by the Tribunal was incorrectly published and omitted a crucial proviso. The authentic text of Section 8(5) explicitly allows retired civil servants to be considered for proforma promotion as prescribed. Applying the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' (an act of the court shall prejudice no one), the Court held that a party must not suffer due to a court's reliance on erroneous legal texts or procedural faults. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on the merits based on the correct statutory provision.

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• Homeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2022 PLC 1390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  proforma promotionretired civil servantservice tribunalstatutory interpretationmistake of courtremandcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's service appeal seeking proforma promotion from BS-15 to BS-16 and BS-17. The Tribunal had relied on an incorrectly published version of section 8(5) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, which omitted the proviso allowing retired civil servants to be considered for proforma promotion as prescribed. The core legal question was whether a retired civil servant is eligible for proforma promotion under the correct statutory provisions of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, as amended by the Punjab Civil Servants (Amendment) Act, 2005. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal based its decision on an erroneous and inaccurate text of the law, ignoring the proper proviso in section 8(5) that permits retired civil servants to be considered for proforma promotion. The Court set aside the impugned judgment, emphasizing that parties must not suffer due to judicial reliance on incorrect statutory publications, and remanded the matter to the Service Tribunal for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with the correct law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired civil servant is eligible for the grant of proforma promotion under section 8(5) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Does section 8(5) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 contain a proviso allowing retired civil servants to be considered for proforma promotion?
  • Can a service appeal be dismissed on the basis of a wrongly published gazette notification or statutory text?
  • What is the effect of an incorrect exposition of law by a tribunal resulting from inaccurate legal publications?
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• Hassan Aziz and others vs Meraj ud Din and others2022 SCP 16, 2022 SCMR 1131, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 307, PLJ 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-08
  Muslim family lawsuccessioninheritancepredeceased sonper stirpesstatutory interpretationgreat-grandchildrenleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of a civil suit concerning inheritance and succession rights under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The core legal question raised was whether great-grandchildren fall within the meaning of 'children' for the purposes of Section 4 of the Ordinance, thereby entitling them to inherit per stirpes from a propositus through a predeceased grandchild. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 4 explicitly limits its application to children of a predeceased son or daughter who are living at the time the succession opens, specifically upon the death of the propositus. The ratio of the decision is that the statutory exception carved out by Section 4 is strictly circumscribed and does not extend to great-grandchildren or other remote descendants who are not alive when the succession opens. The key principle laid down is that statutory exceptions in inheritance laws must be interpreted strictly according to their plain wording, and terms such as 'children' cannot be expanded to include remote descendants where explicit statutory limitations restrict the benefit to those living at the opening of succession.

  Questions settled

  • Are great-grandchildren within the meaning of children for the purposes of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 extend inheritance rights to descendants who are not alive at the time the succession opens?
  • How is the phrase 'per stirpes' in Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 to be construed in relation to remote descendants?
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• Hasham Khan and others vs Haroon Ur Rashid and others2022 SCMR 1793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-28
  dismissal of suitproduction of evidencedefaulting partycivil procedureremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a suit for declaration by the Trial Court under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, after the plaintiffs failed to produce their remaining evidence, which dismissal was subsequently upheld by the appellate court and the High Court in revision. The core legal question was whether the phrase 'proceed to decide the suit forthwith' under Order XVII Rule 3 permits a court to dismiss a suit summarily without evaluating the available record or evidence upon a party's default. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that 'to decide the suit forthwith' does not mean dismissing a suit there and then without considering the merits or the material already on record, and that courts must apply the provision by reviewing the record or proceeding with the available evidence rather than resorting to arbitrary dismissal. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments, remanded the matter to the Trial Court for a decision on merits within three months, and laid down the principle that penal provisions for default in producing evidence must be exercised judiciously with reference to the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'proceed to decide the suit forthwith' under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permit a court to dismiss a suit summarily without examining the available record?
  • What is the correct legal course for a trial court when a party fails to produce evidence within the time granted under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Can a trial court strike off a plaintiff's right to produce evidence and straightaway dismiss the suit without touching the merits or existing evidence on record?
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• Haseen Ullah vs Mst. Naheed Begum, etc2022 PSC 1561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-23
  dowermahrmaintenancenikahnamaMuslim personal lawfamily lawconstruction of contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil petition for leave to appeal arising from a matrimonial dispute wherein a husband challenged the Peshawar High Court's judgment decreeing his wife's claims for dower (four Kanal agricultural land and seven tola gold ornaments) and maintenance. The core legal questions involved the proper construction of Nikahnama entries regarding dower and the wife's entitlement to maintenance when residing apart due to the husband's refusal to take her home after a second marriage. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a Nikahnama must be construed according to the true intent of the parties rather than rigid adherence to the headings of its columns, and that a wife willing to discharge her marital obligations is legally entitled to maintenance. The Court laid down the principle that courts must ascertain the true intent of parties in marriage contracts executed by laymen and reaffirmed that a husband's duty to maintain his wife and pay dower is an absolute legal and religious obligation under Islamic law and statute.

  Questions settled

  • How should conflicting or ambiguous entries regarding dower in a Nikahnama be construed by courts?
  • Is a wife entitled to maintenance if she is willing to live with her husband but is prevented from doing so by his conduct?
  • Whether properties mentioned in separate columns of a Nikahnama constitute cumulative dower or alternative provisions?
  • What are the foundational principles governing a husband's obligation to pay dower and maintenance under Islamic law?
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• Haseen Ullah vs Mst. Naheed Begum and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-23
  dowermaintenanceNikahnamaIslamic lawmatrimonial obligationssecond marriagecontract interpretationMuslim Personal Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a husband's challenge to a High Court judgment that decreed his wife's claims for dower and maintenance. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of conflicting entries in the Nikahnama regarding dower and the wife's entitlement to maintenance when living apart from her husband. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that a Nikahnama is a contract where the court must ascertain the true intent of the parties rather than being restricted by the literal headings of the columns. The Court found that the property mentioned in column 16 was additional to, not in lieu of, the gold mentioned in column 13. Regarding maintenance, the Court held that a wife's right is absolute under Islamic law if she is willing to discharge her matrimonial obligations but is prevented from doing so by the husband's actions, such as his refusal to take her back after a second marriage. The judgment reinforces that dower is an obligatory bridal gift and maintenance is a fundamental right of the wife.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entries in a Nikahnama should be interpreted based on the literal column headings or the true intent of the parties?
  • Is a wife entitled to maintenance if she is willing to live with her husband but is prevented by his refusal or conduct?
  • Can property mentioned in column 16 of a Nikahnama be treated as additional dower rather than an alternative to the dower mentioned in column 13?
  • What is the legal status of dower (mahr) and maintenance under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962?
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• Haq Nawaz and others vs Banaras and others2022 SCMR 1068, 2022 PSC 736 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  power of attorneyparda nashin ladyrevocation of power of attorneyfiduciary dutycontract acttransfer of propertyamendment of plaintoral sale mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over agricultural land originally owned by Mst. Channan Jan, an illiterate parda nashin lady. The predecessor in interest of the appellants, Ghulam Rasool, acting as the lady's attorney and who was also her tenant, transferred the land to his sons (the appellants) via an oral sale mutation. The core legal questions involved the validity of the power of attorney, whether an attorney can transfer property to his own family without explicit consent, the effect of revoking a power of attorney, and the permissibility of introducing a fundamentally new case through multiple plaint amendments. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an attorney cannot lawfully transfer property to himself or his associates for his own benefit without explicit consent of the principal, and that the principal has the right to repudiate such a transaction under Section 215 of the Contract Act 1872. The Court further laid down that a power of attorney executed by a parda nashin lady without independent advice and clear proof of her understanding its contents is invalid, and that an agent cannot transfer property after the power of attorney has been validly revoked.

  Questions settled

  • Can an attorney lawfully transfer property under an agency to his own sons or near relatives without the explicit consent of the principal?
  • What are the legal requirements to prove the valid execution of a power of attorney by an illiterate parda nashin lady?
  • What is the effect of the revocation of a general power of attorney on subsequent transfers made by the former attorney?
  • Can a plaintiff be permitted to introduce an entirely new case regarding an oral sale and consideration through subsequent amendments of the plaint after a significant lapse of time?
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• Haji Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs and another vs Mst.2022 SCP 96, 2022 PSC 68, 2022 PLJ SC 389, 2022 SCMR 1282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-17
  sale mutationlimitationoverseas Pakistanisrevenue recorddeclaratory suitfraudpossessionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a dispute over a 1989 sale mutation of a house in Abbottabad purchased by overseas Pakistanis. The legal heirs of the deceased seller challenged the mutation in 2009, alleging fraud and forgery. The core legal questions concerned the application of the law of limitation to declaratory suits involving revenue entries and the shifting of the burden of proof in challenges to long-standing mutations. The Supreme Court held that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a fresh cause of action does not arise with every new Jamabandi entry if the beneficiary has already taken physical possession, as this constitutes an 'actual denial' of rights. The Court found the suit time-barred since the seller lived for 19 years post-mutation without challenging it. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the initial burden to rebut the presumption of regularity under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat and Section 52 of the Land Revenue Act lies with the challenger; only then does the onus shift to the beneficiary. The High Court's reversal of concurrent findings was set aside.

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• Gulzar Ahmad and others vs Muhammad Aslam and others2022 SCMR 1433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-08-20
  specific performancebona fide purchaseragreement to sellpenalty clauseburden of proofimmovable propertysecond appealdue diligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The vendor (Respondent No. 3) entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs but, before the stipulated cut-off date, transferred the land to the appellants via mutation for a higher price. The trial court dismissed the suit, awarding only a refund of earnest money and a penalty, but the first appellate court reversed this, decreeing specific performance. The High Court maintained the decree in a second appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and the effect of a penalty clause on specific performance. The Court held that the burden of proof lies on the subsequent vendee to establish good faith and lack of notice through due diligence. It further ruled that under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, a penalty clause does not bar specific performance, as the legal presumption remains that a breach of contract for immovable property cannot be adequately compensated by money. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a penalty clause in an agreement to sell immovable property precludes a decree for specific performance?
  • On whom does the initial burden of proof lie to establish the status of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice under Section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act?
  • Can a subsequent vendee be considered a bona fide purchaser if they failed to conduct due diligence or inquiries regarding the vendor's title and existing encumbrances?
  • Does the legal presumption that breach of contract for immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by money still apply if a liquidated damages sum is named in the agreement?
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• Gull Din vs The State through P.G., Punjab and another2022 SCP 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-17
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsdelay in analysisdirectory provisionspeedy trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to bail due to non-compliance with Rule 4(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, which requires seized narcotics to be dispatched for analysis within seventy-two hours of seizure. In this case, the sample was sent after seventeen days. The Court examined whether the non-compliance with this timeline constitutes a sufficient ground for bail. Relying on established precedent, the Court held that Rule 4(2) is directory rather than mandatory. Applying the principle that non-compliance with a directory rule does not automatically entitle an accused to bail, the Court ruled that this delay alone was not a sufficient ground for granting bail. However, noting the petitioner's grievance regarding trial delays, the Court disposed of the petition with directions to the prosecution to proceed expeditiously without seeking unnecessary adjournments, and instructed the trial court to enforce this commitment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the seventy-two hour timeline for dispatching seized narcotics under Rule 4(2) of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001 is directory or mandatory?
  • Does the non-compliance with a directory procedural rule regarding the dispatch of seized narcotics automatically entitle an accused to the concession of bail?
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• Gul Nawab vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another2022 SCMR 547, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 85, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 237 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-25
  post-arrest bailcross-version FIRfurther inquiryabsconsionmurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court denying post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case registered under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the existence of a cross-version FIR, the lack of specific attribution of the fatal shot, and the petitioner's nine-year absconsion. The Supreme Court held that the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 because both parties had registered FIRs regarding the same incident, indicating a conflict in versions that required trial evidence to resolve. The Court further held that mere absconsion, while relevant, is not an absolute bar to bail and cannot serve as the sole ground for refusal when the case otherwise merits relief. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and granted bail to the petitioner, establishing that where two versions of an occurrence exist, the case warrants further probe, and absconsion does not automatically preclude the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a cross-version FIR regarding the same occurrence justify the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Can absconsion alone serve as a sufficient ground to deny bail to an accused?
  • Is the registration of a counter-version a mandatory ground for the grant of bail in a murder case?
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• GuI Zarin S/O Abdul Hakim etc vs Kamal-ud-Din and another2022 SCP 56, 2022 SCMR 1085, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 118, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-09
  MurderConvictionSentence alterationOcular accountWitness testimonyPremeditationSudden occurrenceCriminal petitionAbscondenceRelated witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses criminal petitions challenging a murder conviction and sentence. The core legal questions revolved around the reliability of ocular evidence, the impact of minor contradictions and witness relationships, the distinction between the petitioner and an acquitted co-accused, and the appropriate quantum of punishment. The Supreme Court converted the petitioner's criminal petition into an appeal, partly allowing it. The Court maintained the conviction for murder but altered the sentence from life imprisonment (awarded by the High Court) to fourteen years rigorous imprisonment under Section 302(c) PPC, citing the occurrence taking place at the spur of the moment without premeditation, a single shot fired, and no established motive. The complainant's petition seeking enhancement of the sentence was dismissed. The Court affirmed that consistent ocular accounts from injured witnesses are reliable, even with minor discrepancies after a long abscondence. It reiterated that mere relationship of witnesses with the deceased does not discredit their testimony unless enmity is proven, and distinct roles can justify different outcomes for co-accused.

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• Govt. of Pakistan M/Oa Housing & Works through Joint Estate Officer,2022 SCP 288, 2022 SCMR 2073 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-18
  official accommodationallotment cancellationcivil court jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicecivil servantsaccommodation allocation rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a civil servant serving in the Income Tax Department, was allotted an official residence in Peshawar. Upon his transfer, the Estate Officer cancelled the allotment under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002. The respondent challenged the cancellation by filing a civil suit, which was decreed in his favour, and concurrent findings were upheld by the appellate court and the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave, converted the petition into an appeal, and examined whether civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain disputes regarding the allotment or cancellation of official accommodation. The Court held that matters pertaining to official accommodation are connected with the terms and conditions of service, and remedies must be sought before the specialized forums provided under the applicable rules. Consequently, pursuant to Section 23B of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, civil courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes or grant injunctions in respect thereof. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court judgments and directing the return of the plaint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the cancellation of an official accommodation allotted to a civil servant?
  • Does Section 23B of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 bar civil courts from granting injunctions in respect of decisions taken under the Accommodation Allocation Rules, 2002?
  • Are disputes regarding the allotment and cancellation of official residences connected with the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
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• Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others vs Defence Rays Golf and Country Club and others2022 PSC 639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-28
  double taxationlegislative competenceeducation cessnon obstante clausefiscal statuteultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that declared Section 7 of the Punjab Finance Act, 2011, ultra vires the Constitution on the ground that the education cess imposed on clubs amounted to impermissible double taxation, as clubs were already subject to sales tax on services under the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that double taxation is not per se unconstitutional if the levy is within the legislative competence of the Province. The Court clarified that the rule against double taxation typically applies within the four corners of a single statute, and even then, clear legislative language overrides it. Furthermore, the Court found that the non obstante clauses in Section 7 of the Punjab Finance Act, 2011, clearly expressed legislative intent to impose the levy. The Court affirmed that the substance of the levy was within the Province's legislative domain and that the High Court erred in striking it down based on the economic burden of double taxation.

  Questions settled

  • Is double taxation per se unconstitutional under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the rule against double taxation apply when levies are imposed under two different statutes?
  • Can a court strike down a fiscal levy solely on the ground that it creates an economic burden of double taxation?
  • Does the presence of a non obstante clause in a charging provision negate arguments against double taxation?
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• Government of The Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others vs Defence Raya Golf and Country Club and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-28
  education cessdouble taxationsales tax on serviceslegislative competenceconstitutional validitynon-obstante clauseprovincial taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  The Province appealed judgments of the Lahore High Court declaring Section 7 of the Punjab Finance Act 2011 ultra vires the Constitution. Section 7 levied an education cess on clubs, which the respondents argued constituted unconstitutional double taxation because services provided by clubs were already subjected to sales tax under the Punjab Sales Tax Ordinance 2000 and the Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act 2012. The High Court struck down the provision on the ground that double taxation was impermissible under the law. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's ruling and allowed the appeals. The Court held that double taxation is not inherently unconstitutional or beyond legislative competence if the subject matter falls within the legislature's domain. There is a strong presumption against double taxation, but where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the tax must be enforced. Furthermore, economic double taxation across two separate enactments does not render a tax legally invalid, especially given express non-obstante clauses indicating clear legislative intent.

  Questions settled

  • Is double taxation inherently unconstitutional or beyond the legislative competence of a legislature under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the existence of economic or commercial double taxation across separate statutes render a provincial tax levy invalid?
  • How does a non-obstante clause in a fiscal statute affect the presumption against double taxation?
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• Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi2022 SCP 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-16
  land acquisitionSection 48withdrawal from acquisitionpossession of landexecution proceedingscompensation award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing challenges to execution proceedings regarding land acquisition. The core legal question was whether the Government of Pakistan could invoke Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to withdraw from the acquisition of land after possession had already been taken and compensation awards had been finalized and upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Government’s power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 is not absolute and is explicitly circumscribed by the prerequisite that possession of the land must not have been taken. The Court determined that because the acquisition proceedings were complete, the award was finalized, and possession had long been transferred to the acquiring department, the Government could no longer exercise the power to withdraw. The Court affirmed that the Government cannot retrace its steps to undo a completed acquisition process, thereby dismissing the petitions and refusing leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government withdraw from land acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 after possession of the land has been taken?
  • Does the power of the government to withdraw from land acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 remain available after the acquisition proceedings are completed?
  • Is the government's power to withdraw from land acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 absolute?
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• Government of KP thr. Secretary Home & TAs and others vs Noorani Gul thr.2022 SCP 138, 2022 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-15
  land settlementunsettled landescheatproperty rightspossession as evidencerevenue recordfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over land ownership between the Provincial Government and a private individual. Following land settlement proceedings in 1986, the government recorded previously unsettled land in its name. The respondent challenged this entry, asserting ownership based on cultivated possession. The trial court decreed in favor of the respondent, but the appellate court reversed this. The Peshawar High Court subsequently allowed the respondent's revision, restoring the trial court's decree. The core legal question was whether the government could claim ownership of land solely because it was "unsettled" at the time of settlement proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the government's appeal, holding that the government failed to establish its title or demonstrate that the land was acquired through due process or escheat. The Court affirmed that the government cannot claim ownership merely on the basis of land being unsettled. It established that in the absence of documentary records—often due to the government's failure to conduct timely settlement proceedings—proven possession serves as sufficient evidence of ownership, and citizens cannot be deprived of their fundamental constitutional rights to hold property.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government claim ownership of land solely because it was recorded as unsettled during settlement proceedings?
  • Is possession sufficient proof of ownership in the absence of documentary revenue records?
  • What procedure must the government follow to acquire unclaimed or ownerless property under the doctrine of escheat?
  • Does the government's failure to conduct timely settlement proceedings justify depriving citizens of their property rights?
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• Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary, Home2022 PLD Supreme Court 253, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-15
  presidential remissionArticle 45criminal justiceintelligible differentiaheinous crimesconstitutional petitionprison rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions filed by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa challenging Peshawar High Court judgments that granted special remissions to prisoners convicted of heinous crimes, including murder and abduction. The core legal question was whether such convicts were entitled to remissions granted by the President under Article 45 of the Constitution, notwithstanding notifications explicitly excluding them. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting these remissions. The Court ruled that the President’s power to grant clemency does not preclude the government from issuing notifications that create reasonable classifications based on the nature of the offense. By excluding convicts of serious crimes like murder and terrorism, the state acts within its authority to create intelligible differentia, which does not violate the constitutional mandate of equality under Article 25. The Court emphasized that criminal justice objectives, including retribution and deterrence, justify such exclusions. Consequently, the High Court’s judgments were set aside, as the respondents were not entitled to the contested remissions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the President of Pakistan exclude specific categories of convicts from remissions granted under Article 45 of the Constitution?
  • Does the exclusion of convicts of heinous crimes from remission notifications violate the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Are prison superintendents authorized to grant remissions independently of the criteria set by the government?
  • Can a judicial precedent regarding a conviction for murder be automatically applied to a case involving abduction?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Forest, Peshawar2022 PLC (C.S) 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-18
  regularizationcontract employmentproject employeesmaster and servantwrit jurisdictionseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from judgments of the Peshawar High Court which directed the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to reinstate and regularize the services of various contract and project-based employees. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether project employees appointed on a contract basis have a vested right to regularization after the expiration of their projects, and whether employees of entities governed by Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) are subject to the master and servant principle. The Court held that regularization is a policy matter requiring statutory backing, and in its absence, contract employees cannot claim regularization as a matter of right. The Court ruled that project-based employment automatically terminates upon project completion, and courts cannot force the government to adjust such employees against permanent posts without a competitive process. Furthermore, employees of corporate entities under MoUs are governed by the master and servant principle, precluding constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract employee appointed for a specific project claim regularization as a matter of right after the project has concluded?
  • Does the High Court have the authority under Article 199 of the Constitution to direct the adjustment of contract employees against permanent posts without a competitive recruitment process?
  • Are employees of a corporate entity established under a Memorandum of Understanding governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Can regularization of service be ordered by a court in the absence of statutory backing, rules, or policy?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar, etc vs Yousaf Khan, etc2022 PSC 1387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompensationreferee courtinterestrental valueshariat appellate bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the interpretation of the amended Section 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question was whether a Referee Court, when determining the amount to be deposited by the Collector under the amended provision, can award an additional sum (such as interest or rent) over and above the enhanced compensation, following the omission of the 6% interest clause by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001. The appellants argued that the omission of the interest clause, pursuant to Islamic injunctions, barred such awards. The Supreme Court held that the distinction between the 'sum' of compensation and the 'amount' to be determined by the court remains valid. However, modifying its previous ruling in the Misal Khan case, the Court clarified that the additional amount must be characterized as 'rent' rather than 'interest' to align with Islamic jurisprudence. The Court laid down the principle that a Referee Court should award the actual fair market rental value of the land, or in its absence, a minimum of 6% per annum of the enhanced compensation as rental value from the date of possession to actual payment.

  Questions settled

  • How is a Referee Court to determine the amount to be deposited by the Collector under the amended Section 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the omission of the interest clause in Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 prevent a court from awarding additional sums for delayed payment?
  • Whether the additional sum awarded over and above the enhanced compensation under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 should be characterized as interest or rent?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar2022 SCP 372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  conveyance allowancecivil servantsterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunalsummer and winter vacationsdiscriminatory treatmentfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprises 76 civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against judgments of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, which allowed respondents' service appeals concerning the discontinuation of their conveyance allowance during summer and winter vacations. The core legal question is whether the Government could lawfully discontinue or deduct the conveyance allowance of teachers during school vacations without any justifying notification or statutory provision. The Supreme Court held that the discontinuation of the conveyance allowance was illegal, discriminatory, and in violation of the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, as vacations count as duty and salary components cannot be varied to the disadvantage of employees. The Court laid down the principles that terms and conditions of service protected by statute cannot be altered to the disadvantage of civil servants, that administrative bodies must act fairly and non-discriminatorily under Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution, and that a legal ruling on service matters operates in rem to benefit similarly situated civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conveyance allowance of teachers can be lawfully discontinued or deducted during summer and winter vacations?
  • Does a service tribunal judgment on a point of law relating to terms of service operate in rem for other civil servants not party to the litigation?
  • Whether the discontinuation of a salary component without a statutory provision or notification violates the constitutional rights of civil servants?
  • Whether school vacations count as duty for the purpose of entitlement to emoluments and allowances?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar2022 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-10
  land acquisitionenhanced compensationReferee Courtrental valueinterestKhyber Pakhtunkhwa
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed how a Referee Court should determine the amount to be deposited by the Collector under the amended provisions of section 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Act 1894, specifically whether such an amount includes rent or interest. The appellant argued that the statutory omission of the interest clause in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa via the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance 2001 precluded the award of 6% interest on enhanced compensation. The Court examined precedents including the Misal Khan case and the Aslam Khaki case, noting that the 2001 amendment aimed to align the law with Islamic injunctions by replacing traditional interest with a rental value concept to compensate landowners for delayed payment. The Supreme Court modified the interpretation given in Misal Khan, holding that under amended section 28, a Referee Court should add the actual fair market rental value or, in the absence of evidence, 6% per annum of the enhanced compensation as minimum rent from the date of possession until actual payment. The appeals were consequently dismissed, maintaining the awarded 6% per annum sum designated as rent rather than interest.

  Questions settled

  • How is a Referee Court to determine the amount to be deposited by the Collector under the amended provisions of section 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does the term 'amount' in amended section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 include interest or rent for the period of deprivation of land possession?
  • Can a Referee Court award a fair market rental value or a minimum percentage as rent on enhanced compensation when the statutory interest clause has been omitted?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others vs Intizar Ali and others2022 PLC (C.S.) 837, 2022 SCMR 472, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 245, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-28
  sacked employeesreinstatementregularizationad-hoc employeesstatutory interpretationultra viresservice lawmandatory provision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from several appeals filed by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against judgments of the Peshawar High Court and the Service Tribunal, which had ordered the reinstatement of various employees under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sacked Employees (Appointment) Act, 2012. The core legal question was whether the respondents met the statutory eligibility criteria for reinstatement, specifically regarding their status as regular employees, possession of requisite qualifications at the time of appointment, and adherence to the mandatory 30-day application window under Section 7 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the Act was intended strictly for regular employees and not for those on temporary, ad-hoc, or contract bases. The Court emphasized that temporary employees have no vested right to regularization. Furthermore, the Court noted that the federal equivalent of this legislation had already been declared ultra vires the Constitution. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and set aside the reinstatements, except for one respondent who proved regular status and timely application. The judgment reinforces the principle that statutory benefits must be strictly construed according to the legislature's intent and mandatory procedural requirements.

