Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Jawed vs First Women Bank Ltd. and others2021 CLD 39, 2020 SCMR 2134, 2020 SCP 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-08
  execution proceedingscourt auctionhighest bidderequity of redemptionvested rightsbanking courtjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal challenging a Banking Court's refusal to accept the petitioner's bid in an execution sale. The core legal question was whether a bidder, upon being declared the highest bidder in a court auction, acquires a vested right in the property that extinguishes the judgment debtor's right of redemption, even before the court formally accepts the bid. The Supreme Court held that a bid in a court auction is merely an offer and does not create a vested right until the court formally accepts the bid and the full purchase money is deposited under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court emphasized that the judicial function of accepting a bid cannot be delegated to an auctioneer. Consequently, because the Banking Court had not accepted the petitioner's bid, no vested right accrued, and the judgment debtor's right of redemption remained intact. The principle established is that an auction sale is only complete upon judicial acceptance, and until that stage, the mortgagor retains the right to redeem the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does being declared the highest bidder in a court auction create a vested right in the property before the court formally accepts the bid?
  • At what stage of execution proceedings does a court auction sale become complete?
  • Can a court delegate the function of accepting a bid to a court auctioneer?
  • Does the right of redemption of a mortgagor extinguish upon the declaration of the highest bidder in a court auction?
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• Muhammad Jawed Hanif Khan and another vs National Accountability2020 P SC 971, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 195, 2020 SCMR 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-27
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationillegal orderscivil servant liabilityparity in bailNational Accountability BureauKPT appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Muhammad Jawed Hanif Khan, former Chairman of the Karachi Port Trust, facing trial in NAB Reference No.22 of 2018 for allegedly regularizing 940 stipend employees in violation of rules, causing a massive loss to the public exchequer pursuant to directives of the then Federal Minister. The core legal question concerns whether a civil servant can claim absolution from criminal liability by pleading compliance with illegal orders of superiors, and whether parity in bail should be extended when co-accused have been granted pre-arrest bail by the High Court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that compliance by a civil servant with void or illegal orders of superiors is no valid defense, as their primary responsibility is to the Republic and the law. However, noting that the High Court had granted bail to co-accused subordinates on similar grounds of following ministerial directions, the Court ruled that partial interference would be anomalous and applied the principle of parity, enlarging the petitioner on bail while dismissing NAB's petitions for cancellation of bail of the co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant take a valid defense of complying with void or illegal orders issued by superiors?
  • Whether parity in bail should be granted to an accused when co-accused facing similar allegations have been enlarged on bail?
  • Is a public servant absolved from criminal liability for executing unlawful directives of political masters?
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• Muhammad Jamil and others vs Mst. Sajida Bibi and others2021 PLJ SC 28, 2021 P SC 1176, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-12
  family lawdowerpolygamymaintenancearbitration councilrestitution of conjugal rightsdissolution of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding a family dispute involving claims for dower, maintenance, and restitution of conjugal rights. The core legal question was whether a husband who contracts a second marriage without the required permission from his first wife or the Arbitration Council is liable for the immediate payment of the entire dower amount, regardless of whether it was originally stipulated as prompt or deferred. The Supreme Court held that the husband's failure to obtain the requisite permission under the law triggered the immediate payment obligation. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' findings. The key principle laid down is that under Section 6(5)(a) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, contracting a second marriage without the permission of the Arbitration Council renders the entire dower amount, whether prompt or deferred, immediately payable to the existing wife. This provision serves to regulate societal structures and protect the rights of the existing spouse, and any deviation from this regulatory requirement necessitates immediate financial accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Does contracting a second marriage without the permission of the Arbitration Council make the entire dower amount immediately payable?
  • Is the payment of dower under Section 6(5)(a) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 dependent on whether the dower was originally prompt or deferred?
  • Does the requirement to seek permission for a second marriage under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 violate the injunctions of Islam?
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• Muhammad Jahangir Khan and others vs The State and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 69, 2020 SCMR 1270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-07
  pre-arrest bailvicarious liabilitycommon intentioncriminal petitionleave to appealmedical evidenceabsenteeism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged the Lahore High Court's order refusing pre-arrest bail to the petitioners in a case registered under sections 324, 452, 354, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail despite the existence of incriminating medical evidence and their failure to appear before the High Court. The Supreme Court, by a majority, dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail because they had absented themselves during the High Court proceedings, and because the case involved prima facie evidence of vicarious liability under sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court emphasized that at the pre-arrest bail stage, it is not desirable to conduct a deeper appreciation of evidence or bifurcate the roles of accused persons when common intention is alleged. Consequently, the High Court's refusal to grant bail was upheld as proper.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of the accused and their counsel during bail proceedings before the High Court disentitle them to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail?
  • Is it permissible for a court to bifurcate the roles of co-accused at the pre-arrest bail stage when sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 are invoked?
  • Can a court grant pre-arrest bail when prima facie medical evidence supports the allegations against the accused?
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• Muhammad Jahangir Afzal vs The State through P.G. Punjab and another2020 SCMR 935 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-28
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycontradictory evidencecriminal appealmurder casebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Jahangir Afzal, who was implicated in a murder case registered at Police Station Ferozwala. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case regarding his identity and role. The Supreme Court observed that there was no consensus between the complainant and the injured witness regarding the petitioner's identity, and the Investigating Officer's depiction of the petitioner's presence at the crime scene was incompatible with the witnesses' narratives. Furthermore, the injured witness had retracted his statement, creating significant doubt. The Court held that the petitioner's culpability required further inquiry, thereby falling under the scope of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the petitioner, establishing the principle that where prosecution evidence is inconsistent and contradictory, the accused is entitled to the benefit of further inquiry at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lack of consensus between the complainant and injured witnesses regarding the identity of an accused warrant the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Can an accused be released on bail when the Investigating Officer's narrative is incompatible with the statements of the prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the retraction of a statement by an injured witness create a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Jabran and others vs The State2020 SCMR 1493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-25
  abductionadverse inferenceeyewitness credibilitymaterial contradictionsrecovery of weaponcompromiseacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from jail petitions for leave to appeal filed by four appellants against their convictions and sentences under Sections 363, 364-A, and 393 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which were modified and reduced by the Lahore High Court following a partial compromise. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given material contradictions in the eyewitness testimonies and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed significant discrepancies regarding the identification of the accused, the presence of a key witness at the crime scene, and the circumstances of the child victim's recovery. Additionally, the prosecution's failure to examine the child's mother, a natural inmate witness, led the Court to draw an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Finding the prosecution's case highly doubtful from its inception, the Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered the immediate release of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Can an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 be drawn if the prosecution fails to examine a natural inmate witness without a valid reason?
  • Whether material contradictions between the testimony of the investigating officer and eyewitnesses regarding the arrest and recovery of the victim create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are irreconcilable contradictions between eyewitnesses regarding the identification of the accused and their prior acquaintance?
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• Muhammad Islam vs The State through Advocate General Punjab, Lahore2020 SCMR 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-14
  pre-arrest bailNAB referencefraudmala fideanticipatory bailaccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Muhammad Islam, an accused in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference involving allegations of defrauding 61 investors through a travel agency. The petitioner, a former police constable, allegedly lured members of the public with promises of lucrative profits, which ultimately proved fraudulent, evidenced by bounced cheques issued to the investors. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to anticipatory bail, given his claims of mala fide prosecution by a police adversary and his argument that the alleged offense fell outside NAB's jurisdiction because the victims did not constitute the "public at large." The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate abuse of process or mala fide intent. The Court affirmed that anticipatory bail in cognizable, non-bailable offenses requires showing specific circumstances of mala fide, which cannot be established by merely presenting parallel stories or challenging witness credibility at the investigative stage. The Court emphasized that the substantial investigative findings and the consistent statements of numerous victims precluded the grant of relief.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a parallel story or a claim of mala fide automatically entitle an accused to pre-arrest bail?
  • Can an accused challenge the jurisdiction of the National Accountability Bureau on the grounds that the victims do not constitute the "public at large" at the bail stage?
  • What is the standard for granting anticipatory bail in a cognizable and non-bailable offense involving substantial investigative findings?
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• Muhammad Irfan vs The State and another2020 SCMR 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-15
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationnarcotics controlrule of consistencyprohibitory clauserecovery of cannabisSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of pre-arrest/post-arrest bail by the High Court, alongside suo motu consideration of bail granted to a co-accused in a narcotics case. The petitioner Muhammad Irfan and co-accused Dilshad Khan were intercepted by the Anti-Narcotic Force in possession of twelve kilograms of cannabis concealed in their vehicle and on their person. The core legal question revolves around whether the rule of consistency applies when a co-accused is granted bail through an anomalous and flawed order, and the grounds for cancelling bail once granted. The Supreme Court held that the concession of bail granted to the co-accused on mutually destructive and unsustainable grounds—including an erroneous reference to the Covid-19 pandemic—cannot be perpetuated under the guise of consistency, especially in heinous offences falling within prohibitory clauses. Consequently, the Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the co-accused and declined leave to appeal to the petitioner, establishing that inconsistent and flawed bail grants in narcotics cases must be rectified to avoid judicial anomalies.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted to a co-accused on flawed or mutually destructive grounds be sustained on the principle of consistency?
  • Does the recovery of a huge quantity of contraband falling within the prohibitory clause bar the grant of bail?
  • What are the parameters for cancelling bail once it has been granted by a competent court?
  • Does an erroneous initial registration of a case under a specific provincial enactment mitigate the enormity of a narcotics crime for the purpose of bail?
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• Muhammad Imran vs The State2020 SCMR 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-20
  murdercriminal petitionacquittalocular accountreasonable doubtdiscrepancies in evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a criminal petition challenging the petitioner's conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt, given significant discrepancies in the ocular accounts of the witnesses, the improbability of their presence at the crime scene, and a conflicting defense narrative supported by official documents. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, acquitting the petitioner. The Court found the ocular accounts to be inconsistent, particularly regarding material details, the manner of arrival at the scene, and the sequence of events. The recovery of the weapon upon the disclosure of an acquitted co-accused also failed to inspire confidence as independent corroboration. Furthermore, evidence of injuries sustained by the petitioner's mother, supported by police and medical documents, suggested a scenario incompatible with the prosecution's case. The Court held that it would be unsafe to maintain the conviction, reiterating the principle that the benefit of even a single circumstance casting doubt on the prosecution's integrity must be extended to the accused without reservation.

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• Muhammad Ilyas and another vs Ameer Ali and another2020 SCMR 305, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-06
  criminal appealmurderacquittalsentence enhancementbenefit of doubtcommon intentionvicarious liabilitymotiveproof beyond reasonable doubtcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning a murder conviction and related appeals for acquittal and sentence enhancement. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the case against appellant Ameer Ali beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given that multiple fatal injuries were attributed to both him and a co-accused (Shahbaz), and the motive for the crime was disbelieved by the appellate court. The Court held that the prosecution failed to provide strong and independent corroboration to distinguish the appellant's case from that of his co-accused Shahbaz, especially since the motive was not proven. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed Ameer Ali's appeal, set aside his conviction and sentence under Section 302(b) PPC, and acquitted him. The Court also dismissed the complainant's appeal seeking enhancement of sentences for co-convicts, finding no arbitrary or capricious reasons in the High Court's decision. The key principle reiterated is that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and where evidence against co-accused is on the same pedestal without distinguishing corroboration, the benefit of doubt should be extended.

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• Muhammad Ibrahim (Deceased) through LRs and another vs Taza Gul and others2020 SCMR 2033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-27
  limited estatecustomary lawproprietary rightsframing of issuesinheritancecolonization of government landsshariat application act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal, filed under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, arose from a suit for declaration and possession filed by the collaterals of a deceased tenant of State land allotted under Section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether the conferment of proprietary rights upon a female limited owner under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, constituted her as a full owner, or if her limited estate terminated upon the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, reverting the estate to the legal heirs of the original tenant. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment. The Court held that an estate held under Section 30-A(1) by a female is a limited estate governed by custom, which terminated under Section 3 of the 1962 Act, restricting her entitlement to her personal share under Muslim Law. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the non-framing of a specific issue does not prejudice a party's case or warrant remand unless objected to timely and continuously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female limited owner who acquires proprietary rights under Section 30-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, becomes an absolute owner or remains a limited owner whose estate terminates under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
  • Does the non-framing of a specific issue by the trial court constitute a legal defect sufficient to reverse a judgment or remand a case if the parties had the opportunity to lead evidence on the pleadings?
  • What standard of proof is required for a third-party purchaser to successfully challenge and deny the established family relationship of the plaintiffs to the original propositus?
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• Muhammad Hayat vs The State and another2021 P S c (Crl.) 132, 2020 SCMR 1183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-05
  post-arrest bailarmed robberytest identification paradetentative assessmentcriminal petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail in a criminal case involving armed robbery. The petitioner, along with co-accused, was alleged to have entered a private residence at night, subdued the occupants, and stolen valuables including cash, gold ornaments, and a vehicle. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the alleged discrepancies in the number of assailants and flaws in the test identification parade. The Court declined to grant leave to appeal, holding that issues regarding the number of assailants and the validity of the identification parade constitute factual controversies that cannot be resolved during the tentative assessment stage of bail proceedings. The Court affirmed that such matters must be determined by the trial court after a full trial. The key principle laid down is that the scope of bail proceedings is restricted to a tentative assessment of material, and the Court will not delve into disputed questions of fact or evidentiary flaws that require a full trial for adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can discrepancies regarding the number of assailants be resolved during the tentative assessment stage of bail proceedings?
  • Is the validity of a test identification parade a matter to be decided during bail proceedings or at trial?
  • Does the recovery of looted articles coupled with identification constitute sufficient grounds to deny bail in a robbery case?
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• Muhammad Faisal vs The State and another2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 73, 2020 SCMR 971, 2020 SCP 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-05-05
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubtprohibitory clausecriminal appealsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal assailing the order of the Lahore High Court, which had declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a criminal case registered under FIR No. 524/2019. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given the facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of injuries attributed to him and the delayed declaration of the same. The Supreme Court held that the case of the petitioner called for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, converting the petition into an appeal and allowing it by granting bail to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that where cumulative circumstances—such as non-vital injury location, short hospital stay, and belated injury classification—create doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution version, the benefit of such doubt can be extended even at the bail stage, and liberty of a person being a precious right guaranteed by the Constitution should be protected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the benefit of doubt can be extended to an accused person at the bail stage?
  • Does a case fall within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the prosecution version is surrounded by doubt?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the offenses charged do not strictly fall within the prohibitory clause and the injury attributes require deeper assessment during trial?
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• Muhammad Boota vs The State and another2020 PSC (Crl.) 503, 2020 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-02
  narcoticsforensic reportanalysis protocolevidentiary valueGovernment Analystcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 15 sacks of Bhang. The petitioner and a co-accused were sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court, a decision upheld for the petitioner by the Lahore High Court while the co-accused was acquitted. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the forensic report, which lacked the analysis protocol mandated by Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules 2001, could sustain a conviction. The Court held that the absence of the required protocol renders a Government Analyst's report inconclusive and untrustworthy, failing to meet the necessary evidentiary standards. Following the precedent in 'The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh', the Court determined that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the petitioner was ordered to be released.

