Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Asadullah Khan and others vs Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others2022 SCMR 672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-05-21
  limitationcondonation of delaydirect appealpetition for leave to appealprocedural abusetime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan which were found to be time-barred by 27 and 28 days respectively. The core legal question was whether the appellants could seek condonation of delay after initially filing leave petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, when a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) was the competent remedy, and the limitation period for such an appeal had already expired. The Court held that the practice of filing a petition for leave to appeal where a direct appeal is competent, particularly when the direct appeal is already time-barred, constitutes an attempt to circumvent the law. Relying on the principle established in Mst. Gul Jan and others v. Naik Muhammad and others (PLD 2012 SC 1), the Court dismissed the applications for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the appeals as time-barred, emphasizing that such procedural maneuvers to bypass limitation periods will not be entertained.

  Questions settled

  • Does filing a petition for leave to appeal instead of a competent direct appeal justify condonation of delay when the direct appeal is already time-barred?
  • Is the practice of filing a petition for leave to appeal where a direct appeal is competent considered an attempt to circumvent the law?
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• Asad Ali Khan and others vs Province of Punjab through Secretary2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 336, 2021 PLD Supreme Court 770, 2021 P SC 1318, 2021 SCP 270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-25
  local governmentultra virespremature dissolutionfundamental rightsfreedom of associationthird tier of governmentconstitutional petitionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These constitution petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenged the vires of Section 3 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2019, which dissolved all local governments established under the preceding 2013 Act before the expiry of their five-year term. The petitioners contended that such dissolution violated the constitutional mandate for a third tier of government and infringed upon fundamental rights. The Court examined whether a provincial legislature could prematurely terminate the tenure of elected local bodies through new legislation. The Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the 2019 Act was ultra vires the Constitution. The Court reasoned that Articles 140A, 7, 17, and 32 form a composite scheme for local governance; specifically, the fundamental right to form political parties under Article 17 includes the right of elected representatives to complete their lawful tenure. The Court ruled that premature dissolution without lawful cause disenfranchises voters and violates the constitutional fabric. Consequently, the local governments were restored to complete their remaining terms.

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• Anwar Shaheen and another vs The State and another2021 SCMR 1032 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-15
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal appealrecoveryco-accusedbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the Peshawar High Court's order refusing them post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail based on the material available on the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the deceased and the injured victim each sustained only one firearm injury. Crucially, while the case involved four accused, one co-accused was found innocent during the investigation. Furthermore, the State confirmed that no recoveries were made from the petitioners, whereas a weapon matching the crime scene evidence was recovered from another co-accused. The Court held that these circumstances rendered the petitioners' case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the petitioners, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of recovery from an accused justify the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the ambit of section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if a co-accused with similar allegations has been found innocent during the investigation?
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• Amjid Khan vs The State through A.G. KPK, etc2021 SCMR 1458, 2021 SCP 280 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-08
  investigation reportchallanCode of Criminal Procedurefair trialdue processprosecution delayspeedy justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the inordinate delay by the prosecution in submitting the investigation report (challan) to the trial court, contrary to statutory mandates. The core legal question was whether the Prosecution Department’s internal processing of investigation reports justifies delaying their submission to the court beyond the timelines prescribed by law. The Supreme Court held that the Prosecution’s interpretation—that submitting a report to the Prosecution Department satisfies the legal requirement—is erroneous. The Court clarified that Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandates the submission of the report to the Magistrate or Court, not merely the Prosecution. The Court emphasized that the Prosecution Institution was established to ensure speedy justice, not to create hurdles. It was further held that unjustified delays in filing investigation reports violate the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process. The Court directed the Prosecution to proceed expeditiously with the trial, noting that failure to do so may invite appropriate action by the Trial Court against recalcitrant officials.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of an investigation report to the Prosecution Department satisfy the statutory requirement for filing a challan in court?
  • Does the delay in the submission of an investigation report violate the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process?
  • Is the Prosecution Institution authorized to delay the submission of investigation reports to the court for internal processing?
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• Amjid Khan vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2021 SCMR 1458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-08
  Section 173 CrPCchallan submissioninvestigation reportspeedy justiceinterim reportfair trialPublic Prosecutor
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard a petition concerning the non-compliance of a High Court direction requiring the prosecution to submit an investigation report (challan) within one week and expedite the trial. The Additional Advocate General argued that compliance under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was satisfied when the police submitted the challan to the Prosecution department. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that Section 173 requires the report to be submitted to the Magistrate or Court through the Public Prosecutor, and not merely lodged with the prosecution department. The Court observed that failure to submit an investigation report within fourteen days, or an interim report within three days thereafter, violates the mandatory statutory provisions and undermines the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution. Since the challan was eventually submitted, the petition was disposed of with directions to proceed expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere submission of an investigation report to the Public Prosecutor satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the statutory timeframe under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for submitting an interim investigation report if the investigation is incomplete?
  • Does an unjustifiable delay in the submission of an investigation report (challan) violate the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution?
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• Allied Bank Limited vs Zulfiqar Ali Shar & others2021 PLC 191, 2021 PSC 1526, 2021 SCMR 1213, 2021 PSC (Crl.) 878, 2021 SCP 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-26
  termination simplicitermisconductreinstatementincarcerationlabour lawworkmangrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had dismissed a constitutional petition filed by the Appellant-Bank against the reinstatement of Respondent No. 1, a former cashier. The respondent was arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for over six years on misappropriation charges, during which the bank terminated his services via a letter of termination simpliciter under Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Following his subsequent acquittal on appeal, the respondent successfully sought reinstatement through the Labour Court, which was upheld by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court on the ground that no regular inquiry for misconduct was conducted. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the lower forums erred in treating the termination simpliciter as a dismissal for misconduct. The Court ruled that under Order 12(3), an employer is not required to wait indefinitely for an incarcerated employee's release and may terminate services simpliciter by providing explicit, written reasons, provided a reasonable period (ordinarily not exceeding two months) has elapsed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the termination of an incarcerated employee's services under Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 requires a show-cause notice and a regular inquiry?
  • Is an employer legally obligated to wait indefinitely and keep a post vacant until an incarcerated employee exhausts all appellate remedies and is released?
  • What constitutes a reasonable period for an employer to wait for an incarcerated employee to return to work before terminating their services simpliciter under Order 12(3) of the Ordinance?
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• Allayar Khan and another vs Mst. Massart Sultana2021 PLJ SC 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-16
  pre-emption suitTalb-i-Ishhadservice of noticeleave to appealCode of Civil Procedurepostal receipt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioners' pre-emption suit. The Trial Court had decreed the suit, but the appellate court set it aside on the ground that the date of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice was not mentioned in the plaint. The Supreme Court addressed the core question of whether the failure to state the date in the plaint was fatal, but identified a more fundamental defect concerning the actual service of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice. The Court held that since the recipient of the notice was not named on the postal receipt or in the postman's testimony, the receipt was not put to the defendant's attorney during cross-examination, and the acknowledgement due slip was not produced, the service of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was not validly established. The Court concluded that establishing service is a necessary ingredient for the success of a pre-emption suit when receipt is denied. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to establish the service of Talb-i-Ishhad notice is fatal to a pre-emption suit?
  • Is a pre-emption suit liable to be dismissed if the service of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice is not proved when its receipt is denied?
  • Does the non-production of the acknowledgement due slip and failure to name the recipient on the postal receipt affect the proof of service of Talb-i-Ishhad?
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• Ali Muhammad vs The State2020 SCMR 2143, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 416, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-18
  murdercapital punishmentcommutation of sentencereappraisal of evidencemitigating circumstancesproclaimed offenderjoint investigation team
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from the conviction and death sentences of the appellant, Ali Muhammad, for the murder of seven persons in an incident in 1999, which convictions had been upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the reappraisal of evidence, the credibility of eye-witnesses, and whether mitigating circumstances warranted the commutation of the death sentence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on consistent eye-witness testimony, medical evidence, and his long status as a proclaimed offender, maintaining his convictions. However, the Court held that mitigating circumstances—including a remote motive, an unconnected recovery of a firearm, a defence witness statement from an eyewitness, and a Joint Investigation Team opinion favoring the appellant compared to an executed co-convict—justified the reduction of the death sentences to imprisonment for life. The key principle laid down is that while concurrent findings of guilt based on credible eye-witness accounts will be maintained, distinct mitigating factors regarding motive, weapon recovery, and conflicting investigation opinions can form a valid basis for commuting death sentences to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reappraise evidence in a criminal appeal against concurrent convictions for murder?
  • Whether mitigating circumstances such as remote motive and unconnected weapon recovery are sufficient grounds to commute a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Is the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable when a death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment?
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• Ali Haider alias Papu vs Jameel Hussain and others2021 PLD Supreme Court 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-07
  DNA testforensic scienceper se admissibilityexpert opinionrape and murdercircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionwaj takkar
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a brutal case of rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl, where the petitioner was convicted under sections 302(b) and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, receiving a death sentence and imprisonment for life, which were upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the admissibility and evidentiary value of DNA test reports under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly regarding per se admissibility under section 510, Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that DNA test reports are highly reliable, constitute the strongest corroborative piece of evidence, and are fully admissible under Articles 59 and 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Furthermore, DNA test reports prepared by experts of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency are per se admissible under section 9 of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act, 2007. The key principles laid down emphasize the integration of modern forensic science into criminal jurisprudence, the gatekeeper role of judges regarding scientific evidence, and the conclusive nature of matching DNA profiles in violent crimes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a DNA test report is admissible in evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Are DNA test reports prepared by experts of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency per se admissible under section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the evidentiary weight of DNA profiling in criminal cases involving sexual assault and murder?
  • Does the absence of specific mention of DNA experts in section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 bar the admission of DNA test reports?
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• Ali Haider @ Pappu vs Jameel Hussain, etc2021 PLD Supreme Court 362, 2021 PLJ SC (Cr.C. ) 241, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 214, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-07
  DNA evidenceadmissibility of DNAforensic scienceper se admissiblerape and murdercapital punishmentcircumstantial evidencePFSA Act 2007
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence, including waj takkar evidence, extra-judicial confession, medical reports, and a matching DNA test report from the Punjab Forensic Science Agency. The core legal issues pertained to the admissibility, reliability, and evidentiary value of DNA evidence in rape and murder cases, and whether DNA reports are per se admissible without examining the forensic expert. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and death sentence, holding that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and unbroken. The Court decided that DNA evidence is admissible under Articles 59 and 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, representing one of the strongest corroborative pieces of evidence today. Furthermore, under Section 9 of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency Act 2007, DNA reports prepared by PFSA experts are per se admissible in evidence under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is a DNA test report admissible as scientific expert evidence in criminal trials under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is a DNA test report prepared by an expert of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency per se admissible in evidence under Section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the evidentiary value of DNA evidence in establishing the identity of an accused in cases of sexual violence and murder?
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• Ali Asjad Malhi vs Ms. Syeda Nosheen Iftikhar and others2021 SCP 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-15
  bye-electionelection irregularitiesre-pollElection Commission of Pakistanlaw and orderexecutive and quasi-judicial powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a challenge to the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) judgment declaring the entire bye-election of NA-75, Sialkot-IV null and void following widespread irregularities, violence, and missing presiding officers on polling day. The core legal question concerns the standard of proof, quantum of evidence, scale, and severity of violations required to warrant a total re-poll across an entire constituency under Section 9 of the Elections Act, 2017 read with Article 218(3) of the Constitution. The Court noted that the ECP's executive and quasi-judicial powers under Section 9 operate within a limited timeframe and may not strictly mirror the benchmarks applied by Election Tribunals. Without issuing a final holding on the merits, the Supreme Court directed the ECP to provide a detailed map and chart correlating specific polling station irregularities to the legal thresholds required for ordering a total versus partial re-poll, adjourning the matter for further arguments.

  Questions settled

  • What standard of proof, quantum of evidence, scale and severity of violations of law will warrant a re-poll in the entire constituency under the Elections Act, 2017?
  • What transgressions on the polling day could constitute grave illegalities or violations calling for a fresh rather than a partial re-poll?
  • In what situations would non-pervasiveness of the illegalities or violations committed on polling day still attract the same result of annulling the entire election?
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• Ali Asghar vs The State and others2022 SCMR 970, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 780 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-11
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in trialrule of consistencycyber crimefurther inquiryfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in which the petitioner sought post-arrest bail on statutory grounds in a case registered under sections 9 and 10 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and sections 419 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, relating to allegations of posting false campaigns on social media inciting a mob. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner was entitled to statutory bail due to prolonged incarceration and whether delay in the trial was attributable to him. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where an accused has been detained for a continuous period exceeding one year in a non-bailable offence not punishable with death, and the delay in trial is not occasioned by the accused or his omissions, he is entitled to be released on bail under the provisions of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Additionally, the Court applied the rule of consistency noting that a co-accused with a similar role had already been granted bail, and found that the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the petitioner admitted to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on statutory grounds when detained for a continuous period exceeding one year and the delay in trial is not attributable to him?
  • Does the rule of consistency apply when a co-accused with a similar role has been granted bail?
  • Whether the liberty of a person can be taken away without exceptional foundations?
  • Does a case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 under similar circumstances?
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• Akhtar Ullah @ Akhtar Ali vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 305, 2021 SCP 216, 2021 SCMR 1287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-16
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirynon-vital part injuryattempt to murderfirearm injurymedical report discrepanciesweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's post-arrest bail application in a case registered under Sections 324, 427, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the injury, lack of weapon recovery, and debatable applicability of Section 324 PPC. The Supreme Court held that where an injury is inflicted on a non-vital part, medical reports lack essential details such as dimensions and examining doctor's identification, and weapon recovery is absent, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court laid down the principle that tentative assessment of medical evidence regarding injury on non-vital parts and missing corroborative recoveries can make out a case for further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an injury on a non-vital part of the body make the applicability of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code a matter of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether the absence of weapon recovery renders the recovery of a crime empty from the spot inconsequential for bail purposes?
  • Can deficiencies in a medico-legal report, such as missing dimensions and lack of the examining doctor's name, form a ground for granting post-arrest bail?
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• Akhtar s/o Gul Zameer vs Khwas Khan and another2023 SCP 360, 2024 SCMR 476, 2021 PLD Supreme Court 898, PLJ 2021 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-23
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirypolice confessionrule of consistencytentative assessmentprohibitory limbFIR against unknown persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a post-arrest bail application in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 201, 120-B and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013. The core legal question concerned whether reasonable grounds existed to connect the petitioner with the crime, given that the FIR was initially lodged against unknown persons, the petitioner's name was introduced later via a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no recovery was made directly from the petitioner, and co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed post-arrest bail, holding that the case called for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, particularly in light of evidentiary issues surrounding police confessions under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The key principles laid down include that bail cannot be withheld as punishment, doubt regarding an accused's involvement warrants the concession of bail, and police confessions are inadmissible under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the initial FIR is lodged against unknown persons and his name is introduced subsequently after a delay?
  • Can a confession made before the police during investigation be proved against an accused person in view of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies when co-accused facing similar allegations have already been released on bail?
  • What constitutes reasonable grounds for the purpose of denying bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Akhtar Ali vs Mst. Taj Mahal and another2021 P SC 1241, 2021 SCMR 806, 2021 SCP 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-02
  remand prohibitionShariah Nizam-e-Adl RegulationTwenty-fifth Constitutional Amendmenterstwhile tribal areasfixation of casesjudicial administrationconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a civil revision involving the interpretation of Section 10(8) of the Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009, which prohibits appellate or revisional courts from remanding cases. The petitioner argued that the impugned order violated this prohibition. During proceedings, the Court noted that the case's broader implications, particularly regarding the status of laws in the erstwhile tribal areas following the Twenty-fifth Constitutional Amendment, necessitated a comprehensive approach. The Court observed that several pending cases, including those challenging the validity of provincial laws enacted for former tribal areas, remained undecided for years, often due to interim orders suspending High Court judgments that had struck down such laws as unconstitutional. The Court held that it would be inappropriate to decide the specific issue of remand in isolation, as the pending constitutional challenges regarding the validity of these laws could impact the outcome. Consequently, the Court directed the Registrar to seek the Chief Justice's orders to fix all related appeals and petitions for hearing together to ensure judicial consistency and avoid conflicting findings, emphasizing the necessity of prompt adjudication for public interest and legal certainty.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(8) of the Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009, prohibit appellate or revisional courts from remanding cases?
  • What is the duty of the Registrar of the Supreme Court regarding the fixation of pending cases for hearing?
  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to club related petitions and appeals involving the validity of laws in erstwhile tribal areas to avoid conflicting findings?
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• Akbar Ali and others vs The State and others2021 P S c (Crl.) 134, 2021 SCMR 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-21
  homicidemurderous assaultcommutation of sentenceocular evidenceforensic reportcriminal appealmonetary compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the conviction of appellants for homicide and murderous assault arising from an incident on 12.10.2005. The trial court convicted the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, sentencing the primary appellant to death and others for murderous assault. The High Court subsequently altered the death penalty to imprisonment for life and acquitted the co-accused of the murderous assault charge, while maintaining monetary compensation orders. The Supreme Court reviewed the case, affirming the conviction of the primary appellant for the fatal shot. The Court held that a negative forensic report and the prosecution's failure to establish a motive justified the High Court's decision to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. Regarding the co-accused, the Court declined to revisit the culpability and acquittal on murderous assault charges, noting that the lengthy period of incarceration and the protracted trial process had adequately addressed the justice requirements in the circumstances. The appeals and the petition for leave to appeal were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a negative forensic report regarding a recovered weapon justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can the Supreme Court decline to revisit the culpability of accused persons in a murderous assault case due to the passage of time and lengthy incarceration?
  • Is the failure to establish a motive a valid ground for altering a death penalty to imprisonment for life in a homicide case?
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• Akash Masih vs The State, etc2021 PLD Supreme Court 822, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 849, 2021 SCP 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-30
  pre-arrest bailAdvocate on RecordSupreme Court Rulesnon-appearance of petitionerbail dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail where the petitioner repeatedly failed to appear and the Advocate on Record (AOR) had no information regarding the whereabouts or contact details of the petitioner, coupled with the passing of the learned ASC. The core legal question concerns the prosecution of a pre-arrest bail petition when the petitioner is absent and unrepresented effectively due to the AOR's inability to contact the client. The Supreme Court held that the petition cannot proceed further under Section 498-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 read with the second proviso to Rule 8 of Order 23 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an AOR plays a pivotal, responsible role under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and the failure of a petitioner to appear or maintain contact with their AOR in pre-arrest bail proceedings warrants the dismissal of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a pre-arrest bail petition proceed when the petitioner is absent and the Advocate on Record has no contact details or information regarding the petitioner?
  • What are the responsibilities and liabilities of an Advocate on Record under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • What is the consequence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Supreme Court Rules, 1980 when an accused fails to appear in a pre-arrest bail matter?
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• Aijaz Ali Rajpar vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 861, 2021 SCP 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-09
  narcotics recoverycannabiscontrol of narcotic substancescriminal appealreduction of sentencecredibility of witnessessupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the possession of 1920 grams of cannabis and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment. The conviction was upheld by the High Court of Sindh after a remand for re-examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the conviction alleging a fake recovery foisted by police due to previous animosity and alternatively sought a reduction of sentence. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the narcotics recovery, the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and the justification for reducing the sentence. The Supreme Court held that the considerable quantity of contraband ruled out false imposition, the testimonies of the recovery witnesses were consistent and reliable, and the forensic report clinched the indictment. The Court declined leave to appeal and refused to reduce the sentence, establishing that consistent prosecution evidence regarding a substantial contraband recovery sustains a narcotics conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a considerable quantity of contraband rule out its false imposition by police?
  • Whether unblemished and consistent testimonies of recovery witnesses are sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can an unproved allegation of police animosity undermine the preponderance of prosecution evidence in a narcotics case?
  • Is a prisoner entitled to a reduction of sentence to the period already undergone based on remissions when the sentence is otherwise conscionable?
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• Aijaz Ahmed Tunio vs The State2021 PLD Supreme Court 752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-03-16
  judicial stricturessubordinate judiciarysupervisory jurisdictionadministrative sidejudicial conductHigh Court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner impugned an order of the High Court to the extent of paragraph 13, wherein strictures were passed against a Judicial Officer regarding the propriety of conflicting orders passed by him. The core legal question was whether the High Court can pass adverse strictures against a judicial officer on the judicial side or whether such matters fall exclusively under the supervisory and administrative jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court possesses appellate and revisional powers to set aside or modify judgments of subordinate courts and examine legal reasoning, it must refrain from passing personal strictures, adverse remarks, or censures against the competence, integrity, or capability of judicial officers on the judicial side. Instead, any action regarding the conduct or efficiency of a judicial officer must be handled on the administrative side through supervisory control under the Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed that the matter be examined by the Member Inspection Team (MIT) on the administrative side without being influenced by the observations in the impugned judgment, disposing of the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court pass adverse strictures against a judicial officer on the judicial side regarding his competence and capability?
  • How should the High Court exercise supervisory control over the district judiciary in matters relating to a judge's conduct or efficiency?
  • Does the power of the High Court to set aside or modify judgments of subordinate courts include the power to record personal censure against the judge?
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• Ahmed Din (Deceased) through LRs and another vs Muhammad Iqbal2021 SCMR 1797, 2022 PSC 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-23
  specific performanceagreement to sellbona fide purchaserconstructive noticepossessionevasive denialsecond appealreappraisal of evidencepleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose out of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell executed by the original land allottee in favor of the appellant, who was placed in possession of the suit land. Subsequent to receiving proprietary rights, the vendor executed a sale deed in favor of a subsequent purchaser. The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the decree, holding that the subsequent vendee was not a bona fide purchaser. However, the High Court reversed these findings in a regular second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court addressed whether the prior possession of the appellant constituted constructive notice to the subsequent purchaser and whether the High Court was justified in overturning concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that existing possession of a prior vendee imposes an obligation on a subsequent purchaser to make inquiries. Failing to do so negates good faith. Furthermore, the High Court erred in reappraising evidence and relying on statements beyond the pleadings in second appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the physical possession of a prior vendee over the suit property operate as sufficient notice to a subsequent purchaser?
  • Is a subsequent purchaser burdened with the duty to make inquiries regarding the possession of a third party over the property prior to purchasing it?
  • Can an evasive denial in a written statement concerning delivery of possession be construed as an admission by the defendant?
  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to overturn concurrent findings of fact?
  • Can a court rely on evidence or a statement of a party that travels beyond its written pleadings?
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• Ahmad Khalid Butt vs The State and another2021 SCMR 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-12
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecyber crimenon-bailable offencescriminal appealbail discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from the refusal of post-arrest bail by the Islamabad High Court to the petitioner, who was charged under sections 20, 21, and 24 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, read with sections 34 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the nature of the offences and the duration of his incarceration. Upon review, the Court observed that the alleged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as the maximum punishments involved were three and five years respectively. Furthermore, the petitioner was not the principal accused and had been detained for approximately four months. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the petitioner. The judgment reinforces the established legal principle that in non-prohibitory offences, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception, absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail constitute the rule in cases involving offences that fall outside the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when they are not the principal accused and the alleged offences carry a maximum punishment of three to five years?
  • Can bail be refused in cases where the offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause absent exceptional circumstances?
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• Ahmad Ali vs The State and another2021 SCMR 470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-16
  post-arrest bailfurther enquirysupplementary statementcriminal petitionbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Ahmad Ali, in a case involving charges under sections 302, 324, 201, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not named in the initial FIR and was implicated only through a supplementary statement with a limited role, was entitled to the concession of bail. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was not alleged to have caused any injury to the deceased, and his implication relied on a supplementary statement regarding the act of holding a victim. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the ambit of further enquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the petitioner was granted bail subject to furnishing a bail bond, establishing the principle that where an accused's role is limited and requires further evidentiary enquiry, bail should be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the implication of an accused in a supplementary statement, without an allegation of causing injury, constitute a case for further enquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when they are not named in the initial FIR and their alleged role is limited to catching hold of a victim?
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• Afzul-Ur-Rehman vs The State2021 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-26
  explosive substancescriminal appealsentence reductionjudicial confessionmitigating circumstancesanti-terrorism lawcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant for transporting a large cache of high-intensity explosives in a truck. The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing that his voluntary surrender and cooperation with the police, which prevented a potential catastrophe, should mitigate his culpability. He further contended that his judicial confession was exculpatory and that the acquittal of his co-accused undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court addressed whether the appellant's cooperation warranted a reprieve and whether the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was sustainable. The Court held that while the appellant's actions did not absolve him of criminal liability for transporting explosives, his cooperation and change of heart significantly extenuated the gravity of the offense. Consequently, the Court maintained the conviction under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, but reduced the sentence to the minimum statutory period of seven years. Furthermore, relying on established precedent, the Court set aside the conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, finding it inapplicable to the circumstances, thereby partly allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the voluntary cooperation of an accused in preventing a potential explosive catastrophe absolve them of criminal liability for transporting explosives?
  • Can a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 be maintained for the transportation of explosives where the specific criteria for terrorism are not met?
  • To what extent can an accused's change of heart and cooperation with authorities serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing for explosive-related offenses?
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• Administrator Municipal Corporation, Peshawar vs Taimur Hussain Amin2021 SCP 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-04
  local government electionsconstitutional mandatecensus approvaldissolution of local governmentsCouncil of Common InterestsElection Commission of Pakistandemocratic governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the failure of various provincial governments to hold local government elections, prompting Supreme Court oversight regarding constitutional compliance. The core legal questions involve whether the pending approval of the 2017 census by the Council of Common Interests justifies delaying elections, whether the Covid-19 pandemic constitutes a valid legal ground for such delay, and whether provincial governments possess the authority to dissolve local governments prematurely without valid justification. The Court held that election matters and proceedings preventing constitutional functionaries from performing their duties must be resolved expeditiously. It emphasized that local governments are constitutionally mandated and that arbitrary dissolution of elected bodies is contrary to democratic principles. The Court rejected the argument that the pandemic excuses the failure to hold elections, noting the absence of any legal exception. Furthermore, the Court directed provincial law officers to provide written justifications regarding the dissolution of local governments and the failure to conduct elections within statutory timelines, stressing that constitutional duties cannot be deferred indefinitely by administrative or legislative inaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of census approval before the Council of Common Interests legally justify the postponement of local government elections?
  • Does the prevalence of the Covid-19 pandemic provide a valid legal exception for failing to hold constitutionally mandated local government elections?
  • Can provincial governments prematurely dissolve local governments without providing a valid legal justification?
  • Do dissolved local governments stand resurrected if elections are not held within the statutory time limits prescribed by provincial legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Adeel Rasheed vs The State and another2022 SCP 248, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-29
  probation of offenderscommunity service orderrehabilitation of offendersdishonestly issuing a chequecriminal sentencingIslamic jurisprudencestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was convicted under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dishonestly issuing a cheque and sought release on probation. The core legal question was whether a convict could be released on probation with a condition of unpaid community service under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance 1960. The Supreme Court allowed the petition, converting the sentence into a probation order. It held that while the Ordinance does not explicitly mention 'community service,' its objective of rehabilitating offenders as honest, industrious, and law-abiding citizens allows courts to impose conditions, including unpaid community service, to facilitate reformation. The Court emphasized that punishment should aim for reformation rather than mere incarceration. It integrated Islamic jurisprudence, specifically the concepts of futuwwah and fida' bil 'amal, to support community service as a restorative measure. The Court ruled that courts have the discretion to incorporate unpaid community service into probation orders to benefit the offender, society, and the State, provided the offender agrees to the terms and executes the necessary bond.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose unpaid community service as a condition of a probation order under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance 1960?
  • Does the Probation of Offenders Ordinance 1960 allow for the rehabilitation of an offender through community service?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise the power to release a convict on probation during an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Action Against Distribution of Development Funds: In this Matter of vs N/A2021 P SC 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-03
  development fundsdiscretionary grantsbudget estimatesconstitutional obligationexecutive authoritypublic funds allocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter relates to media reports regarding the announcement of development funds by the Prime Minister for members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies, raising questions about the constitutionality of discretionary fund allocations to lawmakers. The core legal question concerns whether the distribution of public development funds at the discretion of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister to individual legislators complies with the constitutional framework governing the national and provincial budgets. Relying on established precedent and constitutional provisions, the Court reiterated that the Constitution does not permit the allocation or use of funds at the sole discretion of the Executive or specific individuals, and that all expenditures and grants must follow the strict statutory procedures outlined in the Constitution and relevant rules. The Court directed notices to the federal and provincial governments and the Attorney-General to ascertain the factual position and verify whether the reported distribution of funds conformed to constitutional mandates and prior judicial pronouncements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allocation of development funds at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister to lawmakers is constitutional?
  • Is it obligatory upon the Federal Government to lay supplementary budget statements before the National Assembly for scrutiny?
  • Can bulk grants be made in the budget without giving detailed item-wise estimates under each grant?
  Read full judgment →
• Action Against Distribution of Development Funds to MNAs/MPAs by Prime2021 PLD Supreme Court 446, 2021 SCP 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-20
  development fundsdiscretionary grantsconstitutional mandatebench reconstitutionjudicial impartialitypublic exchequer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from suo motu cognizance and subsequent proceedings regarding the alleged distribution of public development funds to members of parliament by the Prime Minister and provincial chief executives, allegedly in conflict with constitutional provisions and prior judgments of the Supreme Court. Reports were submitted by the federal and provincial governments stating that no discretionary or person-specific development funds were being handed over to legislators and that all expenditures would strictly adhere to budgetary systems, constitutional mandates, and applicable rules. Consequently, the majority of the bench concluded that the queries raised by the court had been satisfactorily addressed and disposed of the application. However, a dissenting opinion by a member of the bench raised extensive objections regarding the arbitrary reconstitution of the bench, the abrupt disposal of the matter without verifying certain documents concerning development schemes, and the propriety of restricting a judge from hearing matters involving the Prime Minister.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the allocation of development funds to parliamentarians at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister is constitutional?
  • Can a bench of the Supreme Court already seized of a matter be arbitrarily reconstituted without compelling reasons?
  • Whether a judge of the superior court can be restrained from hearing cases involving a specific public officeholder on grounds of alleged bias without a formal application or proof?
  • Are expenditures incurred under the annual budget required to be demand-specific and project-specific rather than person-specific?
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• Action Against Distribution of Development Funds by Ex-Prime Minister2021 SCP 38 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-03
  development fundsdiscretionary grantunconstitutional allocationAnnual Budget Statementsupplementary budgetre-appropriation of fundsparliamentary scrutinycontempt of court
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan took suo motu notice of media reports stating that the Prime Minister had approved a grant of Rs500 million in development funds for each federal and provincial lawmaker of the ruling party to initiate schemes in their constituencies. The Court highlighted its prior precedent established in Action Against Distribution of Development Funds by Ex-Prime Minister (PLD 2014 SC 131), which held that discretionary, person-specific allocations of public funds to legislators by the Executive are unconstitutional. Under Articles 80 to 84 (and provincial counterparts Articles 120 to 124) of the Constitution, development funds must follow structured statutory procedures, detailed estimates, and parliamentary scrutiny. Citing Article 5(2) and Article 204(2)(a), the Court issued notices to the Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, federal finance secretaries, and provincial chief secretaries and advocate generals to clarify whether public funds were being distributed in violation of the Constitution and established precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Is the allocation of development funds to individual legislators at the sole discretion of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister constitutional?
  • What procedure must the Executive follow under Articles 80 to 84 of the Constitution when allocating or re-appropriating funds for development schemes?
  • Can bulk grants be made in the federal or provincial budgets without providing itemized detailed estimates to Parliament?
  Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar Siddique vs The State and others2021 SCMR 5, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 788 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-27
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailfirearm injuryinvestigation findingaerial firingfurther inquirycapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed against the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder and attempted murder case registered under Sections 302, 324, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the ground that the Investigating Officer found he only engaged in aerial firing. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition. The Court held that extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail cannot be granted where the occurrence took place in broad daylight, a specific role of causing firearm injury was ascribed to the petitioner by an injured eyewitness in a Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, and prima facie sufficient material exists connecting him to an offense entailing capital punishment, noting that the Investigating Officer's conflicting finding regarding aerial firing remains subject to determination by the trial court upon recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person specifically nominated for causing a firearm injury to an injured eyewitness in a daylight occurrence is entitled to pre-arrest bail based on a police finding of aerial firing?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. when prima facie sufficient material exists connecting the accused with an offense carrying capital punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar Siddique alias Muhammad Abu Bakr vs The State and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 192, 2021 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-01-22
  post-arrest bailaerial firingfurther inquirycriminal petitionrule of consistencymurderattempt to murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, challenges the order of the Lahore High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the appellant in a case registered under sections 302, 324, 109, 148, 149, 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), and 337-F(iv) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Mandi Usman wala, District Kasur. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the specific role attributed to him and the principle of consistency vis-a-vis a co-accused. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that there was no allegation against the petitioner of causing injury to the deceased, and police investigation concluded that he only made aerial firing at the spot. Furthermore, a co-accused attributed a similar firearm injury had already been granted bail by the trial court. The Court held that the case against the appellant falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and bail was granted to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused is only alleged to have committed aerial firing without causing injury to the deceased?
  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted to an accused when a co-accused attributed a similar injury has already been granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs Tassawar Hussain and another2021 SCMR 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-02
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailcancellation of bailmurderous assaulttentative assessmentcriminal proceduremala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent, who was accused of murderous assault involving firearm injuries. The High Court had granted anticipatory bail, relying on the respondent's declaration of innocence by the police during investigation and the fact that co-accused had been granted bail. The Supreme Court set aside this order, holding that the High Court's findings constituted an impermissible, in-depth assessment of evidence at the bail stage, which should be reserved for trial. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is not a substitute for post-arrest bail and that the respondent's conduct—specifically his repeated avoidance of the legal process—disentitled him to such relief. Furthermore, the Court clarified that constitutional guarantees of liberty do not shield an accused from the statutory regime governing criminal custody. The Court held that in the absence of substantive evidence of mala fide, and given the consistent allegations by multiple injured witnesses, the respondent failed to make out a case for pre-arrest bail, leading to the cancellation of the impugned order.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted as a substitute for post-arrest bail?
  • Does the constitutional guarantee of liberty prevent the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to an accused person?
  • Does an accused's conduct in avoiding the legal process disentitle them to pre-arrest bail?
  • Is it permissible for a court to conduct a deep analysis of evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 258, 2021 P SC 761, 2021 SCMR 645, 2021 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-16
  Field General Court Martialcivil offencejurisdiction of military courtsreview jurisdictionPakistan Air Force Actarmed forces disciplinelimitation and delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a judgment dismissing the petitioner's challenge to his conviction by a Field General Court Martial (FGCM). The petitioner, a former Corporal Technician in the Pakistan Air Force, was convicted under Section 71 of the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, for receiving unauthorized firearms training. The core legal question was whether the FGCM possessed jurisdiction to try the petitioner for a 'civil offence' or if such jurisdiction exclusively belonged to ordinary criminal courts. The Supreme Court held that the FGCM had full jurisdiction, affirming that under the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, personnel subject to the Act who commit a 'civil offence' are deemed to have committed an offence against the Act itself and are triable by military courts, subject only to specific exceptions under Section 72. The Court emphasized that statutory provisions must be given their ordinary meaning and that the definition of 'civil offence' in military enactments creates a distinct legal framework for armed forces personnel. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the petition due to the petitioner's failure to demonstrate an error apparent on the face of the record and his inordinate, unexplained delay in challenging the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Field General Court Martial have jurisdiction to try a person subject to the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, for a 'civil offence'?
  • What is the legal definition of 'civil offence' within the context of the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953?
  • Can a review petition under Article 188 of the Constitution of Pakistan be used to re-argue the merits of a case already decided?
  • Does the definition of 'criminal court' in the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, exclude the jurisdiction of a court-martial over civil offences?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wasay vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 529, 2021 SCMR 1059, 2021 SCP 200 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-02-19
  murderqatl-e-amdspot arrestinjured eyewitnessesmitigating circumstanceunproven motiveQisas and Diyatstatutory interpretationrepealed ordinancesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprised criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal against a Balochistan High Court judgment which upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 PPC for murder, but modified the sentence from death to life imprisonment due to unproven motive. The core legal questions pertained to the sufficiency of eye-witness and medical evidence supported by prompt FIR registration and spot arrest, as well as the legality of lower courts continuing to cite repealed Qisas and Diyat Ordinances rather than the enacted Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1997. The Supreme Court dismissed all petitions, holding that the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt through injured eyewitnesses and spot recovery, while unproven motive justified reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. Crucially, the Court laid down that citing repealed Qisas and Diyat Ordinances instead of the permanently enacted provisions of Chapter XVI PPC (via Act II of 1997) is an unlawful misconception of law, ordering all judicial and prosecution authorities in Balochistan to immediately rectify this practice.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to prove the alleged motive entitle a convict under Section 302 PPC to a reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment?
  • Is it lawful for courts or prosecution departments to charge or convict an accused under repealed Qisas and Diyat Ordinances instead of Chapter XVI of the Pakistan Penal Code as amended by Act II of 1997?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained primarily on the testimony of injured eyewitnesses corroborated by prompt FIR lodging and spot arrest?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Razzaq vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 863, 2021 SCP 350 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-09-17
  post-arrest bailjuvenilityforensic evidenceempty casingscircumstantial evidencefurther inquirypre-trial detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the dismissal of the petitioner's bail application by the High Court in an unidentified murder case initially reported without naming suspects or motive. The petitioner was subsequently implicated based on belated witness statements alleging he had borrowed and returned a .30 caliber pistol, which was later produced by the witnesses and forensically matched to casings retrieved from the crime scene. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether such circumstantial weapon recovery, in the absence of other direct evidence, conclusively connected the accused to the crime to justify withholding bail, especially in light of the petitioner's juvenility and the conclusion of the investigation. Granting bail, the Court held that attributing the weapon and culpability to the petitioner without further corroboration was a matter to be settled after recording evidence at trial. Furthermore, the petitioner's juvenile status and the completion of the investigation rendered continued pre-trial detention unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon produced by witnesses and forensically linked to crime-scene casings is sufficient to deny bail without substantive evidence attributing its use to the accused?
  • Does an accused person's status as a juvenile entitle them to concessions in the grant of bail pending trial?
  • Is continued pre-trial detention justified when the investigation is complete and no further purpose is served by keeping the accused incarcerated?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Latif vs Noor Zaman and another2021 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-06-28
  murderacquittalswapped witnessesfirst information reportre-appreciation of evidencecriminal petitionbenefit of the doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from an acquittal judgment passed by the Peshawar High Court, which set aside the conviction and death sentence of the respondent recorded by the trial court for the murder of a fifteen-year-old girl under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the prosecution's case where the eyewitnesses originally named in the crime report were abandoned and replaced at trial by swapped witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was disputed and contradicted by the record. The Supreme Court held that while a First Information Report is not an encyclopedia, the wholesale replacement of named witnesses with un-named substitutes without credible explanation undermines the prosecution's case, and a conviction cannot be sustained on moral certainty alone without confidence-inspiring evidence. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was declined, affirming the High Court's acquittal based on the settled principles of safe administration of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be sustained on the testimony of witnesses who were never named in the First Information Report and replaced the original eyewitnesses?
  • Does the absence of the complainant and key cited witnesses at trial render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Can an accused be convicted and sentenced to death merely on the strength of moral certainty regarding his guilt in the absence of confidence-inspiring evidence?
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• Abdul Khaliq vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 455, 2021 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-04
  dying declarationSection 302(b) PPCmurdermedical evidenceforensic reportacquittal of co-accusedfailure to prove motiveevidentiary valuelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction under clause (b) of Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while commuting his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions pertained to the evidentiary value and reliability of a dying declaration, whether the presence of relatives at the hospital tainted the declaration, and whether the acquittal of a co-accused and failure to prove motive impaired the prosecution case against the principal accused. The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was authentic and fully supported by medical testimony, as the attending doctor categorically affirmed the deceased's capacity to communicate. The Court ruled that the mere presence of relatives does not impair a dying declaration, nor does the acquittal of a distinguishable co-accused or failure on motive diminish the case where positive ocular, medical, and forensic evidence—including recovery of the weapon wedded to crime empties—corroborates the charge. Consequently, leave was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of relatives accompanying an injured person to the hospital impair the evidentiary value of his dying declaration?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code be sustained despite the prosecution's failure to establish a motive?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused with a distinguishable role adversely affect the prosecution's case against the principal accused where independent corroboration exists?
  • Is a dying declaration sufficient to sustain a murder conviction when corroborated by medical evidence and matching forensic firearms analysis?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hameed & others vs Water & Power Development Authority through its Chairman, Lahore, etc2021 SCP 242, 2021 SCMR 1230, 2022 PCTLR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-04-12
  Special WAPDA Allowanceservice appealsexecutive policyintelligible differentiadiscrimination in allowanceslimitation in service claimsrecurring cause of actiontrichotomy of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from Civil Appeals and Civil Petitions directed against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed service appeals filed by WAPDA employees seeking retrospective payment of the 'Special WAPDA Allowance' with effect from 20.02.2009 instead of 26.11.2013. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether non-engineer/non-geologist employees could claim an allowance granted specifically to Graduate Engineers from an earlier date; whether recommendations of a Standing Committee bind a competent authority; whether a prior judicial order applied to these employees; and whether financial claims automatically escape the bar of limitation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that executive decisions determining service allowances and their effective dates based on job cadres, fiscal space, and policy fall within executive domain and cannot be interfered with by courts unless arbitrary or illegal. It further laid down that distinct job cadres provide intelligible differentia defeating claims of discrimination, recommendatory bodies cannot dictate executive policy, and limitation for financial claims is condoned only when entitlement is lawfully established.

  Questions settled

  • Can courts interfere in executive policy decisions regarding the grant and effective date of service allowances to specific cadres of employees?
  • Do recommendations made by a advisory or standing committee bind the competent executive authority in granting financial allowances?
  • Does the principle of non-applicability of limitation to financial claims apply where the employee's fundamental legal entitlement has not been established?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani and others vs Haji Abdul Fatah and others2022 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-11-01
  ancient documentdowerQabin-namarevenue recordconcurrent findingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition assailing concurrent findings of lower courts and the High Court of Balochistan in favor of the respondent, who successfully claimed ownership of the suit property through a Qabin-nama dated 29.6.1949 (Ex.P-3) evidencing the transfer of land as dower to Mst. Sahib Khatoon. The core legal question involves the evidentiary value and legal presumption attached to an ancient title document that antedates a period far beyond thirty years and surfaces from proper custody, in contrast to subsequent revenue records and mutations favoring petitioners who claimed as residual successors and purchasers. The Supreme Court held that the ancient document of title, being a Qabin-nama protected by statutory presumption and emanating from proper custody, successfully establishes title and nullifies subsequent inconsistent claims or revenue entries. The Court laid down the principle that ancient documents dating beyond thirty years, when verified in the totality of circumstances, carry formidable evidentiary weight and command judicial recognition, warranting no interference with concurrent findings of lower forums. Leave to appeal was accordingly declined.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of an ancient Qabin-nama antedating a period beyond thirty years in establishing title to property?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding property ownership based on ancient title documents warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a duly established dower transfer through an ancient document override subsequent entries in the revenue record?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The State2022 PSC (Crl.) 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-30
  criminal appealdelayed FIRbenefit of doubtcredibility of witnessesmurder convictionacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 337-F(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and causing injury, respectively. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given an eleven-day delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR) and significant contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained by any justifiable reasoning. Furthermore, the Court observed that the complainant’s contradictory stance regarding the role of the co-accused, who was subsequently acquitted, cast serious doubt on the credibility of the entire prosecution case. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reaffirms the established principle that any reasonable doubt arising in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused, and that the benefit of such doubt is a matter of right, not grace, for the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay of eleven days in lodging an FIR constitute a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when prosecution witnesses provide contradictory testimony?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to provide unimpeachable and trustworthy evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghafoor vs The State and another2022 SCMR 819, PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 135, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-11
  narcotic substanceschain of custodychemical examinersafe transmission of samplesburden of proofcriminal appealconviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from the conviction of the petitioner for the transportation of 500 kg of cannabis, discovered in an oil tanker by the Anti-Narcotic Force. The petitioner was convicted under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentenced to life imprisonment, a decision upheld by the High Court despite the acquittal of a co-accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully established the chain of custody regarding the seized contraband, specifically the safe transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the safe transmission of samples, which is a critical evidentiary requirement to confirm the narcotic nature of the seized substance. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment establishes the principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proving every limb of its case, including the safe transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner, and failure to do so is a fatal flaw that undermines the entire prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to prove the safe transmission of samples to the Chemical Examiner vitiate a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Is the prosecution required to produce the witness responsible for transmitting samples to the Chemical Examiner to establish the chain of custody?
  • Can a conviction for drug trafficking be sustained if the prosecution fails to confirm the narcotic character of the seized contraband through a verified chemical examination process?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas Haider Naqvi and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2022 SCP 174, 2023 PSC (Crl.) 1, 2022 PLJ SC 379, PLD 2022 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal breach of trustentrustmentNAB referenceacquittalSection 265-K Cr.P.C.regulatory compliancefiduciary relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions filed by employees of Shell Pakistan Limited challenging NAB proceedings regarding the alleged illegal sale of aviation fuel (JP-1) as Super Kerosene Oil, which allegedly caused a loss to the public exchequer. The core legal question was whether the alleged act of selling fuel in the open market, contrary to regulatory directives, constitutes the offence of criminal breach of trust under Sections 405 and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby falling under Section 9(a)(x) and (xi) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999. The Court held that the essential ingredient of 'entrustment' was absent because the fuel was purchased by the company in its own right, not entrusted by the public or refinery companies in a fiduciary capacity. Consequently, no offence under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 was made out. The Court established that regulatory control over the distribution of a commodity does not alter the private nature of a commercial transaction or create a fiduciary relationship. Without 'entrustment,' there can be no criminal breach of trust. The Court acquitted the petitioners and quashed the NAB reference.

  Questions settled

  • Does the regulatory control over the distribution of a commodity alter the private nature of a commercial transaction to create a fiduciary relationship?
  • Is 'entrustment' an essential ingredient for the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be entertained when the ground for acquittal does not require the appraisal of prosecution evidence?
  • Does the sale of a commodity owned by a company in its own right, in violation of government supply directives, constitute criminal breach of trust under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbas Ali and another vs The State2021 SCMR 349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-22
  homicidemurderous assaultocular accountinjured witnessnon-recovery of weaponsacquittal of co-accuseddaman
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition arose from the conviction of the petitioners for homicide and murderous assault under multiple counts, resulting in life imprisonment and other concurrent sentences, which were upheld by the High Court. The prosecution's case was based on the ocular account of three eyewitnesses, including an injured witness, who detailed the firearm assault motivated by a family dispute. The petitioners challenged the convictions, arguing that the motive was discarded, the injured witness was biased, no weapons were recovered, and the acquittal of a co-accused on the same evidence undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the failure to recover weapons does not undermine a prosecution case firmly founded on reliable ocular evidence. The Court further ruled that the acquittal of a co-accused with a distinguishable role does not affect the integrity of the charge against the principal accused. While maintaining the convictions, the Court reduced the amount of Daman to Rs. 1,000/- due to the advanced age of the convicts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the investigating officer to recover the weapons used in an offense shake a prosecution case that is otherwise firmly founded on reliable ocular account?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused with a distinguishable role on the same set of evidence automatically require the rejection of the prosecution case against the remaining accused?
  • Can the amount of Daman imposed on a convict be reduced by the court on account of the extreme advanced age of the convict?
  Read full judgment →
• Aam Loeg Itehad & another vs The Election Commission of Pakistan &2021 SCP 428, 2022 PLD Supreme Court 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-16
  quo warrantoElection Commission of Pakistanpost-retirement baroffice of profitquasi-judicialconstitutional interpretationreading injudicial appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a quo warranto challenge against the appointment of retired judges and a civil servant as members of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The petitioners contended that the appointments violated the two-year post-retirement bar for judges holding an 'office of profit' under Article 207(2) of the Constitution. The High Court had dismissed the petition, ruling that the ECP is a 'quasi-judicial' office and thus exempt from the bar. The Supreme Court, while setting aside the High Court's reasoning, held that the inherent nature of the ECP is administrative/executive rather than quasi-judicial, despite certain ancillary judicial functions. However, the Court dismissed the appeal by applying the doctrine of 'reading in'. It determined that constitutional amendments (18th and 22nd) requiring ECP members to be retired judges would be rendered practically unworkable if the Article 207(2) bar applied. Consequently, the Court held that the words 'member of the Election Commission' must be read into the exceptions of Article 207(2) alongside the Chief Election Commissioner to give effect to the constitutional intent.

  Read full judgment →
• (1) Resham Khan s/o Falak Sher (2) Zahid Iqbal s/o Resham Khan vs The2021 SCP 380, 2021 PSC (Crl.) 1009 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-10-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryocular evidencemedical evidenceinvestigation reportcriminal jurisprudencetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioners in a murder case. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given that the investigating agency had placed them in Column No. 2 of the challan, declaring them innocent, and considering significant contradictions between the ocular account in the FIR and the medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail. The Court reasoned that while the investigating officer's opinion is not binding, it cannot be discarded without cogent reasons. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the FIR's description of the injury location and the post-mortem report, combined with the lack of incriminating material, established a case for "further inquiry" under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reiterated that the object of bail is to secure attendance at trial, not to punish, and that the prosecution must establish reasonable grounds for detention, which were absent here.

  Questions settled

  • Does the placement of an accused's name in Column No. 2 of the challan entitle them to bail?
  • Can bail be granted when there are significant contradictions between the ocular account and the medical evidence?
  • Is the opinion of the investigating officer binding on the court during bail proceedings?
  • What is the scope of tentative assessment of evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 208, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 827, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 831, 2020 SCMR 417 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-15
  post-arrest bailmurderabetmentfurther probeevidentiary discrepancycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the rejection of post-arrest bail by the lower courts in a murder case. The petitioner, aged in his late sixties, was accused of involvement in a fatal shooting stemming from a property dispute. While the initial crime report attributed the first shot to the petitioner, the Investigating Officer subsequently concluded that the petitioner merely abetted the crime without being physically present at the scene. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the conflicting evidence regarding his presence and the discrepancy between the number of shots fired and the injuries sustained by the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's culpability required further inquiry, particularly in light of the Investigating Officer's findings and the petitioner's advanced age. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case against an accused is subject to significant evidentiary doubt, particularly regarding presence at the scene and the nature of the role played, the accused is entitled to the benefit of further probe and release on bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when the Investigating Officer's report contradicts the initial FIR regarding the accused's presence at the crime scene?
  • Does a discrepancy between the number of shots fired and the injuries sustained by the deceased warrant further probe for the purpose of bail?
  • Can the advanced age of an accused be considered a relevant factor in granting post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaka Ullah vs The State and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 729, 2020 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-15
  post-arrest bailhomicidedying declarationconflicting evidencefurther inquirycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Zaka Ullah, who has been in custody since May 17, 2019, in connection with a homicide case involving a motive of runaway marriage. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the conflicting evidence regarding his specific role in the crime. The First Information Report (FIR) implicated the petitioner, yet the dying declaration omitted his name and role, and the Investigating Officer’s report suggested the petitioner was present at the scene but played no active role in the shooting. The Supreme Court held that these discrepancies created a dichotomy that required further inquiry during the trial. Consequently, the Court found that a case for further probe into the petitioner's culpability was established. The petition was converted into an appeal, allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to bail subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the FIR and the dying declaration regarding the accused's role justify the grant of bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation report suggests presence at the crime scene but omits an active role in the commission of the offense?
  • When should a bail petition be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Zaid Shah alias Jogi vs The State2020 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-29
  second review petitionconcurrent sentencesabduction for ransomlife imprisonmentcriminal reviewsentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted in six separate cases of abduction for ransom and sentenced to life imprisonment following the commutation of his initial death sentences, filed second review petitions before the Supreme Court seeking concurrent running of his sentences. The core legal question was whether a second review petition is maintainable and whether concurrent commutation of sentences can be granted based on the convict's life expectancy. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that a second review petition is not maintainable under the law, and that discretion regarding concurrent sentences under the Code of Criminal Procedure must be exercised with judicial circumspection rather than as a concessionary package based on life expectancy, particularly given the heinous and repetitive nature of the crimes. The key principle laid down is that second review petitions are barred, and the grant of concurrent sentences is not a matter of course but depends on the facts, circumstances, and enormity of the offenses committed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner maintain a second review petition before the Supreme Court?
  • How is judicial discretion under sections 35 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to be exercised regarding concurrent sentences?
  • Does life expectancy alone warrant the concurrent commutation of multiple sentences for heinous crimes?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Khan vs Akhter Muhammad and another2020 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-21
  post-arrest bailmurdertentative assessmentocular accountmedical evidencereasonable groundsfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a murder case, having been arrested over five years after the alleged incident, which involved the fatal shooting of the deceased. The petitioner argued that there was a conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence. The Supreme Court examined the record and held that arguments regarding discrepancies between witness testimony and medical reports cannot be entertained during the bail stage, as this requires a tentative assessment of evidence. The Court found that the ocular account, supported by medical evidence and investigative findings, established reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was involved in the crime, as contemplated under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a case for further inquiry and that the lower courts' decisions to deny bail were legally sound. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, and bail was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conflict between ocular account and medical evidence be resolved during the bail stage?
  • What constitutes reasonable grounds for denying bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a long delay in arrest sufficient grounds to grant bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahid & Riaz Ali vs The statePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 238, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 426, 2020 SCMR 590, 2020 SCP 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  rapegang rapeFIR delayDNA reportmedical evidencesexual assaultcorroboratory evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition arose from a conviction under Section 376 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the gang rape of a married woman. The petitioners challenged their ten-year rigorous imprisonment sentences, primarily arguing that a one-day delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of a DNA report were fatal to the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that in cases involving sexual assault and personal honor, a delay in reporting is often understandable due to societal stigma and the victim's apprehension. The Court further ruled that the absence of a DNA report does not necessitate acquittal where substantial corroboratory evidence exists, such as medical reports confirming human sperm and physical marks of violence. The Court noted that the victim's testimony remained unshaken during cross-examination and there was no evidence of animosity between the parties. Consequently, the conviction was maintained as the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Read full judgment →
• Yaseen vs The State2020 SCMR 1182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-12
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausefirearm recoveryFSL reportleave to appealcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the petitioner in case FIR No. 924 registered under sections 324, 353, 216, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 15 of the Arms Act. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail when apprehended at the spot with a firearm and supported by positive forensic reports. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner was apprehended at the spot, a pistol was recovered from his possession, the FSL report matching the weapon with empties recovered from the spot is positive, and the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when apprehended at the spot with a firearm and supported by a positive FSL report?
  • Does an offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure bar the grant of bail under the circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Wazir Khan and another vs Sherin Dad and others2020 SCMR 1264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-27
  criminal petitionmurderleave to appealacquittalreduction of sentenceimprisonment for liferevaluation of evidenceSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against concurrent findings and High Court judgments concerning convictions and sentences for murder and related offences. The core legal question revolves around whether the High Court's acquittal of the accused on certain murder counts and the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life were sustainable based on the evidence, and whether the petitioner's conviction for murder was liable to be set aside. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of guilt against the petitioner were well-founded, supported by prompt FIR naming, consistent ocular testimony of the injured complainant, and medical evidence, while the High Court's reasons for partial acquittal and sentence reduction due to suppression of the immediate cause and inability of witnesses to view part of the incident were valid and free from perversity. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's acquittal or sentence reduction unless a jurisdictional infirmity, illegality, or misreading of the record is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's judgment reducing a death sentence to imprisonment for life when valid reasons grounded in the record are provided?
  • Can delay in filing a criminal petition against a murder conviction be condoned in the interests of justice?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the courts below based on prompt FIR, injured witness testimony, and medical evidence warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Is a High Court's acquittal on certain murder counts sustainable when eyewitnesses were not in a position to see that part of the incident and a material witness was given up as won over?
  Read full judgment →
• Waris and another vs The State and others2020 SCMR 2044 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-23
  leave to appealcapital chargereappraisal of evidenceco-accused acquittalindependent corroborationcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a jail petition and criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal against concurrent findings of lower courts involving a murder conviction. The core legal question is whether the same set of judicial evidence, disbelieved by the courts below regarding acquitted co-accused, can be safely relied upon to sustain the capital conviction of the remaining petitioner without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised merit consideration and granted leave to appeal to reappraise the entire evidence on record for the safe administration of justice. The key principle laid down is that evidence disbelieved for co-accused requires careful scrutiny and independent corroboration before being used to sustain the conviction of another accused on a capital charge.

  Questions settled

  • Can the same set of evidence disbelieved regarding acquitted co-accused be relied upon to convict the remaining petitioner on a capital charge without independent corroboration?
  • Does a delay in the registration of the FIR warrant the grant of leave to appeal for reappraisal of evidence?
  • When is leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court for the reappraisal of evidence in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat, Islamabad, etc vs SNGPL, Lahore, etc2020 PLD Supreme Court 586, 2021 P SC 1185, 2020 SCP 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-11
  Wafaqi Mohtasiblocus standiquasi-judicial neutralityjurisdiction of OmbudsmanOGRAfrivolous litigationaggrieved person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat challenging a High Court order which held that disputes regarding gas detection bills and meter tampering fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) rather than the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat or the Ombudsman has the locus standi to maintain a petition against a judicial order interpreting the Ombudsman's statutory jurisdiction and powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat is not a legal entity with the power to sue, and that a neutral quasi-judicial forum like the Ombudsman cannot challenge an order interpreting its powers, as it is not an aggrieved person and must maintain its institutional neutrality. The Court established that a statutory adjudicatory body cannot defend its decisions before higher courts or challenge legislative curtailment of its powers, and directed an inquiry into the filing of the frivolous petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat possess the legal status or locus standi to file a petition before the Supreme Court?
  • Can the Wafaqi Mohtasib be considered an aggrieved person when a constitutional court interprets or determines the scope of its statutory powers?
  • Is a neutral quasi-judicial forum empowered to defend its decisions or challenge an order of a higher court touching upon its jurisdiction?
  • Does challenging the statutory powers of the Ombudsman amount to challenging the intent of the Parliament?
  Read full judgment →
• Umaid Ali vs The Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary2021 PLJ SC 113, 2020 P SC 1226, 2020 SCMR 1058, 2020 SCP 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-11
  local government electiondisqualification of candidatestatutory interpretationgovernment contractorreading inElection Commission of PakistanSindh Local Government Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the Election Commission of Pakistan's disqualification of the appellant from holding the office of Chairman of a Town Committee. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a government contractor, was disqualified under Section 36(1)(i) or Section 36(1)(j) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, given that Section 36(1)(i) specifically mentions contracts with a "council" and not the government. The Supreme Court held that Section 36(1)(i) only disqualifies those under contract with a local council, not government contractors. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that Section 36(1)(j) functions as a blanket provision incorporating all disqualifications from Article 63(1) of the Constitution, finding the clause vague and noting that the legislature had already selectively incorporated specific disqualifications. The Court established that judicial interpretation should not "read in" or "read down" provisions to cure ambiguity unless the legislative intent is manifest or literal construction causes absurdity. Consequently, the disqualification was set aside, and the Provincial Government was directed to amend the provision for clarity.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 36(1)(i) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 disqualify a person who is a government contractor from being a member of a local council?
  • Can a court use the doctrine of 'reading in' to interpret a vague statutory provision where the legislative intent is not clear?
  • Does Section 36(1)(j) of the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013 function as a blanket provision incorporating all disqualifications listed in Article 63(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through P.G. Sindh and others vs Ahmad Omer Shaikh and others2020 SCMR 2096, 2022 KLR Supreme Court Cases 425, 2022 PSC (Crl.) 874 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  criminal appealleave to appealre-appraisal of evidenceabductionterrorismcircumstantial evidenceconfessional statementmiscarriage of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal petitions filed by the State and the parents of the deceased, challenging a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder and terrorism charges in the Daniel Pearl kidnapping case, while maintaining a conviction for abduction. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of the circumstantial, forensic, and confessional evidence, and whether it was legally consistent to uphold a conviction for abduction while acquitting the accused of the associated murder and terrorism charges. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence, noting the potential for miscarriage of justice and the need to examine the consistency of the High Court's findings. The Court also ordered that the respondents remain in custody pending the final adjudication of the appeals. The judgment emphasizes the Court's duty to re-examine evidence when lower court findings appear self-destructive or fail to account for the totality of the prosecution's case, particularly regarding the nexus between abduction and terrorism.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a criminal appeal where the High Court's findings appear self-destructive?
  • Is a conviction for abduction sustainable when the accused has been acquitted of the associated murder and terrorism charges?
  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 provide a right of appeal to the parents of a deceased victim against an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Rawalpindi and others vs Syed Irshad Ali Abid2021 PLC (C.S.) 277, 2020 SCMR 2064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-29
  advance incrementsincentive schemeservice lawpromissory estoppelvested rightdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, and others appealed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal granting four advance increments to the respondent for obtaining an LL.B. degree in 2002 under a 1996 incentive scheme. The core legal question was whether an employee who acquired a higher qualification after the discontinuation of the incentive scheme was entitled to advance increments on the grounds of discrimination and promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court held that the incentive scheme had been validly discontinued by notification dated 13.9.2001, prior to the respondent acquiring his degree in 2002, meaning no vested right or promissory estoppel arose. The Court concluded that past cases relied upon by the Tribunal were distinguishable as they involved employees who acquired qualifications before the discontinuation or were decided ex parte without considering the withdrawal notification. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's judgment was set aside, establishing that advance increments cannot be claimed under a repealed incentive scheme when the qualification is obtained after its abolition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee acquires a vested right to advance increments under an incentive scheme that was discontinued prior to the acquisition of the higher qualification?
  • Can the principle of promissory estoppel be invoked when an incentive scheme is withdrawn before the claimant obtains the requisite qualification?
  • Does the granting of relief to other employees under distinguishable circumstances create a case of actionable discrimination?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Rto-II, Lahore vs MessrsPTCL 2021 CL.1, 2020 SCP 178, 2020 SCMR 1822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-20
  Sales Tax Actsub-delegationjurisdictionCommissioner Inland RevenueFederal Board of Revenueshow cause noticestatutory interpretationtax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner Inland Revenue and related tax authorities challenged a common judgment of the Lahore High Court that set aside show cause notices issued to respondent-taxpayers under section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The High Court had held that a notification issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) appointing Commissioners and delineating their jurisdiction amounted to a delegation of powers, and that a subsequent notification by the Commissioner authorizing subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue (OIRs) to exercise those powers constituted unlawful sub-delegation. The core legal question concerned whether the assignment of jurisdiction by the FBR and the subsequent distribution of territorial and personal limits by the Commissioner among subordinate OIRs constitutes impermissible sub-delegation of tax assessment and recovery powers. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, holding that the FBR does not delegate its own powers when assigning jurisdiction under section 30, since the powers of assessment and recovery are directly vested in OIRs by sections 11 and 31 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court established that the statutory scheme permits Commissioners to distribute functions and assign jurisdiction to subordinate officers under section 30(3), and the exercise of powers forms an integral part of the functions of an office.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the assignment of jurisdiction by the Federal Board of Revenue to Commissioners of Inland Revenue constitutes a delegation of powers that bars subsequent jurisdictional distribution to subordinate officers?
  • Can a Commissioner of Inland Revenue authorize subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue to exercise powers and perform functions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue possess the power of assessment and recovery of tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to enable it to delegate such powers?
  • Whether the exercise of powers forms an integral part of the functions of a statutory office under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore, etc vs M_s Hamza Nasir Wire, Lahore, etc2021 P T C L R 738, PTCL 2021 CL.1, 2020 PTD 1790, 2020 SCMR 1822, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-20
  Sales Tax Act 1990delegation of powerssub-delegationjurisdiction of tax officersshow cause noticestatutory interpretationtax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of show-cause notices issued by Officers of Inland Revenue (OIRs) under Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Taxpayers challenged these notices, arguing that the Commissioner Inland Revenue (CIR) had unlawfully sub-delegated powers to subordinate OIRs through a notification, following an earlier notification from the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) assigning jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the CIR could distribute jurisdictional and functional authority to subordinate OIRs or if such action constituted impermissible sub-delegation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that the FBR’s assignment of jurisdiction does not involve delegating its own powers, as the FBR is not an OIR and lacks assessment powers. Instead, the CIR exercises independent statutory authority under Section 30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, to organize subordinate officers. The Court established that the exercise of powers is an inherent part of the functions of an office, and the CIR’s distribution of jurisdictional limits is a valid administrative act, not unlawful sub-delegation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Board of Revenue delegate its own powers to Commissioners of Inland Revenue when assigning jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can a Commissioner of Inland Revenue delegate or assign jurisdictional limits to subordinate Officers of Inland Revenue under Section 30(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, a function that forms part of the powers of an Officer of Inland Revenue?
  • Does the principle of 'nemo dat quod non habet' apply to the delegation of functions by the Federal Board of Revenue to Commissioners of Inland Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue vs The Secretary Revenue Division and othersPTCL 2021 CL. 616, 2020 SCP 194, 2021 PCTLR 655, 2021 PSC 295, 2021 PTD 11, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-28
  tax exemptionfinal tax regimefranchisee commissionaffected areasadvance tax deductiontax refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning whether a taxpayer operating as a mobile phone franchisee in District Nowshera was entitled to a tax exemption under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the said Ordinance, which granted tax exemptions on profits and gains derived by taxpayers located in moderately affected areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and PATA. The core legal question was whether the respondent, whose commission income was subject to advance tax deduction treated as a final tax under section 233, could claim the exemption, and whether section 169 bar on refunds precluded relief. The Supreme Court held that the respondent fell squarely within the category of primary affectees intended to benefit from the exemption clause, as its business was located and operated within a moderately affected area. The Court ruled that the final tax regime provisions under section 169 did not negate the substantive tax exemption, and the return of incorrectly deducted tax merely restored the lawful position rather than constituting a barred refund. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a taxpayer whose business is located inside a moderately affected area is entitled to the tax exemption provided under clause (126F) of Part I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the application of the final tax regime under section 169 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 bar a qualifying taxpayer from claiming a substantive tax exemption?
  • Whether the return of tax incorrectly deducted as advance tax due to the failure of the Commissioner to issue an exemption certificate constitutes a barred refund under section 169(2)(e) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasneem Jalal vs Deputy Director ANF, etc2020 P SC (C rl.) 139, 2020 SCMR 454, 2020 SCP 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-15
  retrospective punishmentforfeiture of propertynarcotic substancesforeign convictionfundamental rightsconstitutional protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the application of the punishment of forfeiture of property under section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 to an offence committed prior to its introduction. The appellant's predecessor-in-interest was convicted by a United States court in September 1993 for drug offences committed in 1992. Subsequently, in 1995, the Federal Government sought forfeiture of his assets in Pakistan under section 37 of the newly promulgated Ordinance. The core legal question was whether section 37 could be applied retrospectively to a foreign conviction for an act predating the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the punishment of forfeiture could not be imposed retrospectively, as Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protects individuals against retrospective punishment or penalties greater than or different from those prescribed at the time the offence was committed. The Court ruled that section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 is not applicable to an offence committed before its promulgation, thus setting aside the forfeiture order and allowing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995 applies to an offence committed prior to its promulgation?
  • Does Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protect against the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture not in existence at the time an offence was committed?
  • Can a conviction by a foreign court be utilized to forfeit assets in Pakistan under laws enacted after the commission of the offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Tasar Mehmood and another vs The State and others2020 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-05
  Test identification paradeCriminal convictionRobberyHomicideWitness identificationForensic evidenceProof beyond doubtAdverse inferenceCompounding of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses petitions challenging convictions for robbery and homicide, where the petitioners were identified by an injured witness in a test identification parade. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of convictions based on a solitary witness, alleged flaws in the test identification parade, and the impact of a missing witness. The Supreme Court declined leave, upholding the convictions. The Court held that a test identification parade is not an immutable ritual and its fairness depends on the exigencies of each case, conducted in a non-collusive manner. It emphasized that dogmatic standards with empirical exactitude cannot be applied to identification, and prosecution is not required to provide hyper-technical details. The Court found the identification by witnesses, coupled with forensic evidence and the subsequent compounding of murder by one petitioner, constituted proof beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of one witness was deemed not to raise an adverse inference when other witnesses were available.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the identification by a solitary witness in a test identification parade?
  • Do alleged flaws in a test identification parade, such as lack of detailed description of features or roles, automatically render it inconsequential?
  • What is the purpose and scope of Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 regarding the establishment of identity?
  • Does the absence of one witness from the witness box necessarily cast an adverse inference against the prosecution case?
  • What standards apply to the conduct of a test identification parade under Police Rules, 1934 and High Court Rules and Orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saeed vs The State2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 81, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 19, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 27, · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  white-collar crimecorruptiondisproportionate assetsbenamidarsentence reductionconcurrent findingsplea-bargain
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, a former public servant, for corruption and corrupt practices. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the charges of amassing assets disproportionate to known income through 'benamidar' transactions, and whether the sentence imposed was excessive given the petitioner's age and health. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt were well-founded, noting that the defense failed to rebut evidence during cross-examination and that the petitioner had a history of similar conduct. While the Court affirmed the conviction, confiscation of assets, and fine, it exercised judicial discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment from seven years to five years, citing the petitioner's advanced age and poor health. The judgment reinforces the principle that while white-collar crimes demand strict accountability due to their detrimental societal impact, courts may exercise leniency in sentencing based on humanitarian grounds such as age and physical condition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to cross-examine a witness on specific evidence constitute an admission of that evidence?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence for corruption based on the advanced age and poor health of the convict?
  • Are concurrent findings of guilt by lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal error?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Zeb and others vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-25
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycommunity of intentionsudden incidentvehicular assaultmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioners in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the co-accused ran over the deceased with a vehicle due to a dispute over a car sale, while the petitioner, Shair Zaib, was sitting in the passenger seat. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's presence in the passenger seat during a sudden, unconventional vehicular assault established a community of intention sufficient to deny bail. The Supreme Court held that the suddenness of the incident and the unconventional method used by the co-accused placed the petitioner's culpability and shared intention within the remit of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner, while dismissing the petition as not pressed regarding the co-accused driver.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere presence of an accused in the passenger seat of a vehicle used by a co-accused to run over a victim constitutes a community of intention sufficient to deny bail?
  • Does an unconventional and sudden mode of assault by a co-accused bring the case of a passenger within the scope of further inquiry for the purpose of granting bail?
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• Syed Muddasar Shah Termizi vs Peshawar High Court, Peshawar thr.2020 SCP 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawsenioritycontractual appointmentdeeming provisionpensionary benefitsjudicial servicestatutory interpretationregularization
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns judicial officers who were initially appointed on contract and subsequently regularized following competitive examinations. The appellants sought seniority from the date of their initial contractual appointment, relying on the deeming provisions introduced in Section 19 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, via the 2005 and 2013 amendments. The core legal question was whether the statutory fiction created by these amendments, which regularized contract service for pensionary purposes, also entitled the appellants to seniority from the date of their initial contract. The Supreme Court held that the deeming provision is strictly limited to the calculation of pension and gratuity benefits and cannot be extended to determine seniority. The Court affirmed that seniority is governed by separate provisions and commences only upon regular appointment. The key principle laid down is that a deeming provision in a statute must be construed strictly within the framework of the specific section it is attached to and cannot be extended to other collateral purposes, such as seniority, unless the legislature explicitly provides otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deeming provision in a statute regarding pension benefits automatically confer seniority rights from the date of initial contractual appointment?
  • Can a statutory fiction created for a specific purpose be extended to other collateral matters within the same statute?
  • Does seniority for civil servants commence from the date of initial contract appointment or from the date of regular appointment?
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• Syed Hamid Mir and Muhammad Jamil vs Board of Revenue Sindh &2020 SHC 1162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interlocutory injunctionmandatory injunctionappellate discretionland disputecommissioner's reportstatus quopossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of a learned Single Judge dismissing two miscellaneous applications for interim relief in a suit concerning a land dispute. The appellants sought a mandatory injunction for the restoration of possession of 16 acres of land and a prohibitory injunction against dispossession. The core legal question was whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing these interlocutory reliefs given the uncertainty regarding the land's exact location and the contradictory nature of the prayers. The High Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was reasonable and based on the material available. The Court affirmed that appellate interference with discretionary interlocutory orders is limited to cases of arbitrary, capricious, or perverse reasoning. Furthermore, it reiterated that mandatory injunctions at the interlocutory stage are rare, equitable remedies intended to preserve the status quo, not to create new situations, and that a court-appointed commissioner’s report is merely persuasive, not binding, and cannot substitute for evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial court in granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction?
  • Is a report submitted by a court-appointed commissioner binding upon the court in a civil suit?
  • Can a mandatory injunction be granted at the interlocutory stage to create a new situation rather than preserve the status quo?
  • Does the filing of contradictory prayers in miscellaneous applications for interim relief affect the court's ability to grant such relief?
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• Suo Motu Action Regarding Combating the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Covid-19): In the matter of vs N/A2020 SCMR 1006 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-19
  suo motuCOVID-19executive authorityfundamental rightsright to lifefederalismsanitary workers
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu matter concerns the Government of Pakistan's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the locust infestation. The core legal question addressed is the extent of the Federal Government's executive authority over the Provinces during a national crisis, particularly regarding the prevention of grave menaces to the economic life and tranquility of the country. The Court held that under Article 149 of the Constitution, the Federal Government possesses the authority to issue binding directions to Provinces to mitigate such threats. The Court emphasized the fundamental right to life, which obligates the State to provide safe and healthy living conditions. Furthermore, the Court addressed the plight of sanitary workers, mandating that all relevant governments ensure the provision of protective gear and the immediate payment of outstanding salaries and pensions. The key principle laid down is that the Federal executive authority extends to directing Provinces to prevent grave menaces to the peace, tranquility, or economic life of Pakistan, thereby ensuring a unified national response to existential crises.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to issue directions to Provinces to prevent grave menaces to the economic life or tranquility of Pakistan?
  • Does the right to life under the Constitution of Pakistan impose an obligation on the Government to provide safe and healthy living conditions during a pandemic?
  • Can the Federal Government exercise executive authority over Provinces to manage national crises like the COVID-19 pandemic?
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• Suo Motu Action Regarding Combating the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Covid - 19): In the matter of vs N/A2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-13
  suo motuCOVID-19fundamental rightsfreedom of movementexecutive authoritypublic health emergencystate accountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu action concerns the state's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically addressing the adequacy of government measures, the protection of fundamental rights, and the legality of executive restrictions on movement. The core legal question was whether the executive branch possesses the authority to restrict inter-provincial movement and seal localities without legislative backing. The Court held that executive orders restricting the fundamental right to movement are unconstitutional when issued without legislative authority, consequently striking down the Punjab government's executive order prohibiting inter-provincial travel. Furthermore, the Court expressed concern over the lack of documentation and planning regarding the sealing of Union Councils in Sindh and the provision of basic necessities to affected residents. The Court emphasized the state's obligation to safeguard fundamental rights, ensure the welfare of frontline healthcare workers and sanitary staff, and maintain a uniform policy across all territories. The judgment establishes that executive actions curtailing fundamental rights must be grounded in law enacted by the legislature, rather than mere executive fiat, and mandates comprehensive reporting by provincial governments to ensure state accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Can the executive branch restrict inter-provincial movement without legislative authority?
  • Is an executive order restricting fundamental rights valid if it lacks a supporting legislative enactment?
  • Does the state have a constitutional obligation to ensure the protection and welfare of frontline healthcare and sanitary workers during a public health emergency?
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• Suo Moto Action Regarding Combating the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Covid-19) vs N/A2020 SCMR 987, 2020 SCP 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-18
  COVID-19fundamental rightsfreedom of tradesuo motolockdownreasonable classificationconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo moto action was initiated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to address the restrictive measures imposed by the government during the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically regarding the closure of shopping malls and the weekend lockdown of businesses. The core legal question was whether the selective closure of shopping malls in Sindh and the mandated weekend shutdown of businesses across the country constituted a reasonable classification or violated fundamental rights. The Court held that the restriction on operating businesses on Saturdays and Sundays lacked a rational basis and violated the constitutional rights of citizens to conduct business. Consequently, the Court declared the weekend lockdown illegal and set it aside. Furthermore, the Court directed the Sindh government to seek approval from the National Health Services and Research Centre for opening shopping malls, emphasizing that businesses should be allowed to operate on all days subject to the enforcement of standard operating procedures (SOPs). The Court cautioned against prioritizing one disease over other prevalent health crises, warning of the detrimental economic consequences of prolonged business closures.

  Questions settled

  • Does the closure of businesses on specific days of the week, such as Saturday and Sunday, constitute a reasonable classification under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can the government restrict the fundamental right to conduct business without a rational basis?
  • Is the selective closure of shopping malls in one province while allowing them in others legally justifiable?
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• Suo Moto Action Regarding Combating the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Covid -19) vs N/A2020 SCMR 930, 2020 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-20
  COVID-19suo motufundamental rightsZakat fundBait-ul-Mallabour lawspublic health
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo motu action concerns the state's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the protection of citizens' lives and the adequacy of medical infrastructure. The Supreme Court reviewed reports from federal and provincial governments regarding the provision of personal protective equipment and medical facilities for healthcare workers. The Court emphasized the state's constitutional obligation to secure the lives of citizens under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Regarding the distribution of Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal funds, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency and required detailed reports on distribution criteria and administrative expenses, while seeking expert religious opinions on the permissible utilization of these funds for administrative costs. Furthermore, the Court addressed the operation of industrial units, directing strict compliance with the Factories Act, 1934, to ensure worker safety, sanitation, and medical facilities. The Court mandated that all governments cooperate to provide a consolidated response to the pandemic, ensuring that medical facilities, including those for legal professionals, are adequately provided across the country.

  Questions settled

  • Does the state have a constitutional obligation to secure the lives of citizens during a pandemic under Article 9 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are provincial governments required to provide transparent reporting on the distribution criteria and administrative expenses of Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal funds?
  • Must industrial units ensure strict compliance with the Factories Act, 1934, regarding worker safety and facilities during the pandemic?
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• Suo Moto Action Regarding Combating the Pandemic of Corona Virus (Covid -19 vs Mr. Khalid Javed Khan, Attorney General for PakistanPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 4, 2020 SCMR 1189, 2020 SCP 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-25
  suo motopublic procurementfiscal responsibilitypilot licensingCOVID-19fundamental rightsright to life
  Summary & questions settled

  This suo moto action concerns the state's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on transparency in procurement by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the regulation of pilot licensing, and the fiscal priorities of the Sindh Government. The Court examined NDMA's procurement of machinery for N-95 masks and the importation of unregistered drugs, noting a lack of transparency and compliance with regulatory conditions. Regarding aviation, the Court addressed concerns over fake pilot licenses, ordering the Civil Aviation Authority and airline CEOs to verify credentials and report on safety measures. Furthermore, the Court scrutinized the Sindh Government's 2020-2021 budget, specifically criticizing the allocation of funds for luxury vehicles while essential services like sanitation and infrastructure remained underfunded. The Court held that public funds must prioritize essential public welfare over non-essential expenditures, restraining the Sindh Government from procuring vehicles until further notice. The judgment reinforces the principle that fundamental rights, including the right to life, mandate that state resources be directed toward health, infrastructure, and public safety rather than luxury, and that regulatory bodies must strictly enforce safety and transparency standards.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court restrain a provincial government from incurring expenditures on luxury vehicles when essential public services are underfunded?
  • Does the failure of a regulatory authority to verify pilot licenses and degrees constitute a violation of the fundamental right to life?
  • Is the National Disaster Management Authority required to demonstrate transparency and compliance with regulatory conditions when importing unregistered drugs and machinery?
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• Sultan vs Noor Asghar2020 PLJ SC 387, 2020 SCMR 682, 2020 SCP 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-28
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadright of shufaregistered acknowledgement duesuit sui generisperformance of talbscivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals were filed under Article 185(2) of the Constitution challenging a High Court judgment that dismissed the appellant's pre-emption suit. The primary legal issue was whether the appellant/pre-emptor successfully proved the performance of Talb-i-Ishhad as required by law. The appellant failed to produce the postman to prove service or refusal of the notice and did not exhibit the original notice in evidence. The Supreme Court held that in pre-emption suits, which are sui generis, the plaintiff must stand on their own legs and strictly prove each Talb. The Court clarified that a defendant's admission of receiving a notice is insufficient to prove Talb-i-Ishhad unless it is established that the notice was issued within two weeks of knowledge, attested by two truthful witnesses, and sent via registered post acknowledgement due. Since the appellant failed to meet these mandatory evidentiary requirements, the appeals were dismissed, affirming that the performance of Talbs is a sine qua non for a successful pre-emption claim.

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• Sui Southern Gas Company Limited, Karachi vs Imdad Ali Pathan and others2020 PLJ SC 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-02
  master and servantcivil serviceresignationpensionary benefitsconcurrent findingsremandSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil dispute where the respondent, a former Chief Engineer of the appellant-company, resigned from service, subsequently sought rejoining, and after his resignation was accepted, filed a civil suit seeking a declaratory decree. The trial court and the appellate court dismissed the suit as non-maintainable under the master and servant principle. However, the High Court, through a constitutional petition converted into a revision application, allowed the claim and directed the calculation of pensionary benefits. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in interfering with concurrent findings of the lower courts and improperly applying civil service rules to an employee governed by master and servant principles. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to properly consider the applicable service rules, erroneously relied on the ESTA Code which applies to civil servants, and failed to justify interference with concurrent findings. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the matter remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts without addressing the legal maintainability of a suit?
  • Do principles of the ESTA Code apply to employees of the Sui Southern Gas Company Limited?
  • Whether a declaratory suit is maintainable by an employee governed by the master and servant principle?
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• Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited vs President of Pakistan, President2020 P SC 954, 2020 SCMR 242, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  Wafaqi Mohtasib jurisdictionpublic sector recruitmentexecutive functionBlood Relations Quotamaladministrationjudicial reviewOmbudsman
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the Wafaqi Mohtasib’s order directing the appointment of a candidate under the "Blood Relations Quota" (BRQ) in the Petitioner Company. The core legal question was whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib possesses the jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding recruitment and appointment processes in a public sector company, or if such matters constitute an executive function outside the Ombudsman's purview. The Supreme Court held that recruitment and appointment in a public sector company are executive functions, and the Wafaqi Mohtasib lacks the jurisdiction under the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983, to interfere in such matters or order appointments. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders. However, exercising powers under Article 187 of the Constitution, the Court directed the Petitioner Company to formulate a clear, transparent policy for BRQ appointments, noting the absence of standardized criteria, and to reconsider the respondent's case under the newly established policy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Wafaqi Mohtasib have the jurisdiction to order appointments or recruitment in a public sector company?
  • Is the recruitment process in a public sector company considered an executive function?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct a public sector company to formulate a transparent policy for employee quotas under Article 187 of the Constitution?
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• Sufyan Nawaz and another vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 192, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 444, 2020 SCMR 192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-21
  MurderAcquittalAppealJail PetitionReasonable DoubtEye-witness TestimonyMaterial ImprovementChance WitnessAutopsy DelayBenefit of Doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a jail petition for leave to appeal, converted into an appeal, challenging the conviction and life imprisonment of Sufyan Nawaz for murder under Section 302(b)/34 PPC, and a connected petition seeking enhancement of his sentence. The central legal question concerned the sufficiency of evidence to establish the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence, and ordered his acquittal. The Court identified several factors creating reasonable doubt: an unexplained ten-hour delay in the autopsy, material improvements in the eye-witness's testimony regarding the injury location, the doubtful presence of a "chance witness" at the scene, the disbelieved motive, and the discarding of pistol recovery evidence due to lack of corroboration. These deficiencies led the Court to conclude that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The connected petition for sentence enhancement was dismissed as having lost relevance.

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• Sufyan Nawaz and another vs State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-21
  murder convictionreasonable doubtchance witnessautopsy delaycriminal appealacquittalmaterial improvement
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal jail petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the conviction and sentence of the petitioner for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering significant discrepancies in the evidence. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the petitioner. The Court held that a ten-hour unexplained delay in conducting an autopsy creates a substantial dent in the prosecution's case regarding the presence of eye-witnesses. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that material improvements in testimony, the status of a witness as a 'chance witness' without justification for their presence, and the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive or recovery of the weapon, collectively render the prosecution's case doubtful. When the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt due to these evidentiary gaps, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, necessitating acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in conducting an autopsy create a doubt regarding the presence of eye-witnesses at the place of occurrence?
  • Can a witness who fails to provide a plausible reason for their presence at the crime scene be classified as a chance witness?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive and recovery of the weapon entitle the accused to an acquittal?
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• State Life Insurance Corporation Of Pakistan and another vs Muzafar Ali2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 379, 2020 P C T L R 1168, 2020 P SC 1052, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-20
  insurance claimpermanent disabilityliquidated damagesun-cross-examined testimonyannuitylate settlement of claimsevidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State Life Insurance Corporation against concurrent judgments of lower courts, which upheld a claim by the respondent for benefits under an Accidental Death and Indemnity Benefit Policy. The respondent, having suffered a road accident leading to permanent disability, sought annuity payments under the policy. The petitioner challenged the claim on grounds of late filing, lack of evidence regarding permanent disability, and the imposition of liquidated damages. The Supreme Court declined to entertain the late filing argument as it was not framed as an issue before the Tribunal. Regarding the disability, the Court held that the respondent's un-cross-examined testimony, combined with the petitioner's own internal medical assessment and the petitioner's prior reliance on the same evidence to grant sickness benefits, sufficiently established the permanent disability. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the imposition of liquidated damages, ruling that Section 118 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 mandates such payments for late settlement of claims. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the concurrent findings were maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to cross-examine a witness on a material fact in examination-in-chief constitute an admission of that fact?
  • Is an insurer entitled to reject evidence for the purpose of an annuity claim while simultaneously relying on the same evidence to grant sickness benefits?
  • Are liquidated damages mandatory under the Insurance Ordinance 2000 in cases of late settlement of insurance claims?
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• Sohail Akhtar and another vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2020 P SC 1985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-10
  civil reviewadmissibility of evidencevideo evidenceappellate jurisdictionjudicial discretionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil review petitions filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had disposed of constitutional petitions regarding the admissibility and impact of a video recording relevant to a pending criminal appeal before the Islamabad High Court. The petitioner contended that the initial order was passed without notice and allegedly restricted the High Court's discretion in deciding the pending criminal appeal. The Supreme Court held that the initial order was passed in proceedings that had not been admitted to regular hearing, thus negating the necessity of notice, and that the order did not preclude the High Court from exercising its independent jurisdiction. The Court clarified that its previous observations regarding the admissibility of video evidence were merely a summary of existing legal opinions and not exhaustive, nor were they intended to bind the High Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the review petitions while granting the requested clarification that the petitioner remains free to agitate all relevant legal questions before the appellate court without being influenced by the Supreme Court's prior observations.

  Questions settled

  • Is a notice required to be issued to a party when a constitutional petition is disposed of without being admitted to regular hearing?
  • Does a Supreme Court order summarizing existing case law on evidentiary admissibility preclude a High Court from exercising its own discretion in a pending criminal appeal?
  • Can a party seek clarification in a review petition to ensure that prior observations of the Supreme Court do not influence the lower appellate court's decision-making process?
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• Sohail Ahmad vs The State, etc2020 P SC (Crl.) 920 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-05
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustprohibitory clausestatutory delaycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, challenges the order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which had refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in case FIR No. 168 dated 15.03.2015 registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Muzaffarabad, District Multan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail considering the period of incarceration already undergone and the fact that the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant, holding that since the accused had been in custody since 2015 without the conclusion of the trial and the offense did not fall within the prohibitory clause, the case warranted the grant of bail as a rule, given that refusal in such circumstances is an exception.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when an offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does prolonged incarceration without conclusion of trial entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Is grant of bail the general rule in cases falling outside the prohibitory clause?
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• Sikandar Hayat and another vs Sughran Bibi and 6 others2020 P SC 922, 2020 SCMR 214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-08
  Civil AppealMutation of HibaDeclaration of TitleNecessary PartyMinor DoneePresumption of RegularityQanun-e-Shahadat OrderInheritanceFraudulent AttestationLimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Appeal, filed under Article 185(2) of the Constitution, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that restored a Trial Court's decree for declaration of title. The original suit contested a mutation of Hiba (gift) attested by a father in favor of his minor son, alleging fraud and connivance of revenue officials. The core legal questions involved the necessity of joining revenue officials and the Province as parties when their connivance is alleged, the burden of proof for a minor donee in a Hiba, and the rebuttal of the presumption of regularity attached to official acts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the Appellate Court's decision. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove any defect in the mutation's attestation or the alleged fraud. Key principles laid down include that revenue officials and the Province are necessary parties when their connivance is alleged in a mutation challenge, a minor donee is not required to independently prove offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, and the presumption of regularity under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, must be rebutted by the challenging party.

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• Sidra Abbas vs The State and another2021 P S c (Crl.) 147, 2020 SCMR 2089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-10
  cancellation of bailperverse orderpost-arrest bailcommon intentionfurther inquiryappellate review of bailcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the High Court's order granting post-arrest bail to an accused charged with murder under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court's order was perverse for ignoring material evidence of the accused's active involvement and relying on a misinterpretation of the record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was indeed perverse because it disregarded incriminating material—specifically, witness statements alleging the accused facilitated the principal offender and the fact that the crime weapon was the accused's licensed pistol—while incorrectly characterizing the case as one of mere presence. The Court reaffirmed the principle that while bail should not be cancelled lightly, an appellate court must not ignore the reasoning of the trial court or relevant material on record when reversing a bail-refusal order. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and cancelled the bail, distinguishing between the cancellation of bail due to misuse of concession and the setting aside of a perverse bail-granting order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bail-granting order be cancelled if it is found to be perverse?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to set aside a bail order that ignores material evidence on record?
  • Is the presence of an accused at two consecutive crime scenes with the principal offender sufficient to establish a prima facie case for common intention?
  • Must an appellate court consider the reasoning of the trial court when reversing an order that refused bail?
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• Sheqab Muhammad vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-07
  post-arrest bailmurderous assaultfirearm injurystatutory prohibitionfurther probevital and non-vital partscriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court declining post-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was accused of a murderous assault involving firearm injuries during a dispute over immovable property. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, given the arguments regarding contradictions between ocular and medical accounts, the absence of independent public witnesses, and the injury being on a non-vital part of the body. The Supreme Court held that in a daylight incident supported by injured witnesses and timely medical examinations, a prima facie case under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, was established, attracting the statutory prohibition against bail. The Court laid down the principle that a murderous assault draws no anatomical distinction between vital and non-vital parts of the body once the trigger is pressed, and an assailant cannot claim a concession or premium for poor marksmanship. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when charged with a murderous assault supported by injured eyewitnesses and medical evidence?
  • Does a murderous assault under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, draw any anatomical distinction between vital and non-vital parts of the human body?
  • Can an assailant claim the benefit of bail on the ground of poor marksmanship when a firearm is discharged at a victim?
  • At what stage is an in-depth analysis of the prosecution case forbidden by law in bail matters?
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• Sheikh Iqbal Azam Farooqui through Legal Heirs vs The State through Chairman NABPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 203, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 482, 2020 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-02
  abatement of appealdeath of convictfinancial liabilityfinelegal heirsaccountabilitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed by the legal heirs of the deceased convict, Sheikh Iqbal Azam Farooqui, challenging the order of the High Court of Sindh which disposed of his pending criminal appeal as abated upon his death while keeping the sentence of fine intact to be realized from his estate. The core legal question concerns whether a criminal appeal against conviction abates entirely upon the death of the appellant notwithstanding the persistence of financial liabilities such as fines affecting his estate. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while corporal consequences of a conviction wither away with the death of the convict, financial liability shifted upon the estate requires the appellate court to decide the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and directed that the appeal, sustained by the legal heirs, shall be deemed pending for adjudication on merits. The key principle laid down is that Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 does not warrant the abatement of an appeal regarding financial liabilities impinging upon the estate of a deceased convict without a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal appeal abate entirely upon the death of the convict when a sentence of fine remains attached to his estate?
  • Whether an appellate court is required to decide an appeal on its merits when financial consequences of a conviction continue to impinge upon the estate of a deceased appellant?
  • How does the death of a convict affect the corporal versus financial consequences of a conviction under Section 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Shehryar Khan vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-03
  post-arrest bailcross versionabscondenceself-defensemurderfurther probe
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the petitioner's request for post-arrest bail in a murder case. The petitioner was charged with firing a fatal shot at the deceased during a dispute over immovable property. The core legal question was whether the existence of a 'cross version' of the incident, based on an injury sustained by a co-accused (the petitioner's brother), entitled the petitioner to bail, particularly when the petitioner had absconded following the incident and was only apprehended months later. The Supreme Court held that the merits of the cross-version and the claim of self-defense were matters to be determined by the trial court, not at the bail stage. Furthermore, the Court observed that the suppression of injuries in both versions did not elevate the petitioner's case for bail. Crucially, the Court ruled that the specific role attributed to the petitioner, combined with his post-incident abscondence, precluded his release on bail. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that a cross-version does not automatically necessitate further probe or bail when the accused is charged with a fatal act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a cross-version in a murder case automatically entitle an accused to bail?
  • Can an accused's abscondence after the commission of an offense act as an impediment to the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is the veracity of a cross-version regarding self-defense a matter to be decided at the bail stage or by the trial court?
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• Shazia Bibi vs The State2020 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-08
  narcoticscannabisconvictionappealforensic reportfalse implicationjudicial custodyleave to appealControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a petition for leave to appeal filed by Shazia Bibi against her conviction under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possessing 4 kilograms of cannabis. She was sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine, a judgment upheld in appeal. The petitioner argued she was falsely implicated as a scapegoat due to police animosity towards her husband and that the prosecution failed to provide complete details/protocol of forensic tests. The Supreme Court declined leave to appeal, finding that the substantial quantity of contraband made the scapegoat defense incredible, especially given her silence when produced before a Magistrate. The Court also held that the forensic report, which explicitly detailed the tests performed (weighing, chemical spot tests, Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry), sufficiently met statutory requirements, rendering the argument about missing protocol beside the mark. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a substantial quantity of recovered contraband negate a defense of false implication?
  • Does a failure to protest false implication before a Magistrate weaken a later defense?
  • Is a forensic report detailing specific tests performed (weighing, chemical spot tests, Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry) sufficient to meet statutory requirements without a full 'protocol'?
  • Can a conviction based on concurrent findings of lower courts be interfered with without strong grounds?
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• Sharif Khan vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 155, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 18, 2021 SCMR 87, 2020 SCP 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-11-26
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationfurther inquirycriminal procedurepolice investigationcolumn no. 2liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's order cancelling the petitioner's post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in cancelling the bail previously granted by the trial court, given that the police investigation had placed the petitioner in column No. 02 of the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, declaring him innocent. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to apply the established principles governing bail cancellation, which require strong and exceptional grounds to deprive an accused of liberty once granted. The Court emphasized that the considerations for granting bail and cancelling it are distinct. Finding that the case against the petitioner was one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the bail, reaffirming that liberty should not be curtailed without compelling reasons.

  Questions settled

  • What are the distinct legal considerations for granting bail versus cancelling bail?
  • Does the inclusion of an accused's name in column No. 02 of a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle them to bail?
  • What are the exceptional grounds required for the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Is a case considered one of 'further inquiry' when the investigating officer declares the accused innocent despite their nomination in the crime report?
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• Shakeel Abbas vs The State2020 SCMR 479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  qatl-shibh-i-amddiyatindefinite detentioncriminal liabilityindigent convictsstatutory interpretationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a convict against his conviction under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the High Court's modification of his initial conviction for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, convicted for the death of his two minor children, challenges the sustainability of his conviction for qatl-shibh-i-amd and the imposition of diyat. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine critical legal questions, specifically whether a conviction under Section 316 is sustainable absent the requisite intent, and whether alternative convictions under Section 319 (qatl-i-khata) or Section 321 (qatl-bis-sabab) are applicable. Furthermore, the Court identified significant constitutional and human rights concerns regarding the indefinite detention of indigent convicts unable to pay diyat, the failure of the Federal Government to consider the financial position of convicts when fixing diyat amounts as required by Section 323, and the interpretation of Rule 11 of the Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007. The Court ordered notices to be issued to various legal and religious authorities to assist in interpreting these provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is a conviction under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable if the intent to cause harm to the body is absent?
  • Can a convict be detained indefinitely for failure to pay diyat due to poverty?
  • Does the fixation of diyat without considering the financial position of the convict violate the requirements of Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What constitutes part payment and valid terms for release under Rule 11 of the Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007?
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• Shabran Khan vs The State and another2020 SCMR 974 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-06
  post-arrest bailcriminal conspiracysubstitution of accusedfurther inquirymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail filed by Shabran Khan, who has been in custody since 30 December 2019 and is accused of conspiring in the murder of Muhammad Iqbal. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's alleged role as a conspirator warrants further inquiry under criminal procedure, given subsequent restructuring of the prosecution case and substitution of suspects. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the petitioner's culpability as the mastermind behind the crime requires further probe. The Court laid down the principle that where the prosecution case undergoes significant restructuring and substitution of accused persons, the case of an accused implicated as a conspirator may fall within the purview of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, entitling him to post-arrest bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a case where initial suspects are replaced and the prosecution restructures its version warrant further probe for the purpose of bail?
  • Does an accused implicated as a conspirator fall within the remit of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 under circumstances of delayed restructuring?
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• Sh. Abdul Waheed vs Custodian Evacuee Property, Lahore, etc2020 P SC 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  evacuee propertyrestoration of propertycustodian of evacuee propertypermanent residencepartition of British Indiarehabilitation authorityallotment of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns the status of properties declared as evacuee following the 1947 partition of British India. The core legal question is whether property, once restored to its original owners by the Custodian of Evacuee Property on specific conditions, can re-acquire evacuee status due to the owners' subsequent movements and failure to maintain permanent residence in Pakistan. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the property re-acquired its evacuee status. The Court reasoned that the heirs of the original owner failed to establish permanent residence in Pakistan, thereby violating the conditions imposed during the 1948 restoration. The principle laid down is that the status of restored evacuee property can revert to evacuee status if the owners' return to Pakistan is found to be temporary or intended to evade evacuee laws, and if they fail to satisfy the residency conditions stipulated at the time of restoration. Evidence of shifting stands regarding residency and failure to prove permanent settlement justifies the Custodian's determination that the property remains evacuee.

  Questions settled

  • Can property restored to its original owners after being declared evacuee re-acquire evacuee status?
  • Does a failure to maintain permanent residence in Pakistan by heirs of an original owner justify the revocation of a restoration order for evacuee property?
  • Is the determination of evacuee status by the Custodian based on the residency of the owners subject to judicial review when evidence shows shifting stands regarding permanent settlement?
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• Senior General Manager/Ceo, Pakistan Railways Headquarters, Lahore and2021 PLC (C.S.) 207, 2020 SCMR 2171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  annual incrementsrailways employeestraining periodservice tribunalapprenticesmisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding whether railway employees are entitled to annual increments for the period of two years training undergone as Apprentice Loco Cleaners at the Walton Training Academy. The core legal question is whether the Federal Service Tribunal correctly interpreted departmental letters and rules to grant annual increments for the training period. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal misread the departmental letter dated 20.04.1987, which merely regularized the intervening period between completion of training and assumption of duty for probationary sub-engineers rather than granting increments for the training period itself. Furthermore, under Clause 214 of the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual, apprentices and stipendiary students are not regular employees during training and their training period does not count for increments. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal and allowed the appeals, establishing that apprentices undergoing training are not entitled to annual increments for their training period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether railway employees are entitled to the grant of annual increments for the period of training undergone at the training academy?
  • Does a departmental letter regularizing the period between completion of training and assumption of duty entitle employees to increments during the training period itself?
  • Are apprentices and stipendiary students considered regular employees of Pakistan Railways entitled to service benefits such as annual increments during their training?
  • What is the effect of Clause 214 of the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual regarding the counting of the apprenticeship period for increments?
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• Secretary Revenue Division/Chairman FBR and another vs Muhammad2020 SCMR 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-17
  extraordinary leaveannual incrementsFundamental Rule 26willful absenceservice lawFederal Services Tribunalreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Federal Services Tribunal (FST) granting three annual increments for the period 1987 to 1989 to a retired civil servant. The respondent had been absent from duty for 2,557 days between 1983 and 1990, resulting in his removal from service, though he was subsequently reinstated without back benefits and later granted regularizations, back benefits, and seniority. His period of absence was regularized into various forms of leave, including extraordinary leave (EOL). Post-retirement, the respondent sought annual increments for the period falling under EOL. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether extraordinary leave granted for absence attributable to the civil servant's own conduct can be counted towards annual increments under Fundamental Rule 26. The Supreme Court held that under Fundamental Rule 26(a), periods of extraordinary leave can only count towards increments if approved by the competent authority on grounds that the leave was taken due to illness or reasons beyond the employee's control. Reversing the FST's judgment, the Court allowed the appeal and held that the respondent was not entitled to increments for the EOL period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether extraordinary leave granted due to a civil servant's own absence can be counted towards annual increments under Fundamental Rule 26?
  • Under what conditions does extraordinary leave count for annual increments under Fundamental Rule 26?
  • Can a civil servant claim annual increments for an extraordinary leave period without proving that the absence was beyond their control?
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• Secretary Revenue Division / Chairman FBR and another vs Muhammad2020 PLC (C.S.) 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-17
  civil serviceextraordinary leaveannual incrementsFundamental Rulesservice benefitswillful absencereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil service matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement of a retired government servant to annual increments for a period during which he was on extraordinary leave (EOL). The respondent, having been removed from service for willful absence and subsequently reinstated, sought increments for the years 1987-1989, which the Federal Service Tribunal (FST) granted. The core legal question was whether the respondent could claim increments for a period classified as extraordinary leave, given that such leave generally does not count toward increments under Fundamental Rule 26 unless the absence was beyond the government servant's control. The Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to demonstrate that his absence was due to causes beyond his control. The Court emphasized that while the department had previously regularized his absence as EOL, this did not automatically entitle him to increments. Consequently, the Court set aside the FST's judgment, ruling that EOL periods attributable to the employee's own actions cannot be counted toward increments, thereby upholding the strict application of service rules regarding leave and pay progression.

  Questions settled

  • Does a period of extraordinary leave automatically count towards annual increments for a government servant?
  • Under what conditions can extraordinary leave be counted for increments under F.R.-26?
  • Is a government servant entitled to annual increments for a period of absence that was not beyond their control?
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• Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad vs Tahawwar Ahmad2021 PLC (C.S.) 319, 2021 P SC 509, 2021 SCMR 46, 2020 SCP 216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-16
  proforma promotionservice tribunalmiscellaneous petitionfundamental rulescivil servicejurisdictionallotment of plotimplementation of judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal directing the allotment of an additional residential plot to a retired civil servant. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal, while exercising implementation jurisdiction via a miscellaneous petition, could expand the scope of its original judgment to grant benefits not originally awarded, and whether proforma promotion under Fundamental Rule 17 entitles a civil servant to such additional benefits. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal acted illegally and without jurisdiction by modifying its original judgment, which was strictly limited to the grant of ante-dated promotion. The Court clarified that proforma promotion granted under Fundamental Rule 17 is restricted solely to the payment of arrears of pay and allowances. It does not encompass other privileges or benefits, such as the allotment of residential plots, which are governed by distinct government policies and eligibility criteria. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order, ruling that the Tribunal lacked the authority to expand the scope of its final judgment through subsequent miscellaneous proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal modify its original judgment while exercising jurisdiction to implement that judgment through a miscellaneous petition?
  • Does the grant of proforma promotion under Fundamental Rule 17 entitle a retired civil servant to additional benefits like the allotment of a residential plot?
  • Is the scope of proforma promotion under Fundamental Rule 17 limited to the payment of arrears of pay and allowances?
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• Sarwar and another vs The State and others2020 SCMR 1250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-25
  murderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentocular accountmedical evidencedelay in FIRmitigating circumstances
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of a murder trial where the petitioner was convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death, which was subsequently altered to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question involved the appreciation of ocular and medical evidence, the effect of minor delay in lodging the FIR, and the justification for altering the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, and that a brief delay in reporting the crime due to distance and circumstances was immaterial. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that mitigating circumstances, including unproven motive, discarded recovery, and a single firearm shot, fully justified the High Court's decision to alter the death sentence to life imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that minor delays in reporting do not vitiate the prosecution case when reasonably explained, and mitigating factors surrounding the crime justify lesser capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a short delay in reporting a crime to the police is considered material when the distance to the police station is significant and the complainant is a female?
  • Does the testimony of a related witness residing in another village lack credibility when a plausible reason for their presence at the crime scene is established?
  • Whether the alteration of a death sentence to imprisonment for life is justified when the motive is unproved, the weapon recovery is discarded, and a single fire shot is attributed to the accused?
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• Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind vs Election Tribunal Balochistan, Quetta2020 P SC 150, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-05
  DisqualificationElection lawArticle 62(1)(f)Honesty and AmeenNomination papersEducational qualificationEvidenceAdmissionPresumptionLifetime bar
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard petitions challenging the disqualification of a returned candidate from provincial and national assembly elections. The petitioner's nomination papers were rejected, and his ineligibility upheld by the Appellate Tribunal and High Court, primarily under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, for allegedly not being 'honest.' This finding stemmed from his failure to disclose a Sanad of Shahad-ul-Aalmia in 2013, after claiming it in 2008, which was construed as concealment and an admission of a false statement. The Supreme Court held that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) requires a judicial declaration of 'not honest' based on positive evidence, oral or documentary, and a specific finding of deliberate false statement or dishonest conduct. A mere non-denial or omission does not constitute an unambiguous admission with evidentiary value, and dishonesty cannot be presumed. The Court found no evidence or specific finding of dishonest and deceitful action by the petitioner. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, allowed them, and set aside the impugned judgments, reiterating that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) entails a lifetime bar and must be founded on concrete proof of dishonesty.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate be disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution without a specific finding of dishonest and deceitful action?
  • Is a mere non-denial or omission of a fact in nomination papers sufficient to constitute an admission with evidentiary value for disqualification purposes?
  • Does disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution entail a lifetime bar on eligibility to contest elections?
  • What kind of evidence is required to establish 'not honest' for disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can dishonesty be presumed for disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, or must it be proven through overt acts reflecting deliberate false statements or cheatful involvement?
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• Sardar Muhammad Asif Naqkshbandi vs The State through P.G. Sindh2020 P SC (Crl.) 654, 2020 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-08
  pre-arrest bailfalse CNICfurther inquiryAfghan nationalbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 419, 465, 468, 471, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with Section 30(2)(a), (e), and (f) of the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance 2000, for allegedly obtaining a National Identity Card with false particulars while being an Afghan national. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the case warranted further inquiry as the petitioner claimed he obtained the CNIC in accordance with law, had previously served as a General Councillor, and no recovery was to be made from him, rendering his incarceration before trial pointless. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the impugned judgment, and confirmed the pre-arrest bail subject to regular appearance before the Trial Court and participation in the investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail should be confirmed when the case falls within the scope of further inquiry?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to pre-arrest bail when no recovery is to be made and incarceration before trial serves no useful purpose?
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• Saqib and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 121, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 721, 2020 SCMR 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-06
  post-arrest bailcross versionsuppression of injuriesfurther inquiryaggressor and aggressedcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court refusing them post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 635 registered under sections 324, 337-D, 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail in the presence of suppressed injuries on the accused side and a registered cross version. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where injuries sustained by the accused party were not disclosed in the FIR and a cross version was recorded with challans submitted in both cases, the determination of the aggressor was a matter for the trial court after recording evidence. Consequently, the case against the petitioners fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted post-arrest bail to the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted when injuries sustained by the accused party are not disclosed in the initial FIR?
  • Does the existence of a cross version and submission of challans in both cases make out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the determination of the aggressor a question to be decided by the trial court after recording evidence?
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• Sami Ullah and another vs Laiq Zada and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 268, 2020 SCMR 1115, 2020 SCP 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-08
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationliberty of personmisuse of bailcriminal procedurebenefit of doubtleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution was filed against a Peshawar High Court order that cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioners by the trial court. The petitioners were accused of offenses under Sections 316, 452, 337-A(ii), and 337 F(iv)/34 PPC involving a dispute over agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly applied the principles for the cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court relied on material not substantiated by the record, specifically regarding the nature of the deceased's injuries. The Court held that the considerations for granting bail and cancelling it are distinct; once bail is granted by a competent court, it requires strong and exceptional grounds, such as misuse of liberty or interference with evidence, to be recalled. Finding no evidence of misuse or patent illegality in the trial court's order, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the petitioners' bail.

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• Salih Muhammad alias Ghalib vs The State through A.-G., KhyberPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 208, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 501, 2020 SCMR 315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-01
  post-arrest bailrash and negligent drivingtraffic accidentdelay in trialcriminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a petition converted from a matter where the appellant was implicated in a first information report regarding a fatal traffic accident caused by rash and negligent driving. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was sufficiently connected to the alleged crime to warrant the continuation of his pre-trial incarceration, particularly in the absence of direct eyewitness identification in the FIR and prolonged detention without framing of the charge. The Supreme Court held that since the FIR failed to establish direct sighting of the petitioner as the driver and no material was placed to connect him with the bus, coupled with the delay where the trial court had not yet framed charges despite prolonged custody, the appeal ought to be allowed. The key principle laid down is that post-arrest bail may be granted in accident cases involving rash and negligent driving when the initial identification is tentative, direct incriminating material is lacking, and the trial is subjected to undue delay without framing of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the FIR lacks direct eyewitness identification of the accused as the driver?
  • Does an unverified delayed discovery of the accused's identity in the FIR justify continued pre-trial incarceration?
  • Is prolonged detention without the framing of a charge by the trial court a ground for granting bail in a criminal matter?
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• Saleem Khan vs The State and others2020 P SC (Crl.) 723, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-20
  juvenile offenderstatutory bailJuvenile Justice System Act, 2018Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000determination of agedelay in trialbail applicationmurderrobbery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a juvenile offender's second bail application, moved on statutory grounds. The petitioner, accused initially under Section 394 PPC and later Section 302 PPC, was declared a juvenile by the trial court after an application and ossification test. The core legal question revolved around the applicability of statutory bail under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, particularly whether the delay in determining juvenility was attributable to the petitioner and if the proviso allowing refusal of bail for juveniles over 15 in heinous crimes under the repealed Ordinance still applied. The Supreme Court held that the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, which repealed the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, was applicable, reducing the statutory delay period for bail to six months and removing the proviso for refusing bail in heinous crimes. The Court ruled that the determination of juvenility by the court, even on the accused's application, is a statutory obligation and does not constitute a delay attributable to the accused to deny statutory bail. Consequently, the petitioner was granted bail on statutory grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Can the time spent by a court in determining an accused's juvenility, even on the accused's application, be considered a delay attributable to the accused to deny statutory bail?
  • Does the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, repeal the proviso under Section 10(7) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, which allowed refusal of bail to juveniles over 15 involved in heinous crimes?
  • What is the statutory period for granting bail to a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, if their trial has not concluded?
  • Who is initially responsible for determining the age or juvenility of an accused under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
  • Can a court of general criminal jurisdiction determine the juvenility of an accused and transfer the case to a Juvenile Court if the police fail to do so?
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• Sakhi Jan and others vs Shah Nawaz2020 PLJ SC 416, 2020 P SC 1272, 2020 SCMR 832, 2020 SCP 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-22
  specific performancesuit for declarationagreement to sellmutationfraudrevenue recordsproprietary rightsestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil petitions for leave to appeal arose from a dispute involving a suit for specific performance filed by the respondent and a suit for declaration filed by the petitioners challenging the validity of various land mutations on grounds of fraud. The petitioners primarily contended that the underlying agreement to sell was unenforceable because it lacked the purchaser's signature and allegedly violated the Land Reforms Regulation (Validation of Orders) Ordinance, 1978. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that an agreement to sell is valid and enforceable if its existence is proved through reliable evidence, even in the absence of the purchaser's signature. Regarding the statutory bar on transfer, the Court applied the maxim 'Nullus Commodum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria', ruling that vendors cannot benefit from their own wrong by invoking a legal bar against a sale they themselves executed. Furthermore, the Court noted that once proprietary rights are fully vested by the State, subsequent alienation bars have little value. The Court also emphasized that revenue officials are proper parties when the validity of public documents like mutations is challenged.

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