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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Civil2022 PLC (C.S.) 1481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-16
  service appealantedated promotionvested rightseniority cum fitnessfresh cause of actionarbitrary exercise of authorityfrivolous appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a service matter where the respondent, a Soil Conservation Inspector (BPS-11), was denied promotion to Soil Conservation Assistant (BPS-17) upon the retirement of the incumbent on 12th May 2015, despite being the senior-most eligible candidate. After successfully challenging the initial denial before the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, the department promoted the respondent on 29th May 2018 with immediate effect rather than from the date the vacancy arose. The respondent filed a second service appeal before the Tribunal, which directed antedated promotion from 12th May 2015, prompting the department's appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether the second service appeal was barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Rule 23 of the KPK Service Tribunal Rules 1974, and whether an employee wrongfully delayed promotion is entitled to antedated promotion. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent promotion order with immediate effect gave rise to a fresh cause of action, rendering the bar inapplicable, and that an employee blamelessly delayed by department inaction is entitled to promotion from the date the vacancy occurred. The court dismissed the appeal as meritless, denouncing the department's conduct as arbitrary and frivolous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second service appeal claiming antedated promotion from the date a vacancy arose is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Rule 23 of the KPK Service Tribunal Rules 1974 when a prior appeal only addressed the general refusal to promote?
  • Does an eligible civil servant wrongfully denied promotion due to departmental delay acquire a vested right to be promoted from the date the post fell vacant?
  • Does the issuance of a promotion order with immediate effect, following a tribunal's remand, constitute a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved employee?
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• Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Civil2022 SCMR 1765 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-16
  antedated promotionvested rightservice appealdepartmental delaysubsequent appealarbitrary exercise of authorityseniority cum fitness
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, an employee of the Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department, sought promotion as Soil Conservation Assistant (BPS-17) after becoming the senior-most eligible candidate following a retirement. Although a vacancy arose on 12th May 2015, the department delayed consideration and later granted promotion only with immediate effect from 29th May 2018 rather than from the date the post fell vacant. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal accepted the respondent's second service appeal and directed antedated promotion from the date of the vacancy. The Supreme Court dismissed the department's appeal, holding that an employee who is unjustly denied promotion due to departmental delay is entitled to promotion from the date the vacancy occurred and that a subsequent service appeal seeking consequential relief is not barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or Rule 23 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal Rules 1974. The Court laid down that arbitrary withholding of a vested right to promotion does not extinguish the employee's claim to retrospective effect upon correction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee is entitled to promotion from the date a vacancy occurs when the promotion was wrongfully delayed by the department?
  • Is a second service appeal claiming retrospective promotion barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or Rule 23 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal Rules 1974?
  • Does the implementation of a tribunal's direction for promotion with immediate effect extinguish an employee's claim to an antedated promotion from the date of the vacancy?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Khyber2022 SCP 294, 2022 SCMR 2114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-06
  service lawcompulsory retirementmisconductservice tribunal jurisdictionunauthorized absencepenalty modificationcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenged a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, which had modified a civil servant's penalty of compulsory retirement to a reduction in rank. The respondent, a government servant, had been penalized by the competent authority for unauthorized frequent foreign travel without obtaining the mandatory No Objection Certificate (NOC) and for prolonged unauthorized absence. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in modifying the penalty imposed by the competent authority despite finding the respondent guilty of the misconduct. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's interference was unjustified and arbitrary. The Court ruled that while the Tribunal possesses the power to modify penalties under the Service Tribunals Act 1973, such power is not unbridled or discretionary; it must be exercised with circumspection, recording cogent and legally sustainable reasons. Because the Tribunal failed to provide a valid justification for its leniency despite acknowledging the gravity of the proven misconduct, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and restored the penalty of compulsory retirement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to modify a penalty imposed by a competent authority on a civil servant?
  • Is the power of the Service Tribunal to modify penalties under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 discretionary and unbridled?
  • What criteria must the Service Tribunal satisfy when modifying a disciplinary penalty imposed by a departmental authority?
  • Can a Service Tribunal modify a penalty without recording cogent and legally sustainable reasons for doing so?
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• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others2022 PSC 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-22
  service lawregularization of servicesproject employeescontractual appointmentstatutory interpretationjudicial restrainttermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that ordered the regularization of a project employee. The core legal question was whether a project employee, whose post was converted to the regular budget after the cut-off date of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Regularization of Services Act, 2009, was eligible for regularization, and whether such employment was contingent upon the project's lifespan. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting regularization. The Court determined that the 2009 Act explicitly excludes project employees from its purview, and the respondent's appointment was governed by policy terms stipulating automatic termination upon project completion or conversion to the regular budget. The Court emphasized that judicial sympathy cannot override the clear letter of the law. The key principle laid down is that courts must strictly adhere to statutory cut-off dates and express contractual terms governing project-based employment, and cannot extend the scope of regularization statutes to include categories of employees—such as project staff—that the legislature has expressly excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees eligible for regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Regularization of Services Act 2009 if their posts were converted to the regular budget after the Act's cut-off date?
  • Does the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Regularization of Services Act 2009 include or exclude project employees from its regularization benefits?
  • Do project employees have a vested right to regularization upon the conversion of project posts into regular budgetary posts?
  • Can a court grant regularization on sympathetic grounds when the governing statute and appointment terms expressly exclude such relief?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs The State2022 SCP 265, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 50, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-01
  jail petitionleave to appealconcurrent findings of factidentity of accusedmurderbenefit of doubtweapon of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's son. The core legal questions involved the identity of the accused in view of a variance in the name mentioned in the FIR, the nexus between the weapon of offence and the fatal injury, and the grounds for interfering with concurrent findings of fact under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies in names, where aliases are well-established and no identity challenge was raised during trial, do not create a reasonable doubt, and that medical evidence corroborating a sharp-edged weapon supports the prosecution. Declining leave to appeal, the Court affirmed that it will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the absence of gross misreading or non-reading of evidence or any substantial question of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a variance in the name of the accused in the FIR create reasonable doubt as to identity when the accused is known by an alias and no question of identity was raised during trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the culpability of an accused under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in the absence of gross misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does the statement of a medical witness that any sharp-edged weapon might cause an injury negate the recovery of a specific knife as the weapon of offence?
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• Ghulam Rasool vs Muhammad Siddiq, etc.2022 SCP 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-28
  civil reviewsupreme court rulessubstitution of advocatevexatious review petitionpre-emption suittalb-i-ishhadadvocate-on-record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition arises from the dismissal of a civil petition for non-prosecution and on merits, where the original pre-emption suit was dismissed for failure to produce the postman to prove service of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice, a concurrent finding supported by established case law. The Supreme Court considered an application under Order XXVI, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, seeking to substitute the Advocate Supreme Court who had not appeared at the original hearing without providing a valid reason. The Court held that substituting an advocate without special leave or a valid explanation is impermissible under the rules, and dismissed the substitution application as well as the review petition, noting that the review petition was frivolous, vexatious, and filed with a delay of nine days without disclosing any grounds for review under Article 188 of the Constitution and Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Court cautioned against filing vexatious review petitions and highlighted the professional responsibilities of Advocates-on-Record regarding rule compliance and representation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for review can be drawn and supported by an advocate who did not appear at the hearing of the original case without special leave of the Court?
  • Does the mere desire of a petitioner constitute a sufficient reason to disregard the rules governing representation in review petitions?
  • Whether a review petition filed with a delay and lacking valid grounds under the Supreme Court Rules is liable to be dismissed?
  • What are the consequences under the Supreme Court Rules for filing vexatious or frivolous review petitions?
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• Ghulam Murtaza vs State, etc.PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-04
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction baildelay in disposal of appealstatutory periodcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an order passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, dismissing the petitioner's application for suspension of sentence and release on bail under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner had been convicted under Section 324 and Section 337-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with financial penalties. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence and bail pending the appeal due to the delayed disposal of his criminal appeal by the High Court beyond the statutory period. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that since the petitioner had served a substantial period in custody without the delay being attributable to him, and his case did not fall within the prohibitory exceptions of Section 426(1-A), he made out a fit case for suspension of sentence. The key principle laid down is that where an appeal of a convicted person is not decided within the statutory period and delay is not attributable to the convict, sentence may be suspended provided the case is not hit by the statutory exceptions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convict is entitled to suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the criminal appeal is not decided within the statutory period?
  • Does a delay in the disposal of a criminal appeal not attributable to the convict form a valid ground for suspension of sentence?
  • What categories of convicts are excluded from the benefit of suspension of sentence under the proviso to sub-section (1-A) of Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Ghulam Murtaza vs Muhammad Rafique, etc2022 PSC 1406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-16
  pre-emption suitPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991Talb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadregistered noticerefusal to accept servicemisreading of evidenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by a pre-emptor challenging a Lahore High Court decision that allowed the respondents' civil revision, set aside concurrent findings of two lower courts, and dismissed the appellant's pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the statutory requirement of performing Talabs under Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991 had been properly fulfilled and proved. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant provided detailed pleadings and cogent, unrebutted testimony from the informer and attesting witnesses regarding Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad. Moreover, statutory notice for Talb-i-Ishhad was dispatched via registered mail to the respondents' correct addresses, which were returned due to intentional refusal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed gross misreading and non-reading of material evidence, as properly addressed registered envelopes and postal receipts constitute sufficient legal compliance where non-acceptance is intentional. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decrees of the trial and appellate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does intentional refusal by a vendee to receive a properly addressed registered notice of Talb-i-Ishhad constitute sufficient compliance with Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
  • Can a High Court in civil revision set aside concurrent findings of fact without establishing misreading or non-reading of material evidence?
  • What proof is required to successfully establish the valid performance of Talbs in a pre-emption suit?
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• Ghulam Murtaza vs Muhammad Rafique and others2022 SCMR 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-16
  right of pre-emptiontalabstalb-i-muwathibttalb-i-ishhadconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidencecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the pre-emption suit of the Appellant. The core legal question was whether the mandatory `Talabs` (demand of pre-emption) were validly performed and proved in accordance with section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and settled case law. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that the Appellant had successfully pleaded and proved the due performance of both `talb-i-muwathibt` and `talb-i-ishhad` through consistent ocular testimony and documentary evidence, while the vendee respondents intentionally refused service of the notices sent via registered post. Finding that the High Court committed gross misreading and non-reading of evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and restored the concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and Appellate Court decreeing the pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirements of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 regarding the performance of Talabs were duly fulfilled?
  • Does the intentional refusal to accept registered notices containing talb-i-ishhad amount to sufficient compliance with the law?
  • Under what circumstances can concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts be interfered with in civil revision?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs The State2022 SCMR 1102, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-18
  acid throwingtest identification paradecriminal appealdirect identificationmuffled facessurviving victim testimonyabsence of motiveanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the court arises from the conviction of the appellant under section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 read with section 7(c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for splashing acid on the victim inside a village mosque, which was upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the omission of a test identification parade despite initial mention of muffled assailants in the First Information Report was fatal to the case, and whether the victim's direct identification of the appellant sufficed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the direct testimony of the surviving victim, who identified his assailant upon regaining his faculties, inspired confidence and rendered a test identification parade unnecessary. Furthermore, the absence of motive does not vitiate a conviction where ocular and direct evidence is reliable. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, while maintaining the conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, laying down that a surviving victim's direct identification of an assailant in heinous crimes like acid attacks obviates the need for a test identification parade.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of a test identification parade is fatal to the prosecution case when the surviving victim directly identifies the assailant?
  • Does the lack of a proven motive vitiate a conviction for acid throwing supported by direct victim testimony?
  • Whether multiple extensive burn injuries rule out the possibility of an accident or self-infliction in acid attack cases?
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• Ghaffar Mahesar vs The State through P.G Sindh and others2022 SCMR 1280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-26
  murderleave to appealeye witness testimonyproof beyond reasonable doubtmedical evidenceballistic reportsubstitution of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which upheld the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the petitioner under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt based on eye-witness testimony, medical evidence, and forensic match of the recovered weapon. The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence took place in broad daylight, witnessed by close relatives whose presence at the crime scene was natural and whose ocular testimony was consistent and corroborated by medical evidence. The Court held that a close relative of the deceased would not substitute the real assassin with an innocent person. Finding that the preponderance of evidence constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, maintaining the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of close relatives can be relied upon to uphold a conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Can an accused be convicted of murder where ocular evidence is consistent and corroborated, despite allegations of discrepancies and an unproven motive?
  • Is a father expected to substitute the real assassin of his son with an innocent proxy without cogent proof of false implication?
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• First Dawood Investment Bank Ltd., Karachi vs Bank of Punjab through its2022 SCP 210, 2022 CLD 1415, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-18
  winding upunable to pay debtsstatutory noticebona fide disputesuretydischarge of suretybanking suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a conditional winding-up order passed by the High Court of Sindh against the appellant-company under the Companies Ordinance 1984. The respondent-bank had sought winding-up based on the appellant's alleged default on liabilities arising from a Letter of Commitment and two guarantees. The appellant-company contended that the terms of the underlying finance agreements were altered without its consent, thereby discharging its liability as surety under the Contract Act 1872, and that the debt was bona fide disputed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the winding-up order. The Court held that the term 'neglect to pay' under Section 306(1)(a) of the Ordinance refers to a refusal to pay without reasonable cause, and does not apply where a company raises a bona fide dispute based on substantial grounds. The Court laid down that winding-up jurisdiction is discretionary and cannot be used to resolve complex factual and legal disputes arising from financial contracts, which are properly within the domain of civil or banking courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere omission to comply with a statutory notice under Section 306(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 automatically establish that a company is unable to pay its debts?
  • What is the effect of a bona fide dispute regarding the existence of a debt on a petition for winding-up under the Companies Ordinance 1984?
  • Can a company court in its winding-up jurisdiction conduct a detailed analysis of complex factual and legal questions regarding liability under a contract of guarantee?
  • Whether the pendency of a recovery suit before a banking court affects the maintainability of a winding-up petition where the underlying debt is substantially disputed?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health2022 SCP 262, 2022 SCMR 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-26
  proforma promotionmove-overcivil servicepay scaleadministrative oversightservice tribunalFundamental Rule 17
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns civil petitions against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment directing the grant of 'move-over' benefits to retired employees of the Population Welfare Department. The core question was whether the respondents, having received proforma promotions, were entitled to move-over to the next higher pay scale (BPS-20) upon reaching the maximum stage of their previous scale (BPS-19) prior to the proforma promotion date. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the Tribunal's decision. The Court found that the Move-Over Committee had rejected the claims based on resentment toward court-ordered proforma promotions rather than on the merits of the entitlement. The Court affirmed that 'move-over' is an extension of an existing pay scale, not a promotion. It emphasized that proforma promotion is a remedial mechanism under Fundamental Rule 17 to compensate civil servants for administrative delays or oversight. Furthermore, the Court held that administrative bodies must decide entitlements based on established policy and merit, rather than personal grievances against judicial orders, and that unjustified delays in such matters cause unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a move-over considered a promotion to a higher post or an extension of an existing pay scale?
  • Does a civil servant have a legitimate expectation for proforma promotion when denied due to administrative oversight?
  • Can a government committee deny a service benefit based on resentment toward court-ordered promotions?
  • Are civil servants entitled to move-over benefits if they reached the maximum stage of their pay scale prior to the date of their proforma promotion?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M_o Communications, Islamabad & another vs Shuja Sharif & others2022 SCP 342 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  motorway banmotorcycles on motorwaypublic safetyjudicial reviewjudicial overreachfundamental rightsintelligible differentiaut res magis valeat quam pereat
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an intra-court appeal judgment of the Islamabad High Court affirming the setting aside of a ban on motorcycles on motorways imposed by the National Highways and Motorway Police. The core legal question was whether restricting motorcycles on motorways under Section 45 of the National Highways Safety Ordinance, 2000 infringed fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgments. The Court held that Section 45 explicitly empowers the Federal Government or an authorized agency to prohibit or restrict specific classes of vehicles on specified roads in the interest of public safety. Where the vires of Section 45 were not challenged, the High Court erred in rendering it inoperative. The key principles established are that statutes must be interpreted to remain effective ('ut res magis valeat quam pereat'), public safety restrictions based on intelligible differentia do not violate Article 9, and courts must maintain separation of powers by avoiding judicial overreach.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to regulate traffic under Section 45 of the National Highways Safety Ordinance 2000 include the authority to prohibit or restrict specific classes of vehicles on motorways in the interest of public safety?
  • Does a regulatory prohibition on plying motorcycles on motorways violate the fundamental right to life under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a court render a statutory provision inoperative or restricted when its constitutionality or vires have not been directly challenged in the proceedings?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior vs Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi2022 SCP 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-26
  contempt of courtbreach of undertakingpolitical rallyprima facie liabilitySupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from contempt proceedings initiated against the respondent and his counsel for the alleged breach of solemn undertakings given to the Supreme Court regarding the peaceful conduct of a political rally in Islamabad without causing public inconvenience or blocking highways. The core legal question concerns the prima facie liability of the respondent and his counsel for violating court undertakings under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003. The Court held that before proceeding further, the factual aspects of the alleged breach must be ascertained at a prima facie level, particularly regarding the role of an absent party, and directed the office to serve the investigative reports and related applications upon the respondents to submit their written replies. The key principle laid down is that notice and an opportunity to respond based on verified material must be afforded to alleged contemnors to ascertain prima facie liability for the breach of court undertakings before initiating formal contempt proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether breach of an undertaking given to the court for holding a political rally attracts proceedings under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003?
  • Can contempt proceedings be initiated against a party for the violation of court undertakings without first ascertaining their prima facie role and liability?
  • Whether an application for interim relief under Article 187 of the Constitution is maintainable in the context of contempt proceedings?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and another2022 SCMR 1021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-30
  public procurementcontract awardjudicial reviewtransparencydue processconflict of interestprocurement rules violationcargo trackingFBRmaintainability of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a contract awarded by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to NLC Construction Solutions (Private) Limited (NCSPL) for tracking and monitoring cargo. The Supreme Court first held that the petition, as filed by the Federation of Pakistan, was not maintainable due to lack of proper authorization. Proceeding on behalf of the FBR, the core legal question revolved around the legality and transparency of the FBR's procurement process, specifically the belated introduction of NCSPL, an unlicensed and inexperienced company, and the subsequent alteration of bidding criteria. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the FBR's actions violated the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, the Tracking and Monitoring of Cargo Rules, 2012, and principles of transparency and due process. The award of the contract to NCSPL, a subsidiary of the largest cargo transporter, was deemed an illegal act against public interest due to a momentous conflict of interest. The Court emphasized that public functionaries must act justly, fairly, and in accordance with the law, fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the people.

