Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 323 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ- vs Mst. KHALIQUNNISSA AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 20 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-21Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 570 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-14Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 391 · Lahore High Court · 1972-11-22
  murdercommon intentioninterested witnessescourt witnessesmedical evidencefirearm expertmitigating circumstancescompensationcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and connected revision petition arise out of a judgment by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lyallpur, convicting four appellants under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing them to transportation for life for the murder of Muhammad Nawaz. The prosecution relied upon interested eye-witnesses and an FIR alleging that all four appellants attacked the deceased, with two firing pistols and the others wielding blunt weapons. However, court-witnesses and independent evidence presented an alternative version splitting the incident and attributing the fatal blows solely to Muhammad Rafiq, supported by firearm expert reports and medical evidence. The Lahore High Court evaluated the conflicting testimonies, noted improvements and contradictions in the prosecution witnesses' statements, and disregarded delayed police statements. The Court held that the case against appellants Ghulam Sarwar, Muhammad Sharif, and Muhammad Siddique was doubtful, warranting their acquittal, while the conviction of Muhammad Rafiq was sustained based on independent corroboration. In the revision petition, the Court declined to enhance Muhammad Rafiq's sentence to death due to mitigating circumstances of grave provocation regarding illicit relations, but ordered him to pay compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related and interested eye-witnesses can be relied upon without independent corroboration?
  • Does suspicion of illicit relations with a sister constitute a mitigating circumstance for awarding a lesser penalty in a murder case?
  • Whether the provisions of section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the award of compensation are mandatory?
  • What is the evidentiary value of statements recorded by the police after a considerable delay?
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• MUHAMMAD RAFIQ Alias TITAI vs Thestate1974 PLD Supreme Court 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-12
  ocular testimonycorroborationabsconsionballistic evidencemedical evidencemurderdeath sentencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of one Muhammad Jan. The core legal questions concern the reliability of ocular testimony when challenged by alleged discrepancies in medical evidence, specifically regarding the number of shots fired, the absence of blood at the crime scene, and the distance of firing as indicated by charring. The Court held that the conviction was well-founded, affirming that minor discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence do not necessarily invalidate eyewitness accounts, especially when those witnesses are natural and disinterested. The Court emphasized that judges should not speculate on medical or ballistic matters without expert testimony. Furthermore, the Court held that corroborative evidence, including the matching of crime empties with a weapon recovered from the appellant and the appellant's unexplained absconsion, sufficiently supported the prosecution's case. The principle laid down is that the testimony of reliable, natural witnesses should not be discarded based on theoretical medical opinions or speculative discrepancies, and that absconsion and ballistic matching serve as strong corroborative evidence in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of natural and disinterested eyewitnesses be discarded based on speculative discrepancies regarding medical evidence?
  • Does the absence of blood at a crime scene necessarily falsify the prosecution's case when other evidence is consistent?
  • Is it appropriate for judges to form opinions on medical or ballistic matters without expert testimony?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon matching crime empties serve as valid corroboration in a murder trial?
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• MUHAMMAD NAZIR KHAN vs DR. MUBASHAR HASAN AND Ano1ier1974 PLD Lahore 49 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-30
  constitutional petitionmaster and servanteconomic reformsstatutory protectionnatural justiceadequate alternative remedyillegal dismissal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner challenged his removal from service by BECO Industries Ltd., whose management had been taken over by the Government under President's Order 1 of 1972 (Economic Reforms Order, 1972). The core legal questions were whether an employee of a taken-over private concern enjoys statutory protection under Article 6 of the said Order, whether the Managing Director performs functions in connection with the affairs of the federation, and whether a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1962 is maintainable against such removal notwithstanding the availability of a civil suit. The High Court held that the Managing Director functions under the control of the Central Government in connection with the affairs of the federation, that Article 6 grants statutory protection to employees of taken-over concerns, and that termination by an incompetent authority without a proper inquiry violates principles of natural justice and statutory provisions. The court laid down that employees protected by specific statutory provisions can invoke writ jurisdiction regardless of the ordinary master-servant rule, provided a public duty or statutory violation is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of a private industrial concern taken over under the Economic Reforms Order, 1972, enjoys statutory protection regarding service matters?
  • Does a Managing Director appointed under the Economic Reforms Order, 1972, perform functions in connection with the affairs of the federation?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 is maintainable against the wrongful termination of service of an employee of a federally controlled industrial concern?
  • Is a civil suit for damages an adequate alternative remedy barring the invocation of writ jurisdiction where a statutory public duty is violated?
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• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 264 · Lahore High Court · 1974-04-29Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 3 Others vs Mst. SAKINA BIBI AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01
  limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeleave to appealinheritancenegligence of counsel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a leave petition filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the inheritance of non-ancestral land left by a deceased unmarried person, which devolved upon his sisters in preference to a collateral in the fifth degree. The core legal question concerns whether the explanation provided by the petitioners constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of a 59-day delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the petition is barred by limitation as the petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay, ruling that the initial obligation to inquire about the decision rests upon the litigant, and mere negligence or failure of counsel to inform the client does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay when a valuable right has accrued to the opposing party. The key principle laid down is that a party must show constant diligence and care in pursuing legal remedies, and the default of a counsel alone, without active diligence by the litigant, does not justify condonation of long delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a counsel to inform his client about the announcement of a judgment constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under the law of limitation?
  • Whose initial obligation is it to inquire about the decision of an appeal when judgment is reserved and delivered in the absence of the parties?
  • Can negligence on the part of a legal counsel per se justify the condonation of a long delay in filing a petition when a valuable right has accrued to the opposite party?
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• MUHAMMAD MUSA vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND 21974 SCMR 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-03
  evacuee propertyauction saletransfer of propertyautomatic cancellationdiscretionary powersettlement authoritieslocal occupant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition concerns a dispute over the transfer of an evacuee shop in Malakwal, District Gujrat. The petitioner, a local in occupation, sought transfer of the property under Scheme No. VIII, but his application was rejected because the property had already been auctioned to respondent No. 3 and confirmed. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the auction sale was automatically cancelled due to the respondent's failure to pay installments. The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no evidence of cancellation and rejecting the argument of automatic cancellation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner reiterated that the auction sale stood automatically cancelled under paragraph 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that the phrase 'liable to cancellation' in the statute does not imply automatic cancellation but rather grants discretion to the appropriate authority to decide whether to cancel the sale. As the auction was never set aside and the property was not available for transfer, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'liable to cancellation' in paragraph 24 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 imply an automatic cancellation of an auction sale upon default of payment?
  • Does an auction purchaser's failure to pay installments automatically void an auction sale of evacuee property?
  • Does a local occupant have a right to apply for the transfer of an evacuee property that has already been auctioned and confirmed in favor of another party?
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• MUHAMMAD MUNAWAR And 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 189 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD LATIF & Co. vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1974 PLD Supreme Court 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-13
  land settlementcancellation of allotmentsuo motu revisionlimitation perioddisplaced personsbuilding siteurban land claim
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave addresses whether section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, which empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner to cancel land allotments, is controlled by the time limit prescribed for suo motu revision under section 19 of the said Act. The appellants argued that an allotment confirmed as agricultural land could not be cancelled after the expiry of the limitation period for suo motu revision, contending that section 11 powers are subject to section 19. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of sections 11 and 19 deal with distinct matters and that the power of cancellation under section 11 is not subject to any period of limitation prescribed for revisional powers under section 19. The Court established that section 11 provides an independent and complete code for the cancellation or termination of allotments or leases by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the phrase 'subject to the other provisions of this Act' merely subjects such orders to the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under section 21.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to cancel an allotment under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 controlled by the time limit prescribed for suo motu revision under section 19?
  • Does section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 provide an independent code for the cancellation of allotments and termination of leases?
  • What is the legal significance and import of the phrase 'subject to the other provisions of this Act' as used in section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
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• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 62 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-18Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD KHAN vs ATAULLAH AND Other1974 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-04
  post-arrest bailmurder casedelay in trialcancellation of bailcommitment proceedingsjudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order granting bail to respondents accused of murder, primarily on the ground of delay in commitment proceedings. The petitioner argued that for offences punishable by death or life imprisonment, delay alone does not warrant bail, citing precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that delay in itself is insufficient to justify the grant of bail, emphasizing that the nature of the delay and the circumstances causing it must be examined. However, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretion in this specific instance, noting that the commitment proceedings were nearing completion with only three formal witnesses remaining. The Court held that it was appropriate to await the conclusion of these proceedings, clarifying that if the respondents are committed for trial, the Magistrate retains the authority to consider the cancellation of bail in accordance with the law. The petition was disposed of with these observations, maintaining the existing bail order while preserving the right to seek cancellation upon commitment.

  Questions settled

  • Does delay in commitment proceedings by itself justify the grant of bail in cases involving offences punishable with death or life imprisonment?
  • What factors must be examined when considering delay as a ground for bail in serious criminal cases?
  • Can a Magistrate consider the cancellation of bail once commitment proceedings are finalized?
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• MUHAMMAD KHAN (MULLA) AND 11 Others vs The STATE1974 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-04
  condonation of delaylimitation periodspecial leave to appealnegligence of counseltime-barred petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the petitioners against a judgment of the High Court, which had partially allowed their appeal by setting aside convictions under sections 366 and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining convictions under other sections. The core legal question was whether the seven-day delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal should be condoned based on the petitioners' claim that their counsel failed to inform them of the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court held that the petitioners, who were on bail during the pendency of the appeal, had a duty to remain in contact with their counsel and monitor the progress of their case. The Court emphasized that negligence on the part of the petitioners in failing to track their own litigation cannot be shifted entirely to their legal counsel. Consequently, the Court found no sufficient cause to condone the delay, as the petitioners failed to substantiate their claims regarding the delay with credible evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a lawyer to inform a client of a judgment constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is a litigant who is on bail during the pendency of an appeal under a duty to monitor the progress of their case?
  • Can a petition for special leave to appeal be entertained if it is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation without sufficient cause?
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• MUHAMMAD KAMIL vs Haji Sh. MUHAMMAD BASHIR SONI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 224 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-10Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JUMAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 266 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-26Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD JAVAID IQBAL vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1974 SCMR 481 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-23
  Telephone billsPerpetual injunctionTemporary injunctionCompromise orderInterlocutory orderDisconnection of servicesContempt of courtExtraneous mattersCivil revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case concerns a dispute over telephone bills where the petitioner, Managing Director of a newspaper, challenged initial bills and sought a perpetual injunction against their recovery and disconnection of services. An application for a temporary injunction resulted in a compromise where the petitioner furnished security for the disputed amounts and "any future amount." Subsequently, the petitioner defaulted on future bills, leading to disconnection of services. The petitioner then sought contempt proceedings and restoration of telephones, arguing the compromise covered future bills. The trial court ordered restoration, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, holding that the compromise order could not extend to matters "extraneous to the suit," such as future bills. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's civil revision. The Supreme Court endorsed the view that an interlocutory order, even if based on a settlement, cannot operate on matters outside the scope of the original suit, thus upholding the disconnection for non-payment of future bills.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise order for a temporary injunction, made in a suit challenging past liabilities, extend to future liabilities not explicitly part of the original suit?
  • Whether an interlocutory order, even if founded on a settlement between parties, can operate on matters extraneous to the suit?
  • Can a utility service be disconnected for non-payment of bills incurred subsequent to the filing of a suit challenging earlier bills, even if a compromise order for a temporary injunction was made?
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• MUHAMMAD JAMIL vs The STATE1974 SCMR 236 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-08-20
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationappreciation of evidenceleave to appealpolice statementwitness credibilityanti-corruption
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an appeal by the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction for criminal breach of trust. The petitioner, a Tapedar, was convicted by a Special Judge for misappropriating Rs. 500 received from a complainant, in violation of section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the reliability of prosecution witnesses whose statements regarding the cash payment were allegedly absent from their initial police statements. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had properly appreciated the evidence. The Court reasoned that the omission of the cash payment detail in the police statements occurred because the witnesses were only questioned about the cheque payment at that time. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments regarding the credibility of witnesses or the alleged tampering of the receipt, and dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when prosecution witnesses omit specific details in their initial police statements?
  • Does the failure to mention a specific payment in a police statement necessarily render witness testimony unreliable?
  • Is the appreciation of evidence by lower courts subject to interference when findings are based on a proper evaluation of the record?
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• MUHAMMAD ISSA AND 10 Other vs KARAM KHAN AND 7 Other1974 PLD Quetta 46 · Balochistan High Court · 1974-04-11Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 29 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-19
  post-arrest bailSpecial TribunalDefence of Pakistan OrdinanceDefence of Pakistan Rulesjurisdiction of High Courtouster of jurisdictionforumseditious speeches
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This case involves multiple bail applications arising out of a First Information Report registered at Sanghar Police Station under rule 42(6) read with rule 49 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and section 122/124-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following alleged seditious speeches and activities. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether the High Court retains jurisdiction under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to entertain bail applications in cases that have been competently referred for trial to a Special Tribunal constituted under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance. The court held that once a case is validly withdrawn from the ordinary judicial field and remitted to a Special Tribunal, the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, including the High Court's power to grant bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, is completely ousted by virtue of the comprehensive bar contained in section 13(1) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance. The key principle laid down is that the establishment of a special tribunal with its own independent procedure completely severs the contact of ordinary courts with the case, rendering applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to grant bail in a case referred to a Special Tribunal constituted under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance?
  • Does an accused person have a vested right to be tried by a particular forum or ordinary court?
  • Is a pre-reference notice required to be given to an accused person before the Federal Government refers a case to a Special Tribunal?
  • Does the bar on jurisdiction under section 13 of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance apply to proceedings for obtaining bail?
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• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND 7 Or HER S1974 PLD Supreme Court 37 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  criminal appealacquittalocular testimonybenefit of doubtinterested witnessesmurderappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which acquitted seven respondents of charges including murder and rioting. The prosecution alleged that the respondents killed the deceased, Budhoo, and injured two others, subsequently removing the body. The trial court had convicted the respondents, but the High Court acquitted them, citing inconsistencies in the prosecution's case, including the failure to recover the body, the unreliability of ocular testimony, and the false implication of other accused persons. The core legal question is whether the High Court's acquittal was perverse or unreasonable. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with improbabilities, including the fantastic nature of the accused returning to remove the body, the delay in reporting, and the failure of witnesses to act naturally. The Court affirmed that while a conviction can rest on ocular testimony, it must be unimpeachable, especially when witnesses are interested or have falsely implicated others. The Court concluded that the High Court correctly applied the principle that where prosecution evidence is inconsistent and unreliable, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on ocular testimony when the dead body has not been recovered?
  • Is it a valid ground for acquittal if prosecution witnesses are found to have falsely implicated some accused persons?
  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to act naturally during an incident cast doubt on their credibility?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment by a High Court?
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• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER. LAHORE AND 81974 SCMR 85 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  locus standiinformerland settlementallotment cancellationwrit petitionsettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition filed by an informer challenging the allotment of land to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The petitioner had alleged that the respondents were allotted land in excess of their entitlement. Following various proceedings before Settlement authorities, the Additional Settlement Commissioner ultimately ruled that no fraud had occurred and that, as a permanent transfer had been effected under the relevant statute, the authorities lacked the competence to cancel the excess land. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's subsequent writ petition. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an informer possesses the locus standi to challenge the validity of orders passed by Settlement authorities regarding land allotments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that an informer has no locus standi to challenge such orders. The key principle laid down is that third-party informers lack the legal standing to initiate or maintain proceedings against the validity of land settlement decisions made by the competent authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer have the locus standi to challenge the validity of an order passed by Settlement authorities?
  • Can Settlement authorities cancel a permanent transfer of land after it has been effected under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
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• MUHAMMAD ISMAIL ALI CHARAN vs MESSRS PAKPOR CERAMICS LTD.1974 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-06
  winding upinterlocutory applicationsspecial leave to appealinfructuous petitionshareholdingsinterim receiverprovisional liquidator
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against interlocutory orders passed during winding up proceedings of a respondent company by the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner, claiming to be a majority shareholder excluded from management and whose managing directorship had terminated under President's Order No. 2 of 1972, was entitled to the appointment of an interim receiver, provisional liquidator, and restraint of eviction from company premises. The Supreme Court held that the petition had become wholly infructuous because the winding up petition itself had been permitted to be withdrawn by the High Court upon the petitioner selling his entire shareholdings to the rival group, and the disputed premises had already been vacated. The Court laid down the principle that an appeal arising from interlocutory matters in a winding up proceeding becomes infructuous and will be dismissed when the main winding up petition is validly withdrawn by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for special leave to appeal against interlocutory orders in a winding up proceeding becomes infructuous upon the withdrawal of the main winding up petition?
  • Does the termination of a managing directorship by operation of law under President's Order No. 2 of 1972 afford grounds for appointing an interim receiver in winding up proceedings?
  • Whether an adjournment should be granted for negotiating a compromise when the underlying winding up petition has already been withdrawn before the High Court?
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• MUHAMMAD ISHAQ vs ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1974 PLD Peshawar 90 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-06-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ISHAQ AND Another vs ABDUL HAQUE AND Other1974 SCMR 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28
  settlement schemeauction purchasedemand noticeresumption of propertyconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute over the transfer and auction of a shop originally purchased by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Abdul Shakoor, under Settlement laws. Following his death, a demand notice for the balance price was issued to the deceased, leading the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to cancel the transfer and subsequently transfer the property to the petitioner, Muhammad Ishaque. Upon revision, the Settlement Commissioner set aside the cancellation and remand orders, directing a fresh decision. A constitutional petition challenging this was dismissed by the High Court, which held that a demand notice served on a dead person was a nullity and that factual inquiries regarding payment were unsuited for writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the petition, affirming that the Settlement Commissioner's remand for a fresh decision stands, allowing all legal questions to be agitated before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner unhindered.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a demand notice issued to a deceased person for the balance price of auction property is a nullity?
  • Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction inquire into disputed questions of fact regarding the payment of auction prices?
  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner can validly remand a case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision upon finding earlier orders illegal?
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• MUHAMMAD IQBAL vs MUHAMMAD RAMZAN AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-12
  acquittalmurderappreciation of evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonycriminal petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a criminal petition for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the acquittal of the respondents charged under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of one Irfan. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appreciation of evidence and acquittal of the respondents was perverse or unreasonable so as to warrant interference. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's conclusion was fully justified because the prosecution presented conflicting versions of the occurrence, the medical evidence falsified the ocular testimony regarding the time of the incident and the presence of semi-digested food contradicted the prosecution's narrative, supporting the defense theory that the deceased was killed by an unknown assailant in the dark hours. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order by the High Court unless the conclusions reached are perverse or unreasonable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when the conclusions are neither perverse nor unreasonable?
  • Does the presence of semi-digested food in the stomach falsify the prosecution's timeline regarding the time of the incident?
  • Can an acquittal be sustained when the prosecution presents conflicting versions of the occurrence before the investigating officer and at the trial?
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• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 1450 · Sindh High Court · 1974-06-03Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIDDIQUI vs THAL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LTD. AND ANOTHERP L D1974 Supreme Court 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land reformsMartial Law Regulation No. 64Thal Development Authorityshareholder rightscorporate land holdingnotional vestingreversion of landwithout lawful authority
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from the summary dismissal of a writ petition filed by a shareholder of the Thal Industries Corporation Ltd. concerning agricultural land transferred to the Thal Development Authority. Following the promulgation of the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64), the Corporation resolved to transfer 4,763 acres back to the Authority and allocate the remaining land among other shareholders. The appellant challenged this arrangement, seeking physical distribution of the entire land to private shareholders to the exclusion of the Authority. The Supreme Court held that under paragraph 12(2) of MLR No. 64, land held by a company does not revert to a statutory body (as it is excluded from the definition of 'person') nor is it subject to physical division among shareholders; it is only notionally deemed owned by individual shareholders for calculating holding ceilings. Consequently, the transfer of possession to the Authority was declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect, requiring restoration to the Corporation, while the prayer for physical distribution to shareholders was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statutory body or local authority qualify as a 'person' entitled to reversion of land transferred to a company under paragraph 12 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
  • Does paragraph 12(2) of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 require the actual physical distribution and fragmentation of corporate agricultural land among the company's individual shareholders?
  • Whether the transfer of agricultural land by a company to a statutory authority in purported implementation of land reform regulations without statutory sanction is without lawful authority and void?
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• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs REHMAT ULLAH AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 303 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-11
  leave to appeallocus standijoint ownershipallotment disputeevacuee land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a land allotment dispute where agricultural lands jointly allotted to the petitioner and his deceased brother were partially cancelled and re-allotted to the respondent. After various administrative proceedings, the Settlement Commissioner restored the allotment in favor of the petitioner and his brother. The High Court dismissed the respondent's writ petition and Letters Patent appeal as to the petitioner, but allowed the appeal regarding the deceased brother's share because his heirs had settled the dispute outside the court. The Supreme Court considered whether the surviving brother had the locus standi to challenge the judgment concerning his deceased brother's share. The Court held that the petitioner, as a surviving joint owner, was not aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal as to his own share and lacked locus standi to challenge the adjudication regarding his deceased brother's share, noting that joint ownership does not entitle a co-sharer to represent deceased co-heirs or claim their specific shares. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a surviving joint owner have the locus standi to challenge an adjudication regarding the share of a deceased co-owner?
  • Does joint ownership of property entitle a co-sharer to represent deceased co-heirs or claim the entirety of the property?
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• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs MUHAMMAD BASHIR AND 4 Other1974 PLD Lahore 446 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-18
  landlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantcompetency of appealorder under section 13urban rent restrictionejectment petitionremand of case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment addresses three consolidated second appeals arising from ejectment petitions filed under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether an order of the Rent Controller dismissing an ejectment petition on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist is an 'order under section 13' and thus appealable under section 15 of the Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that the phrase 'under section 13' in section 15 is not restricted to cases where the tenancy relationship is admitted or proved, but encompasses any order passed in respect of proceedings initiated or purported to be taken under section 13, including a dismissal for lack of landlord-tenant relationship. The court also held that while the appellate court could reverse the Rent Controller's finding on tenancy, it erred in directly ordering ejectment instead of remanding the matter to the Rent Controller to proceed in accordance with law. The appeals were partly accepted, the finding on the existence of the tenancy was maintained, the direct ejectment order was set aside, and the cases were remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the Rent Controller dismissing an ejectment petition on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist is appealable under section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the phrase 'order under section 13' in section 15 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, apply only to orders passed after the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted or proved?
  • Can an appellate authority, upon reversing the Rent Controller's finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant, directly order the ejectment of the tenant instead of remanding the case to the Rent Controller?
  • Do the Rent Controller and appellate authorities have jurisdiction to examine Settlement records to determine rights based on orders of the Settlement Authorities when property is no longer in the compensation pool?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN vs FAZAL HAQ AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 208 · Lahore High Court · 1973-06-18
  pre-emptionamendment of pleadingsremand orderfinality of judgmentrevision petitionappellate jurisdictionCode of Civil Procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision petition challenges an order of the Administrative Civil Judge dismissing the petitioner's application to amend their written statement following a remand order. The core legal question is whether a trial court, post-remand, possesses the jurisdiction to permit an amendment of pleadings that seeks to re-open issues already determined or abandoned during the appellate stage. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a trial court’s jurisdiction after remand is strictly confined to the specific issues remanded by the appellate court. The court established the principle that the power to amend pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, does not authorize a trial court to disturb the finality of findings established by an appellate court or to re-open issues that were not challenged in appeal. Once a case is remanded for a limited purpose, the trial court cannot entertain amendments that contradict the scope of the remand or attempt to re-litigate matters that have attained finality under Section 105(2), Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court allow an amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after a case has been remanded for a limited purpose?
  • Does an appellate court's remand order for specific issues preclude the trial court from re-opening issues that were not challenged in the appeal?
  • Can a party introduce new defenses in a written statement after a case has been remanded by an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 164 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-17Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND 3 Other vs Syed AHMED MASOOD AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 61 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-10-05Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HUSAIN MUNIR AND Other vs SIKANDAR AND Other.1974 PLD Supreme Court 139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-20
  writ jurisdictionsupervisory jurisdictionconsolidation of holdingsBoard of Revenuejurisdictional defecterror of lawerror of factequityjudicial reviewland disputes
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which, in its writ jurisdiction, set aside a Member, Board of Revenue's revisional order concerning land consolidation proceedings under the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1936. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution, could interfere with a tribunal's decision solely on equitable grounds, or if its jurisdiction was limited to jurisdictional defects. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its writ jurisdiction by setting aside the Board of Revenue's order merely because it appeared inequitable. The Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction is supervisory, akin to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and is concerned with orders made "without lawful authority and of no legal effect," referring to jurisdictional defects, not mere erroneous decisions of fact or law. A tribunal with jurisdiction can decide a matter rightly or wrongly, and an incorrect decision does not render it without jurisdiction. Justice must be administered in accordance with law, with equitable considerations yielding to legal provisions. The appeal was accepted, and the Board of Revenue's order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, set aside a tribunal's order solely on equitable considerations?
  • Is the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution (or Article 199 of the 1973 Constitution) an appellate jurisdiction for correcting errors of fact or law?
  • Does an erroneous decision on a question of fact or law by a tribunal with jurisdiction render its decision "without lawful authority"?
  • Can a Member, Board of Revenue, exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1936, even if a case was remanded for a limited purpose?
  • Must equitable considerations yield to the provisions of law in judicial administration?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD HAYAT vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 450 · Lahore High Court · 1972-06-19
  post-arrest bailmurder casepolice investigationopinion of innocencecriminal procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for post-arrest bail in a murder case where the petitioner, along with others, was accused of causing the death of the deceased by firing. The core legal question was whether the opinion of innocence expressed by police investigating officers during the investigation can be taken into consideration for granting bail to an accused person. The Lahore High Court held that the opinion of the investigating officer, when based on a proper investigation and material collected during the inquiry rather than mere moral conviction, can be duly considered for the purpose of granting bail under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court established that where an investigating officer forms an opinion of innocence based on admissible evidence and witness statements, an accused is entitled to derive benefit from such an opinion at the bail stage, provided the opinion is not shown to be dishonest or mala fide. Consequently, the petition was accepted and bail was granted to the petitioner subject to furnishing surety bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Can the opinion of innocence by a police investigating officer be taken note of for the purpose of deciding a bail application?
  • Whether an investigating officer is permitted to make secret inquiries during an investigation to reach conclusions regarding the participation of an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD GHAZI KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 600 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD GHAFOOR vs GOVERNMENT OF N. W. F. P. THROUGH SECRETARY, HOME AND TRIBAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT1974 PLD Peshawar 28 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-01-16Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs The STATE1974 SCMR 374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-30
  death sentenceocular evidenceappreciation of evidencespecial leave to appealmedical evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the murder of a fifteen-year-old boy. The core legal questions addressed were whether the ocular evidence was credible despite the distance of witnesses from the crime scene, whether medical evidence contradicted the prosecution's case regarding the weapon used, and whether the petitioner possessed a constitutional right to appeal against a death sentence confirmed by the High Court without seeking leave from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the ocular evidence was consistent and credible, and that the medical evidence did not detract from the prosecution's case. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it is not its function to reappraise evidence already evaluated by lower courts. Regarding the constitutional argument, the Court relied on established precedent to reject the claim of an automatic right of appeal, confirming that leave to appeal is required. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the confirmation of a death sentence by the High Court grant an automatic constitutional right of appeal to the Supreme Court without leave?
  • Is it the function of the Supreme Court to reappraise evidence already evaluated by the trial court and High Court?
  • Does the possibility that injuries could be caused by different weapons detract from ocular evidence identifying a specific weapon?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WAZIRABAD THROUGH ITS1974 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-28
  review petitionlimitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealletters patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for the review of an order dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal as being barred by time. The core legal question revolves around the computation of limitation for filing a petition for special leave to appeal and whether the time spent pursuing a certificate of fitness under the Letters Patent automatically extends limitation or requires continuous diligence for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that limitation runs from the date of the High Court judgment, and time spent in pursuing a certificate of fitness may only be condoned if the petitioner proves continuous diligence. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner seeking condonation of delay must explain each day's delay and establish continuous diligence, and that a misconception regarding the starting point of limitation does not constitute a valid ground for review.

  Questions settled

  • Does limitation for filing a petition for special leave to appeal begin from the date of the High Court judgment or from the date of refusal of a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent?
  • Is time spent in pursuing a certificate of fitness under the Letters Patent automatically excluded for limitation purposes?
  • What must a petitioner demonstrate in order to obtain condonation of delay for filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Can the merits of a petition be examined when the petition is barred by time and no sufficient ground for condonation of delay is established?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD BAKHSH AND Another vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 211 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-22Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AZIZ AND 20 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 130 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AYUB AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 501 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THESTATE1974 PLD Lahore 493 · Lahore High Court · 1974-04-11
  pre-arrest bailinterim bailcriminal procedurejudicial discretionbail application
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a criminal petition filed before the High Court challenging the refusal of a Sessions Judge to grant interim pre-arrest bail while admitting a bail application for regular hearing. The core legal question was whether a court, upon admitting a pre-arrest bail application for hearing, should simultaneously grant interim bail to prevent the petitioner's arrest during the pendency of the proceedings. The Court held that the Sessions Judge erred by admitting the application for hearing while refusing interim bail, thereby leaving the petitioner vulnerable to arrest. The Court granted the interim bail, emphasizing that the primary purpose of pre-arrest bail is to protect an accused from the humiliation of arrest when the court has deemed the application worthy of consideration. The key principle laid down is that once a court admits a pre-arrest bail application for regular hearing, it should grant interim bail to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, the Court directed that such bail matters must be fixed for early hearing to prevent prolonged uncertainty for the accused and potential interference with evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Should a court grant interim bail when it admits a pre-arrest bail application for regular hearing?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to delay the hearing of a pre-arrest bail application for a significant period while refusing interim bail?
  • What is the underlying purpose of granting pre-arrest bail in criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 743 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-20Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs ABDUL REHMAN AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 176 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-15Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASLAM BAJWA vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN1974 PLD LAHORE 545 · Lahore High Court · 1974-07-11
  abatement of writ petitionsService Tribunalexclusive jurisdictioncompulsory retirementterms and conditions of servicedisciplinary mattersouster of jurisdictionMLR 114
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  Writ petitions were instituted before the Lahore High Court challenging orders of compulsory retirement passed against civil servants under the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulation 1972 (MLR 114). The core legal issue was whether, following the promulgation of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, the Civil Servants Act 1973, and the Service Tribunals Act 1973, such pending writ petitions abated under Article 212 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. The High Court held that the establishment of the Service Tribunal created an exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the terms and conditions of civil servants, including disciplinary removals and actions under MLR 114. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 was completely ousted. The Court laid down that orders passed under MLR 114 pertain to terms and conditions of service, that the 'competent authority' functions as a 'departmental authority', and that grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or mala fides can be raised on appeal before the Service Tribunal. Accordingly, all pending petitions abated and subsequent ones were held non-entertainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether writ petitions challenging compulsory retirement under Martial Law Regulation 114 abate upon the establishment of a Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does an order passed by a competent authority under Martial Law Regulation 114 relate to the 'terms and conditions' of a civil servant within the meaning of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Can a plea of coram non judice or mala fides in respect of a departmental penalty be adjudicated in an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does Article 264 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preserve pending writ proceedings despite the establishment of exclusive Administrative Courts or Tribunals under Article 212?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ASGHAR vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 355 · Lahore High Court · 1972-07-23Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AQIL vs CHAIRMAN, SIND LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL1974 PLC 194 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-29
  workmanemployerestablishmentaward vs decisionindustrial disputeappealconstitutional jurisdictionreinstatement
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenged an order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside a Labour Court's decision reinstating the petitioner under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The core legal questions were whether an employee supervising a section of an establishment qualifies as a 'workman' under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and whether an order passed under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 constitutes an 'award' or a 'decision' for the purpose of appeal. The High Court held that the petitioner, whose duties involved production planning, supervision, and canvassing, was not a 'workman' under the Standing Orders Ordinance and was thus not entitled to its benefits. The Court further held that an order under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is a 'decision' rather than an 'award', meaning no appeal lay to the Tribunal under Section 37. However, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction to set aside the Tribunal's order, as doing so would perpetuate an illegal reinstatement order. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person employed in a supervisory capacity over a specific section of an establishment qualifies as a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Does an order passed by a Labour Court under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 constitute an 'award' or a 'decision'?
  • Is an order of a Labour Court made on an application under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 appealable to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under Section 37?
  • Can the High Court refuse to interfere in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction when setting aside an order without jurisdiction would perpetuate an illegality?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ANWAR vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 202 · Lahore High Court · 1972-10-19Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AMIR AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 524 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-13Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD Alias MAMMI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 433 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-04Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs PRESIDENT, BORDER BELT COMMITTEE (No. 2), BAHAWALNAGAR AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-07
  Border Allotment CommitteeRehabilitation Commissionerindivisible orderconsent orderMartial Law Regulation No. 9-Callotment of landwrit petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing in limine the appellant's writ petition against the Border Allotment Committee's order dated 5 January 1965. The core legal question concerned the implementation and divisibility of a consent order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 23 May 1958, which cancelled 20 acres from the appellant's total allotted land and directed compensation from another lot, and whether the Border Allotment Committee could partially implement the order while refusing the compensation part based on Martial Law Regulation No. 9-C. The Supreme Court held that the consent order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner was indivisible and could not be partially implemented while rejecting the compensatory portion; since one part was incapable of implementation, the entire order remained ineffective and did not affect the appellant's original allotment. The key principle established is that a composite consent order involving mutual concessions is indivisible, and if a substantive part cannot be implemented, the entire order fails, leaving the parties' original rights intact.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner is indivisible when it involves a cancellation of land coupled with a compensatory allotment?
  • Can the Border Allotment Committee partially implement a composite order while refusing the compensatory portion?
  • What is the effect on an allotment when a reciprocal part of a rehabilitation order is incapable of implementation?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs M. AQIL MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-16
  writ petitionselection grademunicipal servantcontrolling authoritydisciplinary rulesstatutory interpretationadministrative law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the Provincial Government's order withdrawing the appellant's selection grade, which had been previously approved by the Municipal Committee and upheld by the Commissioner. The core legal question is whether the Provincial Government possessed the statutory authority to interfere with the Commissioner's decision, which the High Court had justified by invoking Rule 42(c) of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government lacked such authority. The Court reasoned that Rule 42, when read with Rule 40, applies exclusively to cases where a penalty has been imposed under the Rules. Since the appellant’s case involved the grant of a selection grade rather than a disciplinary penalty, the Rules were inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Commissioner was the designated Controlling Authority under the relevant notification. Consequently, the Provincial Government's interference was declared without lawful authority, and the appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Rule 42 of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963, authorize the Provincial Government to interfere in matters other than disciplinary penalties?
  • Is the Provincial Government empowered to revise an order passed by the Commissioner acting as the Controlling Authority in non-disciplinary matters?
  • Does the scope of Rule 40 of the West Pakistan Municipal Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963, limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Government to cases involving the imposition of penalties?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALI vs AHMAD ALI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  culpable homicidereckless firingimminently dangerous actdying declarationacquittalcriminal liabilityappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from the acquittal of the respondent by the High Court in a murder case. The respondent had fired a revolver into a crowd during a sports-related altercation, resulting in the death of the deceased. The trial court had convicted the respondent, but the High Court acquitted him, speculating that the bullet might have ricocheted from a brickbat. The Supreme Court addressed whether the respondent could escape liability for such reckless conduct. The Court rejected the High Court's speculative theory regarding ricocheting, noting the lack of expert evidence and the physical improbability of the bullet retaining such force. The Supreme Court held that even if the respondent's act was not a direct, intentional murder, the reckless discharge of a firearm into a crowd constitutes an imminently dangerous act. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal, ruling that the respondent was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as the act was committed with the knowledge that it was imminently dangerous and likely to cause death.

  Questions settled

  • Does the reckless discharge of a firearm into a crowd constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a court reject a dying declaration solely based on a hypothetical medical opinion when there is direct evidence from the person who recorded it?
  • Is an acquittal based on speculative theories regarding the trajectory of a bullet sustainable when such theories were not supported by evidence or expert testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ALAM KHAN AND 3 Others vs MAHMUD AHMAD AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 92 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01
  evacuee propertyrehabilitation and settlement schemeejected tenants schemerevenue recordsresumption of landleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This leave petition arises out of a dispute over state land formerly granted under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, which was treated as evacuee property and allotted under the Rehabilitation and Settlement Scheme to a displaced person, whose rights were contested by petitioners claiming as allottees under the Ejected Tenants Scheme. The core legal question was whether the land in dispute was 'treated' as evacuee property prior to 1st March 1957 within the meaning of section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that revenue records consistently showing the land in possession of the Rehabilitation Commissioner sufficiently established that the property was treated as evacuee property, rendering any resumption order by the Naib-Tehsildar ultra vires the government's policy, and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that consistent entries in revenue records demonstrating possession by the Rehabilitation Commissioner satisfy the statutory requirement of property being 'treated' as evacuee property under the relevant evacuee laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land abandoned by a non-Muslim grantee can be treated as evacuee property based on consistent entries in revenue records showing possession by the Rehabilitation Commissioner?
  • Does an order of resumption passed by an Additional Naib-Tehsildar in contravention of provincial government memoranda hold validity against subsequent evacuee property rehabilitation measures?
  • Whether the jurisdiction to determine the evacuee character of a property vests exclusively in the Custodian under section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKRAM vs DR. GHAFUR MUHAMMAD (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS)S1974 SCMR 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-11
  ejectment proceedingsstatutory noticeDisplaced Persons Actmunicipal assessmentdefault in rentlandlord and tenant relationship
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged the dismissal of the petitioner's second appeal regarding ejectment proceedings initiated by a transferee of a shop. The core legal questions were whether a statutory notice under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was invalid due to a demand for excessive rent and whether the lack of 'acknowledgement due' rendered the notice defective. The Supreme Court held that the transferee was entitled to demand rent based on the latest municipal assessment as per the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act. Furthermore, the Court determined that the statutory relationship created by Section 30 overrides general rent fixation applications during the initial period, and the tenant's failure to pay rent constituted default. The Court affirmed the ejectment order, establishing that a transferee is entitled to demand rent at the municipal assessment rate and that failure to pay such rent constitutes a valid ground for ejectment under the statutory framework, regardless of pending applications for fair rent fixation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a statutory notice under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, invalid if it demands rent based on the latest municipal assessment?
  • Can a tenant maintain an application for the fixation of fair rent under the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to override the rent demand prescribed by Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does the failure to pay rent demanded by a transferee under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, constitute a valid ground for ejectment?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AKBAR vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB1974 PLD Lahore 231 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-30Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD AHMAD Alias ANJUM vs THE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 459 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-21
  juvenile delinquencyjuvenile court jurisdictioncommittal proceedingsBombay Children Act 1924Code of Criminal Procedure 1898offences punishable with deathstatutory interpretation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This revision application concerns the jurisdiction of a Juvenile Court to try a juvenile offender for an offence punishable with death or transportation for life under the Bombay Children Act, 1924. The core legal question was whether the Juvenile Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction to try such heinous offences or if the case should have been committed to the Court of Session under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that the Bombay Children Act, 1924, did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on Juvenile Courts to try offences punishable by death or life imprisonment. Consequently, in the absence of express statutory provisions overriding the general law, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, governs, necessitating the committal of such cases to the Court of Session. The principle laid down is that where a special law does not explicitly oust the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts for serious offences, the general procedure for committal to the Court of Session remains applicable. Accordingly, the proceedings before the Juvenile Court were declared without jurisdiction and set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Bombay Children Act, 1924, confer exclusive jurisdiction on Juvenile Courts to try offences punishable with death or transportation for life?
  • Can a Juvenile Court try a juvenile offender for an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session in the absence of express statutory authority?
  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to juvenile offenders when no special law provides a contrary procedure for serious offences?
  Read full judgment →
• MUHAMMAD ABBAS vs The STATE1974 SCMR 445 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-24
  anti-corruptionillegal gratificationsanction for prosecutionpublic servantcognizance of offenceremandleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a former Assistant Sub-Inspector of police, sought leave to appeal against his conviction under section 101 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for demanding and accepting a bribe. The conviction was upheld by the High Court. The petitioner raised two main contentions: first, a discrepancy regarding the date of the alleged demand versus the date of payment and trap; and second, that the trial was vitiated for want of prior sanction for prosecution under section 6(5) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, arguing that the court had taken cognizance by granting a remand while he was still in service. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the delay in payment did not undermine the credible trap evidence. Furthermore, reaffirming the binding authority of earlier Full Court precedents, the Court held that the statutory bar requiring previous sanction applies to persons who are public servants at the time the court takes cognizance of the offence in a judicial sense, and that the mere granting of an investigative remand does not amount to taking cognizance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bar to prosecution requiring previous sanction applies to persons who are public servants at the time of the alleged offence or at the time the court takes cognizance?
  • Does the granting of an investigative remand by a court amount to taking cognizance of an offence in a judicial sense?
  • Whether a discrepancy between the date of a demand for a bribe and the date of its actual payment through a trap vitiates a conviction under anti-corruption laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZUBEDA BEGUM AND Another vs WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 181 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-15
  mortgaged landsredemptionlimitationamendment of plaintinheritancecustomary law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a second appeal concerning a suit for declaration and possession of mortgaged lands redeemed between 1940 and 1948. The original male owner died in 1933 under customary law, mutating property to his son while excluding female heirs. The trial court, district court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit as barred by limitation and held that possession without redemption was not that of a co-owner. The core legal question was whether the suit instituted for possession of mortgaged properties redeemed between 1940 and 1948 was barred by limitation and whether amendment of the plaint ought to be permitted to prevent injustice. The Supreme Court held that the suit filed within 12 years of the last date of redemption in 1948 was not barred by limitation. The Court laid down the principle that, in special circumstances to prevent the defeat of justice by limitation, appellate courts may permit plaint amendments even if it affects a limitation defense, thereby allowing the plaintiffs to amend their plaint to confine the suit to mortgaged properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for possession of mortgaged properties filed within twelve years of their redemption is barred by limitation?
  • Can an appellate court permit the amendment of a plaint to allow a claim for redemption when a fresh suit would be barred by limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZARO vs THE STATE AND Another1974 SCMR 11 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  bail cancellationspecial leave to appealprivate defencesudden fightjudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the mother of the deceased against an order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court refusing to cancel bail granted to respondent No. 2. The respondent was charged under Section 304 in connection with the death of his employee following a sudden fight, during which the respondent also sustained a grievous knife injury. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's discretion in granting and refusing to cancel bail on the ground of absence of premeditation and a possible right of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the grant of bail is a matter of judicial discretion and the court will not interfere with a discretionary order unless it is perverse or in clear disregard of principles of law. The court laid down the principle that appellate interference with bail orders is unwarranted in the absence of perversity or legal error, as the availability of the right of private defence is a matter for evidence at trial.

  Questions settled

  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with a discretionary order granting bail?
  • Is the question of the right of private defence to be decided at the bail stage or on evidence at the trial?
  • Does the High Court commit a legal error by granting bail in a case involving a sudden fight and injuries sustained by the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ZAINAB BIBI AND 5 Other vs Mst. IQBAL BEGUM AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 350 · Lahore High Court · 1974-02-04
  rented landbuilding siteejectmentjurisdictionevacuee propertyaccretionlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These appeals before the Lahore High Court involved a common question of law regarding whether the Rent Controller has jurisdiction over residential plots transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, where non-permanent structures exist. The appellants argued that because the transferred properties were vacant plots rather than 'rented land' (which the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 defines as land used for trade or business), the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction. The Court analyzed paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Schedule to the 1958 Act alongside Settlement Scheme No. VI, holding that a 'vacant building site' includes sites with non-permanent constructions. Such non-permanent structures constitute accretions to the land and pass to the transferee upon auction. Consequently, once a plot contains a residential structure, it falls within the definition of a 'house' or 'building' under the 1959 Ordinance. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller possesses jurisdiction over such properties and dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a building site containing non-permanent constructions is deemed a vacant site and transferred inclusive of such constructions under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Does the Rent Controller have jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding whether a building on a transferred site is permanent or non-permanent?
  • Do unauthorized constructions raised by an occupant on evacuee property form an accretion that passes to the transferee of the site?
