Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• United Bank Limited vs Ghulam Rasool Bhatti1990 PLC 449 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-05-22Read full judgment →
• Umerzad and 2 others vs The State1990 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  murderrelated witnessescorroborationeye-witness testimonyappreciation of evidencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioners for the murder of two individuals, Badiuz-Zaman and Zar Khan, in 1971. The trial court convicted the petitioners under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to life imprisonment, which the High Court subsequently maintained. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses, whose presence at the scene was contested, was sufficient to sustain a conviction when corroborated by medical and recovery evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established its case, finding no misreading of evidence or miscarriage of justice by the High Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of related witnesses is admissible and reliable if their presence at the crime scene is established and their account is corroborated by independent evidence, such as recoveries and medical reports. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, upholding the convictions and sentences imposed by the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of related eye-witnesses sufficient to sustain a conviction if corroborated by medical and recovery evidence?
  • Does the presence of related witnesses at the crime scene render their testimony reliable despite their relationship to the deceased?
  • Can a conviction be maintained under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on the consistent testimony of eye-witnesses whose presence is established by independent evidence?
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• Umer Hayat and another vs The State1990 SCMR 495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-24
  criminal appealappreciation of evidencesavings clauserepeal of statuteconvictionspecial court for speedy trials
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioners for an offense under section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with the addition of section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners challenged the conviction on grounds of improper appreciation of evidence regarding recoveries and false implication, and further contended that the trial was illegal due to the repeal of the Ordinance under which the trial court exercised jurisdiction upon the enactment of Act XV of 1987. The Supreme Court declined to re-appraise the evidence, noting that the lower courts had already adjudicated upon it. Regarding the legal challenge, the Court held that the trial was valid, as section 15 of Ordinance II of 1987 expressly saved previous proceedings and judgments. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The judgment affirms the principle that appellate courts will generally not re-appraise evidence already considered by lower courts and that savings clauses in new legislation preserve the validity of prior judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the enactment of a new statute automatically invalidate proceedings conducted under a repealed Ordinance?
  • Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence already considered by two lower courts in a criminal appeal?
  • Does section 15 of Ordinance II of 1987 save proceedings and judgments rendered by a trial court prior to the repeal of the Ordinance?
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• Umer Hakim and others vs Deputy Commissioner, Dir and others1990 PLD Peshawar 91 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-01-02
  Martial Law RegulationCivil Court JurisdictionOuster of JurisdictionLand DisputesRoyalty RightsFormer State of DirImmovable Property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against trial court orders returning plaints for lack of jurisdiction in suits regarding royalty shares from forest property in the former State of Dir. The core legal question is whether such disputes, involving claims by local right-holders against the former Ruler, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of authorities appointed under Martial Law Regulation No. 123 of 1972, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Court held that the dispute relates to an interest in immovable property within the former State of Dir, falling squarely within the mischief of the Regulation. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Regulation provides a complete, exclusive mechanism for resolving such disputes through the Provincial Government or its authorized officers. The key principle laid down is that where a special statute provides a specific forum and procedure for adjudicating land-related disputes in former states, the jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded, and litigants are legally bound to pursue their remedies through the designated statutory authorities rather than initiating civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute regarding royalty shares in forest property in the former State of Dir fall within the scope of Martial Law Regulation No. 123 of 1972?
  • Does the Martial Law Regulation No. 123 of 1972 oust the jurisdiction of civil courts to adjudicate land-related disputes in the former State of Dir?
  • Is the former Ruler of a state considered to have an interest in immovable property for the purposes of Martial Law Regulation No. 123 of 1972 even after the property is declared State property?
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• Umer Din and 6 others vs Messrs Gulf Airlines1990 PLC 304 · Sindh High Court · 1989-04-30Read full judgment →
• Umer Din alias Umroo vs S.H.O.,Bhai Pheru and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 948 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Umer Din alias Umroo vs S.H.O, Bhai Pheru and Respondents1990 P Cr. L J 948 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Umar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1663 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26Read full judgment →
• Umar Khan vs Nasim Raza and others1990 MLD 1062 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-18
  civil revisionrestoration of petitiondismissal for non-prosecutioninherent powerssufficient causelegal representativesabatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a civil revision petition that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question was whether a High Court possesses the jurisdiction to restore a revision petition dismissed for default, given the absence of an express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 analogous to those governing the restoration of suits or appeals. The respondent contended that such restoration was not maintainable due to the lack of specific statutory authority. The Court, after reviewing conflicting precedents, held that while the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not explicitly provide for the restoration of revision petitions, the inherent power of the Court to dismiss a matter for non-prosecution carries with it the corresponding inherent jurisdiction to restore it, provided sufficient cause is demonstrated. Relying on Supreme Court authority, the Court affirmed that it maintains discretionary jurisdiction to restore such petitions. Finding that the applicant established sufficient cause regarding the death of the original petitioner and the subsequent lack of knowledge of proceedings, the Court allowed the application for restoration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the inherent jurisdiction to restore a civil revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is the restoration of a revision petition dependent on the existence of specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a legal representative apply for the restoration of a revision petition if the original petitioner died during the pendency of the proceedings?
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• Umar Hayat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 125 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-26
  dying declarationmurdercompensation to heirsappreciation of evidencecriminal revisionjail appealSection 544-A CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder, while a criminal revision seeks enhancement of the sentence. The core legal questions concern the evidentiary value of a dying declaration in the absence of ocular witnesses and the proper application of compensation provisions under Section 544(A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that a dying declaration, if credible and free from suspicion, can form the sole basis for conviction without further corroboration. In this case, the dying declaration was deemed reliable, corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon. The Court upheld the conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment, finding no grounds for enhancement. Crucially, the Court laid down that compensation under Section 544(A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, must be imposed as an additional burden independent of any fine levied as part of the sentence, rather than being deducted from such fine.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration form the sole basis of a conviction without corroboration?
  • Is compensation awarded under Section 544(A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 required to be in addition to, or part of, the fine imposed as a sentence?
  • Does the failure to examine ocular witnesses mentioned in the FIR automatically invalidate a conviction based on other evidence?
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• Umar Hayat vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 742 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-07-09Read full judgment →
• Umar Hayat vs Said Shah and another1990 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  leave to appealmurdersentence alterationextenuating circumstancesfamily honourillicit relationshipdeath sentencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that altered a death sentence to life imprisonment and reduced a fine for murder. The trial court had convicted the respondent under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing him to death and a fine. The High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence, citing an extenuating circumstance. The Supreme Court considered the prosecution's own version, as stated in the F.I.R., that the respondent had a suspicion of the deceased having an illicit relationship with his wife. This suspicion was deemed a valid extenuating circumstance, as the respondent appeared to have killed the deceased to vindicate his family honour. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can suspicion of an illicit relationship be considered an extenuating circumstance in a murder case?
  • Is a High Court justified in altering a death sentence to life imprisonment based on extenuating circumstances?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's sentence reduction when extenuating circumstances are established?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed if the High Court's reasoning for sentence alteration is found sound?
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• Umar Hayat Khan and others vs Muhammad Ash Raf and others1990 SCMR 1382 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-02
  customary lawmaintenance holderlimited ownerlife estatesuccessionalienation of propertyinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the nature of a widow's interest in property inherited upon the death of her husband in 1938. The central legal question was whether the widow, Mst. Noor Khanum, held the property as a limited owner or merely as a maintenance holder, thereby restricting her power of alienation. The trial court, the first appellate court, and the High Court concurrently held that she was a maintenance holder, not a limited owner. The appellants argued, relying on a Federal Shariat Court judgment, that there was no distinction between maintenance holders and life estate holders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Federal Shariat Court's decision did not alter the factual determination of the widow's status under the customary law existing in 1938. The Court affirmed that the nature of the interest held by the widow at the time of succession was a factual finding that remained undisturbed, and the subsequent legislation regarding life estates did not retroactively change the character of the interest she acquired in 1938.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court judgment in Mst. Sunar Begum v. Federal Government of Pakistan retroactively alter the status of a widow who acquired property as a maintenance holder in 1938?