  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Hadi vs Yaqoob Ullah and another2022 SCMR 1080, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-14
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderpost-mortem reportcriminal procedurebail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that granted post-arrest bail to the respondent in a murder case registered under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to bail given the evidentiary circumstances surrounding the death of his wife. The complainant had initially charged the respondent in a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, but the High Court noted the absence of disclosed sources or material linking the respondent to the crime. The Supreme Court reviewed the post-mortem report, which indicated a ligature mark on the front of the neck, and considered conflicting accounts regarding whether this injury resulted from a fall or external pressure. The Court held that the determination of the cause of death requires further inquiry by the trial court after medical evidence is recorded. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the case against the respondent called for further inquiry, thereby upholding the bail grant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a disclosed source for an accusation in a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify a grant of bail?
  • When medical evidence regarding the cause of death is inconclusive, does the case of the accused call for further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Is a bail-granting order that is well-reasoned liable to be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawad Ahmad Mukhtar vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Zone-II), Rto, MultanPTCL 2022 CL. 327 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  dividend in specieretrospective effecttax deduction at sourcebeneficial legislationexemptions
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a High Court judgment concerning the tax treatment of dividends paid in specie for the tax year 2008. The legal issues centered on whether a dividend in specie constitutes taxable income, whether Clause (103B) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 operates retrospectively as a curative provision, and whether Section 150 obligates a paying company to deduct tax on a dividend in specie. The Supreme Court held that income includes money's worth and thus a dividend in specie is taxable income under Section 5 (or residually Section 39). The Court held that Clause (103B) was an exemption provision rather than a declaratory or curative one, and therefore lacked retrospective effect because no legislative intent for retroactivity was expressed. Finally, the Court ruled that Section 150 and Rule 43 of the Income Tax Rules, 2002 govern monetary tax deductions at source and do not apply to non-monetary distributions in specie. All appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dividend paid in specie constitute taxable income under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Clause (103B) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 have retrospective effect?
  • Does Section 150 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 mandate tax deduction at source for dividends paid in specie?
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• Farrukhk Raza Sheikh vs The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, etc2022 SCP 202, 2022 PTD 1467, 2022 SCMR 1787, 2022 PCTLR 1294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-28
  ultra viresdismissal in defaultex-parte decisiondelegated legislationtax appealnon-prosecutionstatutory interpretationtax governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a constitutional petition challenging the vires of Rule 22(1) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue Rules, 2010, after the petitioner's tax appeal and subsequent restoration applications were dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether Rule 22(1), which permits the dismissal of an appeal in default, is ultra vires Section 132(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, which mandates that the Tribunal proceed ex-parte to decide an appeal on the basis of available record in the event of a party's default. The Supreme Court held that the 2011 amendment to Section 132(2) intentionally omitted the power to dismiss in default to ensure tax controversies are decided on merits. Consequently, Rule 22(1) was declared ultra vires to the extent of its inconsistency with the parent statute. The Court established the principle that delegated legislation cannot contradict or expand upon the clear provisions of a parent statute, and tax tribunals are legally obligated to decide appeals on merits rather than short-circuiting them through technical dismissals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Rule 22(1) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue Rules, 2010 is ultra vires Section 132(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a tax tribunal dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution when the parent statute mandates an ex-parte decision on the merits?
  • Does the omission of specific language from a statute by a Finance Act render inconsistent subordinate rules unenforceable?
  • What is the legal effect of a rule that contradicts the procedural mandates of its parent primary legislation?
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• Farid Ullah Khan vs Irfan Ullah Khan2022 SCP 70, 2022 SCMR 1231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-04-26
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadright of pre-emptionhearsay evidencedirect evidenceconcurrent findings of factleave to appealmiscarriage of justicepreponderance of probability
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the Peshawar High Court, upholding concurrent judgments in a pre-emption suit. The respondent (pre-emptor) sought possession of land based on a superior right of pre-emption, claiming to have made Talb-i-Muwathibat (immediate demand) and Talb-i-Ishhad (demand by establishing evidence). The Supreme Court examined the evidence regarding Talb-i-Muwathibat and found serious legal lapses. It held that the pre-emptor failed to prove the immediate demand due to a crucial delay in making the demand after acquiring knowledge of the sale, reliance on hearsay evidence regarding the source of information, and circumstances inconsistent with his claim of late knowledge. The Court emphasized that oral evidence must be direct as per Article 71 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the chain of information for Talb-i-Muwathibat must be complete. The Court also ruled that it can interfere with concurrent findings of fact if they are vitiated by errors of law or misappreciation of evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the pre-emption suit dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • What are the essential elements required to prove Talb-i-Muwathibat in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a delay in making Talb-i-Muwathibat upon obtaining knowledge of a sale legally defeat the right of pre-emption?
  • Is hearsay evidence admissible to establish the source of information for Talb-i-Muwathibat?
  • What is the evidentiary standard for oral evidence regarding a fact that can be seen or heard?
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• Faraz Naveed vs District Police Officer Gujrat and another2022 SCP 200, 2022 SCMR 1770, 2022 PSC 1568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-28
  service lawmisconductdepartmental inquirybenefit of doubthonourable acquittaldisciplined forcepolice rulesstandard of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a service appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector, was dismissed from service following his conviction for murder under Section 302 PPC and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Although the High Court subsequently acquitted him by extending the benefit of doubt, the departmental authorities refused reinstatement. The core legal question was whether an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt in a criminal trial automatically entitles a civil servant to reinstatement and exoneration in departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court held that criminal prosecution and departmental inquiries are distinct jurisdictions with different standards of proof—'beyond reasonable doubt' versus 'preponderance of evidence.' The Court ruled that an employer, especially in a disciplined force like the police, retains the prerogative to assess an employee's suitability and integrity. Acquittal on technical grounds or benefit of doubt does not wash away the stigma of misconduct or preclude departmental penalties. The petition was dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Faraz Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Communications, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others2022 SCP 198, 2022 PLJ SC 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contractual employeesregularizationvested rightconstitutional jurisdictionimplementation of judgmentage relaxationabsorption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition seeking implementation of a Labour Court judgment and absorption into a newly created government cell. The petitioner, a former contractual Upper Division Clerk in the now-wound-up Vigilance Directorate of the Ministry of Communications, claimed a right to absorption and age relaxation. The core legal questions involved whether contractual employees possess a vested right to regularization or absorption, and whether a High Court can execute judgments of subordinate courts under constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that contractual employees have no vested right to regularization or absorption in the absence of a specific statutory basis, and that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to execute judgments passed by subordinate courts or tribunals. The Court established that temporary, ad hoc, or contractual appointees must serve according to their contract terms and cannot claim regularization or reinstatement as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contractual or project employees have a vested right to seek regularization or permanent absorption?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be invoked for the implementation or execution of a judgment passed by a Labour Court?
  • Does an ad hoc or temporary appointment create any enforceable legal right of regularization in favour of the appointee?
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• Faraz Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others2022 SCMR 1680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  contractual employeesregularizationvested rightabsorptionconstitutional jurisdictionLabour Courtwind up of department
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition, which sought the implementation of a Labour Court judgment regarding the absorption of a contractual employee following the winding up of the Vigilance Directorate. The core legal questions involve whether a contractual employee possesses a vested right to regularization or permanent absorption upon the abolition of their department, and whether the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution can execute judgments of subordinate courts. The Supreme Court held that contractual employees have no vested right to regularization or permanent absorption in the absence of a statutory basis or rules providing therefor, and that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to execute or implement judgments passed by a Labour Court. The Court laid down the principle that temporary, ad hoc, or contractual employees serve at the pleasure of their employer and cannot claim automatic regularization or absorption unless appointed through a regular recruitment process against sanctioned posts under applicable rules and laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contractual employees possess a vested right to regularization or permanent absorption upon the winding up of their department?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution be invoked to execute or implement a judgment passed by a Labour Court?
  • Does an ad hoc, temporary, or contractual appointment create any enforceable legal right to continued employment or reinstatement?
  • Is a claim for regularization maintainable in the absence of a specific statutory basis or rule providing for the same?
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• Faqir Dad Khan Khoso vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and others2022 SCMR 1612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  pre-arrest bailpost-arrest bailrule of consistencyNational Accountability Bureaudiscriminatory treatmentintelligible differentia
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the petitioners' applications for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail in connection with corruption and accountability proceedings. The core legal question concerned whether bail could be refused to the petitioners when other co-accused with ostensibly similar or worse roles had not been arrested and were left at large. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, confirming ad interim pre-arrest bail for some petitioners and granting post-arrest bail to another. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to provide an intelligible differentia justifying the differential treatment between arrested accused and those left at large constituted discriminatory enforcement, warranting the grant of bail to ensure parity, notwithstanding provisions of the accountability law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted on the principle of consistency when co-accused with similar or worse roles are left at large by the prosecution?
  • Can the prosecution claim differential treatment of accused persons without showing an intelligible differentia?
  • Does the existence of a culpable prima facie role justify discriminatory arrest and denial of bail?
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• Faiz Ullah and others vs Dilawar Hussain and others2022 SCMR 1647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-01
  inheritancelimited estatecustomary lawShariat lawco-sharerlimitationrevenue recordmutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the inheritance of agricultural land originally owned by Imam Din, who died in 1922. The property was held as a limited estate by his widow and subsequently his daughter, Mst. Noor Bibi, under prevailing customary law. Upon Mst. Noor Bibi’s marriage in 1944/45, her limited interest terminated. The core legal question was whether the property reverted to the legal heirs of the last full owner upon such termination and whether the law of limitation barred the suit for declaration filed by the heirs of the last full owner’s brothers. The Court held that upon the termination of a limited interest, succession opens in favor of the heirs of the last full owner as if Shariat law applied at the time of his death. The Court affirmed that inheritance rights vest by operation of law, and mutation entries are merely for fiscal purposes, not title. Furthermore, the Court established that the law of limitation does not run against co-sharers in possession of joint property, and mere delay in updating revenue records does not extinguish vested inheritance rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation run against a co-sharer in possession of joint property?
  • Does the termination of a limited interest held by a Muslim female under customary law trigger the opening of succession for the heirs of the last full owner?
  • Is the attestation of a mutation of inheritance a document of title or merely for fiscal purposes?
  • Can a suit for declaration be maintained by legal heirs to correct revenue records after the termination of a limited estate?
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• Faisal Shahzad vs The State2022 SCP 68, 2022 SCMR 905, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 766 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-14
  NarcoticsDrug traffickingControl of Narcotic Substances ActConvictionSentenceRecovery of narcoticsSafe custody of evidencePolice testimonyPresumption of guiltLesser penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition against the conviction and life imprisonment sentence of the petitioner under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possessing 10 kg of charas and 5 kg of opium. The core legal questions addressed were whether the non-association of public witnesses, alleged flaws in the safe custody and transmission of narcotics, and the non-production of the 'gatoo' (sack) from which the narcotics were recovered, undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the conviction and sentence. The Court held that police testimony is reliable unless animus is proven, and public reluctance to witness is a judicially recognized fact. It further clarified that the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, are directory, not mandatory, and minor lapses do not automatically discard a prosecution case if salient features are proven. Non-production of a common carrying item like a 'gatoo' does not invalidate recovery, especially for large quantities, and Section 29 of the Act presumes guilt unless the contrary is proven.

