Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Taj Din and 4 others vs Zilla Council, Kasur and 3 others1990 PLD Lahore 269 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-25
  cattle marketprivate marketZila CouncilMunicipal CommitteelicencePunjab Local Government Ordinanceintra-court appealfreedom of trade
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court disposes of intra-court appeals arising from writ petitions concerning the establishment and operation of private cattle markets within municipal limits. The core legal question was whether a Zila Council possesses the exclusive right to hold cattle markets within the municipal limits of an urban local council, thereby precluding private individuals from operating private cattle markets under a licence from the Municipal Committee. The court held that the Zila Council's power to hold cattle markets does not nullify or override the provisions governing private markets, and that private individuals may establish and maintain private cattle markets under a licence granted by the urban local council pursuant to Section 62 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The ratio decidendi is that private markets are specifically excluded from the Zila Council's functions, and both statutory bodies operate within their distinct spheres without repugnancy. The key principles laid down include that special provisions prevail without implying the repeal of independent general provisions, that framing bye-laws is not a condition precedent for issuing licences under Section 62, and that the validity of statutory provisions cannot be challenged on the touchstone of Principles of Policy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Zila Council has the exclusive authority to hold cattle markets within municipal limits so as to exclude private cattle markets?
  • Does the power of a Zila Council under Section 51 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 override or repeal the provisions of Section 62 regarding private markets?
  • Is the framing of bye-laws a mandatory condition precedent for the issuance of a licence by an urban local council under Section 62 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can the vires of a statutory provision be tested on the touchstone of the Principles of Policy contained in the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Taj alias Taju vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 707 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-21Read full judgment →
• Tahir vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1198 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-15
  post-arrest bailsection 302 PPCminoritydetermination of ageossification testradiological examinationfirst proviso to section 497(1) CrPCschool leaving certificate
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail application was filed by applicant Tahir, who was accused along with co-accused under Sections 302, 34, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Akram. The prosecution alleged that the applicant, along with co-accused, dragged the deceased into a banana garden and inflicted fatal hatchet blows on his head, supported by eyewitness statements, recovery of a bloodstained hatchet, and corroborative medical evidence. On the merits, the High Court found sufficient prima facie material linking the applicant to the crime. On the plea of minority under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the applicant relied on a school certificate showing his age below 16 years, whereas a court-ordered medical/radiological examination assessed his age at about 18 years at the time of examination (making him over 16 and a half years at the time of occurrence, even allowing a one-year margin of error). The Sindh High Court held that the medical certificate based on radiological tests was preferable to the school certificate, and even allowing a margin of error, the applicant was over 16 years old. Furthermore, minor status alone does not entitle an accused to bail as a matter of right when grave, specific roles and incriminating recoveries exist. The bail application was accordingly rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a radiological/medical report assessing age takes precedence over a school certificate when determining an accused person's age for bail under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does being under sixteen years of age automatically entitle an accused person to bail as a matter of right under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How should the margin of error in an ossification/radiological age certificate be applied when assessing whether an accused is below sixteen years of age for bail purposes?
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• Tahir Hassan Hashmi vs The State1990 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  post-arrest bailcriminal liabilityFIRnon-bailable offencesvicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which rejected the petitioner's application for post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being named in the First Information Report (FIR) and having a specific role attributed to him in the commission of the alleged offense. The petitioner contended that his case was distinguishable from the principal accused because he allegedly inflicted only simple incised injuries on a non-vital part of the deceased's body, whereas the fatal injury was caused by a co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the FIR specifically named the petitioner and ascribed a particular role to him in the incident, no case for the grant of bail was made out. The judgment reaffirms the principle that specific allegations of involvement in a serious crime, as detailed in the FIR, preclude the grant of bail at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the FIR specifically names them and ascribes a specific role in the commission of a crime?
  • Does the infliction of non-fatal injuries by an accused in a murder case automatically entitle them to bail?
  • Can a case for bail be distinguished from the principal accused solely on the basis of the location of the injuries caused?
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• Tahir Habib vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1474 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-18Read full judgment →
• Tabassum Sultana vs Messrs I.M.T. Associated Tractors Ltd1990 PLC 39 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-06-07Read full judgment →
• T. Govindankutty Menon vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 638 · Kerala High Court · 1989-07-20Read full judgment →
• Syed Wajid Ali and others vs Globe Automobile Limited and others1990 SCMR 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  public auctiondisplaced personssettlement schemeindustrial concernprovisional transfer orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, concerning the disputed transfer of a property in Rawalpindi Cantt. The petitioners purchased the property via public auction in 1960, receiving a Provisional Transfer Order. Subsequently, respondent No. 1, an industrial concern in possession, sought transfer based on a 1960 Press Note issued under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially cancelled the auction in favor of the respondent, a decision later reversed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner and upheld by the Settlement Commissioner. However, the Chief Settlement Commissioner subsequently set aside the auction in favor of the respondent. A Single Judge of the High Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, but a Division Bench later reversed this in an Intra-Court Appeal. The Supreme Court, noting the complexity of the arguments regarding the availability of the property for auction and the applicability of Settlement Scheme No. 1, granted leave to appeal to authoritatively resolve these conflicting claims and the legal status of the auction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property disposed of in a public auction remains available for subsequent transfer to an occupant?
  • Whether Paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 creates a vested right in favor of an occupant?
  • Whether an auction is rendered invalid if it violates the provisions of Paragraph 20 of Chapter 3 of Settlement Scheme No. 1?
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• Syed Wajahat Ali Shah vs Chief Justice, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and another1990 PLC (C.S.) 212 · Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal · 1989-10-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Umed Ali Shah vs Pakistan Steel Mills, Karachi1990 PLC 406 · Labour Court · 1988-11-26Read full judgment →
• Syed Tathir Hussain Shirazi vs The Governor of the Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  probationertermination of serviceadverse remarksservice tribunalcivil servantleave to appealshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns four petitions for leave to appeal against the Service Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioner's appeals regarding adverse remarks and the termination of his services while on probation as an Additional District and Sessions Judge. The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that it was based on improperly recorded and uncommunicated adverse reports, and alleged victimization and mala fide intent. The Supreme Court examined the legal position of a probationer, referencing the established precedent in Muhammad Siddique Javed Chaudhry v. Government of West Pakistan. The Court held that the termination of a probationer's services by a competent authority, which contains no stigma, does not require a show-cause procedure. Furthermore, the Court determined that delays in recording adverse remarks do not inherently invalidate them, and the petitioner possessed no vested right to challenge the High Court's internal procedures for recording such remarks. Concluding that no question of law of public importance was raised, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the services were competently terminated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the termination of a civil servant's services during the probation period require a show-cause procedure if the order contains no stigma?
  • Does a delay in recording adverse remarks against a civil servant automatically render them illegal or ineffective?
  • Can a probationer challenge the internal procedures established by the High Court for the recording and handling of adverse remarks?
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• Syed Shahzad Hussain and 4 others vs Mst. Hajira Bibi and 3 others1990 PLD Lahore 222 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-30
  res judicataabuse of processinherent powersadverse possessionrejection of plaintwrit jurisdictioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arose from a civil suit filed by the petitioners claiming exclusive ownership and possession of a passage comprising Khasra Nos. 621 and 622, asserting title by prescription under the Limitation Act. The respondents contended that the status of this passage as a common thoroughfare had been conclusively determined by the High Court in previous writ proceedings. The core legal question was whether the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata, despite the formal inapplicability of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the courts below erred in rejecting the plaint. The Court held that while Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 did not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction decisions, the general principles of res judicata and the court's inherent power to prevent abuse of process barred the re-litigation of the passage's status. However, the Court clarified that the suit could not be summarily dismissed regarding the separate claim of unauthorized construction on the petitioners' property, as that specific factual issue remained undecided. The suit was partially remanded for trial on the latter issue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the general principle of res judicata apply to bar a civil suit when the matter was previously decided by the High Court in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a court exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to dismiss a suit that constitutes an abuse of process?
  • Is a plaint liable to be rejected in its entirety if only one of the reliefs claimed is barred by res judicata?
  • Does the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to cases where the suit is barred by the general principles of res judicata?
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• Syed Shabbir Hussain vs Province of the Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-23
  reversiondepartmental promotionadverse remarksspecial reportservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, who challenged his reversion from the post of Superintendent to his original post of Concurrent Auditor. The petitioner was promoted subject to a special report following adverse annual confidential reports for the years 1980 and 1981, which were subsequently expunged by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question is whether the expungement of earlier adverse reports renders the subsequent unsatisfactory special report and the resultant reversion inoperative. The Supreme Court held that despite the expungement of the earlier adverse entries, the adverse remarks in the special report remained intact and provided a sufficient and independent basis for the department to direct the petitioner's reversion. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an unsatisfactory special report recorded during a probationary or conditional promotion constitutes an independent and valid ground for reversion, notwithstanding the subsequent expungement of earlier adverse annual confidential reports that initially prompted the condition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the expungement of earlier adverse annual confidential reports invalidates a subsequent unsatisfactory special report leading to reversion?
  • Does an adverse special report recorded during a conditional promotion provide sufficient basis for reversion?
  • When can a civil servant be lawfully reverted to their original post following a conditional promotion?
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• Syed Saleemul Haq and another vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 439 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-19Read full judgment →
• Syed Sajid Mian vs Habib Bank Limited Pakistan Through President,Habib1990 CLC 557 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-11-22Read full judgment →
• Syed Nisar Haider vs Mst. Razia Sultana1990 SCMR 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-15
  rent evictionbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantleave to appealrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant challenging the High Court's dismissal of his first rent appeal, which had upheld an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller based on the landlady's personal need. The core legal question was whether a landlady's requirement for the premises to accommodate her married daughter, who would assist her due to her old age and ill health, constitutes a bona fide personal need under the relevant rent laws. The Supreme Court held that the landlady's stated need was legitimate and bona fide. The Court reasoned that the law does not prohibit a landlord from seeking eviction to accommodate a family member whose presence is mutually beneficial, particularly when the landlord has been transparent about the purpose of the requirement. Consequently, the Court affirmed the eviction order, finding no merit in the tenant's argument that the daughter should have been accommodated elsewhere. The key principle laid down is that a landlord's bona fide personal need, including the need to house a family member for caregiving purposes, is a valid ground for eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord seek eviction of a tenant on the ground of personal need to accommodate a family member for caregiving purposes?
  • Is a landlord's requirement to house a daughter for assistance due to old age and illness considered a bona fide need under rent law?
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• Syed Nasir Abbas vs The Secretary to Govt. of the Punjab and AnotherK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 161 · Punjab Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Syed Nasir Abbas vs Secretary, Govt. of Punjab, Housing Physical and Environmental Planning Department and another1990 PLC (C.S.) 835 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1990-02-17
  service tribunalminor penaltyinquiry reportnatural justicedepartmental proceedingsbiasprejudiceincrement stoppage
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Assistant Engineer in the Public Health Engineering Department, filed an appeal under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 against orders imposing the minor penalty of stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect and rejecting his departmental appeal. He had been proceeded against under the Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1975. The core legal questions involved whether the failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report prior to issuing a show-cause notice for a minor penalty vitiated the proceedings, and whether the inquiry was conducted fairly without prejudice or undue haste. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the non-supply of the inquiry report prejudiced the appellant, violating principles of natural justice, and that the inquiry officer rushed the proceedings due to a miscalculation of statutory time limits. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders, laying down the principle that the requirement to supply an inquiry report applies equally to cases of minor and major penalties on grounds of fairness, and that rules of natural justice are to be read as part and parcel of every statute unless expressly excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-supply of an inquiry report to an accused civil servant facing minor penalty proceedings invalidates the departmental proceedings?
  • Are the rules of natural justice to be read as part and parcel of every statute unless specifically excluded?
  • How is the sixty-day period for completion of inquiry proceedings under the Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1975 to be calculated?
  • Does the distinction between major and minor penalties under the E&D Rules exempt authorities from supplying an inquiry report to the accused officer?
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• Syed Mustafa Hussain vs Muzaffar alias Bahi Sahib1990 SCMR 917 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-07
  bona fide personal useejectmentrent controllerappreciation of evidencefinding of factlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan examines the correctness of a High Court judgment setting aside a Rent Controller's order directing the eviction of a tenant from commercial premises. The landlord sought ejectment of two shops for his bona fide personal use to expand his existing bicycle hiring business, which was operated from an adjacent small shop measuring 7 by 7 square feet. The Rent Controller partly allowed the application, ordering the tenant to vacate one shop. On appeal, the High Court of Sindh reversed this decision, holding the landlord's requirement lacked genuineness and discarding the testimony of the landlord's witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in reversing a finding of fact and discarding witness testimony merely because their statements were in identical terms, noting that the extremely small area of 7 by 7 square feet was manifestly insufficient for the expanding business. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Rent Controller's order granting one shop to the appellant was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Was the High Court justified in setting aside the finding of fact of the Rent Controller regarding the landlord's bona fide need?
  • Can the testimony of witnesses in a civil case be discarded merely on the ground that their statements are in identical terms?
  • Whether an area of 7 by 7 square feet is sufficient for running and expanding a bicycle hiring business?
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• Syed Muqaddar Shah And Another vs Haji Abdul Arad Khan And Another1990 CLC 1596 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-31Read full judgment →
• Syed Muhammad Yousaf and another vs Qadeer Ahmad and another1990 SCMR 243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-22
  acquittalleave to appealextra-judicial confessionlast seen evidencecriminal appealappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the acquittal of the respondent on charges of murder and sexual assault under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the evidence presented—specifically an alleged extra-judicial confession and a purported 'last seen' witness—was sufficient to overturn an acquittal order passed by the trial court. The Supreme Court examined the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, noting that the witness claiming to have heard the extra-judicial confession failed to report the incident despite public outcry, and the witness cited for 'last seen' evidence did not actually testify to seeing the accused with the deceased. The Court held that the trial court and the High Court had correctly scrutinized the evidence and found it insufficient to establish guilt. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that in the absence of legal error or misreading of evidence, an acquittal judgment warrants no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Is an extra-judicial confession reliable when the witness fails to disclose it despite public knowledge of the crime?