  • Is a concurrent finding of fact by three courts regarding the nature of a widow's interest in property as a maintenance holder subject to interference in appeal?
  • Does the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 or the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 affect the determination of the character of a widow's interest in property acquired prior to their enactment?
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• Umar Gul Khattak vs Inspector General of Police, NWFP, Peshwar EtcK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 46 · Sindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Umar Ayyar Khan vs Umar Daraz Khan And 10 Other1990 CLC 1196 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-19Read full judgment →
• Tufail Ahmad Qureshi vs Accountant-General Pakistan1990 PLC (C.S.) 219 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-29Read full judgment →
• Trustees of the Port of Karachi vs Gujranwala Steel Industries and another1990 CLC 197 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-23
  rejection of plaintcause of actionport trust dueshard feesship breakingstatutory notificationcivil court jurisdictionamendment of pleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs, Trustees of the Port of Karachi, instituted suits for the recovery of 'Hard Fees' for successive periods against the defendants for utilizing plaintiffs' foreshore and hard areas to break up a stranded, unserviceable ship named m.v. 'Trauggut' which ran aground at Clifton beach. The defendants filed applications under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking rejection of the plaints for lack of cause of action, contending inter alia that no specific area had been demarcated and notified by the Deputy Conservator as required under Note 6 of Table IX of the notification issued pursuant to Section 43-B of the Karachi Port Trust Act 1886. The Sindh High Court examined the statutory provisions, the meaning of 'notified', and the necessity of a public declaration or follow-up notification. The court held that without the mandatory demarcation and notifying of the specific areas under the relevant rules, no statutory right to claim such fees vests in the plaintiffs, thereby disclosing no cause of action. Consequently, the court rejected the plaints in all the suits under Order 7 Rule 11, while clarifying that the plaintiffs were at liberty to institute fresh proceedings on different grounds such as compensation for use and occupation of land.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is impliedly barred where a statute creates new rights and provides a summary tribunal for their enforcement?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for lack of cause of action when the mandatory statutory notification required for levying fees has not been issued or pleaded?
  • What constitutes a valid 'notification' or 'notifying' under a statutory provision when the power is exercised by a public functionary?
  • Whether a belated oral request for the amendment of a plaint can cure a fundamental lack of cause of action in proceedings under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Trade & Industry Publications Limited. vs Industrial Development Bank Of PakistanPTCL 1990 CL. 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  winding upcompanies ordinanceinability to pay debtsdisputed debtstatutory demandcompany liquidationpending civil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh ordering the winding up of the appellant company under section 305 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, due to its inability to pay debts owed to the respondent financial institution after statutory notice. The core legal questions involved whether the debt was bona fide disputed on account of a pending suit filed by the appellant against the Federal Government, and whether the winding-up petition was maintainable. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of a separate suit against a third party (the Federal Government) does not render the respondent's undisputed loan claim a disputed debt, nor does it bar winding-up proceedings where the company has failed to satisfy a statutory demand and suffered massive losses exceeding its paid-up capital. The court affirmed that insolvency is presumed upon neglecting to pay a valid statutory demand, and distinguished English authorities relied upon by the appellant. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pendency of a civil suit by a company against the Federal Government constitutes a bona fide dispute regarding a debt owed to a financial institution so as to bar a winding-up petition?
  • Does the failure to pay a debt after service of a statutory demand raise a presumption of insolvency under company law?
  • Can a creditor maintain a winding-up petition notwithstanding the pendency of separate legal proceedings against third parties?
  • Whether an unsatisfied default in paying loan instalments permits the creditor to recall the entire loan amount under the credit agreement terms?
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• Trade & Industry Publications Limited vs Industrial Development Bank1990 PLD Supreme Court 768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  winding up petitioninability to pay debtsbona fide disputestatutory notice of demandinsolvency presumptionCompanies Ordinancecorporate insolvency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order directing the winding up of the appellant company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, due to its inability to pay debts owed to the respondent bank. The appellant argued that the winding-up petition was not bona fide because it had filed a separate civil suit against the Federal Government and the respondent, claiming damages for breach of promises. The core legal question was whether the pendency of this civil litigation created a bona fide dispute regarding the debt, thereby barring the winding-up proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the winding-up order. The Court held that the mere pendency of a civil suit does not prevent a winding-up petition unless the debt is genuinely and bona fide disputed. It established that a debtor cannot use litigation as a 'cloak' to evade liability. Since the appellant failed to pay after receiving a statutory notice of demand, insolvency was presumed, and the appellant’s defenses were deemed frivolous and insufficient to displace the creditor's right to seek winding up.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit by a debtor against a creditor automatically bar a winding-up petition?
  • Can a company avoid a winding-up order by claiming a debt is disputed when the defense is merely a cloak for non-payment?
  • Is insolvency presumed when a company fails to pay a debt after receiving a statutory notice of demand?
  • Does a creditor have the right to seek winding up if the debtor fails to pay an undisputed debt despite statutory notice?
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• TM Mahal Hotels Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary1990 MLD 290 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• TM Begum vs Ghulam Abbas and 5 others1990 PLD Lahore 453 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-19Read full judgment →
• Tilla Gul and another vs Deputy Collector of Central Excise & Land1990 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-13
  Customs LawTribal AreasRepeal of StatuteJurisdictionStatutory InterpretationLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legal validity of actions taken by Customs Officers in the Khyber Agency and Torkham Land Customs Station on 10-8-1982. The core legal question is whether the Sea Customs Act 1878 remained applicable to these Tribal Areas despite its repeal by the Customs Act 1969. The petitioners argued that upon the repeal of the 1878 Act, Customs Officers lacked the statutory authority to seize goods or initiate proceedings, rendering the orders of the Deputy Collector, Collector (Appeals), and the Additional Secretary without jurisdiction. The High Court had previously held that the Customs Officers continued to exercise powers under the 1878 Act by virtue of the Tribal Areas (Application of Acts) Regulation 1965, a position challenged by the petitioners. The Supreme Court, recognizing the issue as one of law and considerable general importance, granted leave to appeal to determine whether the 1965 Regulation effectively preserved the application of the repealed 1878 Act in the Tribal Areas.

  Questions settled

  • Was the Sea Customs Act 1878 applicable to the Khyber Agency and Torkham Land Customs Station on 10-8-1982 despite its repeal by the Customs Act 1969?
  • Did the Tribal Areas (Application of Acts) Regulation 1965 preserve the authority of Customs Officers to act under the Sea Customs Act 1878 after its repeal?
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• Themas and 16 others vs Dawar Khan and 7 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-26
  revenue recordcolumn of legancolumn of cultivationbila legan bawaja bairemand for additional evidencesuit for possessionpresumption of truth
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for possession filed by the respondents, who claimed ownership of the suit land. The primary legal question concerned the evidentiary value of an entry stating 'Bila Legan Bawaja Bai' in the column of rent (Legan) when in conflict with the entry in the column of possession or cultivation in the revenue record. The Supreme Court observed that while an entry in the column of Legan is ordinarily not preferred over entries in the cultivation or ownership columns, a party relying on the Legan column may be permitted to adduce independent evidence to corroborate such entry, provided the claim is genuine and not mala fide. Reaffirming the principles established in precedent cases, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and remanded the matter to the trial court to afford both parties an opportunity to produce additional evidence regarding their respective claims of ownership through purchase.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an entry in the column of Legan takes precedence over an entry in the column of possession or cultivation in revenue records?
