Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Ashiq Hussain vs The State and 2 others1998 P Cr. L J 1269 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-28Read full judgment →
• Asghar vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 472 · Lahore High Court · 1997-01-15Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs The State(K.L.R. 1998 Shariat Cases 31) · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-30Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Home Secretary and others1998 CLC 1541 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-15Read full judgment →
• Asghar Ali vs Director-General, Anti-Narcotics Task Force and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-12-08
  unauthorized absencedisciplinary proceedingsservice appealmisconductdepartmental inquiryArticle 212(3)removal from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment upholding the petitioner's removal from service for unauthorized absence. The petitioner, a Field Investigating Officer, contended that departmental proceedings should have been stayed pending the outcome of criminal litigation against him. The core legal question was whether departmental disciplinary proceedings are legally required to be held in abeyance during the pendency of criminal proceedings, and whether the penalty of removal from service for prolonged unauthorized absence was excessive. The Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings are distinct and independent from criminal trials; therefore, the department was not precluded from proceeding against the petitioner for misconduct. The Court found that the petitioner's absence was admitted and lacked justification, as he failed to report for duty even when on bail. Consequently, the Court affirmed the penalty, ruling that unauthorized absence from a sensitive assignment cannot be tolerated on capricious grounds. The judgment establishes that departmental disciplinary actions for misconduct are independent of criminal proceedings, and an employee cannot unilaterally suspend their service obligations based on pending litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings be held in abeyance pending the outcome of criminal litigation?
  • Is unauthorized absence from a sensitive government assignment sufficient grounds for removal from service?
  • Does the pendency of criminal proceedings preclude a department from initiating disciplinary action for misconduct?
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• Asadullah Sehar and 44 others vs Karachi Water and Sewerage Board1998 PLC (C.S.) 1121 · Sindh High Court · 1998-03-30Read full judgment →
• Asadullah Rashid vs Haji Muhammad Muneer and others1998 SCMR 2129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-01
  transfer of civil servantterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212 barexclusive jurisdictionService Tribunalmaintainability of writ petitioninterim reliefmala fide transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arose out of a transfer order of a civil servant, which was challenged through a writ petition before the Lahore High Court. The High Court admitted the petition and granted interim suspension of the transfer order, relying on allegations of political interference and mala fides. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a constitutional petition regarding transfer orders of civil servants in light of the constitutional bar. Reiteration of settled precedent established that under Article 212 of the Constitution, Service Tribunals hold exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the terms and conditions of civil servants, including transfer orders. Orders alleged to be mala fide, ultra vires, or coram non judice remain within the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction, excluding High Court jurisdiction under Article 199. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interim order and remanded the matter, directing the High Court to decide the jurisdictional bar under Article 212 prior to admitting the petition or granting interim relief.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 in matters relating to the transfer of civil servants?
  • Can allegations of mala fides or political interference confer jurisdiction on the High Court over service matters falling within the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal?
  • Must the High Court determine its jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution before admitting a writ petition and granting interim relief regarding civil service matters?
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• Asad Ali vs State1998 MLD 1598 · Lahore High Court · 1998-01-14Read full judgment →
• Asad Ali Khan vs Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication1998 PLC (C.S.) 588 · Sindh High Court · 1997-03-11Read full judgment →
• Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Ministry of Finance And Others1998 P.C.T.L.R. 841 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  leave to appealcustoms dutiessales tax refundwithdrawal of concessiondiscriminationpromissory estoppelconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 14-6-1995, which dismissed writ petitions challenging the withdrawal of customs duty and sales tax refund concessions. The core legal questions involve whether the Government can lawfully withdraw an exemption or concession previously granted through a notification, whether the principle of promissory estoppel applies to such withdrawal, and whether the withdrawal targeting plastic shopping bags exported to Afghanistan is discriminatory. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the lack of valid basis for withdrawal and potential constitutional discrimination require detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions and ordered that the interim stay orders shall continue in force pending the final disposal of the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government can lawfully withdraw a notification granting repayment of customs duties and refund of sales tax?
  • Does the principle of promissory estoppel apply to prevent the withdrawal of a tax concession or exemption by the Government?
  • Whether the withdrawal of a tax concession in respect of a specific item exported to a particular destination constitutes unconstitutional discrimination?
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• Arvind Polycot Ltd vs Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 2510 · Gujarat High Court · 1996-07-11Read full judgment →
• Aruj Textile Mills Limited vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary1998 PTD 3855 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-14
  Sales TaxDelegated LegislationUltra ViresRule-making PowerCentral Board of RevenueGinning Industry Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to a notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) which purported to amend the Special Procedure for Ginning Industry Rules, 1996. The core legal question was whether the CBR possessed the statutory authority to amend rules that were originally framed by the Federal Government under Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The petitioners argued that since the Federal Government was the rule-making authority under the statute, the CBR lacked the power to amend these rules. The Lahore High Court held that the Sales Tax Act, 1990 grants the power to prescribe special procedures solely to the Federal Government, and the Act contains no provision authorizing the CBR to frame or amend such rules. Consequently, the Court declared the impugned notification issued by the CBR to be ultra vires, without lawful authority, and of no legal effect. The key principle laid down is that an authority lacking the original rule-making power cannot amend or vary rules framed by the competent authority, absent specific statutory delegation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Central Board of Revenue have the authority to amend rules framed by the Federal Government under Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Can an authority that did not issue the original notification or frame the original rules amend or vary them?
  • Is a notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue ultra vires if it amends rules that the Board lacks the statutory power to amend?
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• Arshad Zubair vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 95 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-10Read full judgment →
• Arshad vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1705 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-08Read full judgment →
• Arshad Sam1 Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry1998 MLD 490 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-18
  Exit Control Listfreedom of movementfundamental rightsarbitrary exercise of poweradministrative discretionmala fidepublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a public servant designated as an Ambassador, challenged the inclusion of his name on the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Ministry of Interior. The order was issued based on an unverified complaint forwarded to the Ehtesab Cell, amidst a personal family dispute. The petitioner argued that the action was mala fide, lacked application of mind, and infringed upon his fundamental rights to freedom of movement and equal treatment. The court examined whether the Federal Government's power under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, was exercised lawfully. The court held that while the statute grants the government wide discretion to restrict travel without prior notice or disclosure of grounds, such power must not be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or without conscious application of mind. Finding that the authorities acted merely as a conduit for an unverified complaint in a fluid situation, the court ruled the order unsustainable. The principle laid down is that restrictive laws affecting a citizen's liberty must be exercised with extreme care, transparency, and reasonableness, ensuring that discretion is not used to facilitate personal vendettas.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power of the Federal Government to place a person on the Exit Control List under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1981 allow for arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion?
  • Is the Federal Government required to apply its mind consciously when exercising its power to restrict a citizen's movement under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance 1981?
  • Can an unverified complaint, currently in a state of incubation, serve as a valid legal ground to deprive a citizen of their fundamental right to freedom of movement?