  • Does the failure of a 'last seen' witness to testify that they saw the accused with the deceased constitute sufficient evidence for conviction?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a concurrent finding of acquittal by the lower courts?
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• Syed Muhammad Ramzan vs Muslim Zaidi and others1990 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  leave to appealspecific performancespecial oathagreement to sellconcurrent findings of factcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  Syed Muhammad Ramzan sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed his civil revision arising from the dismissal of his suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 15-11-1977. The trial court and the Additional District Judge had previously dismissed the petitioner's suit and appeal, holding him bound by the statement of respondent No. 2 given on a special oath. The core legal question was whether a party who made an offer for the opposing party to take a special oath is bound by that statement and precluded from resiling from it. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact were unexceptionable and that the petitioner, having made the offer for the special oath which was duly administered and recorded, was bound by it and could not subsequently resile. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party who offers for the opposing party to make a statement on special oath bound by that statement?
  • Can a party resile from a special oath after making an offer for the same and having it administered?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact by lower courts bar interference in a petition for leave to appeal regarding a suit for specific performance?
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• Syed Muhammad Farooq vs Aziz Fazal and others1990 SCMR 1181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  property disputesettlement authoritypermanent transfer deedfraudulent transferejectment proceedingstitle disputegift deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the title of a property previously transferred by the Settlement Authority to an original transferee, Ch. Muhammad Jalil, who held a Permanent Transfer Deed. Following the original transferee's death, his successors sought to execute an ejectment order against the tenant. Simultaneously, a third party, Muhammad Maqsood, claimed title based on a subsequent transfer order issued by the Settlement Authorities decades later, which he subsequently gifted to the petitioner, Syed Muhammad Farooq. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Authorities could validly transfer property already subject to a Permanent Transfer Deed to a new party, and whether such a subsequent transfer could be upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that once a property is permanently transferred, it is no longer available for subsequent transfer. The Court ruled that the subsequent transfer order issued to Muhammad Maqsood was void, as it was obtained behind the back of the original transferee. Consequently, the petitioner acquired no valid title through the gift, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can property already subject to a Permanent Transfer Deed be subsequently transferred by the Settlement Authorities?
  • Does a transferee who acquires no legal title to a property have the authority to gift that property to another?
  • Is a subsequent transfer order issued by the Settlement Authorities valid if the property was previously permanently transferred to another party?
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• Syed Muhammad Anwar Shah through Legal Heirs vs Maulvi Abdul1990 PLD Peshawar 148 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-04-18
  execution of decreelimitation periodresiduary articlefirst execution applicationpre-emption suitrevision petitiontime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the lower courts' dismissal of an objection regarding the limitation period for an execution application. The core legal question was whether the first application for the execution of a decree is governed by the six-year limitation period stipulated in Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, or the three-year residuary limitation period under Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Court held that the execution application was time-barred, as it was filed more than three years after the appellate court's dismissal of the appeal. The Court established the principle that Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 merely provides an outer limit for fresh execution applications and does not regulate the timing of the initial execution application. Therefore, the first application for execution of a decree is governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908, which requires such applications to be filed within three years from the date the right to apply accrues. Consequently, the lower courts' orders were set aside, and the execution application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is the first application for execution of a decree governed by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provide a limitation period for the initial application for execution of a decree?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for the first application for execution of a decree following the omission of Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Syed Mohsin Alt Hasani vs Government of Pakistan and another1990 SCMR 1685 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-02
  review petitioncivil servicedeputationlienservice rules interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition directed against the Supreme Court's earlier judgment dismissing the petitioner's civil appeal regarding the denial of service benefits and higher pay following his transfer from the Provincial Government to the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether a government servant who has exercised an irrevocable option to serve under the Federal Government, but remains unconfirmed, retains deputation benefits and is entitled to the pay and promotion scale applicable in his parent provincial department. The Supreme Court held that where two interpretations of a service rule are possible, the one favourable and more beneficial to the employee must be adopted. Consequently, the review petition was accepted, the earlier judgment recalled, and the civil appeal allowed, granting the petitioner the emoluments he would have drawn under the Punjab Government from the date of his promotion. The key principle laid down is that in service matters involving competing interpretations of rules, the construction protecting the rights and interests of the civil servant against the State should prevail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a government servant who has exercised an irrevocable option to serve under the Federal Government retains a lien on his provincial post pending confirmation?
  • Does a rule interpretation more beneficial to a civil servant apply in a contest between two possible interpretations?
  • Is a review petition maintainable when the court previously overlooked an established principle of statutory interpretation regarding service benefits?
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• Syed Mazhar Ali Shah vs Shah Muhammad1990 MLD 1070 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-08
  ex parte decreeservice of summonsdue serviceCode of Civil Procedure 1908limitation periodspecific performancerevision applicationprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges an appellate court's order setting aside an ex parte decree for specific performance. The core legal question was whether the defendant was "duly served" with summons, thereby justifying the setting aside of the ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The High Court held that the trial court failed to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, specifically Order 5 Rule 10-A regarding service by registered post and Rule 19 regarding the examination of the serving officer on oath. Furthermore, the bailiff’s reliance on the plaintiff’s agent to identify the defendant violated Rule 105 of the Sindh Civil Court Rules, rendering the service invalid. The Court affirmed that "duly served" implies strict adherence to legal formalities, not merely indirect knowledge. Consequently, the ex parte decree was correctly set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial. The principle established is that procedural mandates for service are essential for due process, and failure to comply renders an ex parte decree liable to be set aside within the limitation period calculated from the date of the defendant's knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send summons by registered post acknowledgement due, as required by Order 5 Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, invalidate service?
  • Is an ex parte decree liable to be set aside if the serving officer fails to be examined on oath under Order 5 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a serving officer rely on the assistance of the plaintiff or their agent to identify the defendant during the service of summons?
  • When does the limitation period for an application to set aside an ex parte decree commence if the defendant was not duly served?
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• Syed Matlubul Hassan vs Brooke Bond Pakistan Ltd.1990 SCMR 456 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-05
  workmanindustrial relationslabour court jurisdictionleave to appealsalesman statusemployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had upheld the decisions of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Court. The petitioner, a former salesman for Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, had challenged his removal from service. The lower forums had dismissed his grievance on the preliminary ground that, as a salesman, he did not fall within the definition of a "workman" and, therefore, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that in a previous judgment, Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. Conciliator appointed by the Government of Sind and others (PLD 1977 SC 237), it had already determined that a salesman falls within the definition of a "workman" under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the matter further, directing the appeal to be prepared on the existing record and fixed for an early hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Does a salesman employed by a company fall within the definition of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition filed by a salesman against his removal from service?