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• Engineer Nasir Shafqat Marri vs Pakistan Engineering Council Election Cell, Islamabad and others2022 SCMR 1920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-02
  Pakistan Engineering CouncilGovernment Servants (Conduct) Ruleslegislative bodystatutory professional bodyex-officio memberselection contestleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the participation of certain Government servants in the elections to the governing body of the Pakistan Engineering Council, arguing it violated Rule 24(3) of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964, because the Council is a legislative body. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Engineering Council qualifies as a legislative body under the Conduct Rules, thereby barring Government servants from contesting its elections. The Supreme Court held that the Pakistan Engineering Council is a statutory professional body rather than a political legislative body, and its power to frame regulations and bye-laws constitutes a supervisory and professional function rather than a political law-making function. Furthermore, the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 itself contemplates Government servants serving as ex-officio members of the Council. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused. The key principle laid down is that professional and regulatory statutory bodies empowered to frame subordinate regulations do not constitute legislative bodies for the purposes of political and electoral restrictions on Government servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Pakistan Engineering Council is a legislative body within the meaning of Rule 24(3) of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964?
  • Are Government servants barred from contesting elections to the governing body of the Pakistan Engineering Council?
  • What is the nature of the rule-making and regulatory functions performed by the Pakistan Engineering Council under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976?
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• Efu General Insurance Limited vs Zhongxing Telecom Pakistan (Private)2022 CLD 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-08
  demand guaranteeadvance payment guaranteestrict complianceautonomous contractperformance bondencashment of guarantee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a civil suit for the recovery of money under an advance payment guarantee issued by the petitioner insurance company on behalf of a sub-contractor in favour of respondent No. 1. The trial court decreed the suit, and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Upon granting leave, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and examined the legal nature of demand guarantees and performance bonds, which operate as autonomous contracts akin to letters of credit. The core legal question concerned the standard of compliance required for a demand made under a bank guarantee or performance bond. The Court held that the correct approach in this jurisdiction is to apply the rule of strict compliance to demands made under demand guarantees, requiring the beneficiary's demand to exactly match the terms of the instrument, subject to a high threshold for establishing substantial compliance where justified. The Court concluded that the contesting respondent's purported demand letter did not comply with the terms of the guarantee, as it lacked the requisite statement of breach and was merely a request for time extension. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed, laying down the principle that demand guarantees require strict compliance unless exceptional circumstances justify substantial compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a demand made under a demand guarantee or performance bond is subject to the rule of strict compliance?
  • Does a failure to strictly comply with the terms of a demand guarantee absolve the issuing bank or insurance company from liability to pay?
  • Can a letter requesting an extension of a guarantee's validity period be legally treated as a valid notice for the encashment of the guarantee?
  • What is the standard required for a party to successfully invoke substantial compliance in lieu of strict compliance under a demand guarantee?
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• Eden Builders (Pvt) Limited, Lahore vs Muhammad Aslam and others2022 SCP 282, 2023 PLJ SC 55, 2022 SCMR 2044 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-13
  territorial jurisdictionexclusive jurisdiction clausereturn of plaintcontractual disputecivil procedureforum selection
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the territorial jurisdiction of civil courts regarding a suit for the cancellation of an agreement. The petitioner sought the return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, citing a clause in the agreement that conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the courts in Lahore. The trial court and the High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's application, leading to the current proceedings. The core legal question was whether a contractual clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction in a specific forum is binding upon the parties when the court otherwise possesses territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court that lacks it, they may mutually select a specific court from among those that already possess territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Finding that the agreement was executed in Lahore and related to property matters there, the Court upheld the exclusivity clause, allowed the appeal, and directed the return of the plaint for filing in the appropriate Lahore court.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties by mutual agreement confer exclusive jurisdiction upon a court that already possesses territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction?
  • Is a clause in an agreement designating a specific court for dispute resolution binding upon the parties?
  • Under what circumstances can a plaint be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Faisalabad, Accounts Officer2022 SCP 370 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-10-06
  back benefitsregularization of serviceservice tribunaladmission of liabilityapprobate and reprobateconsensual ordercivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had allowed service appeals filed by employees seeking back benefits following the regularization of their services. The core legal question concerned whether the department could challenge a tribunal judgment that was rendered based on a clear, unequivocal admission and consensual statement made by the department itself in its written comments acknowledging the employees' right to regularization and arrears subject to fund availability. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that where parties are not at issue and an unambiguous admission of liability is made on record, a court or tribunal is fully justified in disposing of the matter accordingly, akin to the principles governing judgments on admissions. The Court laid down that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging a consensual order or an admission it consciously made during proceedings, and that the doctrine of admission applies to expedite litigation when statements are clear, unconditional, and definite.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a judgment passed by a service tribunal based on its own clear and unequivocal admission made in written comments?
  • Whether the principles regarding judgment on admissions under the Code of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings before a service tribunal?
  • Does the doctrine of approbate and reprobate bar a department from resiling from a consensual statement made during judicial proceedings?
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• Dilawar Ali vs The State and others2022 SCMR 1066, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 210, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 671 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-27
  post-arrest bailmurderstrangulationburden of proofjoint abodemedical evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Dilawar Ali, sought leave to appeal for post-arrest bail after his previous bail applications were dismissed by the lower forums, including the Lahore High Court, in a case involving the murder of his wife, Muqaddas Bibi, who was strangulated to death. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the medical evidence and statutory provisions regarding the burden of proof in a joint abode. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the medical evidence, including the autopsy report showing signs inconsistent with suicide and the petitioner's failure to discharge his burden under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, constituted reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to connect the petitioner with the crime. Consequently, the court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower forums and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted to an accused when the medical evidence contradicts the plea of suicide in a murder case?
  • Does the failure of an accused spouse to explain the circumstances of a death occurring under a joint roof constitute reasonable grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • How does the statutory burden under Article 122 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 apply to a husband when his wife is found dead in their joint abode?
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• Deputy Director Finance And Administration Fata through Additional Chief2022 SCMR 566, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 261, 2022 PLC (C.S.) 701, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-28
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject employeesFATAPATAjurisdiction of High Courtconstitutional amendmentretrospective applicationstatutory basisArticle 247
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard civil appeals challenging Peshawar High Court judgments that had allowed the regularization of services for contract and project employees in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core legal questions involved the applicability of the KP Employees (Regularization of Services) Act, 2009 to FATA/PATA, the High Court's jurisdiction in FATA/PATA matters prior to the 25th Constitutional Amendment, and the effect of Presidential Order No. 13 of 1972. The Supreme Court held that the 2009 Act was not applicable to FATA/PATA as its provisions were specific to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its extension required a Presidential direction under Article 247(3) of the Constitution, which was absent. Furthermore, the High Court lacked jurisdiction in FATA/PATA matters under Article 247(7) of the Constitution, which was in force at the relevant time, and the 25th Amendment could not be applied retrospectively. Presidential Order No. 13 of 1972 was found inapplicable as it only covered employees in service on the appointed day. The Court emphasized that regularization requires a statutory basis, not merely long service or claims of discrimination based on others' potentially illegal regularization. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgments.

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• Deputy Commissioner Upper Dir, and others vs Mst. Nusrat Begum2022 PSC 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-26
  regularization of servicecontract employeeproject employeesPublic Service Commissionprescribed mannerlachesreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a constitutional petition filed by the respondent, ordering her regularization as a Charge Nurse. The respondent was originally appointed on a contract basis under an ADP project scheme, with contract extensions granted over time until her services were terminated in 2008. The Supreme Court considered whether a project contract employee whose post required recruitment through the Public Service Commission was entitled to statutory regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act 2009 or the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act 2005. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that Section 2(b) of the 2009 Act explicitly excludes project employees from regularization. Furthermore, regularization under Section 19(2) of the 2005 Act required appointment in the 'prescribed manner', whereas the respondent was selected by a Departmental Selection Committee without Public Service Commission requisition. The Court reaffirmed that long service or contract extensions do not confer a vested right to regularization for project-based employees.

  Questions settled

  • Are project employees excluded from the scope of regularization under Section 2(b) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Employees (Regularization of Services) Act 2009?
  • Does long continuous contract service automatically entitle a project employee to regular service status?
  • Can a contract employee claim regularization under Section 19(2) of the Civil Servants (Amendment) Act 2005 if their appointment was not made through the Public Service Commission as required by the rules?
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• Deputy Administrator Evacuee Trust Property, Rawalpindi vs Sakhi2022 SCP 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-22
  katchi abadievacuee trust propertyproprietary rightsself-projectionconstitutional oathpublic propertyregistration of documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court allowing a writ petition that challenged the refusal of the Sub-Registrar to register sale deeds and other documents for properties located in an area declared as a katchi abadi. The Evacuee Trust Property Board contended that the land belonged to a dharamshala and vested in the Board under the relevant law. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute constituted evacuee trust property and rightly vested in the Board, thereby precluding its status as a katchi abadi. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence or record showing the land ever became evacuee trust property or formed part of the trust pool, nor had the Chairman of the Board determined it as such under the law. Consequently, the High Court's decision was upheld and leave to appeal was declined. Additionally, the Court laid down the principle that self-projection, self-glorification, and the affixing of photographs of political figures or living persons on public and government documents, records, or properties are unconstitutional, violate oaths of office, and are impermissible at public expense.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land declared as a katchi abadi automatically vests in the Evacuee Trust Property Board without a proper determination by the Chairman under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Can a government authority refuse to register documents for properties in a katchi abadi based on an unsupported assertion of ownership?
  • Is it permissible under the Constitution and oath of office for public office holders to affix their photographs or names on public documents and government records for self-projection?
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• Dean / Chief Executive, Gomal Medical College, Medical Teaching2022 SCP 336, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 501, 2023 PLD Supreme Court 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-15
  administrative tribunalsappellate jurisdictionsupreme courtprovincial legislationconstitutional interpretationservice tribunalmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose as a leave petition under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging an order of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Appellate Tribunal. The core legal question was whether a direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) against an order of a service tribunal created by a Provincial law to which the proviso to clause (2) of Article 212 has not been made applicable through a provincial resolution and federal extension legislation. The Supreme Court held that an appeal to the Court under clause (3) of Article 212 against a decision of an administrative tribunal created by a provincial law is maintainable if and only if clause (2) applies to that tribunal via the proviso. Because the tribunal in question was not covered by the proviso, the appeal was not maintainable. The key principle laid down is that clause (3) of Article 212 is not a standalone provision, and provincial assemblies lack the competence to independently alter or enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without prior activation of clause (2) through the constitutional mechanism prescribed in the proviso.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against an order of a provincial service tribunal to which the proviso to Article 212(2) has not been extended?
  • Is clause (3) of Article 212 of the Constitution a standalone provision independent of clause (2)?
  • Can a Provincial Assembly enact legislation that directly affects or enlarges the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
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• Dadu Khan (decd.) thr. LRs and 3 others vs Ghulam Abbas and 23 others2022 SCP 238, 2023 PLJ SC 129, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 376, 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-06-23
  evacuee propertyouster of jurisdictionredemption of mortgagecivil court jurisdictionDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actlimitation perioddeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage concerning land treated as evacuee property. The appellants claimed the mortgage was redeemed in 1892, challenging subsequent allotments made by the Central Government. The core legal questions were whether the Central Government acquired valid mortgagee rights and whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that once land is treated as evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, Section 25 of that Act bars the jurisdiction of civil courts, mandating that grievances be addressed through the specific statutory authorities created by the Act or its successors under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Court further noted the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that the civil proceedings were coram non judice and that the appellants failed to pursue the correct legal forum for their grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, bar the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate matters concerning land treated as evacuee property?
  • Is a suit for declaration and redemption of mortgage maintainable in a civil court if the land in question has been allotted as evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • Does the right to redeem a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, override the statutory ouster of jurisdiction regarding evacuee property?
  • Can the benefit of Section 13 of the Limitation Act, 1908, be claimed against a party that is not a defendant in the suit?
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• Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Haripur vs Government Of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2022 PLD Supreme Court 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-14
  adjournmentdismissal for non-prosecutionSupreme Court of Pakistanunprepared counselabsence of medical certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Crescent Textile Mills Ltd., Haripur against the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns the handling of repeated requests for adjournment by the petitioner's counsel without sufficient justification or medical evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that where a matter has been repeatedly adjourned on previous dates of hearing due to the unavailability of the petitioner's counsel and no medical certificate is provided to substantiate the current illness, and the Advocate-on-Record lacks instructions and is unprepared, the court is not inclined to grant further adjournments. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for non-prosecution. The key principle laid down is that repeated unjustified adjournments sought by counsel without supporting evidence, leaving the associated advocate uninstructed, warrant the dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition can be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioner's counsel repeatedly seeks adjournments without providing a medical certificate?
  • Is an Advocate-on-Record who lacks instructions and is unprepared to argue the case entitled to an adjournment when prior adjournments were already granted on the counsel's request?
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• Controller General of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another vs Abdul Waheed, Sajid Iqbal, Syed Muhammad Usman, Ashar Jan Siddiqui, Muhammad Baqir2022 SCP 378 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealpromotionretrospective operationvested rightsrecruitment rulescivil servantsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed service appeals filed by the respondent-employees and directed the department to consider them for promotion as Assistant Accounts Officer (BS-17). The core legal question concerned whether subsequent amendments to recruitment rules, requiring promotion sequentially in terms of qualified batches, operated retrospectively to affect employees who had already qualified the prerequisite examination prior to the Departmental Promotion Committee meeting. The Supreme Court held that the amendments operated prospectively and could not impair substantive rights or vested rights that had already accrued under the unamended rules. The Court laid down the principle that statutory amendments affecting substantive rights operate prospectively unless an express enactment or necessary intendment provides for retrospective operation, and rules cannot be applied retrospectively to alter the promotion eligibility of employees who qualified under existing criteria before the convening of a promotion committee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether amendments to service recruitment rules altering promotion criteria operate retrospectively to affect employees who qualified prior to the amendment?
  • Can a statutory rule or amendment impair substantive rights or vested rights accrued under previously existing rules without explicit retrospective language?
  • Are employees who qualified their professional examinations before the convening of a Departmental Promotion Committee entitled to be considered under the rules existing at that time?
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• Commissioner Of Inland Revenue vs M/s. Mughal Board IndustryPTCL 2022 CL. 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-02
  sales taxamnesty notificationdefault surchargeexemptionssubordinate legislationtax recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue against M/s. Mughal Board Industry, challenging the judgment of the High Court which granted the respondent the benefit of a tax amnesty notification. The core legal question was whether a registered taxpayer who voluntarily deposited the principal amount of illegally adjusted sales tax prior to the issuance of the amnesty notification (SRO 606(1)/2012) is entitled to the exemption from default surcharge and penalties, given that the notification requires payment by a specified cut-off date. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer is indeed entitled to the benefit, ruling that the spirit and object of the amnesty notification is to incentivize the quick recovery of stuck-up tax revenue by or before the cut-off date of 25th June 2012, and penalizing a taxpayer who made a voluntary prior deposit would create an absurd result. The court laid down the principle that beneficial subordinate tax legislation must be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayer to encourage voluntary compliance and achieve fiscal objectives.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer who deposits the principal amount of sales tax prior to the issuance of an amnesty notification is entitled to the exemption of default surcharge and penalties?
  • How should beneficial subordinate legislation relating to tax amnesty be interpreted?
  • What is the primary objective of a tax amnesty scheme offering exemption on default surcharge and penalties upon payment of the principal tax amount by a cut-off date?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal) vs M/s Askari Bank Limited,PTCL 2022 CL. 186, 2022 SCMR 1104, 2022 PLJ SC 228, 2022 PSC 1174, 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-01
  initial allowancedepreciable assetincome taxbuilding deductiontax year
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a controversy regarding the meaning and scope of section 23 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically concerning whether a taxpayer can claim a deduction of initial allowance for an eligible depreciable asset, such as a building, put to use by the taxpayer for the first time in a tax year, even if the building had been used previously by other taxpayers. The core legal question revolves around the interpretation of the phrase 'first time in a tax year' under section 23. The Court held that the phrase relates to the first-time use of the building by the taxpayer, rendering any prior use by a previous owner or proprietor inconsequential. Furthermore, the Court noted that sub-section (5) of section 23 explicitly excludes previously used plant or machinery from the definition of an eligible depreciable asset, but does not exclude previously used buildings. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to an initial allowance deduction for a building put into service by them for the first time in a tax year, irrespective of its prior usage history. The Supreme Court declined leave and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer can claim a deduction of initial allowance for a building put to use for the first time in a tax year if the said building was previously used by another person?
  • What is the scope and meaning of the phrase 'first time in a tax year' under section 23 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the definition of an eligible depreciable asset under section 23(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 exclude previously used buildings?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Lahore vs Messrs Panther Sports2022 SCMR 1135, PTCL 2022 CL. 544, 2022 PCTLR 1543, 2022 PTD 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-21
  Income Tax Ordinancetax recordsstatutory periodtaxpayer obligationnoticestax administrationsix-year rulerecord maintenancetax recoveryconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered a petition seeking leave to appeal against a High Court order which set aside notices issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue. The notices demanded statements under Section 165 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, reconciliation statements under Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, and sought recovery under Section 161(1A) of the Ordinance, for tax years 2007 and 2009, issued in 2017. The core legal question was whether a taxpayer could be compelled to furnish records beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 174(3) of the Ordinance. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that taxpayers are not obligated to maintain tax records after six years from the end of the relevant tax year. Consequently, notices demanding such records are unlawful, ineffective, and unenforceable, attracting no penal consequences. The Court clarified that Section 214A of the Ordinance, dealing with condonation of time limits, does not apply to this scenario.

  Questions settled

  • Can a taxpayer be compelled to furnish tax records beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 174(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Are notices issued under sections 161(1A) or 165(2B) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, or Rule 44(4) of the Income Tax Rules, 2002, effective and enforceable if they demand records beyond the statutory six-year period?
  • Does Section 214A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, apply to condone the time limit for demanding tax records beyond the six-year period under Section 174(3)?
  • Is the tax department restricted from seeking records beyond the statutory period under Section 174(3) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, from the taxpayer?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (Rto), Mayo2022 SCP 152, 2022 SCMR 1333, 2023 PCTLR 76, 2022 PSC 1612, PTCL 2022 CL. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-12
  sales taxlimitation periodmandatory provisionappellate tribunalcommissioner appealstax liabilitystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a sales tax reference. The core legal question was whether the time frame prescribed under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) is mandatory or directory in nature, and whether a decision rendered beyond the maximum stipulated period of 180 days is void. The Supreme Court held that the provision is mandatory, as the use of restrictive and negative language limiting extensions to a maximum of 60 days beyond the initial 120 days reflects a clear legislative intent to ensure expeditious resolution of tax matters within the relevant tax year. Consequently, any appellate decision rendered beyond the prescribed 180-day limit is invalid and a nullity in law. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time period prescribed under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal is mandatory or directory?
  • What is the legal consequence of a decision rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the maximum prescribed period of 180 days?
  • Does the failure of the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide an appeal within the statutory time frame extinguish the underlying tax liability of the taxpayer?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (Rto), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another vs Messrs Sarwaq Traders, 216_1-a, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi and another2022 SCMR 1333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-12
  sales tax referencelimitation periodmandatory provisionCommissioner Appealstax liabilityappellate tribunalstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a sales tax reference and affirming the appellate tribunal's decision. The core legal question was whether the time limit prescribed under section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) within a maximum of 180 days is mandatory or directory in nature, and whether a decision rendered beyond this period is void. The Supreme Court held that the statutory time limit of 180 days is mandatory, as evinced by the restrictive and negative language used in the provisos limiting the extension of time. The Court concluded that any appellate decision rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the prescribed 180 days is invalid and a nullity in law. The key principle laid down is that statutory timeframes imposing duties on public tax officials to decide appeals within a maximum stipulated period are mandatory, and failure to render a decision within such period renders the resulting order void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the time period prescribed under section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for deciding an appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals) is mandatory or directory?
  • Does an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the maximum prescribed period of 180 days become void and a nullity in law?
  • What is the effect of negative and restrictive language in a statute imposing a duty on a public official?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs Abdul2022 PTD 1673 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-31
  Income Tax Ordinance 2001final tax regimelabour and carriage servicesstatutory interpretationFederal Board of Revenuelitigation managementtax services definition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against a High Court order regarding the tax treatment of contracts for labour and carriage services. The core legal question was whether such contracts fall under Section 153(1)(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, subjecting income to the final tax regime, or under Section 153(1)(b) as the rendering of services. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the definition of "services" in Section 153(9) of the Ordinance is not exhaustive and encompasses labour and carriage services. Consequently, the Court rejected the department's attempt to classify these services under Section 153(1)(c). The Court affirmed that excluding such services from the definition would be discriminatory. Furthermore, the Court expressed significant concern regarding the Federal Board of Revenue's failure to maintain an adequate data bank of decided cases, noting that this lack of institutional record-keeping hampers the efficient administration of justice and wastes judicial time. The Court directed the FBR to address these systemic shortcomings promptly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'services' in Section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 include labour and carriage services?
  • Are contracts for labour and carriage services subject to the final tax regime under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the definition of 'services' provided in Section 153(9) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 exhaustive?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Peshawar vs M/s Pakistan Tobacco2022 SCP 148, PTCL 2022 CL. 698, 2022 PLJ SC 404, 2022 PCTLR 1175, 2022 PTD · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-31
  sales taxerstwhile tribal areasFATA and PATAtaxable suppliesadditional sales taxconstitutional application of lawsshow cause noticesale of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated appeals arise from the dismissal of tax references by the High Court regarding the levy of additional sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for periods prior to the 25th Amendment. The core legal question is whether additional sales tax was payable on supplies made by a manufacturer/dealer located within settled areas of Pakistan to unregistered recipients situated in the erstwhile FATA/PATA, where the Sales Tax Act had not been extended under Article 247 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that for a valid levy under Section 3(1A), the taxable supply or sale must have taken place "in Pakistan" in the special constitutional sense prevailing at the relevant time, which required the supply to have been executed within the jurisdiction where the Act was applicable. The Court found that the department failed to properly allege and establish through evidence that the disputed supplies were made within Pakistan, as the mere fact that the supplier was located in Pakistan was insufficient. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether additional sales tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 could be levied on supplies made to recipients located in the erstwhile Tribal Areas where the Act had not been extended under Article 247 of the Constitution?
  • Is the mere fact that a supplier is located in Pakistan sufficient to establish that a taxable supply was made "in Pakistan" for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What is the effect of a failure by the tax department to properly allege and prove the factual basis regarding the place of supply in the show cause notice?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lto, Karachi vs Packages LimitedPTCL 2022 CL. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-13
  Income Tax Ordinancetime-barredshow cause noticestatutory limitationfrivolous litigationassessment ordertaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the High Court of Sindh, which had ruled against the Commissioner Inland Revenue regarding the initiation of tax assessment proceedings. The core legal question was whether a show cause notice issued under Section 66-A of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, was time-barred, given that it was issued more than thirteen years after the original assessment order by the Deputy Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the proceedings were indeed time-barred. The Court observed that Section 66-A explicitly mandates that such notices must be issued within a period of four years from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Since the notice in question was issued well beyond this statutory limitation, the action was invalid. The Court dismissed the petition with costs, emphasizing that the Federal Board of Revenue must act fairly, adhere to statutory time limits, and avoid frivolous litigation that wastes the time and resources of the taxpayers and the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Is a show cause notice issued under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, valid if issued more than four years after the original assessment order?
  • What is the statutory time limit for the issuance of a notice under Section 66-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited, Lahore2022 SCP 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-29
  limitation periodpronouncement of judgmentjudicial delaycivil procedureappellate jurisdictionjudicial accountabilitypetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from Civil Miscellaneous Applications concerning the limitation period for filing petitions for leave to appeal, where the impugned High Court judgments lacked the date of signing and pronouncement. The core legal questions addressed whether a judgment must be dated, the consequences of omitting such dates, and whether surrounding circumstances should be used to determine the limitation period when dates are absent. The Supreme Court held that every judgment must explicitly inscribe the date it is written, signed, and pronounced, as mandated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Court emphasized that "pronouncement" encompasses the statement of grounds, not merely the result. It further held that inordinate delays in writing judgments are objectionable and may constitute misconduct under the Judges Code of Conduct. Consequently, the Court directed the Registrars of all High Courts to ensure that all future judgments and orders clearly state the actual date of signing and pronouncement to prevent prejudice to litigants and avoid unnecessary wastage of judicial time.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judgment have to be dated?
  • What are the consequences if a judgment does not mention the date when it was written, signed and pronounced?
  • When a judgment, which does not mention when it was written, signed and pronounced, is challenged, should the surrounding circumstances and record be considered to determine whether the challenge has been made within the prescribed period?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M/s. Sargodha Spinning MillsPTCL 2022 CL. 197, 2022 SCMR 1082, 2022 PSC 655, 2022 PLJ SC 231, 2022 PTD · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-03
  sales tax refundquestion of lawfinality of factsAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenueadvisory jurisdictiontax invoicesblack-listed units
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Sales Tax Reference where the petitioner department challenged a refund claim made by the respondent. The department alleged that the respondent claimed refunds on invoices from black-listed units where sales tax had not been deposited in the government treasury. The Appellate Tribunal, Inland Revenue, allowed the respondent's appeal, finding as a matter of fact that the department failed to produce evidence proving the invoices were fake or forged. The High Court subsequently dismissed the department's reference, holding that no question of law arose from the Tribunal's factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed this, holding that the Appellate Tribunal is the final fact-finding body in tax matters. Its findings are conclusive and cannot be disturbed by the High Court unless specifically challenged as perverse or unsupported by evidence through a formulated question of law. Since the department failed to raise a specific question of law regarding the misreading of evidence, the Tribunal's factual determinations attained finality.

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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M_s HNR Company (Pvt) Limited, Lahore2022 SCP 62, 2022 PSC 659, PTCL 2022 CL.463, 2022 PTD 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-24
  deemed assessmentbest judgment assessmentretrospective applicationincome tax auditlimitation periodfrivolous litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of best judgment assessments initiated by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the respondent for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether an assessment under Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, could be framed when a valid return had already been filed and deemed assessed under Section 120 of the same Ordinance, and whether amendments introduced via Section 177(10) applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that for the tax years in question, the legislative scheme did not permit the cancellation or amendment of a deemed assessment order through Section 121. The Court affirmed that amendments to the law, specifically those regarding procedural powers, cannot be applied retrospectively to past tax years. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the limitation period under Section 122(2) had expired, and the department failed to provide the taxpayer with a proper opportunity for a hearing. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, with the Court cautioning the department against filing frivolous litigation on matters already settled by authoritative judicial precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assessment under Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, be made where a deemed assessment order already exists under Section 120?
  • Do amendments to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, regarding procedural powers apply retrospectively to tax years prior to the amendment?
  • Does the expiration of the limitation period under Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, bar the initiation of assessment proceedings?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Messrs HNR Company (Pvt.)2022 SCMR 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-24
  best judgment assessmentdeemed assessmentretrospective applicationincome taxstatutory limitationtaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of best judgment assessment orders issued by the tax department for tax years 2005 and 2006. The core legal question was whether the department could invoke Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to override returns that were already deemed assessed under Section 120 of the same Ordinance, and whether amendments introduced via the Finance Act, 2010, including Section 177(10), applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that the department could not retrospectively apply these amendments to override deemed assessments. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that Section 121(1)(d) did not apply to cases where valid returns had been filed and deemed assessed under Section 120 prior to the 2010 amendments. The Court further noted that the limitation period under Section 122(2) had expired, rendering the action time-barred. The key principle laid down is that statutory amendments do not operate retrospectively to affect settled assessments, and the tax department is cautioned against re-agitating issues already authoritatively decided by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the tax department invoke Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to override a deemed assessment made under Section 120?
  • Do the amendments to Section 177(10) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 apply retrospectively?
  • Is a best judgment assessment valid if initiated after the five-year limitation period prescribed in Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Asif Kamal2022 SCP 66, 2022 SCMR 1091, PTCL 2022 CL.480, 2022 PTD 965 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-16
  tax auditshow cause noticeincome tax referenceappellate tribunal inland revenuerevenue litigationprocedural compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the respondent regarding a tax dispute for the tax year 2012. The petitioner challenged an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had ruled in favor of the respondent, and a subsequent High Court order that relied on a precedent case, Commissioner Inland Revenue v Falah ud Din Qureshi. The core legal questions involved whether the show cause notice was issued within the prescribed statutory period and whether the audit report was properly shared with the respondent, providing him an opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner failed to provide necessary documentation or answers to these fundamental queries. Furthermore, the Court noted that the precedent relied upon by the High Court had already been upheld by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court held that there was no illegality in the impugned orders requiring interference. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, with the Court expressing strong disapproval regarding the lack of preparedness and assistance provided by the Federal Board of Revenue in court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the tax department to provide necessary documentation and answer queries regarding the issuance of a show cause notice warrants the dismissal of a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue's decision final when the tax department fails to demonstrate any illegality or error in the impugned order?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Federal Board of Revenue, Karachi vs Muhammad Mustafa GigiPTCL 2022 CL. 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Money BillLegislative ProcedureIncome Support LevyConstitutional InterpretationFederal Consolidated FundSenate of PakistanTaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns five hundred and eighty-one petitions seeking leave to appeal against High Court judgments that declared the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether the Act, which imposed a levy for poverty alleviation, constituted a 'Money Bill' under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, thereby allowing it to bypass the Senate. The Supreme Court held that the Act did not meet the criteria for a Money Bill as it was social legislation rather than a tax measure, and it failed to establish a dedicated fund for its stated objectives, meaning collected funds would merge into the Federal Consolidated Fund. Consequently, the Act required passage by both Houses of Parliament under Article 70. Because the Act was not transmitted to the Senate for voting, it never validly became law. The Court affirmed the principle that legislative procedures prescribed by the Constitution must be strictly adhered to, and that bypassing the Senate in non-Money Bill legislation violates the constitutional rights of the provinces and the principles of representative democracy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 constituted a 'Money Bill' under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can legislation that does not qualify as a Money Bill be enacted without being transmitted to the Senate for voting?
  • Does the failure to include a saving clause in a repealing statute render proceedings initiated under the repealed law void?
  • Are funds collected under a levy that does not specify a dedicated fund automatically part of the Federal Consolidated Fund?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Federal Board of Revenue, Karachi vs Muhammad Mustafa Gigi and others2022 PLD Supreme Court 420, PTCL 2022 CL. 346, 2022 PCTLR 1548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-28
  Money Billlegislative procedureconstitutional interpretationIncome Support LevySenate of PakistanFederal Consolidated Fundtaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Income Support Levy Act, 2013, which was enacted through the Finance Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether the Act constituted a "Money Bill" under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, thereby allowing it to bypass the Senate. The Supreme Court held that the Act was not a Money Bill but rather social legislation aimed at poverty alleviation. Consequently, it was required to follow the ordinary legislative procedure under Article 70 of the Constitution, necessitating passage by both the National Assembly and the Senate. Because the Act was not transmitted to the Senate for voting, it never validly became law. The Court emphasized that constitutional legislative procedures must be strictly adhered to, and mislabeling legislation as a Money Bill to bypass the Senate is unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that actions taken pursuant to an invalidly enacted law are legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Income Support Levy Act, 2013 qualify as a Money Bill under Article 73(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is legislation that bypasses the Senate by being incorrectly introduced as a Money Bill valid under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the failure to designate funds collected under a statute as 'expenditure charged' upon the Federal Consolidated Fund render the statute's stated objectives unachievable under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen & others2022 P C T L R 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  writ jurisdictionshow cause noticedelegation of powerstax assessmentpremature petitionexhaustion of remediesjurisdictional errorIncome Tax Ordinance 2001
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that quashed a show cause notice issued by the tax authorities to the respondent regarding unexplained agricultural income. The core legal question concerns the propriety of invoking writ jurisdiction to challenge a show cause notice at a premature stage and the validity of the delegation of authority to the Additional Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, as the taxpayer should first exhaust the departmental remedies provided under the tax laws. The Court emphasized that interference with show cause notices at the initial stage is generally impermissible, as the recipient can raise jurisdictional objections before the issuing authority. Consequently, the matter was remanded with directions for the Additional Commissioner to first establish the conditions of delegated authority under the relevant statute before proceeding on the merits. Furthermore, the Court underscored the necessity for the Federal Board of Revenue to ensure the official publication of all notifications to prevent unnecessary litigation and uphold the right to information.

  Questions settled

  • Should a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction to quash a show cause notice at a premature stage?
  • Is a taxpayer required to exhaust departmental remedies before challenging a show cause notice in a constitutional petition?
  • Must tax authorities establish the validity of delegated authority under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 before proceeding on the merits of a case?
  • Does the failure to publish notifications in the official gazette impact the transparency of tax authority actions?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen and others2022 PLJ SC 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show-cause noticeconstitutional petitiondelegation of powersjurisdictionincome tax assessmentpremature petitiontax authoritiespublication of notifications
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court quashing a show-cause notice issued to the respondent under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on the ground that the Additional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction and valid delegation of powers. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that constitutional petitions challenging mere show-cause notices at a premature stage are generally barred and that aggrieved parties must raise all factual and jurisdictional objections before the departmental authorities. The Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Additional Commissioner to first establish the proper statutory conditions regarding the delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, before proceeding on the merits. Additionally, the Court emphasized the statutory and constitutional obligation of tax authorities and public bodies to ensure proper publication of notifications and orders in the official gazette and official websites to avoid unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition against a mere show-cause notice is premature when an adequate statutory remedy is available?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner proceed to amend a tax assessment without first establishing the validity of delegated authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue have a legal duty to publish tax jurisdiction notifications in the official gazette and on its official website?
  • Whether questions regarding the authenticity or existence of delegated powers should be raised before the departmental authority in the first instance rather than in writ jurisdiction?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue etc vs Jahangir Khan Tareen & othersPTCL 2022 CL. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-15
  show cause noticewrit jurisdictionpremature petitiondelegation of powersincome tax assessmentjurisdictional erroralternative statutory remedypublication of notifications
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, converted into an appeal, arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court that quashed a show cause notice issued under Section 122(5A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to the respondent on the ground that the Additional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition against a mere show cause notice is premature and whether the Additional Commissioner was properly delegated powers under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter, holding that high courts should ordinarily not interfere at the premature stage of a show cause notice and that the recipient must first raise jurisdictional and other objections before the competent tax authority. The Court laid down the principle that writ petitions challenging show cause notices are generally premature and tend to bypass adequate statutory remedies, and directed the Federal Board of Revenue to ensure proper publication and online posting of all statutory notifications to prevent unnecessary litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against a mere show cause notice issued by a tax authority?
  • Can an Additional Commissioner exercise powers of amendment of assessment without proper delegation of authority under Section 210 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Should a taxpayer raise objections regarding jurisdiction and delegation before the departmental authority rather than invoking writ jurisdiction at a premature stage?
  • Are statutory rules, orders, and notifications required to be published in the official Gazette and posted on the official website to ensure public access?
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