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• Arshad Razzaq vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 484 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-03-21Read full judgment →
• Arshad Mahmood vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control, Islamabad and another1998 PTD 370 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Arshad Javed vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 486 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-11-18Read full judgment →
• Arshad Imran Sulehri vs The Election Tribunal and others1998 PLD Lahore 252 · Lahore High Court · 1997-09-25Read full judgment →
• Arshad and anothers vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 2075 · Lahore High Court · 1997-12-08Read full judgment →
• Arif vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 85 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-31Read full judgment →
• Arif Khan vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1287 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-02
  benefit of doubtillegal detentionrecovery of weaponburden of proofcriminal appealpolice witnessArms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance 1965, where the appellant was sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the recovery of the weapon beyond reasonable doubt and whether the burden of proof shifted to the accused under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act 1975. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case due to material contradictions regarding the description of the weapon (described variously as a 'big mauser' and 'T.T. pistol'), the failure to seal the weapon at the spot, the absence of independent witnesses despite the arrest occurring in a populated area, and the failure to produce the daily diary entry to verify the police patrolling. The Court affirmed that the burden of proof only shifts to the accused under the Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act 1975 after the prosecution has established the prerequisite conditions, which were not met here. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, extending him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to seal a recovered weapon at the spot and send it to a ballistic expert create reasonable doubt in a prosecution case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions in the prosecution's evidence regarding the description of the recovered weapon?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 8 of the Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act 1975 before the prosecution has established the prerequisite conditions?
  • Is the evidence of police officials sufficient to sustain a conviction when no independent witnesses are joined in a populated area?
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• Ardeshir Cowasjee and others vs Government of Sindh and others1998 MLD 1219 · Sindh High Court · 1998-02-06
  public interest litigationlocus standicommercialisationbuilding regulationsroad wideningdemolition ordertown planning
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the commercialisation of a residential plot and the construction of a multi-storeyed commercial building thereon, known as 'Glass Towers' on Abdullah Haroon Road (Clifton Road), Karachi. The petitioners, acting pro bono publico, alleged illegal plot conversion, violation of building regulations, and encroachment upon land reserved for future road widening under Schedule G of the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding locus standi and the pendency of a civil suit regarding the subject matter.

  The High Court held that the petitioners possessed locus standi under Article 199 of the Constitution in public interest litigation, as strict personal legal rights are not required when enforcing statutory compliance and public amenities. The court declined to interfere with the plot commercialisation due to prior conversions in the locality and laches. However, the court held that the structure violated the prescribed 150-foot road-widening set-back under Schedule G, Item 30 of the Regulations. It ordered the partial demolition of the structure obstructing the proposed road expansion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether citizens acting pro bono publico have locus standi under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge illegal building constructions affecting public amenities?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit between a builder and a building control authority bar a constitutional petition brought by public interest litigants regarding the same property?
  • Can a multi-storeyed building structure be partially demolished if constructed in violation of road-widening set-back requirements prescribed by town planning regulations?
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• Ardeshir Cowasjee and 4 others vs Clifton Cantonment Board and others1998 MLD 1818 · Sindh High Court · 1998-07-01
  commercialisation of residential plotpublic interest litigationlachespast and closed transactionbuilding controlzonal planning schemepublic nuisancestatutory interpretationinterlocutory injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a High Court Appeal and a Constitutional Petition concerning the commercialisation and construction of a multi-storeyed building on Plot G-7, Block 9, K.D.A. Scheme No. 5, Clifton, Karachi. The petitioners challenged the plot's conversion from residential to commercial use, alleging non-compliance with Article 40(4) of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957, lack of mandatory public notice, public nuisance, and over-burdening of civic infrastructure. The respondents contended that commercialisation was legally done under valid policy decisions, validated by previous judicial and administrative orders, and that the petition was barred by laches. The High Court held that the word 'may' in Article 40(4) of the K.D.A. Order 1957 is directory rather than mandatory, distinguishing it from Article 52-A. The Court found that official acts carry a presumption of regularity under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Relying on binding precedent, the Court ruled that the commercialisation of Clifton Road was a past and closed transaction and that the petition was heavily barred by laches.

  Questions settled

  • Is the word 'may' in Article 40(4) of the Karachi Development Authority Order 1957 directory or mandatory in requiring public notice and hearing prior to land use conversion?
  • Whether an unexcused delay of several years in challenging a commercialisation order after third-party rights have accrued attracts the doctrine of laches?
  • Can a past and closed transaction regarding general commercialisation of a main road area be re-opened by neighbouring residents?
  • Is an earlier judgment of a High Court Bench of equal strength on the same question of law binding upon a subsequent Bench of the same High Court?
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• Anwar Shah and otherss vs Additional Sessions Judge and others1998 CLC 1388 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-11-18Read full judgment →
• Anwar Saleem vs Member, National Industrial Relations Commission, Lahore Bench, Lahore and others1998 PLC 9 · Lahore High Court · 1997-04-07Read full judgment →
• Anwar Saifullah Khan, Ex-Senator vs Passport & Immigration Officer, Government of Pakistan and 3 others1998 SCMR 1343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-24
  Exit Control ListECLfundamental rightsfreedom of movementnatural justiceEhtesab referencesinterim reliefleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the inclusion of the petitioner's name on the Exit Control List (E.C.L.). The petitioner argued that the placement of his name on the E.C.L. was arbitrary, discriminatory, and violated principles of natural justice, as he was denied a hearing. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that Section 2 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, is unconstitutional, violating Articles 2-A, 4, 9, 15, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The respondents justified the action by citing pending Ehtesab references against the petitioner. The Supreme Court noted a conflict in judicial opinion between the Sindh High Court and the Lahore High Court regarding the legality of such E.C.L. placements. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to resolve this inconsistency. While the Court declined the petitioner's request for interim relief to suspend the E.C.L. entry, it clarified that the petitioner may seek specific permission to travel abroad for business engagements during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of a person's name on the Exit Control List without a prior hearing violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Is Section 2 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a person be indefinitely placed on the Exit Control List if the legal proceedings against them are unreasonably delayed?
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• Anwar Saifullah Khan vs The Passport and Immigration Officer, Government of Pakistan University Town, Peshawar and 3 others1998 PLD Peshawar 82 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-12-10
  Exit Control Listfreedom of movementnatural justiceaudi alteram partemEhtesab processconstitutional petitionpassport
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Federal Minister and Senator, challenged the placement of his name on the Exit Control List (E.C.L.) and the non-issuance of a passport by filing a constitutional petition before the Peshawar High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the placement of a person's name on the E.C.L. without prior notice or opportunity of hearing violates principles of natural justice under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, and whether the non-issuance of a passport constituted an unlawful restraint on personal liberty. The Court held that Section 2 of the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 expressly excludes the requirement of a prior show-cause notice or hearing, meaning the principles of natural justice cannot override explicit statutory text unless the provision is declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the pendency of accountability references before the Ehtesab Bench constituted a valid and reasonable ground in the public interest to restrict foreign travel to prevent frustrating the accountability process. The grievance regarding the passport was deemed premature. The petition was accordingly dismissed with observations regarding undue delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 2 of the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 legally exclude the right to a pre-decisional hearing or show-cause notice?
  • Whether the pendency of accountability references before an Ehtesab Bench constitutes a valid ground for placing a person's name on the Exit Control List?
  • Can the principle of audi alteram partem be invoked to override an express statutory exclusion of a right to hearing in a statute?
  • Is a constitutional petition against the non-issuance of a passport maintainable when the aggrieved party has not filed a formal application under the Passports Act, 1974?
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• Anwar Khan vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 406 · Sindh High Court · 1997-07-02Read full judgment →
• Anwar Habib vs Mrs. Durdana Yousufi1998 MLD 99 · Sindh High Court · 1997-08-11Read full judgment →
• Anwar Beg, S.E.T. and others vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Education, N.W.F.P. and others1998 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-27
  service tribunalregularization of serviceleave to appealgraded payjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, which partly allowed the petitioners' appeals regarding graded pay but omitted to decide their prayer for the regularization of their appointments as S.E.T. (Science). The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal's failure to adjudicate upon the prayer for regularization amounted to a refusal to exercise vested jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contention regarding the failure to decide the regularization prayer requires examination. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the petitioners were entitled to regularization under the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the Service Tribunal to decide a specific prayer in an appeal amount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in it?
  • Are employees appointed on fixed pay entitled to regularization under Section 3 of Act I of 1988 upon fulfilling requisite qualifications and experience?
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• Anwar Beg and 2 others vs The Government of N.-W.F.P. and others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-10
  service lawregularization of serviceremandcivil servantgraded payservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three appeals filed by government employees who were initially appointed as S.E.T. (Science) on fixed pay and subsequently sought both graded pay and regularization of their service. While the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal granted the appellants graded pay from the date they acquired the requisite educational qualifications, it failed to address their claim for regularization under the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regularization of Service) Act, 1988. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal erred in omitting to adjudicate upon the appellants' entitlement to regularization pursuant to Section 3 of the said Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal had indeed failed to advert to the relevant statutory provision regarding regularization. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals and remanded the cases back to the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal with a specific direction to decide the issue of whether the appellants are entitled to be regularized in terms of Section 3 of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regularization of Service) Act, 1988.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Service Tribunal is required to adjudicate upon all grievances raised in an appeal, including claims for regularization under the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants (Regularization of Service) Act, 1988?
  • Can the Supreme Court remand a matter to the Service Tribunal if the Tribunal failed to address a specific statutory claim for regularization?
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• Anthony Gonsalves vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 242 · Sindh High Court · 1997-06-19Read full judgment →
• Anjum Sheraz vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 477 · Lahore High Court · 1998-05-21Read full judgment →
• Anjum Shah, Pharmacist, Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences, Islamabad vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 3 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 913 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  seniority disputeretrospective regularizationcontractual appointmentcivil servantservice tribunalcompetent authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over seniority between the petitioner, a Pharmacist appointed on a regular basis in 1987, and the 4th respondent, who was initially appointed on a contract basis in 1986 but subsequently regularized with retrospective effect from his initial contract date. The petitioner challenged the regularization of the 4th respondent's service, arguing that the competent authority lacked the power under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 to retrospectively regularize a contractual appointment. The Service Tribunal had previously upheld the regularization, citing the recommendations of the Board of Governors and the need to avoid discrimination against the 4th respondent, who was treated similarly to other PIMS employees. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to specifically examine whether the competent authority possessed the legal power under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 to convert a contractual appointment into a regular appointment with retrospective effect from the date of the initial contract, thereby affecting the seniority of other regular employees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Civil Servants Act, 1973 authorize the competent authority to regularize a contractual appointment with retrospective effect?
  • Can a contractual appointment be converted into a regular appointment under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
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• Anjum Shafi vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 31998 SCMR 2328 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  seniorityregularization of servicecontract appointmentretrospective regularizationcivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning a seniority dispute between the petitioner, appointed as a Pharmacist on a regular basis on March 9, 1987, and the fourth respondent, initially appointed on a contract basis on March 24, 1986, and subsequently regularized with retrospective effect from his initial contract appointment date. The core legal question revolves around whether a contractual appointment can be regularized retrospectively and whether the Civil Servants Act, 1973, grants powers to the competent authority to make such retrospective regularizations affecting seniority. The Service Tribunal had upheld the regularization based on fairness, recommendations of the Board of Governors, and absence of specific enforced rules at the time. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the extent of the competent authority's powers under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, to accord retrospective regular effect to contract appointments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contractual appointment can be regularised retrospectively under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the competent authority have the power under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, to give effect to a regular appointment from the date of an earlier contract appointment?
  • Can the regularization of contract employees from the date of their initial contractual appointments affect the seniority of regularly appointed employees?
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• Aneel Kumar vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Health Department, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and 3 others1998 CLC 1944 · Sindh High Court · 1998-05-13Read full judgment →
• Andhra Bank Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 110 · Supreme Court of India · 1996-05-01Read full judgment →
• Anara and anothers vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 581 · Federal Shariat Court · 1996-11-12Read full judgment →
• Anand Ram Raitani vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 3286 · Gauhati High Court · 1996-08-20Read full judgment →
• Amritsar Transport Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 3315 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1996-10-03Read full judgment →
• Amjid Mehmood and others vs The State1998 SCMR 1718 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-16
  kidnapping for ransomnon-compoundable offensecompromisecorroborative evidencerecovery of ransomcriminal appealsentencing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the trial court and the High Court convicting the appellants under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for kidnapping for ransom and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the credibility of ocular testimony, the effect of delay in lodging the First Information Report (F.I.R.), the evidentiary value of recoveries, the parity of cases with acquitted co-accused, and whether a compromise between parties affects a non-compoundable offense. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular testimony corroborated by recoveries of ransom money and that the delay in reporting was sufficiently explained by persistent threats from the abductors. The Court clarified that an offense under Section 365-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is not compoundable, and therefore a private compromise cannot affect criminal culpability or warrant acquittal, though it may serve as a mitigating factor where permissible. Furthermore, the Court detailed the legislative history and correct penal provisions of Section 365-A, confirming that death or imprisonment for life alongside forfeiture of property are the statutory punishments.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise between the parties affect the culpability or warrant the acquittal of an accused charged with a non-compoundable offense like kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. be excused when the delay is satisfactorily explained by ongoing threats of dire consequences to the victim and their family?
  • Whether the parity of role with an acquitted co-accused entitles another appellant to acquittal when specific and continuous participation from abduction to release is established against them?
  • What are the correct statutory punishments prescribed under Section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following its legislative amendments?
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• Amjid Farooque And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 127 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-21Read full judgment →
• Amjad Raza Khan and anothers vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore and 4 others1998 SCMR 2064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-05
  writ petitionjurisdictionservice tribunalterms and conditions of serviceinterim relieftransfer and postingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an interim order passed by the High Court suspending the operation of transfer and posting orders of the petitioners as Executive Engineers in the Punjab Local Government and Rural Development Department, which had been challenged by respondents. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the writ petition in light of the constitutional bar under Article 212 regarding the terms and conditions of service, as well as the propriety of granting interim relief that effectively amounted to final relief. The Supreme Court held that the question of jurisdiction is of paramount importance and should have been decided by the High Court in the first instance, particularly when raised alongside objections regarding departmental remedies. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with a direction to the High Court to decide the main writ petition finally, including a specific finding on jurisdiction, within two weeks. The key principle laid down is that where a fundamental question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter, the High Court ought to determine it at the earliest or expedite the final disposal of the main cause rather than leaving it pending while interim relief operates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding terms and conditions of service in view of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Should the High Court decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance when raised in service matters?
  • Is it permissible to grant interim relief that amounts to granting the main petition in totality while the main matter remains pending?
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• Amjad Raza Khan and another vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore and 4 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 891 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-05
  service matterjurisdiction of High CourtArticle 212Service Tribunalinterim reliefterms and conditions of servicetransfer and posting
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that suspended the transfer and posting orders of the petitioners as Executive Engineers in the Punjab Local Government and Rural Development Department. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition concerning terms and conditions of service, given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which mandates the Service Tribunal as the exclusive forum for such disputes. Additionally, the petitioners challenged the propriety of the High Court granting interim relief that effectively granted the final relief sought in the pending writ petition. The Supreme Court did not definitively rule on the merits of the jurisdiction issue but held that the question of jurisdiction was of paramount importance and should have been decided by the High Court in the first instance. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to prioritize and finally dispose of the main writ petition, including a specific finding on the question of jurisdiction, within two weeks.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition regarding terms and conditions of service in light of Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is it appropriate for a High Court to grant interim relief that effectively constitutes the final relief sought in a pending writ petition?
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• Amjad Hussain vs Secretary, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1058 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  salary protectionFundamental Rulescivil servant statusautonomous bodyservice tribunalpay fixation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's claim for fixation and protection of his salary under Fundamental Rule 22, clause A(i) upon his appointment from an Assistant Director (BS-17) in the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources to Assistant Scientific Advisor (BS-18) in the Ministry of Science and Technology. The core legal question was whether an employee of a body created by the Government through a resolution retains the status of a civil servant and is entitled to protection of pay drawn in the parent department upon fresh appointment in the Federal Government. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's judgment, holding that the appellant retained his status as a civil servant and was entitled to invoke Fundamental Rule 22(A)(i) for salary protection, and that the Government cannot deny rightful salary on technical grounds such as limitation when dealing with a civil servant's remuneration. The key principle laid down is that employees of government-created bodies retain civil servant status, qualify for pay protection under Fundamental Rule 22, and technical objections regarding limitation cannot defeat legitimate salary claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of a body created by the Government through a resolution is entitled to protection of pay under Fundamental Rule 22 upon appointment to a post in the Federal Government?
  • Can the Government deny the rightful salary of a civil servant on technical grounds such as limitation?
  • Does an employee of the Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources qualify for pay protection upon recruitment in a Federal Ministry?
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• Amjad Farooq and others vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1590 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-21Read full judgment →
• Amir through Legal vs Hasham through Legal Representatives1998 PLD Lahore 142 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-11Read full judgment →
• Amir Shah vs Ziarat Gul1998 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-19
  pre-emptionco-sharerSecundum Allegata et ProbataLand Record Manualcultivation columnundivided khata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption regarding land in Mardan. The petitioner, having purchased land, faced a pre-emption suit by the respondent, who claimed a superior right based on co-sharership. The petitioner contested the suit, arguing partial pre-emption and claiming a superior right as a tenant under MLR-115. The trial court and the appellate court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent. In revision, the petitioner argued that the respondent was not a co-sharer because the sale was recorded only in the column of cultivation. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's new plea, raised for the first time in the High Court without prior pleading or evidence, violated the principle of 'Secundum Allegata et Probata'. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a vendee purchasing specific plots from a co-owner in an undivided khata steps into the shoes of the vendor, thereby acquiring the status of a co-sharer, regardless of whether the entry appears in the column of cultivation in the Land Record Manual.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of specific plots from a co-owner in an undivided khata confer the status of a co-sharer on the vendee?
  • Can a party succeed on a plea that was not set up in the written statement or evidence?
  • Does an entry in the column of cultivation in the Land Record Manual preclude a vendee from being considered a co-sharer?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan vs The District Magistrate, Chakwal and 2 others1998 P Cr. L J 1326 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-03Read full judgment →
• Amir Ali and another vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 186 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-05Read full judgment →
• Amines Plasticizers Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1998 PTD 1364 · Gauhati High Court · 1996-08-20Read full judgment →
• Amin vs Haji Abdul Sattar and others1998 CLC 1256 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-12Read full judgment →
• Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 31998 SCMR 2389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-07-01
  territorial jurisdictionwrit petitiondominant objectmaintainabilityplace of suingcentral excise duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of a writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner, a textile company, challenged the legality of a bank's demand for central excise duty, which was based on an amendment to the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 introduced by the Finance Act 1991. The petitioner argued that because the Central Board of Revenue and the Federal Government were headquartered in Islamabad, the Lahore High Court possessed jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined whether the Lahore High Court correctly declined jurisdiction, focusing on the "dominant object" of the litigation. The Court held that the primary objective of the writ petition was to challenge a loan repayment demand and related financial facilities executed and payable in Karachi. Following the principle established in Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue, the Court affirmed that courts must determine jurisdiction based on the dominant object of the petition rather than ancillary grounds. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, confirming that the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have territorial jurisdiction to hear a writ petition where the dominant object of the litigation relates to a cause of action arising outside its territorial limits?
  • Should the territorial jurisdiction of a court be determined by the primary relief sought or by the location of the regulatory authority involved?
  • Can an objection regarding the place of suing be raised for the first time in appellate proceedings if it was not raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance?
  Read full judgment →
• Amer Siddiq Malik vs Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary1998 SCMR 939 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  unfair meansexamination malpracticedisciplinary committeequantum of punishmentwrit jurisdictionscope of judicial reviewquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a writ petition against a notification by the Federal Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Islamabad. The Board had cancelled the petitioner's Higher Secondary School Certificate (H.S.S.C.) examination results due to the use of unfair means. The petitioner contended that there was insufficient evidence of malpractice, citing a technical report from the Federal Investigating Agency regarding chemical erasures on his Chemistry answer sheet. The Supreme Court held that the Disciplinary Committee was justified in inferring the use of unfair means based on the evidence of extensive chemical erasures, noting that candidates typically strike through incorrect answers rather than erasing and rewriting multiple pages. The Court affirmed that findings of fact by a specialized disciplinary body, absent glaring illegality, are not subject to interference by the High Court. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the determination of the quantum of punishment falls within the competence of the disciplinary authority. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Disciplinary Committee regarding the use of unfair means in an examination?