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• Syed Manzoor Hussain Bokhari and anothers vs S.P., City Lahore and 21990 MLD 1807 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-26
  religious processionfundamental rightsPolice Act 1861public orderlicensingwrit jurisdictionultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the District Magistrate, Lahore, rejecting the petitioners' application for a license to take out a religious procession. The petitioners contended that the refusal violated their fundamental rights to assemble and practice religion. A central legal question concerned the validity of the second proviso to Section 30(3) of the Police Act 1861, as amended by Punjab Ordinance VIII of 1984, which allowed refusal of licenses based on 'public interest.' The Court held that while the state may regulate processions to maintain public order, the impugned order was legally flawed for lacking reasons and demonstrating non-application of mind. Furthermore, the Court declared the inclusion of 'public interest' in the proviso ultra vires the Constitution, as it exceeded the permissible scope of 'public order' under Articles 16 and 20 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. The principle established is that executive authorities must exercise their licensing powers reasonably, providing specific reasons for refusal, and that statutory restrictions on fundamental rights must remain strictly within the bounds of constitutional provisions regarding public order.

  Questions settled

  • Is the inclusion of 'public interest' as a ground for refusing a procession license under the Police Act 1861 constitutionally valid?
  • Does the refusal of a license for a religious procession require the executive authority to provide reasons?
  • Can the District Magistrate ban a religious procession under Section 30 of the Police Act 1861 without demonstrating a threat to public order?
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• Syed Mansoor Ahmad vs Mst.Maqbool Begum and others1990 SCMR 1259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-17
  benami transactioncertified copy of registered documentproof of executionsecondary evidenceregistration actcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a civil suit for a declaration of ownership and correction of Cantonment Board records regarding a residential property. The plaintiff-respondent claimed ownership via a registered sale-deed, whereas the defendants contended that the transaction was benami and that the property was subsequently retransferred via a later sale-deed and then to the appellant. The trial court decreed the suit, holding the initial sale valid and the subsequent retransfer unproven, which findings were upheld by the first appellate court and the High Court in revision. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether a certified copy of a registered sale-deed is admissible and sufficient to prove execution when the original is denied and secondary evidence conditions are not met. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a certified copy under Section 57(5) of the Registration Act, 1908, may prove the contents of a document, it does not dispense with the requirement to prove its execution in accordance with law, particularly when execution is denied and foundational requirements for secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, are unsatisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the production of a certified copy of a registered document under section 57(5) of the Registration Act, 1908, dispense with the necessity of proving its execution when denied?
  • Can a certified copy of a sale-deed be admitted as secondary evidence without fulfilling the conditions laid down for the production of secondary evidence?
  • What is the distinction between the admissibility of a registered document's contents and the legal proof of its execution?
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• Syed Israr Ali vs Mst. Ahmedi Begum and others1990 MLD 1834 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-20
  malicious prosecutionsuit for damageswithdrawal of criminal complaintlimitation periodcivil revisionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil revision application filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the applicant's suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The core legal questions involve whether the lower courts erred in failing to record findings on all issues when the negative finding on the primary issue of malicious prosecution was decisive, whether the ingredients of malicious prosecution were established where a criminal complaint was withdrawn pursuant to a compromise, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove the essential ingredients of malicious prosecution—specifically, that the prosecution was malicious and without reasonable and probable cause, given that the complaint was withdrawn mutually rather than decided on merits and followed by a successful civil suit by the respondent for recovery of dowry. Furthermore, the Court held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 22 of the Limitation Act 1908. The revision application was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is legally required to record separate findings on all issues when a negative finding on the primary issue of malicious prosecution fully disposes of the suit?
  • Can an action for malicious prosecution succeed where the underlying criminal complaint was dismissed as withdrawn pursuant to a compromise between the parties rather than adjudicated on merits?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for filing a suit for damages for malicious prosecution under Pakistani law?
  • Whether the essential ingredients of malicious prosecution include the absence of reasonable and probable cause alongside the presence of malice?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Irshad Hussain vs Messrs Kohinoor Soap and Detergent Ltd., Karachi1990 PLC 423 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1988-11-23Read full judgment →
• Syed Ijaz Hussain Sherazi And 28 Others vs Secretary, Local1990 CLC 230 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-25
  local council suspensionnatural justiceaudi alteram partemquasi-judicial powerconstitutional petitionadministrative discretionpunitive action
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, elected members of the Municipal Committee, Sheikhupura, challenged a government notification suspending the committee under Section 159 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the government's power to suspend a local council is absolute or subject to the principles of natural justice and objective justification. The Court held that the impugned order was illegal and unsustainable. It ruled that the power to suspend a local council is quasi-judicial in nature, not purely administrative, and carries severe consequences. Consequently, the government is legally obligated to adhere to the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to a hearing, before taking such punitive action. Furthermore, the Court established that the statutory requirement of 'reasons to believe' necessitates objective satisfaction based on sufficient material, rather than arbitrary or whimsical exercise of discretion. As the government failed to provide reasons, demonstrate application of mind, or produce evidence justifying the suspension, the order was struck down for violating both procedural fairness and the statutory requirements of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of the Government to suspend a local council under Section 159 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979 absolute or subject to judicial review?
  • Does the principle of natural justice, specifically the right to be heard, apply to the suspension of a local council even if the statute is silent on the matter?
  • Must the government demonstrate objective satisfaction based on material evidence when exercising the power to suspend a local council?
  • Is the suspension of a local council a punitive act or a purely administrative measure?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Hazrat Said vs Capt. Abdur Rasheed1990 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-13
  adverse possessionlimitationco-sharerinheritancepossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which affirmed the dismissal of the appellant's suit for possession of land and residential houses. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant's suit was barred by limitation and whether the respondents had acquired title by adverse possession, notwithstanding the appellant's claim of being a co-sharer. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to prove his father was a co-sharer or real brother of the original owner, that the respondents (members of the local Jirga) had taken over the property adversely upon the death of the owners rather than as co-sharers, and that the suit instituted in 1977 was heavily time-barred. The key principle laid down is that where members of a local body take possession of a deceased person's estate under a claim of custom and distribute it among themselves openly, such possession is adverse to the true heirs from its inception, rendering subsequent suits barred by limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession filed decades after the property was appropriated by a local Jirga is barred by limitation?
  • Can members of a local Jirga who take over a deceased person's property claim adverse possession against the legal heirs?
  • Does the possession of a small portion of disputed property as a tenant assist a party in claiming co-ownership over the remaining estate?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Habibullah vs The State1990 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-30
  narcotics recoveryleave to appealnon-cognizable offencesearch warrantprohibition lawappreciation of evidencenew plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Baluchistan High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for possession of 200 grams of heroin. The petitioner was convicted alongside co-accused after being found in a narcotics den in Quetta. The trial court and the High Court both relied on the testimony of raiding party members to establish guilt. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for the first time that the recovery occurred in a non-public place, rendering the offence non-cognizable under Article 16 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, and making the search illegal for lack of a warrant under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that as this plea regarding the nature of the premises and the lack of a warrant was neither raised at the trial nor before the High Court, it could not be entertained for the first time during leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding the illegality of a search due to the lack of a warrant be raised for the first time during leave to appeal proceedings?
  • Is a conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979 sustainable when based on the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghulam Raza and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1367 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-04Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghulam Rasool Shah vs Inspector General of Police and, 2 OtherK.L.R. 1990, Labour & Service Cases 191 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-10-30Read full judgment →
• Syed Ghayyur Hussain Shah and anothers vs Gharib Alam1990 PLD Lahore 432 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-20
  malicious prosecutiondamagesFIR cancellationabuse of process of lawactio personalis moritur cum personaabatement of suitconstitutional principlesIslamic lawreputation damagefalse report
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved two suits for damages for malicious prosecution, initiated by the plaintiffs after a false First Information Report (FIR) alleging abduction and conspiracy to murder was lodged against them, which was subsequently cancelled by the Ilaqa Magistrate. The Civil Judge found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages. However, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, holding that no malicious prosecution occurred as the matter did not reach a court, and that a claim for slander/libel was time-barred. The High Court, in second appeal, re-examined the concept of malicious prosecution, holding that the term 'prosecution' is not limited to technical court proceedings but includes police proceedings where damage to the plaintiff results. The Court further held that the English common law maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' (a personal right of action dies with the person) is not applicable in Pakistani law, especially where a decree has been passed, being repugnant to the Constitution and Islamic principles. Consequently, the High Court restored the Civil Judge's decrees for damages.

  Questions settled

  • Does an action for malicious prosecution require the proceedings to have reached a court, or can it be founded on police proceedings that cause damage?
  • Is the English common law maxim 'actio personalis moritur cum persona' applicable in Pakistani law, particularly in cases of malicious prosecution where a decree has been passed?
  • Can a suit for damages for malicious prosecution abate upon the death of the defendant after a trial court decree but before appellate finality?
  • What is the scope of 'prosecution' in the context of an action for damages for malicious prosecution under Pakistani law?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan, particularly Articles 4 and 14, influence the interpretation of malicious prosecution actions?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Gaffar Hussain vs Ilahee Bakhsh1990 MLD 739 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-29Read full judgment →
• Syed Asghar Imam vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 2 others1990 PLC 346 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-29
  back benefitswrongful dismissalreinstatementIndustrial Relations Ordinanceconstitutional jurisdictionLabour Appellate Tribunaldisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which, while reinstating the petitioner, denied him back benefits based on alleged negligence. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal could deny back benefits on grounds of negligence that were not part of the original disciplinary charges against the employee. The Court held that once a dismissal is declared wrongful and reinstatement is ordered, the denial of back benefits must be legally justified. It established that the denial of back benefits should only be based on whether the workman earned or could have earned income during the period of dismissal, which could then be set off against the salary due. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal is obligated to decide matters in accordance with law rather than personal notions of justice. Consequently, because the alleged negligence was not part of the original charge, the Tribunal’s denial of back benefits was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, entitling the petitioner to the withheld benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Labour Appellate Tribunal deny back benefits to a reinstated employee based on grounds not included in the original disciplinary charge sheet?
  • What is the legal criterion for denying back benefits to an employee whose dismissal is found to be wrongful?
  • Is a Labour Appellate Tribunal’s discretion to award or deny back benefits subject to judicial review if the decision is not based on relevant legal principles?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Shah vs Abdul Saghir Khan Sherwani and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionrevisional powerscondonation of delaytransfer of propertysettlement commissionerdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside a Settlement Commissioner's revisional order including two rooms and a kitchen in the appellant's transfer documents. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in exercising its constitutional writ jurisdiction to set aside the Settlement Commissioner's order, which had condoned delay and corrected an erroneous transfer of property in possession of the appellant since 1948 without a hearing or sustainable grounds. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the revisional order, emphasizing that revisional powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act are wide and can be exercised to undo injustice, and that constitutional writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to perpetuate an injustice or set aside orders that cure manifest illegalities. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction is designed to foster justice and right a wrong, and should be declined if setting aside an order would result in perpetuating an injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in setting aside a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner in exercise of constitutional writ jurisdiction when such order cures a manifest injustice?
  • Can the revisional authority under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act examine the legality and propriety of an order and act of its own accord?
  • Does the question of limitation act as an absolute bar on the exercise of vast and unbridled revisional powers by a competent authority to prevent injustice?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Raza vs The Secretary, Statistics Division, Islamabad and 21990 PLC (C.S.) 62 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Syed Ali Kausar Zaidi vs Muhammad Shafique and others1990 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-20
  criminal proceedingsproperty disputeacquittalconstitutional petitionpossession of propertyspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding criminal proceedings. The petitioner had initiated criminal charges under sections 452, 448, 457, 148, 147, and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which resulted in the respondents' acquittal by a Magistrate under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner's subsequent revision petition was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, and the High Court similarly dismissed his constitutional petition. The core legal issue concerned whether the High Court's dismissal of the constitutional petition was justified given the underlying facts. The Supreme Court observed that the criminal case arose from a property dispute where prior proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had already determined the respondents were in possession of the property. Furthermore, a civil suit regarding the same property was pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the case was not a fit matter for its interference and dismissed the petition, affirming that criminal courts should not be used to settle disputed property possession already subject to civil litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to interfere in criminal proceedings where a civil suit regarding the same property is already pending?
  • Can criminal proceedings be utilized to resolve a dispute over the possession of property when prior proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have already determined possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Akbar Ali vs Zonal Municipal Committee (East), Karachi1990 PLC (C.S.) 23 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-17Read full judgment →
• Syed Ahmad Farooo And 3 Others vs Muhammad Arif Through L.Rs. And 31990 CLC 310 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-25Read full judgment →
• Sved Nasir Abbas vs The Secretary to Govt.of the PunjabK.L.R 1990 Labour & Services Cases 295 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1990-01-31Read full judgment →
• Suryabali and others vs The Vith Additional District Judge, Deoria and others1990 MLD 394 · Allahabad High Court · 1988-10-31Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer, Public Health Engineering Circle, Multan and others vs Irshad Ahmad CH1990 SCMR 936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-29
  service tribunalleave to appealsuspension ordersubsistence allowanceextraordinary leave without payimproper constitutionnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, directed against an order of the Service Tribunal. The core legal questions concern whether remaining members of the Service Tribunal can perform functions when the office of the Chairman is vacant; whether a tribunal can partly accept an appeal after holding it improperly constituted and not entertainable due to non-joinder of a necessary party; whether a suspension order is void if not accompanied or followed by an order for subsistence allowance; and whether competent authorities can treat a period of suspension as extraordinary leave without pay when the suspension is followed by reinstatement with a minor penalty like censure. The Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions and directed the appeal to be made ready for hearing on the present record. The key principle relates to the proper constitution of service tribunals, the legal effects of suspension orders, subsistence allowance requirements, and the regulation of suspension periods upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • When the office of Chairman is vacant, can the other members of the Service Tribunal perform the functions of the Tribunal?
  • Whether it is open to the Tribunal to partly accept an appeal after recording a finding that it is improperly constituted and not entertainable on account of non-impleading of a necessary party?
  • Whether an order of suspension is void if it does not incorporate a direction or is not immediately followed by an order for the payment of subsistence allowance to the accused official?
  • Where suspension of an accused official is followed by reinstatement with a minor penalty like censure, is it open to the competent authority to direct that the period of suspension be treated as extraordinary leave without pay?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintending Engineer Multan Development Authority, Multan and others vs Habib Bank Ltd. and another1990 SCMR 946 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-28
  leave to appealexecution of decreelimitation periodmoney decreecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the rejection of their application for the execution of a money decree as time-barred. The core legal question concerned the applicable period of limitation for filing the execution application in light of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and whether a period of six years applied. The Supreme Court noted that a similar question had been addressed in a previous case and held that the matters raised required formal examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions regarding the correct interpretation and computation of the limitation period for executing decrees.

  Questions settled

  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing an application for the execution of a money decree?
  • Does the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 affect the limitation period previously governed by Article 182 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether an execution application filed within six years is barred by time under the relevant statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Superintendent, Government Printing Press vs Abdul Waheed1990 PLC 485 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-06-09Read full judgment →
• Sultan Sikandar and others vs The State1990 SCMR 197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-04
  leave to appealfree fightgrievous hurtquantum of sentenceappreciation of evidencecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which modified sentences in a criminal case involving charges under sections 323, 324, 326, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial magistrate had convicted the accused petitioners for causing injuries with a sharp-edged weapon, which was partly modified on appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge, and subsequently reviewed by the High Court. The core legal questions pertained to the appreciation of evidence regarding a free fight, the presence of cross-injuries on the accused, and the quantum of sentence for causing grievous hurt versus simple hurt. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly appreciated the evidence, noting that the injuries sustained by the accused were minor and superficial, and that the single grievous injury inflicted by the principal accused warranted a reduction in sentence rather than an acquittal or a finding of a free fight. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of the accused under section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does the presence of minor scratches on the accused establish a free fight so as to alter the nature of the offence?
  • Whether the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment for causing simple hurt with a stick is proper under the circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Shah vs Inspector-General of Police and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 465 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-02-13Read full judgment →
• Sultan Shah vs Inspector General of Police, Sindh and 3 OtherK.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service Cases 57 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1990-02-01Read full judgment →
• Sultan Muhammad and others vs Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and others1990 SCMR 1364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1979-03-27
  audi alteram partemwrit jurisdictiondismissal in limineland disputeproperty rightsnatural justiceremandformer State of Dir
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of writ petitions by the Peshawar High Court regarding land disputes in the former State of Dir. The petitioners, claiming ownership and possession of specific agricultural lands, were not impleaded in proceedings before the Inquiry Commission constituted under Regulation No. 123 of 1972, which ultimately resulted in orders by the Federal Land Commission affecting their property rights. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petitions without inquiry, despite the petitioners' allegations that they were condemned unheard. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s dismissal was legally flawed, as it failed to address the petitioners' uncontroverted claims of ownership and possession. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments and administrative orders, remanding the cases to the Inquiry Commission for fresh disposal. The key principle laid down is the fundamental doctrine of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no party should be deprived of property rights without being afforded a fair opportunity to be heard and present evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a writ petition in limine when the petitioner alleges they were condemned unheard and supports this with an affidavit?
  • Is an order passed by a quasi-judicial body valid if it affects the property rights of persons who were not impleaded as parties to the proceedings?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem require that parties claiming ownership and possession of land be given notice before their rights are adjudicated by an Inquiry Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Khan vs Shahbaz Khan and others1990 MLD 2145 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-19Read full judgment →
• Sultan Industries vs The Authority under Payment of Wages Act and another1990 PLC 357 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-29Read full judgment →
• Sultan Azam Shah and others vs Member, Board of Revenue and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 795 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  Martial Law Regulation 115land alienationeconomic holdingbona fide requirementmesne profitsland reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the validity of land alienations under Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question is the interpretation of paragraph 24(6)(a) of the Regulation, specifically whether the requirement that land be "bona fide required for the purpose of building thereon" must be satisfied by the alienor or the alienee. The appellants argued that the 1976 amendment, which removed the words "by the owner," implied that the bona fide requirement must be that of the alienor, thereby rendering the subject transactions void. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that the amendment was intended to clarify that the bona fide requirement relates to the needs of the alienee, not the alienor. The Court affirmed that land transfers for building purposes are valid if the alienee requires the land for such purposes, regardless of the alienor's intent. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the forfeiture of the bank guarantee provided by the appellants to cover mesne profits due to the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'bona fide required for the purpose of building thereon' in paragraph 24(6)(a) of Martial Law Regulation 115 refer to the requirement of the alienor or the alienee?
  • Did the 1976 amendment to paragraph 24(6)(a) of Martial Law Regulation 115 change the requirement that land must be bona fide required for building purposes to apply to the alienor?
  • Are land alienations that reduce a holding below the economic holding limit void if the land is bona fide required by the alienee for building purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan and anothers vs Habib Ahmad and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 897 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-12
  pre-emptionco-sharerShariat Appellate Benchtarget datecivil appealsuit dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated civil appeals involving the right of pre-emption in Pakistan. The core legal question addressed is whether a suit for pre-emption based on the right of a co-sharer could be decreed after the target date of 31-7-1986, following the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment dated 26-5-1990 (PLD 1990 SC 865). In both cases, the pre-emptors had not secured a decree for pre-emption prior to the specified target date. The Supreme Court held that the view previously held by the High Court, which allowed such suits to proceed based on the survival of the co-sharer's right as discussed in Said Kamal Shah's case, was no longer tenable in light of the Shariat Appellate Bench's ruling. Consequently, the Court determined that because the pre-emptors had not obtained a decree before 31-7-1986, their suits could not be decreed thereafter. The Court allowed both appeals, set aside the impugned judgments and decrees, and dismissed the pre-emption suits, establishing that the Shariat Appellate Bench's judgment must be given effect according to its tenor.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for pre-emption based on the right of a co-sharer be decreed after 31-7-1986 if no decree was granted before that date?
  • Does the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench dated 26-5-1990 (PLD 1990 SC 865) preclude the decreeing of pre-emption suits after the target date of 31-7-1986?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 718 · Lahore High Court · 1988-07-19Read full judgment →
• Sultan And 3 Others vs Mst. Sat Bharai1990 CLC 887 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-18Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali vs The State1990 MLD 2070 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-10Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ali and others vs Mst. Dildar Begum and another1990 SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-31
  limitationcondonation of delaypre-emptioncompensation for improvementstime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, wherein the petitioners sought an enhancement of compensation awarded for improvements made on land that was the subject-matter of a pre-emption suit. The petitioners had previously challenged the compensation amount fixed by the trial court based on a Local Commissioner's report, but their appeal was dismissed by the District Judge, and a subsequent second appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petition was found to be barred by limitation by 60 days. The petitioners sought condonation of delay, citing the illness of one petitioner, Sultan Ali, and providing medical certificates indicating he was an outdoor patient. The Court observed that other co-petitioners, specifically Ghulam and Ghulam Shabbir, were available to pursue the legal remedy but failed to take action within the prescribed period. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no sufficient grounds existed for the condonation of delay and dismissed the petition as time-barred, affirming that the negligence of co-litigants precludes the condonation of delay based on the illness of a single party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing a petition be condoned based on the illness of one petitioner when other co-petitioners are available to pursue the litigation?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it is filed 60 days beyond the period of limitation without sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmed Geelani vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.1990 PLC 11 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-18Read full judgment →
• Suleman vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1302 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-09Read full judgment →
• Suhno vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 779 · Sindh High Court · 1979-07-03Read full judgment →
• Suhail Hanif vs Secretary, Planning and Development Division, Islamabad And Another1990 CLC 127 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-22Read full judgment →
• Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. vs Appropriate Authority and another1990 PTD 662 · Madras High Court · 1989-02-23Read full judgment →
• Subtreasury Officer, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh and another vs Shabbir Ahmad and 2 others1990 MLD 1895 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-05Read full judgment →
• Subhan Khan vs Nawal Khan1990 PLD Lahore 302 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-10Read full judgment →
• Subedar Muhammad Hussain vs Mst. Shah Begum and others1990 MLD 2100 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-18
  Intra-Court AppealSection 12(2) CPCCondonation of delayRevisional jurisdictionLaw Reforms OrdinanceCivil Courts OrdinanceMistaken legal advice
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's refusal to condone a nine-year delay in filing an application under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal questions were whether an Intra-Court Appeal is competent against an order passed in revisional jurisdiction and whether Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908, confers original civil jurisdiction or applies to High Court judgments. The Court held that the appeal was incompetent under Section 3, Law Reforms Ordinance 1972, as that provision does not contemplate appeals against orders passed in revisional jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court determined that Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908, does not apply to High Court judgments because the High Court is not a 'Civil Court' under the Civil Courts Ordinance 1962. The Court also affirmed that mistaken legal advice is not a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, emphasizing that each day of delay must be accounted for. The appeal was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Is an Intra-Court Appeal competent against an order passed by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute an exercise of original civil jurisdiction?
  • Can an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be filed against a judgment of the High Court?
  • Does mistaken legal advice constitute a valid ground for the condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Subedar Imam Din vs Riaz Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 167 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-21Read full judgment →
• State vs Mr. Aziz Hussain, Chief Executive, Hyesons Sugar Mills Limited, KarachiPTCL 1990 CL. 687 · Corporate Law Authority · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• State vs Mr. Amin-Ur-Rashid, Manager Finance And Accounts, Janana DePTCL 1990 CL. 1057 · Corporate Law Authority · 1990-04-22Read full judgment →
• State vs Khurshid Ahmad, Chief Executive of the CompanyPTCL 1900 CL. 798 · Corporate Law Authority · 1989-06-26Read full judgment →
• State through Assistant AdvocateGeneral, N.W.F.P., Abbottabad vs Muhammad Riaz Khan, S.H.O. Bagnotar1990 PLD Peshawar 116 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-02-28Read full judgment →
• State through AdvocateGeneral, N.W.F.P. and another vs Sajjad Hussain and others1990 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-27
  Federal Shariat CourtFederally Administered Tribal AreasAppellate JurisdictionFrontier Crimes RegulationsConstitutional InterpretationLeave to Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against an order of the Federal Shariat Court, which had asserted its jurisdiction to hear appeals against convictions and sentences passed by political authorities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) under the Frontier Crimes Regulations 1901. The respondents had been convicted for the possession of large quantities of heroin. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Shariat Court, as constituted under Article 203-C of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, possesses the legal authority or jurisdiction to entertain appeals regarding offences committed and tried within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the issue involves significant questions of general public importance regarding the interpretation of constitutional provisions. Consequently, the Court stayed further proceedings before the Federal Shariat Court pending the final adjudication of the appeal. The matter is set to be heard on the existing record to determine the scope of the Federal Shariat Court's appellate jurisdiction in relation to the tribal areas.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction to entertain appeals in respect of offences committed and tried in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?
  • Can the Federal Shariat Court, as constituted under Article 203-C of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, exercise jurisdiction in relation to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P vs Wasal Khan alias Narai1990 P Cr. L J 1955 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-06-03Read full judgment →
• State of Uttar Pradesh vs Chet Ram and others1990 MLD 402 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-03-28Read full judgment →
• State of U.P. through C.B.I. S.P.E., Lucknow and another vs R.K. Srivastava1990 MLD 497 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-08-11Read full judgment →
• State of Maharashtra vs Ramesh Kumar Shobhraj Jain and others1990 MLD 1322 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-01-12Read full judgment →
• State of Maharashtra vs Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao1990 MLD 520 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-09-29Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan: In re vs Not1990 MLD 1838 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-12Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs Wali Muhammad and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 997 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-17Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs The Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 827 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-14
  annual rental valuerevisional jurisdictionstatutory interpretationtaxationcantonment boardleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the assessment of the annual rental value of a building under the Cantonments Act 1924. The Cantonment Board increased the annual rental value, which was subsequently reduced on appeal by the District Judge under Section 84 of the Cantonments Act 1924. The Director Military Lands and Cantonments, acting as a revisional authority under Section 277 of the Cantonments Act 1924, subsequently increased the value. The petitioner challenged this revisional order in the High Court via a constitutional petition, arguing that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 277 did not apply to taxation and assessment matters governed by Chapter V. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that a statute must be read and construed as a whole, and the division into chapters is merely for convenience. The Court ruled that the finality of appellate orders under Section 88 is subject to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 277, which explicitly permits revision of appellate decisions made by a District Magistrate from orders of the Board.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the division of a statute into chapters prevents a revisional provision in one chapter from applying to appellate orders passed under another chapter?
  • Does the finality clause of an appellate order under Section 88 of the Cantonments Act 1924 exclude the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 277 of the same Act?
  • Whether a revision under Section 277 of the Cantonments Act 1924 is competent against an appellate order of a District Magistrate arising from a valuation or assessment decision of the Board?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through The Senior Deputy Director Banking1990 P Cr. L J 854 · Sindh High Court · 1989-09-28Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through The Banking Officer--Complainant vs Messrs Raza Enterprises (Regd.) and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 317 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-31Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through its Manager (Rawalpindi Branch) vs The Director, Military Lands and Cantonments, Rawalpindi and another1990 PLD Lahore 258 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-05Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through Banking Officer, Banking Control1990 P Cr. L J 583 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-16Read full judgment →
• Staff Union, Social Security, Bahawalpur Region vs The Registrar, Trade Unions, Bahawalpur1990 PLC 527 · Labour CourtRead full judgment →
• Sri Sanatan Dharam Sabha and anothers vs The Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P., Lucknow and others1990 MLD 423 · Allahabad High Court · 1989-02-09Read full judgment →
• Spr. (Retd.) Duri Aman Khan vs Lt.Col. Muhammad Sadique and others1990 SCMR 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-20
  Border Area AllotmentLand AllotmentFraudulent AllotmentG.H.Q. RecommendationCancellation of AllotmentFactual Dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the cancellation of an allotment of 200 Kanals of land in the Border Area, which the appellant claimed was granted to him based on a recommendation from the General Headquarters (G.H.Q.). The core legal question was whether the appellant had established that he was a valid recommendee of the G.H.Q. for the land allotment as required under the relevant regulations. The Supreme Court observed that the appellant failed to produce the alleged recommendation letter despite multiple opportunities. Conversely, the respondents produced official correspondence from the Adjutant-General confirming that no such recommendation had been made and that the allotment was secured fraudulently. The Court held that the appellant failed to substantiate his claim, noting that the factual dispute had been consistently resolved against him by all lower forums. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that an allotment obtained without the requisite G.H.Q. recommendation, as mandated by the applicable regulations, is invalid and subject to cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an allotment of land in the Border Area is valid if the allottee fails to prove the mandatory recommendation from the General Headquarters?
  • Can an allotment of land be cancelled if it is determined to have been secured fraudulently without the required administrative recommendation?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the existence of an administrative recommendation for land allotment?
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• Spin Bacha and anothers vs The State1990 PLD Federal Shariat Court 57 · Federal Shariat Court
  abductionexculpatory confessionexamination of accusedSection 342 CrPCSection 340(2) CrPCco-accused testimonyabscondenceidentification paradebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from a criminal appeal before the Federal Shariat Court against convictions under Section 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979. The core legal questions pertained to the evidentiary value of an exculpatory judicial confession against co-accused, the admissibility of testimony given by an accused on oath under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against co-accused without cross-examination, and the effect of failing to put incriminating circumstances—such as alleged abscondence—to the accused during Section 342 Cr.P.C. examination. The Court acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of doubt. The Court laid down that under Article 43 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, an exculpatory confession cannot be used against co-accused. Additionally, testimony of an accused under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. cannot be used against a co-accused unless the co-accused is afforded the right to cross-examine and the evidence is formally put to them under Section 342 Cr.P.C. Failure to put any incriminating circumstance to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. completely excludes such circumstance from being used to base a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can an exculpatory judicial confession of an accused be used as incriminating evidence against a co-accused under Article 43 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can incriminating evidence given by an accused on oath under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. be relied upon against a co-accused who was not given the opportunity to cross-examine?
  • Does the failure to put an incriminating circumstance to an accused during their examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C. render that circumstance unusable for conviction?
  • Can the factum of abscondence be used as corroborative evidence if it was neither proved by prosecution evidence nor put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C.?
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• Soomar and another vs The State1990 MLD 1077 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
• Sookerating Tea Company (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income-Tax1990 PTD 235 · Gauhati High Court · 1988-07-28Read full judgment →
• Soofi Dilawar Hussain Chishti vs Muhammad Afzal1990 SCMR 705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-10
  petition for leave to appealregular first appealsummary dismissalpromissory notesuit for recoveryremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 8-7-1987, whereby the petitioner's Regular First Appeal against a summary decree in a suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was summarily dismissed by a learned Single Judge in chambers. The core legal question was whether a Regular First Appeal could be dismissed summarily in chambers contrary to established precedent. The Supreme Court accepted the contention, relying on its prior ruling in Abid Hussain v. Mst. Afsar Jehan Begum and another (PLD 1973 SC 1), converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that Regular First Appeals must be heard and decided in accordance with the prescribed legal procedure and cannot be summarily dismissed in chambers when binding precedent dictates otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Regular First Appeal can be dismissed summarily by a judge in chambers?
  • Can a suit based on a promissory note be decreed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Sohno vs The State and another1990 P Cr. L J 1190 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-15
  joinder of accusedColumn 2 of challancognizance of offenceCourt of Session jurisdictioncriminal revisionLaw Reforms Ordinance 1972
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenged an order by the Sessions Judge, Shikarpur, which directed the joinder of the applicant as an accused in a pending murder trial, despite the applicant having been placed in Column 2 of the police challan. The core legal question was whether a Court of Session, once seized of a case, possesses the jurisdiction to summon and join as an accused a person whose name was placed in Column 2 of the police report, or if such power is restricted to a Magistrate. The Court held that upon the submission of a challan to the Court of Session, the Court becomes seized of the entire criminal transaction and the case as a whole. Consequently, the Court of Session is competent to summon any person implicated in the offence, regardless of their placement in the police report. The principle laid down is that the Court of Session, having taken cognizance of the offence, has the authority to join additional accused persons connected with the case and issue process against them.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Court of Session have the jurisdiction to join as an accused a person whose name was placed in Column 2 of the police challan?
  • Does the Court of Session become seized of the entire criminal transaction upon receiving a challan?
  • Is the power to summon an accused person restricted to a Magistrate, or does it extend to the Court of Session?
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• Sobedar vs Balochistan Labour Appellate Tribunal, Quetta and others1990 PLC 152 · Balochistan High Court · 1989-08-21Read full judgment →
• Smt. Chandrakantaben J. Modi and another vs Vadilal Bapalal Modi1990 MLD 1332 · Supreme Court of India · 1989-03-30Read full judgment →
• Sirsa Industries vs Commissioner of Income-Tax and another1990 PTD 646 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1988-11-17Read full judgment →
• Sirajuddin vs The State1990 SCMR 588 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  murderdying declarationocular testimonyabscondenceleave to appealcriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Sirajuddin, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 2nd November 1986, which had dismissed his appeal and confirmed his conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Abdul Rehman (subsequently commuted to imprisonment for life via a Presidential Order). The core legal question was whether the conviction was sustainable on the basis of the dying declaration, ocular testimony, medical evidence, motive, and prolonged abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular testimony, corroborating medical evidence, a reliable dying declaration, and the petitioner's abscondence for over seven years. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration corroborated by medical and ocular evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can prolonged abscondence of an accused person serve as a corroborative circumstance supporting a murder conviction?
  • Whether the testimony of close relatives of the deceased can be discarded merely on the ground of being interested witnesses when no prior enmity is established?
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• Siraj vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1109 · Lahore High Court · 1980-04-23Read full judgment →