Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MOHAMMAD IDRIS vs The STATE1974 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01
  murderright of self-defencedying declarationocular testimonygrave and sudden provocationspecial leave to appealcriminal liability
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for murder under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner could successfully invoke the right of self-defence and whether the ocular testimony and dying declarations were reliable despite alleged contradictions. The Supreme Court held that the plea of self-defence was unavailable because the evidence established that the petitioner arrived at the scene after the initial quarrel had ceased and the parties had separated, meaning there was no imminent apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Furthermore, the Court found no material contradictions between the dying declarations and the ocular testimony of the witnesses. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, concluding that the prosecution had established the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that the right of self-defence cannot be invoked when the accused arrives at the scene after the cessation of a conflict and acts with deliberation rather than under grave and sudden provocation.

  Questions settled

  • Can the plea of self-defence be successfully raised if the accused arrives at the scene after the initial conflict has ceased?
  • Does the absence of a witness's name in a dying declaration automatically render their ocular testimony unreliable?
  • Is a plea of self-defence available to an accused who acts with deliberation rather than under grave and sudden provocation?
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• MOHAMMAD HANIF vs TAE STATE1974 PLD Karachi 22 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-11
  enhancement of sentencereview of judgmentinherent powers of High Courtnatural justicecriminal referencecriminal revisionbail
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal reference and revision matter involves the enhancement of a sentence awarded to the accused Mohammad Hanif, who was convicted following an altercation over cycle hire charges. The core legal question addressed is whether a High Court can recall or review its own earlier final order or judgment enhancing a sentence under Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly when the order was passed without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard or when a connected revision petition remained pending. The Sindh High Court held that Section 369 is strictly confined to judgments delivered in the exercise of original jurisdiction, and that in rare and exceptional circumstances—such as where an order is passed in violation of mandatory provisions of law or principles of natural justice—the High Court possesses inherent power under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to revoke, review, or alter its earlier decisions. Consequently, the court recalled its previous enhancement order, reviewed the prosecution's evidence, found significant discrepancies and lack of credible eye-witness testimony, set aside the conviction and sentence, and rejected the reference.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to judgments or orders passed by a High Court in the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to recall or review its earlier final order in rare and exceptional circumstances?
  • Whether an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard justifies the recall of a previous criminal judgment?
  • Does the finality attached to appellate judgments under Section 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the High Court from altering an order passed without notice to the affected party?
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• MOHAMMAD BOOTA AND 2 Other vs Mirza GHIAS AHMED1974 PLC 241 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-09-02Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD ASHRAF vs MOHAMMAD HANIF AND Another1974 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-26
  settlement of evacuee propertyopen public auctiontransfer of propertyejectment proceedingsres judicataconcurrent jurisdictionattornment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of a shop in Sargodha. The petitioner, a local occupant, challenged the transfer of the shop to the respondents, who had purchased it via open public auction. The petitioner claimed the shop was converted into industrial premises and sought its transfer, despite having previously entered into a compromise agreement to attorn to the respondents as a tenant during ejectment proceedings. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities could validly transfer the property to the petitioner after it had already been auctioned and confirmed in favor of the respondents, and whether the petitioner’s subsequent claim was maintainable. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the auction transfer was final and the subsequent transfer to the petitioner was without lawful authority. The Court established that once a property is disposed of by auction and confirmed, an officer of concurrent jurisdiction cannot re-transfer the same property without setting aside the prior auction, and a party cannot re-litigate a claim after accepting the status of a tenant in valid ejectment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an officer of concurrent jurisdiction transfer a property that has already been disposed of by a confirmed auction?
  • Does a party who enters into a compromise to attorn to a transferee as a tenant forfeit the right to subsequently claim ownership of the same property?
  • Is a property disposed of by auction subject to re-transfer by Settlement authorities without the prior auction being formally set aside?
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• MOHAMMAD ARAF vs THE STATE1974 PLD Peshawar 33 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-02-13Read full judgment →
• MOHAMMAD AFZAL KHAN vs PROVINCE OF N. W. F. P., THROUGH THE1974 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-16
  writ jurisdictionpay fixationservice matterremedy adequacydismissal in limineinterpretation of notification
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from the dismissal in limine of a writ petition by the Peshawar High Court, which had held that a civil suit was a more expeditious remedy for the appellant’s grievance regarding pay fixation. The appellant, a government servant, challenged the Department’s interpretation of a Finance Department notification concerning the minimum pay increase entitled upon promotion to the post of Accounts Clerk. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that a civil suit was a more adequate remedy, and whether the appellant was entitled to a specific pay increase under the relevant notification. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s view regarding the adequacy of a civil suit was incorrect, noting that writ jurisdiction is generally more expeditious for interpreting service rules. The Court further held that the notification entitled the appellant to a minimum increase of Rs. 25 over the pay he was drawing immediately prior to his promotion, rather than his pay in an earlier, lower post. The appeal was allowed, and the Department was directed to fix the appellant's pay accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil suit always a more expeditious remedy than a writ petition in matters involving the interpretation of service rules?
  • Does a provision granting a minimum increase on promotion apply to the pay drawn immediately prior to the promotion or to a previous lower post?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a writ petition in limine on the sole ground that a civil suit is an alternative remedy?
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• MOHABAT SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF N: W. F. P. THROUGH SECRETARY, HOME1974 PLD Peshawar 24 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-01-17Read full judgment →
• Miss S. N. NAQVI vs LT. COL. MUHAMMAD AMIR KHAN AND ANOTHER1974 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-18
  contempt of courtinterim stay orderdisobedience of orderejectment proceedingsrestoration of possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a civil petition for special leave to appeal where the Supreme Court had issued an interim stay order restraining ejectment proceedings against the petitioner, subject to the deposit of monthly rent. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a civil miscellaneous application alleging that the respondent had violated the stay order by proceeding with the ejectment before the Rent Controller and taking physical possession of the premises. The core legal question concerned whether the respondent was guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the interim stay order. The Court held that while the respondent violated the interim order, contempt proceedings were not warranted because the order had never been formally conveyed to him or the Rent Controller by his counsel or attorney, and possession of the premises had already been restored to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot be punished for contempt for violating an interim court order unless it is established that the order was duly communicated or brought to their knowledge, while counsel must exercise due diligence in conveying court orders to their clients.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can be punished for contempt of court for violating an interim stay order that was never conveyed to them?
  • Is an advocate-on-record duty-bound to communicate an interim order passed in their presence to their client?
  • Can possession of disputed premises be ordered to be restored when an ejectment order is executed in violation of a stay order?
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• Miss YOUNICA-- vs JOSEPH DAVID1974 PLD Karachi 185 · Sindh High Court · 1973-11-29Read full judgment →
• Mirza YOUSAF BRIG ETC. vs SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1974 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-31
  evacuee propertysettlement schemeconcurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdictionallotment of shoppossessiontransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly refused to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities concerning the physical occupation of the property, and whether the petitioners were entitled to transfer under the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII despite having abandoned possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court rightly declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding occupation. The Court further held that Paragraph 3 of the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII requires an applicant to be in occupation of the property to be eligible for transfer; it does not confer entitlement upon individuals who, while occupying the property before the prescribed date, subsequently abandoned it before making an application. The judgment affirms that eligibility for transfer under the scheme is contingent upon the applicant's actual occupation of the property at the relevant time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by settlement authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does Paragraph 3 of the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII 1966 require an applicant to be in occupation of the property at the time of application for transfer?
  • Is a person who occupied an evacuee property before the prescribed date but abandoned it prior to the application entitled to transfer under the Revised Settlement Scheme No. VII 1966?
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• Mirza INAYAT BEG Alias Mirza INAYAT HUSSAIN AND 9 Other vs Mirza1974 PLD Lahore 359 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-19Read full judgment →
• Mir MUMTAZ ALI KHAN vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERS1974 P Cr. L J 335 · Sindh High Court · 1972-03-12Read full judgment →
• Mir DARYA KHAN vs MEHRAN KHAN AND 5 OTERRS1974 PLD Karachi 209 · Sindh High Court · 1974-01-31Read full judgment →
• MIR AHMAD vs KARAM KHAN1974 PLD Peshawar 42 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-04-07Read full judgment →
• MINHOON vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 18 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-15Read full judgment →
• Mian MUSARAT SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Peshawar 18 · Peshawar High Court · 1973-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mian MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE AND Another vs COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1974 PLD Lahore 468 · Lahore High Court · 1974-02-25Read full judgment →
• Mian MANZAR BASHIR, ADVOCATE vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ISLAMABAD1974 PLD Lahore 319 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mian KHADIM SHAH vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AHD Other1974 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-22
  land acquisitionwithdrawal from acquisitiondelivery of possessionmarket valueconcurrent findings of fact
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition concerning the acquisition of State land and subsequent withdrawal from acquisition proceedings by the Government. The core legal question revolves around whether the Government could validly withdraw from the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and whether physical possession of the land had been delivered to the Government. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether possession of the land was taken was one of fact, which stood concluded by concurrent findings of lower tribunals and the High Court against the petitioner. Consequently, the High Court correctly ruled that the Government was legally competent to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings under section 48(1) of the Act. The key principle laid down is that the Government retains the right to withdraw from land acquisition proceedings prior to taking possession, and concurrent findings of fact regarding lack of possession will not be disturbed unless shown to be meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Government is entitled to withdraw from land acquisition proceedings under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 when physical possession has not been taken?
  • Is the question of whether possession of land was taken by the Government considered a question of fact concluded by concurrent findings?
  • What is the remedy available to a landowner when the Government withdraws from acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
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• MESSRS, M. G. KADIR & Co. vs ABDUL LATIF1974 SCMR 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-20
  acknowledgment of liabilitylimitation periodextension of limitationrecovery of loanpartnership accountsset-offdiscretionary jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These two appeals arise out of a suit filed by the respondent against the appellant for the recovery of a loan and partnership dues, which was initially dismissed for default, subsequently restored by the Letters Patent Bench, and eventually decreed on merits by the learned Single Judge. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider the sole issue of limitation. The core legal question was whether a letter written by the debtor acknowledging a credit balance in the creditor's personal account while disputing a separate partnership claim constituted a valid acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act to extend the period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the letter contained an unequivocal admission of an existing liability in respect of the personal loan, and any attendant dispute or claim regarding partnership accounts merely amounted to a claim for set-off, which under Explanation I to section 19 does not invalidate the acknowledgment. The Court laid down the principle that an acknowledgment of liability coupled with a refusal to pay or a claim to a set-off constitutes a valid acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act, extending the period of limitation from the date of such acknowledgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acknowledgment of liability accompanied by a dispute over separate partnership accounts constitutes a valid acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does a claim to a set-off nullify the effect of an unequivocal admission of an existing liability for the purpose of extending limitation?
  • Will the Supreme Court ordinarily interfere with an order passed by the High Court in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction restoring a suit dismissed in default?
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• MESSRS SIND ISLAMIA HOTEL, KARACHI vs GHULAM JILANI1974 PLC 297 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-27Read full judgment →
• MESSRS SATTAR SILK INDUSTRIES, KARACHI vs HUNAR SAID1974 PLC 298 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-22Read full judgment →
• MESSRS S. MOHAMMAD DIN TANNERY, KARACHI vs Sh. ABDULLAH AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 287 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-13Read full judgment →
• MESSRS REHMAT ULLAH & Sonss vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX1974 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-11
  sales tax exemptionstatutory interpretationquestion of factreference jurisdictionstrict construction of exemptiongoldsmiths and silversmiths
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the imposition of sales tax on metallic watch chains and bracelets. The petitioner claimed these items were exempt under item 16 of a government notification as 'ornaments and jewellery' and alternatively under item 15 as products of hammer work. The Sales Tax Authorities and the High Court concurrently found that these items were not commonly or commercially known as ornaments or jewellery, were not used for personal adornment, and were not products of goldsmiths or silversmiths. The Supreme Court held that whether an article is commonly known as jewellery is a question of fact, which cannot be disturbed in a reference under section 17 of the Sales Tax Act. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that exemption provisions must be strictly construed, and since the articles were not manufactured by goldsmiths or silversmiths, they did not qualify for the exemption. The Court also upheld the refusal to entertain new pleas not raised before the statutory authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the classification of an article as 'ornaments and jewellery' for tax exemption purposes is a question of fact or law?
  • Can a new plea for tax exemption be raised for the first time in proceedings before the High Court?
  • Should exemption provisions in tax statutes be strictly construed?
  • Does the term 'goldsmiths and silversmiths products' in a tax notification require the articles to be manufactured by such persons?
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• MESSRS NATIONAL CARPET INDUSTRIES LTD. vs THIRD SIND LABOUR COURT, KARACHI ANO ANOTHER1974 PLC 25 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-06-11Read full judgment →
• MESSRS MUHAMMAD ALI TRAMWAY Co. vs Syed YAHYA1974 PLC 64 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-11Read full judgment →
• MESSRS MUHAMMAD AFZAL MUHAMMAD KHALEEL AND Other vs INDUSTRIAL1974 PLD Supreme Court 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-12
  Industrial Development Bank Ordinanceattachment of propertyex parte proceedingsdecreeDistrict Judge powersleave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition seeks leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' appeal against an order passed by the District Judge under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961. The District Judge had confirmed an ad interim attachment of properties and purported to pass a money decree in favor of the Bank. The core legal question was whether a District Judge acting under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961, possesses the power or jurisdiction to pass a formal decree against a debtor. The Supreme Court held that while the District Judge is not specifically empowered to pass a formal decree under section 39, he is fully competent to investigate the claim, determine and fix the liability of the petitioners, and confirm the attachment or direct the sale of the property. The key principle laid down is that although a technical money decree cannot be passed under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961, the District Judge's powers of investigation and enforcement of liability operate effectively to secure the Bank's claims.

  Questions settled

  • Does a District Judge acting under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961, have the power or jurisdiction to pass a formal decree against an industrial concern?
  • Is a fresh notice required for the appearance of parties when a ministerial officer of the court adjourns a matter under the provisions introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972?
  • Can a District Judge investigate the liability of a debtor and direct the sale of attached property under section 39 of the Industrial Development Bank Ordinance, 1961?
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• MESSRS LODHI INDUSTRIES LTD Appellant vs WORKERS' UNION AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 254 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-07-04Read full judgment →
• MESSRS KARIMI & COMPANY vs THE KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION1974 SCMR 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-25
  municipal taxationShow Taxquid pro quomunicipal limitsresumption of landlocal government
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal, by special leave, arose from a suit filed by the appellant-company challenging the Karachi Municipal Corporation's demand for 'Show Tax' and written returns regarding its cinema in Nazimabad for the period October 1955 to October 1958. The appellant contended that because the respondent-Corporation rendered no municipal services to Nazimabad during this period, and because the Central Government had resumed the area under section 57 of the City of Karachi Municipal Act 1933, the Corporation was not entitled to levy the tax. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that resumption under section 57 did not exclude the area from municipal limits, which could only be altered under section 271 of the Act. The Court laid down that municipal taxation is intended for the collective administration of the municipality as a whole, and liability to pay arises from the presence of the citizen or property within municipal limits, not as a quid pro quo for concrete services rendered, unless specifically conditioned by statute as in the case of conservancy and water taxes.

  Questions settled

  • Does the resumption of a municipal area by the Government under section 57 of the City of Karachi Municipal Act 1933 exclude that area from the municipal limits?
  • Can a citizen refuse to pay an authorized municipal tax on the ground that the municipality failed to perform its statutory duties or render services in their specific locality?
  • Is a general municipal tax dependent on a quid pro quo of concrete services rendered to the taxpayer, or is it for the collective good of the municipal community as a whole?
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• MESSRS GANISONS INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs Mirza AKHLAQUE AHMED1974 PLD Karachi 339 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-31
  ex parte ordercivil revisioninherent powerssection 151 cpcreview of judgmentsufficient cause
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves two applications filed under Order XLI, Rule 21 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to set aside ex parte orders passed in revision applications. The core legal question addressed is whether a High Court possesses the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an ex parte order or a dismissal for default passed in civil revision proceedings, in the absence of express statutory provisions analogous to those governing suits and appeals. The court held that once an order is properly made, a court cannot set it aside or review it unless such power is expressly conferred by statute, and inherent powers cannot be invoked to assume a jurisdiction not otherwise provided by law. The key principle laid down is that inherent powers are ancillary to existing jurisdiction and cannot be exercised to bypass the absence of specific statutory provisions for reviewing or setting aside ex parte orders or defaults in revisional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a High Court have the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside an ex parte order passed in a civil revision?
  • Can a court review, alter, or vary a final order or judgment in the absence of an express statutory provision?
  • Whether the principles governing the setting aside of ex parte decrees in suits and appeals apply mutatis mutandis to civil revision petitions?
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• MESSRS DADA LTD., KARACHI vs SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND Another1974 PLD Karachi 254 · Sindh High Court · 1974-02-15Read full judgment →
• MESSRS DADA LTD AND MESSRS MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM & Co. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX1974 PLD Supreme Court 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-08
  Business Profits Tax ActIncome-tax Actnotice of assessmentescaped assessmentlimitation periodchargeable accounting period
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether a notice under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act 1947 can be issued at any time without initiating proceedings under section 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922 read with section 19 of the Business Profits Tax Act 1947. The appellants contended that a notice under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act must be issued within one year following the chargeable accounting period, drawing an analogy from section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act 1922, failing which it constitutes an escapement of tax requiring notice under section 34. The Supreme Court held that unlike section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act which restricts notice to the immediately following year by using the words 'the previous year', section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act uses the expression 'any chargeable accounting period', thereby placing no statutory time limit for the issuance of a notice under section 11(1). The Court affirmed the impugned judgments of the High Court, ruling that failure to issue a notice within the accounting year does not amount to an escapement of income requiring section 34 notices, and dismissed the appeals accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notice under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act 1947 can be issued at any time without issuing a notice under section 34 of the Income-tax Act 1922?
  • Does the failure to initiate proceedings under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act 1947 within the chargeable accounting period amount to an escapement of income?
  • Is there any period of limitation prescribed under section 11(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act 1947 for the issuance of a notice?
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• MESSRS D. B. WALKER & Co. LTD., Karachis vs NOOR ELAHI AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Karachi 50 · Sindh High Court · 1973-09-17Read full judgment →
• MESSRS CONFORCE LIMITED vs WORKERS' UNION1974 PLC 59 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-05-27Read full judgment →
• MESSRS CHAWLA THREAD FACTORY vs ABDUL MAJEED AND 14 OTHERS1974 PLC 122 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-08-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs BROOKE BOND (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI vs THE GENERAL SECRETARY, UNION KARKUNAN-E-BROOKE1974 PLC 4 · Labour Court · 1973-11-06Read full judgment →
• MESSRS BAWANY INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs ABDULLAH AND 2 OTHERS1974 PLC 252 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-06-07Read full judgment →
• MESSRS AZAD PAPERS LTD. AND Another vs PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH SECRETARY, HOME1974 PLD Karachi 81 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-26
  preventive detentionfreedom of speechnewspaper prohibitionpublic orderex facie invalidconstitutional petitionlocus standi
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenged an order dated 11th March 1973 issued by the Government of Sind under Section 6(1)(d) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance 1960, which prohibited the editing, printing, and publication of the daily newspaper "JASARAT" for a period of two months commencing from the date of the service of the order. The petitioners contended, inter alia, that the order was ex facie invalid because it was made effective from the date of service rather than from the date of the making of the order as mandated by the statute. The High Court of Sindh held that preventive actions are designed to curb specific situations rather than award punitive sentences. Under Section 6(1) read with its proviso, an order prohibiting the publication of a newspaper can only be effective for a maximum of two months from the date of making the order, not from the date of service. Consequently, the court declared the impugned order to be without lawful authority and quashed it.

  Questions settled

  • From what date must the statutory two-month limit for a preventive order under Section 6 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance 1960 be computed?
  • Does an owner of a newspaper have locus standi as an aggrieved person to challenge an order prohibiting its publication?
  • Is a petitioner required to exhaust an alternative remedy of executive representation before filing a constitutional petition when the impugned order is ex facie illegal?
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• MESSRS ATLAS TRAVELS LTD. AND Others vs THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR, CO1974 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  co-operative bankrepayment of loansscheduled bankjurisdiction of registrarspecial leave to appealconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitution petition that challenged notices issued by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies under section 5 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966. The core legal question was whether the respondent co-operative bank, having been notified as a scheduled bank under the State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956, lost its character as a co-operative bank, thereby excluding transactions with the petitioner from the scope of the Repayment of Loans Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that notification as a scheduled bank does not alter the co-operative character of the institution, and the transactions properly fall within the definition of a loan under the Ordinance. The Court established the principle that the pendency of civil litigation does not bar the Registrar from acting under the Ordinance, and debtors must avail of the statutory opportunity of being heard under section 6 to dispute liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does the notification of a co-operative bank as a scheduled bank under the State Bank of Pakistan Act alter its character as a co-operative institution?
  • Does the pendency of civil litigation act as a bar against the Registrar of Co-operative Societies proceeding under the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance?
  • Do commercial transactions entered into by a co-operative bank fall outside the scope of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies and Co-operative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance?
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• MESSRS AHMED FOOD INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs SIND LABOUR APPELLATE1974 PLC 225 · Sindh High Court · 1974-03-28
  industrial disputereinstatementpower of reviewconciliation proceedingspublic utility servicetrade union officerwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary relief
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  These constitutional petitions were filed to challenge orders passed by the Industrial Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal directing the reinstatement of five workmen who had been dismissed by the petitioner company. The core legal questions involved whether the Industrial Court possessed the power of review, whether the dismissal of trade union officers during conciliation proceedings violated Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, and whether certiorari should issue in discretionary writ jurisdiction when the impugned order cured an underlying illegality committed by the petitioner. The Sindh High Court held that the Industrial Court has no inherent or implied power of review unless expressly conferred by statute, and that the dismissal of the workmen during conciliation proceedings violated Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. However, the Court refused to interfere in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction, holding that granting relief would perpetuate the petitioner's initial illegal act and that a writ will not issue to aid a party in retaining ill-gotten gains or to foster injustice. The key principle laid down is that while an Industrial Court lacks review powers and jurisdiction to entertain certain individual complaints directly under the statute, the High Court will decline to exercise extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction to set aside an order that rectifies a manifest illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Industrial Court possess an inherent or implied power of review under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance?
  • Whether the dismissal of a trade union officer during the pendency of conciliation proceedings without the permission of the court violates Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can the High Court refuse to issue a writ under constitutional jurisdiction when setting aside an order would perpetuate an antecedent illegality committed by the petitioner?
  • Does participation in proceedings before a tribunal without raising an objection to jurisdiction bar a party from subsequently challenging that jurisdiction in a constitutional petition?
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• Messers M.G. KADIR & CO. vs ABDUL LATIF1974 PLD Supreme Court 174 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-20
  acknowledgment of liabilitylimitation periodextension of limitationdebtor and creditorset-offpartnership accounts
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent against the appellant for the recovery of a loan and partnership dues. The core legal question was whether a letter written by the debtor prior to the expiration of the limitation period constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act, thereby extending the period of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the statement in the letter admitting a credit balance in the creditor's personal account was an unequivocal acknowledgment of an existing liability, and any accompanying dispute or claim of a set-off regarding separate partnership accounts did not invalidate the acknowledgment, as explicitly protected by Explanation 1 to section 19. The Court laid down the principle that an admission of an existing liability and jural relationship, even if coupled with a claim to a set-off or disputed counter-claims, suffices to extend limitation under section 19.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission of a debt coupled with a claim of set-off constitute a valid acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • Whether an acknowledgment of debt accompanied by a refusal to pay or a dispute over separate accounts extends the period of limitation for filing a suit?
  • What constitutes a sufficient acknowledgment of an existing liability to attract the application of section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB vs Munshi ABDUS SALAM1974 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-01
  disciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticereasonable opportunityillegal gratificationnatural justiceinquiry reportdismissal from service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside the dismissal of a Patwari. The respondent was initially charged with accepting illegal gratification, but an Inquiry Officer exonerated him after examining numerous witnesses and providing detailed reasoning. The Collector, however, disagreed with the Inquiry Officer's findings and dismissed the respondent without adequately explaining the reasons for differing with the Inquiry Officer's report in the show-cause notice. The respondent was subsequently acquitted of criminal charges by a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, who found the prosecution case to be engineered. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the dismissal was invalid. The Court held that the failure of the disciplinary authority to address the specific findings of the Inquiry Officer or to provide valid, truthful reasons for the proposed action in the show-cause notice violated the requirement of providing a reasonable opportunity to show cause. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, reinforcing the principle that disciplinary proceedings must be transparent and provide the accused a fair opportunity to respond to the actual grounds of proposed punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a show-cause notice satisfy the requirement of a reasonable opportunity if it fails to disclose the reasons for disagreeing with an inquiry officer's findings?
  • Is a disciplinary authority required to address the specific reasons provided by an inquiry officer when differing from their conclusion?
  • Can a dismissal order be sustained when the show-cause notice relies on a premise that is factually untrue regarding the inquiry report's findings?
  Read full judgment →
• MEHRA vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 46 · Lahore High Court · 1972-04-11Read full judgment →
• MEHR DAD vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE1974 PLD Supreme Court 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-05
  evacuee propertyShamlat Dehsettlement authoritiesjoint propertyco-sharer possessionwrit petitionjurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition concerning the allotment of a house and cattle shed situated in village Darweshke. The core legal question was whether a structure built on undivided Shamlat Deh land by a local co-sharer could be treated as evacuee property and allotted to a displaced person by the Settlement and Rehabilitation authorities without partition. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner failed to apply his judicial mind and assumed jurisdiction based on conjectures without determining the nature of the property. The Court ruled that undivided Shamlat Deh land owned jointly by Muslim and non-Muslim proprietors cannot be unilaterally declared or treated as evacuee property without proper partition under the relevant rehabilitation scheme, and a co-sharer is entitled to maintain exclusive possession until partition. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and held the property was wrongly treated as evacuee property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether undivided Shamlat Deh land can be treated as evacuee property without partition?
  • Can the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner assume jurisdiction over property without determining its actual nature?
  • Is a co-sharer entitled to maintain exclusive possession of a portion of Shamlat land until partition?
  Read full judgment →
• MEHAR KHAN vs Mst. BAKHAT BIBI ETC.S1974 SCMR 423 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-04
  condonation of delaytime-barred appealspecial leave appealsufficient causelimitation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, which allowed a second appeal. The petition for special leave was barred by 252 days. The core legal question is whether the appellant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the extensive delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that each day's delay must be explained, as a valuable right accrues in favor of the opposing party by lapse of time, and the appellant's vague assertions and suspicious correspondence failed to substantiate sufficient cause for condonation. The appeal was consequently dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that an appellant seeking condonation of delay must provide a credible, day-to-day explanation for the entire period of delay, and vague allegations against counsel or suspicious documents will not suffice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant must explain each day's delay when seeking condonation of time?
  • Does vague and unsupported assertion regarding counsel negligence constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay?
  • Is an appeal liable to be dismissed if the appellant fails to offer any explanation for a portion of the delay?
  Read full judgment →
• MAZUOOR UNION (READ.) vs THE MANAGEMENT (COLONY) THAL TEXTILE MILLS1974 PLC 191 · Lahore High Court · 1974-05-27Read full judgment →
• Maulana ABDUS SATTAR KHAN NIAZI- Petitioner vs THE STATE1974 PLD Lahore 324 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-03
  anticipatory bailomnibus bail ordermala fide arrestabuse of statutory powerconstitutional jurisdictionfraud on the statuteright to liberty
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves an application for bail and protective orders filed on behalf of Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, who faced a series of successive arrests across various police stations in Punjab following numerous speeches critical of the government's stance on political and constitutional issues. The core legal question centered on whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to issue an omnibus or composite interim order granting bail and restraining the state from arresting the petitioner in multiple un-notified and pending cases where particulars were deliberately withheld by the prosecution to prolong incarceration. The Lahore High Court held that the systematic and successive re-arrests of the petitioner constituted a mala fide exercise of statutory powers and a fraud on the statute, which warranted the intervention of the court under constitutional jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of process. The court confirmed the bail granted to the petitioner, ruling that a mala fide administrative or police action is void ab initio and stands on the same footing as an act done without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to issue an omnibus or composite order granting bail in multiple cases where the full particulars and FIRs are not known to the accused due to state withholding information?
  • Does a mala fide exercise of power by investigating agencies render an arrest and subsequent detention illegal and without jurisdiction?
  • Whether a series of successive re-arrests immediately upon the grant of bail in prior cases constitutes a colourable exercise of police powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• MAUJ KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 237 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-12Read full judgment →
• MATIULLAH AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 49 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-09Read full judgment →
• MASTER CHIRAGH DIN vs ABDUL HAKIM AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 370 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-05
  evacuee trust propertylocus standistatutory referenceDisplaced Persons Actcompensation pooljurisdiction of Settlement Commissioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This litigation concerns a dispute over the character of property situated in Lahore Cantonment, specifically whether it constitutes "evacuee trust property" or part of the "compensation pool" under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether a private individual has the locus standi to directly refer the question of the property's character to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 4(3) of the Act. The Court held that such a direct reference by a private individual is incompetent. The ratio decidendi is that the power to make a reference under Section 4(3) is reserved for courts, tribunals, or authorities seized of a dispute, not for private litigants. The key principle laid down is that the term "reference" in statutory contexts must be interpreted according to the specific legislative intent of the Act; absent explicit authorization, the power to refer is a procedural mechanism for adjudicating bodies to resolve legal questions, not a substantive right for individuals to initiate proceedings directly before the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a private individual directly refer a question regarding the status of evacuee property to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Is the power to make a statutory reference under Section 4(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, restricted to courts or tribunals?
  • Does a tenant have an interest sufficient to challenge the transfer of property by the Settlement Department?
  Read full judgment →
• MARGHUB SIDDIQI vs HAMID AHMAD KHAN AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ad interim injunctionservice matterspecific performancebalance of convenienceirreparable losscivil revisionpersonal service contract
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a university department head, challenged a suspension order and disciplinary proceedings via a civil suit. The trial court granted an ad interim injunction, which was subsequently set aside by the appellate court due to the trial court's failure to consider the balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The High Court affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the lower courts erred in refusing the injunction. The Court held that the petition must fail, affirming that an injunction cannot be granted solely on a prima facie case; the court must also consider the balance of convenience and irreparable loss. Furthermore, the Court established that an ad interim injunction is legally impermissible where no perpetual injunction is claimed in the main suit. Additionally, citing the Specific Relief Act, the Court held that injunctions cannot be granted in service matters involving personal service, as such contracts cannot be specifically enforced, and courts should not foist an employee upon an unwilling employer. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ad interim injunction be granted in a suit where no perpetual injunction is claimed?
  • Is a court required to consider the balance of convenience and irreparable loss before granting an ad interim injunction?
  • Can an injunction be granted in a service matter to prevent the breach of a contract for personal service?
  Read full judgment →
• MANZOOR HUSSAIN And Another vs MANZOOR HUSSAIN1974 PLD Lahore 202 · Lahore High Court · 1973-05-17
  quashing of proceedingshabeas corpusadulteryenticementres judicatacriminal jurisdictionmarital statusinherent powers
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment addresses a petition filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners for offences related to enticement and adultery. The core legal questions revolved around whether previous summary proceedings under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, where the alleged detenu (petitioner No. 2) declared herself married to petitioner No. 1, barred subsequent criminal prosecution by her first husband (the respondent). The court held that proceedings under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, are summary in nature, do not finally decide questions of marital status or divorce, and therefore do not operate as *res judicata* to prevent a regular criminal trial. It was further clarified that a criminal court is competent to determine the question of marriage in connection with offences like adultery without requiring a prior civil decree. The High Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, should be exercised sparingly, especially when a competent court has found a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Do summary proceedings under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, operate as a bar to subsequent criminal proceedings for offences like adultery or enticement?
  • Can a criminal court determine the validity or subsistence of a marriage in connection with offences under the Pakistan Penal Code without a prior civil decree?
  • Is the non-summoning of co-accused or a delay in filing a complaint sufficient ground for quashing criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in quashing criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• MANSHA AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 598 · Lahore High Court · 1973-11-26Read full judgment →
• MANSAB KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 416 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-07Read full judgment →
• MANEK J. MOBED AND Another vs SHAH BEHRAM AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-02-07
  sublettingassignment of leaseejectment suitestoppelcivil court jurisdictionrent restrictiontenant in possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal arose from an ejectment suit filed by a landlord seeking possession of cinema premises and mesne profits on the grounds of expiry of the lease and unauthorized subletting. The tenant had transferred the cinema business and physical possession to a private limited company incorporated by him without obtaining the landlord's prior written consent, in breach of the lease terms. The legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether transferring the business to a corporate entity constituted unauthorized assignment or subletting, whether accepting rent cheques drawn on the company's account created an estoppel or waiver against the landlord, and whether rent control legislation barred the jurisdiction of civil courts to decree eviction. The Supreme Court held that assigning the operation and premises to a distinct corporate entity divested the original tenant of possession, constituting unauthorized subletting. The Court further held that mere acceptance of rent cheques signed by the tenant as managing director did not constitute waiver of the contractual requirement for written consent. Consequently, statutory eviction protections apply only to tenants in actual possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does transferring a leased business and physical possession to a private limited company constitute unauthorized subletting or assignment?
  • Does the acceptance of rent cheques drawn by a corporate entity estop a landlord from asserting a breach of a covenant requiring written consent for subletting?
  • Does statutory protection against eviction under rent control legislation extend to a tenant who has parted with possession through unauthorized subletting?
  Read full judgment →
• MANAGING COMMITTEE MASJID MUJHAJRIN vs Mst. ZAINAB BIBI AND Other1974 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-08
  evacuee propertyres judicatawrit jurisdictionSettlement Scheme No. VIReligious Institutions Schemeunauthorized possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the transfer of a seven-marla portion of an evacuee plot (Khasra No. 1134) under the settlement laws. The petitioner-committee, representing a nearby mosque, claimed the site on the ground that it housed the Imam's residence and was thus appurtenant to the mosque. However, the entire plot had already been lawfully transferred to respondent No. 1 under Settlement Scheme No. VI, which transfer was upheld in a previous round of litigation reaching the Supreme Court. The petitioner-committee sought to reopen the matter by claiming transfer under Scheme No. VI instead of the Religious Institutions Scheme previously pressed. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the matter was barred by the principle of res judicata, which applies to writ proceedings. The Court ruled that a party cannot reopen a finalized transfer by changing the legal scheme under which they claim, and that the doctrine of res judicata prevents such vexatious litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to proceedings under writ jurisdiction to prevent the reopening of finalized property transfers?
  • Can an applicant revive a claim under a different settlement scheme after their claim under another scheme has been finally rejected by the courts?
  • Does unauthorized possession of a portion of an evacuee plot override the preferential transfer rights of a lawful allottee under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik SOHRAB KHAN vs THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, RAWALPINDI AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 214 · Lahore High Court · 1973-02-01
  preventive detentionvague groundseffective representationpost-arrest bailfrustration of bailhabeas corpusmartial law regulations
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a habeas corpus petition and connected bail applications challenging the preventive detention of the detenu under section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, alongside criminal cases registered under various statutes including the Pakistan Penal Code and Martial Law Regulations. The core legal question concerns whether the grounds of detention supplied to the detenu were sufficiently precise to enable an effective representation, and whether the detention was ordered to frustrate lawful bail orders. The High Court held that the grounds of detention were vague, indefinite, and lacked necessary particulars, thereby rendering the detention order illegal and without lawful authority. Furthermore, the court held that since the offences in the primary F.I.R. were not punishable with death or transportation for life, and the detenu appeared to be a British national, he was entitled to bail in both the criminal case and the Martial Law Regulation cases. The key principle laid down is that detention grounds must contain precise particulars to enable the detenu to make an effective representation beyond a bare denial, and authorities cannot utilize preventive detention merely to frustrate bail orders.

  Questions settled

  • Are detention grounds considered vague and indefinite if they lack precise particulars of the actual acts committed by the detenu?
  • Can a preventive detention order be sustained when it is issued to frustrate lawful bail orders obtained by a detenu?
  • Whether bail should be granted in offences not punishable with death or transportation for life when the detenu is a foreign national?
  • What is the true test for examining whether the grounds furnished for preventive detention are in order?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik MUHAMMAD SALIM AND Another vs Malik MIRAJ DIN AND ANOTHER1974 P Cr. L J 460 · Lahore High Court · 1974-03-04Read full judgment →
• Malik INAYATULLAH vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1974 PLD Peshawar 68 · Peshawar High Court · 1974-05-06Read full judgment →
• MANGA KHAN vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 223 · Lahore High Court · 1973-04-26Read full judgment →
• Malik AMAN AND 2 Others vs MISAL KHAN AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-11
  acquittalocular testimonycriminal appealspecial leave to appealappreciation of evidencecontradictions in testimonymurder trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the acquittal of the respondents by the Sessions Judge, Peshawar, in a murder case. The respondents were charged with the murder of two individuals, Haji Abdur Rahman and Saeedur Rahman, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution relied on ocular testimony to allege that the accused ambushed the deceased and others, firing upon them and robbing them of weapons. The High Court, however, dismissed the State's appeal, finding significant discrepancies and contradictions between the initial First Information Report and the testimony provided at trial, particularly regarding the sequence of events and the identification of weapons used. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and affirmed the High Court's findings, noting that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable and their accounts were exaggerated and contradicted by physical evidence, such as the absence of shell casings at the alleged firing point. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court's judgment was not perverse, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment that is based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  • Can ocular testimony be rejected when it is contradicted by the initial First Information Report and physical evidence at the scene?
  • Is a judgment of the High Court liable to be set aside if it is not found to be perverse?
  Read full judgment →
• MAJOR Syed MUJTABA HUSSALN vs Sired JAWADUL ASGHAR1974 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-22
  property disputeallotment of propertyejectmentburden of proofcooperative housing societyspurious documenttitle to property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a property dispute concerning the allotment of a housing quarter in a cooperative society. The appellant sought the ejectment of the respondent, claiming prior allotment of the premises. The core legal questions were whether the appellant had established a valid title to the property sufficient to justify an ejectment order, and whether the High Court erred in setting aside the ejectment order without definitively establishing the respondent's title. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to prove his claim, as the documentary evidence relied upon to establish the allotment was found to be a spurious document. The Court affirmed that in an action for ejectment, the burden of proof rests entirely upon the plaintiff to establish their own title to the property. Consequently, the plaintiff cannot succeed solely by attacking the defendant's possession. The Court ruled that where a plaintiff fails to prove their own title, the court is not required to adjudicate the defendant's title to deny the ejectment. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the plaintiff to establish their own title in an ejectment suit?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed in an ejectment suit solely by challenging the defendant's possession without proving their own title?
  • Is it necessary for a court to establish the defendant's title when the plaintiff has failed to prove their own title in an ejectment proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• MAJOR SARDAR AKBAR KHAN vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1974 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1961-05-22
  Rehabilitation Settlement Schememortgagee rightsproduce index unitsillegal allotmentevacuee landretroactive policyproprietary land
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal, by special leave, challenges a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which upheld the cancellation of land allotments made to the appellant, a displaced person. The appellant had obtained allotments for mortgagee rights in 1952, which were later cancelled by Settlement Authorities for violating Paragraph 7 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, as the appellant had already exceeded the 1,000 produce index unit limit. The core legal questions were whether the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, specifically Paragraph 7, applied to allotments confirmed in 1952, and whether subsequent policy memoranda allowing for the adjustment of withdrawn mortgagee land against proprietary claims could retroactively validate illegal allotments. The Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme was in force since 1951, justifying the application of Paragraph 7 to the 1952 allotments. The Court further held that policy decisions issued in 1961 could not retroactively legalize allotments that were illegal at the time of their inception. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the cancellation was justified and that the appellant could not rely on subsequent policy changes to validate an initial illegal allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme apply to land allotments confirmed prior to the introduction of specific restrictive clauses?
  • Can subsequent policy memoranda be invoked to retroactively validate an allotment that was illegal at the time it was made?
  • Is a mortgagee of land eligible for allotment under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme if they have already exceeded the 1,000 produce index unit limit?
  Read full judgment →
• MAJEED vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 437 · Sindh High Court · 1973-08-22Read full judgment →
• MAHMOOD HUSSAIN vs MESSRS UNITED DISTRIBUTORS LTD1974 PLC 66 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-05-14Read full judgment →
• MAHMOOD AZAM FARUQUI vs Moulana MUHAMMAD SHAFI OKARVI AND Other1974 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-14
  election petitioninterlocutory orderright of appealpleadingsstatutory interpretationElection Tribunalcorrupt practices
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Election Tribunal refusing to dismiss an election petition under Section 60 of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance XIII of 1970. The petitioner argued that the election petition failed to comply with Section 52 of the Ordinance regarding verification and particulars, necessitating dismissal. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order of an Election Tribunal refusing to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with statutory requirements is appealable to the High Court under Section 64(3) of the Ordinance before the conclusion of the trial. The Supreme Court held that the right of appeal under Section 64(3) is restricted to the final decision of the Tribunal upon the conclusion of the trial. The Court affirmed that appeal is a creature of statute and cannot be inferred for interlocutory orders. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that election petitions should not be dismissed on hyper-technical grounds, as the law of pleadings is not to be strictly construed to defeat the ends of justice, and the Tribunal retains discretion to allow amendments for a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is an interlocutory order of an Election Tribunal refusing to dismiss an election petition appealable under the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance XIII of 1970?
  • Does the right of appeal under Section 64(3) of the National and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Ordinance XIII of 1970 extend to orders passed before the conclusion of the trial?
  • Should election petitions be dismissed on hyper-technical grounds regarding the verification of pleadings?
  Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ALAM vs MIR ZAMAN AND 2 Other1974 PLD Lahore 218 · Lahore High Court · 1973-10-02Read full judgment →
• MAGARIA TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs HABIB ZAMAN AND ANOTHER1974 PLC 282 (2) · Labour Appellate Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
• M. Y KHAN vs M. M. ASLAM AND 2 Other1974 SCMR 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-17
  review petitionwrit jurisdictionadditional evidenceSettlement Commissionermisrepresentationscope of writ
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition arose from a decision of the Supreme Court refusing leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in writ jurisdiction that upheld the transfer of property in favour of the respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court exceeded its writ jurisdiction by admitting and examining additional evidence, specifically a missing file, to determine the validity of the Settlement Commissioner's order. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petitions, holding that while complicated questions of fact should generally be left to relevant statutory authorities, there is no absolute bar preventing the High Court from admitting or examining additional evidence in writ proceedings. Such evidence may be taken where it is not of a complicated nature and is necessary to evaluate whether the impugned administrative order was based on relevant material. The Court laid down the principle that the High Court has discretion to consider additional evidence in writ jurisdiction to verify the factual basis of an authority's order.

  Questions settled

  • Is there an absolute bar against the High Court taking additional evidence in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court examine additional evidence in writ jurisdiction to determine if an administrative order was based on relevant material?
  • Under what circumstances may the High Court consider additional evidence while reviewing an administrative decision in writ proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• M. U. A. KHAN vs Rana M. SULTAN AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-17
  quo warrantopublic officestatutory interpretationdelegated legislationwrit jurisdictionaggrieved partyservice rulesappointment validity
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a constitutional petition seeking a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of the Chief Inspector of Mines. The appellant contended that the appointment was invalid due to the absence of specific regulations under the Mines Act and the respondent's lack of a recognized degree. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in requiring the petitioner to be an "aggrieved party," as quo warranto petitions concern public interest and are maintainable by any person. Regarding the merits, the Court ruled that the failure of the government to frame specific regulations under the Mines Act did not render the statute unworkable or invalidate the appointment, as the government could still appoint a "duly qualified person" under the Act's enabling provisions. Furthermore, the Court found the respondent was qualified, noting that the concurrence of the Public Service Commission and the government in accepting his credentials constituted sufficient recognition of his foreign university degree. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner required to be an aggrieved party to file a writ of quo warranto under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution?
  • Does the failure of a government to frame subsidiary regulations under an enabling statute render the statute unworkable or invalidate appointments made under it?
  • What constitutes a public office for the purpose of issuing a writ of quo warranto?
  • Can a government department appoint a qualified person to a statutory post in the absence of specific recruitment regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• M. MUNAWAR MALIK vs THE STATE THROUGH STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN1974 P Cr. L J 144 · Sindh High Court · 1973-02-18Read full judgment →
• M. B. KHALFAY vs CHAIRMAN, WEST PAKISTAN RAILWAY BOARD, LAHORE AND Another1974 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-01
  service lawreinstatementarrears of salarycontempt of courtexecution of decreecivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought redress regarding the implementation of a Supreme Court judgment that had restored a trial court decree declaring his removal from service void and inoperative, effectively reinstating him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could seek enforcement of arrears of salary and seniority through contempt proceedings or similar summary enforcement when the original decree merely declared him to be in service without explicitly ordering payment of back wages or specific seniority fixation. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit. The Court reasoned that the previous judgment and the restored trial court decree only established the petitioner's status as being in service, which the respondents had complied with by reinstating him. Relying on the principle established in Muhammad Abu Zafar v. Secretary to Government of West Pakistan Agriculture Department, the Court determined that where a decree or order does not contain an absolute mandate regarding the payment of arrears of salary, contempt proceedings are inappropriate. The proper remedy for the petitioner to pursue claims for salary arrears or seniority is to approach the civil court for adjudication of those specific grievances.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner initiate contempt proceedings to recover salary arrears if the underlying court order only declares the petitioner to be in service?
  • Is a civil court the appropriate forum for seeking redress regarding salary arrears and seniority when a previous decree only declared the plaintiff to be in service?
  • Does a decree declaring a removal from service void and inoperative automatically entitle the employee to payment of arrears of salary without a specific order to that effect?
  Read full judgment →
• M. ATAUR REHHMAN ALVI vs INAMUR RAHMAN1974 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-09
  special leave to appealappointment of receiverinterim injunctiondisputed titlestatus quocontempt of courtcivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from a consolidated order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's applications for the appointment of a receiver, injunction, attachment of property, and contempt of court in a civil suit. The petitioner had filed a suit seeking a declaration that certain agreements executed between the parties were unenforceable and void, or alternatively for a money decree. The core legal question was whether a plaintiff with a disputed title to properties not standing in his name, and who made an alternative claim for a money decree, is entitled to the appointment of a receiver or interim injunctions pending the suit. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no clear or established prima facie title to the properties, as they stood in the names of third parties, and therefore could not seek to deprive a person bona fide in possession by having a receiver appointed. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff with a disputed title to properties standing in the names of third parties is entitled to the appointment of a receiver pendente lite?
  • Does an alternative prayer for a money decree in the plaint affect a plaintiff's claim of having a prima facie title for the appointment of a receiver?
  • Can a court attach property situated outside its jurisdiction and standing in the name of a person who is not a party to the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• LT: COL. S. M. JAHANDUR vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER1974 PLD Peshawar 58 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• LT. MASEEL AHMAD vs PUNJAB SPORTS CONTROL BOARD THROUGH DIRECTOR1974 SCMR 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-18
  special leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitationpauper appealbreach of contracttermination of service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a boxing coach whose services were terminated before the expiry of his five-year contract due to the abolition of his post, filed a suit for damages for breach of contract. The trial court and the additional district judge dismissed the suit, finding that the appointment letter permitted termination upon three months' notice, which the respondent-Board had duly provided. The petitioner's second appeal in the High Court was rejected as time-barred and unstamped after his request for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was refused due to an unsatisfactory explanation of the delay, and he failed to pay the requisite court-fee. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing to condone the delay as the lapse of time confers a valuable right on the opposing party which cannot be defeated without a satisfactory explanation for every day's delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the creation of a post for a specific period guarantees continued employment for that entire duration notwithstanding its abolition?
  • Whether a separate application for permission to appeal as a pauper is required for a second appeal when the appellant was permitted to sue and appeal as a pauper in prior proceedings?
  • Whether the lapse of time in civil matters confers a valuable right requiring a satisfactory explanation for each day's delay when seeking condonation under the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• LT. COL. A. H. MINHAS (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) vs GHULAM AHMAD AND Another1974 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-11-01
  Settlement authoritieswrit jurisdictionproperty transferindependent residential unitappurtenanceconstitutional jurisdictionmunicipal taxation records
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court order that dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal, thereby upholding a writ petition which had quashed the transfer of a property (House No. 21/456) by Settlement authorities to the appellant. The core legal question was whether the property in dispute constituted an independent residential unit or was merely an appurtenance to another house (House No. 21/508), and whether the High Court properly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in reviewing the Settlement authorities' findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly determined, based on municipal taxation records and the appellant's own admissions, that the properties were distinct and separate. The Court affirmed that the Settlement authorities' decision, which ignored clear documentary evidence of the properties' independence, was an arbitrary and illegal exercise of power. The key principle laid down is that the contiguity of properties does not negate their status as independent premises in fact and law, and the High Court possesses the constitutional jurisdiction to review and correct Settlement authority findings that are based on erroneous deductions from established facts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to review findings of Settlement authorities that are based on erroneous deductions from facts?
  • Does the contiguity of two properties necessarily imply that they constitute a single house for the purpose of transfer by Settlement authorities?
  • Is a property that is separately numbered and assessed in municipal taxation records considered an independent residential unit?
  Read full judgment →
• LAL HUSSAIN AND Another vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 129 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-21Read full judgment →
• LAL BAZ (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS) vs SHERDIL AND Other1974 PLD Supreme Court 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-09
  redemption of mortgagesubrogationadverse possessionlimitationrevenue recordsmortgagee rightsinheritance mutation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a suit for the redemption of mortgaged agricultural land. The core legal questions were whether the appellants, who obtained possession through a compromise redemption decree, acquired the status of subrogated mortgagees or held the land adversely, and whether the respondents' suit for redemption was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the appellants, being strangers to the property, did not fall within the categories of persons entitled to subrogation under the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Consequently, they could not claim the rights of a subrogated mortgagee. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim of adverse possession, finding that the appellants' possession was not overt, open, or hostile against the true owners, who were never notified of the revenue record corrections. The Court affirmed that the suit was essentially for the redemption of a mortgage and was filed well within the 60-year limitation period. The key principle laid down is that a person who is not a party under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 cannot claim subrogation, and possession obtained by a stranger through a surreptitious revenue correction does not constitute adverse possession against the true owners.

  Questions settled

  • Does a person who is not a party under Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 acquire the right of subrogation upon redeeming a mortgage?
  • Can possession obtained by a stranger through surreptitious revenue record corrections be considered adverse possession against the true owners?
  • Is a suit for redemption of a mortgage governed by the 60-year limitation period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Does the purchase of mortgagee rights by a stranger to the property constitute subrogation?
  Read full judgment →
• L. H. SHAIKH vs GENERAL MANAGER, KARACHI TELECOMMUNICATION REGION1974 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-09-07
  writ jurisdictionseniority listofficiating appointmentreversionterms and conditions of servicereduction in rankpublic servant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging the reversion of an Engineering Supervisor to his substantive rank by the Telecommunication Department. The petitioner contended that the reversion was based on an invalid seniority list prepared in contravention of recruitment rules. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition is maintainable to challenge a seniority list or the reversion of an officiating public servant under the Constitution of 1962. The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because seniority is not a term or condition of service guaranteed by Article 178(3) of the Constitution of 1962, and thus cannot be enforced through writ jurisdiction under Article 98. Furthermore, on the merits, the Court affirmed that a public servant holds no lien on an officiating post, and reversion therefrom to a substantive position does not constitute a reduction in rank. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that non-guaranteed service conditions cannot be enforced via constitutional writ jurisdiction, and officiating appointments confer no vested right against reversion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge a seniority list under the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does an officiating public servant acquire a lien on a post that prevents reversion to a substantive position?
  • Are all terms and conditions of service enforceable through a writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Does the reversion of an official from an officiating post to a substantive rank constitute a reduction in rank?
  Read full judgment →
• Kunwar KHURSHID MUHAMMAD KHAN vs MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, WEST PAKISTAN9 LAHORE AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 87 · Lahore High Court · 1973-08-29Read full judgment →
• KOHI-NOOR TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE1974 PLD Supreme Court 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-12
  business profits taxincome-tax actlimitation periodprocedural amendmentretrospective operationassessmentfinance act
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a decision of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the assessment of business profits tax under the Business Profits Tax Act. The core legal question was whether the statutory amendments introduced by the Finance Act of 1957—which repealed section 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act and incorporated section 34 of the Income-tax Act—applied retroactively to pending proceedings, thereby barring an assessment made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, or whether such applicability was contingent upon executive modifications by the Central Board of Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the statutory amendment operated of its own force without requiring prior executive modifications and was procedural in nature, thereby applying retrospectively to pending proceedings. Consequently, the Court ruled that the assessment completed after the expiration of the limitation period stipulated under section 34 of the Income-tax Act was illegal and barred by time. The key principle laid down is that amendments to machinery or procedural provisions relating to tax assessment operate retrospectively on pending proceedings and do not require executive notifications to become operative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 34 of the Income-tax Act became applicable to the Business Profits Tax Act immediately upon the enactment of the Finance Act of 1957 without waiting for modifications by the Central Board of Revenue?
  • Do statutory amendments relating to limitation and assessment machinery apply retrospectively to pending proceedings?
  • Does an assessee acquire a vested right in procedural provisions regarding the limitation for tax assessment?
  Read full judgment →
• KHURSHID ALAM vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BATA SHOE COMPANY (PAK.)1974 PLC 6 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1973-09-06Read full judgment →
• KHUDADAD AND 2 Others vs The STATE1974 SCMR 485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-01-31
  murderdeath sentencetransportation for lifegrave and sudden provocationfamily honourcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon conversion of a petition into an appeal, limited to the question of the propriety of the death sentences imposed upon the appellants for the murder of the deceased, whose conviction was earlier upheld. The core legal question concerns the appropriate quantum of sentence in murder cases arising from motives of vindicating family honour involving an illicit liaison with a female relative. The Court held that where a crime is committed by agricultural tribes to vindicate family honour regarding females, and the circumstances approach those of grave and sudden provocation though not formally falling within the exception, the death penalty is not the proper penalty. The key principle laid down is that in such cases of family honour involving females, the ends of justice are adequately met by awarding the lesser punishment of transportation for life rather than capital punishment.

  Questions settled

  • Is death the proper penalty for a murder committed to vindicate family honour involving an illicit liaison with a female relative?
  • Does the principle regarding mitigation of sentence for crimes of family honour apply when the convict did not find the parties in a compromising position on the spot?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BUKHSH vs MUHAMMAD SHARIF AND Another1974 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-11
  evacuee propertypower of reviewdelegation of powerretrospective validationconcurrent findingssettlement authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a double-storied evacuee property divided into a shop and a residential portion. The Settlement Commissioner had declared the property divisible, transferring the shop to the petitioner and the residential portion to the respondent. Although a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner subsequently reviewed this decision and transferred the entire building to the petitioner, the Supreme Court had previously held that review order to be invalid because the power of review was abolished by Ordinance II of 1962 with effect from January 13, 1962, and no review proceedings were pending on that date. The petitioner argued that the Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act 1972 retrospectively validated the delegate's review order. The Supreme Court held that the Act of 1972 only validates review orders where the delegation of review power was deficient, but does not revive or validate orders that neither the Chief Settlement Commissioner nor his delegates had the jurisdiction to make after the statutory abolition of the review power itself. Consequently, the concurrent findings of fact regarding prior possession and divisibility were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Commissioners (Validation of Orders) Act 1972 validate review orders passed after the statutory abolition of the review power where no review proceedings were pending at the time of such abolition?
  • Can a legislative validation of delegated powers retrospectively confer jurisdiction that the delegating authority itself did not possess at the time the order was made?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by settlement authorities regarding prior possession and divisibility of evacuee property can be disturbed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH vs FATEH KHAN AND Another1974 SCMR 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-26
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiestransfer of propertywrit jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factpossessionallotment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the transfer of an evacuee property (house No. 43, village Padhrar) to respondent No. 1. The petitioner alleged prior possession since 1947, interrupted by police occupation, and claimed illegal dispossession by the respondent. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities erred in fact-finding regarding the respondent's possession of the property as of January 1, 1961, which was the qualifying date for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. 7. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement authorities' findings were supported by evidence, including official records from the Patwari and the register of Scheme No. 7, which confirmed the respondent's occupation and purchase of rights from the original allottee. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with these concurrent findings of fact. The principle laid down is that where Settlement authorities have based their conclusions on a proper examination of official records and evidence, such findings of fact are not subject to reappraisal in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact made by Settlement authorities when those findings are supported by official records?
  • Does the occupation of an evacuee property on January 1, 1961, constitute a valid basis for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. 7?
  • Is a purchase of rights from an original allottee sufficient to establish a claim to evacuee property?
  Read full judgment →
• KHIZAR HAYAT vs The STATE1974 SCMR 295 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-12-06
  murder convictionsentence enhancementappellate jurisdictionself-induced intoxicationspecial leave to appealcriminal liabilityInterim Constitutiondeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that enhanced a sentence of life imprisonment to death for a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan when the High Court enhances a sentence on revision. Additionally, the Court addressed whether self-induced intoxication constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing. The Supreme Court held that, based on established precedent, such an appeal is not maintainable as of right under the Interim Constitution. Consequently, the Court treated the memorandum of appeal as a petition for special leave to appeal. On the merits, the Court upheld the death sentence, ruling that self-induced intoxication does not exculpate an offender under Section 85 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The key principle established is that voluntary intoxication does not mitigate criminal liability or sentencing where the offender demonstrates awareness of their actions, and that appellate jurisdiction as of right is strictly construed based on the specific constitutional provisions in force.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie as of right to the Supreme Court under the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan when the High Court enhances a sentence on revision?
  • Does self-induced intoxication constitute a valid mitigating factor for sentencing under Section 85 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a memorandum of appeal be treated as a petition for special leave to appeal when the appeal is not maintainable as of right?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja ABDUL RASHID vs THE BANK OF TOKYO LTD., KARACHI1974 PLD Karachi 411 · Sindh High Court · 1974-04-08Read full judgment →
• KHAN MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH Etc.S1974 SCMR 228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-09
  superdaricase propertycustody of propertycriminal procedurecancellation of FIRproduction of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the custody of a tractor, which was the subject of a theft case. The petitioner challenged the respondent's continued possession of the tractor as a superdar, alleging that the respondent failed to produce the vehicle in court, thereby obstructing the recording of prosecution evidence. The respondent argued that because the police had recommended the cancellation of the initial FIR, the superdari order was no longer operative. The Supreme Court held that the mere recommendation by the police for the cancellation of a case does not automatically terminate a superdari order. The Court affirmed that a person entrusted with case property as a superdar remains under a legal obligation to produce that property in court as and when required, until a formal order regarding the final disposal of the property is passed by the competent court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition while emphasizing the respondent's continuing obligation to produce the tractor.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police recommendation for the cancellation of an FIR automatically terminate a superdari order regarding case property?
  • Is a superdar under a continuing obligation to produce case property in court until a final order is passed under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan FAIZULLAH KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT SECRETARY, CABINET ,SECRETARIAT AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Supreme Court 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-07-04
  listed postspay fixationProvincial Civil ServiceCivil Service of Pakistanretrospective application of rulesArticle 212 abatementservice tribunals jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, a member of the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial Branch) of the North-West Frontier Province, challenged the fixation of his pay during periods he officiated in listed judicial posts (such as District and Sessions Judge) prior to his confirmation and ultimate elevation to the High Court. He contended that his emoluments should be governed by the 1924 Resolution of the Secretary of State for India in Council, granting him the old Indian Civil Service pay scale, and that neither the Central Government nor the Governor-General had jurisdiction to alter his terms of service retroactively to his prejudice. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the abatement of the appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution of 1973; however, the Supreme Court held the appeal did not abate because the Service Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over disputes arising prior to July 1, 1969. On the merits, the Court held that judicial listed posts were borne on the cadre of the All-Pakistan Service (formerly ICS/CSP), remaining under the rule-making power of the Central Government/Governor-General rather than the Provincial Governor. The Court affirmed that civil service rules cannot be applied retrospectively to reduce accrued salary rights. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed except for the period from August 27, 1952, to July 22, 1953, during which the appellant was declared entitled to pay under the 1924 Resolution prior to the enforcement of the 1953 Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal pending before the Supreme Court abates under Article 212 of the 1973 Constitution if the underlying service dispute arose prior to the statutory cut-off date governing the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction?
  • Whether listed judicial posts held by members of the Provincial Civil Service fall under the rule-making authority of the Federal Government or the Provincial Governor?
  • Can administrative service rules or notifications be applied retrospectively to alter or diminish emoluments that have already accrued to a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIRUDDIN AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 219 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-29
  stolen propertynon-production of case propertybenefit of doubtrevision applicationdishonestly receiving stolen propertycriminal revision
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal revision application arises from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Nawabshah, which set aside the applicants' convictions under sections 457 and 380 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and convicted them under section 411 of the same Code. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether the conviction under section 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 could be sustained when the alleged stolen property recovered from the applicants was never produced or exhibited during the trial and lacked proper description by prosecution witnesses. The court held that the non-production of the case property before the trial court creates a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case, entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt. The key principle laid down is that failure to produce and exhibit alleged recovered stolen property during trial invalidates a conviction for dishonestly receiving stolen property under section 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, as the corpus delicti is missing.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under section 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the alleged recovered stolen property is not produced and exhibited during the trial?
  • Does the failure to produce case property in court entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Whether vague descriptions of recovered items by prosecution witnesses without production of the actual property are sufficient to prove an offense under section 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• KHAIR DIN vs INAYAT AND Another1974 SCMR 140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-03
  cross-casesstay of proceedingscriminal trialspecial leave to appealcondonation of delayprocedural law
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order regarding the management of cross-cases arising from a single violent incident. The petitioner sought to challenge the High Court's direction that the trial of a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (murder) should proceed and conclude before the trial of a cross-case registered under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (attempted murder) could continue. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly interpreted and applied established Supreme Court precedent regarding the stay of proceedings in cross-cases. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had correctly interpreted the relevant precedent and that there was no justification to interfere with the order directing the Section 307 case to remain pending until the conclusion of the Section 302 case. The petition was dismissed on merits, although the delay in filing was condoned due to the petitioner's incarceration and the resulting ignorance of his family members.

  Questions settled

  • Should the trial of a cross-case be stayed until the conclusion of the primary case involving more serious charges?
  • Can the Supreme Court condone a delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal if the delay is caused by the petitioner's incarceration?
  Read full judgment →
• Kh. MUHAMMAD SAFDAR vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1974 PLD Lahore 200 · Lahore High Court · 1973-09-16Read full judgment →
• Kazi ABDUL MAJID vs THE PROVINCE OF SIND THROUGH SECRETARY, EXCISE &1974 PLD Karachi 417 · Sindh High Court · 1974-05-05
  constitutional lawordinance-making powertaxationentertainment dutyinterpretation of statutesnon-obstante clausetransitional provisions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a cinema proprietor, challenged the constitutional validity of the West Pakistan Entertainment Duty (Sind Amendment) Ordinance, 1974. The petitioner raised two primary contentions: first, that the Governor lacked the competency to promulgate the Ordinance under Article 128 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 as no emergency or immediate circumstances existed; and second, that Article 279 of the Constitution, which contains a non-obstante clause, mandates that existing taxes can only be varied or abolished by an 'Act of the appropriate Legislature', thereby excluding executive Ordinances. The High Court of Sindh dismissed the petition. It held that the Governor is the sole judge of the existence of circumstances requiring immediate action under Article 128. Furthermore, interpreting Article 279 in light of the definition clause in Article 260(2), the Court ruled that the term 'Act of the appropriate Legislature' includes an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor or President. The Court concluded that the non-obstante clause in Article 279 was intended to clarify the continuation of existing taxes rather than to restrict the legislative power of the executive to issue tax-related Ordinances.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Governor the sole judge of the existence of circumstances requiring immediate action to promulgate an Ordinance under Article 128 of the Constitution?
  • Does the expression 'Act of the appropriate Legislature' in Article 279 of the Constitution include an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor or the President?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in Article 279 of the Constitution prevent the variation or abolition of existing taxes through an executive Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• KARIM DAD AND 6 Others vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 16 · Lahore High Court · 1973-03-07Read full judgment →
• KARAMULLAH vs THE STATE1974 P Cr. L J 1 · Sindh High Court · 1973-03-14Read full judgment →
• KARAM KHAN vs THE CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB, LAHORE AND 51974 PLD Lahore 487 · Lahore High Court · 1974-02-26Read full judgment →
• KARAM KHAN AND 15 Others vs THE STATE-1974 P Cr. L J 246 · Sindh High Court · 1972-10-12Read full judgment →
• KARAM ELAHI AND ANOTHER vs Ch. ALI AHMAD AND 5 Other1974 SCMR 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-06-28
  displaced personsland allotmentexcess allotmentlocus standisettlement commissionerspecial leave to appealFard-i-Haqiat
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a dispute concerning the cancellation of excess land allotted to displaced persons. The petitioners were initially allotted land in village Nagaur, which was later found to exceed their verified entitlement due to a misclassification of the assessment circle. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner cancelled the excess area, a decision initially reversed on appeal but subsequently restored in revision by the Settlement Commissioner. The petitioners challenged the revision order, arguing that the respondents lacked locus standi as mere informers, that the Assistant Settlement Commissioner lacked competence to cancel the allotment, and that they should retain the land as no fraud was committed. The Supreme Court held that the cancellation was based on a factual inquiry by the Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Room, and was not an exercise of independent power by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner. The Court affirmed the cancellation, noting that the petitioners held land in excess of their entitlement, and clarified that the discretion to allow retention of excess land lies solely with the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does an informer have locus standi to file a revision petition against an allotment order before the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Can an Assistant Settlement Commissioner cancel an allotment made by a superior officer if acting pursuant to a directive from a higher authority?
  • Is the retention of excess land allotted to displaced persons a matter of right or a matter of discretion for the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & STATUTORY BODY vs EDULJEE DINSHAW1974 PLD Karachi 328 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• KARACHI M. E. S. EMPLOYEES' UNION vs D. V. & C. E. (NAVY)1974 PLC 256 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1974-05-01Read full judgment →