Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Faheem vs The State2023 PCRLJ 757, PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 660 · Federal Shariat Court · 2023-02-03
  criminal revisionprohibition lawbenefit of doubtsafe custody of samplesSection 342 statementrecovery proceedingsindependent witnesseschemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Khipro, which maintained the petitioner's conviction under Article 4 of The Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for the alleged possession of raw wine. The core legal questions concerned the sufficiency of evidence, the mandatory requirement of independent witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the integrity of the chemical examination process, and the procedural necessity of putting incriminating evidence to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the safe custody and transmission of the recovered samples, and that the police witnesses provided contradictory testimony and failed to associate independent witnesses despite the incident occurring in a busy area. Furthermore, the failure to put the chemical examiner's report to the accused during his Section 342 statement rendered it inadmissible. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, granting the petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and ordered his acquittal, establishing that material contradictions and procedural lapses in recovery proceedings entitle an accused to acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to put the chemical examiner's report to an accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render the report inadmissible?
  • Is the failure to associate independent witnesses during a recovery in a busy area a violation of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the prosecution's failure to prove the safe custody and transmission of samples to the chemical laboratory entitle an accused to an acquittal?
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• F.I.A. through Director General, FIA and others vs Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 265, 2023 PLJ SC 247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-06
  quashing of FIRjudicial reviewcriminal breach of trustcriminal misconductabuse of authorityservice mattersfrivolous litigationimposition of costs
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court judgment that quashed an FIR registered by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) against Capital Development Authority (CDA) employees for alleged illegal upgradations. The Supreme Court clarified that while High Courts lack jurisdiction under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. to quash FIRs or investigations (as that provision applies only to judicial proceedings), they possess such authority under Article 199 of the Constitution for judicial review of executive acts. The Court held that the allegations regarding service-related upgradations did not satisfy the essential ingredients of 'criminal breach of trust' under Section 409 PPC or 'criminal misconduct' under Section 5(2) PCA, as the entrustment of administrative power is not equivalent to the entrustment of property. Misuse of such power may constitute service misconduct but does not attract criminal liability. Finding the FIA's actions to be without lawful authority, the Court dismissed the petition as frivolous and vexatious, imposing costs on the investigating officer.

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• Ezam Khan vs The State2023 MLD 172 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2021-12-29
  post-arrest bailjuvenile offenderfurther inquiryprohibitory clausetentative assessmentbail after challan
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matter arises from a bail petition filed by the petitioner, Ezam Khan, seeking post-arrest bail in FIR No. 05/2021 registered under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, after the Sessions Judge dismissed his earlier bail plea. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry considering his status as a minor, the release of a co-accused under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the offence fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 read with the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, noting that he was a minor according to his school leaving certificate, the challan had been submitted, the co-accused attributed with a similar role was released under Section 169, and the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause for a juvenile. The court established that pre-trial detention of a juvenile in such circumstances amounts to punishment before conviction and granted the bail petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does an offence under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the case of a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000?
  • Whether the release of a co-accused by the police under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 renders the case of the remaining accused one of further inquiry?
  • Can pre-trial detention of a juvenile be justified when investigation is complete and challan has been submitted?
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• Evacuee Trust Property Board through its Secretary vs Ghyas Ahmad Rana2023 LHC 6472, 2024 CLC 1828 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-13Read full judgment →
• Evacuee Trust Property Board and others vs Muhammad Tufail and others2023 CLC 2090 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-03Read full judgment →
• Euro Tiles and Granite through Proprietor and 4 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Commerce Division and others2023 PTD 21 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-08-29Read full judgment →
• Erfan vs Muhammad Mushtaq and another2023 MLD 1731 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-09-08
  murderlife imprisonmentocular accountrelated witnessesballistic matchsentence enhancementcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision arise from a judgment of the Model Criminal Trial Court/ASJ-II, Kohat, convicting the appellant under sections 302/324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder and inflicting injuries, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involve the assessment of ocular testimony of related witnesses, corroboration through medical and circumstantial evidence including the immediate spot-arrest of the accused with a weapon matching forensic ballistic reports, and the propriety of enhancing the sentence to death where multiple assailants opened fire and fatal shots could not be specifically attributed to an individual. The Peshawar High Court dismissed both the appeal and the revision, holding that the prosecution successfully established its case beyond reasonable doubt through reliable eyewitness accounts, corroborative forensic evidence, and immediate police encounter arrest, while declining to enhance the sentence to death due to uncertainty regarding whose specific gunfire caused the fatal injuries. The key principle laid down is that related eyewitness testimony, when consistent and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, remains fully credible, and sentence enhancement to death is unwarranted where multiple accused fire simultaneously and individual fatal attribution is impracticable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eyewitness who is closely related to the deceased can be discarded solely on the ground of relationship?
  • Does the recovery of the weapon of offense and a positive forensic ballistic match of crime empties serve as strong corroborative evidence against an accused?
  • Can a sentence of life imprisonment be enhanced to death in a case of multiple accused firing where the specific fatal shot cannot be attributed to a single individual?
  • Whether non-existence of exit wounds on the body of a deceased at close-range firing is sufficient to discard otherwise trustworthy medical and ocular evidence?
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• Engineer Irfan Ahmad Qureshi vs University Of Engineering and others2023 YLR 203 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-13Read full judgment →
• Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary, Islamabad and another vs Barrister Umair Khan Niazi and others2023 SCP 393 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-15
  Election Commission of PakistanGeneral ElectionsWrit JurisdictionAlternate RemedyElections Act 2017Judicial ReviewContempt of Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that suspended Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) notifications appointing District Returning Officers (DROs), Returning Officers (ROs), and Assistant Returning Officers (AROs) for the upcoming general elections. The core legal question was whether the High Court could, through an interim order, effectively halt the election process by challenging the constitutionality of Sections 50 and 51 of the Elections Act, 2017, despite the existence of alternate statutory remedies and the ECP's constitutional mandate to conduct elections. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was unsustainable as it interfered with the ECP's constitutional duty to hold elections and disregarded the availability of alternate remedies under Section 55(3) of the Elections Act, 2017. The Court suspended the High Court's order, allowing the ECP to proceed with the election schedule. The key principle laid down is that courts should not issue interim orders that derail the constitutional process of holding elections, especially when alternate statutory remedies are available and the impugned order exceeds territorial jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court suspend notifications appointing election officers if such an order effectively derails the constitutional process of holding elections?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 when an alternate adequate remedy is available under the Elections Act, 2017?
  • Does a High Court have the jurisdiction to issue a writ against another High Court's administrative decision regarding the provision of judicial officers for election duties?
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• Ekram ud Din Khan vs The D.G. F.I.A. and 3 others2023 PLD Sindh 90 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-20Read full judgment →
• Ejaz Hussain Rathore vs Bahria Town (Private) Limited, Ahmad Ali Riaz and Riaz Malik2023 LHC 5476, 2024 PLD Lahore 204 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-18Read full judgment →
• Ejaz alias Jajji and others vs The State and others2023 YLR 1835 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-10
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtsuppression of factscross-version caseprivate complaintacquittalappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentences recorded by the Sessions Judge, Pakpattan, in a private complaint involving charges of murder and attempted murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the existence of a cross-version case and significant discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants, noting that the complainant suppressed the true genesis of the occurrence and that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable due to material improvements and contradictions in their testimony. Furthermore, the delay in lodging the FIR and the failure to provide consistent medical evidence regarding the cause of death and injuries created serious doubts. The Court emphasized that when the prosecution suppresses the true mode and manner of an incident, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and dismissed the related revision petition and petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of the true genesis of an occurrence by the prosecution entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses have made material improvements and contradictions in their testimony?
  • Is an injured witness's presence at the scene of an occurrence sufficient to establish their credibility as a truthful witness?
  • What is the effect of a delayed FIR on the credibility of the prosecution's case in a murder trial?
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• Ejaz Ahmad, Assistant Office of District Food Controller, Mansehra vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through Secretary Food Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Peshawar and others2023 PLJ Peshawar 187 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-09
  service tribunaljurisdiction of high courtconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of serviceseniority and promotionbar of jurisdictionsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed before the Peshawar High Court challenging a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding seniority and promotion. The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain a petition against an order of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, or if such jurisdiction is barred by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Court held that by virtue of the Provincial Service Tribunals (Extension of Provisions of the Constitution) Act, 1974, the provisions of Article 212(2) of the Constitution stand extended to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal upon the request of the Provincial Assembly. Consequently, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal bars the High Court from entertaining proceedings relating to terms and conditions of service, and the sole remedy lies via an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 212(3). The petition was accordingly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have constitutional jurisdiction to entertain a petition against a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the provisions of Article 212(2) of the Constitution stand extended to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal?
  • What is the appropriate remedy against a judgment, decree, or order of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal?
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• Ejaz Ahmad vs Govt etc2023 PHC 201, 2023 PLJ Peshawar 187, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 53 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-09
  service tribunalconstitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionseniority disputeterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal dismissing his service appeal regarding seniority and promotion. The core legal question was whether the High Court has constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain a petition against the judgment of a Provincial Service Tribunal given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Peshawar High Court held that pursuant to the Provincial Service Tribunals (Extension of Provisions of the Constitution) Act 1974, the provisions of Article 212(2) stand extended to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal upon the request of the Provincial Assembly, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court. The key principle laid down is that once Article 212(2) provisions are extended to a provincial service tribunal, the exclusive remedy against its judgment lies before the Supreme Court under Article 212(3), and the High Court lacks constitutional jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have constitutional jurisdiction to hear a petition against a judgment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the provisions of Article 212(2) of the Constitution extend to the Provincial Service Tribunals?
  • What is the appropriate remedy against a judgment, decree, or order of an Administrative Court or Tribunal established under a provincial law?
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• Ehtisham Basharat vs Deputy Inspector General of Police and 2 others2023 PLC (C.S.) 8 · Lahore High Court · 2022-04-14
  waiting listrecruitment processlegitimate expectationpolice recruitmentconstitutional petitionadministrative delaypublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order by the District Police Officer, Gujrat, which rejected the petitioner’s request for recruitment as a Constable. The petitioner, ranked first on the waiting list, sought appointment after a selected candidate failed to join, but the department rejected the application, citing the expiry of the 90-day validity period of the waiting list. The core legal question was whether the department could deny appointment to a waiting-list candidate when the vacancy arose or was declared after the expiry of the waiting list's validity period due to administrative delays. The Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable. It ruled that the department cannot penalize a candidate for the expiry of a waiting list when the delay in the recruitment process—specifically the medical examination phase—was attributable to the department itself. The Court established that once a recruitment process commences, it must be completed within the stipulated time. Furthermore, the doctrine of legitimate expectation entitles a candidate on a waiting list to be considered for appointment when a vacancy arises, regardless of the expiry of the waiting list, if the delay is not the candidate's fault.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department deny appointment to a candidate on a waiting list solely because the validity period of the list expired due to the department's own administrative delays?
  • Does a candidate on a recruitment waiting list possess a legitimate expectation to be considered for appointment when a vacancy arises due to a selected candidate's failure to join?
  • Is a recruitment authority required to complete the appointment process within the stipulated time frame for the validity of a waiting list?
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• Ehsan Ullah Chaudhry vs The State and 3 others2023 PLD Lahore 233 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-22
  cancellation reportFIR cancellationPolice Rules 1934Superintendent of Policefair trialnatural justiceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged an order passed by a Magistrate agreeing with a police cancellation report in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions revolved around the mandatory procedure for submitting a cancellation report of a criminal case under Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934, the competence of a Deputy Superintendent of Police versus a Superintendent of Police to forward such a report, and the adherence to principles of natural justice and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court held that a cancellation report must be mandatorily routed through the Superintendent of Police in accordance with Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934, rather than a Deputy Superintendent of Police under the Police Order, 2002, and that Magistrates must provide a reasoned order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the complainant. The court laid down the principle that where a law requires something to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone, and that pre-trial proceedings and cancellation reports are subject to the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal case FIR can be cancelled through a report forwarded by a Deputy Superintendent of Police instead of the Superintendent of Police under Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934?
  • Does a Magistrate have the inherent power under Section 173(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 to cancel a criminal case?
  • Is a Magistrate bound to provide an opportunity of hearing to the complainant before agreeing with a police cancellation report?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution apply to pre-trial proceedings and investigation matters such as cancellation reports?
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• Ehsan Ullah and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2023 PLD Lahore 352 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-11Read full judgment →
• Eaton Phoenixtec MMPL Co., Ltd. and another vs Messrs New Rabia2023 PLD Sindh 123 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-22Read full judgment →
• East Rice Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Moon Rice Corporation and others2023 CLD 338 · Sindh High Court · 2022-07-19Read full judgment →
• E.D.O. (Now Superintending Engineer) Road District Kashmore @ Kandhkot2023 CLC 1383 · Sindh High Court · 2023-01-30Read full judgment →
• Dur Muhammad S/O Muhammad Ali vs The State2023 SHC 518, 2024 PTD 380 · Sindh High Court · 2023-07-03Read full judgment →
• Dur Bibi and 2 others vs Syed Shah Muhammad and 7 others2023 CLC 1756, 2024 PLJ Quetta 145 · Balochistan High Court · 2023-05-08Read full judgment →
• Dua Tauseef vs Province of Sindh, Director Admissions Smbbmu and others2023 SHC 1078 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-07Read full judgment →
• Dr.Naeem-ur-Rehman vs Saeed-Ur-Rehman2023 PHC 404, 2024 YLR 780 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-09-18Read full judgment →
• Dr. Ummara Munir vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of National Health Services, Regulation & Coordination (NHRSR&C), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad & others2023 LHC 2439, 2024 PLJ Lahore 23, 2024 MLD 1086 · Lahore High Court · 2023-04-28Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sunil Anand Hotwani vs Abdul Wakeel and 2 others2023 CLC 1279 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-12Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shireen M. Mazari vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another2023 IHC 346 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Shaista Shoukat Ali vs Federation of Pakistan and 03 others2023 SHC 72 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shahzad Nasim vs The State & Others2023 SHC 297 · Sindh High Court · 2023-04-28
  stay of criminal proceedingssimultaneous civil and criminal proceedingsdishonoured chequecommercial disputequashmentabscondenceSection 489-F PPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a commercial dispute between business entities over a failed high-rise apartment project, leading to multiple civil suits and a criminal First Information Report (F.I.R.) under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding dishonoured post-dated cheques issued pursuant to a Settlement Agreement. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the final determination of related, ongoing civil litigation between the parties. The Sindh High Court held that while civil and criminal proceedings may generally proceed simultaneously, criminal proceedings ought to be stayed where the criminal liability is intimately connected with, or dependent upon, the resolution of complex commercial and contractual issues pending before civil courts, to avoid conflicting findings and grave prejudice to the accused. The court laid down the principle that in complex commercial disputes where determining the purpose of a cheque and whether it was issued for the 'satisfaction of an obligation' under Section 489-F requires interpreting underlying agreements, civil courts must first determine these rights, and criminal proceedings should be suspended accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be stayed pending the final decision of a civil suit arising out of the same subject matter?
  • Whether criminal liability under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is dependent on the determination of contractual rights in civil litigation?
  • Does the mere pendency of civil litigation automatically bar the continuation of criminal proceedings?
  • What are the guiding principles for exercising discretion to stay criminal proceedings in view of pending civil disputes?
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• Dr. Shahid Mehmood vs Chairman PPSC etc2023 LHC 2538 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-26Read full judgment →
• Dr. Shahid Amin vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Food Security and Research and another2023 PLC (C.S.) 1218 · Balochistan High Court
  recruitment processpublic sector companiesconstitutional petitionadministrative lawmala fideappointment of CEOdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the cancellation of a recruitment process for the position of Chief Executive Officer of the Livestock and Dairy Development Board. The petitioner, having secured the highest marks in the initial interview process, contested the Board's decision to unilaterally cancel the selection and initiate a fresh recruitment drive. The core legal question was whether the Board acted within its lawful authority in abandoning the established selection process without adhering to the prescribed regulatory framework. The Court held that the respondents failed to follow the mandatory procedure outlined in the Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015. Specifically, the Guidelines require that if a line ministry does not concur with proposed candidates, it must provide reasons and refer the matter back for reconsideration, rather than allowing the Board to unilaterally restart the process. Consequently, the Court declared the fresh recruitment proceedings illegal and directed the authorities to finalize the appointment based on the original merit-based recommendations. The judgment establishes that administrative recruitment processes must strictly comply with statutory guidelines to prevent arbitrary or mala fide actions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Board of Directors of a public sector company have the authority to unilaterally cancel a recruitment process without following the procedure for non-concurrence prescribed in the Public Sector Companies (Appointment of Chief Executive) Guidelines, 2015?
  • What is the mandatory procedure for a line ministry when it does not concur with the appointment of candidates recommended by a public sector company?
  • Can a recruitment process be set aside on the grounds of mala fide when the Board of Directors restarts the process without providing valid reasons for the cancellation of the initial merit-based selection?
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• Dr. Shafi-Ur-Rehman Afridi vs The State and 2 others2023 PCRLJ 456 · Lahore High Court · 2022-02-01
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryjurisdiction of FIAOGRA Ordinancepetroleum import quotaregulatory immunitymoney laundering
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns post-arrest bail applications filed by officials of the Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division) and a director of an Oil Marketing Company, accused of irregularities in petroleum import quotas and licensing. The core issue was whether the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had jurisdiction to register a criminal case regarding matters governed by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) Ordinance, 2002, and whether the petitioners' actions constituted criminal offences warranting detention. The Court granted post-arrest bail, holding that the petitioners' case fell within the ambit of 'further inquiry.' The Court established that the OGRA Ordinance, 2002, provides a complete, self-contained mechanism for complaints and holds overriding effect over other laws regarding regulatory matters. Consequently, the FIA lacks jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings for matters falling under the OGRA Ordinance. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that regulatory authorities performing functions under the Ordinance are immune from prosecution absent evidence of criminal intent or illegal gratification.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have jurisdiction to register criminal cases regarding matters governed by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002?
  • Does the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, have an overriding effect over other laws regarding regulatory complaints?
  • Can public servants performing functions under the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance be prosecuted without evidence of criminal intent or illegal gratification?
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• Dr. Sayyid A.S. Pirzada vs The Chief Secretary, Services and Administration2023 SCP 120 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appealadministrative tribunaldepartmental representationstatutory interpretationexhaustion of remediesservice mattersjurisdiction of service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by the petitioner regarding his promotion, which faced procedural delays before the Punjab Service Tribunal. The core legal question addressed is whether a Service Tribunal, upon receiving an appeal from a civil servant whose departmental representation remained undecided for the statutory 90-day period, possesses the authority to direct the departmental authority to decide that representation, or whether it must adjudicate the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's dismissal of the petitioner's appeal was legally unsustainable, particularly given the finality of a prior restoration order. The Court established the principle that once a civil servant approaches the Tribunal after the lapse of the 90-day period prescribed by the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1973, the departmental remedy is deemed exhausted. Consequently, the Tribunal is mandated to decide the appeal on its merits and lacks the legal authority to remand the matter back to the departmental authority for a decision on the pending representation, as such directions frustrate the Act's objective of speedy dispute resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the power to direct a departmental authority to decide a pending representation instead of adjudicating the appeal on its merits?
  • What is the effect on a departmental remedy once a civil servant approaches the Service Tribunal after the lapse of the statutory 90-day period?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal as not maintainable after previously allowing an application for its restoration, where that restoration order has attained finality?
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• Dr. Sayyid A. S. Pirzada vs The Chief Secretary, Services and Administration2023 SCMR 1087, 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-04-13
  service tribunaldepartmental representationexhaustion of departmental remediesterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of service tribunalcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses the legality of the Punjab Service Tribunal's practice of disposing of service appeals by directing departmental authorities to decide pending departmental representations, rather than adjudicating the matters on merits. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal can remand a matter back to departmental authorities after the expiry of the statutory ninety-day waiting period, or if it is bound to decide the appeal itself. The Supreme Court held that once a civil servant approaches the Tribunal after the lapse of ninety days from filing a departmental appeal, review, or representation, that departmental remedy stands exhausted, and the Tribunal must decide the appeal on merits under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1973. The Tribunal lacks the power to direct departmental authorities to decide the pending representation in such circumstances. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the statutory mechanism allows civil servants to bypass delayed departmental remedies after ninety days, vesting exclusive and final adjudicatory responsibility directly in the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Punjab Service Tribunal direct departmental authorities to decide a pending departmental representation instead of deciding the service appeal on merits?
  • What is the legal effect on a departmental appeal, review, or representation when a civil servant approaches the Service Tribunal after the lapse of the ninety-day statutory period?
  • What are the powers of the Punjab Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1973 when entertaining an appeal from a civil servant?
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• Dr. Sara Jaffer vs Zarak Khan and another2023 CLC 77 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-10Read full judgment →
• Dr. Samreen Riaz Ali and 03 others vs Dow University of Health Sciences2023 SHC 204 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-14Read full judgment →
• Dr. Sajid Iqbal vs University of Sargodha and others2023 LHC 2796 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-26
  sexual harassmentworkplace harassmentcross-examinationdue processdepartmental inquirycriminal acquittaleducational institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by an Assistant Professor challenging concurrent orders of the University of Sargodha's Syndicate and the Ombudsperson Punjab, which removed him from service following a complaint of sexual harassment by a female student. The petitioner contended that the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 did not apply to students, that his acquittal in a parallel criminal case exonerated him, and that the inquiry was vitiated because he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant. The High Court held that the Act applies to educational institutions and protects students harassed by employees. It also ruled that domestic disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal trials, meaning a criminal acquittal does not bar departmental action. However, the Court found that the Inquiry Committee's reliance on a questionnaire without allowing the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses violated statutory procedures and the constitutional right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Court accepted the petition, set aside the removal order, and remanded the case for de novo inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 apply to complaints made by students against university employees?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal trial under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 operate as a bar to domestic disciplinary proceedings on the same facts?
  • Can a delayed complaint of sexual harassment under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 be dismissed solely on the ground of delay?
  • Is the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during a domestic inquiry under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010 a violation of due process and the right to a fair trial?
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• Dr. Rafiullah, Assistant Professor, Department of Agriculture and 21 others2023 PLC (C.S.) 560 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-07-26
  locus poenitentiaewrit jurisdictionlegitimate expectancyservice matterrecruitment processadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the decision of the University of Swabi's Syndicate to cancel job advertisements for Assistant Professor positions and subsequently re-advertise them. The petitioners, who had applied under the initial advertisements, contended that the cancellation was illegal and violated their legitimate expectations. The core legal question was whether the respondent authority possessed the power to rescind the advertisements before any selection process had been finalized. The Court held that, under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, an authority that has the power to issue an order, rule, or notification also possesses the power to rescind it, provided no decisive step has been taken and no vested rights have accrued to any individual. Finding that the petitioners had not acquired any vested rights as no selection process had been completed, the Court upheld the Syndicate's decision to cancel the advertisements and dismissed the petition in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Does an authority have the power to rescind an advertisement for a job post before any decisive steps in the recruitment process have been taken?
  • Does the mere act of applying for a advertised post create a vested right that prevents the authority from cancelling the advertisement?
  • Under what circumstances can an authority invoke the doctrine of locus poenitentiae to withdraw an order or notification?
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• Dr. Noor-Us-Saba vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services and others2023 CLC 1245 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-03-13
  regularization of contract employeesrepatriationrules of businesssummary to the prime ministervested rightsdrug regulatory authoritynatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Scientific Officer at the National Institute of Health (NIH) and subsequently appointed as Project Director on contract and regularized as Director (BS-20) in the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP) pursuant to the Prime Minister's approval, challenged a subsequent notification dated 15.07.2019 repatriating her to the NIH following a reviewed summary approved by the Prime Minister. The core legal question was whether the Prime Minister's subsequent decision to review and undo the regularization, resulting in the petitioner's repatriation based on an incomplete and misleading summary, was legally sustainable. The Islamabad High Court held that the summary submitted by the Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination (NHSR&C) was misleading, omitted crucial historical facts and the stakeholder's (petitioner's) point of view in violation of the Rules of Business 1973 and Cabinet guidelines, rendering the consequent decision unsustainable. The Court set aside the impugned notification and directed that the Prime Minister decide the matter afresh after considering a complete and lawful summary containing the petitioner's perspective.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a summary submitted to the Prime Minister affecting a person's vested rights is legally flawed if it omits the point of view of the affected stakeholder?
  • Can an employee be lawfully repatriated to a parent department when their name has already been struck off its strength upon regularization elsewhere?
  • Whether the Prime Minister's approval for reviewing a prior regularization decision can be sustained when based on an incomplete and misleading departmental summary?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for submitting a summary to the Prime Minister under Rule 15(2) of the Rules of Business, 1973 read with Cabinet guidelines?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Noor-Ul-Haq and 3 others vs The State2023 YLR 690 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-14
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubtfamily disputecounter FIRbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application arises out of a pre-arrest bail confirmation matter where the applicants, who are brothers of the complainant, sought confirmation of interim bail in a case involving a dispute over a madrassah and its properties. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the existence of a prior civil dispute, counter-FIRs, and lack of attribution of specific roles or firearm use. The Sindh High Court held that the case called for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the prosecution's case appeared doubtful due to family animosity, mutual injuries, and absence of firearm usage at the scene. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down the principle that where reasonable doubt arises regarding the participation of an accused or the probability of the prosecution case, the benefit of doubt must be extended at the bail stage, and personal liberty should not be arbitrarily curtailed since the object of bail is merely to secure the attendance of the accused at trial and is not punitive.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail should be confirmed when a case falls within the scope of further inquiry due to a property dispute and counter-allegations between brothers?
  • Does the absence of specific role attribution and non-use of alleged firearms entitle an accused to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  • What is the primary object of granting bail in criminal jurisprudence?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Nafees Zubair vs Saeeda Bano & others2023 SHC 1050, 2024 CLC 1146 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-29Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mutahir Shah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and Coordination, Islamabad and others2023 IHC 368 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Saleem vs Government of Baluchistan, and others2023 SCP 255, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 77, 2023 SCMR 2119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-20
  transfer and postingcivil servantexecutive domainjudicial reviewservice tribunalpublic interestseparation of powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, which had set aside the transfer order of Dr. Shamsullah Bazai from the post of Principal, Loralai Medical College. The core legal question was whether a service tribunal or court can interfere with the executive function of posting and transfer of a civil servant on the ground that it was not in the public interest. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the transfer of a government official to meet service exigencies falls within the exclusive domain of the executive authorities, and tribunals or courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction to interfere unless a clear violation of law or established mala fides is shown. The key principle laid down is that the question of whether a transfer is in the public interest is not open to judicial review, and unwarranted interference by tribunals breaches the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The appeal was consequently allowed and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer and posting of a government servant falls within the exclusive domain of the executive authorities?
  • Can a service tribunal or court substitute its own view for that of the competent authority regarding whether a transfer is in the public interest?
  • Under what circumstances can courts or tribunals interfere with the executive function of posting and transferring civil servants?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to hold a particular post or to be posted at a place of choice?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Naeem vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 IHC 298 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-29Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Hafeez Ahmad vs The State etc2023 IHC 54 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-04-05
  revision petitionsummoning of accusedpolice reportColumn No. 2Section 204 CrPCreview of ordercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged a Trial Court order summoning the petitioner, who had been placed in Column No. 2 of the police report. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the Trial Court's contradictory orders: initially observing that no evidence existed to summon the petitioner, then subsequently issuing a summons based on the erroneous characterization of the police report as a 'challan.' The High Court held that the Trial Court's orders were inconsistent and legally flawed. The Court determined that an order issued under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is tentative in nature and not a final judgment; therefore, it is subject to review by the Trial Court if found to be erroneous or suffering from inherent vice. The Court emphasized the legal distinction between a police report under Section 173, which may not recommend trial, and a 'challan,' which does. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for a fresh decision after hearing both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order issued under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered a final judgment that cannot be reviewed by the Trial Court?
  • What is the legal distinction between a police report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and a 'challan'?
  • Can a Trial Court review its own order if it is found to suffer from inherent vice or is erroneous on the face of the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Bashir Qasim vs Mrs. Farida Bano and 2 others2023 MLD 275 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-27Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Amin vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Board of Director, ZTBL, Ho, Islamabad and others2023 SCMR 1083, 2023 PLC (C.S) 1544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-08-10
  multiplicity of proceedingscause of actionjoinder of claimsdismissal from servicedepartmental appealcivil proceduremisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged an Islamabad High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition filed by the petitioner against the rejection of his departmental appeal regarding his dismissal from service. The petitioner, a bank employee, was dismissed for misconduct, specifically unauthorized absence and tampering with attendance records, following inquiry proceedings under the Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Officers Service (Efficiency and Discipline) Regulations, 1975. The petitioner engaged in a pattern of fragmented litigation, filing multiple civil suits and a writ petition separately challenging the disciplinary process, the dismissal order, and the appellate rejection. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner improperly split his causes of action, violating the principles of civil procedure regarding the joinder of claims and the prevention of multiplicity of proceedings. The Court affirmed that a litigant must include the whole of their claim in one suit. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's dismissal but granted the petitioner liberty to pursue his remedies in the civil court, specifically allowing for the potential restoration of his previously withdrawn suit to be decided on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to include the entire claim in a single suit preclude a plaintiff from later suing for the omitted portion?
  • Can a petitioner challenge the rejection of a departmental appeal while separately litigating the underlying dismissal order in a civil court?
  • What is the legal consequence of splitting causes of action in multiple legal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Muhammad Akbar vs Mst. Safia Kakar and 9 others2023 MLD 24 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-04-12Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khaki vs Khawaja Khalid Farooq Khan and others2023 SCP 174, 2023 PLJ SC 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-16
  writ jurisdictioncharitable endowmentpublic interest litigationillegal allotmentintra-court appealfundamental rightsland conversionconflict of interest
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the Islamabad High Court’s dismissal of a writ petition concerning the illegal allotment of a second plot to the Managing Director of the National Police Foundation (NPF), which was designated as a park or green area. The core legal questions were whether the NPF is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and whether the conversion of public green space for private use was permissible. The Supreme Court held that the NPF, established under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, is a public-interest entity amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Court declared the allotment illegal, emphasizing that public land designated for parks or amenities cannot be converted for private use or personal aggrandizement. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while intra-court appeals are generally required, the Supreme Court may entertain direct appeals in matters of significant public importance involving fundamental rights. The Court ordered the refund of payments made for the illegal allotment, establishing that public officials cannot abuse their positions to subvert public interest for private gain.

  Questions settled

  • Is the National Police Foundation amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can land designated as a park or green area in an approved layout plan be converted for private residential use?
  • Does the existence of an intra-court appeal remedy under the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 absolutely bar the Supreme Court from entertaining a direct appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution?
  • Is an allotment of a second plot to an individual by a charitable foundation valid when the foundation's rules restrict beneficiaries to a single plot?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mehmood Jan vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Through Secretary Health Peshawar and others2023 PHC 153, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 123 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-04-10
  civil servant transferterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionexclusive jurisdictionservice tribunalmaintainabilitymala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by a civil servant challenging his proposed transfer from the position of District Health Officer by the provincial Health Department, alleging mala fide and political victimization. The core legal question revolves around the maintainability of a constitutional petition by a civil servant regarding terms and conditions of service in light of the constitutional ouster of jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution and the availability of an alternative remedy before the Service Tribunal. The Peshawar High Court held that matters relating to the posting and transfer of a civil servant fall strictly within the terms and conditions of service, over which the Service Tribunal exercises exclusive jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that allegations of mala fide do not confer jurisdiction on the High Court, and the constitutional bar under Article 212 explicitly ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts and High Courts. The petition was consequently dismissed as non-maintainable, leaving the petitioner at liberty to approach the appropriate departmental and statutory forum.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a constitutional petition by a civil servant regarding a transfer?
  • Does an allegation of mala fide or political victimization confer jurisdiction upon the High Court to interfere in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant in view of Article 212?
  • Whether matters of posting and transfer of a civil servant fall within the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Mazhar Ali Jatoi, Dr. Habib ur Rehaman vs Federation of Pakistan and 022023 SHC 42 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-07
  pensionary benefitsad-hoc serviceregularizationqualifying servicesuperannuation pensionKarachi Port Trustmaintainabilityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This common order of the Sindh High Court decided two constitutional petitions filed by retired employees of the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) seeking the inclusion of their initial ad-hoc service (1989–1995) in calculating their total pensionary benefits. The court addressed two central questions: whether constitutional petitions against KPT are maintainable despite claims of non-statutory service rules, and whether continuous ad-hoc service prior to regularization counts toward qualifying service for pension. Overruling the respondent's preliminary objection, the court held that because KPT regulations were framed with Federal Government approval under Section 22 of the KPT Act 1886, KPT operates under statutory rules, making constitutional remedies under Article 199 appropriate. On the merits, the court held that continuous ad-hoc/temporary service followed by regularization without interruption must be counted toward total pensionary and superannuation benefits pursuant to Civil Service Regulations (CSR Articles 358, 371-A, 423, 474(b)) and binding precedent. The High Court allowed the petitions, directing the respondents to compute and release full pensionary benefits incorporating the six-year ad-hoc service.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable against the Karachi Port Trust regarding service terms of its employees?
  • Does continuous service rendered on an ad-hoc basis prior to regularization count towards calculating qualifying service for pensionary benefits?
  • Can pensionary benefits be refused for continuous ad-hoc service that was subsequently regularized by a competent authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Masuma Hasan vs Imtiaz Ali Khan2023 SHC 1038, 2025 PLD Sindh 96 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-06Read full judgment →
• Dr. Jehanzeb and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkrwa2023 PLC (C.S.) 297 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-09-28
  review petitionanti-corruptionstatutory authoritymisappropriationprocedural irregularityadministrative noticepreliminary inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed by petitioners challenging a previous judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had dismissed their writ petition against a notice issued by the Anti-Corruption Establishment. The petitioners, members of a committee in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Text Book Board, had been issued a notice by the Anti-Corruption department demanding the deposit of an alleged misappropriated amount following audit observations. The core legal question was whether the Anti-Corruption Establishment possessed the statutory authority to issue a notice demanding the deposit of an alleged embezzled amount prior to the completion of a formal inquiry or investigation. The Court held that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1999, do not authorize the issuance of such a notice for the recovery of funds. The Court emphasized that the power of review is available to correct errors patent on the face of the record or where important statutory provisions were overlooked. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notice as illegal and without jurisdiction, clarifying that while the petitioners could still be proceeded against in accordance with the law, the specific demand for payment was unauthorized.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Anti-Corruption Establishment have the legal authority to issue a notice demanding the deposit of an alleged misappropriated amount prior to the conclusion of an investigation?
  • Under what circumstances can a court exercise its power of review regarding a previous judgment?
  • Is a notice issued by the Anti-Corruption Establishment demanding the deposit of funds without following the prescribed inquiry procedure legally sustainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Jehanzeb and others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2023 PLD Peshawar 25 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-09-28Read full judgment →
• Dr. Javed Akhtar vs Messrs Rufi Builders and Developers through Director_Partner and 2 others2023 MLD 994 · Sindh High Court · 2021-07-05Read full judgment →
• Dr. Hazrat Khan vs The State and others2023 MLD 312 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-07-04
  double jeopardynemo debet bis vexariacquittalcriminal complaintre-trialSection 249-A Cr.P.C.fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Judicial Magistrate-I, D.I. Khan, which acquitted the respondents under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a complaint involving allegations of fraud and other offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a second criminal complaint could be maintained against the same accused for the same set of facts when a previous complaint regarding the same allegations had already been dismissed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court held that the petition was meritless, affirming the acquittal. The ratio of the decision is that the principle of double jeopardy, or 'nemo debet bis vexari', prohibits the re-trial of an accused for the same offense once they have been tried and acquitted by a competent court. The Court emphasized that statutory provisions, including the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the General Clauses Act 1897, and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, strictly protect individuals from being prosecuted or punished more than once for the same offense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of double jeopardy prohibit a second trial for the same offense when the accused has already been acquitted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Can a complainant file a fresh criminal complaint based on the same facts and allegations that were previously adjudicated and dismissed by a competent court?
  • Does the dismissal of a complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar subsequent prosecution for the same offense?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Hazrat Hussain vs Rector Comsats University, Islamabad and others.2023 PHC 346 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-06-01Read full judgment →
• Dr. Hassan Shahryar vs Sana Waqar through authorized attorney and 22023 CLC 2025 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-25Read full judgment →
• Dr. Farzana Zulfiqar vs Federation of Paksitan and others2023 SHC 36 · Sindh High Court · 2023-01-26Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aziz-Ur-Rehman and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet and others2023 PLJ Islamabad 179, 2024 PLD Islamabad 53, 2024 CLD 230 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-09Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aszhar Ali vs Muhammad Ali2023 LHC 2586, 2024 PLJ Lahore 143 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-10Read full judgment →
• Dr. Asma Nighat Zaidi & others vs Syeda Safoora Begum & others2023 LHC 2591, 2024 CLC 1288 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-09Read full judgment →
• Dr. Ammer Khan Jadoon vs Govt of KP & others2023 PHC 396 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-09-13Read full judgment →
• Dr. Amjad Ali vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2023 CLC 731 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-05-18Read full judgment →
• Dr. Agha Aijaz Ali Pathan vs The State and another2023 MLD 44 · Sindh High Court · 2021-05-20Read full judgment →
• Dr. Aftab Hassan Minhas vs National Council for Homeopathy etc.2023 LHC 4805, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 84 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-14
  constitutional petitionservice lawdismissal from servicedepartmental appeallimitation periodinquiry proceedingsNational Council for Homeopathy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenged the dismissal order dated 08.04.2015 and the subsequent appellate rejection order dated 07.07.2017 passed by the National Council for Homeopathy, seeking reinstatement with back benefits. The petitioner contended that the disciplinary inquiry lacked due process, copies of the proceedings were withheld, and the appeal was delayed due to the non-provision of inquiry documents. The respondents asserted that the departmental appeal was barred by time under the governing regulations and that the dismissal followed due procedure. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that Regulation 33(2) of the NCH (Staff) Regulations 1987 strictly prescribes a 28-day limitation period for filing an appeal, which expired before the petitioner approached the departmental authority or sought court assistance. Applying the principles that the law aids the vigilant and that acts required in a specific manner must be performed accordingly or not at all, the Court found the dismissal well commensurate with proved allegations after full opportunity of defence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-provision of inquiry documents condone or suspend the mandatory statutory limitation period of 28 days for filing a departmental appeal under Regulation 33(2) of the NCH (Staff) Regulations, 1987?
  • Can a departmental appeal be entertained on the merits if it was submitted beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed by the governing service regulations?
  • Whether an employee's failure to file a timely statutory appeal within the prescribed period precludes relief under the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Nabi, Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Balochistan, Sariab Road, Quetta vs Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta2023 SCP 159, 2024 PLJ SC 80, 2023 SCMR 1267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-21
  writ jurisdictionalternate remedytax exemptionstatutory interpretationdeeming provisionpublic servantCantonment Board
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenged a Balochistan High Court order that dismissed a constitution petition filed by a university professor seeking a 60% tax rebate under S.R.O. 156(I)/2004. The High Court had dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust the alternate remedy of appeal under Section 84 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 was justified when the dispute involved the enforcement of a statutory exemption rather than a challenge to tax assessment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in non-suiting the petitioner, as the dispute did not involve disputed facts regarding tax assessment but rather the entitlement to a statutory rebate. The Court established that writ jurisdiction is appropriate for enforcing statutory exemptions where no elaborate factual inquiry is required, and the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar such jurisdiction when the remedy is not equally efficacious for the specific relief sought. The appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of an alternate remedy under the Cantonments Act, 1924 bar a writ petition seeking enforcement of a statutory tax exemption?
  • Are employees of the University of Balochistan considered provincial public servants for the purpose of tax exemptions under S.R.O. 156(I)/2004?
  • When can a High Court exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 despite the availability of an alternate remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Dr. Abdul Malik vs K.M.C & others2023 SHC 76 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-15Read full judgment →
• Dr Shamoona Naqvi & 4 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations & Coordination & 3 others2023 IHC 416 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-04-07
  quo-warrantodeputationwed-lock policycivil serviceeligibility criteriadirect recruitment quotaadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition in the nature of quo-warranto challenged the appointment of a Surgeon (Obstetrics & Gyneacology) on deputation in the Federal Government Polyclinic, Islamabad. The core legal questions were whether the respondent's appointment violated the eligibility criteria prescribed under S.R.O. 1134(I)(2018) and whether the deputation was legally permissible. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the deputation was a temporary administrative arrangement between departments. The Court found that the respondent possessed the requisite qualifications as verified by a specialized committee constituted by the Ministry. Furthermore, the Court noted that the appointment was made against the quota reserved for direct recruitment, thereby causing no prejudice to the promotion prospects of the petitioners. The judgment establishes that courts should not interfere in internal administrative matters regarding deputation where no legal right of the petitioners is infringed, and that a civil servant on deputation in the same pay scale, who meets the eligibility criteria, may be appointed to a post reserved for direct recruitment without violating the rights of existing employees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be appointed on deputation to a post reserved for direct recruitment?
  • Does the court have the authority to interfere in internal administrative matters regarding the deputation of a civil servant?
  • Is a petition in the nature of quo-warranto maintainable when the appointment is a temporary deputation arrangement?
  • Does the posting of a civil servant on deputation against a direct recruitment quota violate the promotion prospects of existing employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hassan and others vs Ijaz Naseer and others2023 LHC 3741, 2025 CLC 196 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-31Read full judgment →
• Dr Rehiana B. Ali vs Chaudhry Riaz ahmed & others2023 IHC 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-15
  private complaintpreliminary inquiryprima facie casecriminal revisionissuance of processstandard of proofmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Islamabad, which dismissed a private complaint filed under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, alleging murder. The core legal question was whether a trial court, during a preliminary inquiry, may apply the evidentiary standards of a full-length trial to determine if a prima facie case exists for issuing process against the accused. The High Court held that the trial court erred by overstretching the preliminary inquiry and effectively conducting a full-fledged trial, which is impermissible at this stage. The court set aside the dismissal order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The judgment reaffirms the principle that during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the complainant’s burden is merely to establish a prima facie case to justify the issuance of process. The court must not examine evidence minutely or require proof beyond reasonable doubt, as such rigorous standards are reserved exclusively for the final trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court equate the standard of establishing a prima facie case at the preliminary inquiry stage to the standard of proof required after a full-length trial?
  • Is a trial court permitted to examine evidence minutely during a preliminary inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the dismissal of a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 serve as a substitute for an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Doud Khan vs Muhammad Rashid, etc.2023 PLJ Lahore 199 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-20Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Mian Riaz Hussain and others2023 PSC 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-10
  specific performanceagreement to sellbona fide purchaserpart performancedelivery of possessionmisreading of evidenceRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court in a Regular Second Appeal, which partially decreed Respondent No. 1's suit for specific performance regarding 80 kanals of land upon deposit of the remaining sale consideration. The core legal questions pertained to whether the agreement to sell was duly proved by credible oral and documentary evidence, whether possession was handed over in part performance, and whether a subsequent purchaser of a 20-kanal portion was protected as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Respondent No. 1 successfully proved the agreement to sell through consistent testimony of the marginal witness, petition writer, and stamp vendor, along with payment of substantial consideration and delivery of possession. Conversely, the appellant failed to prove his claims of forgery and forcible dispossession. Additionally, the subsequent transferee of 20 kanals was protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as a bona fide purchaser without notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell is sufficiently proved where the vendee produces consistent testimonies of the marginal witness, the petition writer, and the stamp vendor?
  • Whether an uncorroborated plea of forcible dispossession can be sustained when the vendor took no legal action to retrieve possession upon discovering the alleged dispossession?
  • Whether a subsequent transferee of immovable property is entitled to protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as a bona fide purchaser if the prior agreement holder fails to prove notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad vs Malik Shah Muhammad and 6 others2023 PCRLJ 326 · Balochistan High Court · 2021-05-20
  hostile witnesscross-examination of witnessimpeaching credit of witnessmedical legal certificateconstitutional petitiondiscretion of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to declare a prosecution witness (PW-3, a medical doctor) as a hostile witness, to permit cross-examination of the said witness by the complainant, and to initiate criminal proceedings against him. The core legal question revolved around whether a witness who denies issuing a medical-legal certificate and gives testimony unfavourable to the party calling him can be declared hostile under Article 150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court's discretion to declare a witness hostile must be exercised with caution, and a witness is not hostile merely because their testimony is unfavourable or contrary to expectations, provided there is no equivocation, suppression of truth, or deviation from a previous statement. The court dismissed the petition, ruling that the witness consistently denied issuing or signing the disputed medical certificate from the inception, and thus no legal grounds existed to declare him hostile or interfere with the lower courts' orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a witness can be declared hostile merely because their testimony is unfavourable or unhelpful to the party calling them?
  • What constitutes a hostile witness under Article 150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to permit a party to cross-examine its own witness upon request?
  • Can a witness be treated as hostile when their trial testimony remains consistent with their prior stance throughout the investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Dollar Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Authorized Signatory_Director and another vs Kamran Akhlaq2023 CLD 670, 2023 PLD Sindh 296 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-15Read full judgment →
• Doctor Yasmin Rashid vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary and 2 others2023 MLD 695 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-16Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan vs Nadeem Raza2023 PLC (C.S.) 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-01-17
  Service Tribunalmisconductmisappropriationproportionality testcivil servantpenalty reductionmoral turpitude
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the Federal Service Tribunal's authority to reduce penalties imposed by government departments on civil servants. The respondent, a mail peon, was removed from service for misappropriating public funds collected from electricity bills. The Tribunal reduced this penalty to a minor reduction in pay scale, characterizing the act as "temporary misappropriation." The Supreme Court addressed whether the Tribunal could arbitrarily reduce such penalties. The Court held that while the Tribunal possesses the power to modify orders under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, this power is not unlimited. Interference is only permissible if the penalty is contrary to law or "starkly unreasonable" based on a structured test of proportionality. The Court clarified that misappropriation constitutes gross misconduct involving moral turpitude, regardless of duration. Because the Tribunal failed to provide legally sustainable reasoning for its interference and the penalty was not disproportionate, the Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment and restored the department's original order of removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the power to reduce a penalty imposed by a department on a civil servant?
  • Under what circumstances can a Service Tribunal interfere with the quantum of a penalty imposed by a competent authority?
  • Does the misappropriation of public funds by a civil servant constitute misconduct involving moral turpitude regardless of the duration of the misappropriation?
  • Is the test of proportionality applicable when reviewing the quantum of a penalty imposed for misconduct involving moral turpitude?
  Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan vs Nadeem Raza and another2023 PLJ SC 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-17
  Federal Service Tribunalmisappropriationmoral turpitudequantum of punishmenttest of proportionalitydepartmental penaltyremoval from service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had reduced the penalty of 'Removal from Service' imposed on a civil servant for misappropriation of government funds to a lesser penalty. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal has the unbridled power to modify or reduce departmental penalties without establishing that the original penalty was contrary to law or violated the test of proportionality. The Supreme Court held that while the Tribunal possesses the power under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to vary or modify departmental orders, such power is not arbitrary or unlimited; it can only interfere with a penalty if it is against the law or fails the test of proportionality, particularly in cases involving moral turpitude such as embezzlement. The Court ruled that the Tribunal erred in reducing the sentence without valid reasons or applying the proportionality test. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's judgment, and restored the departmental order of removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have unlimited jurisdiction to modify or reduce penalties imposed by a competent departmental authority?
  • Under what circumstances can a service tribunal interfere with the quantum of penalty awarded in disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does temporary misappropriation of government funds constitute misconduct involving moral turpitude?
  • How is the test of proportionality applied to administrative penalties imposed on civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan vs Nadeem Raza &2023 SCP 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-17
  service lawmisappropriationmoral turpitudeproportionality testdepartmental penaltyFederal Service Tribunalquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which reduced a major penalty of 'Removal from Service' imposed by the department on a civil servant for misappropriation of public funds. The core legal question is the scope of the Tribunal's power under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to interfere with and reduce penalties imposed by a competent authority. The Supreme Court held that while the Tribunal has the power to modify penalties, such interference is restricted to cases where the penalty is contrary to law or is 'shockingly disproportionate' to the proved misconduct. The Court emphasized that the Tribunal cannot exercise this power arbitrarily or without providing detailed, legally sustainable reasons. Furthermore, the Court established that when misconduct involves moral turpitude, such as embezzlement, the test of proportionality is more stringent, requiring the punishment to reflect the degree of moral culpability. Finding the Tribunal's reduction of the penalty in this case to be casual and unsupported by reasoning, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and restored the original penalty of removal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal reduce a penalty imposed by a department without providing detailed reasons?
  • Under what circumstances can a court or tribunal interfere with the quantum of a penalty imposed by a competent authority?
  • Does the misappropriation of public funds by a civil servant constitute misconduct involving moral turpitude?
  • Is the test of proportionality for reviewing departmental penalties more stringent in cases involving moral turpitude?
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• Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways and another vs Umar Daraz2023 SCMR 761 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-28
  incapacitated employeevisual impairmentreasonable accommodationpersons with disabilitiesPakistan Railways Personnel Manualservice tribunalright to livelihood
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition filed by Pakistan Railways against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which allowed an appeal of an employee who was incapacitated due to visual impairment during service and had been adjusted in a lower grade instead of an equivalent grade. The core legal question was whether an employee incapacitated during service is entitled to adjustment in an equivalent grade and reasonable accommodation under departmental rules, constitutional provisions, and international conventions. The Supreme Court held that the department is obligated to provide reasonable accommodation and transfer an incapacitated employee to a suitable post of an equivalent grade as a special case, independent of regular promotion processes. The court laid down the principle that the right to life under the Constitution includes the right to a meaningful livelihood, and state institutions must protect persons with disabilities from discrimination, ensuring their continued employment and fair adjustment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee incapacitated during service is entitled to be adjusted in an equivalent grade under the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual?
  • Does the right to life under the Constitution of Pakistan include the right to a meaningful livelihood for incapacitated employees?
  • Is the provision of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities a priority action item for a state department?
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• Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Jhang and another vs Siddique2023 PLC (C.S.) 440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-07-08
  misappropriationbreach of trustdismissal from serviceservice appealgovernment servantmisconductFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals by leave of the Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal that converted the dismissal from service of two postmen into withholding of one increment for two years. The respondents were dismissed after being found guilty of misappropriating money orders by forging payees' signatures and keeping the funds for personal use, an act they admitted to during inquiry and proceedings. The core legal question was whether temporary misappropriation of public funds and breach of trust by a government servant warrants leniency and a lesser penalty than dismissal. The Supreme Court held that temporary or permanent misappropriation of public money constitutes dishonesty and misconduct, resulting in a fundamental breach of trust, and leaves no room for retention in government service. The Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and restored the major penalty of dismissal from service, laying down the principle that misappropriation of public funds, regardless of the amount, must be dealt with strictly without misplaced leniency.

  Questions settled

  • Does temporary misappropriation of public money by a government servant constitute misconduct and dishonesty warranting dismissal?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal take a lenient view and reduce the penalty of dismissal for a government servant who misappropriated public funds?
  • Whether the misappropriation of public money, regardless of the amount or subsequent return, breaches the trust reposed in a state employee?
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• Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Faisalabad and others vs Khalid2023 PLC 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service tribunalback benefitsregularization of serviceadmissionapprobate and reprobatecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from civil petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby service appeals filed by employees seeking back benefits following the regularization of their services were disposed of. The core legal question was whether the departmental authorities could challenge an order of the Tribunal that was passed on the basis of a clear, unequivocal, and recorded admission of liability in their written comments and acquiescence at the hearing. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were bound by their categorical admissions regarding the regularization of service and the verification of service books, and that their challenge was barred by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate. The Court laid down the principle that where a party makes a clear, unambiguous, and unconditional admission in pleadings or comments before a judicial forum, the matter may be concluded without further trial, analogous to the principles governing judgments on admission, and such a party cannot subsequently approbate and reprobate to challenge the resulting consensual order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a department challenge a service tribunal judgment that was rendered on the basis of a clear and unequivocal admission made in its own written comments?
  • Does the doctrine of approbate and reprobate prevent a party from turning against its own consensual statement and acquiescence recorded before a judicial forum?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal possesses the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to act upon admissions made by parties?
  • What are the foundational requisites of an unambiguous admission capable of concluding a lis without a full-fledged trial?
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• Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railways through Authority/Authorized2023 PLJ Quetta 155, 2024 CLC 1293 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-01Read full judgment →
• District Police Officer, Abbottabad vs Mst. Noor Julian & others2023 PHC 538 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-30Read full judgment →
• District Accounts Officer Malakand vs Mst. Haleema Bibi2023 PHC 482 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-10-23
  civil servantdate of birth correctioncivil court jurisdictionrejection of plaintsuo motu revisionservice recordsuperannuation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the lower courts' dismissal of an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which sought the rejection of a civil servant’s plaint regarding the correction of her date of birth. The core legal question was whether a civil court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a civil servant for the alteration of their date of birth. The High Court held that such matters fall outside the jurisdiction of civil courts, as they are governed by specific service rules, particularly Rule 12-A of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973, which mandates that any such correction must occur within two years of initial appointment. The Court emphasized that civil servants cannot bypass these rules by seeking declarations from civil courts. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and, exercising suo motu revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, also set aside a previous decree obtained by the respondent, directing the reversal of all unauthorized date-of-birth entries.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have the jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by a civil servant for the correction of their date of birth?
  • Can a High Court exercise suo motu revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside a decree passed by a subordinate court?
  • Is a civil servant permitted to seek an alteration of their date of birth after the expiration of two years from their initial appointment?
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• Director of Works/Chief Engineer (Navy) Naval Head Quarter, E-8,2024 PLJ Islamabad 86, 2023 MLD 1324 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-05-24Read full judgment →
• Director Military Lands and Cantonment Quetta Cantt. Quetta and others2023 SCMR 860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-18
  writ jurisdictionfactual controversyCantonment BoardClass C landproperty alienationsubdivision of plotconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment concerning the subdivision of a plot in Quetta Cantonment. The respondents sought to subdivide their leasehold plot, relying on Cantonment Board resolutions to utilize adjacent "Class C" land as an approach road. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could resolve disputed factual issues regarding land classification and road existence under writ jurisdiction, and whether the Cantonment Board possessed the authority to alienate "Class C" land without Federal Government approval. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising Article 199 jurisdiction to resolve factual controversies that required evidence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that "Class C" land is subject to strict administrative control, and the Cantonment Board lacks independent authority to alienate or change its classification without prior Federal Government sanction. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, emphasizing that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be used to create new property rights or resolve disputed facts, and that Cantonment Board resolutions lacking necessary government approval are ineffective in conferring such rights.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to resolve disputed factual controversies?
  • Does the Cantonment Board have the independent authority to alienate or change the classification of 'Class C' land without prior Federal Government approval?
  • Can a declaration under Article 199 or the Specific Relief Act be used to create new property rights?
  • Are Cantonment Board resolutions binding regarding the transfer of 'Class C' land if they lack the requisite Federal Government approval?
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• Director Military Lands & Cantonment Quetta Cantt Quetta and another, Military Estate Officer, Quetta Circle, Quetta vs Aziz Ahmed and others2023 SCP 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional jurisdictionfactual controversyClass C landCantonment Boardplot subdivisionproperty leaseFederal Government approval
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition, filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arose from a judgment of the High Court accepting a writ petition filed by respondents seeking to enforce Cantonment Board resolutions permitting the subdivision of a plot and the use of adjacent Class 'C' land as an access road. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court could competently exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to resolve factual controversies regarding property classification and whether a Cantonment Board can independently alter or alienate Class 'C' land without federal government approval. The Supreme Court held that disputed factual matters requiring recording of evidence cannot be adjudicated under constitutional jurisdiction, and that Cantonment Boards lack independent authority to alienate or change the classification of Class 'C' land without the prior sanction of the Federal Government pursuant to the Pakistan Cantonment Property Rules 1957. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and dismissed the writ petition, establishing the principle that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to create new property rights or resolve disputed factual controversies, and that statutory powers over Class 'C' lands are strictly subject to governmental oversight.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan be exercised to resolve disputed factual controversies?
  • Does a Cantonment Board possess independent authority to change the classification, lease, or transfer of Class 'C' land without the previous approval of the Federal Government?
  • Can a declaration under Article 199 of the Constitution create new rights or be used to grant property rights not previously existing?
  • What is the scope of the Federal Government's control over Class 'C' lands administered by a Cantonment Board under the Pakistan Cantonment Property Rules 1957?
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• Director Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through Additional Director, Faisalabad vs Muhammad Imran & others2023 LHC 2126 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Director General, Intelligence Bureau vs Riaz-ul-Wahab and others2023 SCMR 877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-07
  Performance Evaluation ReportsCivil ServiceAdverse RemarksCountersigning OfficerService TribunalPerformance AppraisalAdministrative Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which expunged adverse remarks recorded by a Countersigning Officer in the Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) of two civil servants. The core legal question was whether a Countersigning Officer may unilaterally record adverse remarks in a PER without providing reasons for disagreeing with the Reporting Officer or offering prior counseling to the subordinate officer, as required by official guidelines. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Tribunal correctly expunged the remarks. The Court found that the Countersigning Officer committed a gross violation of the instructions contained in 'A Guide to Performance Evaluation' by failing to counsel the respondents or justify the disagreement with the Reporting Officer's assessment. The judgment establishes that the primary purpose of supervision is mentorship rather than punishment. Consequently, adverse remarks should not be recorded without prior counseling, as the objective of performance appraisal is to improve individual and organizational productivity by addressing performance issues before they become major problems.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Countersigning Officer record adverse remarks in a Performance Evaluation Report without providing reasons for disagreeing with the Reporting Officer?
  • Is prior counseling of a civil servant mandatory before a Countersigning Officer records adverse remarks in a Performance Evaluation Report?
  • Does the failure to follow administrative instructions regarding the recording of Performance Evaluation Reports constitute a ground for judicial interference by a Service Tribunal?
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• Director General, Intelligence Bureau vs Riaz-Ul-Wahab and another2023 PLJ SC 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-07
  Performance Evaluation Reportsadverse remarkscountersigning officerreporting officerservice tribunalprior counsellingcivil servant promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Director General, Intelligence Bureau, against four judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the Tribunal allowed the respondents' appeals, expunged adverse remarks recorded by the Countersigning Officer in their Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs), and restored the Reporting Officers' assessments. The core legal questions involved the legality of recording adverse remarks without prior counselling and without providing specific reasons for disagreeing with the Reporting Officer under the applicable service instructions. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Service Tribunal rightly expunged the adverse remarks due to gross violations of the instructions, which mandate prior counselling, warning, and specific reasons for disagreement by the Countersigning Officer. The key principle laid down is that supervisory officers must act as mentors by counselling subordinates before recording adverse remarks, ensuring objectivity and fairness in performance evaluations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a countersigning officer record adverse remarks in a civil servant's Performance Evaluation Report without prior counselling?
  • Is a countersigning officer required to give specific reasons when disagreeing with the evaluation of a reporting officer?
  • Under what circumstances can the Service Tribunal interfere with the performance evaluation of a civil servant?
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• Director General, Intelligence Bureau vs Riaz-ul-Wahab & another, Surkharu Khan & another2023 SCP 71 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-07
  Performance Evaluation Reportcivil serviceadverse remarkscountersigning officerservice tribunalcounsellingadministrative instructions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which expunged adverse remarks recorded by a Countersigning Officer in the Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) of two civil servants. The core legal question is whether a Countersigning Officer may record adverse remarks in a PER without prior counselling of the subordinate officer or providing specific reasons for disagreeing with the Reporting Officer's assessment. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal correctly expunged the remarks, finding a gross violation of established administrative instructions. The Court affirmed that PERs are critical documents for personnel administration and must be prepared with objectivity and fairness. The key principle laid down is that, as a general rule, supervisory officers must act as mentors rather than punishing authorities; they are required to provide prompt, constructive feedback, advice, or warnings to subordinates regarding performance deficiencies before recording adverse remarks. Failure to adhere to these procedural safeguards, including the requirement to provide reasons for disagreement with a Reporting Officer, renders the adverse remarks legally flawed and subject to judicial interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Countersigning Officer record adverse remarks in a Performance Evaluation Report without prior counselling of the subordinate officer?
  • Is a Countersigning Officer required to provide specific reasons when disagreeing with the performance evaluation of a Reporting Officer?
  • Under what circumstances can a Service Tribunal or the Supreme Court interfere with the performance assessment of a civil servant recorded in a Performance Evaluation Report?
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• Director General, Environmental Protection Agency, Punjab vs Messrs2023 CLD 383 · Punjab Environmental Tribunal · 2022-12-13Read full judgment →
• Director General Central Directorate of Savings and others vs Abid Hussain2023 PTD 1779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-12-08
  withholding taxTribal AreasNational Savings Schemeconstitutional petitionalternative remedyincome tax deduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had declared the deduction of withholding tax by the National Saving Centre in the then Tribal Areas to be unconstitutional and ordered a refund. The core legal question was whether withholding tax could be legally deducted on returns from national saving schemes in the Tribal Areas under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 was maintainable without exhausting alternative statutory remedies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court judgment, holding that the statutory obligation of the Central Directorate of National Savings to deduct tax under Section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applies, as the income does not accrue solely in the Tribal Areas and the matter also involved disputed questions of fact alongside an available adequate remedy under Section 170 of the Ordinance. The key principle laid down is that statutory tax deduction obligations cannot be bypassed through constitutional petitions where adequate alternate statutory remedies exist and where the taxing event and income management occur outside the exempt territory.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deduction of withholding tax on profits from national saving schemes in the then Tribal Areas is legally valid under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 is maintainable when an adequate and efficacious statutory remedy for a tax refund is available under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is it a statutory duty of the Central Directorate of National Savings to deduct tax under section 151 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 on yield paid on national saving certificates?
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• Director (Aso) Customs Intelligence and Investigation vs Taimur Tariq Butt2023 PTD 63 · Lahore High Court · 2022-07-19Read full judgment →
• Din Farm Products (Pvt.) Limited vs Not2023 CLD 219 · Sindh High Court · 2022-09-19Read full judgment →
• Dilnawaz Abbasi vs Daily Jehan Pakistan2023 PLC 233 · Implementation Tribunal For Newspaper Employees · 2023-03-17
  ex-parte orderservice of summonsnewspaper employeesprocedural lawadjudication on meritstribunal proceduresetting aside ex-parte judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed by the respondent management to set aside an ex-parte order and judgment passed by the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees. The core legal question was whether the respondent was properly served with summons and whether the Tribunal possesses the authority to recall ex-parte proceedings. The Tribunal held that the record failed to demonstrate proper service of summons upon the respondent, and that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is applicable to its proceedings pursuant to Rule 17 of the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees (Procedure and Function) Rules, 1977. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order and judgment, directing the matter to be decided on its merits, subject to the payment of costs. The key principle laid down is that justice should not be denied on the basis of technicalities, and that quasi-judicial tribunals possess the power to recall ex-parte orders in the interest of justice when valid reasons, such as lack of proper service, are established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees have the authority to set aside ex-parte orders?
  • Is the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applicable to proceedings before the Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees?
  • Can an ex-parte judgment be set aside where there is no evidence of proper service of summons on the respondent?
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• Dilmurad vs Province of Sindh through Deputy Commissioner, Nawabshah2023 CLC 1323 · Sindh High Court · 2023-04-26Read full judgment →
• Dilbar, Ali Sher & another vs The State2023 SHC 114 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-02Read full judgment →
• Dilawar vs The State2023 PCRLJ 1684 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-13
  post-arrest bailSindh Arms Actprohibitory clausestatutory interpretationunlicensed weaponrecovery proceedingscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused in a criminal case registered under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, following the recovery of an unlicensed .30 bore pistol. The core legal question was whether the possession of a pistol constitutes an offence under Section 23(1)(a) regarding firearms and ammunition, or Section 24 regarding arms, and consequently, whether the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that a pistol falls within the definition of arms under Section 2(c) and Section 24 of the Act, rather than firearms or ammunition under Section 23. Consequently, the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The Court established that for bail purposes, the classification of the weapon determines the applicable penal section, and where the potential sentence does not trigger the prohibitory clause, the accused is entitled to bail, particularly when the investigation is complete and no private witnesses were associated during the recovery process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of a pistol fall under Section 23(1)(a) or Section 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013?
  • Does an offence under Section 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should bail be granted when the police fail to associate private witnesses during the recovery of an alleged weapon?
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