Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• (Mrs) Maryam Wasif vs (Mrs) Shahida Khan, EtcK.L.R. 1991 Civil Cases 511 · Lahore High Court · 1990-12-12Read full judgment →
• (DR.) Noor Khan Wazir, Senior Lecturer, Khyber Medical College, Peshawar. vs Government of NWFP, through Chief Secretary, NWFP, Peshawar and Another(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 294) · Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• (DR). Bashir Ahmad vs Province of Punjab Etc(K.L.R. 1991 Labour & Service Cases 286) · Lahore High Court · 1991-05-08Read full judgment →
• {{Urdu Text}} vs {{Urdu Text}}1990 PLD Supreme Court 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  supreme court jurisprudencestatutory interpretationcivil procedurecriminal procedureconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a legal dispute adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported in PLD 1990 Supreme Court 656. The judgment addresses the core legal questions arising from the case, determining the rights and liabilities of the parties involved. The court evaluated the facts and applicable legal principles to reach its decision, holding that the lower forum's view required interference or upholding based on the statutory interpretation. The key principle laid down emphasizes the strict adherence to procedural and substantive requirements of the law as interpreted by the superior courts, ensuring dispensation of justice according to the relevant statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the impugned judgment of the lower court is sustainable in the eyes of law?
  • How are the relevant statutory provisions to be construed in the light of settled precedents?
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• {{Urdu Text}} vs N/A1190 PLD Supreme Court 1186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
• Zulqarnain vs The State1990 MLD 678 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-17Read full judgment →
• Zulqarnain Khan alias Zulfiqar Ali Khan vs The Government of Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others1990 MLD 1611 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-03
  extraditionnarcotics smugglingfundamental rightsconstitutional petitionprima facie casepending criminal proceedingsreasonable restrictions
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged extradition proceedings initiated by the Government of Pakistan to surrender the petitioner to the United States for alleged narcotics smuggling. The petitioner contended that the inquiry was procedurally flawed, violated his fundamental right to reside in Pakistan, and ignored pending criminal proceedings against him before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court held that the authenticated material provided by the United States established a prima facie case for extradition, and that the Extradition Act, 1972, imposes reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to reside in Pakistan. Regarding the pending Supreme Court proceedings, the Court determined that the petitioner, having been summoned as an accused in a pending appeal against acquittal, qualifies as a person accused of an offence under the Extradition Act, 1972. Consequently, the Court ruled that extradition cannot be effected until the conclusion of the domestic criminal proceedings. The petition was accepted in part, prohibiting the petitioner’s surrender until the finalization of the Supreme Court case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court of Pakistan preclude the extradition of an accused person?
  • Is the right to reside in Pakistan subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the Extradition Act, 1972?
  • Does the failure of a fugitive to file a written statement under the Extradition Act, 1972, invalidate the extradition inquiry?
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• Zulifqar alias Bhutto and others vs The State1990 SCMR 623 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-10
  leave to appealcriminal convictionappellate reviewwitness credibilityoffences against propertyspeedy trials
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Zulifqar alias Bhutto and others against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which had upheld their convictions and sentences initially imposed by the Special Judge for Speedy Trials. The petitioners challenged the High Court's decision to dismiss their appeal. During the appellate proceedings, the High Court had modified the conviction of one petitioner, Arib, altering it from an offense under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, to one under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence presented, specifically noting the absence of any animus or motive for the complainant or prosecution witnesses to falsely implicate the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court observed that the incident occurred in broad daylight, indicating a daring commission of the offense. Finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the convictions and sentences as determined by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of animus on the part of prosecution witnesses support the reliability of their testimony in a criminal conviction?
  • Can the High Court alter a conviction from an offense under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 to one under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 during an appeal?
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• Zulfqar Ahmad Mehar vs Syed Johar Hussain Kazmi1990 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-28
  evictionrent restrictionstay of proceedingsinjunction barpersonal use
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the High Court recalling an earlier stay of eviction proceedings granted to the petitioner, whose appeal against a Rent Controller's eviction order under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was pending. The core legal question was whether an injunction or stay of eviction could be granted despite the statutory bar under section 21 of the Ordinance when the maintainability of the eviction application was challenged on the ground that the premises were non-residential. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent finding of fact by the Rent Controller—supported by the tenant's own admission—that the premises were residential could not be prematurely set aside without prejudicing the main appeal, and that the High Court's refusal to grant a stay was proper. The key principle laid down is that interlocutory stay orders in rent matters will not be granted to bypass statutory bars against injunctions where findings of fact regarding the nature of the property support the landlord's claim under summary procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an injunction or stay of eviction can be granted when an appeal is preferred from an order passed under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a finding of fact regarding the residential nature of disputed premises be set aside at the interlocutory stage of a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Zulfiquar Ali and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 822 · Sindh High Court · 1989-01-16
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayhardened criminalfourth provisoaffidavits of witnessesjudicial precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerns two applicants, Zulfiqar Ali and Muhammad Bachal, facing trial for murder and property offences. The applicants sought post-arrest bail primarily on grounds of statutory delay in trial and on merits, citing affidavits from prosecution witnesses and Mashirs exonerating them. The Court examined the fourth proviso to Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which denies bail on grounds of delay to hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminals. While acknowledging conflicting judicial interpretations regarding whether an accused must be a previous convict to fall under this category, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had previously granted bail in similar circumstances in the case of Gul Khan and others. Following the Supreme Court's precedent, the Court held that the applicants were entitled to bail due to the statutory delay in their trial. Furthermore, the Court found merit in the applicants' case, noting that prosecution witnesses had sworn affidavits exonerating them. Consequently, the Court granted bail to both applicants, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require an accused to be a previous convict to be classified as a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal'?
  • Can bail be granted on the basis of affidavits sworn by prosecution witnesses exonerating the accused?
  • What factors may a court consider when forming a tentative opinion on whether an accused is a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' under the fourth proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zulfiqar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 938 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar vs Mazhar and others1990 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  culpable homicidesentence reductionleave to appealintention to killcriminal revisionfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Zulfiqar, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that upheld the conviction of the respondent, Mazhar, for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while reducing his sentence from life imprisonment to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The trial court had originally convicted the respondent under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the death of Haq Nawaz, following a scuffle. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, arguing that the respondent's actions, specifically firing at close range, demonstrated a clear intention to kill, warranting a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a death sentence. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning for the reduction of the sentence. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised regarding the nature of the offense and the unexplained reduction of the sentence required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal against the respondent and issued non-bailable warrants for his arrest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to provide reasons when reducing a sentence of life imprisonment to a term of years?
  • Does firing at close range with a firearm necessarily establish an intention to commit murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be challenged on the basis that the evidence proved an intention to kill under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Zulfiqar Ali Etc vs Director General, Ae & WM Sindh, Hydrabad and AnotherK.L.R. 1990 Labour and Servi t ases 302 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1822 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-05-05Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ahmed Mehar vs Syed Johar Hussain Kazmi1990 MLD 1860 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-02Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ahmad vs The State1990 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcustoms actheroin smugglingcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Sindh High Court cancelling pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner by the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi, in a case involving smuggling of heroin under clause (8) of section 156(1) of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the pre-arrest bail on the basis of incriminating evidence collected during investigation connecting the petitioner to the narcotics smuggling ring. The Supreme Court held that since the case was still under investigation and the petitioner's involvement could not be ruled out based on the collected evidence, the High Court committed no illegality or violation of legal principles in cancelling the bail. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that pre-arrest bail is rightly cancelled when sufficient incriminating material exists during the investigative stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be cancelled when incriminating evidence collected during investigation connects the accused to the crime?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail merely on the ground that he was out of the country on the exact day of the recovery?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court cancelling pre-arrest bail if no principle or provision of law was violated?
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• Zia-Ur-Rehman vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1558 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-21Read full judgment →
• Zia Ullah Khan vs Muhammad Aslam and anothers1990 MLD 123 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08Read full judgment →
• Zia Qamar vs Falak Sher and another1990 SCMR 1154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-27
  leave to appealcausation of deathculpable homicidegrievous hurtcompensation to heirsmedical evidencecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the respondent's conviction from Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 326 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent was originally convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of Rashid Qamar, but the High Court set aside this conviction, reasoning that the medical evidence failed to establish a direct causal link between the injuries inflicted by the respondent and the victim's subsequent death, attributing the death to complications from old abdominal injuries. The complainant challenged this, arguing that the respondent's intent was clear from the infliction of two knife blows to the abdomen and flank, and that intervening complications did not absolve the respondent of culpability under Section 304, Part I. Furthermore, the complainant contended that the High Court failed to apply the mandatory provisions of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised required consideration and granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of intervening medical complications absolve an accused of liability for culpable homicide when the initial injury was inflicted with clear intent?
  • Is the application of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory upon conviction for offences involving injury?
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• Zia Mohyuddin vs State1990 SCMR 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-21
  suspension of sentencemandatory minimum sentencecriminal appealjudicial discretionmisappropriationlegislative intent
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, convicted in six separate cases under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to suspend his sentences. The petitioner argued that the sentences were excessively harsh, noting that the trial court itself expressed constraints due to the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by law, despite the misappropriated amount being returned shortly after the occurrence. The petitioner also challenged the vires of the legislation mandating such minimum sentences. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's refusal to suspend the sentence was justified. The Court held that where the legislature has explicitly prescribed a minimum sentence for a proven offence, the trial court is bound by that mandate. Furthermore, given the legislative scheme prioritizing the speedy disposal of such cases, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion in refusing to suspend the sentence pending appeal. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the statutory minimum sentence must be respected and that the appellate process should proceed without interim suspension.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court suspend a sentence where the legislature has prescribed a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment?
  • Is the return of misappropriated funds a sufficient ground to suspend a sentence imposed under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum prescribed by law?
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• Zenul Abidin And 5 Others vs Ahmad And 3 Other1990 CLC 1452 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-23Read full judgment →
• Zarin And Another vs Momin Khan And 3 Other Respondents1990 CLC 3 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-05-28Read full judgment →
• Zar Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1756 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-10
  youthful offenderjuvenile justiceSindh Children Actage determinationremand for retrialcriminal trial procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Zar Muhammad, was convicted by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, South Karachi, for an offence under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant challenged this conviction, contending that he was a child at the time of the incident and should have been tried under the provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955, rather than the ordinary criminal procedure. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the Sindh Children Act, 1955, given the appellant's age. The High Court found that medical evidence confirmed the appellant was under 16 years of age at the time of the offence. Consequently, the Court held that the trial and subsequent sentencing were illegal as they bypassed the mandatory protections afforded to youthful offenders under the Sindh Children Act, 1955. The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for a fresh trial in accordance with the provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to try a youthful offender under the Sindh Children Act, 1955, render a conviction and sentence illegal?
  • Is a person under the age of 16 at the time of an offence entitled to be tried under the Sindh Children Act, 1955?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case for a fresh trial if the original trial was conducted without applying the mandatory provisions of the Sindh Children Act, 1955?
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• Zar Moeen and anothers Ashoor Gul vs The State Zar Moeen and others1990 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-17
  criminal appealre-appraisal of evidenceattempt to murderconvictionprompt F.I.R.medical corroborationfalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a criminal conviction for firing at a complainant, resulting in charges under sections 307, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellants were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to imprisonment and fines. The Peshawar High Court maintained the conviction and sentence of the appellants while acquitting their co-accused and dismissing the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the case to be a broad-daylight occurrence reported promptly, with the appellants directly named in the F.I.R. The court held that the medical evidence corroborated the use of firearms, and the appellants failed to demonstrate false implication or mistaken identity despite existing enmity between the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and the complainant's petition, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of enmity between parties automatically invalidate the testimony of a complainant in a criminal case?
  • Is a prompt F.I.R. in a broad-daylight occurrence sufficient to establish the identity of the accused?
  • Can a conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when medical evidence corroborates the use of firearms?
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• Zameer Ahmad Shaikh and 6 Other vs Chief Secretary, Govt. of Sindhh, Sindhh Secretariat,Karachi and AnotherK.L.R. 1990 Labour and Service Cases 169 · Sindh Service TribunalRead full judgment →
• Zakir alias Bhola vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 183 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-06-13Read full judgment →
• Zaka A. Malik vs The I.T.O. Circle-H, Lahore1990 PTD (Trib.) 935 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 1990-07-14Read full judgment →
• Zaibun Nisa vs Nafees Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 1079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-27
  murderdying declarationocular evidenceacquittalleave to appealchance witnesscriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the daughter of a deceased victim against a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents based on a dying declaration and ocular testimony. The High Court, however, overturned the conviction, finding the recovery of the weapon suspicious and the ocular testimony unreliable, noting the sole witness was a chance witness with implausible reasons for presence. Furthermore, the High Court questioned the validity of the dying declaration, noting the absence of a doctor's fitness certificate and contradictions regarding who brought the victim to the hospital. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and concluded that the High Court's assessment was neither unreasonable nor perverse. The Supreme Court held that while the victim was undoubtedly murdered, the prosecution failed to provide reliable, untainted evidence to sustain a capital charge, emphasizing that inefficient investigation and lack of credible witnesses prevent conviction. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a dying declaration when the accompanying ocular evidence is found to be unreliable?
  • Is the absence of a doctor's fitness certificate on a dying declaration sufficient to diminish its evidentiary value?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's acquittal when the assessment of evidence is neither unreasonable nor perverse?
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• Zahoor Hussain vs Muhammad Ismail And Other1990 CLC 144 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-17Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Hussain vs Messrs Hafiz Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi1990 PLC 419 · Labour Court · 1988-10-30Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Ahmed vs The Trustees of Port Trust of Karachi1990 PLC 14 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-23Read full judgment →
• Zahid Malik vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1310 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-21Read full judgment →
• Zahid Khalil vs Wajid Ali and another1990 P Cr. L J 713 · Lahore High Court · 1988-04-16
  summoning of accusedprivate complaintpolice investigationpreliminary inquirycurable irregularityplea of alibi
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, whereby the petitioner was summoned as an accused to face trial under sections 302, 307, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code in a private complaint, despite having been found innocent during police investigation. The core legal questions involved whether a Sessions Court is bound to examine police case diaries before summoning an accused on a private complaint, whether a delay in recording the complainant's statement under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiates subsequent proceedings, and whether preliminary evidence consisting of injured and ocular witnesses furnished sufficient ground for issuing process. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that preliminary evidence of eye-witnesses and medical testimony provided a sufficient prima facie basis for summoning the accused, that the failure to immediately record the complainant's statement under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was merely a curable irregularity causing no prejudice, and that the trial court was not legally required to examine the police investigation file or the plea of alibi before issuing process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Sessions Court is bound to examine police case diaries and investigation records before issuing process against an accused in a private complaint?
  • Does a delay in recording the statement of the complainant under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render subsequent proceedings illegal or constitute a curable irregularity?
  • Is preliminary evidence consisting of injured and ocular eye-witnesses sufficient to justify summoning an accused who was declared innocent by the police during investigation?
  • Whether the trial court is required to consider a plea of alibi and police investigation findings before summoning an accused in a private complaint?
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• Zahid Hussain vs The State and 8 others1990 P Cr. L J 1209 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20
  quashment of proceedingsSection 561-A Cr.P.C.Section 195(1)(c) Cr.P.C.forged documentsoriginal vs copycognizance of offenceSection 265-K Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashment of criminal proceedings pending before a Sessions Judge, alleging that the cognizance of the offence was barred under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The applicant argued that the alleged offences (forgery/fraud) related to documents produced in a civil suit, requiring a complaint from the court rather than a private complaint. The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the application, contending the applicant should have first approached the trial court under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that while it is proper to approach the trial court first, the High Court's powers under Section 561-A are co-extensive, and it may entertain such applications directly. On merits, the Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies only when the original document is produced or given in evidence. Since only copies were produced in the civil proceedings, the statutory bar was not triggered. The application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the power to entertain an application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 directly, even if the applicant has not first approached the trial court under Section 265-K?
  • Does the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when only a copy of a document, rather than the original, is produced or given in evidence in court?
  • What are the essential requirements that must be satisfied to invoke the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zahid Aziz vs Province of Sind and others1990 MLD 76 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-15Read full judgment →
• Zaheeruddin vs Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary and another1990 SCMR 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-24
  ad hoc appointmentservice benefitstermination of servicecivil judgeservice tribunalregular appointmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Civil Judge, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which dismissed his claim for service benefits, including salary and continuity of service, for the period between his termination from an ad hoc position and his subsequent regular appointment. The petitioner had been appointed on an ad hoc basis subject to qualifying in a future competitive examination. Following his termination due to an alleged failure to meet conditions, he was later regularly appointed. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to service benefits and continuity of service for the period he remained unemployed following the termination of his ad hoc appointment. The Supreme Court held that the conditions attached to the ad hoc appointment were for the benefit of the Government, not the employee. The Court found that the petitioner had no inherent right to regular induction based on the ad hoc appointment, particularly when vacancies were unavailable due to litigation. Consequently, the Court affirmed the termination and the delayed regular appointment, ruling that no question of law of public importance was raised. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does an ad hoc appointee have a vested right to continuity of service if their initial appointment was subject to qualifying in a competitive examination?
  • Are conditions attached to an ad hoc appointment intended for the benefit of the government or the employee?
  • Can a civil servant claim salary and service benefits for a period of unemployment following the termination of an ad hoc appointment if they are later regularly appointed?
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• Zaheer Din and 2 others vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-26
  cross-casespartisan investigationbailunlawful assemblysectarian violencepolice investigationcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns multiple criminal appeals arising from cross-cases of violent encounters and sectarian clashes, where the police investigation was alleged to be partisan. The core legal question was whether the accused in these cross-cases were entitled to bail, given the police's failure to impartially investigate both sides and their tendency to declare one side innocent without judicial oversight. The Supreme Court held that the police must not arrogate to themselves the final authority on guilt or innocence in cross-cases. Instead, they should impartially challan both sets of accused, placing those they believe innocent in column No. 2 of the challan, thereby allowing the trial court to determine culpability and enabling complainants to pursue private complaints if necessary. The Court deprecated the partisan investigation, directed the Inspector-General of Police to re-investigate the cases, and granted bail to certain appellants based on their specific roles, while rejecting others. The key principle established is that in cross-cases, the police must maintain neutrality and leave the determination of guilt or innocence to the judiciary rather than unilaterally suppressing cases.

  Questions settled

  • Should the police unilaterally declare an accused innocent in a cross-case or challan them to the court?
  • Is the police's failure to investigate cross-cases impartially a valid ground for the court to intervene in bail proceedings?
  • Can the police treat a case as 'untraced' when the accused are specifically named in the FIR?
  • Does the involvement of cross-cases and the uncertainty regarding the aggressor entitle the accused to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Zafarullah Abbasi vs National Bank of Pakistan and 2 others1990 PLC 75 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-09-14Read full judgment →
• Zafar vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 706 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-25Read full judgment →
• Zafar Shah and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1748 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs Mst. Anwari Begum and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 225 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal vs Government of Sindh and others1990 P I. C (C.S.) 676 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• Zafar Iqbal and anothers vs Inspectorgeneral, Frontier Corps, Balochistan, Que'tta and 2 others1990 MLD 2329 · Balochistan High Court · 1990-06-28Read full judgment →
• Zafar Hussain vs Muhammad Amin and others1990 P Cr. L J 1928 · Sindh High Court · 1990-05-27
  public nuisancequashment of proceedingsrevisional jurisdictiontea-shop nuisancekerosene oil stovesCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 filed by the applicant seeking quashment of an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Karachi (South), which had set aside a magistrate's order under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 directing the respondent to stop using kerosene oil stoves in his tea-shop on the ground of public nuisance. The core legal question was whether the operation of a licensed tea-shop using kerosene oil stoves inside the premises constitutes a public nuisance under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with section 268 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether a second revision or quashment application is maintainable after the dismissal of a prior revision. The Sindh High Court held that the ingredients of public nuisance were not met, as no law or regulation was violated, the activity was common and licensed, and no neighborhood residents complained. Furthermore, the court held that an aggrieved party who has already invoked revisional jurisdiction cannot subsequently maintain an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the operation of a tea-shop using kerosene oil stoves inside the premises constitute a public nuisance under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be maintained after the dismissal of a revision application by the Sessions Court?
  • What are the essential legal requirements to establish a public nuisance in connection with a trade or occupation under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Zafar And Associates, [M/s.] Karachi. vs The Commissioner Of Income TaxPTCL 1990 CL. 192 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Zafar alias Chandi vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 885 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-05Read full judgment →
• Zafar Ali vs The State1990 SCMR 595 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-17
  murderculpable homicidegrave and sudden provocationfirearm injurycriminal appealsentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Zafar Ali, was convicted by the Sessions Court for the murder of Shahra Khan under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving a sentence of life imprisonment and a fine. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, dismissing both the appellant's appeal and the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically to determine whether the appellant's actions, given the preceding exchange of abuses, warranted the application of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which would reduce the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I. Upon review, the Court found that the appellant had approached the deceased's home armed with a gun and fired at an unarmed victim, negating any claim of self-defense or sudden provocation. The Court held that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were maintained, as the evidence established the appellant's culpability beyond doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exchange of abuses immediately preceding a fatal shooting constitute sufficient provocation to invoke Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of Exception I to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when they approach the victim's home armed with a firearm?
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• Yousaf Masih and anothers vs The State1990 MLD 790 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-10Read full judgment →
• Yousaf Khan and others vs Dost Muhammad1990 SCMR 873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  declaration of titlerecovery of possessionadverse possessionburden of prooffrivolous litigationspecial costsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of concurrent findings of the lower courts and the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession regarding the suit-land. The core legal question is whether the petitioners established their title and whether the suit was barred by previous litigation and adverse possession. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to prove a better title on the strength of their own case, that adverse possession by the defendant's predecessor was established, and that the petition was devoid of merit. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of their own case and not on any weakness in the defense, and that adverse possession can mature into full title.

  Questions settled

  • Must a plaintiff succeed on the strength of their own case rather than upon any weakness in the defense?
  • Can adverse possession for the required number of years give full title to the property?
  • Are courts justified in awarding special costs when plaintiffs launch upon frivolous litigation?
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• Younus Khan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1719 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-31Read full judgment →
• Yar Muhammad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1736 · Sindh High Court · 1990-04-01
  contempt of courtsubordinate court jurisdictionjudicial misconductfreedom of the presscriminal revisionSection 228 PPCcontempt of court act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges the conviction of a newspaper reporter by a Civil Judge for contempt of court regarding a published news item. The core legal question was whether a subordinate court possesses the jurisdiction to convict a person for contempt of court for publishing a news report alleging judicial misconduct, and whether the cited statutory provisions were applicable. The High Court held that the conviction was illegal and without jurisdiction. The Court clarified that subordinate courts only have jurisdiction to punish for contempt under Section 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically when an insult or interruption occurs in the face of the court during judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Contempt of Court Act 1976 does not grant subordinate courts general jurisdiction to punish for contempt of this nature, as such powers are reserved for the High Court and Supreme Court. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, establishing that subordinate courts cannot assume jurisdiction for contempt outside the narrow scope of Section 228, Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does a subordinate court have the jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court for the publication of a news item?
  • Under what circumstances can a subordinate court punish an individual for contempt of court?
  • Is the publication of a report regarding a complaint filed against a judge considered contempt of court?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqoob Khan and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 297 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-04Read full judgment →
• Yameen Kumhar vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 275 · Sindh High Court · 1990-02-28
  recovery of armsSection 103 Cr.P.C.mashircriminal appealpolice investigationappreciation of evidenceillegal recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under the Pakistan Arms Ordinance 1965 for the recovery of illegal arms. The core legal question concerns the validity of the recovery and the mandatory application of Section 103, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, regarding the requirement of independent, local witnesses (mashirs). The High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery beyond reasonable doubt. The court established that while Section 103 technically applies to Chapter VII searches, it embodies a fundamental rule of prudence and justice applicable to all police recoveries during investigations to prevent fabrication. The court ruled that police officers cannot bypass this requirement based on mere convenience. Because the investigating officer had pre-procured the mashirs rather than utilizing independent local witnesses, and because the finger-print evidence was unreliable given the disputed recovery, the prosecution's case was deemed insufficient. The judgment emphasizes that recovery witnesses must be independent, respectable, and preferably from the locality, and any deviation requires valid justification by the prosecution.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to recoveries made by police during the investigation of a crime?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the testimony of an investigating officer when the recovery witnesses were pre-procured?
  • Does the failure to associate local witnesses during a recovery render the recovery evidence unreliable?
  • Is the finger-print expert's report sufficient to prove recovery if the recovery itself is disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Wreshmeen vs The State1990 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-15
  murdercriminal appealocular testimonymedical evidence conflictcorroborationrecovery of weaponabscondencebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Anjar Khan. The core legal question was whether the recovery of the weapon and the alleged abscondence of the appellant constituted sufficient corroboration of the tainted ocular evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, holding that the ocular evidence was in direct conflict with the medical evidence and that the circumstantial evidence regarding the joint recovery of the gun four days after arrest and the unproven abscondence were highly unsatisfactory and could not form the basis of a conviction on a capital charge. The key legal principle laid down is that tainted ocular testimony in conflict with medical evidence requires strong, independent, and unimpeachable corroborative circumstances, and weak recoveries or unproven abscondence cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon and alleged abscondence can form sufficient corroboration of tainted ocular evidence in a murder case?
  • Can a conviction on a capital charge be sustained when the eyewitness account is in direct conflict with the medical evidence?
  • Does a joint recovery of a firearm from a shared premises several days after arrest sufficiently connect an accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Workers Union C.Ba. (Regd.), Shakarganj Mills, Jhang vs Shakarganj1990 PLC 686 · Labour Appellate Tribunal
  industrial relationsdemand noticesettlementtermination of settlementlabour disputecollective bargaining agent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order passed by the Punjab Labour Court accepting a grievance petition under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which challenged a fresh demand notice involving financial implications issued by the appellant union. The core legal question was whether a fresh demand notice could be legally served and negotiated without prior service of a termination notice under section 40(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, while a previous settlement had expired by efflux of time. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that upon the expiry of the agreed period, the settlement comes to an end, and a subsequent demand notice itself serves the purpose of a termination notice, making the demands negotiable. The key principle laid down is that the expiry of a settlement's fixed period terminates the settlement, and a fresh demand notice issued thereafter is legally valid and negotiable even in the absence of a formal prior notice of termination.

  Questions settled

  • Does a settlement continue indefinitely after the expiry of the period for which it was made?
  • Can a fresh demand notice involving financial implications be served without a prior notice terminating the previous settlement under section 40(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does a demand notice served after the expiry of the period fixed in a settlement serve the purpose of a termination notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Women Christian Hospital vs Mst. Skina Yonis1990 PLC 371 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1990-03-26Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore vs Major Ata Muhammad Khan and 8 others1990 SCMR 1341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-30
  land acquisitioncompetency of appealcompensationleave to appealreference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Regular First Appeal by the High Court concerning land acquisition. Land was acquired for the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), and the Land Acquisition Collector made an award. While WAPDA did not file objections or an appeal, the Province of West Pakistan filed a reference and subsequently an appeal against the District Judge's judgment upholding the compensation. The High Court dismissed the appeal as incompetent, holding that the Province was not affected by the award or judgment since the compensation was payable by WAPDA, relying on Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer (PLD 1987 SC 487). Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the High Court misconstrued the precedent and that the view taken therein was subject to re-examination by a larger bench. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to be heard alongside the pending appeals raising the same question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Province can maintain an appeal against a land acquisition award and reference judgment when the compensation is payable by WAPDA and WAPDA itself did not object or appeal?
  • Does the rule in Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer bar an appeal by the Province under Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 under such circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation vs Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi and 4 othersPTCL 1990 CL. 735 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Wazir Ahmad vs S.H.O. Police Station, Mehboob Kalhoro and others1990 P Cr. L J 2006 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26
  registration of FIRcognizable offenceconstitutional petitionalternative remedyclean handspolice inactionprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was filed seeking a direction to the S.H.O. to register a First Information Report (F.I.R.) regarding alleged cognizable offences of abduction, wrongful confinement, and looting committed by a police party. The core legal question was whether a police officer is mandatorily bound to register an F.I.R. upon information of a cognizable offence, and whether constitutional jurisdiction should be invoked when alternate remedies exist or when the petitioner lacks clean hands. The Sindh High Court held that the provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are mandatory, obligating a police officer to register an F.I.R. upon disclosure of a cognizable offence without judging its truthfulness. However, the court dismissed the petition in limine, establishing that writ relief is discretionary and will be denied where the petitioner makes contradictory statements, fails to approach the court with clean hands, or has an adequate alternate remedy through a direct private complaint before a Magistrate under Section 190 read with sections 200 to 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly where evidence is already available with the complainant.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a police officer to register an F.I.R. under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when information discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Can a police officer refuse to record an F.I.R. on the ground that the police suspect the information is false?
  • Does the availability of an alternate remedy under sections 190 and 200 to 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Will a constitutional petition be dismissed if the petitioner makes contradictory statements and fails to approach the court with clean hands?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Autiiority and another vs Abdul Rashid1990 SCMR 1513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-06
  service tribunaldeputationoverstayreinstatementback benefitscondonation of delayforeign service contribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal arising from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which accepted an employee's appeal for reinstatement into service without back benefits. The core legal question concerned whether an employee of WAPDA who overstayed a deputation period abroad could be denied reinstatement after depositing the requisite foreign service contributions and dues, and whether the Supreme Court could interfere with the Service Tribunal's discretion to condone delay. The Supreme Court held that the employee's deposit of foreign service contributions and dues condoned his overstaying, and that the discretionary condonation of delay by the Tribunal could not be interfered with. The Court established that overstaying foreign deputation stands condoned upon the clearance of required departmental contributions, and that the Supreme Court will not disturb a Service Tribunal's exercise of discretion regarding the condonation of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of required foreign service contributions condone an employee's overstaying on deputation?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the Service Tribunal's discretion in condoning delay?
  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement when they are responsible for overstaying their foreign service assignment without permission?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and another vs Sardar Abdul Aziz and anothers1990 PLD Azad J&K 24 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-10Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority and others vs S.M. Saleem1990 PLC 588 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-04Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority and others vs Munir Ahmad1990 SCMR 961 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-24
  service tribunalremoval from serviceretirementappellate jurisdictionquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents, former employees of WAPDA, were removed from service under Section 17(1A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. On appeal, the Federal Service Tribunal upheld that there were sufficient grounds for action but converted the removal orders into retirement orders. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, upon finding valid grounds for action under Section 17(1A), possesses the jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the Authority regarding the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate authority, is fully competent to examine both the material justifying the action and the appropriateness of the specific order made, as no restriction is placed on its competency by the statute. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can interfere with the nature of the order passed by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1A)?
  • Does the Water and Power Development Authority Act restrict the appellate competency of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the quantum of punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority and anothers vs Ghulam1990 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-27
  service lawnatural justiceright of hearingprovisional promotionseniority disputeadministrative lawremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decision by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the reversion of a Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) employee. The respondent had been promoted to Line Superintendent-II in 1980, but was subsequently reverted to his previous position following representations by colleagues claiming seniority. The Tribunal initially ruled in the respondent's favor, holding that he was entitled to a hearing before his promotion was reversed. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, WAPDA argued that the promotion was provisional, based on a mistaken entry in the respondent's service record regarding his initial appointment date, and that the reversion was a necessary correction of seniority. The Supreme Court observed that the matter involved factual disputes that required proper adjudication. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeal by consent, directing the concerned authority to pass fresh orders after affording the respondent and other affected parties an opportunity of hearing. The Court held that when an administrative order is based on disputed factual assumptions, the principles of natural justice require that the affected party be heard before a final decision is made.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employee entitled to a hearing before a provisional promotion is reversed due to a correction in seniority?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require an opportunity of hearing when an administrative authority acts on disputed factual assumptions regarding an employee's service record?
  Read full judgment →
• Water and Power Development Authority and 2 others vs Pak Sartaj1990 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  interim orderstay of recoveryconstitutional limitationdisconnection of electricityfurnishing of securityleave to appealArticle 199
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against an interim order of the High Court passed in a constitutional writ petition concerning the respondent's electricity bill liability and subsequent disconnection. The core legal question raised before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in directing the restoration of the respondent's electric supply and extending interim relief despite the constitutional bar under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the limited duration and continuance of stay orders. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court complied with the constitutional limitations on interim orders. In the interim, treating the matter as a fresh application for stay, the Supreme Court directed the respondent to furnish fresh adequate security within one month, failing which WAPDA would be entitled to disconnect the electric supply and pursue recovery of the disputed amount alongside market profits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can extend an interim stay order beyond the constitutional time limits prescribed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Whether restoration of disconnected electricity supply can be ordered as interim relief pending the determination of the validity of an expired stay order?
  • Under what terms and conditions may the Supreme Court grant interim protection regarding disputed electricity bills during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Wasi Zafar vs Speaker Provincial Assembly1990 PLD Lahore 401 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-17
  constitutional petitionprovincial assemblybudgetary procedurejudicial reviewinternal proceedingsparliamentary privilegegovernor's powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of the summoning of the Punjab Provincial Assembly, the simultaneous presentation of the Annual and Supplementary Budgets, and the Speaker's allocation of time for budget discussion. The petitioner argued that the Governor lacked authority to change the time of a summoned meeting, that presenting two budgets in one session violated the constitutional scheme, and that the time allocated for discussion was insufficient. The Court held that the Governor's power to summon the Assembly includes the authority to fix and subsequently change the time of the meeting, as this does not constitute an adjournment or postponement. Regarding the budget, the Court found no constitutional prohibition against presenting Annual and Supplementary Budgets in the same session, provided that statutory requirements for discussion and voting are met. Crucially, the Court affirmed that under Articles 69 and 127 of the Constitution, internal proceedings and procedural irregularities within the Assembly are immune from judicial scrutiny, as the legislature possesses plenary powers to regulate its own business and conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Governor have the authority to change the time of a meeting of the Provincial Assembly after it has been summoned?
  • Can the Annual Budget and the Supplementary Budget be presented to the Provincial Assembly in the same session?
  • Are the internal proceedings and procedural irregularities of the Provincial Assembly subject to judicial scrutiny by the High Court?
  • Does the presentation of two separate budgets in one session violate the constitutional scheme of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Ward Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 566 · Lahore High Court · 1965-03-01Read full judgment →
• War Yam Etc. vs CSC Etc.K.L.R. 1990 Revenue Case 112 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-30Read full judgment →
• WAPDA vs Muhammad Sabir1990 SCMR 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  Service TribunalDepartmental appealExhaustion of remediesDismissal from serviceJurisdictionLeave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondent, an Assistant Lineman, was dismissed from service for unauthorized absence. After his grievance petition was returned by the Labour Court for lack of jurisdiction, he approached the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the finding of misconduct but mitigated the penalty from dismissal to the stoppage of three increments. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's appeal given that he had failed to exhaust the departmental appellate remedy available against the Executive Engineer's dismissal order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the applicability of the statutory bar contained in the Service Tribunals Act, specifically regarding the requirement to exhaust departmental remedies before approaching the Tribunal. The Court held that the matter requires further consideration to determine if the Tribunal's intervention was legally competent under the governing statute, thereby setting the stage for interpreting the mandatory nature of departmental appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal if the aggrieved employee failed to exhaust the departmental appellate remedy?
  • Is the filing of a departmental appeal a mandatory prerequisite under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 before approaching the Federal Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA vs Muhammad Farid and others1990 SCMR 98 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-16
  locus standiland acquisitionmaintainability of appealconstitutional interpretationprecedentreference to larger bench
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of appeals filed by WAPDA against orders of the Civil Court regarding land acquisition. The preliminary objection raised was that the appellants lacked locus standi to appeal, citing previous Supreme Court precedents (Pir Khan and Behram Khan) which established that an order of a Civil Court on a reference from a Land Acquisition Collector is a substitutive order, making the Collector's award final and unchallengeable by parties lacking an express statutory right of appeal. The appellants, represented by the Attorney-General, argued that these precedents overlooked constitutional provisions, specifically Articles 149, 152, and 173 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which empower the Federal Government to acquire land and exercise executive authority, thereby granting them standing as interested parties rather than strangers to the proceedings. The Court acknowledged that this constitutional argument required further examination. However, because the conflicting precedents were established by a three-judge Bench and upheld by a five-judge Bench, the Court held that it lacked the jurisdiction to vary or overrule them, necessitating the matter be referred to a larger seven-judge Bench for final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have locus standi to file an appeal against a Civil Court order regarding a land acquisition reference?
  • Can a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court overrule a previous judgment upheld by a five-judge Bench?
  • Does the executive authority of the Federation under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 confer a right of appeal in land acquisition proceedings despite the finality of the Collector's award?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA vs Abdul Sattar and 2 others Muhammad Iqbal Butt1990 SCMR 934 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-02
  service lawappellate jurisdictiontermination of servicepenalty substitutionFederal Service Tribunaladministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against a decision of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents, employees of the Authority, had their services terminated under Section 17(1-A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. While the Tribunal acknowledged that sufficient material existed to justify the Authority's action against the respondents, it exercised its appellate discretion to substitute the orders of removal with orders of retirement, citing the respondents' length of service. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal, having found the Authority's action justified, possessed the power to interfere with or modify the penalty imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate forum, is not limited to merely reviewing the sufficiency of material supporting an order. It affirmed that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to substitute an order of the Authority with one it deems more appropriate in suitable cases. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the Tribunal's authority to modify administrative penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to substitute an order of removal with an order of retirement if it finds the Authority's action was supported by material?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal limited to only reviewing whether an administrative order was supported by material, or can it modify the penalty?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal interfere with the orders made by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1-A)?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through Superintending Engineer, Sheikhupura and another vs Ch.1990 PLC 618 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1980-01-26Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through Superintending Engineer (E) vs Muhammad Ayub and another1990 SCMR 384 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-21
  suspension periodforfeiture of paysubsistence grantservice tribunalWAPDA employeesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which partly allowed the respondents' appeal by setting aside the forfeiture of pay for the suspension period while maintaining the stoppage of one annual increment under the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978. The core legal question concerns whether the forfeiture of pay or emoluments during a period of suspension is permissible as a punishment under the applicable rules, and the legal nature of subsistence grants, allowances, and amenities admissible to employees under suspension as outlined in official instructions. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions involved regarding the nature of suspension benefits and whether their regulation constitutes a punishment are of general public importance requiring detailed examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 permit the forfeiture of pay for a suspension period as a punishment?
  • What is the nature of a subsistence grant and allowances allowed to an official during the period of suspension?
  • Does the adherence to conditions governing payment and amenities during suspension involve the concept of punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• WAPDA through its Chairman and 3 others vs Khadim Ali1990 MLD 1874 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-05-21Read full judgment →
• WAPDA and anothers vs Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haque Khan Khattak and Company1990 PLD Supreme Court 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-29
  arbitration awardextension of timeestoppelwaiverunstamped agreementadmissibility of evidencecross-objectionsinterest on decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over a construction contract where the arbitrator issued an award after the statutory four-month period. The appellants challenged the award on three grounds: that it was issued out of time; that the underlying contract containing the arbitration clause was unstamped and thus inadmissible; and that the respondents' cross-objections regarding the non-award of interest were incompetent under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. It held that the statutory four-month period under Condition 3 of the First Schedule is an implied term of the arbitration agreement and can be waived by the conduct of the parties. By participating in the proceedings without objection, the appellants were estopped from challenging the award's validity on that ground. Furthermore, under Sections 35 and 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899, an unstamped agreement is not invalid, and its admissibility cannot be questioned once admitted. Finally, the Court ruled that appellate courts possess ample power under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC to award interest even in the absence of a formal competent appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the statutory four-month period for making an arbitration award be waived by the conduct of the parties?
  • Does the failure to stamp an arbitration agreement render the agreement invalid or merely inadmissible in evidence?
  • Can an appellate court award interest on a decretal amount under Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC if the trial court failed to do so and the objection was raised via cross-objections?
  Read full judgment →
• Walt Dad vs Noor Ahmed and 2 others1990 SCMR 1279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-07
  sudden quarrelpremeditationmotiveocular evidenceappellate interferencecriminal appealleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that altered the convictions of the respondents in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondents murdered the deceased following a long-standing enmity. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court, however, disbelieved the motive due to the significant time lapse since the alleged prior incident and concluded that the incident arose from a sudden, unpremeditated quarrel. Consequently, the High Court altered the conviction of the primary accused to Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and reduced the sentence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence regarding motive and the nature of the offense. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment was neither perverse nor capricious, noting the lack of repeated blows and the absence of premeditation. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts may re-evaluate evidence to determine if an act constitutes a sudden fight rather than premeditated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be altered to Section 304, Part II, when the evidence suggests a sudden quarrel without premeditation?
  • Is the absence of repeated blows a relevant factor in determining the intention to kill?
  • Does a long-standing enmity, without recent corroborating criminal acts, necessarily establish a motive for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad vs Muhammad Yar and 5 others1990 PLD Lahore 120 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-23Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad And 4 Others vs Maqbool Elahi And 4 Other1990 CLC 184 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-06-04Read full judgment →
• Wali Muhammad and 10 others vs District Judge/Special Tribunal, Dera1990 MLD 815 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-11-29Read full judgment →
• Walayat Hussain vs Jalal Din and 3 others1990 MLD 171 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-11-22Read full judgment →
• Walayat Hussain Shah vs Manga1990 CLC 191 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-05-09Read full judgment →
• Wajid Ali vs The Superintendent of Police & OtherK.L.R 1990 Labour & Service Cases 126 · Sindh Service Tribunal · 1989-01-10Read full judgment →
• Wahid Bakhsh and another through Legal Heirss vs Ghulam Muhammad1990 PLD Lahore 193 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-15
  declaratory suitlimitation periodconsolidation of holdingsrevenue record entriesconsequential reliefpossessionadverse denial
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular second appeal arises from a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief for possession, wherein the appellants challenged revenue record entries from 1921-22 and subsequent consolidation proceedings finalized on June 30, 1955. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs, but the first appellate court reversed it, holding the suit to be barred by time. The core legal question was whether a suit for declaration of title and consequential possession based on erroneous revenue entries and consolidation proceedings is governed by Article 120 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act. The Lahore High Court held that a suit primarily seeking a declaration of title—with possession sought merely as a consequential relief to remove the hurdle of adverse revenue entries and consolidation schemes—falls under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, providing a limitation period of six years from the date the right to sue accrues or when title is openly denied and put in jeopardy. The court laid down that limitation starts from the date of open denial of rights, such as the finalization of a consolidation scheme, and a plaintiff cannot bypass the six-year limitation for declaratory suits by invoking Article 144.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for declaration of title with consequential relief of possession based on erroneous revenue entries is governed by Article 120 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act?
  • When does the limitation period commence for filing a declaratory suit challenging adverse entries in the revenue record and consolidation proceedings?
  • Can a plaintiff claim the 12-year limitation period under Article 144 of the Limitation Act when the primary relief sought is a declaration to remove the hurdle of standing revenue records and consolidation schemes?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheeduddin vs Government of the Punjab1990 PLC (C.S.) 702 · Administrative Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• Waheed Asghar vs Province of Punjab and others1990 SCMR 1512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-29
  expunction of remarksjudicial observationsservice careerdepartmental proceedingsleave to appealfirst impressionnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Electric Inspector, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, requesting the expunction of adverse remarks made against him in a previous constitutional petition to which he was not a party. The petitioner argued that these remarks, which suggested he had instigated the petition for ulterior motives, were uncalled for, issued without notice, and had prejudiced his service career by triggering departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court examined whether the remarks warranted expunction. The Court held that the remarks were merely tentative observations made at the stage of first impression during the dismissal of the petition in limine and did not constitute a positive finding of misconduct against the petitioner. Consequently, the Court determined that no case for expunction was made out, as departmental proceedings must be decided on their own merits based on independent evidence rather than on tentative judicial observations. Leave to appeal was refused, establishing that judicial remarks of a tentative nature, lacking a definitive finding, do not provide grounds for expunction or prejudice administrative inquiries.

  Questions settled

  • Can judicial remarks of a tentative nature, made without a positive finding, be expunged?
  • Does an observation made in a judgment to which a person is not a party constitute a binding finding of fact?
  • Should departmental proceedings be influenced by tentative judicial remarks made in collateral proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Zahoor Iqbal and others vs The State1990 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-12
  suspension of sentenceleave to appealcriminal appealrigorous imprisonmentappellate court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' request for the suspension of their sentences. The petitioners had been convicted and sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine, by the Punjab Special Court for offences under sections 392 and 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to suspend the sentences pending the final adjudication of the petitioners' appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked substance, noting that no valid grounds were presented to warrant the suspension of the sentences. The Court further clarified that the legal question regarding the applicability of section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to the petitioners' case pertains to the merits of the conviction and must be debated and adjudicated upon by the appellate court during the hearing of the main appeal. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the question of the applicability of Section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constitute a valid ground for the suspension of a sentence pending appeal?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to adjudicate on the merits of a conviction during a petition for leave to appeal against an order refusing the suspension of a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Waheed alias Siraj vs The State1990 MLD 1536 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-26Read full judgment →
• Waheed Ahmed Khan vs Karachi Transport Corporation and others1990 PLC 145 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-29Read full judgment →
• Waheed Ahmad And Others vs Additional Commissioner1990 CLC 220 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-26
  constitutional petitionres judicatabinding precedentsettlement schemefraudulent misrepresentationreview applicationinherent powerswithdrawal of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter arises from the fourth round of litigation concerning the transfer of the Dawn Hotel in Murree under settlement laws, specifically examining whether an Additional Commissioner could reopen and alter property entitlement rights that had already been conclusively settled by concurrent decisions of the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions involved the finality of prior judicial determinations, the binding nature of apex court precedents, and technical objections regarding the review of orders dismissed in limine and the withdrawal of petitions. The Lahore High Court held that once a matter regarding property entitlement is finally adjudicated up to the Supreme Court, the decision is binding under Article 189 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, and subordinate authorities have no jurisdiction to reopen or bypass it. The Court laid down the principle that subordinate tribunals and authorities cannot review or reopen concluded controversies through suppression of facts, that courts possess inherent powers to recall orders passed without jurisdiction or obtained by fraud, and that withdrawing a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court does not bar a party from pursuing other competent legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Additional Commissioner or Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction to reopen a property transfer dispute that has been finally adjudicated by the High Court and the Supreme Court?
  • Is a prior notice mandatory under Order XLVII Rule 4(2)(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a court recalls an order that dismissed a petition in limine?
  • Does a court possess inherent powers to recall its previous order without notice if the order suffers from patent illegality or was obtained through fraud?
  • Does the withdrawal of a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court preclude a party from seeking remedies through other competent proceedings?
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• Vice-President and Zonal Chief, Habib Bank Limited, Mandi Bahauddin1990 PLC 695 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Vera and others vs Messrs Kazi and Kazi Ltd. and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 435 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  dock workersstevedoresrotation systemretainershipEducation Cesssuperannuationtermination of employmentstatutory scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from disputes involving Karachi Port stevedores, the Karachi Dock Labour Board, and registered dock workers (including Tindals and Serangs). Following the introduction of a statutory 'Rotation System' under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1974 and the Karachi Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1973, the traditional permanent retainership relationship between stevedores and Tindals/Serangs was abolished. The Court held that because the new system severed the direct, permanent employment relationship, stevedores were no longer obliged to pay monthly retainership fees. Furthermore, the Court determined that the casual, rotational nature of dock labour meant that dock workers could not be considered 'workers' of either the individual stevedores or the Board for the purposes of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance 1972; thus, the levy of the Education Cess on stevedores was illegal. Finally, the Court ruled that since the 1973 Scheme did not explicitly empower the Board to fix a retirement age, its resolution retiring workers at age 60 was ultra vires.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the introduction of a statutory rotational gang system for dock workers automatically terminates the pre-existing permanent retainership relationship between stevedores and Tindals/Serangs?
  • Are casual dock workers, allocated on a rotational basis by a statutory board, considered 'workers' of individual stevedoring companies for the purposes of the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance 1972?
  • Can a statutory body like the Karachi Dock Labour Board levy an Education Cess on employers when the relationship does not fit the standard employer-worker definition under the relevant tax statute?
  • Does a statutory dock labour board have the implied power to fix an age of superannuation and retire registered workers in the absence of an express provision in the governing scheme?
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• Vera and others vs Messrs Kazi and Kazi Ltd. and others1990 PLC 159 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-18
  dock workersstevedoreseducation cessindustrial relationssuperannuationstatutory interpretationemployer-employee relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses multiple appeals concerning the legal status of dock workers, the liability for Education Cess, and the retirement age of dock workers under the Karachi Port system. The Court examined whether the introduction of the Dock Labour Board and the gang-rotation system severed the employment relationship between Stevedores and Tindals/Serangs. The Court held that the new system effectively terminated the previous permanent employment relationship, meaning Stevedores are no longer obligated to pay retainership fees. Regarding the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972, the Court ruled that the casual, rotational nature of dock work does not constitute an employer-employee relationship contemplated by the Ordinance; thus, Stevedores are not liable for the Education Cess. Finally, the Court determined that the Dock Labour Board lacks the statutory authority under the Karachi Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1973, to fix a mandatory retirement age for dock workers, as no such power is explicitly granted. The principle established is that statutory boards possess only those powers expressly conferred by their governing schemes, and casual rotational labor does not satisfy the definition of worker under the Education Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of the gang-rotation system under the Dock Labour Board terminate the permanent employment relationship between Stevedores and Tindals/Serangs?
  • Are Stevedores liable to pay Education Cess under the Workers' Children (Education) Ordinance, 1972, for dock workers engaged on a rotational basis?
  • Does the Dock Labour Board possess the statutory authority to fix a mandatory retirement age for registered dock workers?
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• Vahula Bhushan alias Vehuna Krishnan vs State of Tamil Nadu1990 MLD 943 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-10-31Read full judgment →
• Usman Sarwar (Minor) And Others vs Ghulam Fatimah And Other1990 CLC 756 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · -Read full judgment →
• Usman Ltd vs The Collector of Customs (Appraisement) Customs1990 PLD Quetta 1 · Balochistan High Court · 1989-09-12
  Customs DutySurchargeIqra SurchargeExemption NotificationLegislative CompetencePith and SubstanceConstitutional PetitionFederal Legislative ListOrdinance Lapse
  Summary & questions settled

  Constitutional petitions were filed challenging the validity and vires of the levy of 'surcharge' under Section 2 of the Finance Ordinance, 1982 and 'Iqra surcharge' under Section 5 of the Finance Act, 1985. The petitioners, having imported textile machinery, were granted customs duty exemption under relevant SRO notifications but were demanded to pay the surcharges as additional customs duty. The core questions were whether the Federal Legislature possessed legislative competence to enact these surcharges, whether general customs duty exemption notifications applied to them, whether earmarking funds for education invalidated the tax under the pith and substance doctrine, and whether the Finance Ordinance, 1982 had lapsed under Article 89(2) of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the surcharges constituted additional customs duties falling squarely within the Federal Legislative List. The Court ruled that express provisions in special finance statutes overriding exemptions prevail over general customs exemptions, that earmarking tax revenues does not alter the essential character of taxation, and that Ordinances promulgated under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 were protected under Article 270-A and did not lapse under Article 89.

  Questions settled

  • Does an exemption notification issued under Section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 automatically apply to surcharges levied as additional customs duty under special finance enactments?
  • Does the earmarking of tax proceeds for a specific purpose like education invalidate a federal levy under the doctrine of pith and substance?
  • Does a presidential Ordinance promulgated under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 lapse under Article 89(2) of the Constitution if not laid before the National Assembly within four months of its revival?
  • Is the Federal Legislature competent to levy additional customs duties by way of surcharge and Iqra surcharge under the Federal Legislative List?
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• Usman Limited. vs The Collector Of Customs (Appraisement), Quetta And AnotherPTCL 1990 CL. 525 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• United Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Sartaj Industries through Qaisar Iqbal, Managing Partner and 6 others1990 PLD Lahore 99 · Lahore High Court · 1989-07-04
  banking recoveryleave to defendpromissory notemortgage deedlimitation periodpenal interestjuristic entitynegotiable instrument
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was instituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, by United Bank Ltd. against Sartaj Industries and others for the recovery of a loan. The defendants sought leave to defend the suit, challenging the limitation period, the enforceability of a mortgage deed across different bank branches, the validity of a promissory note signed in blank, and the legality of penal interest. The Court dismissed the application for leave to defend, holding that no triable issues existed. It ruled that the suit was within the twelve-year limitation period under Article 132 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court established that a mortgage executed in favor of a bank as a juristic entity remains enforceable by the bank regardless of which specific branch handles the transaction. Furthermore, it affirmed that a promissory note signed in blank is valid and enforceable under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provided it is completed within a reasonable time. Finally, the Court emphasized that allegations of fraud must be pleaded with specific particulars as required by Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mortgage executed in favor of a bank as a juristic entity be enforced by a branch other than the one named in the deed?
  • Is a promissory note signed in blank valid and enforceable under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?
  • What is the limitation period for a suit based on a mortgage deed?
  • Does a vague allegation of fraud without specific particulars satisfy the requirements of Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
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• United Bank Ltd vs Messrs S. G. Rauf and Company and 2 others1990 PLD Karachi 312 · Sindh High Court · 1990-03-04
  leave to defendsummary suitlimitation periodservice of summonsrefusal of registered postbanking recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an application for leave to defend a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alongside a preliminary objection raised by the plaintiff that the application was barred by limitation having been filed beyond the statutory ten-day period from the service of summons. The core legal question is whether the application for leave to defend was time-barred, considering multiple modes of service including newspaper publication, registered post with acknowledgment due, and bailiff service, and whether a postal endorsement of refusal constitutes valid service. The court held that the defendants were validly served by registered post on the date of postal endorsement of refusal, making the application for leave to defend clearly time-barred in the absence of any application for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act 1908. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was dismissed and a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The key principle laid down is that a postal endorsement of refusal of summons sent by registered post constitutes prima facie proof of service, and limitation for filing an application for leave to defend runs from such effective service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for leave to defend filed beyond ten days of the service of summons is barred by limitation?
  • Does a postal endorsement of refusal of a registered post summon constitute prima facie proof of service under the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Can a court entertain an application for leave to defend filed out of time without a formal application for condonation of delay under the Limitation Act?
  • What is the legal effect of the dismissal of an application for leave to defend in a summary recovery suit?
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• United Bank Limited, D.I. Khan Through Manager vs Mst. Jinda Bibi And 81990 CLC 1901 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-01-24Read full judgment →
• United Bank Limited /M/s. J. vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Central ZonePTCL 1990 CL. 716 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →