Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- ZAFARULLAH vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 245 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-19Read full judgment →
- YOUSAF KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 339 · Lahore High Court · 1974-06-29Read full judgment →
- YOUNAS QURESHI vs GHULAM SABIR AND ANOTHER1974 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the first respondent under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and a revision for enhancement of sentence of the co-accused. The core legal question is whether the respondents shared a common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to commit murder, or whether the incident was a sudden occurrence arising from a chance meeting and a taunt by the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below—disbelieving the exaggerated prosecution story of pre-concert and open knives based on the reliable testimony of the court witness and the dying declaration—were fully justified. The ratio decidendi is that in the absence of reliable evidence of pre-planning or pre-concert, and where a fatal incident occurs on the spur of the moment following a sudden provocation or taunt, constructive liability under section 34 cannot be invoked, and each accused is individually responsible for their own acts. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether constructive liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be invoked in the absence of reliable evidence of pre-concert or pre-planning?
- Can an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the absence of common intention when supported by the dying declaration and court witness testimony?
- Whether a sudden incident triggered by a taunt from the deceased excludes the application of pre-meditated murder charges?
- WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS WILLIAM SON & Co. LTD1974 PLC 255 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-04-14Read full judgment →
- WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS SANAULLAH WOOLLEN MILLS LTD., KARACHI1974 PLC 260 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-08-12Read full judgment →
- WORKERS' UNION vs MESSRS CENTRAL CARDBOARD INDUSTRIES, KARACHI1974 PLC 54 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-10-08Read full judgment →
- WEST PAKISTAN TEXTILE MILLS (RHOD.) EMPLOYEES' UNION vs REGISTRAR, TRADE UNIONS, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE1974 PLC 282 (1) · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-11-12Read full judgment →
- WALI MUHAMMAD AND Other vs SAKHI MUHAMMAD AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court affirming a Single Judge's decision that accepted a writ petition setting aside an Additional Settlement Commissioner's order and restoring an Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner's order. The core legal question involved whether an Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner validly reviewed his earlier order regarding the allotment of excess ('beshi') land and whether the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction to preserve allotments resulting from an excessive claim. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its premises by treating a valid revisional order as an incompetent review, and that equity heavily favoured the sitting allottees with genuine pending claims rather than respondents retaining ill-gotten gains. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction is invoked in aid of justice and must not be used to help the retention of ill-gotten gains.
Questions settled- Whether an Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner is competent to review his own earlier order without explicit statutory backing?
- Can the High Court exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to protect allotments based on excessive or spurious claims?
- Do sitting allottees with pending verified claims have priority over excess land held by respondents?
- WALI MOHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 194 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-31Read full judgment →
- WAJID ALI vs Syed SAJID ALI1974 SCMR 17 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed his objections to an arbitration award. The underlying dispute concerned a suit for declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction regarding land, which had proceeded through the trial and appellate courts before reaching the High Court in Second Appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties jointly agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. Following a disagreement between the appointed arbitrators, an Umpire was appointed, who subsequently issued an award favoring the respondent. The petitioner challenged this award, alleging misconduct by the Umpire, specifically claiming a lack of inquiry and failure to hear arguments. The High Court dismissed these objections after recording evidence. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new argument regarding the legality of referring a matter to arbitration during a Second Appeal. The Supreme Court declined to entertain this new plea, noting it was not raised before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court found no evidence of misconduct by the Umpire, affirming that the Umpire had properly considered the record and arguments, and consequently dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can a party raise the issue of the legality of an arbitration reference for the first time before the Supreme Court if it was not raised in the High Court?
- Does an Umpire misconduct themselves by agreeing with the reasoning of one of the appointed arbitrators after reviewing the record and hearing the parties?
- Is a reference to arbitration permissible during the pendency of a Second Appeal?
- WAHID BAKHSH vs The STATE1974 SCMR 219 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court confirming the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Wahid Bakhsh, for the murder of Sher Muhammad. The core legal questions involved whether the omission to put a specific question regarding the dying declaration under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiated the trial, and whether the non-examination of the medical officer in the Sessions Court caused material prejudice to the defence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the omission to question the accused regarding the dying declaration was a curable irregularity under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly given the overwhelming eyewitness and recovery evidence, and that the deposition of the medical officer recorded before the committing magistrate was lawfully admissible under section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principles laid down are that procedural omissions not causing prejudice are curable irregularities, and that a medical officer's deposition before a committing magistrate can be used as evidence at trial under the statutory conditions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Whether the omission to question an accused about a dying declaration under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the trial?
- Is the omission to examine a medical officer in the Sessions Court fatal to the prosecution case when his deposition was recorded before the committing Magistrate?
- Under what conditions can a medical officer's deposition before a committing Magistrate be treated as evidence at the trial under Section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- UMAID KHAN vs AKBAR1974 PLD Lahore 445 · Lahore High Court · 1974-04-29Read full judgment →
- UBEDULLAH vs The STATE1974 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-08Read full judgment →
- TIKKA KHAN AND 3 Other vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 100 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-26Read full judgment →
- THE STATE, GHULAM ABBAS vs RAB NAWAZ AND ANOTHER RAB NAWAZ AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 87 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This case arises from an appeal by the State and a special leave petition against the acquittal of the respondents, Rabnawaz and Ghulam Muhammad, by the High Court of West Pakistan, which had reversed their convictions under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The incident involved an armed assault at the complainant's shop arising from business rivalry, during which a bystander, Sher Muhammad, intervened to prevent a gunshot and was fatally stabbed by Rabnawaz, while others sustained injuries. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of direct ocular evidence, the effect of unexplained minor injuries on the accused, the admissibility of a dying statement, and the principles governing the reversal of acquittals. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in rejecting reliable direct and circumstantial evidence based on the social status of witnesses and minor injuries on the accused, clarifying that failure to explain injuries does not per se vitiate the prosecution case unless it creates a reasonable doubt upon a review of the entire evidence. The Court set aside the acquittal, convicted Rabnawaz under section 302 and section 307/34, sentencing him to imprisonment for life along with compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and convicted Ghulam Muhammad under section 307/34.
Questions settled- Does the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the accused per se render the prosecution case doubtful so as to entitle the accused to an acquittal?
- Is a dying statement required to be in writing or signed by the maker under Section 32 of the Evidence Act 1872?
- Can an appellate court set aside an acquittal when the lower court's judgment ignores cogent direct and circumstantial evidence and results in a miscarriage of justice?
- What are the considerations for awarding compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- THE STATE vs S. ALI HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 403 · Sindh High Court · 1974-05-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference was made by the V Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, recommending the quashing of a criminal complaint filed by a private complainant against two accused under Sections 468, 471, 34, and 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the accused fraudulently obtained his signatures on blank papers and documents, which were subsequently used in a civil suit to obtain a compromise decree. The accused sought discharge under Section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arguing that a private complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 because the alleged forged documents were produced and used in judicial proceedings.
The High Court accepted the reference and quashed the criminal proceedings pending before the Magistrate. The Court held that even if forgery was committed prior to the institution of civil proceedings, once the forged documents were produced and used in a court, the bar under Section 195(1)(c) read with Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies completely, excluding private prosecutions and empowering only the concerned civil court to file a complaint.
Questions settled- Does the bar under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to documents forged prior to the institution of court proceedings if they are subsequently produced or used in court?
- Can a private party maintain a criminal complaint for forgery when the forged document has been produced and used in a civil court proceeding?
- What is the crucial date for determining whether a complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- THE STATE vs MUHAMMAD YOUSUF1974 PLD Supreme Court 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a decision of the High Court which accepted the respondent's revision petition, held that the trying Magistrate lacked jurisdiction under section 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, and quashed all proceedings against the respondent. The core legal question was whether a general government notification investing all Magistrates of the First Class with powers under section 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, by virtue of their office is valid under section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court held that the notification is perfectly valid, as the Provincial Government is legally empowered to confer powers on classes of officials generally by their official titles. Furthermore, the Court held that section 29-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, does not create an exclusive forum or oust the general jurisdiction of a Magistrate to try offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order quashing the proceedings, and reduced the respondent's detention to the period already undergone.
Questions settled- Whether a government notification investing all Magistrates of the First Class with powers under section 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, by virtue of their office is valid?
- Does section 29-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, create a forum of exclusive jurisdiction that takes away the general jurisdiction of a Magistrate to try an offence under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
- Can criminal proceedings be entirely quashed merely because a Magistrate was allegedly not competent to pass a specific order of detention in a Borstal Institution?
- THE STATE vs MAHMOOD1974 PLD Karachi 205 · Sindh High Court · 1973-12-13Read full judgment →
- THE STATE vs ASHFAQ KHAN AND 6 Other1974 PLD Karachi 146 · Sindh High Court · 1973-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment addresses a reference from the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, recommending the quashing of a complaint filed under Section 497, Pakistan Penal Code, read with Sections 34 and 109, Pakistan Penal Code. The complaint, alleging adultery, was filed by Saeed Khan, who claimed care and custody of the woman on behalf of her husband. The core legal question was whether the Court could take cognizance of the offence, given the bar under Section 199, Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a complaint by the husband or, in his absence, by a person having care of the woman with the leave of the Court. The High Court held that leave of the Court must be granted *before* cognizance is taken, not inferred from subsequent proceedings. It further noted that the woman was divorced in 1968, prior to the 1970 complaint, meaning she was not in the complainant's care on behalf of her husband. Consequently, the complaint was found to be barred by Section 199, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the proceedings were quashed.
Questions settled- When must leave of the Court be obtained for a complaint under Section 199, Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Can leave of the Court under Section 199, Code of Criminal Procedure, be inferred from a Magistrate's subsequent actions?
- Who is competent to file a complaint for an offence under Section 497, Pakistan Penal Code?
- Does a complaint for adultery remain valid if the woman was divorced prior to the complaint being filed?
- THE STATE THROUGH THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL, PROVINCE Of BALUCHISTAN, QUETTA vs JAMIL IQBAL1974 PLD Quetta 28 · Balochistan High Court · 1973-07-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent, who was initially convicted under Section 13(e) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, for possessing an unlicensed knife. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility of a statement made by the accused while in police custody, which led to the recovery of the weapon, and the procedural validity of a judicial inspection conducted by the trial magistrate. The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The court held that under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872, only the portion of a statement leading to the discovery of a fact is admissible; a statement admitting the concealment of an object constitutes a full confession of possession and is inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act 1872. Furthermore, the court emphasized that judicial inspections under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require the mandatory recording of a memorandum of relevant facts, the absence of which renders such observations invalid. The court also noted that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery was from the accused's exclusive possession.
Questions settled- Does a statement by an accused in police custody admitting to the concealment of an incriminating object constitute an inadmissible confession under the Evidence Act 1872?
- Is a judicial inspection conducted under Section 539-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 valid if no memorandum of relevant facts is recorded?
- Can a statement made to the police be partially admitted under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1872 if it contains both a discovery of a fact and a confession of guilt?
- THE PUNJAB RELIGIOUS BOOK SOCIETY vs Mst. AMANAT1974 SCMR 269 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a claim for compensation filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 by the respondent widow whose husband died in a fatal accident while working as a labourer on the business premises of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the onus lay on the petitioner employer to prove that the deceased was employed by an independent contractor rather than directly by the petitioner, and whether the petitioner was liable to pay compensation. The Supreme Court held that the onus heavily lay upon the petitioner to establish that the deceased was not its employee and, having failed to produce any corroborative evidence or contractual agreements regarding the alleged independent contractor, the petitioner was directly responsible to pay compensation under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The key principle laid down is that the burden of proof regarding the existence of an independent contractor relationship to avoid employer liability rests upon the principal, and in the absence of supporting evidence, direct liability under the statute ensues.
Questions settled- Where a workman dies on business premises, upon whom does the onus lie to prove that the deceased was employed by an independent contractor rather than the principal?
- Is a principal employer directly responsible to pay compensation under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 when failing to prove the employment of an independent contractor?
- Does the repair of business premises fall under the scope of principal liability for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
- THE PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN AND Others vs JOGESH CHANDRA LODH AND Other1974 SCMR 348 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1958-05-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional appeal challenges a High Court judgment that quashed acquisition proceedings initiated by the Provincial Government under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948. The core legal questions were whether the requisition was made for a genuine public purpose and whether the statutory authority properly exercised its discretion in forming the requisite opinion under the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requisition order was invalid because the authority failed to form an independent opinion as required by the statute, acting instead as a mere instrument of the Land Acquisition Department. Furthermore, the Court found that the acquisition was intended for the personal benefit of a private individual rather than for a public purpose. The judgment establishes the principle that the existence of a public purpose is a condition precedent for the exercise of requisition powers under the Act, and that the government cannot use statutory acquisition powers to transfer property from one private individual to another, as such actions constitute a fraud on the statute.
Questions settled- Is the existence of a public purpose a condition precedent for the exercise of requisition powers under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948?
- Can the government use statutory acquisition powers to transfer property from one private individual to another?
- Does an officer to whom powers are delegated under the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948, have a duty to independently form an opinion regarding the necessity of requisition?
- Is an acquisition order invalid if the statutory authority acts merely as a tool of another department without applying its own mind?
- THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN RAWALPINDI vs SAEED AHMAD KHAN AND Other M. R. TOOSY, Ex PRINCIPAL, GOVERNMENT COLLEGE, SARGODHA AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment concerns two appeals filed by the Federation of Pakistan and the Province of Punjab against a Lahore High Court decision. The High Court had rejected a preliminary objection to its jurisdiction to entertain petitions challenging orders of removal or premature retirement of government servants under Martial Law Regulations Nos. 58 and 114. The core legal question was whether amendments to Article 281 of the Interim Constitution (by President's Order No. 3 of 1973) and Article 269 of the Permanent Constitution completely ousted the High Court's jurisdiction to review actions taken under these Regulations, particularly those alleged to be without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or mala fide. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that actions taken without jurisdiction, mala fide, or coram non judice are not validated by the constitutional provisions and remain subject to judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding the ouster clauses. The Court reaffirmed principles of constitutional interpretation, emphasizing strict construction against ouster of superior court jurisdiction, and clarified the meaning and evidentiary burden for proving mala fides. The President's power to amend the Constitution under Article 279(1)(c) of the Interim Constitution was also held to be competent.
Questions settled- Does an ouster clause in the Constitution prevent superior courts from reviewing actions taken without jurisdiction, mala fide, or coram non judice?
- Can the President amend the Interim Constitution under Article 279(1)(c) of the Interim Constitution?
- What is the evidentiary burden for proving mala fides in official actions?
- Do constitutional provisions validating past actions also validate actions taken without jurisdiction, mala fide, or coram non judice?
- How should provisions seeking to oust the jurisdiction of superior courts be construed?
- THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN AND 3 Other vs Malik GHULAM JILANI1974 PLD Supreme Court 402 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from a petition converted into an appeal regarding the powers of the High Court in habeas corpus proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. During a habeas corpus petition concerning four detained persons, the Lahore High Court ordered their production in court. The Federal and Provincial Governments challenged this order, citing security risks and arguing that jurisdictional questions should be decided first. The core legal question was whether the High Court has the power to order the production of detenus before determining preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction or validity of detention, and how executive assessments of security risks should be accommodated. The Supreme Court held that the High Court undoubtedly possesses the constitutional power to require the production of a detenu to satisfy itself regarding the legality of detention, and such power is not dependent on prior determination of jurisdiction. However, the Court held that executive assessments of security risks regarding the venue of production should be respected. The Supreme Court modified the High Court's order, directing that the detenus be produced at an alternative secure location rather than the court premises in Lahore. The key principle laid down is that while the High Court has the constitutional authority to order the production of a detenu in habeas corpus proceedings without first deciding jurisdictional issues, it must exercise judicial discretion regarding security concerns raised by the executive by selecting appropriate venues.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can order the production of a detenu in a habeas corpus petition before deciding preliminary questions relating to its jurisdiction?
- Does the power of the High Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus depend on the prior determination of the validity of detention?
- How should the High Court exercise its discretion when the executive government highlights serious security risks regarding the physical production of detenus in court?
- THE DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, P. W. R., KARACHI- vs ABDUL HAQ QURESHI AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment resolves three consolidated civil appeals concerning whether the Pakistan Western Railway could deduct enhanced rent from the wages of employees who remained in unauthorized occupation of railway quarters after their transfer. The appellant-railway, relying on rules framed under paragraph 157 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code, deducted up to half of the employees' emoluments as penal rent. The employees challenged these deductions under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 7(1) of the Act, wages must be paid without any deductions except those expressly authorized. While Section 7(2)(d) permits deductions for house accommodation, Section 11 limits such deductions to the actual value of the accommodation supplied. The Court ruled that unauthorized occupation does not alter the character of the accommodation supplied, nor does it permit the employer to bypass Section 7(2)(d) by invoking Section 7(2)(h) to impose penal deductions. Consequently, the rules allowing enhanced deductions were declared repugnant to the Act, and the appeals were dismissed.
Questions settled- Can an employer deduct enhanced penal rent from an employee's wages for unauthorized occupation of accommodation under the Payment of Wages Act 1936?
- Whether rules framed under paragraph 157 of the Pakistan Railway Establishment Code can override the statutory limits on wage deductions set by the Payment of Wages Act 1936?
- Does unauthorized occupation of employer-provided housing change the nature of the accommodation so as to exclude it from the purview of Section 7(2)(d) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936?
- Can an employer rely on Section 7(2)(h) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 to justify house-accommodation deductions that exceed the limits prescribed under Section 11 of the Act?
- THE CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY vs SOHRAB HOMMIE MEHTA1974 PLD Karachi 467 · Sindh High Court · 1974-02-28Read full judgment →
- THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, RAWALPINDI ZONE, RAWALPINDI vs MESSRS PUBLIC MEDICAL HALL, LYALLPUR1974 SCMR 107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had refused to direct a reference under the Income-tax Act. The respondent, a firm dealing in medicines, failed to comply with notices issued by the Income-tax Officer under sections 22(4) and 23(2) of the Income-tax Act, leading to a best-judgment assessment under section 23(4) and the refusal of the firm's application for renewal of registration under section 26-A. While the Income-tax Tribunal directed the renewal of registration, the petitioner sought a reference to the High Court regarding the legality of this interference with the Income-tax Officer's discretion. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application in limine. The Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner, noting that the Income-tax Officer failed to provide reasons for refusing renewal. The Court affirmed that no question of law arose warranting a reference, as the High Court was justified in its conclusion regarding the single default, and consequently dismissed the petition.
Questions settled- Can the High Court refuse to direct a reference under the Income-tax Act if it finds no question of law arises?
- Does an Income-tax Officer have the discretion to refuse the renewal of a firm's registration solely due to a single default in complying with assessment notices?
- Is the Income-tax Officer required to provide reasons when exercising discretion to refuse the renewal of registration under the Income-tax Act?
- TARIQ SHAFAAT vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 376 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-19Read full judgment →
- TAJOO vs Mst. SATTARAN1974 PLD Lahore 105 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-10Read full judgment →
- Syed ZAHIR HASSAN RIZVI vs AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN1974 PLC 125 · Sindh High Court · 1973-12-04Read full judgment →
- Syed ZAHEER AHMAD RIZVI AND Another vs THE STATE THROUGH ADVOCATE1974 PLD Karachi 477 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-29Read full judgment →
- Syed SIRAJUL HASAN AND Another vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND 21974 PLD Lahore 285 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-29Read full judgment →
- Syed SHAUKAT HUSSAIN RIZVI vs K. B. DR. YAR MUHAMMAD KHAN AND ANOTHER AND RIAZ DIN AND 2 Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a dispute over land claimed by the appellant as part of the Shorey Studio in Lahore, originally purchased by Mr. R. K. Shorey for industrial purposes in 1946. Following partition and migration of the owners, the studio was allotted to the appellant by the Industries Rehabilitation Board, while surrounding plots retaining an agricultural character were temporarily allotted to the respondents as displaced persons. The core legal question concerns whether the unconstructed agricultural land formed an inseparable part of the industrial concern (the studio) or remained a distinct agricultural unit subject to separate settlement allotment. The Supreme Court held that since the disputed land continued to be used as agricultural land at the time of partition and was distinct from the developed studio premises, the settlement authorities correctly treated it as an independent agricultural unit rather than part of the industrial allotment. The key legal principle laid down is that the character and nature of property for rehabilitation and settlement purposes are determined by the actual use to which the land was being put at the time of partition, rather than the original unfulfilled intentions of the purchaser.
Questions settled- Does unconstructed agricultural land purchased for an industrial concern automatically form part of the industrial allotment upon partition?
- What test determines the character of property for the purpose of settlement and rehabilitation allotments at the time of partition?
- Was the Chief Settlement Commissioner competent to review and set aside a previous order that was passed without jurisdiction?
- Syed SHARAFAT HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 127 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-08Read full judgment →
- Syed SAEED HUSSAIN vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND Another1974 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave challenged a High Court order dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal regarding the transfer of an evacuee house in Lahore. The dispute arose between the appellant, an allottee of the ground floor, and respondent No. 2, who had been in continuous possession of the upper floor since 1947. The core legal question was whether respondent No. 2, despite lacking a formal allotment order, possessed a preferential right to the transfer of the property over the appellant based on her prior, continuous occupation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the extended definition of possession, a party in undisputed occupation of an evacuee house before December 21, 1958, acquires a valid entitlement to transfer, placing them on equal footing with an allottee. The Court affirmed that such a right cannot be defeated by a subsequent allotment order obtained by another party for a portion of the same property. The principle established is that continuous, undisputed possession of evacuee property constitutes a valid basis for transfer entitlement under the relevant rehabilitation laws, irrespective of the absence of a formal allotment order.
Questions settled- Does a party in continuous, undisputed occupation of an evacuee house prior to December 21, 1958, acquire a preferential right to transfer even without a formal allotment order?
- Can a subsequent allotment order obtained by one party defeat the transfer entitlement of a prior occupant of an evacuee house?
- Does the death of a respondent during the pendency of an appeal necessitate abatement if the application for substitution is filed after the limitation period due to court holidays?
- Syed NAZIR HASSAN vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LYALLPUR AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 434 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court challenged orders of the Settlement authorities rejecting the petitioner's C.H. Form ex parte and transferring the disputed evacuee property exclusively to a private respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The core legal questions pertained to whether an ex parte rejection violating the mandatory procedural provisions of Settlement Scheme No. I renders the order void ab initio, whether outhouses and garages can be treated as independent residential units when the main bungalow was never constructed, whether the 1/8th construction condition under Scheme No. VI is ultra vires the parent statute, and whether a C.H. Form can be converted into a B.S. Form. The High Court accepted the petition, declaring all impugned orders void and without lawful authority, and remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Court held that statutory procedural requirements cannot be cured by subsequent appellate hearings, outhouses without a main house constitute independent residential units, subordinate schemes cannot restrict statutory terms beyond the parent Act, and settlement authorities are legally obligated to consider converting C.H. Forms to B.S. Forms.
Questions settled- Does the failure to comply with statutory inquiry, notice, and hearing requirements under Settlement Scheme No. I render an ex parte order void ab initio?
- Can an initial void order passed in violation of mandatory statutory requirements be cured by granting the aggrieved party a hearing in subsequent appeal or revision proceedings?
- Can outhouses and garages be treated as independent residential units under Section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 where the main bungalow does not exist?
- Is the condition of 1/8th construction in the definition of a building site under Settlement Scheme No. VI ultra vires the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 and its Schedule?
- Can a C.H. Form submitted by an applicant be legally converted into and considered as a B.S. Form by the Settlement Authorities?
- Syed MUZAFFAR HUSSAIN SHAH, ADVOCATE AND Another vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 242 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-12Read full judgment →
- Syed MURID HUSSAIN SHAH vs Mufti MOHAMMAD YOUSAF ALI AND Another1974 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the transfer of an evacuee property to respondent No. 1 under an earmarking scheme. The petitioner, a local occupant, challenged the transfer after the Settlement Commissioner, acting on directions for a suo motu revision, cancelled respondent No. 1's entitlement. Respondent No. 1 had earlier surrendered a previously allotted property, which was subsequently transferred to his sons, and participated successfully in the earmarking scheme. In a previous round of litigation initiated by another party, the Supreme Court had confirmed respondent No. 1's eligibility and the validity of the transfer. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner improperly directed a suo motu review contrary to a binding legal determination of the Supreme Court. Additionally, the cancellation was invalid because no notice was given regarding the disputed property and, upon the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD), the evacuee property left the compensation pool, extinguishing the Settlement Commissioner's revisional jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed remove an evacuee property from the compensation pool, barring the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by Settlement Authorities?
- Can a Settlement Authority initiate a suo motu review on a point of law that has been definitively settled by the Supreme Court?
- Is an order by a Settlement Commissioner setting aside a property transfer valid if no show-cause notice regarding that specific property was served on the transferee?
- Syed MUHAMMAD ZAHID (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) vs MUHAMMAD ASHRAF1974 PLD Lahore 282 · Lahore High Court · 1974-01-09Read full judgment →
- Syed MUHAMMAD AHMAD SHAH & Co. vs ADDITIONAL CHIEF LAND1974 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, concerning the resumption of land under the Land Reforms Regulation 1972. The core legal question is whether an oral gift of land made by a declarant to his minor unmarried sister is protected under the second proviso to paragraph 7(1)(b) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (as amended by Punjab Ordinance XV of 1972) when their father is still alive. The Supreme Court held that the gift is not protected because succession to the living father has not opened, and the sister is not an heir to her brother during the father's lifetime, meaning she cannot be considered as having been denied her due share of inheritance of ancestral land. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that protection for gifts to an unmarried sister under the Regulation requires an actual, presently opening right to inheritance of ancestral land which cannot arise while the ancestor through whom she claims is alive.
Questions settled- Whether an oral gift of land in favour of an unmarried sister is protected under paragraph 7(1)(b) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 when their father is still alive?
- Can a sister be said to have been denied her due share of inheritance of ancestral land during the lifetime of her father?
- Is a sister considered a legal heir to her brother for the purpose of inheritance under Muslim Law while their father is alive?
- Syed FAIZ ALI SHAH (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) vs CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, LAHORE1974 SCMR 33 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal as barred by limitation. The core legal question concerned whether the admitting Bench had impliedly condoned the delay in filing the appeal and whether the final hearing Bench could re-examine the question of limitation without affording the appellant an opportunity to explain the delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the admitting Bench's order, containing the word 'however' despite an office note on limitation, indicated conscious admission and condonation of delay. Furthermore, the Court held that if a final hearing Bench raises the limitation question suo motu, fairness demands that the appellant be granted an opportunity to file an affidavit explaining the delay. The key principle laid down is that an admitting bench's order admitting an appeal despite an office note on limitation can be treated as implied condonation, and a final hearing bench must provide an opportunity for explanation if it chooses to re-examine the matter.
Questions settled- Whether an order of an admitting Bench of the High Court admitting a Letters Patent Appeal despite an office note on limitation can be deemed to have been made after condoning the delay?
- Is it open to the Bench finally hearing a Letters Patent Appeal to re-examine the question of limitation after the appeal has been admitted for hearing?
- Should the Bench finally hearing an appeal give the appellant an opportunity to explain the delay in filing the appeal when raising the question of limitation suo motu?
- Syed ALTAF HUSSAIN AND Another vs Mian FAZAL ILAHI AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 502 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
- Syed ALAM HUSSAIN AND Other vs Syeda SHAMIM AKHTAR AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from a dispute concerning the transfer of an evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether a Settlement Commissioner, in exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction, is legally required to address and set aside an intermediate appellate order dismissing an appeal as time-barred before modifying the original transfer order on merits, and whether a party who failed to raise this objection before the lower authority can do so in writ proceedings. The Supreme Court held that while a Settlement Commissioner must first determine the propriety of an earlier time-barred dismissal before entering into the merits, a party who actively participated in the revisional proceedings without raising this objection is barred by waiver and acquiescence from later challenging the order in writ jurisdiction. The Court laid down the principle that the doctrine of waiver applies to parties who fail to raise procedural illegalities known to them at the earliest opportunity before the tribunal.
Questions settled- Can a Settlement Commissioner in revision ignore an intermediate appeal dismissed as time-barred and deal with the case on merits without first deciding the limitation issue?
- Whether a party who fails to object to procedural irregularities before the Settlement Commissioner is precluded from challenging the order in writ jurisdiction under the principle of waiver?
- Does the Limitation Act apply to suo motu revisions exercised by Settlement authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Syed AKHLAQUE HUSSAIN vs HABIB ISMAIL BAJWA, ADVOCATE1974 SCMR 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Rent Controller, which had refused to finally determine the rent due under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller, having previously struck off the respondent's defence and ordered eviction due to non-compliance with rent deposit orders, concluded that he had become functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to proceed further. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller, after striking off a tenant's defence and ordering eviction, retains the jurisdiction to finally determine the rent as mandated by the second part of Section 13(6). The Supreme Court held that the Rent Controller does not become functus officio upon passing an eviction order. The Court affirmed that the statutory duty to finally determine the rent persists until performed, and the proceedings do not legally conclude until this final determination is made. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order and remanded the case to the Rent Controller to proceed with the final determination of rent in accordance with the law.
Questions settled- Does a Rent Controller become functus officio after passing an order of eviction?
- Is a Rent Controller legally required to finally determine the rent due even after striking off a tenant's defence?
- Does the passing of an eviction order legally conclude proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Syed AHMED MUSTAFA vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 55 · Sindh High Court · 1974-11-12Read full judgment →
- Syed AHMAD SHAH AND 2 Others vs MUHAMMAD YAR AND 6 Other1974 SCMR 191 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the Lahore High Court, which refused to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money in a suit. The core legal question was whether a court possesses the authority under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend a deadline for payment of pre-emption money when that deadline was established by a consent decree based on mutual agreement between the parties, rather than fixed by the court itself. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Order XX, Rule 14 and Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply only where the court has fixed the time for performance. Where the time limit is a result of a compromise or agreement between the parties, the court cannot unilaterally alter or extend that period without the consent of all parties. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that a court-mandated deadline in a consent decree is binding and not subject to enlargement under the general powers of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
Questions settled- Can a court extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when the deadline was fixed by a consent decree?
- Does Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 allow for the extension of time limits established by a mutual agreement between parties?
- Is a court empowered to alter a deadline for payment in a pre-emption suit if that deadline was set by the parties' own agreement?
- SURJA vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 595 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-19Read full judgment →
- SULTAN AHMAD vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1974 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition challenged the dismissal of a police constable, arguing that the Superintendent of Police lacked the authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry after the initial inquiry report was deemed unsatisfactory. The petitioner contended that the second inquiry subjected him to double jeopardy and violated the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The Supreme Court held that the Superintendent of Police possesses the inherent authority to order a fresh inquiry if the initial proceedings are unsatisfactory. The Court clarified that departmental proceedings for misconduct do not constitute a criminal trial, and therefore, the principle of double jeopardy is inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the petitioner's employment was held at the pleasure of the appointing authority, subject only to the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to show cause. Any rule restricting the appointing authority to a single inquiry would be ultra vires the Constitution. As the petitioner was afforded a full opportunity to defend himself, the dismissal was upheld, and the petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Superintendent of Police have the authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry if the initial inquiry is unsatisfactory?
- Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to departmental proceedings for misconduct?
- Is a rule limiting the appointing authority to a single inquiry ultra vires the Constitution regarding the doctrine of pleasure?
- SULEMAN AND Other vs Smt. ASUDI BAI1974 PLD Karachi 133 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-24Read full judgment →
- SUFIA KHATUN vs SECRATARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, SECRATARY WORKS (BLDG.) DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF EASE PAKISTAN, DACCA, EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, C & B DEVELOPMENT (BLDG.) DIVISION No. II, DACCA1974 SCMR 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-12-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges a High Court order dismissing a petition against a notice issued under the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952, requiring the appellant to surrender possession of land. The appellant disputed the government's claim of acquisition, arguing that the specific portion of the plot in her possession was never validly requisitioned or demarcated. The core legal question was whether the government could invoke the summary eviction procedure under the 1952 Act when a bona fide dispute regarding title and the exact extent of the acquired land exists. The Supreme Court held that the summary procedure is inapplicable where there is a bona fide dispute regarding title or the specific demarcation of the property. The Court found that the government failed to prove the land was properly requisitioned or demarcated at the material time. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order, declaring the eviction notice invalid and directing that the title dispute be resolved through a regular civil suit.
Questions settled- Can the summary procedure under the East Bengal Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Act, 1952 be invoked when there is a bona fide dispute regarding title to the land?
- Is a government acquisition valid if the specific portion of the land sought to be acquired was not clearly demarcated at the time of the original requisition?
- Does the government have the authority to use summary ejectment powers if it cannot establish clear title to the property in question?
- STANDARD PRINTING PRESS, KARACHI vs WORKERS' UNION1974 PLC 275 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-05-30Read full judgment →
- STANDARD BANK LTD., KARACHI vs SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE, KARACHI1974 PLC 138 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-07Read full judgment →
- SONY KABUSHIKI KAISHA, JAPAN vs THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF TRADEPL D 1974 Karachi 136 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Sk. ABDUL MAJID vs AKHTAR MOHAMMAD AND 2 Other1974 PLD Quetta 13 · Balochistan High Court · 1973-10-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal concerns an eviction application where the core legal question is whether a landlord must serve a statutory notice of transfer of ownership to a tenant under Section 13-A when the change in ownership arises from the death of a co-owner. The Court held that the death of a co-owner constitutes a change in ownership, thereby triggering the statutory obligation to provide notice to the tenant. The Court rejected the argument that such notice is only required for complete transfers of title, emphasizing that the provision applies to any transfer of interest, including inheritance. The Court established that Section 13-A is a remedial provision intended to assist tenants in identifying the person to whom rent is due and must be construed liberally. Consequently, the obligation to notify the tenant arises whenever there is a change in the title or interest of the property, regardless of whether the transfer is partial or total, ensuring the tenant is not prejudiced in their rent payment obligations.
Questions settled- Does the death of a co-owner constitute a change in ownership requiring notice to the tenant under Section 13-A?
- Is the obligation to provide notice of transfer of ownership applicable to the transfer of an interest in property, or only to a complete transfer of title?
- Should remedial provisions regarding notice of ownership change be construed liberally?
- SIND R. T. C. STAFF &. WORKERS' ASSOCIATION vs DISTRICT MANAGER, K. O. S.1974 PLC 303 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-07-04Read full judgment →
- SIND EMPLOYEES' SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTE vs DR. MUMTAZ ALI TAJ AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 73 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-15Read full judgment →
- SIKANDAR vs SULTAN MOHAMMAD1974 PLD Supreme Court 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-05-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit for possession by pre-emption of a house situated in District Hazara, filed by the appellant claiming a superior right of pre-emption under section 12 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act of 1950 as a co-sharer, a participator in appendages, and an owner of contiguous property. The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court dismissed the respondent's appeal. However, the High Court in second appeal reversed the decisions, holding that a right of permanent residence (Haquq-e-Bashindgane Dawami) did not confer full ownership, and that the finding on the right of way was based on a misreading of evidence. The core legal questions involved whether a right of permanent residence suffices to maintain a pre-emption suit as a contiguous owner, and whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that full ownership or 'milk' is necessary for pre-emption based on contiguity, but ruled that the High Court erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the right of way. The appeal was accordingly allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment.
Questions settled- Does a mere right of permanent residence in a contiguous property confer a sufficient ownership interest to maintain a suit for pre-emption?
- Is a pre-emptor required to have full proprietary ownership or 'milk' in the property on account of which pre-emption is claimed?
- Under what circumstances may a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the location of a passage in second appeal?
- SIDDIQ AHMAD vs ABDUL GHAFUR AND Another1974 SCMR 180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The dispute concerns the transfer of a property in Lyallpur, which was used partly as a residence and partly as a shop (baithak). The Rehabilitation Authorities had previously allotted the residential portion to the petitioner and the shop portion to the respondents. During settlement operations, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the entire property to the petitioner, but the Settlement Commissioner later revised this, transferring the shop to the respondent. The petitioner challenged this in the High Court, arguing that the Settlement Commissioner lacked the authority to bifurcate the property. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, the Settlement Authorities possess the jurisdiction to determine whether premises used for mixed purposes should be treated as a composite building, a shop, or a house. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, rejecting the petitioner's restrictive interpretation of the statute. The Court held that the Settlement Authorities have the power to classify such premises, and overturning this established interpretation would cause chaos in settlement operations. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to determine whether a premises used for both residential and business purposes should be treated as a shop or a house?
- Can a property used partly for residential purposes and partly for business purposes be classified as a composite building under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- SHOUKAT ALI AND Another vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 179 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-17Read full judgment →
- SHER MUHAMMAD vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition filed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which refused to set aside the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's remand order concerning the auction and transfer of a disputed shop. The core legal question involved the validity and effect of an auction confirmation made in violation of a High Court stay order, and whether the disputed property remained available for subsequent transfer under settlement schemes. The Supreme Court held that since a stay order was granted by the High Court prior to the auction confirmation, the confirmation could not legally stand, justifying the Settlement Commissioner's remand of the case to decide the approval of the auction afresh. However, the Court found that the High Court erred in declaring that the auction confirmation in favour of respondent No. 4 held good, thereby interfering with the scope of the remand. The key principle laid down is that an auction confirmation executed despite a subsisting stay order is legally infirm, and a remand order for reconsideration of auction proceedings must be allowed to run its course without pre-empting the merits.
Questions settled- Does an auction confirmation made after the issuance of a High Court stay order remain legally valid?
- Can property subject to a pending auction proceeding be transferred under a new settlement scheme before the auction confirmation is resolved?
- Whether the High Court can make observations pre-empting the merits of a remand order while dismissing a writ petition?
- SHER MUHAMMAD vs NIZAM DIN AND Another1974 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-06-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court summarily dismissing a writ petition filed against the order of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain a second revision petition where records were called for after the cut-off date prescribed by the amending ordinance, and whether discretionary relief could be denied based on alleged fraud and conduct. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second revision since the records were called for after 13th January 1962, in violation of section 20(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 as amended by Ordinance XIII of 1962. The Court further held that a writ of certiorari cannot be withheld merely on a suspicion of interpolation without proof that the party was responsible for it. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the impugned order quashed.
Questions settled- Whether the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain a second revision petition where records were called for after 13th January 1962?
- Can discretionary relief under Article 98 of the Constitution be denied to a petitioner on a mere suspicion of fraud or interpolation without proof?
- Whether an order passed without jurisdiction by a tribunal can be maintained on the ground of the petitioner's conduct?
- SHER MUHAMMAD KHAN AND Another vs Master ALI AHMAD KHAN AND 61974 PLD Lahore 539 · Lahore High Court · 1974-02-04Read full judgment →
- SHER AHMAD KHAN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 555 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Sheikh GHULAM MOIN-UD-DIN .AND 3 Other vs Mst. RAZIA BEGUM AND 71974 PLD Lahore 173 · Lahore High Court · 1972-12-13Read full judgment →
- Sheikh FAZLUR RAHMAN AND 2 Other vs THE PRESIDING OFFICER, FIFTH SIND1974 PLC 288 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-23Read full judgment →
- SHARAFUDDIN AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 107 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-11Read full judgment →
- SHAMSUR REHMAN vs Mst. SHER BANO AND Other1974 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a civil suit instituted in 1956 for possession of land. The plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest claimed ownership following the partition of shamilat land in 1941, alleging the defendants were tenants who stopped paying rent and repudiated his title. The trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Limitation Act 1908, holding that the defendants acquired title by prescription. The Senior Civil Judge reversed this decision, finding that the defendants' initial possession was permissive as co-sharers, partition did not render it adverse per se, and the suit fell under Article 144 rather than Article 142. The Peshawar Bench of the High Court dismissed the defendants' revision. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the 1941 partition rendered the defendants' possession adverse and whether the suit was governed by Article 142 or Article 144. The Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff did not allege actual physical possession and subsequent dispossession in the plaint, the suit fell under Article 144, and the defendants failed to prove adverse possession prior to their open repudiation. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Does the partition of shamilat land per se make the possession of co-sharers adverse to other co-sharers to whose share the land falls?
- Whether a suit for possession based on title falls under Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act 1908 when the plaintiff does not allege actual physical possession and subsequent dispossession?
- Can an appellate court grant relief regarding the entire matter in dispute under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 even if some parties have not appealed?
- SHAMROZ KHAN vs THE SETTLEMENT & RERABILITATION COMMISSIONER, PESHAWAR DIVISION, PESHAWAR AND 4 Other1974 PLD Peshawar 44 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
- SHAHOO AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 39 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-26Read full judgment →
- SHAHBAN vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 44 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-21Read full judgment →
- SHAH NAWAZ KHAN AND Others vs Mst. SHAHIDA PARVEEN AND Other1974 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a revisional order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a Guardian Judge's decision granting interim custody of an eight-month-old infant to his mother. The dispute involved the father and paternal grandmother (petitioners) and the mother (respondent), who was living apart from her husband. The core legal question was whether the interim custody of a suckling infant should be granted to the mother pending the final determination of a custody application under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The petitioners argued that the father, as the natural guardian, was entitled to the hizanat of the child. The Supreme Court held that given the infant's tender age, there was no justification to interfere with the High Court's order maintaining the interim custody arrangement. The Court emphasized that the final determination of custody rights would be resolved in the substantive proceedings under section 25 of the Act, and thus dismissed the petition, prioritizing the immediate welfare of the suckling infant.
Questions settled- Can a court grant interim custody of a suckling infant to the mother pending final adjudication of a custody application?
- Does the father's status as a natural guardian automatically entitle him to the immediate custody of an infant against the mother's claim for interim custody?
- SHAH DIN vs FEROZ DIN AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 481 · Lahore High Court · 1973-12-18Read full judgment →
- SHAH DIN AND Another vs SECRETARY, FOOD & COOPERATION DEPARTMENT1974 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by two government servants challenging the dismissal of their constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld their compulsory retirement from service following departmental proceedings for misconduct. The core legal questions involved whether the failure to accompany a charge-sheet with a statement of allegations under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 vitiates the entire proceedings per se, whether proposing dismissal in a show-cause notice invalidates a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement, and whether procedural technicalities in departmental appellate disposal render subsequent orders without lawful authority. The Supreme Court held that procedural omissions such as failing to attach a statement of allegations do not vitiate proceedings unless actual prejudice is caused and raised at the earliest opportunity, that imposing a lesser punishment than the one proposed in a show-cause notice is permissible, and that technical errors in administrative orders rectified after a full personal hearing do not invalidate the final decision. The Supreme Court laid down that non-compliance with preliminary procedural rules in departmental inquiries must be shown to have caused substantive prejudice to invalidate the ultimate action.
Questions settled- Does the failure to accompany a charge-sheet with a statement of allegations under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 vitiate departmental proceedings per se without proof of prejudice?
- Whether the imposition of a lesser punishment than the one proposed in the show-cause notice renders the penalty unlawful?
- Can technical defects in the disposal of a departmental appeal invalidate a subsequent corrected order passed after affording a full personal hearing?
- Sh. ZAHOOR AHMAD vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 256 · Lahore High Court · 1973-04-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for pre-arrest bail under Section 498, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, was filed directly in the High Court by a political worker alleging victimisation through false criminal cases and imminent arrest by police. The core legal questions concerned the conditions for granting pre-arrest bail, particularly when formal registration of a case is deliberately delayed by police, and the circumstances under which the High Court may entertain a direct application for bail without the petitioner first approaching the Sessions Court. The Court held that formal registration of a case is not a sine qua non for arrest or investigation, and imminent arrest, even without formal registration, can justify pre-arrest bail. It further ruled that while generally the Sessions Court should be approached first, exceptional circumstances, such as political victimisation, police tactics to frustrate court process, or genuine apprehension of harm, permit direct filing in the High Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petition was allowed.
Questions settled- What are the main conditions to be satisfied for the exercise of jurisdiction to allow pre-arrest bail under Section 498, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is formal registration of a criminal case a prerequisite for an arrest or for seeking pre-arrest bail?
- Under what exceptional circumstances can a High Court directly entertain a petition for pre-arrest bail without the petitioner first approaching the Sessions Court?
- Can the High Court issue an order prohibiting arrest for a limited period under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to secure information or prevent abuse of process?
- Does the principle of first approaching a lower court with concurrent jurisdiction apply to petitions under Sections 491 and 526, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when similar remedies are available before lower courts?
- Sh. MUHAMMAD SADIQ- vs MUHAMMAD ZARIN KHAN AND 2 Other1974 PLD Peshawar 49 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-05-08Read full judgment →
- Sh. MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs Ch. SULTAN MUHAMMAD KHAN AND Another1974 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed in limine the appellant's Letters Patent Appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition. The dispute concerns the transfer of certain properties under settlement laws between the appellant and respondent. The core legal questions relate to whether the Settlement Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain a second revision petition without summoning the record prior to issuing notice, and whether orders passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner were subject to appeal and revision. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to prove that the record was not summoned before issuing notice, invoking the presumption that official acts are regularly performed, and noted that the appellant's counsel conceded the second point in view of statutory amendments. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the Settlement Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain a second revision petition if the record was not called for before issuing notice?
- Are orders passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner subject to appeal and revision under the settlement laws?
- Does a report by a subordinate authority constitute sufficient proof that the record was not summoned by the revisional authority?
- Sh. AHMAD SADIQ vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-07-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal by leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the transfer of fractional shares in Nishat Cinema, Rawalpindi, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The appellant, an allottee with a verified claim under Schedule III of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Rules 1955, challenged the transfer of shares to respondents whose abandoned property claim had been reclassified from Schedule III (industrial undertakings) to Schedule I (urban immovable property) by the Claims Commissioner. The core questions involved the demarcation of jurisdictions between the Claims Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the legal connotation of 'cinema house' under paragraph 15 of the Schedule to the 1958 Act, and whether a Schedule III claim was mandatory for transferring a cinema house. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Claims Commissioner classifies claims while the Chief Settlement Commissioner determines how evacuee property is allocated. The Court ruled that 'cinema house' is distinct from an 'industrial undertaking' and constitutes a business undertaking; paragraph 15(2) contains disjunctive requirements, making claimants who abandoned a cinema house eligible for transfer without requiring verification specifically under Schedule III.
Questions settled- What are the distinct jurisdictions of the Claims Commissioner under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956 and the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Whether the term 'cinema house' in paragraph 15 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 is synonymous with or distinct from an 'industrial undertaking'?
- Is a verified claim specifically under Schedule III of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Rules 1955 a mandatory condition precedent for the transfer of a cinema house under paragraph 15(2) of the Schedule to the 1958 Act?
- Can an incomplete cinema building be categorized as a 'cinema house' for the purposes of transfer under evacuee settlement laws?
- Seth SALAHUDDIN vs MESSRS SETH INDUSTRIES LTD. AND Other1974 SCMR 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the High Court setting aside a compromise agreement reached between shareholders during pending company winding-up proceedings. The core legal questions were whether a company could be struck off the register as defunct under Section 247 of the Companies Act while winding-up proceedings were pending, and whether a compromise agreement signed only by two shareholders, without the involvement of other shareholders or the company itself, was valid. The Supreme Court held that the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies erred in striking off the company while liquidation proceedings were active, as Section 247 does not apply to companies undergoing such proceedings. Furthermore, the Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the compromise, ruling that an agreement signed by only two shareholders, excluding other shareholders and the company, was legally insufficient to bind the entity. The key principle established is that liquidation proceedings take precedence over administrative deregistration, and a compromise in winding-up matters requires the participation of all necessary parties to be enforceable.
Questions settled- Can a company be struck off the register as defunct under Section 247 of the Companies Act while winding-up proceedings are pending?
- Is a compromise agreement regarding a company's future valid if signed only by two shareholders without the participation of other shareholders or the company?
- Does the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies have the authority to declare a company defunct while liquidation proceedings are active?
- SEN. Kh. MUHAMMAD SAFDAR vs SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LAHORE1974 PLD Lahore 113 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-16Read full judgment →
- SARTAJ HOTEL vs MUSHTAQ AHMED SIDDIQI1974 PLC 273 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-07-20Read full judgment →
- SARFRAZ AND 2 Other vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 196 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-05Read full judgment →
- Sardar ANIANULLAH KHAN AND Others vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1974 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Letters Patent Appeal, filed with a delay of 161 days beyond the period of limitation. The petitioners sought condonation of delay based on affidavits alleging negligence and delay on the part of their counsel's clerk in applying for and collecting certified copies. The Supreme Court examined the circumstances, noting an initial unexplained delay of 58 days in applying for the copies and a further 94 days in collecting them after they were ready, coupled with a lack of due diligence by the petitioners and the absence of an affidavit from the counsel himself. The Court held that to condone such a long delay without satisfactorily explaining each day's delay after the expiry of the limitation period would amount to placing a premium on negligence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as barred by limitation, reaffirming that a party seeking condonation of delay must account for each day's delay once a valuable right has accrued to the opposite party.
Questions settled- Whether a petitioner seeking condonation of delay must explain each day's delay after the expiry of the normal period of limitation?
- Does the gross negligence of a counsel's clerk in applying for and collecting certified copies constitute sufficient ground for condoning a long delay?
- Whether a petition should be dismissed as barred by limitation when the petitioners fail to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing their case?
- SAMRU AND 5 Other vs The STATE1974 PLD Lahore 108 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-17Read full judgment →
- SAMIN KHAN BAR AT LAW vs THE STATE- Respondent1974 P Cr. L J 153 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-07Read full judgment →
- SAMANDAR KHAN vs Mst. MAQBOOL AND Other1974 SCMR 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns a dispute where a mortgagee sought the eviction of mortgagors under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, based on a lease deed executed simultaneously with a mortgage deed. The core legal question was whether such a simultaneous lease agreement creates a genuine landlord-tenant relationship or serves as a device to extract usurious interest. The Supreme Court held that the lease deed was a sham intended to secure an unconscionable interest rate of 80% per annum, and thus, no landlord-tenant relationship existed. The Court affirmed that courts must be vigilant against such devices used by mortgagees to circumvent laws limiting interest rates. The judgment emphasizes that when a lease is executed alongside a mortgage, the 'rent' is effectively interest, and the mortgagee is liable to account for these sums against the principal debt. The appeal was ultimately disposed of in terms of a compromise where the parties waived their respective claims, highlighting the Court's stance on the invalidity of such disguised interest-bearing arrangements.
Questions settled- Does a lease deed executed simultaneously with a mortgage deed create a valid landlord-tenant relationship?
- Can a court look behind a lease deed to determine if it is a device to charge usurious interest on a mortgage?
- What are the limitations on recovering interest on a debt under the West Pakistan Relief of Indebtedness Ordinance 1960?
- SALMA GILANI AND 2 Other vs DEPUTY LAND COMMISSIONER, RAHIMYAR KHAN1974 PLD Lahore 357 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-29Read full judgment →
- SALEEM AHMAD vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD1974 SCMR 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld a trial court's decree for specific performance based on a special oath. In a suit for specific performance, the petitioner agreed that if the respondent's brother took an oath on the Holy Quran regarding the payment of advance money, a decree could be passed. The petitioner later attempted to resile from this agreement, but the oath was administered regardless. The Supreme Court addressed whether a party can resile from such an agreement and whether a decree for specific performance remains discretionary despite the oath. The Court held that an agreement to abide by a special oath is in the nature of a contract, and a party cannot unilaterally resile from it without valid legal grounds, such as the contract being void or frustrated. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the petitioner held full proprietary rights, rendering the specific performance decree valid. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a party unilaterally resile from an agreement to abide by a special oath once it has been entered into?
- Is an agreement to decide a suit based on a special oath considered an adjustment of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the granting of a decree for specific performance based on a special oath preclude the court from considering the discretionary nature of such relief?
- Saiyed ABU MIYAN vs Haji ABDUL GHANI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 39 · Sindh High Court · 1973-08-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from execution proceedings where the Tax Recovering Officer filed a claim and notice under the Income-tax Act, 1922, seeking to recover income-tax and sales tax arrears from sale proceeds deposited with the nazir of the court. The decree-holder resisted the claim, arguing that the sale proceeds belonged exclusively to the decree-holders and creditors entitled to rateable distribution under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that the Income-tax Department had no locus standi without a formal decree. The court held that government debts enjoy an independent right of priority saved by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that the Income-tax Department could lawfully claim the undisputed debt directly from the funds deposited in court through statutory mechanisms without needing a separate decree. The key principle laid down is that undisputed government tax dues possess an independent right of priority and can be satisfied out of funds held by a court execution department pursuant to statutory recovery provisions, overriding exclusive rateable distribution among private decree-holders.
Questions settled- Whether the sale proceeds of a judgment-debtor's property deposited in court belong to the judgment-debtor for the purpose of satisfying government tax dues?
- Can the Income-tax Department claim priority and recover undisputed tax arrears from funds deposited in court without first obtaining a decree?
- Does Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 preclude the government from asserting its independent right of priority for tax debts?
- SAIJAD HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs ALEEM ULLAH1974 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- SAIFEE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI vs M. A. KARIM1974 PLD Karachi 426 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision application under section 25 of the Small Causes Court Act was filed by a judgment-debtor challenging an order of the Small Causes Court directing the issuance of a writ of attachment in execution proceedings. The core legal questions involved whether a company registered under the Companies Act constitutes a "public corporation" excluded from the jurisdiction of a Conciliation Court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, and whether an executing court can go behind a decree or entertain objections regarding its validity or service. The High Court held that a private company is not a public corporation under the Ordinance, and reaffirmed that an executing court cannot go behind a decree, nor can it entertain objections concerning the validity or nullity of the decree, as such matters must be raised before the original court or via a separate suit. The petition was dismissed with costs.
Questions settled- Whether a company registered under the Companies Act constitutes a public corporation excluded from the jurisdiction of a Conciliation Court under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961?
- Can an executing court go behind a decree or entertain objections regarding its validity, nullity, or fraud?
- What is the proper remedy for a judgment-debtor seeking to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a conciliation court?
