Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Bashir And 7 Others vs Allah Rakha And Another1990 CLC 1715 · Lahore High Court · 1990-06-20
  mortgage redemptionguardian ad-litempreliminary decreecivil revisionres judicataprocedural irregularitymortgage suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an appellate decree that affirmed a trial court's judgment granting a suit for redemption of a mortgage and recovery of possession. The petitioners contended that the trial court failed to properly appoint a guardian ad-litem for a minor defendant and that the absence of a preliminary decree violated the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The court held that the appointment of the Court Reader as guardian ad-litem was procedurally valid given the circumstances and caused no prejudice. Furthermore, the court determined that a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not an absolute requirement in every mortgage suit, particularly where the facts do not necessitate the specific inquiry contemplated by the rule. However, the court found the decree defective for failing to incorporate the requirements of Order XXXIV, Rule 7(c), Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding document delivery and re-conveyance. Consequently, the revision was allowed solely to remit the case for the rectification of the decree's form to ensure compliance with statutory procedural requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Is a preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory in every mortgage redemption suit?
  • Can a court appoint its Reader as a guardian ad-litem for a minor defendant when other relatives refuse the responsibility?
  • Does the failure to include provisions for document delivery and re-conveyance in a redemption decree violate Order XXXIV, Rule 7(c), Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Bashir and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 388 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-11-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Banaras vs The Superintendent of Police, Attock and 31990 SCMR 1551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-12
  leave to appealrestoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutiongeneral adjournmentservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal refusing to restore the petitioner's service appeal, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question revolves around whether the general adjournment obtained by the petitioner's counsel on the ground of serious illness implied the adjournment of all his cases, rendering the fixing of the appeal for hearing improper without recalling the general adjournment order, and whether the absence of the petitioner, his junior, or clerk was justified under such circumstances. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding the effect of a general adjournment and the necessity of separate explanations for the absence of the party or juniors require detailed examination. The Court laid down that an order granting a general adjournment to counsel prima facie covers the fixing of cases during that period unless formally recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general adjournment granted to a counsel on the ground of illness imply the adjournment of all his cases during that period?
  • Can a service appeal be fixed for hearing during an active general adjournment granted to the counsel without recalling the said order?
  • Is it necessary to separately explain the absence of a party, junior counsel, or clerk when the lead counsel's absence is already excused due to a general adjournment?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh vs The State1990 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  leave to appealculpable homicideself-defenceconvictioncriminal appealappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Bakhsh against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld his conviction and sentence for culpable homicide. The petitioner, along with co-accused, was originally tried for murder and attempted murder. While the trial court acquitted one co-accused and convicted the others, the petitioner remained the sole appellant before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions addressed were whether the petitioner's plea of self-defence was substantiated and whether his conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code was legally sound or should have been reduced to Section 325. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate the plea of self-defence, and the prosecution's case was proven. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the conviction should be altered to Section 325, finding no evidentiary basis for such a reduction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the conviction was in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of self-defence can be accepted when it is not substantiated by evidence or the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when the defence fails to prove circumstances warranting a reduction to Section 325?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a plea of self-defence when the prosecution case is proven to the hilt?
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• Muhammad Bakhsh vs Mst. Bakhtan and others1990 PLD Lahore 22 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh and another vs Zila Council, Jhang1990 PLC 538 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1987-10-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim vs Faqir Bakhsh and 23 others1990 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-02
  inheritanceself-acquired propertycustom versus shariatmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which set aside the appellate court's decree and restored the trial court's dismissal of a suit for possession through inheritance. The petitioner sought possession of property measuring 20 kanals 4 marlas originally belonging to the last male owner, Bakhshu. The primary question before the court involved determining whether the parties were governed by custom or by the law of Shariat in matters of succession, particularly regarding the share of a daughter, Mst. Hori, in self-acquired property. Upon examining the documentary evidence, including mutations, the Supreme Court observed that the parties were governed by Shariat rather than custom. Holding that the legal points involved are of public importance requiring further consideration by the Court, leave to appeal was granted subject to questions of limitation, requiring the appeal to be made ready on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the parties are governed by custom or by the law of Shariat in matters of succession to self-acquired property?
  • Is a daughter entitled to inherit her share from the self-acquired property of the last male owner under Shariat?
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• Muhammad Azhar vs General Manager (Operation), Power, WAPDA1990 PLD Lahore 352 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-24
  constitutional petitiondisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunal jurisdictionfunctus officioshow-cause noticepast and closed transactionrevisional powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an Executive Engineer serving with WAPDA, challenging a final show-cause notice and an office order seeking to reopen concluded disciplinary proceedings against him. The core legal question was whether the General Manager had the authority to reopen a closed disciplinary matter after seven years, and whether the High Court's jurisdiction was barred by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court held that the General Manager lacked any review or revision powers under the relevant rules, having become functus officio once the penalty was executed and accepted, making the matter a past and closed transaction. Furthermore, because no appeal lay before the Federal Service Tribunal against a mere show-cause notice prior to any final order, the constitutional bar under Article 212 did not operate to oust the High Court's jurisdiction. The court laid down the principle that where disciplinary proceedings are patently without jurisdiction and no appeal is competent before the Service Tribunal against an interlocutory notice, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court can be validly invoked.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the General Manager has the power to review or revise an earlier concluded disciplinary order in the absence of statutory provisions?
  • Does the bar of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan operate against a constitutional petition directed solely against an illegal show-cause notice?
  • Can an authority reopen a disciplinary matter after the penalty has been implemented and accepted as a past and closed transaction?
  • Is an appeal competent before the Federal Service Tribunal against a show-cause notice prior to the passing of a final departmental order?
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• Muhammad Azeem Qureshi vs Hakim Syed Akhtar Irshad And 4 Other1990 CLC 122 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azeem alias Muhammad Azam vs The Additional District1990 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16
  interim custodyminorcompromisevisitation rightsguardian judgesurety bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition converted into an appeal regarding the interim custody of a minor. The parties reached a compromise during the proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the interim custody arrangements. The court recorded the terms of the compromise, ordering that the custody of the minor remain with the mother, Mst. Shahnaz Kausar, subject to specific visitation rights for the father, Muhammad Azeem alias Muhammad Azam, to be conducted on alternate Fridays at the office of an Advocate Supreme Court in Multan. Furthermore, the mother and her father executed a surety bond to ensure compliance with the agreed arrangement. The interim arrangement is directed to continue until the final decision of the case by the Guardian Judge, Muzaffargarh, before whom the minor must be produced as directed. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of in terms of the compromise without any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition regarding the interim custody of a minor be converted into an appeal based on an arrangement between the parties?
  • What provisions can be made for a father's visitation rights during the interim custody of a minor by the mother?
  • Is a surety bond required for the due performance of an interim custody arrangement arrived at between parties?
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• Muhammad Azam vs Muhammad Hayat and 8 others1990 P Cr. L J 1443 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam and others vs The State1990 SCMR 1319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-26
  post-arrest bailunlawful assemblymurderpolice investigationinnocence of co-accusedcriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the fact that police found several co-accused innocent during investigation renders the case against the remaining named petitioners doubtful, thereby entitling them to bail. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that some persons named in the first information report were found innocent by the police is not sufficient at the bail stage to doubt the active participation of the petitioners, whose names are expressly mentioned in the report and supported by eyewitnesses. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that individual assessment of evidence at the bail stage prevails over police findings regarding other co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finding of innocence by police regarding some co-accused make the case against remaining named accused doubtful for bail?
  • Are petitioners entitled to post-arrest bail when their names are expressly mentioned in the first information report alongside supporting eyewitness accounts?
  • Does police exoneration of certain suspects in the first information report constitute sufficient ground to grant bail to other co-accused?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs The State1990 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiontrap witnessleave to appealcriminal breachconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ayub against the dismissal of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The petitioner, a junior arms licence clerk, was tried and convicted by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption for demanding and accepting illegal gratification in the form of tainted currency notes during a trap laid by the anti-corruption staff. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of guilt and the sentence imposed warranted interference and the grant of leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit as the accused had admitted the finding of facts establishing his guilt, and the sentence awarded was appropriate. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that leave to appeal will be denied where factual guilt is admitted and concurrent findings of lower courts are sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the accused admits the finding of facts establishing guilt?
  • Is a sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 considered inadequate?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court be interfered with where the petitioner admits the guilt?
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• Muhammad Ayub vs Shabbir Hussain and 2 others1990 MLD 37 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-11-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub vs Messrs Zulfiqar Industries Ltd.1990 PLC 69 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub Memon vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 41 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-13
  post-arrest bailpreparation for dacoityfurther inquirydeadly weaponscriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal miscellaneous application by Muhammad Ayub Memon and Qasim Soomro seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 399 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Joharabad, relating to the alleged preparation for dacoity. The core legal question was whether merely sitting in a graveyard while armed with deadly weapons constitutes preparation for committing dacoity under the law. The Sindh High Court held that the evidence collected by the police—showing only that the applicants were found sitting in a graveyard and possessed weapons—was insufficient to establish an offence under section 399, P.P.C., as mere possession of weapons without proof of a design or conspiracy to commit dacoity does not amount to preparation. Consequently, the Court ruled that the case fell within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, laying down the principle that mere presence with weapons does not satisfy the legal requirements of preparation for dacoity without showing an underlying intention or plan to commit the crime, thereby entitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does merely sitting in a graveyard while armed with weapons constitute preparation for committing dacoity under section 399 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Whether possession of firearms alone is sufficient to establish an offence of making preparation for committing dacoity?
  • When does a criminal case fall within the purview of further inquiry for the grant of bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Ayub Khan vs Muhammad Zaman and another1990 PLD Peshawar 181 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-06-30
  pre-emptiontalb-i-muwathibatrevisional jurisdictionimmediate demandburden of proofconcurrent findingsN.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arises from the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the lower courts due to the plaintiff's failure to prove the 'talb-i-muwathibat' (immediate demand) as required by the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. The core legal question concerns the interpretation of 'immediate' demand and the evidentiary standard required to establish it. The Court held that while the initial burden to prove 'talb-i-muwathibat' lies on the pre-emptor, the term 'immediate' must be construed liberally, considering individual circumstances and human limitations, rather than applying a rigid, uniform yardstick. The Court established that 'talb-i-muwathibat' is a private act, unlike 'talb-i-ishhad', and no specific form or manner of declaration is mandated by law; it suffices if the evidence raises a legitimate presumption that the pre-emptor acted with reasonable immediacy. However, because the determination of whether this demand was made is a question of fact, and the lower courts reached concurrent findings based on the evidence, the High Court declined to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction, as no jurisdictional error was demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'immediate' in the context of 'talb-i-muwathibat' require a rigid, uniform application, or should it be interpreted liberally based on the circumstances of each case?
  • Is 'talb-i-muwathibat' a private act that does not require a specific form or manner of declaration to be valid?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the performance of 'talb-i-muwathibat' in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Muhammad Ayub and 6 others vs Minister for Education Punjab1990 PLC (C.S.) 278 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-12Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub alias Ayub and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1322 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Water and Power Development Authority1990 SCMR 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  service matterleave to appealdirect recruitmentretrospective appointmentdeputationnotional promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his claim for direct appointment and notional promotion to the post of Senior Officer (Stores) in Grade 18 in WAPDA. The core legal questions involve whether an employee whose interview for direct recruitment was deferred due to being on deputation can claim retrospective direct appointment and notional promotion from the date his colleagues were appointed. The Supreme Court held that since no appointment letter was ever issued to the petitioner pursuant to the 1978 interview and he could not be directly appointed retrospectively, the Tribunal's judgment suffered from no illegality. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine. The key principle laid down is that a candidate cannot claim retrospective direct appointment to a post when no formal appointment letter was issued at the relevant time, notwithstanding that their interview was deferred due to deputation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can claim retrospective direct appointment when no formal appointment letter was issued at the relevant time?
  • Is a candidate whose interview for direct recruitment was deferred due to deputation entitled to be treated as directly appointed from an earlier date?
  • Whether notional promotion can be granted to a post of direct recruitment for which no appointment order was issued?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 205 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-03
  transfer of casefair trialright to counselcross-examinationreasonable apprehension of biasmurder trialexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal transfer application seeking to move a murder trial from the Court of the Sessions Judge, Okara, to another competent jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s insistence on proceeding with the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, despite the sudden appointment of state-funded counsel who had no time to prepare, violated the accused's right to a fair trial and created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court held that while expeditious disposal of murder trials is a legitimate objective, it cannot supersede the fundamental requirement of providing an accused with a fair opportunity to defend themselves. Forcing a newly appointed counsel to cross-examine witnesses without preparation renders the right to legal assistance a mere formality. The Court concluded that the circumstances created a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that he would not receive an impartial trial. Consequently, the case was transferred, and the transferee court was directed to recall the witnesses for fresh cross-examination, emphasizing that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.

  Questions settled

  • Does forcing a newly appointed defense counsel to cross-examine witnesses without preparation violate the right to a fair trial?
  • Is a transfer of a criminal case justified when the actions of a judge create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the accused?
  • Can the administrative goal of expeditious disposal of murder trials justify the denial of a fair opportunity for the defense to prepare?
  • What is the legal effect of a trial court compelling a state-appointed counsel to proceed with cross-examination without adequate time to study the case?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State and another1990 SCMR 1290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-09
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationconcurrent jurisdictionmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court recalling the bail granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge in a murder and dacoity-related property dispute. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court in setting aside bail granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whether the High Court is precluded from probing the merits when the Sessions Court exercises jurisdiction under the said provision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction and is not precluded from examining the facts and merits of the case even if bail was granted under Section 497(2), and found no reason to interfere with the High Court's sound reasons for recalling bail. The key principle laid down is that superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of a bail matter on a tentative assessment and may set aside a Sessions Court's bail order under Section 497(2) where justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is precluded from probing the facts of a case when bail is granted by the Court of Session under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the practice of superior courts not deciding bail applications on merits when a murder case is fixed for hearing apply where the trial has not started and has been delayed?
  • Can the High Court recall an order of bail granted by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for sound reasons?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1990 MLD 193 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1403 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Suhanra1990 C'L C 1458 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-15Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Muhammad Sharif Ashraf and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 595 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Mst. Zainab Bibi And 3 Other1990 CLC 934 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-24
  past maintenancelimitation periodresiduary article 120family courtconstitutional petitionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Family Court and Additional District Judge directing the petitioner to pay past and future maintenance to his former wife and son. The core legal question was whether a suit for recovery of past maintenance is governed by a limitation period of three years or six years. The Lahore High Court held that since there is no specific article in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908 prescribing a limitation period for suits for maintenance, the residuary Article 120 applies, providing a limitation period of six years. The Court affirmed that suits for past maintenance under the Punjab Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964 as well as proceedings under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 are governed by the six-year limitation period under Article 120, and dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings of fact.

  Questions settled

  • What is the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit for recovery of past maintenance?
  • Does Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply to suits for past maintenance filed before a Family Court?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact recorded by Family Courts open to interference in constitutional jurisdiction without proof of misreading of evidence?
  • Does the limitation period for past maintenance differ between proceedings under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and suits under the Punjab Muslim Family Courts Act, 1964?
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• Muhammad Aslam vs Manager, United Bank Ltd.1990 PLD Azad J&K 29 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-12-24Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Faqir Muhammad And Another1990 CLC 549 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Falak Sher1990 CLC 1119 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-26
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notedeemed admissionrecovery of moneyrecording of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal arises from a suit for the recovery of forty thousand rupees based on a promissory note. The appellant filed an application for leave to defend under Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which the trial court dismissed because it was unsupported by an affidavit, and thereupon straightaway decreed the suit on the ground that the plaint's averments were deemed admitted. The core legal question was whether a trial court can outright decree a suit under Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) simply by refusing or rejecting an application for leave to defend. The Lahore High Court held that the provision only applies when a defendant fails to appear, fails to apply for leave to defend, or defaults in defending after leave is granted; it does not apply when an application for leave to defend is filed and subsequently rejected by the court. In such cases of rejection, the plaintiff must still prove the case by recording evidence. The appeal was accordingly accepted, the decree set aside, and the case remanded for recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rejection of an application for leave to defend automatically entitle the plaintiff to a decree under Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a trial court required to record evidence of the plaintiff after refusing leave to defend in a summary suit?
  • What specific eventualities are contemplated under Order XXXVII Rule 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for straightaway decreeing a suit without evidence?
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• Muhammad Aslam and another vs The State1990 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  commutation of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentbenefit of section 382-Bcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by petitioners convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, who were sentenced to death and fine. During the pendency of the petition, the President of Pakistan commuted the death sentences of all convicts to life imprisonment. Consequently, the petitioners' counsel did not press the petition on merits, requesting only the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of their sentence. The Supreme Court found this request reasonable and held that the petitioners shall be granted the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. in computing the sentence they have yet to undergo. The petition was accordingly dismissed with the said observation, establishing that convicts whose death sentences are commuted to life imprisonment are entitled to the benefit of section 382-B for sentence computation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a convict whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment by the President be granted the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies in the computation of remaining sentence after commutation?
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• Muhammad Aslam and 3 others vs The State1990 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  impersonationfraudulent sale deedcriminal convictionsentencingconcurrent sentencesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners were convicted by the trial court for offences under sections 419, 420, 423, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving the fraudulent execution of a sale deed through impersonation of the complainant. The trial court sentenced each petitioner to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Sessions Judge maintained the convictions but reduced the sentence under section 423 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to two years, as the maximum prescribed punishment for that offence was two years, while maintaining the other sentences and ordering them to run concurrently. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent criminal revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the sentence, arguing for leniency and noting that the maximum punishment for the offence under section 419 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was three years at the time of the offence, though it was later increased. The Supreme Court found the established guilt and the sentences awarded to be adequate, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence imposed for an offence under section 423 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exceed the statutory maximum of two years?
  • Is a sentence of three years for an offence under section 419 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 legally permissible if the maximum punishment at the time of the offence was three years?
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• Muhammad Aslam and 2 others vs Fateh Muhammad through Legal Heirs1990 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  abatement of appealcustomary lawremand orderpecuniary jurisdictionlegal heirsShariat lawalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal against an order of remand. The plaintiffs had sued for a declaration of ownership based on a gift, challenging a subsequent sale by their father to two defendants. The trial court decreed the suit, but the appellate court remanded the case due to issues regarding pecuniary jurisdiction. During the pendency of the second appeal, one respondent died, and the application to bring his legal heirs on record was time-barred. The High Court dismissed the entire appeal, ruling that the abatement was total rather than partial. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the abatement was indeed total or partial. However, during proceedings, the Court noted that intervening changes in the law, specifically the enactment of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1983, rendered suits based on customary law liable to abate. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand order remained in effect, while noting that the trial court must consider the impact of the new legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one respondent in a suit involving co-vendees result in the total abatement of the appeal or only partial abatement?
  • What is the effect of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1983 on pending suits for the annulment of alienations based on customary law?
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• Muhammad Aslam alias Sooba vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 704 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-08
  unlicensed weaponspecial courtexpired ordinanceremandcriminal appealbail pending retrial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction recorded by a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, wherein the appellant was found guilty of possessing an unlicensed sten-gun and sentenced to two years of rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the conviction could be sustained given that the Pakistan Arms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1988, and the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1988, had expired due to a failure to receive approval from the National Assembly and the Senate, thereby lacking the force of law at the time of the trial. The State, represented by the Additional Advocate-General, conceded this position, acknowledging that the ordinances were not in force. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the District and Sessions Judge, Lahore, for entrustment to a court of competent jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court directed the appellant's release on bail pending the new trial, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a conviction based on an ordinance that has expired due to lack of legislative approval remain valid?
  • What is the effect of an expired ordinance on the jurisdiction of a Special Court constituted under that ordinance?
  • Can an appellate court order the release of an appellant on bail after setting aside a conviction and remanding the case for retrial?
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• Muhammad Asif vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 278 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-25
  pre-arrest bailcommon objectsimple injuryjuvenile offendermala fidecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, who was accused of participating in an assault involving multiple individuals under Sections 307, 325, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, despite being named in the FIR with a specific role, was entitled to pre-arrest bail given his age, the nature of the injury attributed to him, and allegations of mala fide prosecution. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of his pre-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the fact that the injury inflicted by the petitioner was simple and on a non-vital part of the victim, and that he did not repeat the injury despite having the opportunity to do so, indicating a lack of intent to cause further harm. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the petitioner's status as a student under eighteen years of age and the potential for unjustified humiliation and harassment, aligning with the broader scope for granting pre-arrest bail established in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of a simple injury on a non-vital part of the victim, without repetition, negate the intent to cause further harm for the purpose of bail?
  • Can the age of the accused be considered a mitigating factor for the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the specific naming of an accused in an FIR with a specific role automatically disentitle them to pre-arrest bail?
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• Muhammad Asif Khan vs Rahim Bux and others1990 PLD Lahore 449 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asif alias Shauka vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1969 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 765 · Sindh High Court · 1989-05-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 MLD 673 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  petition for leave to appealanti-corruptionbribesanction for prosecutionconfessiontime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 165-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner, a Naib Qasid, was convicted of accepting a bribe with the promise of securing a favourable outcome in an appeal. The trial court and the High Court found him guilty based on the testimony of advocate witnesses, the Additional District Judge, and the petitioner's own confession. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the conviction and the belated objection regarding the lack of sanction for prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the objection regarding sanction, not having been raised before the lower forums, could not be raised for the first time before the apex court. Furthermore, the petition was barred by limitation. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred and on merits, laying down the principle that procedural objections not raised at earlier stages cannot be entertained at the leave to appeal stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the absence of sanction for prosecution be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a petition filed beyond the period of limitation without a satisfactory explanation is liable to be dismissed?
  • Is the testimony of judicial and advocate witnesses sufficient to maintain a conviction under anti-corruption laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Muhammad Tahir and 6 others1990 MLD 2399 · Sindh High Court · 1990-08-20
  pre-emptionTalab-e-MowasibatSunni Lawimmediate demandcivil appealright of Shafa
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, challenged the dismissal of a pre-emption suit by the Senior Civil Judge, Sukkur. The core legal question was whether the appellant had performed the mandatory Talab-e-Mowasibat (immediate demand) with the requisite promptitude under Islamic law to sustain his claim of pre-emption. The court held that the appeal must fail, affirming the trial court's decision. Evidence established that the appellant delayed the Talab-e-Mowasibat by approximately thirty minutes to gather witnesses, failing to assert the right immediately upon learning of the sale. The court laid down the principle that under Sunni law, the right of pre-emption is of a feeble nature, requiring the Talab-e-Mowasibat to be made with the utmost promptitude; any delay, even of minutes or seconds, defeats the right. Furthermore, the court clarified that the cause of action for pre-emption accrues upon the completion of the sale, determined by the parties' intention and execution of the sale deed, rather than the date of registration.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay of thirty minutes in making the Talab-e-Mowasibat defeat the right of pre-emption?
  • Is the right of pre-emption lost if the Talab-e-Mowasibat is not made immediately upon knowledge of the sale?
  • Does the cause of action for pre-emption accrue on the date of the execution of the sale deed or the date of registration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Messrs Swissair Transport Company Ltd., Karachi1990 PLC 429 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1988-12-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Khan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 169 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-09-04
  post-arrest bailmedical groundssick or infirmprohibitory clauseCervical Spondylosismurder trialproviso interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition was brought before the Peshawar High Court seeking post-arrest bail on medical grounds in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 452, 449, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner had been arrested for allegedly shooting and killing a Deputy Inspector-General of Police and injuring another person who later died. The core legal questions pertained to the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding bail for a 'sick or infirm' accused, specifically whether the illness must be life-threatening and whether the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) overrides the proviso. The High Court held that 'sick' or 'infirm' in the first proviso does not strictly require the ailment to be dangerous to life; rather, where serious illness is established and adequate specialized treatment cannot be provided in jail, discretion should be exercised in favor of bail. Furthermore, the proviso operates as an exception modifying the prohibitory clause. Bail was accordingly granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'sick or infirm' under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require that the illness must be dangerous to life?
  • Can bail on medical grounds be granted under the first proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to an accused whose case falls within the prohibitory clause?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail where specialized and necessary medical treatment for a serious condition is unavailable in jail facilities?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Khan vs The State1990 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  bailZina-bil-JabrHudood Ordinancediscretionary powermedical evidenceNikah
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioner's bail application in a case registered under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner was accused of committing Zina-bil-Jabr against the complainant. The petitioner's counsel argued that the First Information Report (FIR) was at variance with the complainant's subsequent statement, medical evidence indicated she was accustomed to sexual intercourse, and she had executed an affidavit stating she voluntarily married the petitioner. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that these arguments had already been considered and rejected by the High Court. Holding that no case was made out to interfere with the discretionary power exercised by the High Court in refusing bail, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between an FIR and a victim's subsequent statement are sufficient grounds for granting bail in a Zina-bil-Jabr case?
  • Does an affidavit of voluntary marriage by the victim automatically entitle an accused of Zina-bil-Jabr to bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by the High Court in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Asghar vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1990 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-10
  service tribunalleave to appealconfirmationcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ashraf Asghar, a Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Collector, challenging the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 15-6-1981, which had dismissed his service appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal committed any legal error in upholding the service decision concerning the petitioner's confirmation status, particularly in light of a letter dated 13-5-1978 from the Secretary, Board of Revenue Punjab, indicating that he was not yet matured for confirmation. The Supreme Court held that no satisfactory explanation could be offered by the petitioner's counsel to counter the contents of the said letter, and finding no legal error in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal in the absence of any legal error?
  • Does a government servant have an enforceable right to confirmation when considered not yet matured for confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1359 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-03Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf And Others vs Muazzam Ali And Other1990 CLC 254 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and another vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1411 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and 3 others vs The State1990 MLD 99 · Sindh High Court · 1989-10-19Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf and 3 others vs Member (S&R), Board of Revenue, Punjab and another1990 MLD 2091 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 368 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-10
  murderhostile witnessidentification paradecriminal appealevidentiary valueacquittalreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot the deceased following a dispute over bus fare. The core legal questions concern the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the necessity of a test identification parade when the accused are unknown to witnesses, and the evidentiary value of a witness declared hostile. The Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with glaring discrepancies, including contradictory statements regarding the motive, the sequence of events, and the presence of witnesses at the scene. Furthermore, the failure of the investigating officer to conduct a test identification parade for the appellant, who was previously unknown to the witnesses, proved fatal to the prosecution's case. The Court emphasized that when prosecution witnesses are declared hostile and their testimonies are inconsistent, the evidence loses its probative value. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and ordered his immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of a prosecution witness declared hostile lose all evidentiary value?
  • Is a test identification parade mandatory when the accused is unknown to the eyewitnesses?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to reconcile glaring discrepancies in the testimony of ocular witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1990 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-25
  petition for leave to appealmurdergrievous hurtcriminal appealsentence reductionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, along with two others, was tried for the murder of Abdul Jabbar. The trial court convicted the petitioner under Section 325, Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced him to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine, while the co-accused were convicted under Section 323, Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal and revision, the Lahore High Court dismissed the appeals and the revision, while adjusting the sentences of the co-accused. The petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the petitioner's conviction and the propriety of the sentence and concessions granted by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petition was entirely devoid of merit, noting that the petitioner had in fact been granted undue concessions by the trial court to which he was not entitled. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings and convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent convictions for grievous hurt resulting in death is maintainable without substantial grounds?
  • Can the High Court withdraw the benefit under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while deciding criminal appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 726 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-30Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashfaq and 84 others vs Javaid Akhtar Butt, Director_Chief Executive, Cool Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore and another1990 PLC 380 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1989-12-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1990 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-02
  criminal appealacquittalself-defensemedical evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment acquitting the respondents of charges related to a violent altercation that resulted in the death of one individual and injuries to several others. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and its acceptance of the respondents' plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court, upon re-examining the testimony of the injured prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, found that the respondents' version of events—that the complainant party initiated the aggression and the respondents acted in self-defense—was more probable. The Court noted that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient corroboration for the eye-witness testimony, which contained significant improvements, and that the number of injuries sustained by the deceased did not align with the number of accused persons. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was based on a reasonable assessment of the evidence and did not warrant interference. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that where a defense plea appears reasonably possible, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's acquittal can be upheld when the defense version of self-defense appears reasonably possible?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to provide corroborative evidence for eye-witness testimony justify an acquittal?
  • Is an appellate court required to interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's assessment of the evidence is found to be reasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar vs General Manager, Pakistan Railways, Lahore1990 PLC 704 · Labour Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1646 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asadullah vs Incharge Public Complaint Cell, Lahore and another1990 P Cr. L J 558 · Lahore High Court · 1978-05-16Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1012 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-07Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arshad vs S.H.O., Police Station, Mussafirkhana and 51990 MLD 143 · Lahore High Court · 1989-06-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Superintendent of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  service tribunaldismissal from servicelimitation periodcondonation of delaypolice constableefficiency and discipline rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner police constable's appeal against his dismissal from service as barred by time. The petitioner was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police for releasing bad characters after receiving illegal gratifications. His departmental appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General was dismissed, and a subsequent second appeal before the Inspector-General was filed as incompetent. The core legal question revolved around whether the time spent pursuing the incompetent second appeal before the Inspector-General warranted condonation of delay for filing the service tribunal appeal, given the revision powers under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The Supreme Court held that since the rules provide for only one final appeal against an order of dismissal, the limitation period commenced upon communication of the Deputy Inspector-General's appellate order, and the availability of revision powers by the Inspector-General provided no legal justification to condone the delay. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of an incompetent second departmental appeal justify the condonation of delay for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal?
  • When does the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal commence following the dismissal of a departmental appeal?
  • Does the power of revision vested in an authority under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 extend the limitation period for approaching the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Mst. Amina Begum and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  rent restrictionconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionright of appealsummary ejectmentstatutory interpretationlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a rent restriction matter where the High Court dismissed the appellant’s Constitutional Petition, holding that an adequate remedy by way of appeal under Section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was available against an order passed under Section 13-B. The core legal question was whether a final order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 13-B of the Ordinance is appealable under Section 15. The Supreme Court held that Section 13-B constitutes a self-contained code for specific eviction cases, and since the legislature intentionally omitted Section 13-B from the list of appealable orders in Section 15, no appeal lies against such orders. The Court established the principle that where a specific provision like Section 13-B creates a summary procedure for hardship cases without being included in the appellate provisions of Section 15, the omission is deliberate, and the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party is to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court rather than filing an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a final order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, appealable under Section 15 of the same Ordinance?
  • Does the omission of Section 13-B from the list of appealable orders in Section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, constitute a legislative oversight or a deliberate policy choice?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party aggrieved by an order passed under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Chaudhary vs Election Tribunal and others1990 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  leave to appealelection petitionrecount of votesrecriminationconsistent pleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his Constitution Petition, which challenged an order of the Election Tribunal (Additional District Judge) limiting a previously ordered recount of votes. The Election Tribunal had initially ordered a complete recount of votes from an electoral unit, but subsequently allowed an application by a respondent restricting the inspection and recount, excluding the ballot papers of the petitioner on the ground that no recrimination had been claimed in the written statement. The core legal question concerned whether the omission of a recrimination plea precludes the recounting or inspection of votes initially ordered. The Supreme Court observed that in pleading the correctness of the count, a petitioner could not simultaneously plead its incorrectness as the pleas would be mutually destructive and inconsistent, explaining the absence of a recrimination ground. Finding merit in examining the full implications of the matter, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order for recounting of votes once passed can be subsequently limited or made conditional?
  • Can a party plead the correctness of a count and simultaneously claim its incorrectness without seeking recrimination?
  • Does the absence of a recrimination plea bar the inspection and recounting of ballot papers in an election petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The State1990 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  criminal petitionsupreme court appealdismissal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from criminal proceedings where Muhammad Anwar challenged a lower court decision before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the petitioner's conviction or sentence as determined by the lower forums. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the impugned judgment. The key principle governing the matter relates to the exercise of the apex court's discretionary jurisdiction under appellate review where no substantial question of law or miscarriage of justice is made out to warrant interference with concurrent findings or lower court orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts when no substantial question of law is made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The Deputy Commissioner, Okara1990 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  disciplinary proceedingsunauthorized absenceservice lawshow-cause noticemisconductdismissal from servicemedical leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of a government servant, a Reader in a Magistrate's Court, following disciplinary proceedings initiated for habitual late attendance and failure to reside at his station of posting. The core legal question concerns whether the disciplinary action, including the removal from service, was justified given the petitioner's prolonged unauthorized absence and failure to comply with departmental directives to appear before a Medical Superintendent for verification of medical leave claims. The petitioner had repeatedly failed to respond to show-cause notices, necessitating publication in newspapers, and remained untraceable despite providing an address. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner, and the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Court held that the petitioner's conduct constituted gross indiscipline, noting that he had purposely become untraceable to delay proceedings. The principle laid down is that a government servant cannot evade disciplinary inquiries by remaining willfully untraceable or failing to comply with official directives regarding medical verification, and such conduct justifies dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant's failure to appear before a medical authority for verification of leave constitute gross indiscipline?
  • Can a disciplinary authority proceed with dismissal when a government servant remains willfully untraceable to avoid service of notices?
  • Is a finding of gross indiscipline by a service tribunal subject to interference by the Supreme Court when based on factual findings of unauthorized absence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ansar and 3 others vs Ghulam Fatima and 9 others1990 SCMR 1339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-25
  pre-emptionleave to appealowner of the estateland revenuecustomary lawIslamic constitutional set-upRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the successors-in-interest of a pre-emptor against the High Court's judgment accepting the respondents' Regular Second Appeal and setting aside the lower courts' concurrent decrees in favor of the plaintiff. The core legal question concerns whether a plaintiff owning land 'in' an estate but not assessed to land revenue qualifies as an 'owner of the estate' for pre-emption purposes under modern Islamic constitutional principles, notwithstanding historical colonial and Hindu legal concepts distinguishing classes of estate inhabitants. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised concerning the applicability of old authorities in the changed Islamic constitutional framework require formal examination, particularly in light of the Shariat court system superseding customary laws and practices. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the evolving concept of the owner of an estate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an owner of land in an estate who is not assessed to land revenue qualifies as an owner of the estate for pre-emption?
  • Do historical colonial and Hindu concepts regarding class distinctions in rural estates apply under the Islamic constitutional framework of Pakistan?
  • Whether customary law and practices regarding estate ownership survive the introduction of the Shariat court system?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir vs Additional District Judge and others1990 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-28
  evictionlandlord and tenantadverse possessionrent deedrent controllerejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an eviction application filed by the respondent against the petitioners, who were successors-in-interest of the original occupant of a haveli. The petitioners contested the eviction, denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and asserting ownership through adverse possession. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, finding no such relationship existed. However, the Additional District Judge, upon appeal, reappraised the evidence, upheld the validity of a rent deed executed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, and ordered their ejectment. The High Court subsequently declined to interfere with this order. The core legal question was whether the existence of a valid rent deed precludes a claim of adverse possession and establishes the landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's decision, affirming that the execution of a rent deed by a predecessor-in-interest effectively negates a claim of adverse possession. The court held that once the validity and genuineness of a rent deed are established by the appellate authority, the occupant cannot claim ownership through adverse possession, thereby justifying an order of eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the execution of a rent deed by a predecessor-in-interest preclude a claim of adverse possession by the successor?
  • Can an appellate court reappraise evidence to overturn a Rent Controller's finding regarding the landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Is a tenant who executes a rent deed estopped from claiming ownership of the premises through adverse possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir Khan vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1904 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-13Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 749 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-06-11Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs The State1990 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-10
  commutation of sentencedeath penaltypresidential orderlife imprisonmentrevival of appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the grant of leave to appeal specifically regarding the sentence imposed on the appellant. During the pendency of the appeal, a general order issued by the President of Pakistan in December 1988 commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment. Consequently, the appellant was transferred from the death cell to the general section of the jail to serve a life sentence. In light of this development, counsel for the appellant did not press the appeal but requested that the appeal be kept alive, with liberty to revive it on merits should the President's commutation order be modified or the death sentence restored due to pending constitutional challenges in the High Court. The Court found this request reasonable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while granting the appellant explicit liberty to reactivate the proceedings if the legal status of the commutation order changes, thereby preserving the appellant's right to challenge the original sentence should the commutation be revoked.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed while granting the appellant liberty to reactivate the matter if the underlying basis for the commutation of sentence is challenged?
  • Does a general order by the President of Pakistan commuting death sentences to life imprisonment render an appeal against the sentence of death non-pressing?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Syed Tassadaq Hussain Shah and another1990 SCMR 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29
  evacuee trust propertycompensation poolprovisional transfer orderejectmentjurisdictionsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the ejectment of the appellant from property claimed by respondent No. 1 as a transferee. The core legal question was whether the property in question, having been declared evacuee trust property, was available for transfer under the settlement laws, thereby invalidating the respondent's Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.). The Supreme Court held that the property, being evacuee trust property, never formed part of the compensation pool and was thus not available for transfer. Consequently, the P.T.O. issued to the respondent was without jurisdiction and legally void, as it had been recalled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Court emphasized that the status of the property as evacuee trust property precluded any valid transfer to private individuals. The appeal was accepted, setting aside the lower courts' judgments, as the respondent lacked the legal standing to seek the appellant's ejectment based on an invalid transfer document.

  Questions settled

  • Can property declared as evacuee trust property be transferred under the settlement laws?
  • Does a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) confer valid title if the underlying property is subsequently determined to be evacuee trust property?
  • Does the Deputy Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to transfer property that is not part of the compensation pool?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Secretary, Establishment Division and 19 others1990 PLC (C.S.) 562 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1989-11-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Mac)Bool1990 PLD Lahore 397 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-05
  pre-emptionadditional evidencelimitationestoppelwaiverbenamisecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arises from a suit for possession of land through pre-emption, where the vendee-defendant challenged the lower courts' decrees in favour of the respondent. The core legal questions were whether the appellate court erred in refusing to admit additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the plaintiff was estopped from claiming pre-emption due to his presence at the sale or acting as a benamidar. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellate court correctly exercised its discretion regarding additional evidence and that the limitation period commenced from the registration of the sale deed, not the prior agreement to sell. Furthermore, the Court held that mere passive presence of a family member at a sale does not constitute estoppel or waiver of pre-emption rights. The principle laid down is that a prospective pre-emptor is not legally obligated to intervene during sale negotiations, and the right of pre-emption is not waived merely by a 'wait and see' approach before the final price is settled.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a family member at a sale transaction constitute estoppel against their subsequent claim of pre-emption?
  • When does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can an appellate court refuse to consider a request for additional evidence before deciding the merits of the appeal?
  • Is a prospective pre-emptor required to intervene during the negotiation of a sale price to avoid a claim of waiver?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Ghulam NAB! and 2 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-01
  striking off defencetentative rent ordersection 13(6)leave to appealrent restrictioneviction orderdefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing the tenant's constitutional writ petition against an eviction order. The eviction was ordered on the ground that the tenant failed to comply with a tentative pre-trial rent deposit order under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, resulting in the striking off of his defence. The core legal questions involved whether a tentative rent deposit order can be challenged in an appeal against eviction, whether a subsequent finding of no default on merits invalidates the pre-trial order, and whether the Rent Controller retains discretion once non-compliance with section 13(6) is established. The Supreme Court held that while a tenant can challenge a tentative rent deposit order upon final eviction, a subsequent favorable finding on merits does not invalidate a validly passed approximate rent order based on summary inquiry. Furthermore, compliance with section 13(6) is mandatory; upon default without a valid excuse such as impossibility beyond control, striking off the defence is obligatory. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge a tentative pre-trial rent deposit order when appealing against an ultimate eviction order?
  • Does a subsequent finding in the tenant's favor on the main issue of default render a previous tentative rent deposit order invalid or improper?
  • Does the Rent Controller have discretion to refrain from striking off a tenant's defence once default in complying with an order under section 13(6) is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Divisional Forest Officer and another1990 SCMR 1484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-13
  service lawresignationtermination of servicedisciplinary proceedingsFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the petitioner, a Junior Clerk, from service. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal erred in its factual and legal assessment by holding that the petitioner’s resignation, submitted on July 3, 1988, and accepted on July 9, 1988, to take effect on August 3, 1988, precluded him from challenging his subsequent removal from service on July 31, 1988. The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal’s reasoning was factually inconsistent and legally unsound, as the petitioner had been removed from service via disciplinary proceedings prior to the effective date of his resignation. The Court held that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the legal implications of the removal order preceding the resignation's effective date. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the Tribunal's reliance on the resignation to dismiss the appeal was erroneous, thereby necessitating further consideration of the legality of the removal order in light of the conflicting timelines.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant's resignation be validly accepted after they have already been removed from service through disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the acceptance of a resignation with a future effective date preclude a government servant from challenging a prior removal from service?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's finding of fact binding when it is based on a chronological impossibility regarding the termination of employment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ameen vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 84 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-06
  counterfeit prize bondssearch of premisesrecovery witnessstock witnessdecoy witnessbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal under Section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was filed by the appellant challenging his conviction and sentence under Sections 489-B and 489-C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, ordered by the Sessions Judge (South), Karachi, for allegedly dealing in and possessing counterfeit prize bonds. The core legal questions involved whether the search of the appellant's premises complied with the mandatory statutory safeguards under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the testimony of stock search witnesses and an unreliable decoy witness could sustain a criminal conviction. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that Section 103 applies when a place or shop is searched, requiring respectable local inhabitants as recovery witnesses to guard against fabrication. Since the prosecution relied on a stock FIA witness who committed perjury and a suspended officer under corruption charges as a decoy witness, the case against the appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to the search of a shop or business premises?
  • Can a conviction be legally sustained on the evidence of a stock witness who repeatedly acts as a recovery witness for investigative agencies?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a search conducted without associating respectable inhabitants of the locality as required by Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ameen vs Muhammad Younis And 2 Other1990 CLC 1297 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub vs Abdul Khaliq1990 MLD 1293 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-22
  right of appealacquittal appealprivate complainantstatutory interpretationIslamic Penal Laws Enforcement Actcasua omissuslocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Shariat Court judgment that dismissed a complainant's appeal against an acquittal order, ruling that only the State could file such an appeal under the Islamic Penal Laws (Enforcement) Act, 1974. The core legal question was whether a private party possesses the right to appeal an acquittal under the Act. The Court was divided; however, per the Chief Justice’s prevailing opinion, the appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the Act is silent regarding the specific persons competent to file appeals against acquittals. Consequently, Section 32(2) of the Act necessitates recourse to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Under Section 417 of the Code, the right to appeal an acquittal is vested exclusively in the State. The Court affirmed that judges cannot supply legislative omissions or add words like 'complainant' to a statute, as doing so would constitute judicial encroachment into the legislative domain. The principle established is that where a special statute is silent on a procedural matter, the general law applies, and courts must interpret statutes based on their plain, explicit language.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private complainant have the right to appeal an order of acquittal under the Islamic Penal Laws (Enforcement) Act, 1974?
  • Can a court supply an omission in a statute by reading in words not explicitly provided by the legislature?
  • When a special law is silent on a procedural matter, does the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to fill the gap?
  • Does the right of appeal constitute a substantive right that remains unaffected by subsequent procedural amendments during the pendency of a case?
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• Muhammad Ameen Shah vs The State1990 SCMR 1121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  post-arrest bailmurderalibifalse implicationleave to appealcriminal proceduretentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Muhammad Ameen Shah, in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on his plea of alibi and allegations of false implication due to enmity. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's contention that he was at a different location during the occurrence, supported by claims of police investigation findings, and that he was falsely named in the FIR at the instance of a rival. Upon reviewing the record and the High Court's reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's tentative assessment of the evidence and circumstances was proper. The Court found no sufficient grounds to interfere with the High Court's order and consequently dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that at the bail stage, courts must rely on a tentative assessment of the available material and circumstances rather than conducting a mini-trial on the merits of the defense's alibi or motive claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plea of alibi sufficient to grant bail in a murder case where the High Court has already conducted a tentative assessment of the evidence?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing bail if the High Court's reasoning is based on a proper appraisal of the available record?
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• Muhammad Alsam and 2 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1380 · Lahore High Court · 1989-08-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1418 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1990 MLD 65 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1990 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-03
  criminal appealHudood lawsZina Ordinanceleave revocationservice reinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the partial acceptance by the Federal Shariat Court of the appellant's appeal, wherein his conviction and sentence under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 were upheld. The appellant, a former Foot Constable in the Police, challenged his remaining conviction primarily to seek reinstatement in service, having already served out his substantive sentence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the learned counsel for the appellant and examined the matter. The Court held that the case no longer merited re-examination. Consequently, the Court withdrew the leave granting order and dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that where a sentence has been fully served and the primary remaining grievance relates to service matters, the Court may decline to re-examine concurrent findings of lower appellate forums on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against a criminal conviction should be re-examined when the appellant has already served out the sentence and seeks the appeal solely for reinstatement in service?
  • Can the Supreme Court withdraw a leave granting order upon re-evaluation of the merits or circumstances of a case?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Sakina Bibi and others1990 SCMR 1180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  leave to appealmortgage redemptionsub-mortgageacknowledgementlimitationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Ali seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 18-2-1987, which dismissed his civil revision against the concurrent findings of the lower courts in favour of the respondents. The dispute originates from a mortgage created in 1891, where the original mortgagee transferred rights to the respondents' predecessor. The petitioner's second application for redemption before the Collector was initially decreed in 1968, prompting the respondents to file a successful declaratory suit that the order was void, as they had become owners. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenges. The core legal question concerns whether the creation of a sub-mortgage by a mortgagee in favour of another constitutes an acknowledgement under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that this raises a question of public importance requiring consideration, and accordingly granted leave to appeal, directing status quo to be maintained in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the creation of a sub-mortgage by a mortgagee in favour of another mortgagee constitutes an acknowledgement within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is a second application for redemption maintainable after the dismissal of the first application by the Collector?
  • Whether an order of the Collector allowing redemption subsequent to a dismissal is void when the mortgagees have acquired ownership rights over time?
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• Muhammad Ali vs Mukhtar and others1990 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealacquittalocular evidenceappreciation of evidencecriminal revisiondefense witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The respondents had been convicted by the trial court, but the High Court subsequently set aside the conviction and acquitted them. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically by failing to consider the testimony of a defense witness, Mst. Hanifan Bibi, who allegedly implicated the accused, and whether the ocular account of the prosecution was properly evaluated. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the High Court had improperly ignored the testimony of the defense witness by summarily dismissing it as irrelevant to the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to re-examine the ocular evidence and the specific testimony of the witness in question. The key principle established is that a High Court must engage with and properly evaluate all material evidence, including defense testimony, rather than dismissing it without consideration when determining the validity of a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal if the High Court failed to consider material evidence?
  • Is it legally permissible for a High Court to dismiss the testimony of a defense witness without evaluating its relevance to the case?
  • Does the failure of the High Court to refer to specific ocular evidence in its judgment constitute a ground for granting leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Ali Hassan vs Fateh Muhammad and AnotherK.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 148 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-01Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali Azam vs Pfizer Laboratories Ltd., Karachi1990 PLC 662 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 1990-03-07
  unfair labour practicedomestic inquiryjurisdiction of National Industrial Relations Commissiontrade union activitiesdismissal from servicegrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was heard by the National Industrial Relations Commission under section 22-B(4) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, against an order of a learned Single Bench dismissing the appellant's petition. The appellant, an active trade unionist and former General Secretary who faced a no-confidence motion, was charged with theft by his employer and subsequently dismissed following a domestic inquiry. He alleged that his dismissal was an act of unfair labour practice intended to prevent him from contesting upcoming union elections, pointing out various procedural illegalities and biases in the inquiry. The core legal question was whether procedural irregularities and illegalities in a domestic inquiry alone confer jurisdiction upon the National Industrial Relations Commission under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the absence of a proven case of unfair labour practice under section 15. The Commission held that its jurisdiction is strictly attracted only upon establishing an element of unfair labour practice, and mere illegalities or procedural flaws in a domestic inquiry do not ipso facto constitute an unfair labour practice or provide a general appellate jurisdiction. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have general appellate jurisdiction over all kinds of worker grievances and procedural irregularities in domestic inquiries?
  • Can procedural flaws, illegalities, or malice in a domestic inquiry ipso facto constitute an unfair labour practice under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Does a mere intention to take part in upcoming trade union elections amount to performing trade union activity for the purposes of establishing an unfair labour practice?
  • When does the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission under clause (g) of subsection (8) of section 22-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, get attracted?
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• Muhammad Ali and others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1132 · Lahore High Court · 1981-07-22Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali and others vs The State and others1990 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-05
  quashment of criminal proceedingscriminal procedureleave to appealremand of caseframing of charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had partly accepted a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising from case 'State v. Muhammad Ali and two others'. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the entire proceedings and instead remanding the case to the trial court for framing a fresh charge against two of the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was unexceptionable as the remand order directed the trial court to proceed in accordance with law. Consequently, the Court laid down that where criminal proceedings do not warrant total quashment, a partial remand for framing fresh charges and proceeding according to law is legally sound. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be partly quashed while remanding the matter to the trial court for framing fresh charges?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order remanding a criminal case to the trial court to proceed in accordance with law?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an order refusing full quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Ali and 8 others vs Jam Lalu1990 PLD Lahore 190 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-06Read full judgment →
• Muhammad AKSARPetit loner vs The State1990 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  culpable homicideself-defencestatement of accusedsplitting of confessionadmissionacquittalSection 342 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Aksar, for culpable homicide. The petitioner was initially convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based largely on his own statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein he admitted to part of the occurrence but claimed self-defence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in splitting the petitioner's statement, accepting the incriminating portion while rejecting the exculpatory plea of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court deviated from the established legal principle that an accused's statement or confession cannot be split up to use only the incriminating part against them. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, allowed the appeal, and acquitted the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that an admission or statement made by an accused, whether amounting to a confession or not, must be accepted as a whole and cannot be dissected to selectively incriminate the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court split an accused's statement made under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to accept only the incriminating portion?
  • Is it legally permissible to use only the incriminating part of an accused's admission while rejecting their plea of self-defence?
  • Does the principle that a confession cannot be split up apply to statements made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Akram vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 574 · Lahore High Court · 1980-06-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Additional District Judge and 2 others1990 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  tenancy disputeeviction ordercompromise deedvacation of premisesstatutory periodappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an appeal by a tenant against eviction orders, which had been previously upheld by the High Court. Upon the grant of leave to appeal, the parties presented a deed of compromise before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The compromise agreement, signed by both the appellant and the respondent along with their respective legal counsel, stipulated that the appellant would vacate the disputed shop by a specific date. Furthermore, the respondent undertook to occupy the premises and commence business within the statutory period, with a default clause providing that failure to do so would result in the immediate restoration of the appellant's tenancy under the existing terms and conditions. The Supreme Court, having reviewed the compromise and finding it to be genuine, determined there were no legal impediments to its acceptance. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in terms of the compromise, effectively disposing of the matter without an order as to costs, thereby affirming the validity of private settlements in tenancy disputes when voluntarily entered into by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise deed presented by the parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement regarding the vacation of a tenanted shop enforceable when signed by both parties and their counsel?
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• Muhammad Akram Shad vs Additional District Judge And 2 Other1990 CLC 908 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-29
  ejectmentlandlord-tenant relationshipWest Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959constitutional petitionmala fidedefault in rentgeneral power of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, which directed the ejectment of the petitioner for default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether the owner of the premises could maintain an ejectment petition when the property had been let out and managed by her father as a general attorney. The Court held that the owner remains the landlord and is entitled to seek ejectment, as the definition of "landlord" under the Rent Restriction Ordinance encompasses not only those who physically receive rent but also those entitled to receive it. The Court rejected the petitioner's plea that the agent was the sole landlord, noting that an owner does not lose their rights by appointing an agent. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner’s denial of the landlord-tenant relationship to be mala fide, contumacious, and contradicted by his own conduct and admissions in previous proceedings. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with special costs, affirming that the owner’s statutory right to control the property cannot be impaired by agency arrangements.

  Questions settled

  • Does an owner lose their status as a landlord under the Rent Restriction Ordinance by appointing an agent to manage the property and collect rent?
  • Is a tenant's denial of the landlord-tenant relationship legally sustainable when the tenant has previously admitted the tenancy in court proceedings?
  • Does the definition of 'landlord' under the Rent Restriction Ordinance include the owner of the property even if they have not personally collected rent?
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• Muhammad Akram and others vs Khan Muhammad1990 SCMR 1699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  pre-emption suitpreliminary issuepreliminary decreeorder of remandrevision petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court partially accepting the respondent's appeal against an order of remand passed by the District Court. The core legal question was whether the decision of a trial court on a preliminary issue regarding the nature of a transaction (sale versus exchange) in a pre-emption suit could be treated as a preliminary decree. The Supreme Court held that the decision on the preliminary issue by no means constituted a preliminary decree, nor did challenging it through a revision petition convert it into one. The Court ruled that the appellants were entitled of right to challenge the preliminary issue finding along with the final judgment and decree, and that the High Court erred in treating it as a final preliminary decree. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the order of remand passed by the District Court was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decision of a trial court on a preliminary issue be regarded as a preliminary decree?
  • Whether a revision petition against a preliminary issue finding becomes infructuous upon the final decision of the suit?
  • Are parties entitled of right to challenge a preliminary issue finding when appealing the final judgment and decree?
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• Muhammad Akram and 3 others vs Mst. Tazeem Akhter1990 MLD 1280 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akmal vs Chairman, Zila Council, Toba Tek Singh1990 PLC 699 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-07-04Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar vs The State and 2 others1990 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  criminal revisionacquittalappreciation of evidencesolitary statementleave to appealinterested witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which accepted a criminal revision petition and acquitted respondents Nos. 2 and 3 of charges under section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, setting aside their convictions and sentences previously awarded by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's re-appraisal of evidence in revision, particularly regarding the reliance on a solitary statement of an interested complainant with a background of enmity, and the discrediting of eye-witness testimony. The Supreme Court held that the findings recorded by the High Court were unexceptional and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court in revision when the appreciation of evidence regarding the unreliability of eye-witnesses and the interested nature of the complainant's testimony is sound and free from legal defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment setting aside a conviction and acquitting the accused in revision?
  • Is the conviction of an accused sustainable on the solitary statement of an interested complainant with a background of enmity when eye-witnesses have been disbelieved?
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• Muhammad Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti vs Assistant1990 MLD 1316 · Supreme Court of India · 1988-08-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Bajwa vs Federal Government of Pakistan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  civil servantjurisdictionfederal service tribunalliendeputationsenioritytransferred employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction because the appellant was not a civil servant of the Federal Government and remained an employee of the Punjab Police. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been transferred from the Provincial Railway Police to the newly constituted Pakistan Railways Police upon the promulgation of the Pakistan Railways Police Ordinance, 1976 and the subsequent Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977, had become a permanent employee of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court held that while statutory transfer under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 does not automatically terminate a provincial employee's lien without confirmation or formal termination of lien, the Tribunal erred in failing to determine whether the appellant had lost his lien over his substantive post and whether he had been confirmed as a Federal civil servant. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision after impleading the Punjab Government and examining the relevant records.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of personnel from the Provincial Railway Police to the Pakistan Railways Police under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 automatically terminates their lien in the provincial police?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over an appeal filed by an employee whose status as a Federal civil servant remains undetermined regarding the termination of his provincial lien?
  • Whether personnel transferred under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 are to be treated as permanent employees or deputationists prior to confirmation?
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