  • Does a residential plot containing a non-permanent building fall within the definition of a house or residential building under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SABRA AND Others vs FAZAL HAQ AND Another1974 SCMR 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-10
  settlement propertydivisibility of propertywrit jurisdictionfunctus officiotransfer of propertysettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order that refused to interfere with a Settlement Commissioner's decision regarding the transfer of a composite residential property. The core legal questions were whether the Settlement Commissioner was competent to determine the indivisibility of the property despite previous proceedings, and whether the Settlement Commissioner became functus officio after remanding the case for consideration of divisibility. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction. The Court found that the respondent had not made an unequivocal admission of divisibility and that the previous remand order did not mandate a finding of divisibility but merely directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to consider it. The principle laid down is that the determination of the divisibility of property falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities, and the High Court, in the exercise of its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, will not interfere with such findings of fact unless they are patently unlawful or without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of the divisibility of a property within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities?
  • Does a remand order directing an authority to consider the divisibility of a property render that authority functus officio regarding the final decision on divisibility?
  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner regarding property divisibility under its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. SABIRA SULTANA AND Another vs BANGUL KHAN AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 510 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-16
  ad interim injunctioncommon tenancypartitionpower of attorneymortgageexecution proceedingsminor's interest
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a dispute over a residential property in Quetta, originally owned by Muhammad Tufail. Following his death, his son, respondent No. 3, obtained a power of attorney from other heirs, including the mother of the minor appellants, to mortgage the property. Subsequently, the property was mortgaged to respondent No. 1, and ejectment proceedings were initiated, culminating in a compromise decree. The minor appellants filed a suit challenging the validity of the power of attorney, the mortgage deeds, and the compromise, seeking a declaration that their 21/80 share in the property remained unencumbered. They also sought an ad interim injunction to restrain execution proceedings. While the trial court granted an injunction for the whole property, the High Court limited it to the appellants' specific share. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether maintaining the injunction only for the appellants' share effectively partitioned the property, which was held in common tenancy. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, effectively upholding the High Court's decision to restrict the injunction to the appellants' specific share of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ad interim injunction be granted to protect a specific share of property held in common tenancy without effectively partitioning the property?
  • Does Order XXXIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to execution proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. RAJI AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 429 · Lahore High Court · 1973-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. NASIM AKHTAR vs THE DEPUTY SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-04
  displaced personstransfer of propertyvacant sitesettlement authoritiesconcurrent findingspermanent constructionsupreme court appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from an order passed in a petition seeking leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a disputed plot forming part of Bungalow No. SE-16-R-I, Davis Road, Lahore, treated as a vacant site under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question involves the entitlement of the petitioner to the transfer of the plot based on alleged permanent construction and whether concurrent findings of fact by the settlement authorities and the High Court can be interfered with. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings that the petitioner had not raised a permanent construction on the plot and had failed to file the requisite form are findings of fact that cannot be interfered with. Furthermore, the plot had been validly transferred to another party by the Central Government under Section 10(2) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the nature of construction in property transfer matters under settlement laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding the nature of construction on a disputed plot can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a temporary construction such as a small room and chhaper entitle a claimant to the transfer of a vacant site under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. MURAD BEGUM ETC vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ ETC.1974 PLD Supreme Court 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-09
  joint and indivisible decreeabatement of appealnecessary partiesinconsistent decreesmisdescription of partycondonation of delaysubstitution of legal representatives
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  Civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising from a High Court decision that dismissed a Regular First Appeal as incompetent and abated. The suit involved a land sale transaction where the trial court passed a decree for possession, mesne profits, and interest jointly against sixteen defendants who claimed joint possession as sub-purchasers. The core legal questions were whether an appeal against a joint and indivisible decree can proceed when certain necessary parties or their legal representatives are omitted, and whether a misdescription of a party in the decree-sheet warrants condonation of delay for substitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, holding that because the decree was joint and indivisible, the failure of the appealing defendants to implead all co-defendants or bring their legal representatives on record rendered the appeal incompetent due to the risk of inconsistent decrees. The Court established that where a decree is joint and indivisible, abatement against one necessary party results in total abatement of the appeal, and misdescription in the decree under appeal constitutes sufficient cause for substituting parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal proceed against a joint and indivisible decree if necessary co-defendants or their legal representatives are omitted?
  • What is the legal effect on an appeal when a joint decree abates against some of the respondents due to failure to implead their legal representatives?
  • Does a misdescription of a party appearing in the High Court decree-sheet constitute sufficient cause to condone delay and allow substitution of parties in the Supreme Court?
  • Can a party depart from its original pleadings and raise a new line of defence for the first time during appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. LATIFAN AND 7 Other vs MUHAMMAD ISHAQ AND 3 Other1974 PLD Lahore 65 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. LAL JAN vs MESSRS SILVER PAPER TUBE Co., KARACHI1974 PLD Karachi 140 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-04
  workmen's compensationsocial security ordinanceimplied repealinconsistency of statutesdependentsdeath grantemployment injury
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal under Section 30(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation dismissing an application for compensation. The deceased workman died during employment, and his mother (the appellant) claimed compensation. The core legal question was whether Section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 barred relief and impliedly repealed the compensation provisions under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 due to alleged inconsistency. The High Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Commissioner. The Court held that the two enactments have different purposes, beneficiaries, and mechanisms; the Social Security Ordinance provides benefits, grants, and pensions rather than statutory compensation for employment injuries/death to dependents like a widowed mother. Consequently, Section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance 1965 does not bar claims or repeal Section 4 or Section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 bar a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
  • Are the provisions regarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 inconsistent with the benefits provided under the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965?
  • Does a 'death grant' under Section 37 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965 constitute a substitute for 'compensation' under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. KHATUN vs MALLA AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-17
  ancestral propertycustomary lawalienationreversionary heirsShariat Application Actburden of prooflimited estate
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a suit for a declaration filed by reversionary heirs against a gift of ancestral land made by a male holder, Majhi, who had inherited the property under agricultural custom before the enforcement of the Shariat Acts. The core legal question was whether the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1948, as amended in 1951, removed the customary restrictions on a male holder's power to alienate ancestral property, thereby allowing him to gift it freely. The Supreme Court held that the Shariat Acts did not confer absolute ownership powers upon a holder who had inherited property under custom. The Court affirmed that such a holder remains bound by the customary restrictions on alienation until the property devolves under Muslim Law upon his death or the termination of a limited estate. Consequently, the gift was declared void as it violated the customary restrictions applicable to the donor. The Court further held that when both parties have led evidence on a custom, the initial burden of proof (onus) becomes immaterial to the final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1951 remove customary restrictions on the alienation of ancestral property by a male holder who inherited it under custom?
  • Does the question of burden of proof remain relevant when both parties have led evidence on the existence of a custom?
  • What is the nature of the estate held by a person who inherited property under agricultural custom after the enactment of the Shariat Application Acts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. KHANAN vs ZAKIR AND 7 OTHERSs1974 P Cr. L J 105 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. KHADIJA BIBI vs MUHAMMAD NAZIR AND 3 Other1974 SCMR 30 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-12
  private defenseacquittalcriminal appealmedical evidenceburden of proofocular testimonymurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as an appeal against the High Court's acquittal of respondents convicted of murder and attempted murder. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents acted in the exercise of their right of private defense, given the conflicting evidence regarding the origin of the fight and the injuries sustained by both parties. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to acquit the respondents. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its version of events, noting that the medical evidence contradicted the ocular testimony regarding the specific roles of the accused. Furthermore, the injuries sustained by the respondents were inconsistent with the prosecution's claim that the complainant party acted in self-defense. The Court emphasized that where the prosecution's narrative is undermined by physical evidence and the site of the occurrence is shown to be in the possession of the accused, the defense plea of private defense becomes highly probable, warranting acquittal. The judgment reaffirms that the burden of proof remains on the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused that are inconsistent with the prosecution's version of events support a plea of private defense?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when medical evidence contradicts the ocular testimony regarding the specific roles attributed to the accused?
  • Is an acquittal justified when the prosecution fails to prove the alleged motive and the site of occurrence is in the possession of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. JHANDOO AND 6 OTHERS vs THE BORDER AREA COMMITTEE, NAROWAL, DISTRICT SIALKOT AND Another1974 SCMR 26 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-02
  land allotmentBorder Area Committeeadministrative reviewtarget daterehabilitationcancellation of allotment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the cancellation of the appellants' agricultural land allotment by the Border Area Committee. The core legal question was whether the Committee acted lawfully in cancelling the allotment based on an unverified report alleging the claim was filed after the target date, despite prior findings to the contrary. The Supreme Court held that the Committee's order was based on incorrect facts and relied on unauthentic evidence, ignoring the established record. The Court found that the appellants' claim had indeed been submitted by the target date of 24th December 1952, and the Committee had previously scrutinized and validated the allotment. Consequently, the Court set aside the Committee's cancellation order and restored the appellants' allotment. The key principle laid down is that administrative bodies, such as the Border Area Committee, cannot arbitrarily review and cancel validly settled allotments based on unverified reports when the official record clearly demonstrates compliance with statutory deadlines.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Border Area Committee cancel a land allotment based on an unverified report when the official record confirms the claim was filed within the target date?
  • Does the Border Area Committee have the authority to review and reverse its own previous findings regarding the validity of an allotment without new, authentic evidence?
  • Is the possession of land as an allottee under rehabilitation authorities a necessary condition for the exercise of power under paragraph 10 of Martial Law Regulation No. 9-B?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. JANNA T vs Mst. SAEEDA BEGUM AND Other1974 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-24
  evacuee landpermanent settlementallotment cancellationestoppelwrit jurisdictionrehabilitation settlement schemevested rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that set aside the cancellation of the respondents' allotment of evacuee agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose initial allotment was cancelled and whose subsequent writ petition against that cancellation was dismissed, could later re-agitate her claim to displace the respondents' permanent settlement rights. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s failure to challenge the dismissal of her earlier writ petition, coupled with a significant delay of over two years before seeking reconsideration, allowed the respondents' rights to mature. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the respondents' permanent settlement under the relevant statute could not be disturbed by the petitioner's belated efforts. The key principle laid down is that a party who accepts the finality of a cancellation order by failing to pursue further legal remedies is estopped from later disturbing vested rights of third parties who have obtained permanent settlement of the land in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a previous allottee of evacuee land challenge a permanent settlement in favour of another party after failing to appeal the dismissal of a prior writ petition challenging the cancellation of their own claim?
  • Does the pendency of a review petition before the Central Record Office automatically prevent the permanent settlement of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Is a party estopped from claiming land rights after allowing a significant delay to occur before re-agitating a claim that had previously been dismissed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. JAMILA SULTANA vs SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, HYDERABAD AND 21974 SCMR 151 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  evacuee propertysettlement proceedingstransfer of propertyLH formfinality of ordersspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of protracted settlement proceedings regarding evacuee properties consisting of shops and residential floors in Hyderabad. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, who failed to challenge the initial rejection of her transfer application (LH form) and allowed that order to attain finality, could subsequently maintain a claim for the transfer of the first floor following the introduction of Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's earlier failure to challenge the rejection of her LH form rendered that order final, precluding her from subsequently agitating against the transfer of the property in favour of another party. The key principle laid down is that an unchallenged order rejecting a property transfer application attains finality and bars subsequent belated claims and fresh applications under later settlement schemes regarding the same property.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unchallenged order rejecting a property transfer application attain finality so as to bar subsequent claims under later settlement schemes?
  • Can a claimant who failed to pursue appeals against the rejection of an LH form maintain a fresh transfer application after the introduction of Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. JADO AND 3 Other vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SANGHAR1974 PLD Karachi 229 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. HUSSAINZADGAI AND 2, Other vs Mst. BIBI ROHANA AND 3 Other1974 PLD Peshawar 7 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-11-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAZARABAIMERCHANT vs MUHAMMAD ISMAIL AND Other1974 SCMR 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-26
  civil reviewevacuee propertyallotment of propertyRent Controllerindependent possessionlicensee
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a civil review petition filed against a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the interpretation of evacuee property laws and allotment orders. The core legal question revolves around whether an order passed by a Rent Controller under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1947, prior to the extension of evacuee laws to Karachi, could be deemed an allotment of evacuee property under section 18 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, and whether a wife could claim independent possession through her husband. The court dismissed the review petition, holding that the Rent Controller's order could not constitute an allotment of evacuee property since evacuee laws were not applicable to Karachi at the relevant time, and reaffirming that a wife residing with her husband merely occupies as a licensee and possesses no independent right for the purposes of the relevant notifications. The key principles established relate to the strict temporal and jurisdictional application of evacuee property allotment provisions and the legal nature of a wife's joint occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order passed by a Rent Controller under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1947, before evacuee laws were extended to Karachi, be deemed an allotment of evacuee property under section 18 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957?
  • Does a wife residing in evacuee premises with her husband hold independent possession so as to take advantage of the extended definition of possession under Notification No. F. 1(27)/59-SI dated 13th October 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. HAJRA BI AND Another vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND Another1974 SCMR 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-08-20
  evacuee propertypermanent transfer deedsettlement commissionerauctionjurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer and auction of evacuee property bearing No. O.T.F./27-G.I., Karachi. The core legal question concerns the legality of the Settlement Commissioner's order setting aside a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) issued to respondent No. 2 and transferring the property to the petitioners, whose earlier transfer form had been rejected. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that once a P.T.D. has been issued and the petitioners' transfer form stands rejected, the Settlement Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to reopen the matter or set aside the P.T.D. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment that restored the property to the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Settlement Commissioner has jurisdiction to set aside a Permanent Transfer Deed once issued to a transferee?
  • Can a revision petition be entertained against the transfer of property when the objector's transfer form has already been rejected?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATTAN BI And 2 Other vs FATEH MUHAMMAD AND 6 Other1974 PLD Lahore 458 · Lahore High Court · 1974-01-20
  limitationrepeal of statutelimited estateancestral propertycustomary lawrevival of barred claimsgift by widow
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arose from a suit for possession of ancestral land gifted by a widow holding a limited estate under custom. The plaintiffs, collaterals of the deceased husband, filed the suit in 1964 after the widow's death in 1963, challenging the validity of the 1951 gifts. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred under Section 7 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act 1920, but the appellate court reversed this, holding that the suit was governed by Article 141 of the Limitation Act 1908 following the repeal of the 1920 Act by the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962. The High Court analyzed whether the repeal of the 1920 Act revived a right of suit that had already become barred under the old law. The Court held that once a right of action is barred under an existing statute of limitation, the subsequent repeal of that statute or the enactment of a new law does not revive the barred claim, as the defendants had acquired a vested right of immunity from challenge. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial court's dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeal of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act 1920 revive a right of suit that had already become time-barred under its provisions?
  • Can a plaintiff evade the specific limitation period prescribed for challenging an alienation of ancestral property by framing the suit purely as one for possession under Article 141 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does an admission regarding the ancestral nature of property made in a replication form part of the pleadings binding on the party?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. FATIMA- vs THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE1974 PLD Karachi 429 · Sindh High Court · 1974-05-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. CHANO BIBI vs MUHAMMAD SHAFT AND ANOTHEP S1974 PLD Peshawar 4 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. BAKHT BIBI vs MEHR KHAN AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 367 · Lahore High Court · 1966-03-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. ANWARI Alias BALOO vs CIVIL JUDGE FIRST CLASS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 224 · Sindh High Court · 1973-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. ANAR BEGUM vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND Other1974 SCMR 125 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-08
  allotment of landdisplaced personssitting allotteereview petitionquestion of factSupreme Court practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a dispute over the allotment and confirmation of land between two claimant displaced persons. The core legal question concerned the validity of concurrent findings of fact regarding sitting allottee status and the competence of raising fresh grounds before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact rendered by the High Court regarding whether a party is a sitting allottee will not be interfered with when supported by cogent reasons, and new contentions or points not raised before the High Court cannot be permitted to be urged for the first time before the apex court. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding sitting allottee status?
  • Can a party raise a new contention or point for the first time before the Supreme Court without having raised it before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. AMTUL HABIB AND Other AND JOSEPH AND Other vs Mst. MUSARRAT1974 PLD Supreme Court 185 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-21
  co-operative societiesnominationinheritancesuccessionimmovable propertygiftprovident funds
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These consolidated appeals raise the question of whether a nomination made under section 27 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, validly effects a transfer of immovable property in favour of the nominee to the exclusion of legal heirs. The Supreme Court examined the nature of membership in a housing society versus the allotment of immovable plots, comparing the statutory provision with section 5 of the Provident Funds Act, 1925. The Court held that a nomination under section 27 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act does not transfer ownership of immovable property, nor does it override the personal law of succession. Instead, a nomination merely operates to confer a right to receive or collect the relevant share or interest, with the nominee holding the same as a trustee for all legal heirs entitled under the law of succession. The Court laid down that a nomination cannot operate as a valid gift or a will to alter the course of succession, and that prior contrary high court rulings extending the scope of such nominations were erroneous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a nomination made under section 27 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, validly effects a transfer of immovable property in favour of the nominee?
  • Does a nomination under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 supersede the personal law of succession applicable to a deceased member?
  • Does a nominee under section 27 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 take the property beneficially as an absolute owner or as a trustee for the legal heirs?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. AMINA BEGUM vs GHULAM NABI AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 78 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-08
  jactitation of marriagefamily courts jurisdictionmarital statusdeclaratory suitexclusive jurisdictioncivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil revision petition addresses whether a suit for a declaration that the defendant is the plaintiff's legally wedded wife and for a permanent injunction constitutes a suit for "jactitation of marriage" and thus falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The core legal question is whether jactitation of marriage is strictly confined to a suit brought by a party denying the marriage to silence a false boaster, or whether it extends to a converse suit filed by a party asserting the marriage. The Lahore High Court held that the expression "jactitation of marriage" is not limited to suits for negative declarations seeking to silence a false pretender; it encompasses any suit or declaration regarding marital status where one party alleges and the other denies the marriage. The ratio decidendi is that any suit involving a dispute over the existence or subsistence of a marriage relates to family affairs and falls within the exclusive purview of Family Courts. The court set aside the trial court's order and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit for a declaration that the defendant is the plaintiff's legally wedded wife constitutes a suit for jactitation of marriage?
  • Does the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts over jactitation of marriage under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 extend to suits seeking affirmative declarations regarding the subsistence of a marriage?
  • Is the expression 'jactitation of marriage' confined strictly to negative declaratory suits brought to silence a false pretender of marriage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. ALLAH BACHAI AND OTHERS vs Haji WAHID BAKHSH (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS)1974 SC M R108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationcondonation of delayspecial leave petitionletters patent appealbarred by limitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, concerning the dismissal of a petition as barred by limitation. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the application for a certificate for Letters Patent Appeal and the subsequent special leave petition could be condoned on the ground that the impugned judgment was not posted at the Bahawalpur Circuit where the petitioners' counsel practiced. The Court held that the petition was hopelessly time-barred because the initial application for a certificate was filed beyond limitation even from the date of alleged knowledge, and the petitioners failed to explain the subsequent delays and each day's delay as required by law. The key principle laid down is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must explain each day's delay after the expiry of the normal period of limitation, and a lack of intimation at an outlying circuit does not excuse subsequent unexplained delays in pursuing legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to post a judgment at an outlying circuit constitutes sufficient ground for condoning a delay in filing an appeal?
  • Must an applicant seeking condonation of delay explain each day's delay after the expiry of the normal period of limitation?
  • Does the lack of intimation of a judgment to a counsel practicing at an outlying circuit extend limitation indefinitely without accounting for subsequent delays?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. SAHIRA ALMAS AND Another vs GULBAZ KHAN AND 4 Other1974 PLD Lahore 289 · Lahore High Court · 1973-07-26Read full judgment →
• MRS. ISMAT TARIQ vs Sh. SHAUKAT ALI1974 SCMR 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · -
  condonation of delaylimitationcertificate of fitnessdue diligencenegligence of counselspecial leave to appealtime barred petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan with a delay of 865 days against a High Court judgment dated 12-10-1970. The petitioner sought condonation of delay on the ground that she was diligently pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness for appeal under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the High Court, which was ultimately dismissed as inoperative under Article 58 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 following Supreme Court precedent. The respondent opposed the condonation, arguing that the law rendering such High Court applications inoperative had been authoritatively declared prior to the High Court's judgment, making the pursuit of a misconceived remedy lacking in due diligence. The Supreme Court refused to condone the delay, holding that counsel's failure to take note of declared law constituted a lack of due diligence for which the litigant must bear the consequences. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pursuing a misconceived application for a fitness certificate in the High Court constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing a leave to appeal petition?
  • Can a litigant claim due diligence when counsel fails to follow established Supreme Court precedent regarding maintainability of remedies?
  • Whether sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 remained operative after the commencement of Article 58 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• MRS. HABIBA JILANI vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGHTHE1974 PLD Lahore 153 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-24
  preventive detentionsecurity of PakistanDefence of Pakistan Rulesfundamental rightsproclamation of emergencyhabeas corpusreview board
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second writ petition was filed by the wife of Major-General (Rtd.) Mian Ghulam Jillani under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging her husband's preventive detention under Rule 32(1)(b) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules pursuant to an order dated June 21, 1973. The core legal questions involved whether the detention was founded on sufficient and relevant material, whether the action was vitiated as being based on mere suspicion under Rule 208, and whether the procedural safeguards and time limits under Article 10 of the Constitution applied despite the suspension of fundamental rights during a proclamation of emergency. The Lahore High Court held that the detaining authority had sufficient and relevant material before it to reasonably satisfy itself that the detention was necessary for the security of Pakistan and public safety, and that the court cannot substitute its own discretion for that of the executive. Furthermore, the court held that the provisions of Article 10 of the Constitution constitute positive statute law that must be read into preventive detention laws, allowing the court to examine compliance under its constitutional jurisdiction, though the maximum permissible period of detention in this case was twelve months, rendering the continued custody lawful until February 15, 1974. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can substitute its own discretion for that of the detaining authority when reviewing the sufficiency of material for preventive detention?
  • Do the safeguards contained in Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 operate as positive statute law that must be read into preventive detention enactments?
  • Whether the suspension of the right to move a court for the enforcement of fundamental rights during an emergency bars a citizen from seeking scrutiny of mandatory statutory detention procedures?
  • What is the maximum permissible period of preventive detention under Article 10 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for a person detained for acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Pakistan?
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• Mrs. DOREEN BARKAT RAM vs ABDUL HAKIM KHAN1974 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-09
  money-lenderlicence renewaldeeming clausepromissory notesstatutory interpretationadministrative delay
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which restored a trial court decree in a suit for the recovery of Rs. 4,000 based on promissory notes. The core legal question was whether a money-lender's licence, for which a renewal application had been timely filed but not yet processed by the authorities, could be deemed to remain in force at the time the suit was instituted. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the statutory 'deeming clause' must be given full effect. The Court held that where a licensee has applied for renewal within the prescribed time, the existing licence continues to be valid and effective until the authorities dispose of the renewal application, regardless of the delay in processing. The key principle laid down is that a party should not suffer prejudice due to administrative delays in processing a timely renewal application, and the statutory protection afforded by the deeming provision ensures the licence remains valid during the pendency of such an application.

  Questions settled

  • Does a money-lender's licence remain valid after its expiry date if an application for renewal was filed within the prescribed time but not yet decided?
  • Can a party be penalized for the failure of the authorities to process a timely renewal application for a money-lending licence?
  • Does the 'deeming clause' in money-lending legislation effectively extend the validity of an expired licence until the renewal application is disposed of?
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• Moulvi ALI AKBAR vs KHATOON NESSA Alias KHATOON BIBI1974 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-04-30
  restoration of ruledismissal for defaultprocedural discretionundue severitynon-appearance of counselproperty rights
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from an order of the Dacca High Court refusing to restore a Rule that had been discharged due to the non-appearance of the parties. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court exercised its discretion with undue severity by dismissing the petition for default when the petitioner's counsel was absent for only a brief period after the court had directed the matter to be heard after the next item. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was unjustified and overly punitive, particularly given the potential for permanent loss of property rights regarding the petitioner's 1953 purchase. The Court emphasized that procedural rules regarding appearance should not be applied with such rigidity as to cause irreparable harm when the default was minor and the circumstances were known to the court. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and directed that the Rule be restored to its original number to be proceeded with according to law from the stage reached before its dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court's refusal to restore a petition dismissed for default due to a brief absence of counsel constitutes an exercise of undue severity?
  • Does a court have the discretion to dismiss a case for default when the absence of counsel is minor and the circumstances are known to the court?
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• MOHARAM AND Another vs The STATE1974 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  murderdeath sentenceeyewitness testimonycorroborationspecial leave to appealcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal and confirmed their death sentences for the murder of one Kabool. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, armed with pistols, waylaid the deceased and fired at him in retaliation for a previous murder, subsequently dismembering his body. The trial court convicted the petitioners under section 302/34, while acquitting a co-accused, Jiand. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that reliance on unrelated eyewitnesses was unjustified as they were interested witnesses, and argued that the case of the second petitioner lacked corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the credibility of the unrelated eyewitnesses were sound, that their testimony was consistent with medical evidence, and that the oral testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of blood-stained clothing in respect of the first petitioner, while corroboration was not strictly required to sustain the conviction of the second petitioner given the reliable eyewitness testimony. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of unrelated eyewitnesses requires corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the basis of benefit of doubt vitiate the conviction of other co-accused tried jointly?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the appreciation of ocular evidence?
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• MOHAMMAD YAQOOB vs MUHAMMAD SARWAR AND 2 OTHERS1974 P Cr. L J 511 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1971-12-16Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD SHABBIR AND Others vs BASHIR AHMAD1974 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-07-12
  pre-emptionextension of timeinterim orderstatutory right of appealcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit decreed in favour of the respondent on the condition of depositing the pre-emption amount by a specified date, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. On the final day of the deposit period, the respondent filed an appeal challenging the valuation of the land and obtained an ex parte interim order from the District Judge extending the deposit deadline. Although the appeal was ultimately dismissed without a fresh extension, the respondent had deposited the amount within the extended period while the appeal was pending. The petitioners challenged the District Judge's competence to extend the deposit time. The Supreme Court held that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and the appellate court is fully competent under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to pass an interim order extending the deposit time. Refusing to exercise such power would render the statutory right of appeal infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court has the competence under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money fixed by the trial court?
  • Is an appellant in a pre-emption suit legally obliged to deposit the pre-emption money within the trial court's deadline to preserve their right of appeal?
  • Does the dismissal of an appeal on merits invalidate a deposit made within an extended period granted by an interim order of the appellate court?
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• MOHAMMAD QASIM GASOLE vs THE KARACHI MILK SUPPLY SCHEME1974 PLC 289 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-07Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD NAWAZ vs GENERAL MANAGER, HEAVY MECHANICAL COMPLEX, TAXILA1974 PLC 17 · Labour Court · 1973-01-29Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD MANSOOR AND 2 Others vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1974 P Cr. L J 59 · Sindh High Court · 1973-06-10Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD ISHAQ vs MESSRS BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI1974 PLC 305 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-03-08Read full judgment →