  • Is the determination of the quantum of punishment for examination malpractice a matter within the competence of the disciplinary authority?
  • Does the presence of chemical erasures on an answer sheet constitute sufficient evidence to infer the use of unfair means by a candidate?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah and others vs Dilbar Khan and others1998 MLD 461 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-10-24Read full judgment →
• Amanullah alias Mithu vs The State1998 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-01-22
  post-arrest bailidentification paradeblind F.I.R.murderrobberyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application by the Lahore High Court in a murder and robbery case. The petitioner, Amanullah alias Mithu, was arrested following a blind First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding an incident where the victim, Ehsanullah, was murdered and money was robbed. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being identified in a subsequent identification parade, given that his name was absent from the initial F.I.R. and the identification parade occurred after a delay. The Supreme Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The Court reasoned that the offense was punishable by death or life imprisonment, and while the identification test was delayed, the State provided a satisfactory explanation supported by the case diary. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision, establishing that where a reasonable explanation for procedural delays in investigation exists, and the accused is identified in a valid parade, bail may be refused in serious, non-bailable offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of an accused's name in a blind F.I.R. automatically entitle the accused to bail?
  • Can a delay in holding an identification parade be excused if the prosecution provides a satisfactory explanation?
  • Is an accused charged with an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment entitled to bail if identified in a parade?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanat vs The State1998 MLD 1603 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-19Read full judgment →
• Amanat And Other vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 116 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-06Read full judgment →
• Am in vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1677 · Sindh High Court · 1998-01-19Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain vs Director of Agriculture (E & M), Punjab, Lahore1998 PLC (C.S.) 586 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-21Read full judgment →
• Altaf Hussain Bhatti and 5 others vs Secretary to Government of Balochistan, Services & General Administration Department, Balochistan Civil Secretariat, Quetta and 2 others1998 SCMR 1247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-11
  civil servantdeputationregular absorptionservice tribunalrelaxation of rulespromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which upheld the regular absorption and confirmation of the respondent, a civil engineer transferred from the C & W Department, as Chief of Section in Grade-19 within the Planning and Development Department. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent was rightly regularized and confirmed in Grade-19 based on ex-post facto approval and relaxation of rules granted by the Chief Minister, notwithstanding his initial status as a deputationist and objections raised by other departmental employees regarding lack of hearing and rules. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal's judgment was well-reasoned, noting that the respondent possessed superior qualifications and had served more than ten years, making him eligible, whereas the petitioners lacked such qualifications. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the Chief Minister's approval for relaxation and regular absorption was validly acted upon. Consequently, the petition was dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant on deputation be regularly absorbed in a department with the ex-post facto approval and relaxation of rules by the competent authority?
  • Whether a service tribunal's order directing the implementation of a Chief Minister's directive for confirmation is sustainable when based on equitable long service and higher qualifications?
  • Does an employee lacking the requisite higher qualifications have a valid ground to challenge the regular absorption of a qualified officer in a higher grade?
  Read full judgment →
• Allia Safdar vs University of Punjab and others1998 CLC 235 · Lahore High Court · 1994-11-27Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha, Assistant Foreman, T.R.(Dis) Workshop, WAPDA vs Chairman, WAPDA, WAPDA House, Lahore and 4 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-27
  leave to appealservice tribunaltransfer ordermala fidefinding of factWAPDA employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 20-5-1997 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which set aside a transfer order. The core legal question involves whether the Supreme Court can interfere with a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Service Tribunal regarding the mala fide nature of a departmental transfer order. The Supreme Court held that a finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal upon proper consideration of relevant material cannot be interfered with in the absence of any misreading or disregard of material evidence. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact by the Service Tribunal based on evidence and free from misreading will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of any question of law of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the Federal Service Tribunal in the absence of misreading of evidence?
  • Whether a departmental transfer order passed mala fide to accommodate an employee can be sustained?
  • Does a petition against a finding of fact by the Service Tribunal raise a question of law of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs The Chairman, WAPDA, WAPDA House, Lahore and 41998 SCMR 2324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-27
  service mattertransfer ordermala fidefinding of factleave to appealWAPDA employeeservice exigencies
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside a transfer order of a WAPDA employee. The petitioner, a Fitter promoted to Assistant Foreman, was initially posted to Nowshera but failed to join, leading to his attachment at a workshop in Lahore. Subsequently, another employee (respondent No. 5) was posted to the Nowshera position, and the petitioner was allowed to continue in Lahore. The Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that the transfer order of respondent No. 5 was passed mala fide to accommodate the petitioner rather than for service exigencies. The Supreme Court examined the petition and held that the Tribunal's finding of fact regarding mala fides was based on a proper consideration of the material on record. The Court affirmed that it cannot interfere with such findings of fact absent evidence of misreading or disregard of material evidence. As no question of law of public importance was involved, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the Federal Service Tribunal in the absence of misreading or disregard of material evidence?
  • Is a transfer order passed mala fide to accommodate a specific employee legally sustainable?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal require a question of law of public importance to be entertained?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs Director, T.R. (Distribution), WAPDA, Lahore and 101998 PLC (C.S.) 939 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1995-11-29Read full judgment →
• Allah Jewaya and another vs Muhammad Bakhsh and another1998 PLD Lahore 338 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-01
  revision petitionconcurrent findings of factadverse possessionpossessory suitlocal commissionerlimitationtitle to property
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for possession of land in favor of the respondent. The petitioner contested the respondent's title, argued the suit was barred by limitation due to adverse possession, and claimed prejudice regarding a local commissioner's report. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence to establish title, the nature of long-term possession, and the procedural requirements for challenging a local commissioner's report. The Court held that the respondent’s title was established through documentary evidence and that the petitioners failed to prove adverse possession, as mere long-term possession does not automatically confer title against a true owner. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the right to cross-examine a local commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is discretionary and not absolute. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, reiterating the principle that the High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revisional jurisdiction absent material irregularity or illegality affecting the decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does long-term possession of property automatically constitute adverse possession against the true owner?
  • Is the right to cross-examine a local commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908 an absolute right?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 20 · Lahore High Court · 1997-05-21Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Mst. Naseem Mai and another1998 MLD 1890 · Lahore High Court · 1998-06-02
  dissolution of marriagekhularestitution of conjugal rightsres judicatafamily court jurisdictionwrit jurisdictioncontinuing wrong
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged a Family Court decree dissolving a marriage between the petitioner and respondent. The core legal questions concerned whether a prior ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights barred a subsequent suit for dissolution of marriage under the principle of res judicata, and the extent of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction to review factual findings regarding territorial jurisdiction and marital cruelty. The Court held that the petition was meritless, ruling that non-maintenance and non-performance of conjugal rights constitute continuing wrongs, thereby rendering res judicata inapplicable. The Court affirmed that Family Courts operate under an inquisitorial framework, prioritizing substantive justice over the strict technicalities of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Qanoon-i-Shahadat Order, 1984. It established that the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, should not act as an appellate court to re-examine factual findings—such as residence for territorial jurisdiction—unless they are perverse, based on insufficient evidence, or involve a patent error of law. The dissolution was upheld as the parties could no longer observe the limits of God.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ex parte decree for restitution of conjugal rights bar a subsequent suit for dissolution of marriage on the principle of res judicata?
  • Is the principle of res judicata applicable to family disputes involving non-maintenance and non-performance of conjugal rights?
  • Should the High Court interfere with factual findings of a Family Court regarding territorial jurisdiction in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are the strict technicalities of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Qanoon-i-Shahadat Order, 1984 applicable to proceedings before Family Courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Ali Shan and 2 others1998 MLD 2026 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1998-04-02Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta Maikan vs Chief Minister of Punjab, Lahore and 5 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1119 · Lahore High Court · 1998-04-29Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta Hamlani vs Inspectorgeneral and others1998 PLD Lahore 193 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-06Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad Alias Manzoo Sain vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 240 · Sindh High Court · 1997-10-30Read full judgment →
• Allah Bukhsh, Etc. vs (Mst.) Asmat Ara, Etc.K.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 690 · Lahore High Court · 1997-10-06Read full judgment →
• Allah Bukhsh through his Special Attorney vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and others1998 SCMR 2039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  evacuee propertytransfer pricecancellation of transferresumption of propertyservice of noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition concerning the transfer and resumption of an evacuee property. The property in dispute, an evacuee shop, was originally purchased in auction by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, who utilized a compensation book later found to be bogus for part of the payment. Following non-payment of the balance transfer price after several demand notices, the property was cancelled and resumed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and subsequently transferred to the petitioner. The legal heirs of the original purchaser appealed, contending that the notices were issued to a dead person and that an attorney could not represent them before his formal appointment, leading the Additional Settlement Commissioner to set aside the resumption order. The Settlement Commissioner and the High Court affirmed this view. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the demand notices were properly served on the original purchaser during his lifetime and subsequently upon his general attorney and legal heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notice issued to a deceased auction purchaser for the clearance of transfer price is valid and binding on the legal heirs?
  • Does an attorney have the authority to receive notices affecting the estate prior to the execution of a valid general power of attorney?
  • Whether the failure to pay the balance transfer price through a valid compensation book justifies the resumption of evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh and 3 otherss vs Assistant Commissioner, Ahmadpur East1998 CLC 1607 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-19
  proprietary rightsaudi alteram partemnatural justiceadministrative lawwrit jurisdictionsub-tenantscoram non judice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the orders of the Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, which dismissed the petitioners' revision petitions regarding the conferment of proprietary rights over land. The petitioners, claiming rights as sub-tenants under a 1979 Notification, argued that their initial application was rejected by the Collector without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The core legal question was whether the administrative orders, passed without adhering to the principle of natural justice, were sustainable. The Court held that the Collector's order was passed behind the back of the petitioners, violating the fundamental principle of audi alteram partem. Consequently, the Court declared the impugned orders illegal and void, setting them aside. The key principle laid down is that any administrative or quasi-judicial order affecting a party's rights, passed without providing an opportunity of being heard, is coram non judice and void. The Court remanded the matter to the Assistant Commissioner/Collector to decide the petitioners' applications afresh in accordance with the law and relevant precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Is an administrative order passed without providing an opportunity of being heard to the affected party legally sustainable?
  • Does the violation of the principle of audi alteram partem render an administrative order void?
  • Are sub-tenants eligible for the conferment of proprietary rights under the 1979 Notification regarding state land?
  Read full judgment →
• Alif Khan vs Mst. Mumtaz Begum and anothers1998 SCMR 2124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-03
  Muslim lawgift deeddelivery of possessionmutationpreponderance of evidenceinheritanceconstructive possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the validity of a gift deed executed by the deceased in favor of his two daughters, which was challenged by his brother. The core legal question concerned whether the gift was fraudulent and whether the essential requirements of a valid gift under Muslim law, particularly the delivery of possession and the necessity of mutation, were satisfied. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, dismissing the appeal. The Court held that the gift was valid, emphasizing that civil proceedings are determined by the preponderance of evidence. It established that the essential ingredients of a valid gift are a declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession, which may be constructive. Crucially, the Court clarified that mutation of property in official records is not a mandatory requirement for the effectiveness of a gift transaction. Furthermore, it affirmed that a Muslim has the legal right to dispose of property during their lifetime as they deem fit, and such dispositions cannot be questioned by presumptive heirs based on motive alone.

  Questions settled

  • Is mutation of property in official records a mandatory requirement for the validity of a gift under Muslim law?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to constitute a valid gift under Muslim law?
  • Can a gift be considered valid if the donor continues to share possession of the property with the donee?
  • Does the burden of proof in civil proceedings require moral certainty, or is it based on the preponderance of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher vs The State1998 MLD 1576 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-31Read full judgment →
• Ali Sher alias Sher vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1887 · Lahore High Court · 1998-03-19Read full judgment →
• Ali Raza Asif vs Superintendent of Police, Hafizabad and 3 others1998 P Cr. L J 1089 · Lahore High Court · 1998-02-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Qadar vs The StateK.L.R. 1998 Criminal Cases 10 · Lahore High Court · 1997-11-11Read full judgment →
• Ali Nawaz and anothers vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1202 · Sindh High Court · 1997-12-12Read full judgment →
• Ali Hussain vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 656 · Federal Shariat CourtRead full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs Managing Director, Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited, Lahore and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 828 · Peshawar High Court · 1997-06-19
  probationer terminationmaster and servanttransfer and postingpolitical interferencejurisdiction of high courtservice tribunalconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment from the Peshawar High Court and the Lahore High Court addresses two distinct service matters. In the first matter, the petitioner challenged the termination of his probationary service as a Sales Officer of Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The court held that the company lacked statutory rules governing service terms, establishing a master-and-servant relationship, and that termination during probation due to unsatisfactory performance did not require a show-cause notice or amount to misconduct, thus barring writ jurisdiction. In the second matter, multiple civil servants challenged their transfer and posting orders passed under political influence from members of parliament and ministers. The court held that while political interference in civil servant transfers is illegal under the Government Servants Conduct Rules 1966 and subverts the rule of law, the High Court lacks jurisdiction under Article 199 read with Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, as matters relating to terms and conditions of service fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the services of a probationer be terminated without a show-cause notice on the ground of unsatisfactory performance?
  • Does a writ petition under Article 199 lie against a company that lacks statutory service rules?
  • Whether political interference by members of parliament in the transfer and posting of civil servants is legally permissible?
  • Does the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters of civil servants' transfers influenced by political dictation?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bahadur and 2 others vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 24 · Lahore High Court · 1997-03-19
  Qatl-i-Amdjuvenile offenderDiyatTazirdeath sentence conversionocular evidencemedical corroborationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from convictions for murder and causing injuries. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the validity of the defence’s plea of aggression, the appropriateness of the death sentence, and the sentencing of a juvenile offender. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular and medical evidence, rejecting the defence's improbable version of events. While maintaining the convictions, the Court converted the death sentence of the primary appellant to life imprisonment, noting the absence of premeditation and the sudden nature of the occurrence. Regarding the juvenile appellant, the Court ruled that a trial judge’s subjective observation of age cannot override documentary evidence like a school certificate. Consequently, applying the principle that minors are exempt from Qisas for Qatl-i-Amd, the Court sentenced the juvenile to Diyat and Tazir imprisonment under sections 306 and 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The judgment reinforces that medical corroboration of ocular testimony is critical and that statutory age definitions must be strictly applied.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial judge's subjective observation of an accused's age override documentary evidence like a school certificate?
  • Is a minor offender liable to Qisas for Qatl-i-Amd under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the absence of premeditation in a sudden quarrel justify the conversion of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can medical evidence corroborating ocular testimony establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Asghar Shah vs Nasim Khan and 2 others1998 P Cr. L J 167 · Lahore High Court · 1997-06-19Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmad vs Mst. Gulshan and anothers1998 SCMR 2347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-12
  dowerspecific performanceregistration of documentsrecovery of landNikahnamatechnical plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a decree for the recovery of land granted to a wife in lieu of dower. The plaintiff claimed 10 Kanals of land based on an agreement and a Nikahnama. While the trial court initially awarded a money decree, the District Judge modified this to a decree for 5 Kanals of land, finding the marriage unconsummated. The petitioner challenged this in the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the agreement dated 15-9-1990 required compulsory registration to transfer the land. The Supreme Court held that even if the document required registration, the suit was essentially for the specific performance of the agreement and the Nikahnama. Furthermore, the petitioner conceded that he had agreed to transfer the land in lieu of dower. The Court refused to entertain a technical plea regarding registration to defeat the ends of justice, affirming that the lower courts had correctly served the interests of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a technical plea regarding the lack of registration of a document be used to defeat a claim for the specific performance of a dower agreement?
  • Is a suit for the recovery of land based on a dower agreement maintainable as a suit for specific performance?
  Read full judgment →
• Alhaj. Shahzadi Mumtaz Jahan and 2 others vs The Area Magistrate, Lahore Cantt North and 2 others1998 P Cr. L J 1157 · Lahore High Court · 1997-07-23Read full judgment →
• Aleem Jaffar, Ex-Line Superintendent, WAPDA, Lahore vs WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore and 2 others1998 SCMR 1445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  WAPDAremoval from servicemisconductshow-cause noticeservice tribunaldisciplinary proceedingsstatutory employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the appellant's challenge to his removal from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether an order of removal from service that explicitly considers an employee's defense reply to a show-cause notice containing specific charges of misconduct can be treated as a simpliciter removal under section 17(1-A) without holding a regular inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the impugned removal order was founded on serious charges of misconduct, attached a stigma, and was not a simpliciter removal under the unamended section 17(1-A), rendering it legally defective in the absence of a proper departmental inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that while WAPDA possesses broad powers to remove or retire employees under section 17(1-A) without assigning reasons, if an order is founded on allegations of misconduct and considers a show-cause reply, it cannot bypass the requirement of a regular inquiry, though the authority remains free to pass fresh orders in accordance with the amended statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of removal from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, which is based on a show-cause notice for misconduct, can be sustained as a simpliciter removal?
  • Does the power of WAPDA to remove an employee under section 17(1-A) without assigning reasons preclude the necessity of a regular inquiry when the employee is condemned for specific misconduct?
  • Can the initiation of departmental disciplinary proceedings deprive WAPDA of its power to take action under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
  • Whether an employee removed from service through an order tainted with allegations of misconduct is entitled to reinstatement with back benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Aleem Jaffar, Ex-Line Superintendent, WAPDA, Lahore vs WAPDA through Chairman, Lahore and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-06-04
  WAPDA Actservice lawremoval from servicesimpliciter removalmisconductnatural justicedisciplinary proceedingsback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the removal of a WAPDA employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958. The core legal question was whether the removal order, which explicitly referenced a show-cause notice and the appellant's reply to charges of misconduct, constituted a valid "simpliciter" removal or an unlawful penalty imposed without proper inquiry. The Supreme Court held that while Section 17(1-A) empowers the Authority to remove employees without assigning reasons, this power is not absolute or arbitrary. The Court determined that the impugned order was not a "simpliciter" removal because it relied upon specific charges of misconduct, thereby attaching a stigma to the employee. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Authority cannot bypass the requirement for a proper disciplinary inquiry when the removal is effectively a penalty for misconduct. The judgment establishes that an order of removal under Section 17(1-A) must be free from stigma and specific charges to be valid; otherwise, it requires adherence to standard disciplinary procedures. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was reinstated with back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can WAPDA remove an employee under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958 if the removal order is based on specific charges of misconduct?
  • Does the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee preclude the Authority from subsequently passing a 'simpliciter' removal order under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958?
  • Is a removal order under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act 1958 valid if it attaches a stigma to the employee without a formal inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Alamsher and others vs Hukam Khan1998 CLC 1977 · Peshawar High Court · 1998-06-14Read full judgment →
• Alam Zeb Khan vs Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad and 2 others1998 PLC (C.S.) 1383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-04-30
  performance evaluation reportadverse remarksservice tribunalleave to appealcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding adverse remarks recorded in the petitioner's Performance Evaluation Reports. The core legal question concerns the validity of belatedly recorded adverse remarks and whether factual inquiries regarding alleged mala fides in Annual Confidential Reports can be undertaken by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's judgment upgrading the remarks to 'Average' based on concessions and lack of supporting details was well-reasoned, and that the matter involved factual inquiries unsuitable for adjudication in leave to appeal proceedings where no question of law of public importance arises. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused and the petition dismissed, affirming that the expungement of adverse entries resolved the grievance and further factual examination was unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a factual enquiry regarding alleged mala fides in recording Annual Confidential Reports be undertaken in leave to appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether adverse remarks recorded belatedly and without supporting details in Performance Evaluation Reports warrant interference by the Supreme Court when already addressed by the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Zaib Khan vs Muuammad Nawaz Khan and 2 others1998 CLC 83 · Election Tribunal · 1997-06-26
  election petitionverification of pleadingscorrupt practiceOaths Actprocedural complianceElection Tribunaldismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the election of respondent No. 1 for the National Assembly, alleging incorrect disclosure of assets and liabilities under the Representation of People Act, 1976. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of the petition due to procedural non-compliance, specifically regarding the verification of pleadings and the failure to file necessary supporting documents. The Election Tribunal held that the petition was incompetent and liable to dismissal. The Tribunal emphasized that election petitions must strictly adhere to procedural mandates, including Section 55(3) of the Act and Order VI, Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Crucially, the verification must be on oath, and for Muslim deponents, the Oaths Act, 1873, mandates an oath rather than solemn affirmation. Furthermore, the failure to file necessary annexures and the lack of proper verification rendered the petition defective. The Tribunal also noted that it lacked jurisdiction under the lapsed Section 76-A of the Act. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for failing to meet the mandatory procedural requirements essential for the trial of election disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to verify an election petition on oath, as required by the Oaths Act, 1873, render the petition liable to dismissal?
  • Is a Muslim deponent required to take an oath rather than a solemn affirmation when verifying pleadings under the Oaths Act, 1873?
  • Does the failure to file necessary annexures and schedules with an election petition constitute a fatal non-compliance with the Representation of People Act, 1976?
  • Can an election petition be maintained if the verification of pleadings fails to distinguish between facts verified on personal knowledge and facts verified on information and belief?
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• Alam Sher through Legal Heirs vs Muhammad Sharif and 2 others1998 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-04
  civil court jurisdictionrevenue courtColonization of Government Lands ActGrow More Food Schemespecial leave to appealallotment of landbar of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions seeking special leave to appeal against the judgments of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners' civil suits regarding ownership rights of land allotted under the Grow More Food Scheme. The core legal question is whether Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain and decide disputes concerning matters where revenue authorities possess exclusive jurisdiction under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petitions, holding that section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act explicitly bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters empowering the Collector or revenue officers. The Court established the key principle that Civil Courts cannot interfere with orders passed by competent revenue authorities acting within their exclusive jurisdiction unless such orders are proved to be without jurisdiction or mala fide, and that alternate statutory remedies before revenue forums must be exhausted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute in matters where the Collector is empowered by the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Are the provisions of section 36 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, mandatory in nature regarding the exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction?
  • Can a Civil Court interfere with orders passed by a competent revenue authority without proof that the orders were without jurisdiction or mala fide?
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• Akram Beg and 6 others vs The State and others1998 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-04
  murdersudden fightcommutation of sentencecommon objectunlawful assemblycriminal appealappraisal of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a dispute between two parties over bus route timings, resulting in a violent confrontation where the accused blocked the complainant's bus and opened fire, causing deaths and injuries. The trial court convicted the accused under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, imposing death sentences on the main culprits. The High Court subsequently upheld the convictions but commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment, citing the possibility of a sudden fight arising from existing ill-feelings. The core legal question was whether the convictions were sustainable and whether the commutation of the death sentence was legally justified. The Supreme Court dismissed both the convicts' and the complainant's appeals. The Court held that the prosecution evidence was reliable and the convictions were well-founded. Regarding sentencing, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, ruling that given the pre-existing enmity and the likelihood of an altercation, the extreme penalty of death was not appropriate, thereby establishing that mitigating circumstances can justify commuting capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of prior enmity between parties preclude a finding of a sudden fight in a criminal case?
  • Is the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment justified when the evidence suggests an altercation occurred between parties with pre-existing ill-feeling?
  • Can an appellate court uphold a conviction while maintaining a reduced sentence based on the circumstances of the occurrence?
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• Akmal Nawaz and anothers vs The State1998 P Cr. L J 1821 · Federal Shariat Court · 1998-03-13Read full judgment →
• Akistan Chest Foundation (Regd.) through Its Chairman, Prof. DR.K.L.R. 1998 Civil Cases 394 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Akhunzada Behrawar Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan vs Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, Chief Justice of Pakistan and 2 others1988 SCMR 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-28
  constitutional petitionFull Courtaid of Supreme Courtjudicial ordersinstitutional crisis
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an application concerning the non-compliance of an order passed by the Supreme Court in a constitutional petition, amidst conflicting orders from different Benches creating a tense institutional situation. The core legal question involved the enforcement of judicial orders and the constitution of a Full Court to resolve pending constitutional matters when the Chief Justice was a respondent. The court held that all state functionaries must fulfil their constitutional obligations under Article 190 of the Constitution to aid the Supreme Court and ensure compliance with its orders. Furthermore, in light of the senior puisne Judge declining to constitute the Full Court, the matter was directed to be placed before the next senior Judge to make arrangements for a Full Court session. The key principle laid down is the constitutional duty of state functionaries to act in aid of the Supreme Court to uphold judicial orders and maintain institutional integrity during administrative crises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether state functionaries are bound to act in aid of the Supreme Court under Article 190 of the Constitution to ensure compliance with its orders?
  • What procedure should be followed when a senior puisne Judge declines to constitute a Bench for hearing a constitutional matter?
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• Akhunzada Behrawar Saeed vs Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, Chief Justice1998 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-11-28
  original jurisdictionSupreme Court Rulesconstitutional petitionFull Courtjudicial administrationpublic importanceBranch Registry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which the Supreme Court office initially refused to entertain at the Peshawar Branch Registry, citing Supreme Court Rules requiring filing at the principal seat. The Court addressed whether procedural rules could override the Court's original jurisdiction. The Court held that the rules framed under Article 191 of the Constitution are merely regulatory and cannot restrict the jurisdiction conferred by Article 184(3). Consequently, the office objection was overruled, and the petition was entertained. Furthermore, given the public importance of the issues raised regarding the functioning of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, who was a respondent in related proceedings, the Court determined that the matter required consideration by a Full Court. The Court directed the Registrar to place the matter before the senior puisne Judge to constitute a Full Court, excluding the respondent Chief Justice, for an authoritative pronouncement on the constitutional questions presented.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court Rules restrict the filing of a petition under the Court's original jurisdiction at a Branch Registry?
  • Are the rules framed under Article 191 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 regulatory or jurisdictional in nature?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to dispense with procedural filing requirements in matters of public importance and urgency?
  • Can a respondent Chief Justice of Pakistan perform judicial or administrative functions while his appointment is suspended by an order of the Supreme Court?
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• Akhtar Muhammad vs The State1998 SCMR 1011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-03-27
  murder convictioncircumstantial evidenceforensic evidencerecovery of crime weaponpolice testimonysubstantive evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant was apprehended by a police patrol shortly after the incident, found in possession of a pistol smelling of fresh discharge, which forensic analysis later matched to empty casings recovered from the crime scene. The appellant argued that the prosecution evidence was insufficient, relying on alleged contradictions in police statements and the absence of eye-witnesses. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on circumstantial evidence—specifically the immediate arrest with the crime weapon and forensic matching—in the absence of direct eye-witness testimony. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the arrest of the accused by unbiased police officers immediately following the crime, coupled with the recovery of the weapon and forensic confirmation, constitutes substantive and direct evidence. The Court affirmed that such evidence, when credible and consistent, is sufficient to establish guilt, distinguishing the case from precedents involving tainted or interested testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Does the arrest of an accused immediately after a crime with a weapon matching forensic evidence constitute substantive evidence of guilt?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained in the absence of eye-witnesses when circumstantial evidence is strong?
  • Does an omission of certain facts in a police statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 necessarily negate the presence of a witness at the crime scene?
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