Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Akbar vs The State and another1990 SCMR 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  bail cancellationZina Biljabrchemical examiner reportcriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench, which cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, on the allegation of committing Zina Biljabr. The Additional Sessions Judge had initially granted bail to the petitioner due to the non-receipt of the chemical examiner's report. Upon receipt of the report, the High Court cancelled the bail upon an application by the complainant. The petitioner challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court, raising grounds such as delay in lodging the F.I.R., absence of violence marks, the complainant being used to sexual intercourse, and the solitary nature of the statement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in cancelling the bail based on the subsequent chemical report and the circumstances of the case, declining to interfere. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted by a lower court be cancelled upon the subsequent receipt of an incriminating chemical examiner report?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the absence of marks of violence and a delay in the F.I.R. warrant maintaining bail in a Zina Biljabr case?
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• Muhammad Akbar vs Government of Punjab and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 795 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Shad vs Chairman, WAPDA1990 PLC (C.S.) 126 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1984-05-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Shad vs Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore,K.L.R. 1990 Labour & Service 336 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1984-05-17Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar Khan and 3 others vs Sufi Soap and Chemical1990 PLC 488 · Lahore High Court · 1987-07-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar and another vs The State1990 SCMR 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  bail bond forfeituresurety liabilitynon-appearance of accusedmilitary dutypenalty reductioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that had reduced, but not eliminated, the penalty imposed on sureties for the non-appearance of an accused person. The core legal question was whether sureties should be held liable for the forfeiture of bail bonds when the accused, a member of the Army's Special Services Group, failed to appear in court due to being deployed on classified operational duty in the national interest. The Supreme Court held that the sureties were not liable for the absence of the accused, as his failure to appear was beyond their control and did not constitute abscondence. The Court set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, ruling that the bail bonds were not liable to forfeiture. The key principle laid down is that where an accused's non-appearance is due to legitimate, unavoidable circumstances such as military service in the national interest, and not due to the fault or connivance of the sureties, the sureties cannot be penalized for the breach of the bond.

  Questions settled

  • Are sureties liable for the forfeiture of bail bonds if the accused fails to appear due to military service?
  • Can a court impose a penalty on sureties when the accused's absence is beyond the control of the sureties?
  • Does the failure of an accused to appear due to operational military duty constitute abscondence for the purpose of bond forfeiture?
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• Muhammad Akbar and another vs The State1990 MLD 1553 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar and 10 others vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 50 · Sindh High Court · 1989-06-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ajmal vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1652 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-02Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmed Khan vs Commissioner, D.I. Khan and 4 others1990 P Cr. L J 167 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-06-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ahmad vs Pakistan and others1990 PLC (C.S.) 185 · Sindh High Court · 1986-02-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 864 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-26Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1990 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  amendment of chargetheftOffences Against Propertyappellate forumalteration of chargecompetence of trial courtdelay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the trial court's rejection of an application for amendment of charge. The petitioners, facing trial before an Additional Sessions Judge under Sections 302, 307, 379, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought at the arguments stage to amend the theft charge under Section 379 to Section 13 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, contending that Section 3 of the Ordinance rendered Section 379 inapplicable and altered the appellate forum. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that the trial judge was competent to take cognizance under both statutes, the trial was incomplete, and the court retains power under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to alter charges prior to judgment. Furthermore, questions regarding the appellate forum were premature at the argument stage and the application appeared designed to prolong proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court alter or amend a charge under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at any time before the announcement of judgment?
  • Does an objection regarding the potential appellate forum warrant interference with charge framing before the conclusion of trial and pronouncement of sentence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order refusing to amend a charge where the trial court possesses jurisdiction under both competing penal statutes?
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• Muhammad Afzal vs Manager, Colony Textile Mills Ltd., Multan1990 PLC 709 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1989-06-28Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Shah vs Mazhar Hussain and others1990 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-22
  leave to appealacquittalre-appraisal of evidenceinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponscriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The prosecution alleged that the respondents, along with others, attacked the deceased, Nazar Shah, resulting in his death, with the motive being a long-standing enmity. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death. The High Court subsequently acquitted them. The petitioner challenged this acquittal, arguing that the eye-witness testimony, though from interested witnesses, was corroborated by the recovery of weapons at the respondents' pointation and the prompt filing of the F.I.R. The Supreme Court observed that the arguments raised a substantial question regarding the re-appraisal of evidence to determine if the High Court's decision aligned with established legal principles for criminal justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased required a thorough review of the evidence to ensure justice was served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of weapons at the pointation of the accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction based on the testimony of interested witnesses?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment rendered by the High Court?
  • Is the re-appraisal of evidence permissible in a petition for leave to appeal when the High Court's acquittal is challenged on the grounds of misreading of evidence?
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• Muhammad Afzal and 2 others vs Rehmatullah and anothers1990 PLD Peshawar 131 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-04-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and 19 others vs Board of Revenue, Punjab through Secretary (Colony) and 3 others1990 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  interim reliefwrit petitionleave to appealsupreme court practiceinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the High Court during the pendency of the petitioners' writ petition, whereby the High Court declined to grant interim relief to the petitioners in connection with the recovery of a certain sum of money. The core legal question concerns whether interference is warranted against a discretionary interim order passed by the High Court refusing interim relief while the main writ petition remains pending. The Supreme Court held that there is no justification to modify the interim order of the High Court as it is neither contrary to any law nor departs from any established legal principle. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that discretionary interim orders of the High Court will not be lightly interfered with by the apex court unless tainted by illegality or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an interim order of the High Court refusing interim relief during the pendency of a writ petition?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against an interim order when the main writ petition is still pending before the High Court?
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• Muhammad Achar vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 314 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-30
  murdermedical evidenceocular testimonyrecovery of weaponmashirbenefit of doubtacquittalcharring
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Sessions Judge convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death with a fine and compensation for the murder of Master Ghulam Sarwar. The core legal questions involve the reliability of related eye-witnesses, the weight to be given to medical evidence regarding the distance of firing vis-a-vis ocular testimony, and the validity of recoveries made in non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Sindh High Court held that where ocular testimony directly contradicts medical evidence regarding the presence of charring and the distance of firing, and where recovery witnesses are not from the local area as mandated by statute, the prosecution's case becomes highly doubtful. The court laid down that medical evidence based on exact observation must prevail over inconsistent ocular testimony, that recoveries from outside the locality without local mashirs are unreliable, and that the benefit of such doubts must be given to the accused, leading to the acquittal of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether closely related eye-witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration in a murder trial?
  • Does medical evidence regarding the distance of firing prevail over inconsistent ocular testimony?
  • What is the evidentiary value of recoveries made in violation of the requirement to associate respectable inhabitants of the locality as search witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether prompt lodging of a First Information Report can cure fundamental contradictions between ocular and medical evidence?
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• Muhammad Abid vs Messrs Dollar Ink Industries, Karachi1990 PLC 412 · Labour Court · 1988-10-31Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs The Inspectorgeneral of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  service appealdismissal from servicesummary proceduredepartmental inquirycriminal acquittalpolice constableleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Constable dismissed from service following summary proceedings for dereliction of duty, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the dismissal of his appeal by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether summary proceedings and the omission of a formal inquiry vitiated the dismissal when facts were controverted, and whether a subsequent acquittal in a criminal case based on similar facts warranted setting aside the departmental dismissal. The Supreme Court held that where a public servant is apprehended pari delicto by a superior, shorter inquiry procedures are legally permissible under established precedent, and that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not invalidate departmental proceedings when the departmental charges encompass broader and more serious derelictions not forming the subject-matter of the criminal trial. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that summary departmental inquiries are justified under appropriate factual circumstances and remain distinct from criminal prosecutions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether summary departmental proceedings can be adopted instead of a formal inquiry when a public servant is apprehended in the act of committing a dereliction of duty?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal case automatically invalidate a departmental dismissal based on similar facts?
  • Can broader charges in departmental proceedings prevent an acquittal under criminal law from reacting in favour of the accused employee?
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• Muhammad Abdullah And Others vs Noor Muhammad And Other1990 CLC 726 · Lahore High Court · 1989-05-21Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah and others vs Mumtaz Begum and 5 others1990 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-04
  leave to appealspecific performancerevisional jurisdictionbona fide purchaserIslamic lawdisclosure of defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the acceptance of a civil revision by the High Court in a suit for specific performance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact rendered by the two lower courts in favour of the petitioners. The Court also considered the applicability and effect of established judicial precedents regarding specific performance, as well as the provisions of section 27(h) of the Specific Relief Act in conjunction with Islamic law principles requiring vendors to disclose defects in title or property to subsequent vendees, and how such principles impact the plea of bona fides and lack of notice raised by second vendees. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions in detail, directing the preparation of the appeal on the existing record with security fixed at Rs. 5,000.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the case was fit for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court when the two courts below had rendered findings in favour of the petitioners?
  • Whether it was necessary for the courts below to apply principles of Islamic Law requiring vendors to disclose defects in title or property to the second vendees under section 27(h) of the Specific Relief Act?
  • What is the effect of the disclosure principle on the plea of the second vendees regarding their bona fides and lack of notice?
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• Muhammad Abdul Jameel vs Director-General, Pakistan Post Office1990 PLC (C.S.) 136 · Federal Service Tribunal · 1989-07-20Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abbas vs National Bank of Pakistan1990 PLC 189 · Lahore High Court · 1989-04-05Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aalam vs Chiragh Din1990 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  compromiseout-of-court settlementcivil appealpermanent injunctionsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a civil suit concerning a declaration and permanent injunction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the parties could settle the dispute through an out-of-court compromise at the appellate stage and whether such a compromise could be formally recorded and made part of the court's order. Upon representation by learned counsel for both parties that a genuine compromise deed had been executed and that no legal impediments existed to its implementation, the Court accepted the compromise. The Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be converted into an appeal and disposed of in accordance with the terms of the compromise deed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court possesses the authority to record and give effect to a compromise reached between parties during appellate proceedings, thereby disposing of the matter in terms of the settlement, provided the compromise is verified as genuine and legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal to give effect to a compromise between parties?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to dispose of a matter in terms of a compromise deed reached between parties during appellate proceedings?
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• Muhamamad Dawood vs Superintending Engineer, Operation Circles, WAPDA, Quetta and 2 others1990 SCMR 1252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  dismissal in defaultnon-prosecutionadditional evidenceremand of caseofficial witnesscivil procedureelectricity charges
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff filed a civil suit challenging exorbitant electricity installation and consumption charges levied by WAPDA for a tube-well. During trial, after examining three witnesses, the plaintiff's evidence was closed by the court due to the non-attendance of an official witness from WAPDA, and the suit was subsequently dismissed in default for the plaintiff's non-appearance. The appellate court upheld the dismissal and declined an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to produce additional evidence. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the record and held that the plaintiff had fulfilled his legal responsibility regarding the summoning of the official witness, and the courts below erred in penalising the plaintiff for the non-appearance of the official witness whose summons had unserved status without explanation. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal as a pending appeal, and permitted the production of additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution is proper when sufficient evidence exists on the record?
  • Whether a case should be remanded for examining an official witness whose summons remained unserved without fault of the plaintiff?
  • Is there justification for admitting additional evidence in appellate proceedings when the failure to produce the witness in the lower court was due to court or official omission rather than plaintiff's negligence?
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• Mubashir Hussain vs Punjab Province through Secretary, Finance1990 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  civil servantservice tribunalpremature appealfinal orderleave to appealpay revisionrelaxation of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a civil servant against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal as premature. The core legal question was whether the departmental letters and the refusal of a relaxation in rules constituted a final appealable departmental order under the relevant service laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the service appeal was indeed premature as the challenged communications were merely seeking clarifications or refusing discretionary relaxations rather than being final determinative orders affecting the petitioner's terms and conditions of service. The Court affirmed that an appeal before the Service Tribunal is incompetent when the departmental authorities have yet to pass a final adverse order. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, establishing that civil servants cannot maintain a service appeal against non-final correspondence or the refusal of discretionary rule relaxations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent against a departmental communication seeking clarifications regarding service records?
  • Does the refusal of a relaxation in service rules constitute a final appealable order for a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant maintain a service appeal when the departmental authorities have yet to pass a final adverse order concerning their terms and conditions of service?
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• Mubarik Shah vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1796 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-05-27
  special court jurisdictionrepeal of ordinancearticle 264 constitutionscheduled offencelegal proceedingslapsed ordinancecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This Full Bench was constituted to determine whether the Special Court, established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, retained jurisdiction to try an accused for an offence under the Arms Ordinance, 1965, after the amending Ordinances (XVI and XVII of 1988) had lapsed due to not being laid before the National Assembly within the prescribed period. The appellant argued that the Special Court lost jurisdiction upon the repeal of the amending Ordinance. The Court held, by a majority, that under Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, the repeal of a law does not affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed law. The Court ruled that the trial of the appellant was a continuation of the legal proceedings initiated under the law in force at the time of the offence. Consequently, the Special Court validly retained jurisdiction, and the trial was not vitiated by the subsequent lapse of the amending Ordinances.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lapse of an amending Ordinance by operation of Article 89 of the Constitution divest a Special Court of jurisdiction over proceedings initiated under the repealed law?
  • Does Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 save the jurisdiction of a Special Court to continue a trial for an offence committed while the amending Ordinance was in force?
  • Is the forum provided for the trial of an offence considered an integral part of the 'legal proceedings' saved under Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 upon the repeal of a statute?
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• Mubarik Ali vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1685 · Federal Shariat Court · 1989-11-05Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Ali And Another vs The StatePTCL 1990 CL. 268 · Special Appellate Court Customs · 1981-05-24Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Ali Khan And 7 Others vs Government of the Punjab Through Secretary, FinanceDepartment, Civil Secretariat, Lahore And Another1990 CLC 136 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-07
  Secretariat allowanceequal protection of lawreasonable classificationHigh Court establishmentconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of serviceProvincial Consolidated Fund
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, sought a direction against the Government of Punjab to extend the benefit of a Finance Department memorandum granting a 20% Secretariat allowance to employees of the Punjab Secretariat and Board of Revenue, to the officers and servants of the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court employees were barred from invoking writ jurisdiction due to alternative service tribunal remedies or lack of specific framing of rules under Article 208, and whether the denial of the Secretariat allowance to High Court staff constituted unconstitutional discrimination under Articles 4 and 25. The Lahore High Court held that its employees do not fall within the definition of civil servants under the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974, that rule 22 of the High Court Establishment Rules governs their allowances through the Civil Service Rules (Punjab), and that denying the allowance to High Court staff similarly situated to Secretariat employees violates the right to equal protection of law. The court established that administrative expenses charged upon the Provincial Consolidated Fund under Article 121 preclude the state from denying legitimate allowances based on financial constraints.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the officers and servants of the High Court fall within the definition of civil servants so as to exclude the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • Does the failure of the High Court to frame separate rules under Article 208 disentitle its staff from claiming allowances governed generally by the Civil Service Rules (Punjab)?
  • Is the denial of a Secretariat allowance to the staff of the High Court while granting it to the Punjab Secretariat and Board of Revenue employees violative of the principle of equal protection under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Can the Provincial Government refuse to grant admissible allowances to High Court employees on the ground of financial constraints in light of expenditures charged upon the Provincial Consolidated Fund?
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• Mu14ammad Madassar Shah vs Mubarik Shah And Another1990 CLC 1679 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst.Nasreen Akhtar vs Asmat Ullah PehalwanK.L.R. 1990 Revenue Cases 118 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubatda vs The State1990 SCMR 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-06
  ZinaLeave to appealTrial court dutyCriminal procedureMiscarriage of justiceEvidence examinationBail suspension
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for the offence of Zina. The core legal question was whether the trial court failed to perform its mandatory duty to examine relevant evidence and reconcile conflicting versions of the accused's marital status, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 165 of the Evidence Act 1872 to summon and examine crucial documents, specifically conflicting Nikahnama records, which were essential to the defence's case. The Court emphasized that a trial judge has an active duty to ensure justice is done, particularly when the defence is inadequately presented due to counsel's negligence or the accused's lack of resources. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the petitioner's sentence pending the final outcome. The principle laid down is that a trial court must actively marshal evidence and cannot remain a passive observer when material documents on record could resolve fundamental issues of guilt or innocence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have a duty to summon and examine material evidence on record even if the defence fails to highlight it?
  • Can a conviction for Zina be sustained if the trial court fails to reconcile conflicting evidence regarding the validity of a marriage?
  • Is a trial court's passive participation in a criminal trial considered a ground for potential miscarriage of justice?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Zubaida Mumtaz Begum and others vs Mst. Ikram Jan and another1990 SCMR 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-25
  restoration of appealdismissal for defaultnon-appearanceaffidavit as evidencepartition suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order restoring a partition appeal that was earlier dismissed for default. The core legal question is whether the affidavit submitted by a counsel in support of an application for restoration can be treated as valid evidence to explain non-appearance, and whether the District Judge was competent to rely upon it. The Supreme Court held that the District Judge was fully competent to consider and act upon the affidavit of the counsel detailing the reasons for his absence, especially when the restoration application was filed on the very day of dismissal. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an affidavit sworn by a counsel detailing reasons for non-appearance constitutes valid material upon which a court may exercise its discretion to restore a dismissed matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can an affidavit submitted by a counsel in support of an application for restoration be treated as evidence to explain non-appearance?
  • Is a District Judge competent to act upon the affidavit of a counsel in preference to a counter-affidavit when considering the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Whether satisfactory cause for non-appearance is established when a restoration application is filed on the very day the appeal was dismissed?
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• Mst. Zohra Bibi vs Additional District Judge and others1990 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-17
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fideconstitutional jurisdictionrent restrictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's Constitution petition in limine against the appellate order setting aside her ejectment petitions. The appellant, a widow, had sought the ejectment of the respondents from her shop on grounds including personal need for her son to start a business. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding the plea of personal need lacking in bona fides because the appellant had previously rented out another vacated shop to a third party instead of using it and because newly constructed shops were vacant. The core legal question was whether the appellate authority's finding of fact regarding lack of bona fide personal need warranted constitutional interference. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact by the appellate authority was neither fanciful nor arbitrary and could not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that findings of fact on the bona fides of personal need rendered by a competent rent appellate forum, based on tangible evidence, are final and immune from interference under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the bona fides of personal need recorded by a rent appellate authority can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the subsequent letting out of a previously vacated shop affect the bona fides of a landlord's claim for personal need?
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• Mst. Zaitun Begum and others vs Agha Qasim Ali and others1990 SCMR 1613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab vs Kamal Khan alias Kamla1990 PLD Supreme Court 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-12
  inheritanceMuslim Family Laws Ordinanceper stripespredeceased sonIslamic law of inheritancesuccessionpropositus
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, specifically regarding the inheritance rights of children of a predeceased son or daughter of a propositus. The core legal question was whether Section 4 entitles such grandchildren to the entire share their parent would have inherited, or if it merely provides an opportunity to obtain their Islamic Law shares, without increasing them or excluding other legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 does not grant grandchildren a larger share than what they would be entitled to under Islamic Law through their parents. The Court ruled that the provision is intended to protect the interests of grandchildren without depriving other legal heirs of their rightful inheritance. The ratio decidendi is that the distribution must be made per stripes, meaning the estate is divided based on the share the predeceased parent would have received, which is then distributed among the grandchildren according to Islamic Law. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Section 4 cannot be interpreted to exclude other legal heirs or to grant grandchildren more than their Islamic entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, entitle the children of a predeceased son to inherit the entire share their parent would have received if alive?
  • Can Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, be interpreted to exclude other legal heirs of the propositus from their share of inheritance?
  • Is the distribution of inheritance under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, subject to the principles of Islamic Law of Inheritance?
  • Does the principle of 'per stripes' under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, allow grandchildren to receive a larger share than they would be entitled to under Islamic Law?
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• Mst. Zainab Bibi vs The State and another1990 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  culpable homicideintention vs knowledgesentence enhancementcriminal revisionleave to appealfatal injuriesnon-vital parts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal revision filed by the petitioner, the wife of the deceased, seeking the enhancement of the respondent's sentence from life imprisonment to death following his conviction for the murder of his brother. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and instead convicting him under Section 304, Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent lacked the specific intention to kill, as evidenced by the fact that the fatal blows were inflicted on non-vital parts of the body (forearm and leg) despite the absence of anyone to intervene. The Court held that the respondent acted with the knowledge that his actions could cause death, rather than the intent to kill, thereby justifying the conviction under Section 304, Part-II. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the lower court's reasoning regarding the distinction between intention and knowledge in homicide cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of injuries on non-vital body parts negate the intention to commit murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When does an act of homicide fall under the purview of Section 304, Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 302?
  • Is the absence of intervention by third parties a relevant factor in determining the intention of an accused in a murder case?
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• Mst. Zahida alias Zubeda Zahoor vs Deputy Director, Health Services, Bahawalpur Division and another1990 SCMR 1504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delaytermination of serviceleave to appealwilful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner's services were terminated on 30-5-1985 due to willful absence from duty, and her departmental appeal was dismissed on 3-6-1986. She subsequently filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 2-9-1986 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petitioner contended that she was not timely informed of the departmental appellate order and had applied for an attested copy. However, the Service Tribunal rejected these grounds, finding that the decision was dispatched to her recorded address, the allegation regarding the attested copy was contradicted by the filing of a mere photocopy, and no valid explanation was provided for the delay. The Supreme Court affirmed the Service Tribunal's decision, holding that there was no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's exercise of discretion regarding condonation of delay. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide a sufficient explanation for delay in filing a service appeal justify the refusal of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution where the Service Tribunal has lawfully exercised its discretion in dismissing an appeal as time-barred?
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• Mst. Urman Jee vs District Judge, Kohat and 3 others1990 PLD Peshawar 100 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-01-16
  specific performancecross-examinationsummoning of partiesrevisional jurisdictionconstitutional petitionadverse inferenceexamination-in-chief
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Urman Jee filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement against Arshad Javed, where the defendant admitted the claim in his written statement. Subsequently, Kundal Khan was impleaded as a party due to a pending pre-emption suit. Kundal Khan later filed an application to summon Arshad Javed solely for cross-examination without examining him as a witness. The trial court dismissed the application, but the District Judge accepted a revision petition and set aside the trial court's order. In the constitutional petition before the Peshawar High Court, the core legal question was whether a party to a suit can be summoned exclusively for cross-examination without entering the witness-box, and whether the revisional court could interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion. The High Court held that no provision in law compels a party to appear as their own witness or allows a party to be cross-examined without an examination-in-chief, and that revisional courts cannot interfere with a proper exercise of discretion by a trial court without manifest illegality or jurisdictional error. The constitutional petition was accepted and the District Judge's order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party to a suit can be summoned exclusively for cross-examination without being examined-in-chief?
  • Can a court compel a party to litigation to appear as a witness against their will?
  • In what circumstances can a revisional court interfere with a discretionary order passed by a trial court?
  • Does a party have the right to cross-examine an opposing party who refuses to enter the witness-box?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Umme Khatoon vs Mst. Umme Salam1990 PLD Supreme Court 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  rent evictionpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantstatutory noticerent restrictionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment setting aside an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller. The appellant, a landlady, sought eviction of the respondent on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement of the premises. The High Court had overturned the Controller's order, citing the absence of personal requirement grounds in the statutory notice, inconsistencies in the landlady's affidavit, and a lack of proof regarding the pendency of a rent case against the landlady's son. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's reasoning was flawed. The Court ruled that a statutory notice under the relevant rent ordinance does not require the mention of personal requirement to establish bona fide need. Furthermore, the Court established that where a landlord resides in a rented house or with a son who occupies a rented house, this is sufficient to establish good faith for personal requirement unless mala fides are proven. The Court restored the Controller's eviction order, emphasizing that the landlady's right to occupy her own property is not negated by temporary stays with family members.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to mention the ground of personal requirement in a statutory notice issued under Section 13-A of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a landlord's temporary residence with family members negate their claim of personal bona fide requirement for their own property?
  • Is the fact that a landlord resides in a rented house sufficient to establish good faith for an eviction application based on personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Umatullah vs Maqbool Hussain and 4 others1990 MLD 2363 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tauqir Fatima vs Iqbal Mehdi Shah and another1990 P Cr. L J 342 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-30
  habeas corpuschild custodyminorSection 491 Cr.P.C.Guardians and Wards Actinterim custodypersonal law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed by a mother seeking the recovery of her seven-month-old son from his paternal grandparents. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody matters under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if such disputes are exclusively reserved for the Family Court or Guardian Judge. The Court held that while the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides the primary forum for custody disputes, the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to intervene in exceptional cases where custody has been disturbed illegally or improperly. Recognizing the infant’s tender age and the mother’s entitlement under personal law, the Court granted interim custody to the mother, directing the Guardian Judge to decide the permanent custody suit within six months. The judgment establishes that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 proceedings are summary in nature and do not overlap with, but rather complement, the jurisdiction of the Guardian Judge, serving as an efficacious, speedy remedy in urgent situations without prejudicing final adjudication by the competent court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to determine the custody of a minor?
  • Are the proceedings under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 mutually exclusive?
  • Can the High Court grant interim custody of a minor in a habeas corpus petition pending a final decision by a Guardian Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tahira vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others1990 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  guardians and wardscustody of minorhizanatvested right of motherleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining concurrent findings of lower courts that the respondent mother, being the real mother of the minor girl, possessed a vested right of 'hizanat'. The core legal questions involve whether section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 applies when custody of a minor was obtained by an agreement, and whether the non-joinder of the paternal-grandmother renders the custody application incompetent. The Supreme Court held that section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is attracted where custody is denied to a mother based on a disputed agreement, and that a real mother possessing no disqualifications holds a superior vested right of 'hizanat' over a paternal-grandmother. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 apply to a case where custody of a minor was obtained on the basis of an agreement?
  • Does a real mother have a superior vested right of hizanat over a paternal-grandmother when she is otherwise qualified?
  • Does the failure to implead a paternal-grandmother render a custody application under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 incompetent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tabbasum Tarar vs Shabbir Hussain Chowdhry and others1990 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  ejectmentexecution proceedingstenancy rightspartnership deedrent controllerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside an order of the Rent Controller dismissing an execution application. The petitioner, a landlord, had obtained an ejectment order against the first respondent for default in rent payment. Subsequently, other respondents (partners of the first respondent) obstructed the execution of the ejectment order by filing separate civil suits claiming tenancy rights, which were dismissed. The Rent Controller initially held that these partners did not acquire independent tenancy rights and were liable to be ejected under the original order. However, the High Court allowed the respondents' appeal. The Supreme Court, noting the conflicting judgments rendered by various courts regarding the status of the partners and the enforceability of the ejectment order against them, determined that the matter required further judicial consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the legal controversy surrounding the execution of the ejectment order against third parties claiming tenancy through a partnership arrangement.

  Questions settled

  • Can partners of a tenant claim independent tenancy rights to obstruct the execution of an ejectment order against the primary tenant?
  • Does a partnership deed involving the tenant and third parties automatically confer tenancy rights upon those third parties?
  • Can an ejectment order passed against a primary tenant be executed against partners who claim to be in possession of the premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Surayya Begum vs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and 4 others1990 PLD Lahore 4 · Lahore High Court · 1989-10-02
  execution proceedingsattachment of propertyobjection petitionbanking courtbona fide purchaserCode of Civil Procedureremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order by the Special Judge (Banking Court) rejecting the appellant's objection petition against the attachment and auction of property during execution proceedings. The appellant claimed ownership via a registered sale deed predating the suit. The core legal question was whether the executing court could summarily dismiss the objection without conducting an investigation. The High Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable, as the executing court failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed under Order XXI Rules 58, 59, and 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court emphasized that an executing court is legally obligated to adjudicate upon claims relating to title or interest in attached property by providing parties an adequate opportunity to establish their claims. Summary rejection based on conjectures, without proper investigation or framing of issues, violates these provisions. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the proviso to Rule 58(1) regarding delay must be interpreted cautiously to avoid defeating the substantive right to adjudication. The case was remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an executing court required to conduct an investigation into claims of title regarding attached property under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can an executing court summarily reject an objection petition against attachment without framing issues or allowing parties to lead evidence?
  • Does the proviso to Order XXI Rule 58(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the rejection of an objection petition without investigation solely on the grounds of delay?
  • Is a separate suit maintainable to establish title or interest in attached property, or must it be determined by the executing court under Order XXI Rule 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughran Bibi and others vs Member, (Consolidation), Board of Revenuf, Punjab, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-30
  consolidation schemeboard of revenuewrit petitionleave to appealland classificationconsent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition regarding a consolidation scheme dispute in village Mundranwala, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot. The consolidation scheme was originally confirmed in 1966, following which the petitioners litigated alleging a reduction in their entitlement. Their revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, was dismissed because the scheme had been confirmed pursuant to their written consent given on 29 October 1966. The High Court subsequently dismissed their writ petition, noting that the petitioners actually obtained more area in class III land than their previous holding and that no reduction occurred when calculated by land classification. The Supreme Court addressed whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding land entitlement and written consent warranted interference. Holding that the findings of fact called for no interference, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that concurrent factual determinations regarding land classification and consent in consolidation proceedings shall not be disturbed by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding land entitlement in consolidation proceedings can be interfered with?
  • Does a consolidation scheme confirmed pursuant to written consent bind the parties?
  • Whether obtaining more area in class III land negates claims of reduction in entitlement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamshad Begum vs Muhammad Amin and 13 others1990 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of appealleave to appealdeclaratory suitabsence of counselprocedural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a declaratory suit where the petitioner's appeal was dismissed in default by the District Court, and a subsequent application for restoration was also rejected. The High Court affirmed the dismissal, primarily reasoning that the petitioner failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the absence of her engaged counsel on the date of the hearing. The petitioner contends that she intended to appear personally to pursue the appeal but was prevented by an unfortunate incident, arguing that her personal presence would have precluded the dismissal for default regardless of her counsel's absence. The core legal question concerns whether the dismissal of an appeal for default is sustainable when the litigant offers a plausible explanation for their personal absence, potentially mitigating the absence of legal counsel. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioner's explanation regarding her absence and related issues, including limitation, require further examination. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed for default if the appellant is absent but provides a valid explanation for such absence?
  • Does the absence of legal counsel justify the dismissal of an appeal if the litigant is prepared to appear personally?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar Aurangzaib and others vs Minhajul Abidin Khan1990 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-28
  rent restrictionbona fide personal needevictionjoint landlordco-ownershipforfeiture of right to evictMuslim Family Laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved appeals concerning the eviction of tenants from commercial premises based on the personal bona fide need of the landlords. The central legal question, initially framed by the lower courts, was whether the term 'children' in the Rent Restriction Ordinance included a 'step-son' for the purpose of establishing personal need for eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had misconstrued the facts. In both appeals, the individuals for whom the premises were required were not mere step-sons but were, in fact, co-owners and joint landlords of the properties in question. Consequently, the legal question regarding the definition of 'children' and the status of step-sons became academic and irrelevant to the resolution of the cases. The Court held that since the requirement was that of the joint landlords themselves, the eviction applications were maintainable. The Court further rejected arguments regarding the forfeiture of the right to evict due to the alleged re-letting of other premises, noting that the statutory provisions regarding forfeiture were not attracted in these circumstances. The appeals were allowed, and eviction was ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'children' in the Rent Restriction Ordinance exclude a step-son for the purpose of establishing personal bona fide need?
  • Can a joint landlord seek eviction of a tenant for their own personal bona fide use and occupation?
  • Does the re-letting of previously vacated premises by a landlord automatically trigger forfeiture of the right to seek eviction under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz Kausar vs Sarfraz Ahmad and another1990 MLD 935 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shabbo vs The State1990 PLD Supreme Court 1083 · Shariat Appellate Bench · 1990-07-25
  narcotics traffickingmandatory whippingrevisional jurisdictionprocedural defectsfemale offenderdeterrent punishmentProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Federal Shariat Court's judgment, which upheld her conviction under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for drug trafficking and enhanced her sentence by adding 10 stripes of whipping in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The core legal questions were whether the conviction was sustainable despite alleged procedural defects in the search and whether the enhancement of the sentence to include mandatory whipping for a female offender was legally permissible. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, rejecting arguments regarding the absence of a female police official during the search and the lack of independent witnesses, noting that such technicalities do not vitiate the trial. Regarding the sentence, the Court affirmed that whipping is a mandatory requirement of law for the offense, and while criminal law may view female offenders with compassion, the nature of the crime—trafficking narcotics—warrants deterrent punishment. The Court concluded that the sentence was not excessive and refused leave to appeal, establishing that mandatory statutory punishments apply regardless of gender in serious drug-related offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a female police official during the search of a female accused vitiate the trial?
  • Can the Federal Shariat Court enhance a sentence to include mandatory whipping in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is the sentence of whipping under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, mandatory for female offenders?
  • Does the lack of independent witnesses in a narcotics recovery case render the prosecution's case unreliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sayyeeda Khatoon vs Ma Agha1990 MLD 1715 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarwari vs The State and 2 others1990 P Cr. L J 1008 · Sindh High Court · 1989-12-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardari Begum vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1473 · Sindh High Court · 1989-08-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardaran vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1552 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardaran Bibi vs The State1990 PLD Karachi 233 · Sindh High Court · 1989-11-20
  surety bondstoppage of proceedingsdischarge of suretycriminal revisionbail bond liabilitySection 249 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application concerns the interpretation of Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the liability of a surety after proceedings against an accused are stopped. The applicant, who stood surety for two accused persons, sought the return of her surety documents after the Magistrate stopped the proceedings under Section 249, Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court rejected the application, reasoning that the accused had not been acquitted and thus the surety remained liable. The High Court held that the stoppage of proceedings under Section 249, Cr.P.C. effectively discharges the accused from the requirement of regular court attendance, thereby terminating the surety's liability. The Court reasoned that a surety cannot be held liable for an indefinite period when the accused is no longer required to appear before the court. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the return of the surety documents, establishing the principle that the release of an accused under Section 249, Cr.P.C. brings the surety's obligation to produce the accused to an end.

  Questions settled

  • Does the stoppage of proceedings under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 terminate the liability of a surety?
  • Is a surety entitled to the return of surety documents when proceedings against the accused are stopped under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the release of an accused under Section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the continued presence of the accused in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sardaran Bibi and anothers vs Allahdino1990 PLD Karachi 227 · Sindh High Court · 1990-01-17
  dismissal for defaultno instructionstermination of vakalatnamarestoration of appealvoid orderlimitation periodinherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 challenged an order of the Additional District Judge rejecting an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default as barred by limitation under Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal question was whether an appeal could be legally dismissed for default under Order XLI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the appellant's advocate merely reported 'no instructions' without following the mandatory procedure for termination of vakalatnama and obtaining the leave of the court under Order III, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Sindh Civil Court Rules. The Sindh High Court held that an advocate's appointment continues until determined in accordance with the law, and a mere oral statement of 'no instructions' does not terminate the engagement or constitute non-appearance of the appellant. Consequently, the dismissal order was void and inoperative, meaning the restoration application fell under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 governed by the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 rather than Article 168. The appeal was allowed, and the original appeal was restored for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an advocate effectively terminate their engagement by merely reporting no instructions in court without complying with the statutory procedure for withdrawal?
  • Whether an appeal can be dismissed for default of appearance under Order XLI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the appellant's counsel is present in court but reports no instructions?
  • What limitation article applies to an application for the restoration of an appeal dismissed via a void order of dismissal for default?
  • Does an advocate's appointment continue through appellate proceedings arising from a suit unless formally terminated with the leave of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sameen vs Afghanullah and 2 others1990 PLD Peshawar 110 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 693 · Lahore High Court · 1989-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bibi vs Bashir Ahmad1990 CLC 853 · Lahore High Court · 1988-01-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina and 2 others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Vehari and another1990 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  revisional orderrehabilitation commissionerallotment of landverified claim-holdervested rightinter partes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Constitution petition filed by the successors-in-interest of a verified claim-holder seeking protection of land allotments made in 1951-52 against a general revisional order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 23-11-1956. The core legal question was whether the appellants could challenge the implementation of the 1956 revisional order—which had annulled prior allotments and directed de novo allotments and which was upheld by the Supreme Court in earlier litigation—and whether the appellants had any vested right in the land. The Supreme Court held that the general revisional order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, having been preceded by a hearing and upheld by the superior courts, operated of its own force to annul previous allotments without requiring individual cancellation notices. Furthermore, decisions rendered inter partes in prior litigation bound the parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the appellants could not reopen settled matters where no vested right existed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a general revisional order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner operates of its own force to annul previous allotments without individual notices of cancellation?
  • Whether allottees who were not parties to earlier litigation challenging a revisional order can claim the benefit of judgments quashing such orders when a subsequent inter partes decision has attained finality?
  • Does an allottee acquire a vested right in land prior to the final implementation of de novo allotments under a valid revisional order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakeena Begum and another vs Fazlur Rehman and 2 others1990 PLD Azad J&K 22 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1990-01-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Begum vs Taj Din And Other1990 CLC 1503 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-03
  second appealcertified copyspecific performancemaintainability of appealmandatory requirementCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a regular second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which granted specific performance of an agreement to sell in favour of the respondents. The core legal question before the Court was whether a second appeal is maintainable when the appellant fails to file a certified copy of the trial court's judgment along with the memorandum of appeal, as required by law. The Court held that the appeal was not properly constituted and was incompetent. The Court reasoned that the filing of a certified copy of the trial court's judgment is a mandatory requirement under Order XLI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Since the appellant failed to provide the required document despite having notice of the defect for several years and failed to seek condonation of delay, the appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the requirement to file certified copies of lower court judgments in a second appeal is mandatory, and failure to comply without a court-ordered dispensation renders the appeal incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Is the filing of a certified copy of the trial court's judgment a mandatory requirement for a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a second appeal be considered properly constituted if the appellant fails to file the required certified copies and does not obtain a dispensation from the court?
  • Does the failure to file certified copies of lower court judgments render a second appeal incompetent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Begum vs Allah Nawaz1990 CLC 1852 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Khatoon vs Muhammad Ahmed Latifi1990 PLD Supreme Court 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-05
  tenancy agreementsecurity depositrent defaultevictionstatutory tenancyrent restrictionadjustment of deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing an eviction application against a tenant. The core legal question was whether a security deposit held by a landlord under a tenancy agreement could be adjusted against unpaid rent to absolve a tenant of default, particularly after the initial tenancy agreement expired. The Supreme Court held that the security deposit could not be adjusted against current rent arrears, as the agreement specifically prohibited such adjustment and mandated the deposit be held until the premises were vacated. The Court affirmed that covenants regarding security deposits remain enforceable even after the expiry of the initial lease term, as they do not conflict with rent restriction laws. It was established that security deposits are governed by the specific terms of the tenancy agreement and cannot be unilaterally adjusted by a Rent Controller or court to cover rent defaults. Despite the High Court's legal error regarding the adjustment of the deposit, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the eviction application, noting that the Rent Controller had validly exercised discretion in favor of the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a security deposit held under a tenancy agreement be adjusted against current rent arrears to absolve a tenant of default?
  • Do the terms of a tenancy agreement regarding security deposits survive the expiry of the initial lease term?
  • Does the expiration of a tenancy agreement render the covenant concerning the non-adjustment of a security deposit unenforceable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rubia Zarin vs Aamer Amin Malik1990 MLD 2150 · Lahore High Court · 1990-02-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rifat Zohra vs Assistant Commissioner_Collector, Kabirwala, District Khanewal and 2 others1990 MLD 771 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riaz Begum vs The S.H.O., Police Station, Ferozewala and 3 others1990 P Cr. L J 1250 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-13
  transfer of investigationconstitutional jurisdictionfair investigationpolice negligencewrit petitioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner, Mst. Riaz Begum, seeking the transfer of the investigation of a criminal case (F.I.R. No. 563/89) from the local police to an independent officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The petitioner alleged that the investigating officer acted with mala fide intent, ignored crucial evidence regarding the deceased parties' armed presence at the petitioner's residence, and failed to investigate the accused party's plea of self-defence. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could direct the transfer of an ongoing police investigation where the investigating officer failed to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry. The Court held that while the police have the authority to investigate, they are legally obligated to collect all evidence, whether supporting or contradicting the prosecution. Finding that the investigating officer's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and failed to meet the legal requirements of a proper investigation, the Court allowed the petition and directed the authorities to transfer the investigation to a superior officer to ensure impartiality.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to direct the transfer of a police investigation?
  • Is an investigating officer legally required to collect evidence that may support the accused's version of events?
  • Does the failure of an investigating officer to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry justify the transfer of the investigation to another officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Resham Bibi and 3 others vs Walayat Hussain alias Abdul Karim1990 PLD Azad J&K 34 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1989-12-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmoon Mai and 21 others vs Mst. Rasool Bibi and 7 others1990 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  specific performanceagreement to sellconsiderationleave to appealcivil revisionmodification of relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff side against the dismissal of their Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question concerns whether payments of government dues andabadkari done by the petitioners can be treated as valid or adequate consideration for the sale agreement, and whether the court can modify relief or pass a decree upon payment of remaining consideration or partial relief. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding consideration and potential modification of relief require detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that where an agreement to sell is found genuine, the adequacy and nature of consideration involving collateral acts like payment of government dues and development work require judicial examination for potential relief modification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether payments of government dues and abadkari can be treated as valid consideration for an agreement to sell?
  • Can a court modify the relief sought in a suit for specific performance to grant partial relief or return of consideration?
  • Whether a Civil Revision should be dismissed solely on the ground of lack of consideration when the agreement to sell is found genuine?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehana Masud vs Farrukh Saeed Siddiqui1990 MLD 2089 · Lahore High Court · 1990-04-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others vs Kaneez Fatima and 3 others1990 SCMR 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-28
  leave to appealbar of suitcause of actionrejection of plaintdeclaration and possessionsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the lower appellate court's decision holding the petitioners' suit for declaration and possession to be barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the rejection of the plaint in an earlier suit. The core legal question concerns whether Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies when an earlier suit's plaint was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, and whether the cause of action in both suits was identical. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the applicability of Order II, Rule 2 and the nature of the cause of action require detailed examination. The key principle established is that questions regarding the bar of Order II, Rule 2 following the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 merit formal appellate review by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit when the plaint in the earlier suit was rejected under Order VII Rule 11?
  • Can the subject-matter and cause of action of two successive suits be treated as the same for the purposes of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashid Begum vs Abdul Rashid and others1990 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-23
  cancellation of bailmurder casecircumstantial evidenceconcession of bailexpeditious trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an application filed by Mst. Rashid Begum before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, Abdul Rashid, who was accused of murder. The core legal question before the Court was whether the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent, in a case involving circumstantial evidence, satisfied the established judicial standards for bail in murder cases. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence, including recovery of a weapon and witness statements regarding the disposal of items in a canal. The Court held that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value should be left for the trial court to determine. Finding that the respondent was not entitled to the concession of bail under the circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, cancelled the respondent's bail, and dismissed his separate application for bail. The Court further directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, emphasizing that bail is not appropriate where circumstantial evidence warrants a full trial examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted in a murder case resting primarily on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to cancel bail granted by the High Court if the discretion was not exercised in accordance with established practice?
  • Is it appropriate for the appellate court to evaluate the evidentiary value of circumstantial evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rajan vs Jewan1990 CLC 896 · Lahore High Court · 1989-09-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raj Bibi and others vs Ghulam Sarwar and another1990 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-06
  specific performancepre-emptionagreement to sellprivity of contractleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal regarding the specific performance of an agreement to sell back land. Briefly, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sold land to a respondent who simultaneously executed an agreement to reconvey a portion of the land upon payment within a specified period. Subsequently, that initial sale was successfully pre-empted by another respondent, who was substituted in place of the original vendee. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, but the appellate court reversed it, and the High Court upheld that dismissal. The core legal question is whether an agreement to reconvey land executed by a vendee is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who has been substituted for the vendee by a pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court held that the claim for specific performance is not enforceable against the successful pre-emptor because there is no privity of contract between the pre-emptor and the vendor. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a pre-emptor substituted through a successful pre-emption decree is not bound by an agreement to reconvey entered into by the original vendee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to reconvey land is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who is substituted for the original vendee?
  • Does a pre-emptor who successfully pre-empts a sale become bound by a separate agreement to sell executed by the original vendee?
  • Is there privity of contract between a pre-emptor and the vendor under an agreement executed by the original vendee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raisa Bibi vs The Subdivisional Officer (E), WAPDA, Operation1990 PLD Peshawar 105 · Peshawar High Court · 1990-03-07
  temporary injunctionelectricity disconnectionirreparable lossarrears of electricity chargesWAPDArevision petitionstatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition arose from a suit challenging an electricity disconnection notice issued by WAPDA. The petitioner sought an injunction to restrain disconnection, which the trial court granted conditionally upon the deposit of outstanding arrears. The appellate court maintained this condition. The core legal question was whether the court could grant a temporary injunction against electricity disconnection without requiring the deposit of disputed arrears, and whether potential pecuniary loss satisfies the "irreparable loss" requirement for an injunction. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the lower courts correctly applied the law. The Court affirmed that pecuniary loss does not constitute "irreparable loss" for the purpose of granting temporary injunctions. Furthermore, the Court held that under Section 54-C of the Electricity Act, 1910, any order prohibiting the licensee from discontinuing energy supply is statutorily contingent upon the consumer depositing the assessed amount. Consequently, the Court upheld the requirement for the petitioner to deposit the arrears, albeit directing that the funds be deposited in the trial court via National Savings Certificates.

  Questions settled

  • Does potential pecuniary loss constitute irreparable loss for the purpose of granting a temporary injunction?
  • Is an injunction prohibiting the disconnection of electricity supply conditional upon the deposit of the assessed arrears under Section 54-C of the Electricity Act, 1910?
  • Can a court order the deposit of disputed electricity arrears as a condition for maintaining a status quo order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rafioun Nisa And 5 Others vs Allah Ditta And 11 Other1990 CLC 1946 · Board of Revenue · 1989-03-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Qamar Sultan vs Mst. Lofrin Begum and 2 others1990 SCMR 1646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-16
  dowerKabin-Namacollusionadverse inferencesecondary evidencecivil revisionproperty disputeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of a house, claimed by the appellant (mother-in-law) against the respondent (daughter-in-law) who had been awarded a share in the property as dower. The core legal question was whether the appellant could establish her superior title based on an old Kabin-Nama, despite the respondent’s prior successful litigation against the appellant’s husband and son. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that while a certified copy of a document over thirty years old is admissible under Section 90-A of the Evidence Act 1872, the failure to produce the original document without reasonable explanation, combined with the suspicious timing of the suit—filed shortly after the appellant’s family lost the previous litigation—supported a finding of collusion. The Court affirmed that high probabilities and conduct can be considered in determining the genuineness of a claim, and that the appellant failed to prove her case against the respondent’s established interest in the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court draw an adverse inference from the non-production of an original document even if a certified copy is admissible?
  • Does the filing of a suit shortly after the failure of related family litigation support a finding of collusion?
  • Under what circumstances can a court reject a claim based on a Kabin-Nama despite the production of a certified copy of the deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nooran vs Altaf Hussain and others1990 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  enhancement of sentencemurdermitigating circumstancesdeath penaltyimprisonment for lifeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant Mst. Nooran seeking the enhancement of the sentence of respondents Altaf Hussain and Muhammad Sadiq from imprisonment for life back to the death penalty originally awarded by the trial court. The respondents were tried and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Maqbool Ahmad alias Maloo, which conviction and modified sentence of life imprisonment were upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether mitigating circumstances existed to justify the reduction of the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in altering the sentence, noting that the respondents acted under the influence of their 80-year-old uncle who was lying ambushed with them. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts may sustain lesser penalties where mitigating factors such as familial influence are present.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life when mitigating circumstances are present?
  • Does acting under the influence of an elder co-accused constitute a mitigating circumstance for the quantum of sentence in a murder case?
  • Can a complainant maintain a petition for leave to appeal for the enhancement of a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Fatima and another vs Begum Bibi and another1990 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  inheritance rightsco-sharerlimitationadverse possessionmutationousterwidow's share
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a civil revision regarding inheritance rights. The core legal question was whether the respondent, a widow of the deceased, was barred by limitation from claiming her share in the property of her late husband, Raj Muhammad, who died in 1954. The petitioners argued that the suit filed in 1976 was time-barred. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's finding that the respondent's alleged divorce was not proved, establishing her status as a widow and co-sharer. The Court held that in the absence of proof of ouster or adverse possession, the possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be the possession of all co-sharers. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a mutation entry does not, by itself, confer title. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the challenge, and upheld the respondent's entitlement to her 1/8th share of the inheritance, emphasizing that co-sharers are not subject to limitation when adverse possession is not established.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in land records confer title or ownership rights?
  • Is the possession of one co-sharer deemed to be the possession of other co-sharers in the absence of a plea of ouster?
  • Can a claim for inheritance by a co-sharer be defeated by limitation if adverse possession or ouster is not proven?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Bibi and others Inayatullah and anothers vs Abdul Ghani Haji1990 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-24
  pre-emptionexemption from pre-emptionagricultural landvillage immovable propertyjoint vendeesstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two civil appeals arising out of pre-emption suits involving the interpretation of section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether a sale of land measuring more than two kanals purchased by a village resident qualifies for pre-emption exemption if the area exceeds the statutory limit, and whether a single sale involving multiple vendees can be split up to claim cumulative exemptions. The Supreme Court held that since the area purchased in both cases exceeded the statutory limit of two kanals and the sales could not be broken up into separate transactions per vendee in the absence of evidence of specific individual shares and separate price payments, the exemption was inapplicable. The Court concluded that the sales were not protected from pre-emption, and accordingly dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale of land exceeding two kanals qualify for exemption under section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  • Can a single sale involving multiple vendees be broken up into separate sales for the purpose of claiming cumulative exemptions under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nigar Bibi and others vs Salahuddin Khan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  ex parte orderservice of summonsinherent powersreview of orderlimitation periodtemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against an order of the Lahore High Court arising from a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction. The core legal question involved the propriety and jurisdiction of recalling an ex parte order passed against respondents who were not duly served with notice for the date of hearing, and whether a judge of the High Court could review an order passed by another judge. The Supreme Court held that a court is duty-bound to recall an ex parte order passed without service of notice upon the affected party, as such an order is without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that another judge is competent to recall such an order under Section 12(2) read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. when the original judge is unavailable, and that an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to set aside an ex parte order is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act providing a three-year period, rather than Article 162. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court duty-bound to recall an order passed on a date when parties were not duly served?
  • Can another judge of the High Court recall or review an ex parte order passed by a former judge who is no longer on the Bench?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act governs an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to recall an ex parte order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazra Begum vs Government of the Punjab1990 PLC (C.S.) 93 · Lahore High Court · 1989-11-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naziran vs The State1990 P Cr. L J 1630 · Lahore High Court · 1990-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naziran vs The Collector, Sialkot and 2 others1990 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  constitutional petitiondivorce noticemaintenance allowanceeffective divorceUnion Council
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had allowed a constitutional petition and quashed maintenance proceedings pending before a local authority. The core legal question revolved around the effectiveness of a notice of divorce sent by the respondent husband to the Chairman of the Union Council, and whether the wife's application for maintenance filed after the expiration of ninety days from the notice was legally maintainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the notice of divorce was duly served and its genuineness was not denied by the husband at any stage, the divorce became effective upon the expiry of ninety days under the law. Consequently, the Chairman had no jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the application for maintenance filed by the appellant after the divorce had taken effect. The key principle laid down is that upon the statutory lapse of ninety days following a valid and undisputed notice of divorce, the divorce becomes effective, divesting the Union Council authorities of jurisdiction to award maintenance to the former wife.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be allowed when factual controversies are raised?
  • Can a Union Council authority award maintenance to a wife after divorce has become effective?
  • Does a notice of divorce become effective after ninety days if its service and genuineness remain undisputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naziran Mai vs The State1990 MLD 254 · Lahore High Court · 1989-12-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazeeran and others vs Ali Muhammad and others1990 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  civil revisionmutationproperty ownershiprevenue recordpossessionconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision regarding a property dispute. The respondents/plaintiffs had originally filed a suit for a declaration of ownership and permanent injunction, claiming possession of specific land and challenging the legality of a mutation (Mutation No. 74) in favor of the petitioners. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge accepted the respondents' appeal, declaring them owners in possession based on an earlier mutation (Mutation No. 162) and finding the petitioners' mutation illegal. The High Court upheld this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the respondents failed to prove the purchase of the property. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, found that the respondents' possession and ownership were established by Mutation No. 162 and consistent revenue records since 1955-56. The Court held that the validity of Mutation No. 162 was a question of fact concurrently decided by the lower courts, and thus, no grounds existed for interference. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a mutation?
  • Does a mutation entry supported by revenue records and oral testimony constitute sufficient proof of ownership and possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi and 4 others vs Taj Din and others1990 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-09
  settlement proceedingsdemarcation of propertypermanent transfer deedfunctus officiointra-court appealsupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court passed in an Intra-Court Appeal, representing the second round of litigation between the parties concerning property demarcation under settlement laws. The core legal question revolved around whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked competence to proceed with demarcation after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed and the repeal of the relevant settlement statute. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit, dismissing the same while clarifying that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner acted pursuant to explicit High Court directions to demarcate the property without upsetting the existing transfer, and that cited precedents were distinguishable. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities may execute demarcation directed by a competent constitutional court where the underlying transfer is unaffected and the sketch plan is acknowledged by the affected parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner is competent to demarcate property pursuant to High Court directions after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Does the repeal of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act bar authorities from carrying out consequential demarcation ordered by a superior court?
  • Can a party challenge a demarcation proceeding whose sketch plan was signed and accepted as correct by them?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen vs Bashir Ahmad and 2 others1990 SCMR 1088 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  leave to appealreappraisal of evidenceinjured witnessmurder convictionacquittalbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal matter where the Lahore High Court acquitted the respondents, Bashir Ahmad and Zafar Iqbal, of charges related to the murder of Muhammad Inayat. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death, while acquitting two other co-accused. The High Court subsequently overturned these convictions, disbelieving the testimony of the injured eyewitness, Mst. Nasreen, and finding the evidence regarding the recovery of weapons unreliable due to the involvement of interested witnesses. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court erred in discarding the testimony of Mst. Nasreen, particularly given that she sustained injuries during the incident, which strongly corroborated her presence at the scene. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the case warranted a thorough reappraisal of the evidence. Leave to appeal was granted, and non-bailable warrants were issued for the arrest of the respondents, establishing the principle that the testimony of an injured witness, whose presence is corroborated by physical injuries, cannot be summarily discarded without cogent reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an injured eyewitness be discarded by an appellate court if the witness sustained injuries during the occurrence?
  • Does the recovery of weapons in the presence of interested witnesses automatically render the recovery evidence unreliable?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs Asmat Ullah Pehlawan1990 PLD Lahore 365 · Lahore High Court · 1989-03-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar and 5 others vs S.H.O., Police Station Civil Lines, D.G.1990 P Cr. L J 1845 · Lahore High Court · 1990-05-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naghmana Gul vs Alhaj Maj. Dr. Iftikhar Ahmad1990 MLD 2131 · Lahore High Court · 1990-07-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nafisa Begum vs Additional Settlement Commissioner and others1990 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-23
  settlement lawsjoint transferdelay in revisionfinality of orderproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a property transfer dispute under settlement laws between a mother and her son regarding a house in Lahore. Initially transferred solely to the mother, the Additional Settlement Commissioner subsequently ordered a joint transfer in favor of both the mother and one of her sons in June 1960. Years later, revision petitions challenging this joint transfer and seeking to include other siblings were dismissed by the Settlement authorities on the grounds of extreme delay and finality of the earlier orders. A subsequent writ petition filed by the mother was likewise dismissed by the High Court. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the joint transfer order attained finality and whether interference was warranted. The Supreme Court held that since the joint transfer order passed in 1960 was challenged only after an inordinate delay of seven years and the revision was validly dismissed, the transfer attained finality and could not be reopened. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a joint transfer order passed by a settlement authority be challenged after an inordinate delay of seven years?
  • Does an unchallanged settlement order regarding property transfer attain finality between the parties?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of settlement authorities and the High Court when no error of law is shown?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naeema Tabassum and anothers vs Additional District Judge, Gujrat and another1990 MLD 1217 · Lahore High Court · 1990-03-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Begum vs Abdul Wahid1990 CLC 1305 · Peshawar High Court · 1989-10-07
  civil revisionpre-emption decreedeposit of pre-emption moneycomputation of timeclosed holiday
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was filed by the petitioner Mst. Mumtaz Begum to challenge the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two courts below, which had dismissed her suit seeking a declaration that a previous pre-emption decree obtained by the respondent Abdul Wahid had become ineffective. The core legal question was whether the pre-emption money was deposited within the stipulated period of one month when the final day of the limitation period fell on a public holiday (Friday) and the deposit was made on the next working day. The Peshawar High Court held that pursuant to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, where the prescribed period for doing an act expires on a holiday, the act is considered validly done if performed on the next day the court or office re-opens. Consequently, the deposit was made within time. The petition was dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit stands dismissed if the pre-emption money is not deposited within the time specified by the court?
  • Does Section 10 of the General Clauses Act apply when the period for depositing pre-emption money expires on a public holiday?
  • Can a pre-emption decree be declared ineffective on the ground of delayed deposit of pre-emption money when the deposit is made on the next working day following a holiday?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Muhammad Bibi and others vs Lal through Legal Heirss1990 PLD Supreme Court 1067 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-20
  res judicatadeclaratory suitinheritanceconsolidation of landself-acquired propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that accepted a regular second appeal regarding the ownership of agricultural land. The dispute originated from a 1964 suit where the petitioners (heirs of the deceased owner's sister) successfully claimed a 2/9th share in the estate of Kadar Dad. Following consolidation proceedings, the decree-holders obtained possession of land that included property claimed by the respondent, Lal, as his self-acquired land. Lal subsequently filed a separate declaratory suit challenging the earlier decree's application to his self-acquired property. The Supreme Court addressed whether the principle of res judicata barred Lal's subsequent suit and whether the petitioners were entitled to a larger share than previously claimed. The Court held that the rule of res judicata did not apply because the 1964 suit concerned the inheritance estate of Kadar Dad and did not adjudicate title to Lal's self-acquired property. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that litigants cannot improve upon their claims at the final stage of litigation. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a subsequent suit regarding self-acquired property if the previous suit only adjudicated the inheritance estate of a deceased person?
  • Can a party improve upon their claim to a specific share of land at the final stage of litigation before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mubaral Bibi and others vs The Additional District Judge, Sargodha and others1990 SCMR 13 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20
  civil revisionplaint amendmentwrit jurisdictionsuit dismissalremand orderprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves cross-petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment concerning a civil suit for declaration regarding a land transaction. The core legal dispute arose when the trial court directed the plaintiffs to amend their plaint to correct the form of the suit. The defendants challenged this order via civil revision, resulting in the District Court setting aside the remand order and dismissing the suit entirely. Subsequently, the High Court, in a writ petition, declared the dismissal of the suit by the appellate court to be without lawful authority but upheld the decision to set aside the trial court's order for amendment, effectively remanding the case for trial on the original plaint. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the trial court's initial order for amendment was legally justified or improper, and whether the Revisional Court acted within its jurisdiction by dismissing the suit rather than issuing a proper remand order. The Court ordered the appeals to be heard together, directing the parties to file necessary additional documentation for the final adjudication of these procedural questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Revisional Court has the authority to dismiss a suit entirely when reviewing an order concerning the amendment of a plaint?
  • Was the trial court's order directing the amendment of the plaint legally justified or improper?
  • Under what circumstances is a remand order appropriate versus a dismissal of a suit during revision proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Memona Begum and another vs The State through Deputy1990 PLD Revenue 8 · Board of Revenue, Punjab · 1989-08-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam Yunus vs Director of Education, Cantonment, G.H.Q., Rawalpindi and 2 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-10
  Fundamental Rule 18civil servantcontinuous absencetermination of serviceleave rulesefficiency and discipline rulesservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court examined whether Fundamental Rule 18 (FR 18) became otiose upon the enactment of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and whether procedural formalities like show-cause notices or disciplinary proceedings are prerequisites for its application. The appellant, a school teacher, remained absent from duty for over five years, combining authorized leave and subsequent absence, leading the department to strike her name off the strength pursuant to FR 18. The Service Tribunal upheld the termination. The Supreme Court held that FR 18 remains a valid statutory rule saved under section 25(2) of the Civil Servants Act and is not inconsistent with the Act or the Leave Rules. The Court ruled that the operation of FR 18 is an ipso facto statutory consequence upon the expiration of five years of continuous absence, requiring no formal disciplinary proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules or independent show-cause notices. The appeal was dismissed, noting that the appellant's appropriate remedy lay in seeking a special determination or relief from the designated competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Fundamental Rule 18 became otiose upon the enforcement of the Civil Servants Act and the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  • Does a civil servant's cessation of employment under Fundamental Rule 18 require prior disciplinary proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules?
  • Is it mandatory to observe a show-cause procedure before giving effect to the statutory consequences of Fundamental Rule 18?
  • Whether section 18 of the Civil Servants Act and the Leave Rules are inconsistent with Fundamental Rule 18?
  Read full judgment →