- SAID QURESH AND Others vs Mst. GHAFIA BEGUM1974 SCMR 528 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for possession by pre-emption. The respondent claimed a superior right of pre-emption over land purchased by the petitioners, asserting she was a contiguous owner and participator in immunities. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, rejecting the defendants' claim of improved status via a subsequent land acquisition. The lower appellate court and the High Court affirmed this decision. The core legal questions concerned whether the defendants could defeat the pre-emption claim by improving their status post-suit institution, and whether the presumption of correctness attaching to revenue records could be rebutted by contrary documentary evidence. The Supreme Court held that the amendment to the Pre-emption Act precluded defendants from improving their status after the suit's institution, except through inheritance or succession. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the presumption of truth attached to revenue records is rebuttable and that courts possess the jurisdiction to admit additional evidence to resolve factual discrepancies regarding land ownership and contiguity. The petition was consequently dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a vendee-defendant improve their status to defeat a pre-emption suit after the institution of the suit?
- Is the presumption of truth attached to revenue records rebuttable by other documentary evidence?
- Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to take additional evidence in a second appeal to determine land ownership facts?
- SAID KARIM SHAH vs TAJ MUHAMMAD1974 PLD Supreme Court 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal by special leave arises from a second appeal dismissed in limine by the Peshawar High Court, concerning a pre-emption suit over agricultural land comprised of multiple Khasra numbers sold through a single transaction. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor claiming a right of pre-emption based on contiguous property under section 12 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, must own land contiguous to every individual Khasra number sold, or whether contiguity to any part of the parcel or block of land is sufficient to pre-empt the entire sold property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of a parcel of land comprising multiple Khasra numbers constitutes a single property rather than separate properties for each field number, and therefore ownership of land contiguous to any part of the sold parcel grants the right to pre-empt the entire block. The court laid down the principle that where agricultural land comprising several Khasra numbers is sold as a single unit or parcel, a pre-emptor with property contiguous to any part of that parcel satisfies the requirement of vicinage for the whole transaction.
Questions settled- Does the right of pre-emption based on contiguous property extend to the entire block of land comprised of multiple Khasra numbers when the pre-emptor's land is contiguous to only one of those Khasra numbers?
- Is the sale of a parcel of land comprising more than one Khasra number treated as the sale of as many distinct properties as there are field numbers?
- What is the true interpretation of the expression 'contiguous property' under section 12 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, in relation to agricultural land?
- Sahibzada AHMAD RAZA KHAN QASURI AND 4 Others vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 482 · Lahore High Court · 1972-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves petitions for anticipatory bail filed by Sahibzada Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri and others arising out of cross F.I.Rs registered under sections 307, 148, 149, and 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a clash at a public meeting. The core legal questions concerned the evaluation of rival versions in cross-cases, the necessity of the physical presence of an accused at the confirmation stage of pre-arrest bail when already surrendered earlier, and the duty of the investigating agency regarding timely action. The Court held that where petitioners had surrendered at the time of obtaining interim pre-arrest relief, their physical presence on every subsequent date of hearing or at confirmation is not mandatory as a strict rule of law and depends on judicial discretion. Confirming the bail, the Court laid down that investigating agencies cannot keep a case dormant indefinitely after completing an investigation, and cross-cases involving rival versions require a careful prima facie appraisal of circumstances, particularly regarding which party was aggressor and earlier in lodging the first report.
Questions settled- Is the physical presence of an accused mandatory at the time of confirmation of pre-arrest bail if the accused has already surrendered when interim relief was granted?
- Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 fix any strict time limit for conducting an investigation into a criminal offence?
- How should cross F.I.Rs regarding the same occurrence be evaluated prima facie for the purpose of granting pre-arrest bail?
- SAFDARALI vs MOHAMMADALI1974 PLD Quetta 1 · Balochistan High Court · 1973-10-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
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- SAFDAR ALI KHAN AND 3 Other vs MUHAMMAD SAEED UZ ZAMAN AND 4 Other1974 PLD Lahore 300 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-20Read full judgment →
- SAEED AHMAD KHAN vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY,1974 PLD Lahore 18 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a preliminary objection raised by the respondents against the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court to entertain 269 constitutional petitions challenging employment termination orders issued under the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulations, 1972. The core legal question was whether the amendments to Article 281(2) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972, enacted via the Constitution Sixth Amendment Order 1973, effectively ousted the High Court's jurisdiction to review such orders, even where allegations of coram non judice or mala fide actions were raised. The Court overruled the preliminary objection, holding that the constitutional amendment did not confer an all-encompassing immunity. It established that the phrase "purported exercise of powers" cannot be construed to validate acts that are inherently without jurisdiction, mala fide, or constitute a fraud upon the statute. Consequently, the Court affirmed its authority to scrutinize such impugned orders, as the ouster clause does not protect actions that fall outside the scope of the authorizing legislative measure. The Court granted a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Questions settled- Whether the amendment to Article 281(2) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972, introduced by the Constitution Sixth Amendment Order 1973, completely ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court to review orders passed under Martial Law Regulations?
- Does the phrase "purported exercise of powers" in Article 281(2) of the Interim Constitution protect acts that are coram non judice or mala fide?
- Can the High Court scrutinize administrative actions on the grounds of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction despite a constitutional ouster clause?
- Does the President's power to amend the Constitution under Article 279 of the Interim Constitution extend to ousting the jurisdiction of superior courts?
- SAEE vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 184 · Lahore High Court · 1972-08-01Read full judgment →
- SAADAT ALI vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant, an earlier allottee whose allotment was cancelled due to unauthorized occupation and encroachment on evacuee land, challenged the transfer of the property to the respondent, a claimant displaced person. The core legal questions concerned the appellant's entitlement as a previous allottee in possession and whether the respondent qualified for the extended definition of 'possession' under section 2(6) of the Act, specifically regarding the initiation of ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's allotment was validly cancelled and that ejectment proceedings had indeed been initiated against him for the benefit of the respondent, thereby satisfying the conditions of the notification issued under section 2(6). The key principle laid down is that an occupant who has been validly ejected through lawful departmental orders and who has encroached upon evacuee property holds no legal entitlement to the transfer of the house, and that concurrent findings regarding the initiation of ejectment proceedings satisfy the statutory prerequisites for extended possession in favor of a claimant allottee.
Questions settled- Whether an allottee whose allotment has been cancelled for unauthorized occupation and encroachment has a legal entitlement to the transfer of a house under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Does the initiation of ejectment proceedings against an unauthorized occupant satisfy the requirements of the extended definition of possession under section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Whether a claimant displaced person is entitled to the benefit of the extended definition of possession when ejectment orders are passed against the incumbent occupant for the benefit of the allottee?
- S. ZAHOORUL HASSAN ZAIDI vs PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB THROUGH MEMBER1974 PLC 179 · Sindh High Court · 1973-12-20Read full judgment →
- S. M. ZAHIR vs Pirzada Syed FAZAL ALI AJMERI1974 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for the recovery of money based on a pronote and receipt. The petitioner challenged the decree, arguing that the plaintiff introduced evidence of payment by cheque which was not pleaded in the plaint, thereby violating Order VI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the trial court erred by relying on its own visual comparison of signatures rather than appointing a handwriting expert for the disputed documents. The Supreme Court held that the evidence of the cheque was merely supportive of the existing claim and did not constitute a new, inconsistent ground of claim under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court ruled that while expert evidence is preferable, there is no mandatory rule of law requiring it in every case, and a judge may rely on visual comparison. The Court affirmed that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to respect, ultimately dismissing the petition.
Questions settled- Does the introduction of evidence regarding the mode of payment constitute a new ground of claim inconsistent with the pleadings under Order VI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Is a court legally required to appoint a handwriting expert to verify disputed documents, or can it rely on its own visual comparison?
- Is the trial court's assessment of the comparative veracity of witnesses entitled to respect in revision proceedings?