  • Under what circumstances can a party relying on a Legan entry be permitted to adduce additional independent evidence to substantiate its claim of ownership?
  • Whether a remand for adducing additional evidence regarding revenue record entries can be granted where the reliance on the Legan column is found to be mala fide?
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• The Wellcome Foundation Ltd. vs Khawar and 3 others1990 SCMR 561 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-09
  trade marktemporary injunctionphonetic similaritypassing offleave to appealpharmaceutical drug
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a pharmaceutical firm incorporated in the United Kingdom, manufactures and markets an anti-bacterial drug under the registered trade name "Septran" pursuant to the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The respondents subsequently began manufacturing and marketing the same drug under closely resembling trade names, namely "Septrim" and "Septrex". Treating this as a breach of its rights, the petitioner instituted suits seeking permanent and temporary injunctions. The trial court and the High Court both denied the prayers for temporary injunction pendente lite, leading to the filing of petitions for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerned whether the use of phonetically similar trade names for the same pharmaceutical product justified the grant of interim injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding phonetic similarity and the likelihood of consumer confusion required detailed examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and restrained the respondents from manufacturing or marketing the drug under the disputed names pending the final outcome of the appeals, while permitting the trial court to proceed with the main trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the use of phonetically similar trade names for the same pharmaceutical product constitutes a breach of trade mark rights warranting interim relief?
  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction pendente lite when rival trade names are alleged to confuse an average consumer?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to examine the refusal of interim injunctions by lower courts in trade mark infringement matters?
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• The University of the Punjab vs Muhammad Yousaf1990 SCMR 1012 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-25
  disciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticewrit jurisdictioncompetent authorityauthorized officermisappropriation of fundsjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, a Stenographer at the University Oriental College, faced disciplinary proceedings for alleged misappropriation of funds and loss of records. An authorized officer conducted an inquiry, exonerated the respondent, and recommended reinstatement. However, the competent authority disagreed with these findings and issued a show-cause notice proposing dismissal. The respondent challenged this notice via a writ petition in the High Court, which declared the notice without lawful authority. The University of the Punjab appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the competent authority possessed the legal power to disagree with the findings of the authorized officer and whether the High Court acted prematurely in exercising writ jurisdiction against a mere show-cause notice before a final order was passed. The Supreme Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order pending the final adjudication of these legal questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a competent authority has the legal power to disagree with the findings of an authorized officer in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Whether the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction to challenge a show-cause notice before a final order has been passed by the competent authority?
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• The Superintending Engineer, WAPDA, Lahore and another vs Muhammad1990 PLC 242 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-12Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zaida Khan and others1990 MLD 2066 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-30Read full judgment →
• The State vs Zahid Rasool1990 P Cr. L J 340 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-11
  bail cancellationconcurrent jurisdictionhumanitarian groundscustoms offenceprocedural propriety
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by the State seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent by the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi, in a case registered under the Customs Act, 1969. The respondent had initially been refused bail but subsequently secured release on humanitarian grounds upon a second application. The core legal question was whether the State could bypass the trial court and approach the High Court directly for bail cancellation, and whether humanitarian grounds constitute a valid basis for granting bail in such matters. The Court held that while the High Court and the Special Judge possess concurrent jurisdiction regarding bail cancellation, it is a desirable practice to first approach the court that granted the bail unless compelling circumstances exist to bypass it. Citing established precedents, the Court emphasized that the trial court should be the primary forum for such applications. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the State's application for cancellation of bail, directing the applicant to approach the trial court first if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Is it procedurally required to approach the trial court for bail cancellation before moving the High Court when jurisdiction is concurrent?
  • Does the existence of concurrent jurisdiction allow an applicant to bypass the lower court for bail cancellation without showing compelling circumstances?
  • Can bail be granted solely on humanitarian grounds in a customs-related criminal case?
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• The State vs Zahid Hussain1990 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  appeal against acquittalFederal Shariat Courtlimitation periodspecial lawrule making powervires of rulesOffence of Zina
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard an appeal by the State against an order of the Federal Shariat Court dismissing its appeal against an acquittal under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 as time-barred. The core legal question was whether Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981, which prescribes a sixty-day limitation period for filing appeals including acquittal appeals, was intra vires the rule-making powers under Articles 203-E and 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby overriding the six-month limitation under Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908 read with Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Rule 18(1)(A), holding that the Federal Shariat Court possesses wide constitutional powers under Articles 203-E(2) and 203-J to regulate its procedure and proceedings in all respects, including fixing limitation periods where the parent statute is silent. By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, the special rule overrides the general limitation period. Consequently, the State's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981 prescribing a sixty-day limitation period intra vires Articles 203-E and 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the limitation period prescribed under Rule 18(1)(A) of the Federal Shariat Court (Procedure) Rules 1981 override Article 157 of the Limitation Act 1908 for appeals against acquittal under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have the constitutional authority under Article 203-E(2) and Article 203-J of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to prescribe periods of limitation for appeals where the primary statute does not specify one?
  • Does Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act 1908 make a limitation period framed under special procedural rules prevailing over the general schedule of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• The State vs The Special Judge (Customs) and others1990 P Cr. L J 53 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-28Read full judgment →
• The State vs The Special Judge (Customs) and othersPTCL 1990 CL. 549 · Special Appellate Court Customs · 1989-08-28Read full judgment →
• The State vs Sohail Ahmad and 4 others1990 PLD Federal Shariat Court 29 · Federal Shariat Court · 1990-02-12
  appeal against acquittalcognizable offencedefect in investigationpublic placeprohibition orderjurisdiction of courthudood laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against acquittal filed by the State against five respondents who were prosecuted for offences under Articles 3, 4, and 11 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The trial court had acquitted the respondents under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. without recording evidence, holding that the police investigation was unauthorized because the vehicle from which narcotics were recovered was a 'place' and not a 'public place', rendering the offences non-cognizable. The Federal Shariat Court examined the competence of the appeal, affirming its constitutional review jurisdiction under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. On the merits, the court held that Article 16(1) of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 creates distinct categories where offences under Article 3 are cognizable unconditionally, and that defects or irregularities in police investigation do not oust the jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appeal was allowed, the acquittal order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against an order of acquittal under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 lies to the Federal Shariat Court?
  • Are offences under Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 subject to the condition of being committed at a public place to be considered cognizable?
  • Does a defect or illegality in a police investigation vitiate the subsequent trial and oust the jurisdiction of the trial court?
  • Whether a motor vehicle can be considered a public place for the purpose of determining the cognizability of offences under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
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• The State vs Sher Abbas Khan and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 1702 · Federal Shariat Court · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
• The State vs Shandi Gul1990 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-16
  kidnappingminoraggravated intentlawful guardianshipcriminal appealspecial court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from concurrent proceedings where the respondent was charged under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping a minor child, but was convicted by the trial court under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping from lawful guardianship and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The State appealed for a conviction under section 364-A, while the accused appealed for complete acquittal. The core legal question was whether the statutory requirements and specific criminal intents required under section 364-A were established, and whether the conviction under section 363 was sustainable based on the evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the prosecution failed to establish any evidence regarding the specific aggravated intentions mandated by section 364-A, rejecting generalisations regarding the accused's ethnicity, but affirmed that the evidence conclusively proved the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship under section 363. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that conviction under section 364-A requires clear, positive evidence of specific aggravated intent, which cannot be presumed through broad generalisations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under section 364-A of the Pakistan Penal Code can be sustained without evidence of specific aggravated intent?
  • Can general assumptions regarding an accused's background substitute for positive evidence of intent in a criminal charge?
  • Is the offense of kidnapping from lawful guardianship under section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code established when an accused is apprehended carrying a minor away from the place of taking?
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• The State vs Salimuddin1990 P Cr. L J 818 · Lahore High Court · 1977-09-21Read full judgment →
• The State vs Rashid Ahmad, S.I., Police Station, Saddar Sheikhupura1990 P Cr. L J 1402 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-26Read full judgment →
• The State vs Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, Islamabad1990 PLD Lahore 171 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• The State vs Pakistan Medical & Dental Council, Islamabad1990 CLC 1500 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-02Read full judgment →
• The State vs Muhammad Rafi and another1990 P Cr. L J 1042 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-04Read full judgment →
• The State vs Messrs Kalco Pharma and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 865 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ibrar Hussain Shah and others1990 P Cr. L J 176 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-10Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ghulam Jilani and others1990 P Cr. L J 597 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-12-18Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ghulam Hassan and another1990 P Cr. L J 288 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• The State vs Attaullah1990 P Cr. L J 163 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-24Read full judgment →
• The State vs Anwar Khattak and others1990 PLD Federal Shariat Court 62 · Federal Shariat Court
  case decidedrevisional jurisdictionnarcotics smugglingProhibition Enforcement of Hadd Order 1979Customs Act 1969double jeopardydistinct offencespost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The Federal Shariat Court initiated suo motu revisional proceedings under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to examine proceedings in a Customs Court where the accused was charged and granted bail exclusively under Section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act 1969 for smuggling narcotics, without invoking Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 (P.O. No. 4 of 1979).

  The preliminary issue was whether the Federal Shariat Court had revisional jurisdiction under Article 203-DD when trial proceedings had not concluded. The court held that orders granting bail or framing charges constitute a judicial application of mind, satisfying the requirement of a 'case decided'. On the substantive question of double jeopardy and implied repeal, the Court held that the offences under the Customs Act 1969 and the Prohibition Order 1979 are separate, distinct, and carry different penalties, jurisdictional forums, and essential ingredients. Proceedings under the Customs Act 1969 do not bar separate prosecution under the Prohibition Order 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of bail or framing of a charge in a trial court constitute a 'case decided' under Article 203-DD of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Are offences under Section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act 1969 and Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 separate and distinct offences?
  • Does prosecution under the Customs Act 1969 bar a separate prosecution under Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 under Article 13 of the Constitution or Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Are Customs Officers legally obligated to inform general law-enforcing agencies when apprehending individuals in possession of narcotics for offences under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Ali Akbar Sabzoi1990 P Cr. L J 1729 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• The State vs Adnan Ansari and others1990 MLD 303 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-19Read full judgment →
• The State vs Abdul Sattar and others1990 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  petition for leave to appealacquittaldismissal in liminecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine the State appeal against the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the High Court committed any error of law, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in dismissing the State's appeal against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that no case was made out for interference, as the Additional Advocate-General failed to point out any legal error, misreading, or non-reading of evidence by the High Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an order of the High Court dismissing an appeal against acquittal in limine unless a patent error of law or a serious misreading or non-reading of evidence is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's dismissal in limine of an appeal against acquittal without proof of legal error or misreading of evidence?
  • Does the failure to point out misreading or non-reading of evidence justify granting leave to appeal against an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Abdul Majeed1990 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  leave to appealinadequacy of sentencecriminal petitionsentence alteration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition filed by the State, represented by the Additional Advocate-General, challenging the alteration of a sentence by the High Court as being neither legal nor proper. The core legal question concerns the legality and adequacy of the sentence passed by the High Court. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the specific question of the inadequacy of the sentence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may grant leave to appeal to consider whether a sentence altered by a lower court is adequate and in accordance with the law upon a petition by the State.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted by the Supreme Court to consider the inadequacy of a sentence?
  • Is the alteration of a sentence by the High Court subject to review by the Supreme Court regarding its legality and propriety?
  Read full judgment →
• The State vs Abdul Haq and others1990 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirytentative assessmentconspiracymurder casebail cancellationFIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order granting bail to respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the incident, involving firearm injuries and a fatality, resulted from a conspiracy between the respondents and co-accused. The High Court had granted bail, noting that the conspiracy allegation was absent from the First Information Report and that the prosecution witnesses were not mentioned therein, thus finding the case fell under the purview of further inquiry. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's tentative assessment regarding the applicability of bail provisions was justified. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the High Court's decision to grant bail under the relevant statutory provision. The Court held that the High Court's tentative findings regarding the case's merits were appropriate at the bail stage. However, the Supreme Court clarified that these tentative observations and the finding that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry should not influence the trial judge's final determination of the case on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court's tentative findings at the bail stage influence the trial judge's decision on the merits of the case?
  • Does the absence of a conspiracy allegation in the First Information Report justify granting bail under the principle of further inquiry?
  • Is a finding that a case falls under the scope of further inquiry sufficient grounds for the grant of bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through the Advocate- General, N.-W.F.P.- vs Saifur Badshah1990 P Cr. L J 1669 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-05-08Read full judgment →
• The State through Ag. N.W.F.P. and another vs Muhammad Ashraf Khan1990 SCMR 1135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-26
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsleave to appealcancellation of bailtrial delaycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal filed by the State and a private complainant against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which granted post-arrest bail on medical grounds to the respondent, Muhammad Ashraf Khan Tareen, who was accused of murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's exercise of discretion in granting bail on medical grounds was appropriate given the circumstances of the case, including allegations of the respondent's involvement in a fatal shooting. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the merits of the bail order. While the Court did not express a final opinion on the merits of the bail grant, it emphasized the necessity of ensuring the trial proceeds without obstruction. The Court held that the trial must not be delayed and explicitly empowered the trial judge to cancel the respondent's bail should he attempt to absent himself from the proceedings or otherwise delay the trial, thereby reinforcing the principle that bail is conditional upon the accused's cooperation with the judicial process.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court cancel bail if the accused attempts to delay the trial proceedings?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to grant leave to appeal against a High Court order granting bail on medical grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• The State through AdvocateGeneral, N.W.F.P. vs Gul Rehman1990 MLD 1049 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-01-16Read full judgment →
• The State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F. Province, Peshawar- vs Mukamil Shah1990 P Cr. L J 1692 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-05-12Read full judgment →
• The State through A.-G., N.-W.F.P. vs Abdul Latif and another1990 P Cr. L J 113 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-01Read full judgment →
• The State through A.-G., N.-W.F.P. Peshawar vs Irshad Muhammad alias1990 P Cr. L J 1816 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• The Secretary to the Government of Orissa and another vs Sarbeswar1990 MLD 512 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• The Secretary to Government of the Punjab vs Shaukat Jamil1990 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-29
  civil service disciplinemedical leave rulesmisconductservice tribunaldepartmental inquirytransfer of civil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which set aside disciplinary penalties imposed on a civil servant for misconduct. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s failure to comply with mandatory leave rules regarding medical certification and his subsequent avoidance of duty by feigning illness constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's order and restoring the departmental penalties of censure and stoppage of increments. The Court held that civil servants must strictly adhere to prescribed leave rules, specifically the requirement to obtain medical certificates from designated government authorities. The Court further established that an officer's conduct must be viewed in the context of their actions; feigning illness to avoid a transfer and delaying appearance before a Medical Board constitutes misconduct that undermines service discipline. The Tribunal erred by failing to consider the mandatory nature of the leave rules and by viewing the respondent's conduct in isolation rather than as a calculated attempt to avoid duty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil servant's failure to obtain medical certificates from a government-designated authority constitute a violation of the Civil Services Leave Rules?