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• Muhammad Bashir vs Rukhsar and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 334, 2020 SCP 62 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-16
  fair trialdue processcross-examinationrecall of witnessjoint cross-examinationfundamental rightscriminal procedurelegal practitioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal case involving the murder of Muhammad Waseem Raza. The petitioner, the complainant and uncle of the deceased, challenged the orders of the Sessions Judge and the Peshawar High Court which allowed an application filed by the accused, Rukhsar, under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The accused sought to recall the petitioner for cross-examination, asserting he was never granted an individual opportunity to do so, despite a 'joint cross-examination' having already occurred. The Supreme Court examined whether the denial of an individual right to cross-examine a witness violates constitutional guarantees. The Court held that the right to cross-examine is a fundamental component of a fair trial and due process under Articles 10 and 10A of the Constitution. It further clarified that the concept of 'joint cross-examination' is not recognized by law. The Court maintained that where multiple accused are involved, each must be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses through their respective counsel. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

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• Muhammad Azeem vs The State and others2020 P SC (Crl.) 828, 2020 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-31
  post-arrest bailstatutory grounddelay in trialfirearm injurycriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court refusing him post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 374 registered under sections 324, 337D, 337-F(i), 337-A(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of trial under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not concluded within the specified statutory period, and the petitioner could not be solely held responsible for the delay, nor was he a desperate, hardened criminal or a terrorist with previous convictions. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and granted bail to the appellant subject to furnishing surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that an accused person becomes entitled to statutory bail when the trial is not concluded within the prescribed period under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided the delay is not attributable solely to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to statutory bail if the trial is not concluded within the period specified under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be refused statutory bail when he is not solely responsible for the delay in the conclusion of the trial?
  • What are the considerations for granting bail on statutory grounds under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Aslam Siddiqui vs Federation of Pakistan2020 PLD Supreme Court 142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-09
  cantonment landA-1 landcommercial exploitationmilitary landcivil review petitionCantonment Land Administration Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil review petition challenges an earlier order concerning the commercial use of A-1 land in a cantonment area for a private marquee business. The petitioner relied on a document purportedly issued by HQ 5 Corps authorizing the temporary rental of land for a marquee. The core legal question was whether A-1 cantonment land could be legally utilized for commercial ventures catering to the general public. The Court held that the documentation provided by the petitioner was insufficient to establish legal title or authority for such use. Furthermore, the Court examined the Ministry of Defence policy dated 02.04.2008 and Regulation 5 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937, concluding that A-1 land is strictly reserved for military purposes, such as fortifications, barracks, and official requirements. The Court established the principle that A-1 cantonment land cannot be exploited for commercial activities serving the general public, as such use is restricted to essential services for the residents of the respective garrison. Finding the petition frivolous, the Court dismissed it.

  Questions settled

  • Can A-1 cantonment land be legally utilized for commercial activities serving the general public?
  • Does the policy of the Ministry of Defence permit the commercial exploitation of A-1 cantonment land for non-military purposes?
  • What is the permissible scope of use for Class A-1 land under the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State and another2021 MLD 166, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 453, 2020 SCMR 2105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-22
  post-arrest bailmurdertest identification paradeunknown assailantsfurther inquirycriminal appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal against the refusal or consideration of post-arrest bail in a murder case where the victim was shot dead in broad daylight near district courts due to an old blood feud. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, who was not initially named in the FIR but later identified in a test identification parade as an unknown assailant and hired killer, is entitled to bail under the statutory provisions governing further inquiry. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner is entitled to bail because his belated attribution does not correspond with the medical evidence regarding the number of entry wounds or the initial crime report, thereby bringing his case within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that where the role assigned to a subsequently identified unknown accused conflicts with medical findings and the initial report, it creates a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, warranting the grant of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused not named in the initial crime report but subsequently identified in a test identification parade is entitled to bail when his attribution conflicts with medical evidence?
  • Does a discrepancy between the number of unknown assailants in the FIR and the medical report bring the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the alleged culpability of a hired assassin be properly assessed only after the recording of evidence at trial?
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• Muhammad Akram (deceased) through L.Rs vs Mst. Noor Begum2020 PLJ SC 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  tenancy rightsproprietary rightsmerger of rightsdeclaratory suitbar of jurisdictioncivil revisioncolonization of government lands
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court which allowed a civil revision and dismissed the declaratory suit filed by the predecessor of the appellants regarding tenancy rights. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff could challenge decades-old mutations and the conferment of proprietary rights to a widow under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, particularly when he was a consenting party to subsequent transactions and when ownership rights had merged with absolute ownership. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that once proprietary rights are acquired, tenancy or occupancy rights merge into absolute ownership, and a plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory suit while omitting to seek further necessary relief such as cancellation of mutations under the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred under Section 36 of the 1912 Act, and a party cannot belatedly seek to undo long-standing transactions to which they were consenting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tenancy or occupancy rights merge into absolute ownership once proprietary rights are acquired under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912?
  • Is a declaratory suit maintainable when the plaintiff omits to seek further relief such as the cancellation of mutations?
  • Does Section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters entrustable to designated authorities?
  • Can a party challenge long-standing mutations and transactions to which they were themselves a consenting party decades later?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs The State2021 KLR Supreme Court Cases 96, 2021 P S c (Crl.) 106, 2020 SCP 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-08
  criminal petitionleave to appealocular evidencebenefit of doubtmurder convictionsafe administration of justiceovert act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had modified the petitioner's conviction for murder. The petitioner, Muhammad Afzal, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of Iltaf Hussain and sentenced to death, while a co-accused was sentenced to life imprisonment and another was acquitted. The High Court subsequently acquitted the co-accused and converted the petitioner's death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the acquittal of co-accused persons and arguments regarding the motive and evidence. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence provided by the prosecution witnesses was consistent and credible, and the occurrence in broad daylight precluded misidentification. The Court affirmed that the prosecution had proven its case against the petitioner to the hilt. The key principle laid down is that the acquittal of co-accused persons does not automatically entitle a remaining convict to the benefit of doubt if the prosecution has otherwise established the specific overt acts of the convict through consistent and reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons automatically entitle the remaining convict to the benefit of doubt?
  • Is the absence of a forensic report or recovery of a weapon sufficient to invalidate a conviction when ocular evidence is consistent and reliable?
  • Can a court discard a prosecution version based on a rule of caution without substantial material support?
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• Muhammad Abbas vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 90, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 620, 2020 SCP 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-24
  honour killingqatl-i-amdfasad-fil-arzgrave and sudden provocationSection 342 statementli'ancriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a jail petition filed by a petitioner convicted of the qatl-i-amd (murder) of his wife under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged his conviction, contending that the incident occurred under grave and sudden provocation due to his wife's alleged bad character, thereby seeking conversion of the conviction to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove grave and sudden provocation, as the evidence showed no such circumstances. Crucially, the Court held that murders committed in the name or on the pretext of honour (ghairat) cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as specifically excluded by the provisos added in 2005 and 2016, and the definition of fasad-fil-arz. The Court affirmed that such killings must be punished under Section 302(a) or 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The judgment clarifies that honour killings are not legally mitigating factors and mandates strict adherence to the statutory framework and Islamic injunctions regarding proof and procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Can a murder committed in the name or on the pretext of honour be brought within the ambit of Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which is not on oath, constitute sufficient evidence to establish grave and sudden provocation when contradicted by other evidence?
  • Is the definition of fasad-fil-arz applicable to murders committed in the name of honour?
  • Does the requirement to seek guidance from the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah under Section 338-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 permit the justification of honour killings?
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• Mufti Kafayat Ullah vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-04
  murderous assaultcriminal appealappreciation of evidencebenefit of doubtacquittalcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mufti Kafayat Ullah, challenged his conviction under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the alleged murderous assault on his estranged wife and brother-in-law in the District Court premises at Islamabad. The trial magistrate convicted him, and his appeals to the Sessions Court and the High Court were dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of guilt could be sustained on oral testimony that lacked crucial corroboration and suffered from material investigative flaws. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the lower courts' judgments, thereby acquitting the appellant. The Court laid down the principle that where an alleged murderous assault rests solely on oral testimony with inherent missing links, failure to secure vital physical evidence or associate key eyewitnesses—such as the police official who intervened—renders the prosecution's case unsafe for maintaining a conviction, particularly in the presence of persisting animosity between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murderous assault can be sustained solely on oral testimony when the investigating officer fails to secure key physical evidence and associate vital eyewitnesses?
  • Does the failure to meet the requirements of Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 regarding weapon recovery undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Can concurrent findings of guilt by three lower tribunals be set aside by the Supreme Court in the presence of inherent flaws and persisting animosity?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zohra Khatoon vs Ghulam Farid2020 PLJ SC 249, 2020 P SC 213, 2020 SCMR 465, 2020 SCP 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-14
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadsale considerationrevisional jurisdictionagricultural landShariah compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which allowed a civil revision and set aside concurrent judgments of the Subordinate Courts dismissing the respondent's pre-emption suit regarding agricultural land. The core legal questions concerned whether the pre-emptor made Talb-i-Muwathibat immediately upon gaining knowledge of the sale and whether notice of Talb-i-Ishhad was issued within the statutory period of two weeks under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-Emption Act, 1987, as well as the effect of making an unsubstantiated plea regarding the sale consideration. The Supreme Court held that the pre-emptor had knowledge of the sale on or soon after the date of execution (25th January 2003) but falsely claimed knowledge on a later date to bring the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad within time, thereby failing to make the demands within the mandatory statutory periods. The Court further held that making a completely unsubstantiated statement regarding the sale price to gain an undue advantage violates the injunctions of Shariah and disentitles a pre-emptor from claiming pre-emption. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed the pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the limitation period for issuing a notice of Talb-i-Ishhad begins from the actual date of knowledge of the sale obtained by the pre-emptor?
  • Does making an unsubstantiated plea regarding the sale price to gain an advantage disentitle a pre-emptor from claiming pre-emption?
  • Are concurrent findings of subordinate courts liable to be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction when there is no illegality or material irregularity?
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• Mst. Yasmeen vs Javed and another2020 SCMR 505 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-30
  acquittal appealSection 302 PPCinquest reporteyewitness credibilitysource of lightload sheddingbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the complainant Mst. Yasmeen against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had acquitted respondent Javed after setting aside his conviction and death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC. The core legal question pertained to whether the High Court's findings of acquittal were based on a correct reappraisal of the evidence and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution's claim that the matter was reported to the police within three hours of the incident, the relevant column 'brief history of crime' in the inquest report was left entirely blank. The Court held that this omission alone cast serious doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's case and the credibility of the eyewitnesses. Additionally, no source of light was established despite load-shedding at night, no recovery was made, and co-accused facing identical allegations were previously acquitted. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does leaving the 'brief history of crime' column blank in an inquest report cast doubt on the promptness and veracity of a prosecution FIR?
  • Can eyewitness testimony be safely relied upon when the incident occurred in darkness without any proven source of light?
  • Whether an appeal against acquittal can succeed when co-accused charged with identical roles have already been acquitted without challenge-free?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mir Zalai vs Ghazi Khan and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 215, 2020 PSC CRI 458, 2020 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-23
  criminal appealacquittalchance witnesseseye-witnessesnight occurrencevisibilityblood-stained clothesreliability of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the acquittal of the respondents. The case pertained to a murder that occurred after dark, where the prosecution relied on the testimony of eye-witnesses to establish guilt. The core legal question centered on the reliability of these witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the visibility of the occurrence. Upon review, the Court observed that the prosecution failed to provide independent proof of available electric light at the scene. Furthermore, the eye-witnesses were categorized as chance witnesses who could not justify their presence at the time of the incident. A critical evidentiary gap was noted as the witnesses claimed their clothes were smeared with the deceased's blood, yet no such clothing was secured or produced as evidence. The Court held that the circumstances surrounding the FIR were suspicious and the prosecution's narrative lacked credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, ruling that the witnesses were unreliable and likely did not witness the event, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kalsoom Begum vs Rizwan Shah and others2020 SCMR 2029 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-10
  pre-emptionco-sharermutationTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadservice by postrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the appellant sought to pre-empt a sale of land based on her status as a co-sharer and contiguity. The trial and appellate courts initially decreed the suit in her favor, but the High Court subsequently dismissed it, questioning her status as a co-sharer due to a delayed mutation and finding discrepancies in the performance of Talbs. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that a mutation does not create or destroy rights but merely reflects existing revenue records; the appellant's status as a co-sharer was established by a 1976 court decree, regardless of the subsequent mutation date. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellant sufficiently proved the dispatch of Talb-i-Ishhad notices by producing official witnesses from the post office, satisfying the requirements of Section 26 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. The Court also affirmed that minor narrative variations in witness testimony regarding Talbs do not invalidate the claim. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's decree was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records create or destroy an existing right to property?
  • Is the personal appearance of the specific postman who delivered a notice necessary to prove service of Talb-i-Ishhad?
  • Does Section 26 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 apply to the proof of service of pre-emption notices?
  • Do minor narrative variations in the testimony of witnesses regarding the performance of Talbs invalidate a pre-emption claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Chanani Begum (Deceased) through LRs vs Mst. Qamar Sultan2020 P SC 934, 2020 SCMR 254 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-25
  SuccessionReligious faithAdmissibility of evidenceInheritanceRebuttable presumptionQanun-e-ShahadatConcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the religious faith of the late Mst. Anwar Sultan, which determined the distribution of her estate. The appellant asserted the deceased was a 'Sunni' Muslim, while the respondent contended she was 'Shia'. The core legal question concerned the admissibility of the deceased’s prior statement declaring her faith and the criteria for determining religious identity in succession matters. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased’s voluntary declaration of faith, even if made in previous proceedings, is admissible and carries significant weight. The Court affirmed that while there is an initial rebuttable presumption that a Muslim in the Indo-Pak subcontinent is 'Sunni', this presumption loses sanctity once challenged. Faith must be determined based on surrounding circumstances, way of life, parental faith, and the faith of kith and kin. The Court further held that specific practices, such as hoisting an Alam of Hazrat Abbas, serve as strong evidence of 'Shia' faith. Consequently, the concurrent findings of fact regarding the deceased's 'Shia' faith were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person's voluntary declaration of their own religious faith admissible in subsequent legal proceedings regarding their estate?
  • Does the initial presumption that a Muslim is 'Sunni' by faith persist once that faith is challenged in court?
  • What factors should courts consider when determining the religious faith of a deceased person for the purpose of succession?
  • Can the hoisting of an Alam of Hazrat Abbas be considered a strong indicator of 'Shia' faith in legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Brikhna vs Faiz Ullah Khan and others2020 SCMR 1618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-01
  inheritanceSharai sharemutationco-sharerlimitationacquiescencewomen's inheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal concerned a dispute over a female heir's claim to her Sharai share in her father's legacy. The core legal question was whether the claim was barred by limitation and acquiescence, and whether the petitioner was entitled to her share despite the absence of a mutation in her favor. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's decree. The Court held that inheritance vests by operation of law immediately upon the death of the predecessor, rendering the heir a co-sharer in the property. It clarified that mutation is not a document of title but merely a fiscal record for updating rights. Furthermore, the Court determined that the principle of limitation and acquiescence established in Grana v. Sahib Kamala Bibi is not universally applicable to all inheritance claims. The Court emphasized that denying women their due Sharai share is contrary to Sharia and the law, confirming the petitioner's entitlement to her 1/7th share.

  Questions settled

  • Is a mutation entry in revenue records considered a document of title?
  • Does the principle of limitation and acquiescence in inheritance matters apply universally to all cases?
  • When does a legal heir become a co-sharer in the property of a deceased predecessor?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Beena vs Raja Muhammad and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-13
  custody of minorhizanatkhula agreementpublic policyphysical disabilityhuman dignitywelfare of minorMuslim Personal Lawconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a custody dispute where the High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, set aside concurrent findings of the Family and Appellate Courts that had granted physical custody of a minor son to the mother. The High Court had based its decision on a 'khula' agreement where the mother purportedly surrendered custody rights, and on the mother's physical disability and lack of financial independence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that a mother's right to 'hizanat' (custody) cannot be surrendered as consideration for 'khula' under Muslim Personal Law, and any such contractual clause is void under Sections 23 and 25 of the Contract Act, 1872, as being against public policy and without lawful consideration. The Court further ruled that physical disability and financial status are not grounds to disentitle a mother to custody. The Court emphasized that the right to dignity under Articles 9, 14, and 25 of the Constitution protects persons with disabilities from discriminatory labels and ensures their participation in family life.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Beena vs Raj Muhammad, etc2021 PLJ SC 50, 2020 P SC 1177, 2020 SCP 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-17
  hizanatcustody of minorkhulapublic policyrights of persons with disabilitieshuman dignityconstitutional jurisdictionwelfare of the minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a custody dispute over a minor child, Muhammad Rayyan, between his mother (petitioner) and father (respondent). The Family Court and Appellate Court granted custody to the mother, but the High Court set aside these concurrent judgments, citing an agreement where the mother waived custody rights in exchange for khula and noting her physical disability and financial status. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that an agreement to surrender the custody of a child as consideration for khula is void, contrary to public policy, and repugnant to Islamic principles of hizanat. The Court emphasized that a mother's right to custody cannot be bargained away, nor can her physical disability or financial status be used to deny her the right to raise her child. The Court further condemned the use of derogatory language regarding persons with disabilities, affirming that such labeling infringes upon constitutional guarantees of dignity and non-discrimination. The Court restored the custody of the minor to the mother, directing immediate compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mother legally surrender the custody of her minor child as consideration for obtaining khula?
  • Is an agreement between parents regarding the custody of a minor child enforceable if it is contrary to the welfare of the minor?
  • Does a mother's physical disability or financial status constitute valid grounds to deprive her of the custody of her minor child?
  • Can a High Court set aside concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in custody matters without valid legal or Shariah justification?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Attia Bano and others vs Abdul Majeed2020 SCMR 1396 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-24
  benami transactionburden of proofostensible ownerproperty disputeconcurrent findingsdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, legal heirs of the late Arshad Mehmood Humayun, challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts which declared the respondent, Abdul Majeed, the true owner of a residential property in Islamabad. The respondent, a U.S. resident, asserted that the property was purchased and constructed using his funds, with the deceased acting as a benamidar for procedural convenience, a claim supported by an agreement dated 22.4.1993. The appellants contended that the deceased purchased the property with his own resources and that the agreement was forged. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting the respondent's established financial capacity, the lack of evidence regarding the deceased's income, and the corroborative testimony regarding the agreement's execution. The Court held that the respondent successfully discharged the burden of proving the benami nature of the transaction. Affirming the lower courts' decisions, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the totality of circumstances and evidence, including the agreement and witness testimony, conclusively established that the deceased was merely an ostensible owner, while the respondent provided the resources for the property's acquisition.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of proof required to establish a benami transaction in a property dispute?
  • Can an agreement executed by a deceased person acknowledging another's title serve as sufficient evidence to prove a benami arrangement?
  • Does the failure of legal heirs to establish the financial source of their predecessor's property acquisition support a claim of benami ownership by a third party?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another vs Syed Farooq Hussain2020 SCP 162 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-13
  specific performancesale agreementpower of attorneylocal commissiontime is the essencefraud and concealmentdiscretionary reliefcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a civil dispute concerning a sale agreement for an apartment in Karachi, where the vendor appellants failed to complete the sale and unilaterally cancelled the agreement, prompting the vendee respondent to file a suit for specific performance and declaration. The core legal questions involved whether an attorney with no personal knowledge of the transaction can depose on behalf of a party under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the legality of recording evidence through a local commission, and whether time was the essence of the contract given that the apartment lacked legal construction approval from the Karachi Building Control Authority at the time. The Supreme Court held that while an attorney must generally have first-hand knowledge, the non-appearance of the principal was not fatal under the circumstances, that commissions can be issued with the consent of parties, and that the time was not of the essence because the appellants concealed material defects regarding the lack of building approval. The court dismissed the appellants' appeals with costs, affirming the decree for specific performance under the Specific Relief Act 1877.

  Questions settled

  • Is an attorney competent to depose as a witness on behalf of a principal who resides abroad?
  • Can a local commission be appointed for recording evidence with the consent of the parties under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether time can be considered the essence of a contract for the sale of immovable property when the vendor conceals material legal defects regarding property approval?
  • Does the non-appearance of a plaintiff as a witness automatically result in an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi vs Sui Northern Gas2020 P SC 966, 2020 PLJ SC 205, 2020 SCMR 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-20
  closure of evidencelast opportunityOrder XVII Rule 3 CPCadjournmentsGas Utility Courtcivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a recovery suit filed by Respondent No. 1 against the Petitioner for unpaid gas consumption bills. After the Petitioner was granted leave to defend and the Respondent's evidence concluded, the Trial Court (Gas Utility Court) granted multiple adjournments for the Petitioner to lead evidence. On 24.09.2019, the court granted a final opportunity with a specific warning that failure to comply would result in the closure of the right to produce evidence. Upon the Petitioner's failure to produce evidence on the scheduled date, the Trial Court closed their right under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the CPC, a decision subsequently upheld by the Lahore High Court. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the petition, held that the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3 are essential to check the abuse of process through frivolous adjournments. The Court laid down that where a party is granted a 'last opportunity' with a warning, the court must enforce that order strictly to maintain judicial integrity. The ratio establishes that once the conditions of Rule 3 are met—specifically the grant of time at a party's request coupled with a warning of consequences—the closure of evidence must follow default.

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• Miss Naureen Naz Butt vs Pakistan International Airlines through its2020 PLC (C.S) 1502, 2021 PLJ SC 39, 2021 P SC 1120, 2020 SCMR 1625, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-14
  contract employeevested rightmaster and servantwrit petition maintainabilityreinstatementPakistan International Airlines
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside a Single Bench's order allowing the appellant's writ petition and instead dismissed her claim. The appellant, formerly employed as an airhostess on a contract basis by Pakistan International Airlines, had her contract expire and not renewed. The core legal questions involved whether a contract employee possesses a vested right to regularization or reinstatement upon the expiry of their contract, and whether a writ petition is maintainable for employees of Pakistan International Airlines whose service is governed by the principle of master and servant rather than statutory rules. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a contract employee whose period of employment expires by afflux of time carries no vested right to remain in employment or to be reinstated, and that writ petitions against Pakistan International Airlines are not maintainable as its service is governed by master and servant principles. The key principle laid down is that contract employees have no enforceable right to continued employment or regularization upon contract expiry, and non-statutory corporate employment is subject to master and servant rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee acquire a vested right to regularization or extension upon the expiry of their contract period?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against Pakistan International Airlines for service matters not governed by statutory rules?
  • Can courts compel an employer to reinstate a contract employee after the expiration of their employment contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Nazakat Baig vs Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and another2020 PLJ SC 226, 2020 SCMR 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-28
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionArticle 199statutory rulesnon-statutory bodySupreme Court Bar AssociationPakistan Bar Councilfunctionality rule
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing an Intra-Court Appeal, which upheld the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging an amendment to Rule 9(a) of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Rules, 1989. The appellant challenged the clubbing of Rawalpindi with Islamabad Capital Territory for the rotational presidency of the Supreme Court Bar Association. The core legal questions were whether the Supreme Court Bar Association and Pakistan Bar Council are bodies amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and whether the Association's rules are statutory. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that neither the Bar Council nor the Bar Association perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or Provinces within the contemplation of Article 199, as the executive exercises no administrative control over them. The Court established that the Supreme Court Bar Association is a non-statutory body, making its rules non-statutory and unenforceable through constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court Bar Association amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Are the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Rules, 1989 statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Does the Pakistan Bar Council or Supreme Court Bar Association perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation or a Province under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Nazakat Baig vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law & Justice, Islamabad and another2020 P SC 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-28
  writ jurisdictionconstitutional petitionSupreme Court Bar Associationnon-statutory bodyalternative remedybar association rulesjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition regarding an amendment to Rule 9(a) of the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Rules, 1989. The amendment grouped Islamabad and Rawalpindi together for the rotational Presidency of the Supreme Court Bar Association. The appellant contended this was discriminatory and sought judicial intervention. The core legal questions were whether the Supreme Court Bar Association is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and whether the Association's rules are statutory in nature. The Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court Bar Association is a non-statutory body and does not perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, Provinces, or local authorities. Consequently, it is not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that adequate alternative remedies exist under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973, which the appellant failed to exhaust. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Are the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan Rules, 1989, statutory in nature?
  • Does the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan perform functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, Provinces, or local authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Abid Baig vs Zahid Sabir (decd.) through L.Rs2021 PLJ SC 161, 2020 PSC 585, 2020 SCMR 601, 2020 SCP 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-12
  inheritance disputerelinquishment of inheritancepublic policyburden of prooffraudulent documentsShariah inheritanceCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a long-standing inheritance dispute where the appellant, a brother, sought to deprive his sisters of their legal shares in their deceased father’s estate. The core legal questions involved the validity of an alleged compromise application and a subsequent agreement purportedly executed by the deceased sister, Zahida Sabir, relinquishing her inheritance rights for monetary consideration. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the execution of these documents, which were found to be fabricated and non-existent on the court record during the relevant period. The Court emphasized that inheritance rights vest immediately upon the predecessor's death under Shariah, and any purported relinquishment of such rights by female heirs is often contrary to public policy. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an application to withdraw a suit does not constitute a withdrawal until formally accepted by the court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, noting the appellant’s persistent, frivolous attempts to delay the distribution of the estate for forty-five years.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an application to withdraw a suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 automatically result in the withdrawal of the suit?
  • Is a relinquishment of inheritance rights by a female heir contrary to public policy under Islamic jurisprudence?
  • Can a party rely on a compromise agreement that lacks evidence of consideration under Section 25 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Does the burden of proving the execution of a compromise agreement lie on the party asserting its existence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Aamer Hassan vs Commissioner of Income Tax, etc2020 P C T L R 1353, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 1263, 2020 P SC 1287, 2020 SCMR 1218, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-30
  major penaltyreduction to lower pay scalecivil servicetime-bound penaltymisconductinefficiencyservice record
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Inspector in the Income Tax Department, challenged a major penalty of reduction to the lowest time-scale imposed under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, following allegations of misconduct and inefficiency. The Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal, leading to the present proceedings before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether a major penalty of reduction to a lower post or pay scale could be imposed without specifying a duration. The Supreme Court held that such a penalty must be time-bound. Relying on Fundamental Rule 29, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the penalty is to punish for a specific lapse, not to permanently relegate a civil servant to a lower position indefinitely. The Court emphasized that failing to specify a duration renders the penalty disproportionate and contrary to the service rules. Consequently, the Court partially allowed the appeal, setting a fixed period of three years for the penalty and directing the department to rectify the appellant's service record accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a major penalty of reduction to a lower post or pay scale be imposed without specifying a duration?
  • Does Fundamental Rule 29 require that a penalty of reduction in rank or pay scale be time-bound?
  • Is a major penalty of reduction to a lower position intended to permanently relegate a civil servant to a lower status?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Mujib-ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani vs Returning Officer, PB-41, Washuk & Others2021 P SC 860, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 718, 2020 SCP 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  vote recountelection petitionmargin of victorydoctrine of electioncorrupt and illegal practicesreturning officer discretionconsolidation of results
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing an election petition concerning the provincial assembly constituency PB-41, Washuk. The core legal questions involve the interpretation and mandatory scope of vote recount provisions under section 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017, the application of the doctrine of election when a party abandons a remedy during preliminary litigation, and the mandatory statutory requirements for framing an election petition alleging corrupt practices under sections 142 and 144 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that once an aggrieved candidate abandons a challenge relating to pre-consolidation recounts and alternative appellate remedies attain finality, the same issues cannot be re-agitated through a subsequent election petition. Furthermore, election petitions lacking precise material facts, credible particulars, and specific evidence regarding alleged irregularities remain legally deficient and non-proceedable. The Court dismissed the appeal with costs, upholding the concurrent findings of the Election Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate who abandons a pre-consolidation recount plea in earlier constitutional proceedings can re-agitate the same matter through a subsequent election petition?
  • Does section 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017 make a vote recount mandatory for the Returning Officer when the margin of victory falls below the specified threshold?
  • Are the conditions regarding the margin of victory and the reasonableness of a recount request under section 95(5) of the Elections Act, 2017 to be interpreted conjunctively or disjunctively?
  • What are the mandatory legal requirements for the contents and particulars of an election petition alleging corrupt and illegal practices under section 144 of the Elections Act, 2017?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Khan vs Haider & others2020 PLD Supreme Court 233, 2020 PLJ SC 283, 2020 P SC 312, 2020 SCP 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-11
  pre-emptionTalb-i-MuwathibatTalb-i-Ishhadretrospective applicationmaterial factspleadingsjumping demandPunjab Pre-emption Act 1991
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated matters before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of pre-emption suits by the Lahore High Court. The primary legal controversy concerned whether a pre-emptor is mandatorily required to specify the exact date, time, and place of performing 'Talb-i-Muwathibat' (the immediate demand) within the pleadings, and whether the stringent requirements established in the case of Mian Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad (PLD 2007 SC 302) apply retrospectively to pending litigation. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is a fragile, piratical right that must be exercised strictly according to Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The Court ruled that mentioning the date, time, and place of the first demand is a material fact under Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC, essential for calculating statutory timelines for subsequent demands. Furthermore, the Court clarified that judicial interpretations of statutes are declaratory of existing law and thus apply retrospectively to all pending cases unless the Court explicitly directs otherwise. Consequently, the failure to plead the specific time of the demand was fatal to the suits.

  Read full judgment →
• Mian Zafar Ali and another vs Mian Khursheed Ali2020 PLJ SC 214, 2020 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-20
  private partitionnecessary partiesnon-joinderjoint khataremandco-sharerscivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the alleged private partition of agricultural land between the heirs of Mian Rustam Ali and his brother, Mian Khursheed Ali. The appellants (sons of Mian Rustam Ali) sought a declaration that a private partition occurred in 1960, preventing the respondent from seeking a fresh partition before revenue authorities. While the Trial Court dismissed the suit, the Appellate Court reversed this, relying on an arbitration award. The Lahore High Court set aside the Appellate Court's decision, noting that the suit lacked necessary parties, specifically the widow and daughters of Mian Rustam Ali, and that revenue officials were not impleaded despite ongoing partition proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed that while Order I, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 prevents dismissal for non-joinder, the nature of the dispute regarding joint khata necessitated the presence of all co-sharers. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the case to the Trial Court, directing the appellants to implead all legal heirs and relevant revenue officials to ensure a comprehensive adjudication of the partition claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-joinder of necessary parties in a suit for declaration regarding land partition warrant the dismissal of the suit?
  • Are the legal heirs of a deceased co-sharer necessary parties in a suit challenging the partition of joint agricultural land?
  • Can a suit regarding the partition of joint khata proceed without impleading the relevant revenue officials when partition proceedings are pending before them?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Zak Re-Rolling Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Appellate Tribunal Inland2020 P SC 964, 2020 PTD 382, 2020 SCMR 131 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-17
  sales taxfurther taxspecial proceduresteel re-rolling millsunregistered personsArticle 185(3)leave to appealnew points of law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a tax dispute regarding whether a Steel-melter/Re-rolling Mill chargeable to sales tax under the special procedure provided in Rule 58H of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 is also liable to the levy of further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 for supplies made to unregistered persons. The three forums below held that payment of sales tax under Rule 58H does not exempt a registered person from the levy of further tax under Section 3(1A). The Supreme Court affirmed the lower forums' rulings, holding that special procedure assessment does not relieve a taxpayer of further tax liabilities. Additionally, the Court declined to entertain new points of law not raised in the Reference application before the High Court or noted in the impugned judgment. The key principles affirmed are that Rule 58H special procedure does not override Section 3(1A) further tax, and under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court only considers legal questions previously raised before the forum below. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does payment of sales tax under the special procedure in Rule 58H of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 exempt a taxpayer from further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is further tax under Section 3(1A) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 applicable to supplies made by registered persons to unregistered persons under Rule 58H special procedure?
  • Can the Supreme Court entertain questions of law under Article 185(3) of the Constitution that were not raised before the forum below or noted in the impugned judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs State Life Insurance Corporation Of Pakistan and others vs Mst.2020 SCMR 1844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-03
  insurance benefitsInsurance Tribunaljurisdictionre-appointment declarationgroup insuranceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from the denial of insurance benefits by the appellant insurance corporation to the respondent widow of the deceased employee. The core legal questions involve whether the deceased breached his re-appointment declaration by holding concurrent employment as a school teacher, and whether the claim was barred under Section 115 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 regarding the jurisdiction of the Insurance Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the declaration given at the time of re-appointment in 2002 did not prohibit other government or private employment outside of insurers, rendering the denial of benefits unlawful. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 115 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 does not apply to employment-connected insurance schemes such as group insurance and self-subscribed compulsory insurance where no formal insurance policy is issued to the employees. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's concurrent government employment violates a declaration against working for any other insurer.
  • Does Section 115 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000 apply to employment-connected group and compulsory insurance schemes where no policy is issued?
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• Messrs Pak Gulf Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Islamabad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others2020 P SC 276, PTCL 2020 CL. 166, 2020 PTD 336, 2020 SCMR 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-29
  Capital Value TaxProperty transferTax collection liabilityFinance Act 1989Constitutional petitionRegistration authorityTax evasionImmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private limited construction company, sought leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment dismissing its constitutional petition, which challenged demands for Capital Value Tax (CVT). The core legal question was whether a company facilitating property transfers through private agreements to sell and allotment letters, rather than registered deeds, qualifies as a 'registering or attesting authority' responsible for collecting CVT under the Finance Act, 1989. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the company acts as the de facto transferring authority. The Court established that the 'pith and substance' of the transaction governs the liability. Even if an entity is not a formal registrar, if it facilitates property transfers through private instruments to bypass formal registration, it falls within the purview of Section 7 of the Finance Act, 1989. Consequently, such entities are legally obligated to collect and deposit CVT from purchasers, as they perform the functional role of an attesting or registering authority in the context of property transactions, preventing the evasion of statutory tax obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private limited company facilitating property transfers via allotment letters qualify as a registering or attesting authority under the Finance Act 1989?
  • Is a company obligated to collect Capital Value Tax on property transactions that do not involve formal registration with the Registrar of Documents?
  • Can a company avoid the statutory obligation to collect Capital Value Tax by utilizing private agreements to sell instead of registered deeds?
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• Messrs Kuwait National Real Estate Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Messrs Educational Excellence Ltd. and another2020 P SC 748, 2020 SCMR 171 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-19
  Specific performanceMemorandum of UnderstandingShare saleSale considerationReadiness and willingnessAd-interim stay orderAdmissionCivil Procedure CodeDiscretionary reliefCivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for specific performance of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the sale of shares in a company. The core legal questions revolved around the plaintiff's (respondent No. 1) obligation to deposit the sale consideration in court as a prerequisite for seeking specific performance, and whether the petitioners' conditional statements in their written statement constituted an admission warranting a decree under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Civil Judge's order directing the deposit of the purchase price. The Court decided to convert the petition into an appeal, allow it, set aside the impugned High Court order, and restore the Civil Judge's order dated 13.11.2018. The key principles laid down are that a party seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell is essentially required to deposit the sale consideration in court to demonstrate readiness and willingness, and failure to do so disentitles them to the discretionary relief. Furthermore, for an admission to invoke Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C., it must be clear, unambiguous, unqualified, and unequivocal, and read as a whole.

  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khurshid Soap And Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh2020 PLD Supreme Court 641 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Gas Infrastructure Development CessGIDC Act 2015Constitutional validityFee vs. TaxLegislative competenceRes judicataJudgment in remRetrospective applicationQuid pro quoFuture serviceDiscriminationGas pipelinesEnergy securityNorth-South pipelineTAPI pipelineIP pipeline
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals and petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess Act, 2015 (GIDC Act, 2015), which imposed a cess on industrial and commercial natural gas consumers to fund gas import infrastructure projects. The core legal questions included whether the levy constituted a "fee" or a "tax," the Parliament's legislative competence, the applicability of *res judicata* to prior High Court judgments, and the necessity of a timeline for future services. The Court, by a 2:1 majority, dismissed the appeals, upholding the GIDC Act, 2015, as a valid "Cess-fee" enacted within legislative competence (Article 70, Entry 54 read with Entry 27 of Part I, Fourth Schedule to the Constitution). It ruled that *res judicata* does not apply to judgments on the *vires* of a legislative enactment, and the retrospective application of Section 8 was valid. However, the Court issued directions, restraining the Federal Government from charging further cess until collected revenue is expended on projects, mandating recovery of arrears in installments, and setting deadlines for project commencement, failure of which would render the Act in-operational. The key principle established is that a "Cess-fee" is a purpose-specific levy for future benefits, distinct from a general tax, and a Supreme Court's determination on legislative validity operates *in rem*.

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• Messrs Elite Estate (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2020 P C T L R 1276, 2020 SCMR 494, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 381, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-13
  withholding taxnon-resident companydouble taxation treatytechnical servicesconsultancy feeincome tax exemptionbusiness profits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private entity, engaged a non-resident Egyptian company for consultancy services related to infrastructure and golf course development. Seeking exemption from withholding tax on the consultancy fees, the petitioner approached the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 152 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Upon rejection of the exemption request and subsequent dismissal of the revision and constitutional petition, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was liable to deduct 15% withholding tax on payments made to the foreign entity. The Court examined the Pakistan-Egypt Double Taxation Treaty, specifically Article 12 concerning fees for technical services. It held that the consultancy services fell squarely under Article 12, which permits taxation in the contracting State where the services arise, rather than Article 7 regarding business profits. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed exemption. The principle established is that consultancy fees for technical services are governed by specific treaty provisions regarding technical services, precluding reliance on general business profit provisions when the nature of the income is clearly defined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether consultancy fees paid to a non-resident company for technical services are subject to withholding tax under the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Does Article 12 of the Pakistan-Egypt Double Taxation Treaty apply to fees for technical services?
  • Can a taxpayer rely on Article 7 of the Pakistan-Egypt Double Taxation Treaty for business profits when the income is derived from technical services?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Elite Estate (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation Of Pakistan through SecretaryPTCL 2020 CL. 194, 2020 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-01-13
  withholding taxdouble taxation treatytechnical servicesnon-resident entityconsultancy feetax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a private company, engaged an Egyptian non-resident entity for consultancy services related to infrastructure and golf course development. Seeking to avoid withholding tax on payments made to this foreign entity, the petitioner applied for an exemption under Section 152 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Upon the rejection of this request by the Federal Board of Revenue and the subsequent dismissal of their revision and constitutional petition, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was liable to deduct withholding tax on these consultancy payments, specifically whether the income fell under Article 7 (Business Profits) or Article 12 (Technical Services) of the Double Taxation Treaty between Pakistan and Egypt. The Court held that because the payments were for consultancy services and not general business profits, the matter was governed by Article 12, which mandates taxation in the State where the services arise. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the petitioner was not entitled to the claimed exemption.

  Questions settled

  • Does a consultancy fee paid to a non-resident entity for technical services fall under the category of business profits or technical services under the Pakistan-Egypt Double Taxation Treaty?
  • Is a petitioner liable to deduct withholding tax on payments made to a foreign entity for professional consultancy services under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Article 12 of the Double Taxation Treaty between Pakistan and Egypt permit the taxation of technical services in the State where they arise?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmed vs District Police Officer, Bahawalpur, etc2020 PLC (C.S.) 636, 2020 SCMR 653, 2020 SCP 78 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-18
  departmental inquiryenhancement of penaltynatural justicepersonal hearingservice appealmisconductpolice discipline
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Sub-Inspector, challenged his dismissal from service following departmental proceedings regarding his failure to arrest an accused in a criminal case, which allegedly led to the victim's suicide. Initially, the appellant received a lesser penalty of reduction in rank, but the Regional Police Officer (RPO) subsequently enhanced this to dismissal after granting the appellant a personal hearing in an orderly room. The appellant appealed to the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his challenge. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the enhancement of the penalty violated the principles of natural justice and Rule 12(iii) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, due to the lack of a formal show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that the rule requires an opportunity to show cause either personally or in writing. Since the RPO provided a personal hearing to the appellant regarding the proposed enhancement, the Court found no violation of the rules or natural justice. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that a personal hearing satisfies the statutory requirement for showing cause.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement to provide an opportunity to show cause against the enhancement of a penalty necessitate a written notice, or is a personal hearing sufficient?
  • Can a disciplinary authority enhance a penalty imposed on a police officer after granting a personal hearing?
  • Does the failure to provide a formal show-cause notice violate the principles of natural justice if a personal hearing was otherwise provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ellahi vs The State2020 SCMR 586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-20
  criminal appealmurderous assaultappreciation of evidenceinjured witnessacquittal of co-accusedleave to appealhomicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction for homicide and murderous assault. The petitioner, Mazhar Ellahi, was convicted for the murder of an eighteen-year-old and for causing injuries to a witness who attempted to intervene. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to death and imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently modified, commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment while adding a conviction under Section 337-L(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner challenged these convictions, arguing that the acquittal of a co-accused undermined the prosecution's case, that the motive was absent, and that the suppression of a forensic report destroyed the prosecution's evidence. The Supreme Court examined the record, noting the prompt registration of the FIR and the consistency of the injured witness's testimony. The Court held that the acquittal of a co-accused does not automatically invalidate the prosecution's case against the principal offender, especially when the evidence remains consistent. Finding the evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court declined to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused automatically invalidate the prosecution's case against the remaining accused?
  • Can the testimony of an injured witness be relied upon if the prosecution fails to produce a forensic report?
  • Is the prompt registration of an FIR and consistent testimony sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder despite the absence of a proven motive?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ellahi vs StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-02-20
  criminal petitionmurdermurderous assaultinjured witnessacquittal of co-accusedprompt FIRleave declined
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition assailing the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the petitioner's conviction for murder and murderous assault, while altering the death penalty to imprisonment for life and adding a conviction under Section 337-L(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of prompt FIR registration, the credibility of an injured eyewitness, the impact of the acquittal of a co-accused on the prosecution's case against the remaining accused, and the effect of an absent forensic report. The Supreme Court held that the promptness of the proceedings, the natural presence of the injured witness, and medical corroboration firmly establish the petitioner's guilt, and that the acquittal of a co-accused does not undermine the credible testimony regarding the principal offender. The key principle laid down is that the acquittal of a co-accused does not falsify the prosecution case against the main culprit where ocular testimony is consistent, prompt, and corroborated by medical evidence, and that minor evidentiary gaps such as missing forensic reports do not vitiate a conviction supported by reliable eyewitness accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused destroy the prosecution case against the remaining convicted accused in a criminal trial?
  • Can an injured eyewitness's testimony be relied upon despite minor discrepancies and the absence of a forensic report?
  • Whether promptness in registering the FIR and conducting medical examinations lends credence to the prosecution case?
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• Matti Ullah vs The State2020 SCMR 1222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-01
  narcotic possessionofficial witnessespublic witnessesforensic reportappreciation of evidencecriminal convictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the concurrent findings of the Special Court (CNS) and the Peshawar High Court, which convicted the petitioner for possessing 7200 grams of cannabis under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of public witnesses, and whether the forensic report and recovery evidence were sufficient to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecution witnesses, being officials of the Anti-Narcotic Force, provided consistent and credible testimony that remained unshaken during cross-examination. The Court affirmed that the absence of public witnesses does not inherently diminish the value of official testimony, especially when such testimony is reliable and consistent. Furthermore, the Court upheld the validity of the forensic report, noting it followed established protocols. The judgment reaffirms the principle that official acts of state functionaries are statutorily presumed valid, and public apathy should not be exploited to undermine the administration of justice in narcotic cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of public witnesses in a narcotics case automatically invalidate the testimony of official witnesses?
  • Are the official acts and declarations of state functionaries statutorily presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence to the contrary?
  • Can a conviction for narcotics possession be sustained solely on the basis of consistent testimony from official witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Martin Dow Marker Ltd., Quetta vs Asadullah Khan & others2020 SCP 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  reinstatementback benefitsworkmanmisconductabsence from dutycomplete justiceabandonment of relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals filed against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which maintained the reinstatement of the respondent employees in service without back benefits. The core legal questions involve whether the respondents were workmen and the effect of their subsequent refusal to join duty upon being offered reinstatement by the employer. The Supreme Court held that while the concurrent findings of the lower forums regarding the respondents' status as workmen could not be disturbed, the respondents' failure to report for duty after being issued reinstatement letters demonstrated a lack of bona fides and an abandonment of the relief granted. The Court laid down the principle that employees who refuse to resume duties upon valid reinstatement and show no willingness to work forfeit their right to equitable relief of reinstatement, and the Supreme Court may mold relief under its constitutional jurisdiction to achieve complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower forums regarding the status of an employee as a workman under labor laws?
  • Does the failure of an employee to report for duty after receiving a valid reinstatement letter amount to an abandonment of the relief of reinstatement?
  • Can the Supreme Court mold relief under Article 187 of the Constitution based on subsequent conduct of parties during appellate proceedings?
  • Whether an employee who claims to be a workman can refuse reinstatement on the ground that they were previously employed as officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Martin Dow Marker Ltd., Quetta and others vs Asadullah Khan and others2021 PLC 67, 2021 P SC 1111, 2020 SCP 210, 2020 SCMR 2147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-05
  reinstatementworkman statusbona fidelabour lawcomplete justiceabandonment of reliefindustrial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from a labour dispute where employees, previously terminated, sought reinstatement. The Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal declared the respondents to be workmen and ordered reinstatement with back benefits. The High Court maintained the reinstatement but disallowed back benefits. Before the Supreme Court, the employer contended that the respondents were not workmen and had failed to report for duty despite a formal reinstatement offer. The core legal question was whether the respondents' failure to resume duty after winning reinstatement orders demonstrated a lack of bona fides and abandonment of relief. The Supreme Court held that while concurrent findings regarding workman status are generally not disturbed, the respondents' refusal to report for duty—based on an unjustified demand to be reinstated as officers—constituted an abandonment of the relief they had successfully sought. Invoking Article 187(1) of the Constitution to do complete justice, the Court set aside the reinstatement order. The key principle established is that an employee who refuses to comply with a reasonable reinstatement order effectively abandons their claim to relief.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding an employee's status as a workman?
  • Does an employee's failure to report for duty after a reinstatement offer constitute an abandonment of the relief granted?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise its power under Article 187(1) to mould relief based on the conduct of parties during litigation?
  • Is an employee's refusal to accept reinstatement as a workman justified if they previously sought such status in court?
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• Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs vs Misri Khan2020 PLD Supreme Court 749, 2021 P SC 1217, 2020 SCP 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-24
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadacknowledgement receiptmode of proofproduction of postmandocumentary evidenceQanun-e-Shahdat Order
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal, filed under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, arises from a pre-emption suit dismissed by the Trial Court, decreed by the District Judge, and subsequently dismissed again by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction. The core legal questions involved the necessity of proving the delivery and receipt of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice through the production of the postman or by confronting the respondent with the acknowledgement receipt, as well as the proper mode of tendering documents in evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where the purchaser denies receipt of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice, the pre-emptor must legally establish its delivery either by producing the postman or by properly confronting the respondent with the acknowledgement receipt during testimony. The Court laid down that mere exhibition of documents through a counsel's unsworn statement without following the rules of evidence and producing original or certified copies does not dispense with the mandatory proof required under the law, particularly under the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary to produce the postman or confront the respondent with the acknowledgement receipt to prove the delivery of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice when its receipt is denied?
  • Can documents be validly tendered in evidence through a simple unsworn statement of a counsel without following the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order, 1984?
  • What is the effect of failing to establish the delivery and receipt of the Talb-i-Ishhad notice in a pre-emption suit?
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• Malik Ubaidullah vs Government of Punjab, etc2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 392, 2021 PLC (C.S.) 65, PLD 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-14
  disability quotapersons with disabilitiessanctioned postsreasonable accommodationhuman dignitysocial model of disabilityright to livelihoodrecruitment criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal concerning the recruitment against the disability quota under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981. The petitioner challenged the selection process for the post of Senior Elementary School Educator (Arabic), where only one candidate was appointed under the disability quota out of 81 advertised posts. The High Court had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition and intra-court appeal. The Supreme Court addressed whether the statutory disability quota must be calculated on the basis of advertised vacancies or total sanctioned posts. The Court held that the disability quota must be determined on the total sanctioned strength of the establishment and apportioned among distinct cadres, rather than being restricted to arbitrarily advertised vacancies. Calculating the quota based solely on advertised posts unlawfully undermines the statutory rights and livelihood prospects of persons with disabilities. The Court set aside the High Court's judgments, directed the reconsideration of the petitioner's application against the unfulfilled quota seats, and instructed governments to adopt rights-respecting terminology and provide reasonable accommodation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statutory disability quota under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981 must be calculated based on total sanctioned posts or only the advertised vacancies?
  • How should an establishment apportion and allocate the statutory disability quota across different categories and cadres of posts?
  • Can an establishment adjust or shift the disability quota to another post if a specific category of posts has fewer than 50 sanctioned seats or is unfit for persons with disabilities?
  • Whether the State and employers are under a legal obligation to provide reasonable accommodation and accessibility at the workplace for employees with disabilities?
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• Liaqat Ali vs Fayasuddin and others2020 SCMR 1816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-11
  landlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantevacuee trust propertyrent controller jurisdictionejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed the respondent's constitutional petition regarding an ejectment dispute. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) and the property's alleged belonging to the Evacuee Trust Properties Board ousted the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant between the original allottee and the inducted tenant. The Supreme Court held that the induction of the tenant by the respondent created a landlord-tenant relationship, and the mere cancellation or pending dispute regarding the PTD with the Evacuee Trust Property Board did not terminate that relationship or render the Rent Controller without jurisdiction. The Court established the principle that a tenant inducted by a landlord cannot deny the landlord-tenant relationship solely on the basis of a collateral dispute regarding the title or cancellation of transfer documents between the landlord and a third party like the Evacuee Trust Property Board, pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Deed terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant between the original allottee and the inducted tenant?
  • Does a dispute regarding property ownership with the Evacuee Trust Properties Board oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a tenant deny the title of the landlord who inducted him on the ground of pending litigation regarding the property's title?
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• Liaqat Ali and others vs Safdar Khan2020 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-02
  pre-emptionTalabsco-sharersuperior rightsale pricepostal noticecivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a long-standing pre-emption dispute over a parcel of land in District Charsadda, initially sold on June 13, 2005. The respondent, Safdar Khan, filed a pre-emption suit claiming superior rights under section 6 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. The trial court dismissed the suit due to the pre-emptor's failure to prove the due performance of Talabs, and the first appellate court initially maintained the dismissal. However, upon remand by the High Court, the appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, a decision subsequently upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondent had established the requisite Talabs in accordance with law, proved his superior right as a co-sharer, and determined the actual sale price. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had successfully discharged the onus of proving the performance of Talabs through consistent oral testimony and official postal records, and that minor discrepancies in witness statements were mere narrative variations insufficient to defeat a statutory right. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies or narrative variations in the testimony of witnesses regarding the performance of Talabs are sufficient to defeat a pre-emption suit?
  • Can the official testimony of a registration clerk and postal staff, along with relevant receipts and acknowledgment due, legally establish the dispatch and delivery of a pre-emption notice?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the performance of Talabs and superior pre-emptive rights warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a pre-emptor's failure to establish acquiescence or prior intimation to the satisfaction of the court invalidate their statutory right of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority and another vs Muhammad Tariq Niaz2020 SCMR 1957, 2020 SCP 168 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-27
  specific performancepublic auctionhighest biddercontractual obligationspublic functionarydeclaratory suitarbitrary cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a suit for declaration and specific performance filed by the respondent against the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) regarding the auction of a plot. The core legal question was whether the LDA, having declared the respondent the highest bidder and accepted part payment, could unilaterally cancel the auction and re-auction the property based on a higher offer from a non-participant. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the LDA’s conduct was unjustified and lacked legal sanctity, noting that the respondent had fulfilled all contractual obligations and the LDA had formally accepted the bid. The Court emphasized that public functionaries must act within the prescribed limits of the law and cannot arbitrarily frustrate legitimate contracts or public confidence. The principle laid down is that once a public auction process is concluded and a bid is accepted, the authority cannot arbitrarily cancel the transaction to accommodate third-party offers, as such conduct is contrary to the principles of fair dealing and public trust.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public authority unilaterally cancel a concluded auction bid to accept a higher offer from a non-participant?
  • Does the acceptance of a bid and partial payment by a public authority create a binding contractual obligation?
  • Is a public authority permitted to re-auction property after a valid contract has been formed with the highest bidder?
  Read full judgment →
• Khush Rang vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1675 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-05
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderabductioncommon intentionrecovery of vehiclecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging an order of the Peshawar High Court which declined post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving murder and abduction. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the lack of direct evidence and the circumstances surrounding the recovery of a vehicle. The Supreme Court held that the case against the petitioner required further inquiry, noting the absence of direct evidence, the belated recording of the petitioner's name under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the fact that the dead body was not recovered at the petitioner's pointation. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and admitted the petitioner to bail. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where a case lacks direct evidence and requires further inquiry into the allegations, the accused is entitled to the concession of bail under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of direct evidence and the need for further inquiry into the prosecution's case entitle an accused to post-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at a belated stage sufficient to deny bail when other direct evidence is lacking?
  Read full judgment →
• Khiyal Saba and another vs The State and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 209, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 499, 2020 SCMR 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-13
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal appealmurderattempt to murderbail concession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of post-arrest bail by the Peshawar High Court in a case involving charges under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the specific allegations and evidence presented. The Supreme Court observed that the FIR contained no allegation against the petitioners regarding the injuries sustained by the deceased, Jaram Khan. Furthermore, the nature of the injuries sustained by the injured witnesses remained undetermined, and no incriminating recoveries were made from the petitioners during the investigation. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners' case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under the law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and granted bail to the appellants, establishing the principle that where the prosecution fails to link the accused to the fatal injuries and the nature of other injuries remains unverified, the case warrants further inquiry, thereby entitling the accused to the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of specific allegations regarding the fatal injury in an FIR justify the grant of bail?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the ambit of 'further inquiry' for the purpose of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is bail appropriate when the nature of injuries sustained by the injured witnesses remains undetermined by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Salman Rafique and another vs National Accountability Bureau2020 PLD Supreme Court 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-17
  National Accountability OrdinanceApprover's statementCorroborationFundamental rightsLibertyDignity of manPresumption of innocenceArbitrary arrestProportionalityBailCorruption and corrupt practicesConstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a case where petitioners, Khawaja Saad Rafique and Khawaja Salman Rafique, were accused of corruption and corrupt practices under the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), 1999, related to a housing scheme. The core legal questions revolved around the sufficiency of evidence, particularly an approver's statement, and the adherence of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to legal and constitutional principles. The Supreme Court held that there were no reasonable grounds to believe the petitioners were involved in any offence triable under the NAO. The approver's statement was deemed inadmissible due to procedural irregularities, including the lack of notice to the accused for cross-examination and failure to inform the approver of non-remission to prosecution custody, and its lack of corroboration. The Court emphasized that purely civil or commercial disputes between private entities, without adverse public or governmental interest, do not fall under the NAO. The judgment underscored the paramount importance of fundamental rights, including liberty, dignity, and the presumption of innocence, criticizing NAB's conduct for disregarding law, fairness, and proportionality in exercising its powers of arrest and investigation.

  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Anwer Majid vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman2020 PLD Supreme Court 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-02
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsmedical treatment abroadhardshipSupreme Court Rules 1980Exit Control Listmoney laundering
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a criminal appeal filed by a prominent accused seeking post-arrest bail on medical grounds and permission to travel abroad for a high-risk cardiac procedure in a massive money laundering case investigated by the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether a Bench of two Judges could hear an appeal involving the grant or cancellation of bail, whether an accused facing trial can claim a right to seek offshore medical treatment, and whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on grounds of hardship and deteriorating health. The Supreme Court held that under the proviso to Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, a Bench of two Judges is fully competent to hear bail matters. On the merits, the Court rejected the request for medical treatment abroad, holding that equality before the law and due process do not entitle an accused to offshore treatment. However, recognizing his severe medical deterioration, advance age, prolonged incarceration of over two years, and required cardiac procedure as constituting genuine hardship, the Court granted post-arrest bail subject to heavy security, placement on the Exit Control List, and cooperation with trial and investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal involving the grant or cancellation of bail be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court under Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • Is an accused facing criminal trial entitled as a matter of right or legal concession to proceed abroad for medical treatment?
  • Does severe medical deterioration combined with prolonged incarceration constitute a sufficient ground of hardship for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Zeb vs The State through Special Prosecutor, A.N.F.2020 P SC (Crl.) 719, 2020 SCMR 444 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlpassenger in vehiclefurther inquiryrecovery of contraband
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail after being apprehended as a passenger in a vehicle from which contraband was recovered, facing charges under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Peshawar High Court had previously declined his bail application. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a passenger in a vehicle carrying narcotics, without established prior connection or relationship with the driver, is entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, granting bail to the petitioner. The court held that where investigation fails to establish any prima facie connection or relationship between the passenger and the driver regarding the recovered contraband, a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made out, entitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a passenger travelling in a vehicle from which narcotics are recovered is entitled to post-arrest bail when no connection or relationship with the driver is established during investigation?
  • Does the absence of data establishing a link between a vehicle's passenger and driver make out a case for further inquiry under criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Naseer and another vs The State and another2020 SCMR 1966 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-17
  murderocular evidenceabsconsionlife imprisonmentchance witnesscriminal appealmedical evidencesentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the petitioner for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, while commuting his death sentence to imprisonment for life. The core legal questions involved the credibility of ocular witnesses, the impact of the petitioner's prolonged absconsion, and the sufficiency of evidence regarding motive. The Supreme Court held that the ocular testimony, corroborated by medical evidence and the prompt recording of the crime report, was reliable. The Court rejected the argument that the witnesses were 'chance witnesses,' noting their consistency and proximity to the crime scene. Regarding the sentence, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision to commute the death penalty to life imprisonment, noting that while the motive was not independently established, the conviction remained sound. The judgment reinforces the principle that the promptness of medical examination following a crime report effectively precludes the possibility of fabrication, and that a neighbor residing adjacent to the crime scene is a credible witness.

  Questions settled

  • Does the prompt medical examination of a deceased following a crime report preclude the possibility of fabrication of the complaint?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the prosecution fails to independently establish the motive for the crime?
  • Is a witness residing adjacent to the scene of the occurrence considered a credible witness?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive justify the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 119, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 680, 2020 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-07
  post-arrest bailforged documentsfurther inquiryexpert opinioncorruptioncriminal breach of trustcheating
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, arises from an order of the Peshawar High Court refusing post-arrest bail to the appellant in case FIR No. 02 registered under sections 419, 420, 468, 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's case falls within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the lack of expert opinion regarding the alleged forged signatures and the fact that a co-accused beneficiary was already granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the absence of expert verification of the signatures and the grant of bail to the co-accused rendered the case one of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and granted post-arrest bail to the appellant, establishing the principle that failure to collect crucial forensic evidence like handwriting expert reports during investigation can tilt the case in favor of further inquiry for bail purposes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of an expert opinion on alleged forged signatures makes a case one for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the grant of bail to a co-accused who is the primary beneficiary provide a ground for granting bail to another accused allegedly involved in preparing forged documents?
  • Can a criminal petition arising from an order refusing bail be converted into an appeal and allowed when the investigation lacks crucial forensic verification?
  Read full judgment →
• Karachi Circular Railway and Local Train in Karachi_ In the matter of vs N_a2020 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-06
  Kidney Hill Parkanti-encroachmentpublic amenitiesMaster Plan KarachiKDA Scheme No. 32illegal allotmentopen space
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves various miscellaneous applications concerning urban management, encroachments, and land use in Karachi, including the operation of the Karachi Circular Railway, illegal commercial constructions on public land, and encroachments on public amenities, footpaths, and parks by state institutions and foreign missions. A core legal question addressed relates to the ownership, legal status, and claims over the 62 acres of land known as Kidney Hill Park (KDA Scheme No. 32 'Falaknuma'). The Supreme Court held that the land in question was zoned as an open space in the Master Plan of Karachi and designated for a water reservoir and recreation park, and neither housing societies nor private parties could claim any legitimate legal interest or ownership over it. The Court laid down that land designated as open spaces and public amenities in the Master Plan cannot be utilized, allotted, or converted for residential or commercial purposes by housing societies or revenue authorities, and any purported leases or allotments contrary thereto are null and void.

  Questions settled

  • Can housing societies or private allottees claim legal ownership over land zoned as an open space and public park in the Master Plan of Karachi?
  • Does the Revenue Department possess the power to grant 99-year leases of State land contrary to prohibitory orders of the Supreme Court?
  • What is the legal status of Kidney Hill Scheme No. 32 Falaknuma under the Master Plan of Karachi?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamran vs Kamran Malik and another2020 SCMR 1814 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-30
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabetmenttriple murdercriminal appealpre-trial detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged with abetment in a triple murder case. The petitioner was alleged to have exhorted his father, the co-accused, to commit the fatal assault on three brothers. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was not attributed any physical harm to the deceased but was accused of instigation, was entitled to the concession of bail pending trial. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner's specific role—allegedly instigating his father rather than taking the deadly initiative himself—raised a question of further inquiry under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Holding that the petitioner could not be detained merely as a measure of punishment and noting that the investigation was complete, the Court allowed the appeal and granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where an accused's specific role in a crime is subject to further inquiry, particularly regarding the nature of their participation (instigation versus direct action), they are entitled to bail under the principle of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the role of an accused who allegedly instigates a crime rather than committing the physical act fall within the ambit of further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be kept in detention pending trial merely as a measure of punishment?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation is complete and their specific role in the offense requires further evidentiary determination?
  Read full judgment →
• Kamran Ullah vs The State and another2021 P SC (Crl.) 172, 2021 P S c (Crl.) 172, 2020 SCMR 1214 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-06
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderevidentiary valuecriminal appealcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was accused of murder following the discovery of the deceased's body in a field. The prosecution's case relied on a supplementary statement alleging a monetary dispute and the recovery of semi-burnt cell phone handsets at the petitioner's instance. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail pending trial, given the nature of the evidence collected during the investigation. The Supreme Court observed that the evidentiary value of the prosecution's evidence, including the Call Detail Record (C.D.R.) which lacked content details, and the forensic mismatch of the weapon recovered from an accomplice, had yet to be tested through judicial scrutiny. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a definitive nexus between the deceased and the recovered handsets at this stage. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of further inquiry, warranting the grant of bail under the statutory provisions governing pre-trial release.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of content details in a Call Detail Record (C.D.R.) affect the strength of the prosecution's case for the purpose of bail?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the remit of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the grant of bail?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the prosecution has not yet established a definitive nexus between the accused and the incriminating evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Kafyat Ullah Khan vs Inspector-General of Police, Islamabad and another2020 PLC (C.S.) 212, 2020 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-16
  service lawmajor penaltydismissal from servicedouble jeopardyleave without payunauthorized absenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had modified the petitioner's penalty of dismissal from service to removal from service. The petitioner, a civil servant, had been dismissed from service, and his period of unauthorized absence was simultaneously treated as leave without pay. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the imposition of a major penalty of dismissal from service, combined with the treatment of the period of absence as leave without pay, constitutes an impermissible double penalty. The petitioner relied on precedent suggesting such orders are unsustainable, while the respondent cited conflicting case law supporting the maintenance of dismissal penalties despite the treatment of absence as leave without pay. Recognizing a conflict in the existing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court regarding whether treating an absence period as leave without pay alongside a dismissal order amounts to a double penalty, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this legal inconsistency. The appeal is to be heard on the existing record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the imposition of a major penalty of dismissal from service, coupled with treating the period of absence as leave without pay, constitute an impermissible double penalty?
  • Is a dismissal order sustainable when the period of absence leading to the dismissal is simultaneously treated as leave without pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs The President of Pakistan and others2020 KLR Supreme Court 299, 2020 PLD Supreme Court 346, 2020 SCP 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-19
  Presidential ReferenceSupreme Judicial Counciljudicial independenceaccountability of judgestax proceedingsdue processconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional challenge to a Presidential Reference filed against a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question addressed was the validity of the Reference and the subsequent proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council. The Court, by a majority, allowed the petitions and declared the Presidential Reference to be of no legal effect, thereby quashing it and abating the proceedings, including the show-cause notice issued to the Petitioner. While quashing the Reference, the Court directed the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to initiate fresh, independent proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, against the spouse and children of the Petitioner regarding the acquisition of specific foreign properties. The Court established a strict timeline for these tax proceedings and mandated that the Federal Board of Revenue submit a report to the Supreme Judicial Council, which may then exercise its suo moto jurisdiction under Article 209 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The judgment emphasizes the dual principles of judicial independence and the accountability of judges under the law, affirming that while judges are subject to the Constitution, they are also entitled to due process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Judicial Council exercise suo moto jurisdiction based on a report from the Federal Board of Revenue regarding a judge's family assets?
  • Does the quashing of a Presidential Reference against a judge result in the abatement of pending proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council?
  • Are proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, against a judge's family members distinct from proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council?
  • Is a judge of a Constitutional Court entitled to the same inalienable right to be treated in accordance with law as any other citizen?
  Read full judgment →
• Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others vs The President of Pakistan and others2020 P SC 1159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-19
  judicial independencePresidential ReferenceSupreme Judicial Councildue processtax proceedingsconstitutional petitionaccountability of judges
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the validity of a Presidential Reference filed against a sitting Supreme Court judge before the Supreme Judicial Council. The core legal question addressed was whether the Reference and the subsequent proceedings initiated against the petitioner were legally sustainable under the Constitution. The Court, by a majority, held that the Reference was of no legal effect and ordered it to be quashed, resulting in the abatement of the proceedings pending before the Supreme Judicial Council. While quashing the Reference, the Court directed the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to initiate fresh, independent proceedings under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, against the judge's spouse and children regarding the acquisition of specific foreign properties. The Court established that while the independence of the judiciary is a pivotal constitutional value, no institution or individual is above the law. It affirmed that judges, like all citizens, possess the inalienable right to be treated in accordance with the law, balancing judicial accountability with the protection of fundamental rights and due process within the constitutional framework.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Presidential Reference filed against a judge be quashed if it lacks legal effect?
  • Does the Supreme Judicial Council have the authority to exercise suo moto jurisdiction regarding a judge's conduct based on tax reports?
  • Are proceedings initiated under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, against a judge's family members distinct from proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council?
  • Is a judge entitled to the same inalienable right to be treated in accordance with the law as any other citizen?
  Read full judgment →
• Jurists Foundation through Chairman vs Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-26
  public interest litigationfundamental rightsChief of the Army Staffextension of serviceconstitutional petitionCabinet approvalappointment authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenging the extension or re-appointment of the Chief of the Army Staff. Although the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition, the Court declined the request, noting the matter involves public importance and the enforcement of fundamental rights, rendering the petitioner's individual standing secondary. The Court examined the legal basis for the extension of the Chief of the Army Staff's tenure. Upon review, the Court observed significant procedural flaws, including the absence of any express statutory provision in the Pakistan Army laws governing the re-appointment or extension of the Chief of the Army Staff. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Cabinet approval process appeared deficient, as a majority of members had not consented. The Court held that the vague justification of 'regional security' was insufficient to support such an appointment. Consequently, the Court impleaded the Chief of the Army Staff as a respondent and suspended the operation of the impugned notification regarding his extension or re-appointment pending further detailed examination of the legal validity of the process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to continue a public interest petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution if the petitioner seeks to withdraw it?
  • Is there an express provision in the Pakistan Army laws for the re-appointment or extension of the Chief of the Army Staff?
  • Can the federal government extend the tenure of the Chief of the Army Staff based solely on the ground of regional security?
  • Does Regulation No. 255 of the Army Regulations (Rules) authorize the extension of the Chief of the Army Staff's service prior to his retirement?
  Read full judgment →
• Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd, Karachi vs Ravi Steel Company, Lahore2020 PLD Supreme Court 324, 2020 P SC 1022, KLR 2020 Supreme Court · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-09
  Section 12(2) CPCconstructive res judicatadoctrine of election of remedyinsurance claimlimitationcollateral challengeequitable estoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner, an insurance company, sought to challenge an adverse judgment of the Insurance Tribunal on the ground of limitation, despite having previously exhausted all appellate remedies up to the Supreme Court and having failed in an objection petition. The core legal question was whether a litigant, after exhausting available appellate channels, can collaterally challenge a judgment by invoking Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to raise a defense (limitation) that was available but not pleaded during the original trial. The Supreme Court held that the petition was not maintainable. The Court affirmed that a litigant must elect their remedy; once a remedy is exhausted, the doctrine of constructive res judicata and the doctrine of election of remedy bar the party from shopping for further remedies or raising defenses that should have been asserted at the first opportunity. The principle established is that failure to plead a defense at trial precludes its subsequent assertion in collateral proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party, after exhausting appellate remedies, invoke Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to raise a defense that was available but not pleaded at trial?
  • Does the doctrine of election of remedy bar a litigant from pursuing successive, alternative legal channels after one has been exhausted?
  • Is an insurer equitably estopped from raising a limitation defense if they engaged in misleading conduct that induced the insured to delay filing the claim?
  • Does the failure to raise a plea of limitation in the written statement at the trial stage preclude its assertion in subsequent collateral proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Jehanzeb Khan vs The State through A.G. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 507, 2020 SCMR 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-09
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequesbail cancellationjudicial discretionprivate financial settlements
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail after being implicated in a case involving dishonoured bank cheques. Initially granted bail by a Magistrate based on a negotiated settlement, the bail was subsequently cancelled by the Additional Sessions Judge due to a dispute over the genuineness of the arrangement, and the High Court dismissed the subsequent bail petition. The core legal question concerned whether criminal courts can condition bail on private financial settlements or revoke bail based on the failure of such arrangements. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed bail, holding that judicial discretion in bail matters must remain neutral and cannot be used as an enforcement mechanism for private financial recovery or subjected to conditions outside statutory principles. The Court laid down the principle that criminal courts must maintain independence and neutrality, and cannot abandon judicial authority to facilitate swift settlements or corporal coercion for debt retrieval through criminal prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Can the grant of post-arrest bail be subjected to riders and conditions based on private financial arrangements between the parties?
  • Whether a criminal court can act as an instrument for financial recovery or debt retrieval through criminal prosecution?
  • Does an offence punishable with a term of imprisonment not attracting the prohibitory clause warrant continuous detention after the conclusion of investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Ishfaq vs The State2021 P SC (Crl.) 512, 2020 SCMR 1414 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-06
  homicidecriminal appealocular evidencemedical evidenceindivisibility of evidencegunshot woundblackeningsite plan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from a conviction for homicide. The petitioner, Javed Ishfaq, was convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death, which the High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. The incident involved a clash between two groups over the shifting of an electric transformer, resulting in the death of one individual due to a gunshot wound. The petitioner challenged his conviction, arguing that the acquittal of his co-accused necessitated his own acquittal under the principle of indivisibility of evidence, and that a conflict between the ocular account and medical evidence regarding the distance of the shot (indicated by blackening around the wound) undermined the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, holding that the acquittal of co-accused does not automatically absolve the petitioner when his individual criminal act is established. The Court further clarified that the presence of blackening is not a conclusive indicator of distance and that site plans are not substantive evidence. Consequently, the Court found no legal or factual grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts and declined leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused in a criminal case automatically entitle the remaining accused to acquittal based on the principle of indivisibility of evidence?
  • Is the presence of blackening around a gunshot wound a conclusive indicator of the distance between the assailant and the victim?
  • Can a site plan be considered a substantive piece of evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Does the failure of the police to register a counter-version of an incident invalidate the prosecution's case against an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Akhtar vs The StatePLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 12, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 1021, 2020 SCP 108, PLD 2020 Supreme · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-06-04
  qatl-i-amdocular evidenceforensic reportsudden provocationpremeditationshotguncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a conviction for qatl-i-amd and attempted murder. The petitioner, convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death (later reduced to life imprisonment by the High Court), challenged the conviction, arguing contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, specifically regarding gunshot distance and forensic reports. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt despite alleged forensic inconsistencies and whether the petitioner qualified for a reduced sentence under section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 due to sudden provocation or lack of premeditation. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular testimony of injured witnesses consistent and credible. The Court held that the petitioner's actions—reloading and firing multiple times—demonstrated cruelty and negated claims of sudden provocation or lack of premeditation. The Court affirmed that section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is not applicable where the offender acts with cruelty or takes undue advantage, and that medical doctors are not qualified to determine firing distance, which requires forensic expertise.

  Questions settled

  • Can a medical doctor provide expert testimony on the distance from which a firearm was discharged?
  • Does the failure to prove motive automatically entitle a convict to a reduced sentence under section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the act of reloading a firearm and firing multiple times negate the defense of sudden provocation or heat of passion?
  • Is the absence of independent witnesses sufficient to discard the prosecution's case regarding motive in a domestic dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Islam Sharif vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 166, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 820, 2020 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  Qatl-i-amdocular evidenceabsconsionidentification of accusedcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, Islam Sharif, for the Qatl-i-amd of Dr. Sahib Jan, an offence committed in 1991. The petitioner was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment, a decision upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner challenged the conviction, citing the improbability of witness presence, identification issues due to darkness, and the prosecution's failure to recover the murder weapon. The Supreme Court examined the ocular evidence provided by the deceased's sons, noting their long-standing acquaintance with the petitioner and the context of a rural neighbourhood where Fajr prayers occur at dawn. The Court held that the witnesses' identification was reliable given the proximity and familiarity, and the petitioner's absconsion for nearly two decades strongly indicated culpability. Consequently, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined, affirming the conviction based on consistent ocular testimony and circumstantial evidence of absconsion.

  Questions settled

  • Can the identification of an accused by witnesses be considered reliable if the occurrence took place near dawn?
  • Does the long-standing absconsion of an accused serve as a relevant factor in determining culpability?
  • Is the failure to recover a murder weapon fatal to a prosecution case when other evidence is consistent and confidence-inspiring?
  Read full judgment →
• Islam Sharif vs StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-03
  Qatl-i-Amdocular accountabsconsionidentificationFajr prayercriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arose from the conviction of the petitioner for committing Qatl-i-Amd under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner challenged his conviction on grounds of the improbability of the witnesses' presence, identification issues due to darkness, and the prosecution's failure to recover the weapon. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the ocular account provided by the deceased's sons, who were walking with him to a mosque for Fajr prayers. The Court held that the identification of the culprit by the witnesses was highly reliable due to their close proximity and long-standing acquaintance with the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner's absconsion for nearly two decades explained the non-recovery of the weapon and strongly supported his culpability. Finding the ocular evidence consistent, straightforward, and confidence-inspiring, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can the identification of an accused in a rural area shortly before dawn be considered reliable if the witnesses had a long-standing acquaintance with him?
  • Does the prosecution's failure to recover the weapon of offense fatal to the case when the accused has absconded for nearly two decades?
  • Whether the testimony of close relatives of the deceased can be accepted as confidence-inspiring despite a long lapse of time before the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another vs Railway Board through its Chairman2020 PLJ SC 97, 2019 KLR Supreme Court 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  public interest litigationjudicial reviewgovernment contractspublic propertytransparency in biddinglease agreementconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a Constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the leasing of prime railway land in Lahore for the Railways Golf Club (later renamed Royal Palm Golf and Country Club) to a private consortium through a process alleged to be non-transparent, manipulated, and tainted with mala fides. The core legal question revolved around the scope of judicial review over government contracts involving public assets and whether material deviations from advertised terms vitiate the bidding process. The Court held that public functionaries must deal with public property transparently and fairly, and any substantial departure from advertised conditions to benefit a specific bidder renders the contract void ab initio. The ratio laid down is that superior courts can judicially review public contracts under constitutional jurisdiction where transparency is compromised or public property is squandered, and such proceedings can run independently alongside criminal accountability trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether superior courts can exercise judicial review under Article 184(3) of the Constitution over government contracts involving public assets?
  • Does a material departure from the terms and conditions advertised in a public bidding process vitiate the resulting contract?
  • Can civil proceedings regarding the cancellation of a public contract proceed simultaneously and independently with criminal accountability references before a court?
  • What is the effect of altering essential terms such as lease duration and land area after the closing date for bids without issuing a fresh public advertisement?
  Read full judgment →
• Irfan Ali Sher vs The State2020 PLD Supreme Court 295, PLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 60, 2020 SCP 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-04-17
  rapedelayed FIRmedical examinationcredibility of victiminvestigation by lady police officercriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner under section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the rape of a minor girl, which conviction was upheld by the High Court with a reduction of sentence to the minimum statutory term of ten years. The core legal questions addressed relate to the reliability of delayed FIR reporting in sexual assault cases, the necessity of DNA forensic determination, the credibility of the victim's testimony against her teacher, and the procedural lapse of investigation conducted by a male police officer instead of a lady police officer. The Supreme Court held that delay in reporting sexual assault is not material due to trauma and social stigma, that absence of DNA profiling is not fatal when semen was not detected, and that minor investigative shortcomings do not outweigh consistent and credible ocular testimony. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and minimum sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is delay in reporting a sexual assault to the police considered a material defect in rape cases?
  • Does the failure to conduct a DNA forensic test vitiate a rape conviction when semen is not detected during medical examination?
  • Can a rape conviction be sustained solely on the basis of the victim's testimony when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Does an investigation conducted by a male police officer instead of a lady police officer render the trial invalid?
  Read full judgment →
• Inspector General of Prison, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar, etc vs Habib2021 SCMR 1, 2020 SCP 228, 2021 PLJ SC 285, 2021 P SC 261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-09-30
  remission of sentenceAnti-Terrorism ActOffence of Zinaprison rulesconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed by the Inspector General of Jails against a High Court judgment granting remissions to a convict serving concurrent sentences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the convict was entitled to remissions under Article 45 of the Constitution and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prisons Rules, 2018, despite the statutory bar in the Anti-Terrorism Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 21-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 strictly prohibits remissions for convictions under that Act. However, for the sentence served under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, the convict is entitled to remissions permissible under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prisons Rules, 2018, but not under Article 45 of the Constitution, consistent with the precedent in Nazar Hussain v. The State. The Court clarified that such remissions under the Rules apply only after the sentence for the Anti-Terrorism Act conviction has been fully served.

  Questions settled

  • Is a convict sentenced under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 entitled to remissions in their sentence?
  • Can a convict serving concurrent sentences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 claim remissions for the portion of the sentence served under the Ordinance?
  • Are remissions under Article 45 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applicable to convicts serving sentences under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  • When can a convict serving concurrent sentences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and another statute begin to earn remissions under the prison rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz vs Azam Khan and others2021 P SC (Crl.) 59, 2021 SCMR 111, 2020 SCP 202 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-08
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationprohibitory clauseabsconderconcealment of factstentative assessmentcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Peshawar High Court granting post-arrest bail to the respondents in a case registered under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and subsequently amended to include section 337-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve the propriety of granting post-arrest bail to fugitive accused facing capital charges, the concealment of material facts regarding the prior filing and dismissal of bail applications, and the proper tentative assessment of evidence at the bail stage. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, recalling the bail granted to the respondents. The ratio laid down is that concealment of prior bail applications violates established judicial norms, and that the High Court erred in granting bail by bypassing the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, ignoring the fact that the accused remained fugitive for over two years, and making deep-rooted observations into merits instead of confining itself to a tentative assessment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted to an accused who remained a fugitive from law for an extended period in a case falling within the prohibitory clause?
  • Does the concealment of the filing of a previous bail application before the High Court warrant the recall of bail?
  • Whether the High Court can make deep-rooted observations on the merits of applicability of penal sections instead of relying on a tentative assessment at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Haider and others vs The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad, etc2020 P SC 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-12-03
  post-arrest bailpre-arrest bailaccountability referenceAshiana-e-Iqbal projectdelay in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition and connected matters seek leave to appeal against orders of the Lahore High Court refusing pre-arrest and post-arrest bail to the petitioners in an accountability reference relating to the Ashiana-e-Iqbal housing project. The core legal questions involve determining whether the petitioners, who served in various capacities such as Chief Executive Officer, project coordinators, or private contractors without holding principal roles, misusing authority, or receiving financial benefits, made out a case for the grant of post-arrest and pre-arrest bail, particularly in view of finalized investigations, delayed trials, and the lack of necessity for physical custody. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and allowed them, granting post-arrest bail to some petitioners and confirming pre-arrest bail for others. The key principle laid down is that prolonged and unconscionable incarceration without trial progress, absence of financial gain, secondary roles as a-abettors rather than principal accused, and lack of justification for continued physical custody warrant the concession of bail in accountability cases, while observations made during bail hearings remain strictly tentative and shall not prejudice the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who is not the principal offender and is charged merely with aiding and abetting can be refused post-arrest bail when the trial is delayed through no fault of his?
  • Does the intended arrest of an accused at a belated stage, after the completion of investigation and filing of a reference, smack of bad faith when no further recovery is required?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail should be confirmed when the accused has not misused the concession of bail and no financial advantage or gain is attributed to them?
  • What is the legal status of observations made by a superior court while granting or refusing bail in a criminal or accountability case?
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• Imran Abbas vs The State and another2021 P SC (Crl.) 510, 2020 SCMR 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-10
  post-arrest bailwitness protectionretraction of statementcriminal trialadministration of justicemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Imran Abbas, who is charged with the murder of his former wife, Maria Mughal. The petitioner sought bail primarily based on an affidavit sworn by the complainant, the deceased's sister, which attempted to exonerate him by attributing the crime to unknown dacoits, contradicting her initial complaint. The Court observed that the complainant had previously identified the petitioner as the assailant. The core legal question addressed was whether the complainant's subsequent affidavit, which contradicted her initial statement, warranted the grant of bail. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' refusal to grant bail, viewing the affidavit as a crude attempt to subvert prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that witness protection is a sine qua non for the effective administration of criminal justice, casting a bounden responsibility upon the State to safeguard vulnerable witnesses. Consequently, the Court directed the Inspector General of Police to ensure the complainant's safe conduct to testify without duress and ordered the trial court to expedite proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a complainant's subsequent affidavit exonerating an accused, which contradicts their initial complaint, automatically entitle the accused to bail?
  • What is the State's responsibility regarding the protection of vulnerable witnesses during a criminal trial?
  • Can a trial court refuse bail when it perceives that an affidavit submitted by a complainant is a calculated attempt to subvert prosecution evidence?
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• Iftikhar Ahmed vs Mst. Saima Zia and others2020 SCMR 1517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-07-09
  pre-emptionShafi ShankShafi Jarco-ownershipfamily settlementprivate partitionsuperior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed four pre-emption suits challenging independent sale transactions, claiming a superior right of pre-emption. The trial court dismissed these suits, finding the appellant failed to prove his superior right, and these findings were upheld by the Appellate and Provisional Courts. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having purchased specific shares of a property previously owned by a single owner, qualified as a co-owner (Shafi Shank) or an adjacent owner (Shafi Jar) to exercise a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that because the property had been partitioned among legal heirs via a family settlement, the property was no longer joint. Consequently, the appellant was merely an owner of specific portions with defined boundaries, not a co-owner of the whole. Furthermore, the Court found that the boundaries of the appellant's property did not touch the suit properties, negating his claim as an adjacent owner. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeals, establishing that a pre-emptor cannot claim co-ownership status where property has been privately partitioned and specific shares are held in isolation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a family settlement resulting in separate possession of shares effectively terminate the status of property as joint property for the purposes of pre-emption?
  • Can a purchaser of a specific share of property with defined boundaries claim the status of a co-owner (Shafi Shank) over the entire property?
  • Is a pre-emptor entitled to a superior right of pre-emption if their property boundaries are not contiguous with the suit property?
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• Ibrar Hussain and another vs The State2020 SCMR 1850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Qatl-i-amdConvictionAcquittalChance witnessSolitary witnessDiscrepancies in evidenceIdentificationUnsafe convictionCriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned criminal petitions challenging the conviction of Ibrar Hussain and Riaz Hussain for Qatl-i-amd, initially sentenced to death and later altered to life imprisonment by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on the solitary testimony of a chance witness, given significant discrepancies and weaknesses in the prosecution's evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution's case suffered from multiple failures, including a disbelieved motive, inconsequential recoveries, a suspect source of light for identification, delayed post-mortem findings inconsistent with the FIR regarding the time of occurrence, and the doubtful presence of the sole witness. The Court held that relying on the solitary statement of a chance witness under such cumulative circumstances, which suggested a scenario other than what was presented, would entail a potential risk of error and render the conviction unsafe. Consequently, the petitions were converted into appeals, allowed, and the petitioners were acquitted.

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• Hussain Shah, etc. vs The State2020 P SC (Crl.) 47 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-20
  narcoticsconscious possessionchemical examiner reportrecovery from vehiclebenefit of doubtreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the conviction of two appellants for the transportation of a large quantity of Charas concealed in a secret cavity of a trailer-truck under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of evidence, the validity of the Chemical Examiner's report, qualifications of the analyst, and whether a passenger or helper in a vehicle carrying narcotics can be convicted without proof of conscious possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal regarding the driver, holding that concurrent findings of guilt based on consistent and reliable testimony of public servants and a valid chemical report were unexceptionable. However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the co-appellant, the cleaner/helper, holding that mere presence in the vehicle without establishing conscious possession or knowledge of the narcotics hidden in the secret cavity is insufficient for conviction. The key principle laid down is that a passenger or helper travelling in a vehicle cannot be convicted of narcotics possession solely based on presence unless the prosecution affirmatively proves conscious possession and knowledge of the contraband.

  Questions settled

  • Can a passenger or helper travelling in a vehicle be convicted of narcotics possession solely on the basis of their presence without proof of conscious possession?
  • Whether a Chemical Examiner's report can be challenged on the ground of qualification when the analyst is duly notified as a Government Analyst?
  • Is it mandatory under the law to associate the accused persons with the process of drawing fresh samples of recovered narcotics under the supervision of a Magistrate?
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• Hussain Shah, etc vs The State2020 P SC (Crl.) 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-20
  narcotics possessionconscious possessionchemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtpresumption of regularitycriminal appealsampling procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of two appellants, Hussain Shah and Abdul Sattar, for the possession of a large quantity of Charas recovered from a secret cavity in a trailer-truck. The core legal questions involved the validity of the Chemical Examiner's report, the qualifications of the analyst, the procedure for taking samples from the recovered narcotics, and whether a passenger in a vehicle can be held liable for narcotics found in a secret cavity without proof of conscious possession. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the driver, Hussain Shah, finding the prosecution's evidence consistent and the Chemical Examiner's report valid, noting the presumption of regularity regarding the sampling process. However, the Court acquitted the second appellant, Abdul Sattar, ruling that mere presence in a vehicle is insufficient for conviction. The key principle laid down is that for a passenger to be convicted of narcotics possession in a vehicle, the prosecution must establish conscious possession or knowledge of the contraband; absent such proof, the passenger is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is a passenger in a vehicle containing narcotics liable for conviction if the prosecution fails to prove their conscious knowledge of the contraband?
  • Does the law require the presence of an accused person during the court-supervised process of taking fresh samples of recovered narcotics?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a Chemical Examiner's report if the report details the protocols and tests applied?
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• Hubdar Hussain Malik vs Deputy Commissioner Chakwal and another2020 SCMR 1507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-05
  religious processionwrit of mandamusadministrative discretionsecurity arrangementsjusticiabilitypublic orderfreedom of religion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a member of the Shiite community, sought a writ of mandamus from the High Court to mandate permanent security arrangements for an annual religious procession during Moharram-ul-Haram. The High Court initially disposed of the petition after the administration assured security measures, and subsequent attempts to review the order and file an Intra Court Appeal were unsuccessful as the event had already passed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that permanent security directions were necessary regardless of the passage of time. The Supreme Court held that while the Constitution guarantees the right to profess and practice religion, this right is subject to law, public order, and morality. The Court determined that security arrangements are administrative matters involving resource allocation and threat assessment, which fall within the discretion of state functionaries. Consequently, the Court ruled that such matters are not justiciable, emphasizing that authorities must be granted the autonomy to manage security based on evolving public interest and threat assessments, rather than judicial micromanagement.

  Questions settled

  • Are security arrangements for religious processions justiciable issues subject to judicial direction?
  • Does the constitutional right to profess and practice religion require the judiciary to mandate specific security measures for religious events?
  • To what extent should state functionaries have autonomy in determining security measures for public events?
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• House Building Finance Company Limited vs Muhammad Irfan Khan and others2020 PLC (C.S.) 171, 2020 P SC 917, 2020 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-04
  equal treatmentArticle 25service regulationsintelligible differentiasalary revisionworkmen vs executivesclassification of employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment directing House Building Finance Company Limited (HBFCL) to grant uniform pay and allowances to all employees, irrespective of their cadre. The core legal question was whether distinguishing between 'workmen' and 'officers/executives' for salary revision purposes violates the right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the classification between these two categories is valid. The Court reasoned that 'workmen' enjoy statutory protection under labor laws, whereas 'officers and executives' operate under different service regulations and lack collective bargaining rights. Consequently, the employer is entitled to apply different yardsticks for salary revisions based on financial exigencies, job descriptions, and performance roles. The Court affirmed that differential treatment based on intelligible differentia, having a rational nexus to the objective of the policy, is permissible. Employees in different grades, domains, and classes cannot claim identical treatment as a matter of right, and such grouping for good governance does not constitute arbitrary or unreasonable classification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification between 'workmen' and 'officers/executives' for salary revision purposes violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can an employer apply different yardsticks for salary revisions based on financial exigencies and the specific cadre of employees?
  • Is the distinction between employees covered by labor laws and those in executive cadres considered a valid classification for service conditions?
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• Hidayat Ullah vs Mohammad Younas and others2020 PLD Supreme Court 362, 2021 PLJ SC 109, 2020 P SC 1349, 2020 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-17
  Frontier Crimes RegulationTribal AreasHigh Court jurisdictionConstitutional ouster of jurisdictionCouncil of EldersSersaya compensationCriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil and criminal controversy involving the murder of the chairman of a coal company and a subsequent dispute over the payment of compensation known as Sersaya in the tribal area of Frontier Region, Kohat. The Qasim Khel tribal heads applied under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, leading to a decree affirming their entitlement to Sersaya, alongside an improper recommendation by the Council of Elders regarding criminal revenge. After appellate and revisional proceedings under the FCR, the coal company challenged the decisions via a writ petition in the High Court, which set aside the FCR fora judgments. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 247(7) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, given that the cause of action and dispute arose in the tribal areas prior to the Twenty-fifth Constitutional Amendment. The Court further held that the criminal recommendation by the Jirga was without jurisdiction and had already been excluded by the Commissioner, while the civil entitlement to Sersaya remained intact. The impugned judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in relation to a tribal area dispute arising prior to the Twenty-fifth Constitutional Amendment in view of Article 247(7)?
  • Can the Council of Elders validly make recommendations regarding criminal law matters or revenge under Section 8 of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901?
  • Whether a writ petition can interfere with a civil decree passed under the Frontier Crimes Regulation when the constitutional bar on jurisdiction applies?
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• Hidayat Khan vs The State and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 684, 2020 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-18
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryevidentiary valueforensic reportcriminal appealbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court refusing bail to the petitioner in a case registered under sections 302, 404, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was not named in the FIR. The prosecution's case relied on the recovery of a SIM card from the petitioner, the recovery of a pistol upon his pointation, a positive Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report, and a statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court observed that the FSL report was potentially compromised by a significant delay between the recovery of crime scene empties and their submission to the firearm expert. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner's involvement required further inquiry. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner subject to furnishing bail bonds, and directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, noting that the trial court retains the authority to recall bail if the concession is misused or if the petitioner causes unnecessary delays.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in sending crime scene evidence to a forensic laboratory justify a finding of further inquiry for bail purposes?
  • Can a trial court recall bail if the accused causes unnecessary delays in the trial?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution's case rests on evidence requiring further judicial scrutiny at trial?
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• Hazrat Nabi Shah alias Hazrat Khan vs The State and anotherPLJ 2021 SC (Cr.C.) 100, 2021 P SC (Crl.) 243, 2020 SCMR 1672 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-08-25
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationexplosivesprinciple of consistencytentative assessmentterrorist activities
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail by Hazrat Nabi Shah alias Hazrat Khan, whose earlier bail plea was dismissed by the Lahore High Court, whereas his co-accused Ismail Khan was granted bail. The core legal question concerned whether the co-accused was rightly granted bail on the ground that the bomb disposal expert was not a notified expert and whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the principle of consistency, alongside allegations of a fake recovery. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, declined leave to appeal, and suo motu cancelled the bail granted to the co-accused. The holding establishes that the recovery of high-intensity explosives and contraband from accused persons hailing from a different province constitutes reasonable grounds under the prohibitory clause, and that the High Court erred by undertaking a tentative assessment ignoring expert recovery memos confirming the explosive potential of seized devices. The principle laid down emphasizes that bail granted erroneously on legally untenable grounds will be recalled by the apex court, and cases involving high-explosive devices and threats to public safety must be viewed with strict judicial caution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted to a co-accused on legally untenable grounds can be cancelled by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the recovery of high-intensity explosives and contraband bring the case within the prohibitory clause of bail?
  • Can a high court grant bail by ignoring expert memos confirming the operational lethality of seized explosives?
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• Hazrat Amin vs The State and another2020 P SC (Crl.) 651, 2020 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-07
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal petitionadmissibility of evidencedelay in FIRbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of bail pending trial, given the evidentiary material available on record. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed an eight-day delay in reporting the incident to the police. Furthermore, the State conceded that there was no direct evidence connecting the petitioner to the alleged offence, and the police officer present could not identify any legally admissible evidence. Additionally, the challan had not yet been submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction, and the petitioner had been incarcerated since July 2019. The Court held that these circumstances rendered the case one of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, with the Court granting bail to the petitioner subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does an eight-day delay in reporting an offence to the police constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the prosecution fails to point to any legally admissible evidence connecting the accused to the alleged offence?
  • Does the failure to submit a challan before a court of competent jurisdiction support a finding that a case falls within the ambit of further inquiry?
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• Hassan Raza vs Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and others2020 SCMR 994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-06-14
  compulsory retirementmisconductillegal gratificationdetailed inquirycivil servant disciplineservice tribunalSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sepoy in the Collectorate of Customs, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal against his compulsory retirement from service. He was accused of corruption and misconduct after a video clip was uploaded on social media showing him demanding illegal gratification from a passenger to clear baggage without checking. An inquiry was conducted, leading to the imposition of a major penalty of dismissal by the competent authority, which was later converted to compulsory retirement by the appellate authority. The core legal question was whether a detailed inquiry is mandatory in all cases of major penalties and whether the evidence sufficed to establish misconduct. The Supreme Court held that a detailed inquiry is not an absolute rule where sufficient evidence, such as video and CCTV footage, is already available and the delinquent has been given an opportunity to defend himself. The Court ruled that demanding a bribe to bypass security checks constitutes grave misconduct, especially in sensitive positions, and upheld the dismissal of the petition, affirming the principle that corruption and dereliction of duty in law enforcement warrant strict disciplinary action without leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Is a detailed inquiry mandatory in all cases before the imposition of a major penalty under the Government Servants Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973?
  • Whether demanding illegal gratification to clear passenger baggage without screening constitutes misconduct warranting major penalty?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of departmental authorities and the Federal Service Tribunal when valid and cogent reasons are recorded?
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• Hassan Javed vs The State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 153, 2020 P SC (Crl.) 656, 2020 SCMR 670 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-06
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustmala fidefurther inquiryanticipatory bailevidentiary sufficiency
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Hassan Javed, sought pre-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of criminal breach of trust filed by his employer, Dev Batch (Pvt.), regarding a financial loss of US $50,000. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and others diverted company funds to personal accounts and settled consignments privately. The petitioner contended that the criminal proceedings were mala fide, intended to coerce him in a civil rendition dispute, and argued that the essential ingredients of criminal breach of trust were absent. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to produce evidence of the alleged transactions, confessions, or forensic verification of incriminating voice messages. The Court held that the prosecution's case lacked foundational evidence and that the alleged financial loss did not automatically constitute criminal breach of trust. Finding the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and noting the potential for mala fide, the Court granted the petitioner pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the trial must be decided on its own merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a financial loss incurred by an employee in the course of employment automatically constitute criminal breach of trust under section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When does a criminal case qualify for the grant of bail under the principle of further inquiry pursuant to section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the prosecution fails to provide foundational evidence or forensic confirmation of alleged incriminating material?
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• Hassan Javed vs State and anotherPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-06
  pre-arrest bailanticipatory bailcriminal breach of trustfurther inquirymala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Hassan Javed, who stands accused by his employer of committing a criminal breach of trust causing financial loss to the company by receiving customer payments into personal accounts. The core legal question concerns whether the allegations and available record disclose reasonable grounds for criminal breach of trust under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, warranting the petitioner's arrest, or if the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, admitting the petitioner to anticipatory bail. The court held that the prosecution failed to point out material or evidence establishing the documented transactions or confirming the alleged confession, and that commercial loss cannot be equated with criminal breach of trust. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case lacks foundational details and forensic verification of evidence, the matter falls within the remit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, justifying the grant of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether commercial loss incurred by an employer can be equated with criminal breach of trust under Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Does the absence of time, date, and forensic confirmation of evidence bring a case within the remit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the intended arrest is argued to be tainted with mala fide and the prosecution's case lacks foundational evidence?
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• Hamid Ashraf (Late) through his L.Rs., etc vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore2020 P C T L R 1296, 2020 P SC 1279, PTCL 2020 CL. 412, 2020 PTD 1157, 2020 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-03-05
  tax refunddelayed refund compensationdeemed assessmentIncome Tax Ordinance 2001refund orderstatutory interpretationtaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns the determination of the date from which a tax refund becomes "due" for the purpose of calculating compensation for delayed refunds under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the refund becomes due upon the "deemed assessment" of a tax return under Section 120, or only upon the issuance of a formal refund order by the Commissioner under Section 170. The Supreme Court held that the refund becomes due only from the date the refund order is made, rejecting the taxpayer's contention that deemed assessment serves as a substitute for such an order. The Court affirmed that the statutory scheme requires a formal application and scrutiny by the Commissioner before a refund is triggered. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Explanation to Section 171(2), inserted by the Finance Act, 2013, serves as a retrospective clarification confirming that compensation for delayed refunds is strictly tied to the date of the refund order, thereby overriding any interpretation that deemed assessment automatically triggers the refund process.

  Questions settled

  • Does a deemed assessment under Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 constitute a refund order for the purpose of claiming compensation for delayed refunds?
  • From what date does a tax refund become due for the purpose of calculating compensation under Section 171 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Does the Explanation to Section 171(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001, introduced by the Finance Act 2013, have retrospective effect regarding the determination of when a refund becomes due?
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• Haji Wajdad vs Provincial Government through Secretary Board of Revenue, Government of Balochistan, Quetta, etc2021 P SC 1132, 2020 SCMR 2046, 2020 SCP 190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2020-10-02
  revisional jurisdictionsuo motu powersconcurrent findings of factpresumption of correctnessrevenue recordlimitation periodburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding a property dispute. The appellant claimed title and possession of land, which had been mutated in favour of the Provincial Government. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction and whether a time-barred revision petition could be entertained. The Supreme Court held that while revisional courts generally do not disturb concurrent findings of fact, they may do so when there is gross misreading or non-reading of evidence, or material irregularity. The Court found the appellant failed to prove continuous possession or rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the revenue record. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that even if a revision petition is filed beyond the limitation period, the High Court possesses suo motu power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to correct jurisdictional errors, treating the petition as information to trigger such oversight. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, even if the revision petition is filed beyond the period of limitation?
  • Does the presumption of correctness attached to revenue records under Section 52 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, require more than mere oral evidence to be rebutted?
  • Under what circumstances can a revisional court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by trial and appellate courts?
  • Does a failure to prove continuous possession of disputed property preclude a party from challenging a mutation entry in the revenue record?
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