  • Can a civil servant be penalized for feigning illness to avoid a transfer order?
  • Is a Service Tribunal required to consider all applicable leave rules when adjudicating a disciplinary matter?
  • Does avoiding a mandatory medical board examination constitute misconduct for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• The President of Pakistan and others vs Brig. (Retd.) Abdul Rashid1990 SCMR 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-28
  service tribunalbasic pay scalesleave payretrospective operationcivil servantsfringe benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the President of Pakistan challenges the order of the Federal Service Tribunal which allowed a civil employee (respondent) the benefit of an increased pay scale during his period of leave. The core legal question was whether the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits of Civil Employees of the Federal Government, 1983, which was promulgated on 18-8-1983 but made effective retrospectively from 1-7-1983, modified the leave pay of an employee who had proceeded on leave prior to the retrospective date under the Revised Leave Rules, 1980. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that since the Scheme did not specifically deal with or modify the subject of pay during leave in its preceding paragraphs, the existing Revised Leave Rules, 1980 continued to govern the respondent's leave pay pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Scheme. The key principle laid down is that retrospective fiscal or pay schemes do not modify past closed transactions or specific matters like leave pay unless expressly provided for or covered by the new scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retrospective pay scheme modifies leave pay governed by earlier rules when the scheme itself does not address pay during leave?
  • Are civil servants who proceeded on leave prior to the promulgation of the Scheme of Basic Pay Scales and Fringe Benefits, 1983 entitled to claim the enhanced rates for the leave period based on a retrospective effective date?
  • Do existing rules and orders continue in force under a new pay scheme to the extent they are not specifically modified by it?
  Read full judgment →
• The Managing Director, P.Ia.C. and another vs Mr. Saeed Hayat1990 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-07
  service tribunalmisconductdismissal from servicereduction in pay scaledepartmental appeal limitationleave to appealmajority view
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The employee, a Scheduling Officer of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.), overstayed his ex-Pakistan leave, leading to disciplinary proceedings under the P.I.A.C. Employees (Service and Discipline) Rules, 1985 for misconduct, and was subsequently dismissed from service. He appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Tribunal, through a majority view, upheld the finding of guilt but modified the penalty from dismissal to reduction to the minimum of his pay scale for three years, while also ruling that the departmental appeal was within time. Both parties filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court heard the matters and held that the impugned judgment did not suffer from any infirmity and that no substantial question of law of public importance was involved, as the case merely presented conflicting views among the members and Chairman of the Tribunal where the majority view prevails. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution when no substantial question of law of public importance is involved?
  • Whether a service tribunal has the jurisdiction to modify a penalty of dismissal from service to a lesser major penalty upon upholding a finding of guilt?
  • Whether a departmental appeal is within time when the departmental authority fails to communicate a decision on the appeal within the statutory period?
  Read full judgment →
• The Land Acquisition Collector and 2 others vs Muhammad Akhtar1990 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  land acquisitionbank guaranteeexecution of decreestay of executionfinancial securitySupreme Court Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application seeking clarification of a Supreme Court order regarding the withdrawal of deposited funds by a land-owner pending an appeal. The Supreme Court had previously ordered that the land-owner could withdraw the deposited amount upon furnishing security for one-half of the amount and a bank guarantee for the remainder. The Senior Civil Judge had rejected the bank guarantee provided by the respondent on grounds that it was not from a scheduled bank and had a limited validity period. The Supreme Court clarified that its original order did not mandate the guarantee be from a scheduled bank. The Court held that the primary objective of the guarantee is to ensure the appellants can recover funds if their appeal succeeds. Consequently, the Court directed that the guarantee should be accepted if the issuing bank's financial capacity (assets and liabilities) is verified through its balance sheet and if the guarantee is valid for the duration of the appeal's pendency. The Court emphasized that security must be sufficient, easily disposable, and realizable.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order requiring a bank guarantee for the withdrawal of deposited funds implicitly mandate that the guarantee must be issued by a scheduled bank?
  • What criteria should a court use to determine the acceptability of a bank guarantee provided as security for the withdrawal of funds?
  • Is a bank guarantee with a limited expiry date sufficient if the underlying litigation is still pending before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Diocesan Trust Association vs Province of Punjab and 61990 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-10
  leave to appealad interim injunctionrevenue recorddiscretionary orderscivil revisionsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a suit for declaration, challenging the dismissal by the High Court of a civil revision. The revision had arisen from the trial court's refusal to grant an ad interim injunction staying changes to the revenue record. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with concurrent discretionary orders denying interim relief in civil proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the discretionary orders regarding interim relief, holding that leave to appeal should be refused. However, the Court laid down the principle that any alterations made in the revenue records during the pendency of the civil suit shall remain subject to the final decision of the suit and shall not adversely affect any rights or interests of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent discretionary orders denying ad interim injunctions?
  • Do changes made in the revenue record during the pendency of a civil suit affect the rights of the parties?
  • Can an appellate court safeguard a petitioner's interests by ordering that revenue record changes remain subject to the final decision of the civil suit?
  Read full judgment →
• The Karachi Catholic Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. vs Mrs. Daphne1990 MLD 2232 · Sindh High Court · 1990-07-16Read full judgment →
• The Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Islamabad vs Rizvia Cooperative Housing Society Ltd1990 MLD 912 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-09Read full judgment →
• The Evacuee Trust Property Board and others vs Haji Ghulam Rasul Khokhar and others1990 SCMR 725 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-28
  Evacuee Trust PropertyCharitable TrustAccretion to TrustDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) ActRemand OrderPermanent Transfer DeedBona fide transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding the status of four plots in Karachi. The core legal question was whether these properties, purchased by the 'Rai Bahadur Naraindas Moolchand Dharmda Trust' before the creation of Pakistan, constituted 'Evacuee Trust Property' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, or if they were validly transferred to individuals by the Settlement Department. The Supreme Court held that the documentary evidence, including sale deeds and correspondence with the Karachi Estate Board, established that the properties were acquired for the charitable trust created in 1941, making them accretions to the trust estate. The Court ruled that the High Court had exceeded the scope of the remand order by re-examining the connection between the trust and the properties. While declaring the properties as Evacuee Trust Property, the Court clarified that transfers made via Permanent Transfer Deeds prior to June 1968 remain valid under Section 10(1)(b) of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, provided they were bona fide, thus balancing the protection of trust assets with existing statutory transfer protections.

  Questions settled

  • Does property purchased by a trust for charitable purposes constitute an accretion to the trust estate?
  • Can a court, upon remand, re-examine issues that were already settled by the order of remand?
  • Are transfers of evacuee trust property made via Permanent Transfer Deeds prior to June 1968 protected under the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975?
  • Does the lack of formal confirmation by the Custodian of a trust deed automatically invalidate the trust nature of property if other evidence confirms the trust's existence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Director of Industries and Mineral Development vs Dada Bhoy1990 MLD 301 · Sindh High Court · 1989-02-20
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorcontractual interpretationC&F valuesetting aside awardreasoned award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit challenging an arbitration award issued against the defendants, M/s. Dadabhoy Hormusjee & Sons, regarding alleged overcharging of commission fees by the plaintiffs, the Directorate of Industries and Mineral Development. The core legal question was whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the contractual term "C&F Value" and whether the failure to consider relevant evidence constituted misconduct. The court found that the arbitrator ignored a crucial "Tender Notice" document that clarified the definition of "C&F Value," which the plaintiffs themselves had adopted in subsequent contracts. The court held that the arbitrator's failure to consider this material evidence, combined with the statutory obligation to provide reasoned awards, amounted to legal misconduct. Consequently, the court set aside the arbitration award. The key principle laid down is that an arbitrator's failure to address evidence that goes to the root of a dispute, particularly when there is a statutory requirement to provide reasons for an award, constitutes misconduct sufficient to set aside the award under the Arbitration Act, 1940.

  Questions settled

  • Does an arbitrator's failure to consider a material piece of evidence constitute misconduct?
  • Is an arbitrator legally required to provide reasons for their award under the Arbitration Act, 1940?
  • Does the failure of an arbitrator to address matters going to the root of a dispute amount to misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Amritsar Sweet Shop, Lahore and another1990 SCMR 1347 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  sales tax assessmentlimitation periodretrospective legislationleave to appealtax lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax against judgments of the Lahore High Court, which had ruled in favour of the respondents regarding the limitation period for sales tax assessments. The core dispute involves whether the sales tax assessment for the year 1956-57, completed on 30-6-1961, was time-barred under the Sales Tax Act. The High Court, relying on precedent, had previously held the assessment to be time-barred. The petitioner, however, contended that the insertion of subsection (1-A) into Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act by the Finance Act of 1974 fundamentally altered the legal position. The petitioner argued that this amendment was retrospective in nature and validated the assessment, a point not considered by the High Court. The Supreme Court, finding that the plea raised a pure question of law regarding the retrospective effect of the 1974 amendment, granted leave to appeal in both petitions to examine the impact of the amended Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act on the limitation period for assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment introduced by subsection (1-A) of Section 28 of the Sales Tax Act via the Finance Act of 1974 have retrospective effect?
  • Is a sales tax assessment completed after the lapse of the statutory period prescribed in the Sales Tax Act valid?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore vs Messrs Amritsar Sweet Shop, Lahore and another1990 PTD 837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi vs Messrs Haji Maula Bux Corporation Limited Sargodha1990 PLD Supreme Court 990 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  income taxundisclosed sourceunrecorded investmentexcess stockdeemed incometax assessmentonus of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a reference to the Lahore High Court concerning an income tax assessment for the year 1967-68. The respondent-assessee, a private limited company, declared a closing stock of grams valued at Rs. 3,88,717, but inquiries revealed that they had pledged stock valued at Rs. 13,07,180 with the National Bank of Pakistan. The Income-tax Officer rejected the assessee's explanation that the stock figures were inflated merely to secure higher credit facilities, and treated the value of the excess stock (Rs. 9,18,363) as income from an undisclosed source. The High Court upheld the finding of excess stock but ruled that the addition of the gross value without deducting the corresponding purchase price was arbitrary and unsustainable. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the value of unrecorded investments is deemed to be the income of the assessee. The Court established that when an investment in excess stock is treated as deemed income from undisclosed sources, the question of deducting its purchase price does not arise, as the entire value of the unrecorded investment represents the concealed income itself.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the value of unrecorded excess stock pledged with a bank can be deemed as income from an undisclosed source under Section 4(2-B) of the Income-tax Act, 1922?
  • Is the Income-tax Officer required to deduct the corresponding purchase price of excess stock when treating the value of such unrecorded stock as deemed income?
  • Does an assessee's failure to satisfactorily explain the source of an unrecorded investment entitle the Income-tax Officer to presume the investment is of an assessable nature?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Woollen1990 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  income tax assessmentrejection of accountstrading account additionstatutory provisoleave to appealarbitrary assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding tax assessment for the year 1966-67. The core legal question was whether the Income-tax Officer's rejection of the respondent's accounts and the subsequent addition of Rs. 50,000 to the trading account violated the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922. The High Court, relying on precedent, held that the assessment was violative of the statutory proviso due to the lack of a proper basis for the addition. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted the petitioner's argument that the High Court's reliance on the Rajput Metal Works Gujranwala case was inconsistent with established legal principles previously declared by the Supreme Court and the Privy Council. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the assessment was arbitrary and whether the legal interpretation applied by the High Court regarding the rejection of accounts and the exercise of discretion by the Income-tax Officer was correct under the governing statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Income-tax Officer's addition to a trading account based on low profit rates violates the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Is an assessment made after scrutiny of accounts and historical profit ratios considered arbitrary under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Textile Mills1990 SCMR 1345 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  income taxdepreciation allowancestatutory interpretationindustrial buildingstax assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the applicable rate of depreciation for buildings under the Income-tax Act. The respondent, a public limited company, claimed a 15% depreciation rate for certain buildings constructed between 1946 and 1975. The Income-tax Officer restricted this to 10%, arguing the buildings fell under sub-clause (b) of section 10(2)(vi), while the respondent contended they fell under sub-clause (a). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the respondent, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question was whether the statutory classification of buildings for depreciation purposes depends on their usage or merely on the construction date and exclusion from other specific categories. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory language is clear: buildings constructed within the specified timeframe that are not residential buildings for industrial labour (sub-clause aa) or otherwise excluded fall under sub-clause (a), which entitles the assessee to a 15% depreciation rate. The Court affirmed that the classification is not based on the nature or use of the building.

  Questions settled

  • Does the classification of buildings for depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act depend on the nature of the building's use?
  • Are buildings constructed between April 1, 1946, and June 30, 1975, that are not residential buildings for industrial labour entitled to a 15% depreciation rate?
  • Does sub-clause (b) of section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act apply to buildings that fall within the scope of sub-clause (a)?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore vs Messrs Mian1990 PTD 868 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-24Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Woollen1990 PTD 839 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-03-10
  income tax assessmentrejection of accountstrading account additioncomputation of incomeIncome-tax Act 1922tax reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a tax assessment dispute concerning the respondent's accounts for the assessment year 1966-67. The Income-tax Officer rejected the respondent's submitted accounts based on an analysis of raw material purchases and historical profit ratios, subsequently adding Rs. 50,000 to the trading account. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal upheld this addition. Upon reference, the Lahore High Court, relying on precedent, ruled that the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal violated the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922 by failing to compute income on a proper basis when rejecting the accounts. The petitioner (Commissioner of Income-tax) sought leave to appeal, arguing that the assessment was not arbitrary but based on careful scrutiny, and that the High Court's reliance on the Rajput Metal Works Gujranwala case conflicted with Supreme Court and Privy Council precedents. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the petitioner's submissions regarding the consistency of the High Court's decision with established legal principles required further examination by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Income-tax Officer violate the first proviso to Section 13 of the Income-tax Act 1922 by adding a sum to a trading account for low profit rates without a proper basis of computation?
  • Is an assessment made after scrutiny of accounts and historical data considered arbitrary under the Income-tax Act 1922?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore vs Messrs Colony Textile1990 PTD 834 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-24
  income taxdepreciation allowanceindustrial buildingsstatutory interpretationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax, Lahore, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the assessment year 1957-58. The respondent public limited company claimed depreciation at the rate of 15% on certain buildings under Section 10(2)(vi)(a) of the Income-tax Act, whereas the Income-tax Officer allowed only 10% under sub-clause (b). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and subsequently the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that buildings constructed within the specified period that are not residential buildings for industrial labour fall squarely within sub-clause (a) and qualify for the 15% depreciation rate. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory language is plain and clear, and since the buildings in question were constructed within the relevant dates and were not meant for housing industrial labour, they rightly attract depreciation at 15% under sub-clause (a). The principle laid down is that statutory interpretation must adhere to the clear and unambiguous language of fiscal provisions regarding depreciation allowances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether buildings constructed within the specified period that are not meant for housing industrial labour fall under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act for depreciation purposes?
  • Is a building that does not fall within the description of residential buildings for industrial labour entitled to a 15% depreciation rate under Section 10(2)(vi)(a) of the Income-tax Act?
  • Did the High Court correctly interpret the statutory scheme of depreciation allowances under Section 10 of the Income-tax Act?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi. vs M/s.PTCL 1990 CL. 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  income taxundisclosed sourceunrecorded investmentdeemed incomeexcess stockassessment yearburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns an income tax assessment dispute where the assessee, a private limited company, declared a certain stock of grams, but the Income-tax Officer discovered a significantly larger stock pledged with a bank. The assessee claimed the stock figures were inflated to secure credit, but the tax authorities rejected this explanation and treated the value of the excess stock as income from an undisclosed source. The High Court upheld the finding that the stock existed but ruled that the tax authorities erred by adding the gross value of the excess stock to the assessee's income without deducting the corresponding purchase price. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that under Section 4(2-B) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, where an assessee fails to explain the nature and source of unrecorded investments, the value of such investments is deemed to be the assessee's income. Consequently, the Court ruled that the question of deducting a purchase price does not arise when the entire value of the excess stock is treated as deemed income from an undisclosed source.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the value of unrecorded investments can be treated as income from an undisclosed source under Section 4(2-B) of the Income Tax Act 1922?
  • Is an Income Tax Officer required to deduct the purchase price of excess stock when treating the value of that stock as deemed income from an undisclosed source?
  • Does the failure of an assessee to satisfactorily explain the source of investments entitle the Income Tax Officer to treat the value of such investments as income?
  • Can an assessee claim that stock figures were inflated for bank credit purposes after the tax authorities have rejected that explanation based on evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Incometax, Investigation, Karachi vs M/s. Nishat1990 SCMR 398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-06
  adjournmentpendency of casesinterest of justiceconnected petitionsleave to appealprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax against a judgment of the Karachi High Court. During the proceedings, the Court directed the petitioner to provide information regarding the pendency of similar matters involving identical questions of law at the Karachi registry. Following a delay, the petitioner submitted a memorandum listing ten connected petitions for leave to appeal (CPSLA) pending disposal at Karachi, which involve the same legal questions as the present petition. Recognizing that the resolution of these connected cases would impact the current matter, the Supreme Court held that it is in the interest of justice to adjourn the present petition pending the final decision of the Karachi cases. The Court further directed the Advocate-on-Record to provide quarterly progress reports regarding the status of the Karachi matters. Consequently, the present petition was ordered to be re-fixed for hearing at Lahore following the adjudication of the connected matters, and the previously issued notice to counsel was discharged.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal should be adjourned pending the decision of other connected matters involving the same questions of law?
  • Is the Court empowered to direct periodic progress reporting by the Advocate-on-Record for pending connected cases?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Settlement Commissioner/Member (Settlement Rehabilitation1990 SCMR 1022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29
  Evacuee PropertyDisplaced PersonsPending ProceedingsRepeal ActAllotment of LandSettlement CommissionerProvincial Government
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The core legal questions address whether a respondent's claim forms constitute 'pending proceedings' under Section 2(2) of the Repeal Act, the binding nature of a concession made by counsel for the Chief Settlement Commissioner before the High Court regarding the respondent's status as a claimant Displaced Person and land availability, and the High Court's authority to direct land allotments from evacuee property after the repeal of the relevant laws, given that such lands were transferred to Provincial Governments. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, specifically focusing on the scope of the Repeal Act and the jurisdictional limits of the High Court in ordering allotments of evacuee property post-repeal. The Court stayed the operation of the High Court's order pending the final adjudication of the appeal, allowing parties to file additional documents for the hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Can claim forms be treated as pending proceedings under Section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act 1975?
  • Is the Chief Settlement Commissioner bound by a concession made by counsel regarding the status of a claimant and land availability?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to direct the allotment of evacuee land after the repeal of the Evacuee Laws and the transfer of such land to Provincial Governments?
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• The Chairman, Railway Board, Lahore and others vs Messrs M.1990 PLD Supreme Court 1034 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-23
  railway liabilityultra vires rulesstatutory inconsistencycompensation for lossnotice of damagedelegated legislationcarrier liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the Railway Administration challenging the judgment and decree of the Peshawar High Court, which had affirmed a decree of Rs 40,706.13 in favor of the respondent firm for damaged goods. The core legal question was whether Rule 1.34 of the Pakistan Western Railway Coaching Tariffs Rules was ultra vires the powers under Section 54 read with Section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Rule 1.34, which required written notice of damage or loss to be given to the Station Master before delivery and removal of property from railway premises, was inconsistent with Section 77 of the Railways Act, which allows six months to file a claim. The Court laid down the principle that rules or bye-laws framed under a parent statute cannot override or conflict with the provisions of that statute, and where such inconsistency arises, the rules are ultra vires and unenforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Rule 1.34 of the Pakistan Western Railway Coaching Tariffs Rules is ultra vires the powers under Section 54 read with Section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890?
  • Can a rule or bye-law framed under a parent statute override or impose additional restrictive conditions not contained in the parent statute?
  • Can a party raise a mixed question of law and fact, such as a defense under Section 75 of the Railways Act, for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not pleaded in the trial court?
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• The Chairman, P.Ia.C. and others vs Nasim Malik1990 PLD Supreme Court 951 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  service appealresignation under duresslimitationestoppelPIAC Actservice of Pakistanjurisdiction of Service Tribunalcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that reinstated a former Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) employee, declaring his resignation void due to alleged duress. The core legal questions concerned the Tribunal's jurisdiction following amendments to the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956, the limitation period for departmental appeals, and whether the respondent was estopped from challenging his resignation after requesting its conversion to termination and accepting substantial financial benefits. The Supreme Court held that upon the extension of the Act to PIAC employees, service matters fell exclusively under the Tribunal's jurisdiction, causing abatement of other proceedings. Regarding limitation, the Court ruled that an appellate authority must be consciously aware of a time-bar for any decision on merits to imply condonation of delay; mere silence does not suffice. Furthermore, the Court held that the respondent, having voluntarily sought the conversion of his resignation into termination and accepted significant financial benefits, was precluded from subsequently claiming the resignation was obtained under duress. The Tribunal's judgment was set aside, and the respondent's appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a resignation into a termination, followed by the acceptance of financial benefits, estop an employee from later claiming the resignation was obtained under duress?
  • Can an appellate authority's decision on merits be construed as an implied condonation of delay if the authority was not conscious of the limitation issue?
  • Does the extension of a statute to a new class of persons synchronize the commencement date of the statute with the date of extension for the purpose of abating pending civil proceedings?
  • Does the declaration of service under the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation as 'service of Pakistan' vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Service Tribunal to the exclusion of other courts?
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• The Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Lahore through its1990 MLD 731 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
• The B.I.T. Teachers Association, Nesra Ranchi vs The Chancellor, Ranchi University and others1990 MLD 1320 · Supreme Court of India · 1987-07-20Read full judgment →
• The Agricultural Engineer vs Muhammad Siddique Akhtar1990 PLC 739 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-04-16Read full judgment →
• Thanthi Trust vs Wealth Tax Officer1990 PTD 206 · Madras High Court · 1989-04-20Read full judgment →
• Tehsin Ahmad Mehmoodi vs Pakistan Steel Mills Company Ltd.1990 MLD 1132 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-30
  earned leave encashmentleave salaryresignationservice rulesnotice periodseverance of employmentcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arose from a suit filed by an ex-employee of Pakistan Steel Mills Company Limited (PASMIC) claiming encashment of 90 days' accumulated earned leave. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court reduced the decree to seven days' encashment. The applicant had submitted a resignation letter requiring 90 days' notice and subsequently applied for 90 days' earned leave while still in service, which the employer refused in writing before accepting the resignation.

  The High Court examined Rules 44 and 45 of the PASMIC Service Rules. It held that while Rule 44(1) restricts leave encashment during subsisting service, Rule 44(2) creates an explicit exception when leave is applied for and refused in writing during service. Once refused, the right to encashment immediately crystallizes. Furthermore, after severance of employment, encashment is not barred. The Court set aside the lower appellate court's decree, holding the employee entitled to encashment of the full 90 days' leave without interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal in writing of an employee's earned leave application while still in service entitle the employee to encashment of such leave under service rules prohibiting encashment during service?
  • Does the submission of a resignation letter terminate an employee's service before the resignation is formally accepted by the employer?
  • Does a service rule stopping the earning of leave upon service of a termination notice prevent the encashment of leave already accumulated prior to the notice?
  • Is an employer permitted to disallow leave encashment while simultaneously deducting payment in lieu of the unserved notice period upon accepting a resignation?
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• Teekoy Rubbers (India) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 634 · Kerala High Court · 1990-09-18Read full judgment →
• Tarique Anwar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1141 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-10Read full judgment →
• Tariq Saeed vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1645 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →
• Tariq Rashid and another vs The State1990 MLD 697 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-20Read full judgment →
• Tariq Butt vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 537 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
• Tara Singh represented by Legal Heirs and others vs Kehar Singh and others1990 MLD 1326 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-03-31Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 254 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-16
  income taxcotton wastagereference applicationrejection of accountsshort productionspinning millSindh High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves four direct references filed under section 66(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922 by the applicant spinning mill against the assessment orders for the years 1973-74 to 1976-77, concerning the rejection of declared wastage and results by the income tax authorities. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in confirming the rejection of the declared results and fixing a uniform rate of production based on alleged short production of cotton yarn. The Sindh High Court answered the primary question in the negative, holding that where the account books are genuine, free from substantial mistakes, and no defects are found in purchases or sales, the tax department cannot reject the declared wastage figures or the accounts merely for want of stage-wise production records, especially when the additions made by the assessing officer lead to the absurd result where total production and wastage exceed raw material consumed. The key principle laid down is that account results and declared wastage cannot be arbitrarily rejected or subjected to a uniform production formula in the absence of tangible discrepancies in the taxpayer's books.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Tribunal was justified in confirming the rejection of declared result merely on the ground of alleged short production?
  • Can the tax department reject account books and wastage figures solely because stage-wise production records are not maintained?
  • Is the application of a uniform formula for production wastage sustainable when it results in total production exceeding the raw material consumed?
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• Tanvir Textile Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1990 CL. 728 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-16Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Taqvi vs Pakistan Broad Casting Corporation and others1990 PLC 1 · Sindh High Court · 1989-03-19Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Brother Oil Dealers vs The Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 383 · Lahore High Court · 1989-01-29
  agreed assessmentIncome-tax Ordinanceconditional acceptanceassessing officerquestion of lawtax assessmentCommissioner of Income-tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition filed under Section 136(2) of the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, challenging an order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner sought to enforce an 'agreed assessment' proposal made to the Income-tax Officer (I.T.O.), which the I.T.O. had accepted subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax. When the Commissioner withheld approval, the I.T.O. proceeded to assess the petitioner's income on merits. The core legal question was whether the I.T.O. could lawfully impose a condition requiring the Commissioner's approval for an agreed assessment, and whether such a conditional acceptance created an enforceable contract. The Court held that the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, does not provide for 'agreed assessments' and requires the I.T.O. to assess income based on material evidence. Consequently, the I.T.O. acted within his discretion to voluntarily impose a condition precedent for such an assessment. The Court affirmed that no enforceable right arose from the unapproved proposal, and as no substantial question of law existed, the petition was dismissed in limine. The principle established is that an assessing officer may voluntarily impose conditions on non-statutory assessment procedures, which do not confer enforceable rights until fulfilled.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Income-tax Officer voluntarily impose a condition requiring the Commissioner's approval for an agreed assessment?
  • Does the Income-tax Ordinance, 1979, provide for the concept of an agreed assessment?
  • Does a proposal for an agreed assessment subject to a condition precedent create an enforceable legal right before that condition is met?
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• Talib Hussain vs The State1990 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-05
  leave to appealcourt witnessessummoning of witnessesculpable homicideappellate reviewcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence under section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, alongside the dismissal of a revision petition against acquittal. The core legal question was whether the trial court and the High Court erred in law by relying upon the testimonies of court witnesses summoned under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the primary eye-witnesses did not support the prosecution case. The Supreme Court held that the conviction and sentence were legal and justified, as courts possess the requisite statutory power to summon material witnesses whose evidence is essential for the just decision of the case. The key principle laid down is that a trial court has wide discretionary powers under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon and examine any witness at any stage if their testimony is essential for a just decision, and such court witnesses can form a valid basis for conviction when found independent and disinterested.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court has the power to summon material witnesses at any stage of the trial?
  • Can a conviction be lawfully sustained on the statements of court witnesses when eye-witnesses fail to support the prosecution case?
  • Does the summoning of court witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiate the trial proceedings?
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• Talah Muhammad and 12 others vs Fateh Muhammad and 2 others1990 PLC 80 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• Taj MUHAMMADPetit ioner vs The State1990 SCMR 416 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-28
  murder convictioneyewitness testimonyminor discrepanciesleave to appealappraisal of evidencebenefit of doubtlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and life imprisonment sentence for the murder of Mumtaz Khan. The petitioner, Taj Muhammad, was convicted by the Trial Court for inflicting fatal chhuri blows on the deceased. The core legal question was whether the eyewitness testimony, which the petitioner alleged contained minor discrepancies, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, and whether the courts below erred in their appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the eyewitnesses were independent, natural witnesses from the same locality, and that the occurrence took place in a familiar setting, precluding mistaken identity. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in testimony do not inherently invalidate the evidence of otherwise credible witnesses. Furthermore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt. While the conviction and sentence were maintained, the Court extended the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of minor discrepancies in eyewitness testimony automatically invalidate the evidence of natural and independent witnesses?
  • Is the identification of an accused person reliable when the occurrence takes place in a familiar locality among known persons?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the appraisal of evidence?
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• Taj Muhammad, Exsuperintending Engineer vs Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority and another1990 SCMR 926 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  disciplinary proceedingsWAPDAenquiry proceduredue processfactual allegationsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions filed by the same petitioner challenging the disciplinary procedure adopted by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The core legal question is whether the respondent authority was legally justified in bypassing a full-fledged enquiry and instead utilizing a shorter procedure—consisting only of a statement of allegations, a reply, and a personal hearing—when the allegations against the petitioner were factual in nature and actively controverted. The petitioner contended that such factual disputes necessitate a full enquiry to allow the accused officer an opportunity to disprove the charges, arguing that the shorter procedure was insufficient and unlawful in these circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, acknowledging that the question raised is of considerable general public importance, did not issue a final adjudication on the merits in this order. Instead, the Court directed that the appeals be prepared expeditiously for a final hearing, effectively deferring the determination of whether the shorter procedure violated the requirements of due process in cases involving disputed factual allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary authority dispense with a full-fledged enquiry when the allegations against an officer are factual and disputed?
  • Is a shorter procedure involving only a statement of allegations and a personal hearing sufficient for punitive action in cases of disputed facts?
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• Taj Muhammad alias Tajan vs The State1990 MLD 1156 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-13Read full judgment →
• Taj Mahal Hotels Limited. vs Federation Of Pakistan Through The SecretaryPTCL 1990 CL. 375 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →