Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Lahore Rubber Store2023 PTD 182 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-17
  rectification jurisdictionAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenuemistake apparent on the face of recordtax referencesales taxfunctus officio
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns the scope and exercise of rectification jurisdiction by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The respondent-taxpayer filed an application for rectification under Section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, seeking to correct an earlier appellate order. The Tribunal allowed the application, annulling its previous decision based on an alleged mistake of law, without identifying the specific mistake or discussing its impact on the original order. The High Court held that the Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction was improper. The Court emphasized that rectification is an ancillary jurisdiction limited to correcting patent mistakes of fact or law apparent on the face of the record, which do not require investigation, appraisal of evidence, or re-hearing. The Court laid down the principle that rectification cannot be used as a substitute for a tax reference or a review/re-hearing. The Tribunal must identify the specific mistake, record reasons, and correct the original order without conducting a fresh inquiry. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the application was remanded for reconsideration in accordance with these guidelines.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Appellate Tribunal use rectification jurisdiction as a substitute for a tax reference or a rehearing of the appeal?
  • What are the essential conditions for the exercise of rectification jurisdiction by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Is the Appellate Tribunal permitted to recall its final order and fix the appeal for rehearing under the guise of a rectification application?
  • Does the rectification of a mistake require the Tribunal to conduct a fresh investigation or appraisal of evidence?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Islamabad Electric Supply2023 PTD 569 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-01-19Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Lyallpur Zone, Rto, Faisalabad vs Messrs2023 PTD 430 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-03Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Corporate Zone, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs M_s. Khyber Tea & Food Manufacturing Company, PeshawarPTCL 2023 CL. 266 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-II) Ltu, Islamabad vs Messrs2023 PTD 390 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-04-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (in both cases) vs M/s Ryk Mills (in both cases)2023 SCP 226, 2023 SCMR 1856, PTCL 2024 CL. 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-11
  Federal Excise DutyShow Cause NoticeDue ProcessFair TrialPrinciples of Natural JusticeSupplementary NoticeOrder-in-OriginalJurisdictionTaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against the Lahore High Court’s dismissal of Excise Tax References arising from an assessment under the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The department had issued a show cause notice alleging that the respondent company short-levied Federal Excise Duty (FED) by charging 0.5% instead of 8% on local supplies of sugar. In reply, the taxpayer relied on concessionary rates under SRO No. 77(I)/2013. The assessing officer subsequently held the taxpayer had failed to fulfill the pre-conditions of the SRO without issuing any fresh or supplementary show cause notice confronting it with those allegations. The Supreme Court refused leave and dismissed the petitions, holding that original adjudication is confined to grounds set out in the show cause notice. Where a taxpayer raises a substantial new factual defence requiring verification, the department must issue a fresh or supplementary notice. Adjudication based on unnotified matters violates due process under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution and renders the order-in-original without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tax assessing officer base an order-in-original on allegations or grounds that were not specifically raised in the show cause notice?
  • Is the tax department required to issue a fresh or supplementary show cause notice when a taxpayer raises a substantial defence or factual ground not contemplated in the initial notice?
  • Does an adjudication on matters extraneous to the show cause notice violate the constitutional right to due process and fair trial under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the department establish a tax liability against a taxpayer on non-fulfilment of statutory exemption conditions without first confronting the taxpayer through a notice?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue & others vs M/s Saim Traders2023 PHC 26 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-01-19Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Income Tax (Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council), Muzaffarab_2d76a7132023 SC AJK 20 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-03-20
  competency of appealsanction of the governmentLaw Department ManualIncome Tax DepartmentAzad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir against orders relating to income tax matters. At the outset, the primary legal question concerned the competency of the Commissioner Income Tax to file petitions for leave to appeal without obtaining prior sanction from the Government, given that the Income Tax Department became a department of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government following the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. The Court held that the petitions were incompetent and not maintainable because the mandatory provisions of section 29 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Law Department Manual, 2016, requiring government sanction, were not complied with. The key principle laid down is that departments of the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, including the Income Tax Department, must strictly adhere to the Law Department Manual by obtaining proper government sanction before instituting legal proceedings or filing appeals before the superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner Income Tax can file a petition for leave to appeal without the sanction of the Government under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Law Department Manual, 2016?
  • Does the Income Tax Department qualify as a department of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government following the 13th Amendment to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974?
  • Are the provisions of section 29 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Law Department Manual, 2016 applicable to the Income Tax Department?
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• Commissioner (Legal Division) vs Pakistan Services Limited2023 PTD 773 · Sindh High Court · 2023-02-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner (Legal Division) Ltu vs Pakistan Petroleum Ltd2023 PTD 1013 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-25Read full judgment →
• Commission (Legal Division) vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2023 SHC 232 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commander (R) Muhammad Riaz vs The Chief of Naval Staff, Naval2023 IHC 190, 2024 MLD 75 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-08-30Read full judgment →
• Commander (R) Muhammad Riaz vs The Chief of Naval Staff, Naval2023 IHC 108 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector, Collectorate of Customs, Custom House, Gawadar vs Mr.2023 PLJ Quetta 1 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector, Collectorate of Customs, Custom House, Gawadar and others vs Wali Muhammad and others2023 PLJ Quetta 19 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector, Collectorate of Customs, Custom House, Gawadar and others vs Abdul Qadir and others2023 PLJ Quetta 141 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Sales Tax & Federal Excise, Ltu, Karachi vs M/s. Hilton Pharma2023 SHC 824 · Sindh High Court · 2023-09-21Read full judgment →
• Collector of Cutoms, Model Customs Collectorate, Customs House, Jamrud Road, Peshawar vs Messrs Waheed Hamid Bros. Ltd and another2023 PTD 1679 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-11-01Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Peshawar vs Messrs New Shinwari Ltd. and another2023 PTD 1610, 2023 SCP 260, 2023 SCMR 1972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-24
  transit tradecustoms dutyconfiscation of goodsPak-Afghan Transit Trade AgreementCustoms Act 1969transit facilityshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  The Collector of Customs challenged a High Court judgment regarding the confiscation of polyester fabric consignments transported under the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement. The core legal question was whether transit goods found in excess of declared quantities are subject to customs duty or confiscation in the absence of evidence of tampering, pilferage, or breach of transit rules. The Supreme Court held that transit trade is distinct from import for home consumption, and such goods are not subject to duties or taxes unless transit rules are materially breached. The Court found that the Customs authorities failed to establish any intent to evade duties or violation of transit protocols, rendering the invocation of Sections 32 and 129 of the Customs Act, 1969, inapplicable. The Court affirmed that customs powers must be exercised strictly within the framework of the Customs Act, 1969, and the comprehensive Customs Rules, 2001. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, emphasizing that transit goods remain exempt from duties absent unauthorized unloading or rule violations, and customs authorities must operate within their prescribed statutory and regulatory limits.

  Questions settled

  • Are goods in transit through Pakistan subject to customs duty when found in excess of declared quantities without evidence of rule violation?
  • Does the mere discovery of excess quantity in transit goods constitute an offence under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can customs authorities confiscate transit goods in the absence of evidence of tampering or unauthorized unloading?
  • Is the transit of goods through Pakistan governed by the general provisions of the Customs Act, 1969, or the specific Customs Rules, 2001?
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• Collector of Customs, M/s. Salman Paper Products (Pvt) Ltd & others vs2023 SHC 638 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, M/s. Salman Paper Products (Pvt) Ltd & others vs2023 SHC 508 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, M/s Falcon Oil Filling Station vs Kazim Raza @2023 SHC 234 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-31Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Waseef2023 PLJ SC 347, PTCL 2023 CL. 428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs duty exemptionSRO interpretationHybrid Electric Vehiclesdepartmental circularfiscal statutesstrict constructiontax exemptionenvironmental protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arises from forty-eight civil petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Collector of Customs against a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question involved whether the custom duty, sales tax, and withholding tax exemptions granted on the import of Hybrid Electric Vehicles (HEVs) under S.R.O. 499(I)/2013 could be restricted, altered, or negated by a subsequent departmental circular issued by an Assistant Collector of Customs restricting the exemption to 'Fully Hybrid Vehicles' or excluding used vehicles. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the High Court and the Customs Appellate Tribunal, holding that an administrative circular cannot alter, amend, or add conditions to an S.R.O. issued by the Federal Government under statutory powers. The Court laid down that fiscal exemption notifications must be strictly yet purposively construed based on their plain statutory language, without supplying casus omissus. Additionally, the Court observed that promoting eco-friendly HEVs aligns with national environmental legislation, including the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 and the Pakistan Climate Change Act 2017.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental circular issued by a subordinate customs officer amend or add conditions to an S.R.O. issued by the Federal Government?
  • Whether the terms of a statutory tax exemption notification can be narrowed through administrative interpretation beyond its plain text?
  • How should statutory regulatory orders granting tax concessions be interpreted when the language is plain and unambiguous?
  • Can an Import Policy Order be given retrospective effect to withdraw an exemption already granted under an S.R.O.?
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• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Muhammad Arif & another2023 PHC 255, 2024 PTD 316, 2023 PLJ Peshawar 198 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-31Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate of Paccs, Custom2023 PTD 962 · Sindh High Court · 2022-02-09Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate of Appraisement2023 SHC 1116, PTCL 2024 CL. 15 · Sindh High Court · 2023-11-23Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, MCC Appraisement (East) vs Creative Electronics2023 SHC 479 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, MCC (E&C) Customs House, Peshawar and another2023 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-06
  condonation of delaylimitationcustoms referenceleave to appealrevenue claimprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged three concurrent decisions, including an order of the High Court in a Customs Reference, which had upheld the Customs Appellate Tribunal's decision, which in turn affirmed an order-in-original by the Additional Collector of Customs. The petition was filed with an 11-day delay. The petitioners sought condonation of delay, citing administrative formalities and the need for internal approval from superiors as the reason for the late filing. The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners had jeopardized a revenue claim of 2.8 million rupees merely to avoid paying a court fee of 250 rupees, and confirmed that no action had been taken against the officials responsible for the delay. The Court held that legal proceedings must be initiated within the prescribed statutory period and that delay cannot be condoned without a valid, sufficient reason. Finding the explanation for the delay inadequate, the Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a delay in filing a petition for leave to appeal be condoned on the ground of awaiting internal administrative approval?
  • Is the lack of a valid reason for delay sufficient grounds to dismiss an application for condonation of delay?
  • Does the failure to file a petition within the prescribed period warrant the dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal?
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• Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore and another vs M/s Waseem2023 SCP 235 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs valuationvaluation rulingprovisional assessmentrelease of imported goodscustoms dutydispute resolution mechanism
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil petitions arising from Lahore High Court orders concerning the release of imported goods. The core legal question is whether Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969 for provisional assessment and release can be invoked when a Valuation Ruling has already been issued under Section 25A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 81 cannot be invoked where a Valuation Ruling exists, because a Valuation Ruling represents a pre-determined, binding assessed value of the goods, whereas provisional assessment under Section 81 applies only when an officer cannot verify assessment correctness and requires chemical testing or further inquiry. The Court established that a Valuation Ruling provides its own dispute resolution mechanism via Section 25D, and Rule 125 of the Customs Rules, 2001 does not override this statutory scheme or apply in the presence of a Valuation Ruling. Consequently, the High Court orders allowing provisional release under Section 81 were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 81 of the Customs Act 1969 be invoked for provisional release of goods where a Valuation Ruling has been issued under Section 25A?
  • Does Rule 125 of the Customs Rules 2001 permit the provisional release of imported goods in the presence of a valid Valuation Ruling?
  • What is the appropriate statutory remedy for an importer aggrieved by a Valuation Ruling issued under Section 25A of the Customs Act 1969?
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• Collector of Customs, Custom House, Lahore and another vs Messrs2023 PTD 1534, 2023 SCMR 1716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-02-23
  customs valuationprovisional assessmentvaluation rulingcustoms dutyimport clearancestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the interpretation of the Customs Act, 1969 regarding the provisional release of imported goods. The core legal question was whether an importer can invoke Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969 for the provisional release of goods when a Valuation Ruling has already been issued under Section 25A of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 81 cannot be invoked in the presence of a valid Valuation Ruling. The Court reasoned that Section 81 is specifically designed for situations where a Customs officer cannot determine the correctness of an assessment due to the need for chemical testing or further inquiry. Conversely, a Valuation Ruling provides a pre-determined, binding assessment value, rendering provisional assessment unnecessary. The Court further clarified that Rule 125(2) of the Customs Rules, 2001 does not grant an independent right to provisional release where a Valuation Ruling exists, as the appropriate remedy for challenging such rulings is provided under Section 25D of the Act. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned High Court orders, establishing that provisional release is not a right when a Valuation Ruling is operative.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 81 of the Customs Act, 1969 be invoked for the provisional release of goods when a Valuation Ruling has been issued under Section 25A of the Act?
  • Does Rule 125(2) of the Customs Rules, 2001 provide an independent right to provisional release of goods in the presence of a Valuation Ruling?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for an importer aggrieved by a Valuation Ruling issued under Section 25A of the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Collector of Customs, (Appraisement) Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs M_S Jan Builders, FF-697, First Floor, Deans Trade Center, Peshawar2023 PHC 360 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Kristof W. Duwaerts2023 PTD 1541 · Sindh High Court · 2022-10-26Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Deputy Collector of Customs and others vs M_s. Netpac and othersPTCL 2023 CL. 741 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Deputy Collector of Customs and others vs Messrs Netpac and others2023 PTD 710 · Sindh High Court · 2022-11-16Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs Port Muhammad Bin Qasim, Karachi vs Messrs Mia2023 SCMR 2052 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-02
  Customs Act 1969provisional assessmentfinal assessmentcustoms duty recoverypenal proceedingsstatutory interpretationfiscal statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which held that once a provisional assessment under Section 81 of the Customs Act 1969 attains finality, proceedings under Section 32 of the same Act for the recovery of escaped duties are barred. The core legal question was whether the finality of a provisional assessment under Section 81 precludes the customs authorities from initiating penal proceedings or recovery actions under Section 32. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court misconstrued the statutory scheme. The Court determined that the finality of an assessment under Section 81 renders it equivalent to an assessment under Section 80, neither of which bars subsequent proceedings under Section 32. The Court established that Section 32 is a distinct penal provision and mechanism for recovering short-levied or erroneously refunded duties. Consequently, the finality of assessment under Section 81 does not operate as a legal bar against invoking Section 32, provided the proceedings are initiated within the prescribed limitation period. The matter was remanded to the High Court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finality of a provisional assessment under Section 81 of the Customs Act 1969 bar subsequent proceedings under Section 32 of the same Act?
  • Is the finality of assessment under Section 81 of the Customs Act 1969 equivalent to an assessment made under Section 80?
  • Can customs authorities initiate proceedings for the recovery of short-levied duties after a provisional assessment has attained finality?
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• Collector of Customs & another vs M/s. Young Tech Private Limited &2023 SCP 389, 2024 PTD 306, 2024 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-11-22
  fiscal statutescharging sectiontax levyinterpretation of statutesmobile handset levysmart phonesFinance Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerned the legality of imposing a mobile handset levy on non-smart mobile phones under the Finance Act, 2018. The core legal question was whether the Federal Board of Revenue could expand the scope of a tax levy to include ordinary mobile phones by merely amending the table of rates in the Finance Act, 2022, without amending the charging section (Section 10) of the Finance Act, 2018, which specifically authorized the levy only on 'smart phones'. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the charging section is the sole source of authority for any tax levy. The Court ruled that a schedule or table is merely a supplement to the charging section and cannot exceed its scope to create a new levy on a class of goods not contemplated by the charging section. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the levy could not be recovered on non-smart phones, as the charging section remained limited to smart phones, and dismissed the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tax levy be imposed on a class of goods not covered by the charging section through an amendment to a schedule or table?
  • Does a table or schedule in a fiscal statute have the power to expand the scope of a levy beyond what is authorized by the charging section?
  • Is the charging section the sole source of authority for the recovery of a tax levy?
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• Collector Modell Custom Collectorate Of Gawadar, Custom House2023 PLJ Quetta 114 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Collector Model Customs Collectorate of Gawadar vs Syed Shabbir Ahmed2023 PTD 662 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-08-04Read full judgment →
• Collector Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Muhammad2023 SCP 204, 2023 PTD 1306, PTCL 2023 CL. 751, 2023 PLJ SC 555, 2023 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Customs Act 1969confiscation of vehicleshow cause noticenatural justiceaudi alteram partemsmugglingseizure of goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment by the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the Customs Appellate Tribunal's decision to release a vehicle confiscated by customs authorities. The core legal question was whether the confiscation of a vehicle under the Customs Act, 1969, is legally sustainable when the owner of the vehicle was not served with a show-cause notice, despite being identified in the seizure inventory. The Supreme Court held that the confiscation was unlawful because the authorities failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969. The Court affirmed that before any goods, including conveyances, can be confiscated or penalties imposed, the owner must be issued a show-cause notice and provided an opportunity to be heard. The judgment reinforces the principle of audi alteram partem, establishing that statutory provisions requiring notice and a hearing are essential safeguards against arbitrary administrative action. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no illegality in the High Court's decision to set aside the confiscation order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vehicle be confiscated under the Customs Act, 1969 without issuing a show-cause notice to the owner of the vehicle?
  • Does the definition of 'goods' under the Customs Act, 1969 include a conveyance?
  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice under Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969 a mandatory prerequisite for the confiscation of property?
  • Does the principle of audi alteram partem apply to administrative proceedings involving the confiscation of property under the Customs Act, 1969?
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• Collector Customs MCC, Peshawar vs Painda Noor and another2023 PTD 750 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-03-31Read full judgment →
• Col. (Reid.) Subh Sadiq Malik and another vs The State through Chairman, Nab, Islamabad2023 SCMR 1914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-17
  expungement of stricturesjudicial proprietyright to a fair trialaudi alteram parteminvestigating officerdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed appeals filed by former National Accountability Bureau (NAB) officials seeking the expungement of adverse judicial strictures recorded against them by the High Court. The High Court, while deciding a criminal appeal, had strongly condemned the petitioners' conduct during the inquiry and investigation stages, accusing them of criminal misconduct and corruption, and directing the Chairman NAB to initiate an inquiry under Section 31 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners were neither arrayed as parties to the appeal nor given any notice or opportunity to defend themselves before the strictures were recorded. The Court held that judicial propriety, precaution, and sobriety require courts to refrain from making personal remarks that act as a permanent stigma. Applying the principles governing strictures against judicial officers to investigating and supervisory officers, the Court ruled that condemning the petitioners unheard infringed their constitutional right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Court condoned the delay, converted the petitions into appeals, and expunged the adverse strictures.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can record adverse strictures against non-parties to an appeal without giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard?
  • Do the principles governing the recording of judicial strictures against judicial officers apply to investigating and supervisory officers?
  • What is the effect of adverse judicial strictures on an employee's right to a fair trial in subsequent disciplinary proceedings?
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• Col. (R) Muhammad Shabir Awan vs Raja Saghir Ahmed and 4 others2023 LHC 503 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-24Read full judgment →
• Coca Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd vs Ghulam Abbas Etc2023 LHC 4544, 2023 PLJ Lahore 824 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-06Read full judgment →
• Cnergyico Pk Limited vs Trafigura Pte Limited2023 SHC 1166 · Sindh High Court · 2023-12-18Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Autority vs Haji Pervez Khan & others2023 LHC 1435 · Lahore High Court · 2023-04-05Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority through Airport Manager vs Haji Pervez Khan and 42023 YLR 2030 · Lahore High Court · 2023-04-05Read full judgment →
• Circle Net Communication Pakistan Pvt. Ltd vs PTCL2023 IHC 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-10-24Read full judgment →
• Cir, Zone-VII, Rto II, Lahore vs M/s. United Wire Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., LahorePTCL 2023 CL. 711 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-06-16Read full judgment →
• China Water and Electric Corporation (Cwe) P.R. China vs National2023 CLD 1365 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-09-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yasin and others vs The State and others2023 PCRLJ 1200, PLJ 2023 Cr.C. 481 · Lahore High Court · 2022-06-16
  murdercapital punishmentappellate jurisdictionmedical evidenceocular accountrecoverymotiveacquittal of co-accuseddelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Ghulam Yasin, under section 302(b), 324, 337-F(iii), and 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting five co-accused. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitnesses when co-accused are acquitted, the effect of delay in lodging the FIR, the validity of medical and recovery evidence, and whether the death sentence should be commuted based on the acquittal of co-accused. The Lahore High Court held that the acquittal of co-accused out of abundant caution does not vitiate the prosecution's case against the principal accused where his role is distinct and proven by reliable ocular and medical evidence. The court upheld the conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but altered the sentence of death to imprisonment for life as a mitigating circumstance due to the acquittal of the co-accused. The key principles laid down include the application of the doctrine of abundant caution regarding the acquittal of co-accused, the corroborative value of prompt medical examination despite delay in the FIR, and the sustainability of conviction based on unimpeachable ocular testimony supported by forensic evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused out of abundant caution adversely impacts the prosecution's case against the principal accused?
  • Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report invariably prove fatal to the prosecution case when injured witnesses are promptly examined medically?
  • Whether the death sentence can be altered to imprisonment for life as a mitigating circumstance when co-accused persons assigned general roles have been acquitted?
  • Can a statement recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 from an injured person who later dies be treated as a substantive dying declaration?
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• China Machinery Engineering Corporation, Pakistan Branch vs Federation2023 LHC 6354, 2024 PTD 242 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-11Read full judgment →
• China International Water and Electric Corporation (Cwe) P.R. China vs National Highway Authority2023 CLD 1400 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-10-04Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary, Govt. of Balochistan and others vs Masood Ahmed and another2023 SCP 292, 2024 SCMR 211, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-26
  service tribunal jurisdictionproforma promotiondeputation policycreation of postsselection gradecivil servant promotionexecutive domain
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Government of Balochistan challenges a judgment of the Balochistan Service Tribunal directing the creation of a supernumerary post and the grant of proforma promotion in BS-21 to Respondent No.1, a civil servant who had remained on deputation for thirteen years and failed to re-join his parent department as required by the Deputation Policy. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal possesses the authority to direct the Executive to create a new post and grant proforma promotion. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, by entering the executive domain of policy-making and the creation of posts, and that promotion to selection grades is the prerogative of the competent authority based on fitness-cum-seniority. The Court laid down the principle that the Tribunal cannot issue directions outside its statutory mandate or perform executive functions such as creating posts or ordering promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to direct the Government to create a new post for granting proforma promotion to a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant on deputation claim promotion in absentia in their parent department without rejoining as mandated by the Deputation Policy?
  • What are the statutory powers of a Service Tribunal under Section 5(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  • Is the creation of a post and the promotion of an officer to a selection grade considered an executive function of the Government?
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• Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Civil Secretariat, Quetta &2023 SCP 379, 2024 SCMR 145, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 242, 2024 PLJ SC 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-12-01
  regularization of servicescontract employeesBalochistan Public Service Commissionproject employeesnegative equalitycivil servantsinitial recruitment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan whereby the appellants were directed to regularize the services of the respondents, who were appointed on contract as I.T. Instructors in BPS-17 in a project, and to pay them arrears. The core legal question was whether contract employees holding posts in BPS-16 and above, which fall within the purview of the Balochistan Public Service Commission, could be regularized without undergoing the prescribed recruitment process through the Commission. The Supreme Court held that appointments to posts in BPS-16 and above must be made on the basis of tests and interviews conducted by the Balochistan Public Service Commission under the applicable rules, and mere creation of project posts on the regular side does not confer an automatic right of regularization without statutory support. Furthermore, Article 25 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality to claim the benefit of a past wrong decision. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the government was directed to refer the posts to the Commission for fresh recruitment on open merit, relaxing the age limit for the respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contract employees holding posts in BPS-16 and above can be regularized without undergoing the recruitment process of the Public Service Commission?
  • Does the mere creation of project posts on the regular side confer an automatic right of regularization to contract employees?
  • Can a party claim the benefit of regularization on the basis of discrimination or negative equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether appointments to civil posts in BPS-16 and above require tests and interviews conducted by the Balochistan Public Service Commission?
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• Chief Operating Officer, Technical Education & Safdar Iqbal Chaudhry vs Vocation Training Authority (TEVTA) & others2023 LHC 3238, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 661 · Lahore High Court · 2023-06-05
  pensionary emolumentssuperannuationwithholding pensionabatement of departmental proceedingsPEEDA Act 2006Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules 1963constitutional petitionmisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a notification issued by the Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) withholding Rs.3,773,122 from the petitioner's pensionary emoluments upon his superannuation, alongside a connected petition challenging the conversion of pending disciplinary proceedings under the PEEDA Act, 2006 into proceedings under Rule 1.8(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963. The primary legal questions were whether pending departmental inquiry proceedings abate upon a civil servant's superannuation and whether such abated proceedings can be converted into pension reduction proceedings under Rule 1.8(a) without establishing grave misconduct. The High Court held that under Fundamental Rule 54-A, departmental disciplinary proceedings abate upon retirement. Furthermore, under Section 18 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, pension is an indefeasible right that cannot be arbitrarily withheld. The Court ruled that pending disciplinary proceedings cannot be converted into Rule 1.8(a) pension proceedings after retirement, especially where recovery of a specific sum is sought, which falls under Rule 1.8(b). Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned notification and quashed the inquiry communications.

  Questions settled

  • Do departmental disciplinary proceedings pending against a civil servant automatically abate upon superannuation?
  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated during service be converted into proceedings under Rule 1.8(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules 1963 after retirement?
  • Can pensionary benefits of a retired civil servant be withheld without fulfilling the conditions set out in Section 18 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Minister through Secretary Government of Punjab, Irrigation2023 SCMR 1951, 2024 PLC (C.S.) 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-24
  disciplinary proceedingsretired employeestatutory limitationPEEDA Actpensionary benefitsservice tribunaloverriding effect
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Punjab Service Tribunal order that set aside disciplinary proceedings against a retired government employee. The core legal question was whether disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee could be validly initiated more than three years after retirement, and whether the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (PEEDA Act) overrides the Pension Rules, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the PEEDA Act, 2006, contains an overriding effect clause, rendering it the governing law for such disciplinary matters. The Court affirmed that the proviso to Section 21 of the PEEDA Act, 2006, imposes a mandatory obligation to finalize proceedings against a retired employee within two years of retirement. Since the proceedings in this case were initiated well beyond this statutory limit, they were held to be null and void. The Court upheld the principle that the PEEDA Act, 2006, provides a comprehensive and exclusive framework for disciplinary actions, and its mandatory timeframes regarding retired employees cannot be circumvented by relying on older, conflicting rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act 2006 have an overriding effect over the Pension Rules 1963 regarding disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is the two-year timeframe for finalizing disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee under Section 21 of the PEEDA Act 2006 mandatory?
  • Can disciplinary proceedings be initiated against a retired government employee after the lapse of the statutory period prescribed by the PEEDA Act 2006?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer, Peshawar Electric and Power Company (Pepco)2023 PLJ SC 194 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  territorial jurisdictionstatutory corporationgovernment servantassistance packageconstitutional jurisdictionservice matterswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, PESCO and WAPDA, challenged Islamabad High Court judgments directing them to extend the Prime Minister’s Assistance Package (2014) to the widows of their deceased employees. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction over PESCO, and whether employees of PESCO and WAPDA qualified as 'government employees' entitled to the federal assistance package. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned judgments. The Court held that PESCO, incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, did not fall within the Islamabad High Court's territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court established that employees of statutory bodies like PESCO and WAPDA are not 'government servants' by default. Consequently, they are not automatically entitled to government-specific assistance packages. The Court emphasized that WAPDA, as an autonomous body, is entitled to devise its own assistance schemes, and courts cannot compel the adoption of external policies upon such entities. The High Court erred by failing to recognize the independent legal status of these entities and the limitations of its own constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad High Court have territorial jurisdiction over a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance 1984 if its registered office is outside the court's territorial limits?
  • Are employees of PESCO and WAPDA considered 'government employees' for the purpose of entitlement to the Prime Minister's Assistance Package?
  • Can a High Court compel a statutory authority to adopt a government assistance package when the authority has its own internally approved assistance scheme?
  • Does the constitutional bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preclude High Court adjudication on matters concerning terms and conditions of service of statutory corporation employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive Officer, Peshawar Electric and Power Company (Pepco)2023 PLC (C.S.) 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-17
  Prime Minister's Assistance Packageterritorial jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictiongovernment employeesstatutory corporationterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed petitions filed by the Peshawar Electric and Power Company (PESCO) and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging Islamabad High Court judgments that directed both entities to extend the Prime Minister's Assistance Package of 2014 to the private respondents (widows of deceased employees). The core legal questions revolved around whether PESCO and WAPDA employees qualify as government servants entitled to the federal package, whether the Islamabad High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction over PESCO, and whether the High Court could impose the federal package upon statutory bodies having their own independent assistance schemes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgments, holding that PESCO and WAPDA employees are not government servants, that PESCO was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court, and that autonomous bodies having their own approved assistance packages cannot be compelled by the High Court to adopt the Prime Minister's Assistance Package.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Peshawar Electric and Power Company (PESCO) and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) fall within the definition of government employees for the purpose of the Prime Minister's Assistance Package?
  • Does the Islamabad High Court possess territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to issue directives to PESCO when its registered office and operations are situated in Peshawar?
  • Can a High Court compel an autonomous statutory body like WAPDA to adopt and implement the federal Prime Minister's Assistance Package when WAPDA has already devised and provided its own independent assistance package?
  • Does a dispute concerning the service-related assistance package of a WAPDA employee fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala2023 PLJ SC 208 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  compulsory retirementregular inquirylaw of limitationvoid orderindustrial relationsservice tribunal abatementacceptance of dues
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals arose from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's writ petitions against the Labour Appellate Tribunal's orders. The respondent, an employee of WAPDA/GEPCO, was compulsorily retired in 1999 following disciplinary proceedings under the Pakistan Wapda Employee (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 without a regular inquiry. After pursuing service appeals and subsequent abatement of proceedings following Supreme Court jurisprudence, the respondent approached the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, which reinstated him. The Supreme Court considered whether the Labour Court could adjudicate the matter and whether the appellant's appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal were barred by time. The Court held that where disputed questions of fact involving major penalties exist, a regular inquiry cannot be dispensed with without written justifiable reasons, and that the concept that limitation does not run against void orders is not an inflexible rule. The appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a regular inquiry can be dispensed with in disciplinary proceedings when major penalties and disputed questions of fact are involved?
  • Does the principle that no limitation runs against a void order operate as an inflexible rule under Pakistani law?
  • Does the mere acceptance of terminal or legal dues by a terminated employee amount to a waiver or estop them from challenging their dismissal?
  • What is the legal effect of the abatement of a civil petition arising from service tribunal proceedings on subsequent remedies before a Labour Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Administrator Auqaf & two others vs Abdul Haleem through Legal2023 PHC 289 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chaudry Fawad Hussain and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 MLD 1417, 2024 PLJ Islamabad 90 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-05-16Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Parvez Elahi vs Governor Punjab etc.2023 PLJ Lahore 245 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-12Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Parvez Elahi vs Governor Punjab etc2023 LHC 8 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-12Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Parvez Elahi vs Governor Punjab and others2023 PLD Lahore 154 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-12Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Parvez Elahi vs Deputy Speaker, Provincial Assembly of Punjab, Lahore and others2023 PLD Supreme Court 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-07-26
  Article 63AChief Minister electiondeflectionparty headparliamentary partyDeputy Speaker rulingfundamental rightsoriginal jurisdictionpolitical parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by Chaudhary Parvez Elahi, Speaker of the Punjab Assembly and joint candidate for Chief Minister, challenging the ruling of the Deputy Speaker dated 22.07.2022. The Deputy Speaker had discarded ten votes cast by members of Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) in favour of the petitioner based on a direction issued by the party head, thereby declaring the rival candidate as the returned Chief Minister. The core legal question was whether, under Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution, the power to issue a voting direction to members of a parliamentary party vests in the party head or the parliamentary party itself. The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of Article 63A(1)(b), the mandate to issue directions to its members regarding voting on the election of a Chief Minister exclusively belongs to the parliamentary party, and the party head cannot usurp or outsource this power. Consequently, the Court set aside the Deputy Speaker's ruling as unconstitutional and declared the petitioner, having secured the majority of valid votes, as the duly elected Chief Minister of Punjab. The key legal principle laid down is that the parliamentary party is the sole competent authority to issue directions under Article 63A(1)(b), ensuring that parliamentary democracy and political party rights under Article 17(2) are preserved without executive or party head overreach.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the party head or the parliamentary party is empowered to issue a direction to members under Article 63A(1)(b) of the Constitution in relation to voting for the election of a Chief Minister?
  • Does Article 69 of the Constitution read with Article 127 bar courts from inquiring into a parliamentary proceeding or ruling that violates express constitutional provisions?
  • Can the parliamentary party delegate, transfer, or assign its power to issue voting directions under Article 63A(1)(b) to the party head?
  • Whether the exclusion of votes cast contrary to an unauthorized direction by a party head constitutes an infringement of Fundamental Rights under Article 17(2) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Munawar Ahmed and others vs Higher Education Commission2023 SCMR 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2021-12-15
  Higher Education Commissionsub-campusesterritorial jurisdictionstatutory chartereducational standardsPreston Universityregulatory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil proceeding before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from petitions challenging a Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the legality of sub-campuses established by universities outside the territorial limits of their statutory charters, specifically addressing the unauthorized Lahore sub-campus of Preston University. The core legal question was whether a university chartered in one province could operate sub-campuses in another province without statutory authority and regulatory compliance under the Higher Education Commission (HEC). The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, holding that the statutory charter of Preston University did not envisage setting up campuses outside Sindh and that establishing sub-campuses beyond territorial charter limits without proper authorization is illegal. Reaffirming its earlier precedent, the Court endorsed the HEC's conditions and regulatory actions aimed at monitoring educational standards and curriculum. It laid down that the maintenance of uniform standards of higher education is essential, directing both Federal and Provincial Governments to render full cooperation to the HEC in enforcing educational standards against illegal sub-campuses.

  Questions settled

  • Can a university establish and operate sub-campuses outside the territorial boundaries permitted by its statutory charter?
  • Does the Higher Education Commission have the regulatory authority to monitor, inspect, and declare unauthorized university sub-campuses illegal?
  • Are the Federal and Provincial Governments obligated to cooperate with the Higher Education Commission to enforce standards and close illegal university sub-campuses?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Abdul Majeed vs The Learned Ex-officio Justice of Peace2023 LHC 6035, 2024 PLJ Lahore 73 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chatto Khan Suhandro vs Ghulam Nabi Suhandro and 4 others2023 MLD 772 · Sindh High Court · 2021-04-22
  enhancement of sentencelife imprisonmentdeath penaltycommon intentionmitigating circumstancescriminal revisionmurdersentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed by the complainant seeking the enhancement of the sentence of the respondents from imprisonment for life to death, following their conviction by the Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, for offenses including murder and robbery under sections 302, 404, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in awarding life imprisonment instead of the death penalty on the grounds of uncertainty regarding the specific fatal blow among multiple co-accused warranted interference and sentence enhancement by the High Court. The Sindh High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that where it is difficult to ascertain which of the co-accused caused the fatal injury and where mitigating circumstances exist, the trial court's discretion in awarding a lesser sentence of life imprisonment rather than death is not arbitrary or perverse. The key principle laid down is that appellate and revisional courts will generally defer to the sentencing discretion of the trial court and decline to enhance a life sentence to death where the specific attribution of the fatal injury among co-accused is uncertain.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can enhance a sentence of life imprisonment to death in a criminal revision application when the attribution of the specific fatal injury among co-accused is uncertain?
  • Does the exercise of sentencing discretion by a trial court in awarding life imprisonment instead of death warrant interference by an appellate or revisional court in the absence of perversity or arbitrariness?
  • Does uncertainty regarding which of multiple co-accused caused the fatal blow constitute a mitigating circumstance justifying a lesser punishment under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Chand Iqbal and others vs Province of the Punjab and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 530 · Lahore High Court · 2021-07-04
  civil servantprobationer terminationshow-cause noticePPSC recommendationswithdrawal of recommendationjurisdiction of service tribunallocus poenitentiaeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the termination of petitioners who were appointed as Deputy Accountants (BS-16) following recommendations by the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC), subsequent to the withdrawal of those recommendations based on an Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) report regarding paper leakage. The core legal questions addressed are whether the petitioners acquired the status of civil servants upon appointment and could be terminated without show-cause notice, whether the High Court's jurisdiction was ousted under Article 212 of the Constitution, and whether the PPSC and ACE acted within their lawful authority in withdrawing the recommendations. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioners became civil servants on probation upon issuance of appointment letters, and since their termination carried a stigma of misconduct without proper inquiry under PPSC Regulations, it amounted to a termination requiring a show-cause notice and due process. The Court further held that the termination did not relate to terms and conditions of service or fitness for appointment, thus falling outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Punjab Service Tribunal and leaving the High Court's writ jurisdiction intact under Article 199. Finally, the Court ruled that neither the ACE nor the PPSC followed the mandatory statutory inquiry procedures under Regulation 25, making the withdrawal of recommendations and subsequent terminations without lawful authority. The key principle laid down is that a probationer civil servant cannot be terminated without a show-cause notice and due process where the termination is stigmatic, and a public service commission cannot arbitrarily withdraw recommendations without complying with its own enabling regulations and conducting a proper inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a probationer civil servant can be terminated without a show-cause notice and due process when the termination is based on allegations of using unfair means?
  • Does the bar to jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution apply when a civil servant's termination stems from the withdrawal of a public service commission's recommendation prior to terms and conditions of service becoming applicable?
  • Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against a termination order passed pursuant to the withdrawal of recommendations by the Punjab Public Service Commission?
  • Can the Punjab Public Service Commission withdraw recommendations for appointment after a candidate has been issued an appointment letter and assumed office without conducting a formal inquiry under its regulations?
  Read full judgment →
• Chancellor Preston University, Kohat & others vs Habibullah Khan2023 SCP 156, 2023 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-03-10
  engineering educationPakistan Engineering CouncilHigher Education Commissionuniversity accreditationsuit for damagesunaccredited universityrecovery of educational expenses
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil appeal arose from concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and the Peshawar High Court decreeing a suit for recovery of expenses and damages filed by a student against Preston University. The respondent enrolled in the university's Bachelor of Engineering (BEng) program, but subsequently discontinued his education after discovering through a Higher Education Commission (HEC) publication that the university lacked accreditation from the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC). The Supreme Court examined whether the university could lawfully offer engineering admissions and degrees without prior PEC accreditation. Dismissing the appeal with costs, the Supreme Court held that compliance with the PEC Act, 1976 and the HEC Ordinance, 2002 regarding accreditation is strictly mandatory before any university offers engineering education or admits students. A degree conferred by an unaccredited institution is legally worthless and unrecognized by HEC and PEC. Universities are obligated to disclose their accreditation status, and the student was entitled to damages for the wasted academic time and expenses.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a university or institution to obtain prior accreditation from the Pakistan Engineering Council before offering engineering education and enrolling students?
  • Is an educational institution legally bound to disclose its accreditation status to prospective students prior to offering admissions?
  • Is a student entitled to damages and recovery of expenses against a university upon discovering that the institution offered an engineering degree program without mandatory PEC accreditation?
  Read full judgment →
• Chancellor Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford and Oxford2023 CLD 1111 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-03Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Sarhad Development Authority PIA, Peshawar and another vs Tafoor-ur-Rehman, Adala Khan etc., Qazi Manzoor Ali etc., Mst. Bashtari etc2023 SCP 302, 2023 SCMR 2142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-07-06
  land acquisitioncompulsory acquisition chargesmarket valuecompensationSection 28Section 23fundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from petitions for leave to appeal challenging a High Court judgment regarding the calculation of excess compensation and additional amounts under Section 28 of the KP Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the compulsory acquisition charges of 15% granted under Section 23(2) of the Act qualify as part of the 'compensation' for the purpose of calculating the additional sum or interest payable under Section 28 of the Act, or whether compensation is strictly limited to the market value determined under Section 23(1).

  The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal. The Court held that compulsory acquisition involves the involuntary deprivation of private property for public purposes, which itself constitutes a crucial factor in determining compensation. Consequently, the 15% charge under Section 23(2) forms an integral part of the total compensation awarded to property owners under constitutional guarantees provided by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the additional 15% compulsory acquisition charge under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 form part of the total compensation for calculating amounts under Section 28?
  • Whether involuntary deprivation of land is a factor to be compensated under Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Does compensation under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 include compulsory acquisition charges in addition to the market value determined under Section 23(1)?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad vs Yar Muhammad2023 SCP 164, 2024 PLJ SC 72, 2023 SCMR 1357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-03-29
  pre-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureaucorruption and corrupt practicesembezzlement of fundsSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant civil petitions arose from a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Balochistan confirming ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the respondents in a corruption reference filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) concerning the embezzlement of funds for development schemes. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in confirming pre-arrest bail where NAB had not sought the arrest of the respondents during the inquiry or investigation, the respondents had fully cooperated, and no further investigation or recovery was required. The Supreme Court held that since NAB never sought the arrest of the respondents during the investigation and the accused fully cooperated without misusing the concession of bail, and given that the exact role of the accused, the loss to the exchequer, and monetary gains are matters to be determined during trial, the impugned judgment suffered from no perversity or miscarriage of justice. The petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused, laying down the principle that pre-arrest bail may not be interfered with where the investigative agency did not require the arrest of the accused during investigation and the trial court is best suited to determine individual culpability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the investigating agency did not seek the arrest of the accused during the inquiry or investigation?
  • Is pre-arrest bail justified where the accused have fully cooperated with the investigation and no further recovery is required?
  • Whether the determination of the exact loss caused to the government exchequer and individual culpability are matters to be adjudicated during trial rather than at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman National Highway Authority and another vs Abdul Hameed etc2023 LHC 1413, 2025 PLJ Lahore 51 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-20Read full judgment →
• Ch. Zafar Muhammad Iqbal vs Mst. Kausar Parveen and others2023 LHC 4770 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-25Read full judgment →
• Ch. Shaukat Ali Noon and another vs Tehzeb Bakers (Pvt.) Limited and others2023 LHC 6559, 2024 CLD 113 · Lahore High Court · 2023-12-19Read full judgment →
• Ch. Saeed Ahmed Khalil vs The State etc2023 SCP 240, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) 311, 2023 SCMR 1712, PLJ 2023 SC (Cr.C.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-08-11
  pre-arrest bailrule of consistencyfurther inquirycriminal fraudliberty of citizensupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order denying pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in a case involving allegations of fraud under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was implicated via a supplementary statement three months after the FIR, was entitled to pre-arrest bail given that the principal accused and other co-accused had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail, noting that the prosecution's case lacked specific dates for the alleged fraud and that the petitioner's involvement was based on suspicion regarding bank accounts. The Court emphasized the principle of consistency, noting that since the principal accused had been granted bail, denying the petitioner bail would be futile as he would likely be entitled to post-arrest bail immediately upon arrest. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the liberty of a citizen is a precious right and that mere registration of other cases or the magnitude of the alleged fraud does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail if a prima facie case for further inquiry exists.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere registration of another criminal case against an accused automatically disentitle them to the grant of bail?
  • Can an accused be granted pre-arrest bail based on the rule of consistency when the principal accused has already been granted bail?
  • Is the magnitude of an alleged fraud a sufficient ground to decline bail to an accused?
  • Does the liberty of a person constitute a right that requires exceptional foundations to be taken away?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Rahmat Ali Memorial Trust vs Lahore Development Authority and another2023 LHC 952 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ch. Noman Haseeb vs The learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption Court, Bahawalpur and four others2023 LHC 1635 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-16
  criminal revisionproduction of documentsfilling lacunaeprosecution evidenceanti-corruption trial
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal revision petition, the petitioner challenged the order of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption Court dismissing his application filed under sections 94 and 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking to produce copies of certain documents as part of prosecution evidence after the accused had been examined under section 342. The core legal question was whether documents could be produced under sections 94 and 540 Cr.P.C. without summoning the person having custody or the maker of the documents, and whether such provisions could be invoked at a belated stage to fill lacunae. The Lahore High Court held that the powers under sections 94 and 540 Cr.P.C. require summoning the person having custody of the documents or a witness to prove them, and cannot be utilized by a party to fill up lacunae in its case or protract proceedings indefinitely. The petition was accordingly dismissed and the impugned order upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can documents be produced under sections 94 and 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, without summoning the person having custody or the maker of the documents?
  • Whether the provisions of section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, can be used by a party to fill in the lacunae of its case?
  • At what stage of a trial can an application under sections 94 and 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be validly entertained?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Noman Haseeb vs Learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption Court, Bahawalpur and 4 othersPLJ 2023 Cr.C. 942 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Saleem vs Ch. Abdul Razzaq2023 YLR 1568 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-05Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ismail vs Azad Jammu And Kashmir Election Commission through Secretary Election Commission Aj&K, Muzaffarabad and others2023 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 78 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Hanif vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2023 PLC (C.S) 836 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-25
  service lawpromotionstatutory ruleswrit jurisdictionState Life Insurance Corporationjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Area Manager at the State Life Insurance Corporation, filed a writ petition seeking promotion to the position of Manager Marketing, alleging that his juniors had been promoted while his claim was denied. The respondents argued that the State Life Employees Service Regulations, 1973, while statutory, were silent regarding promotion criteria and thus could not govern the petitioner's promotion. The petitioner relied on precedent to assert that the regulations were statutory, thereby granting him a legitimate right to seek judicial intervention. The Court addressed the core legal question of whether it could issue a direction for promotion when the governing statutory rules lack specific criteria for such advancement. The Court held that because the statutory rules are completely silent on the criteria and merit for promotion, it is impossible for the Court to determine if the petitioner meets the requirements for promotion. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the respondents' decision and dismissed the petition, noting that the petitioner may pursue any available alternate remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court issue a direction for promotion when the governing statutory rules are silent on promotion criteria?
  • Are the State Life Employees Service Regulations, 1973, considered statutory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Maqbool Ahmed vs Ch. Muhammad Ismail and others2023 PLJ AJ&K 137 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-03-08Read full judgment →
• Ch. Khalid Yousaf, Custodian of Evacuee Property Azad Jammu and Kashmir Custodian Building Muzaffarabad vs Azad2023 PLC (C.S.) 678 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-01-19
  Custodian of Evacuee Propertyterms and conditions of servicediscretionary powerswrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictionservice rulesAzad Jammu and Kashmir
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant writ petition filed under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 challenged the notification determining the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner as the Custodian of Evacuee Property, whereby he was granted pay and privileges equivalent to BS-20 instead of a Judge of the High Court, and sought the revival of earlier service rules. The core legal question revolved around whether the Government could arbitrarily determine inferior terms and conditions of service for the judicial office of Custodian of Evacuee Property without statutory backing and contrary to past practices and judicial precedents. The High Court accepted the writ petition, striking down sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Custodian of Evacuee Property (Appointment, Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 along with the impugned notification. The Court held that the government cannot exercise unbridled discretionary powers to the detriment of a citizen's vested service rights and directed that the petitioner be entitled to the pay, perks, and privileges akin to those provided under the earlier 1992 rules from the date of his joining.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Government determine the terms and conditions of service of the Custodian of Evacuee Property at its own discretion without statutory backing?
  • Whether the post of Custodian of Evacuee Property warrants terms and conditions equivalent to a Judge of the High Court based on historical precedence and past rules?
  • Are administrative functionaries permitted to exercise discretionary powers arbitrarily to the detriment of established service rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Fawad Ahmad and others vs Government of the Punjab and others2023 LHC 3967, 2024 PCRLJ 1903 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-05
  joint investigation teamanti-terrorism actconstitutional petitioncognizanceprosecutor generaldoctrine of ripenessfair trialquashing of investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Lahore High Court addresses constitutional petitions filed by senior politicians of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) challenging the formation of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) by the Punjab Government under section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, to investigate several FIRs registered against party leaders and workers following violent protests. The core legal questions revolved around the legality and maintainability of the challenges against the JIT, the interpretation of terrorism offences in light of Supreme Court precedents, the procedural validity of the JIT's notification, and the role and powers of the Prosecutor General. The Court held that the petitions were maintainable, but dismissed them on merits, ruling that the Provincial Government is fully competent to constitute a JIT under section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, that the formation of a JIT is a purely administrative act not subject to premature judicial review, and that the Impugned Order strictly conformed to mandatory procedural requirements. The key principles laid down include the parameters of the doctrine of ripeness regarding police investigations, the non-interference of courts in ongoing investigations, and the distinct statutory roles of the Advocate General and the Prosecutor General.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the formation of a Joint Investigation Team under section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is open to judicial review before the completion of the investigation?
  • Does the inclusion of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in an FIR automatically vitiate the formation of a Joint Investigation Team when the ingredients of terrorism are yet to be determined during investigation?
  • Whether the High Court should interfere with a notice issued under section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 under its constitutional jurisdiction before the investigation concludes?
  • What is the extent of administrative and prosecutorial independence of the Prosecutor General under the Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006 vis-a-vis government instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ahsan-ul-Haq vs Muhammad Naeem & others2023 SC AJK 54 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2023-08-16Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abdul Jabbar and others vs Controller General Accounts, Islamabad2023 IHC 324 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-12-12
  writ petitioncivil servantterms and conditions of servicedisciplinary proceedingsService TribunaljurisdictionArticle 212departmental appealshow cause noticede novo inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged a show cause notice issued to civil servants by the Controller General of Accounts, alleging successive de novo inquiries without lawful justification and violation of due process and fundamental rights. The core legal question was the maintainability of the petition given that the matter related to the petitioners' terms and conditions of service as civil servants. The court held that the petition was not maintainable, dismissing it in limine. The decision was based on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunals under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for matters concerning civil servants' terms and conditions, including disciplinary proceedings. The court emphasized that departmental remedies, such as appeals under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977, or before the Service Tribunal under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, must be exhausted before invoking the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable in the High Court regarding disciplinary matters concerning civil servants' terms and conditions of service?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the jurisdiction of High Courts in matters pertaining to civil servants' terms and conditions?
  • Are civil servants required to exhaust departmental remedies before filing a writ petition concerning their service matters?
  • Can an order for a de novo inquiry against a civil servant be challenged through a departmental appeal under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over grievances of civil servants relating to their terms and conditions of service, including disciplinary matters?
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• Captain (R) Muhammad Ali Zulqarnain Kiani vs Islamabad Electric Supply2023 PLC (C.S) 886 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-07-06
  maintainability of constitutional petitionmaster and servantstatutory rules of servicetransfer and postingdemotionIESCO
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of Islamabad Electric Supply Company (IESCO), challenged orders regarding his transfer and the withdrawal of his promotion from BS-18 to BS-17. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan against IESCO is maintainable, and whether the service matters of its employees are governed by statutory rules. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that IESCO is a company incorporated under the laws of Pakistan rather than a statutory entity, and its employees do not have statutory rules of service, rendering constitutional petitions against it non-maintainable. Furthermore, the court held that transfer is an exigency of service and demotion was conducted following an inquiry without any violation of fundamental rights or law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against the Islamabad Electric Supply Company (IESCO)?
  • Are the employees of Islamabad Electric Supply Company (IESCO) governed by statutory rules of service?
  • Does an employee have a fundamental right to claim a posting at a particular station?
  • Whether transfer orders and departmental demotions in a non-statutory corporate entity violate fundamental rights without statutory backing?
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• Capt. Muhammad Ali Khan vs Port Qasim Authority and Others2023 SHC 28, 2024 MLD 1039 · Sindh High Court · 2023-01-16
  warning lettercivil servantefficiency and discipline rulesfact-finding inquiryprinciples of natural justiceconstitutional petitionport qasim authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the Sindh High Court challenged a warning letter issued by the Port Qasim Authority to the petitioner, a pilot, following a fact-finding inquiry regarding alleged unprofessional behavior with a senior officer. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a petition against a warning letter, whether a warning constitutes a punishment under service jurisprudence, and whether a proper departmental inquiry was conducted. The court held that a warning is not a recognized penalty under the applicable rules and cannot adversely affect an employee's promotion unless imposed through formal disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the court held that fact-finding inquiries conducted without recording evidence on oath or granting the right of cross-examination violate the principles of natural justice. The petition was disposed of with the observation that the warning letter ought to be ignored, while leaving the respondents at liberty to initiate regular disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the law if warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a warning letter issued to an employee?
  • Is a warning letter considered a formal punishment or penalty under the Civil Servant (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020?
  • Whether a fact-finding inquiry conducted without recording evidence on oath and denying cross-examination violates the principles of natural justice?
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• Capital Foods (Private) Limited vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Cto, Islamabad2023 ATIR 1 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2023-01-11Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority, CDA through Chairman, CDA, Islamabad2023 SCMR 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-02
  specific performancefrivolous litigationspecial costsmisrepresentationconsent decreetransfer of propertySection 12(2) CPC
  Summary & questions settled

  The Capital Development Authority (CDA) challenged a High Court judgment that set aside a trial court's order under Section 12(2) CPC. The CDA contended that a disputed plot in Islamabad was non-transferable outside the original allottee's family and that a consent decree for specific performance was obtained through fraud. The Supreme Court observed that the CDA had previously confirmed the transfer of the plot to Respondent No. 2 in its own records and had failed to challenge earlier transfers to non-family members. Furthermore, the CDA had suppressed the fact that the issue of transferability was already decided against it in a previous FAO, which it had unsuccessfully challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court held that the CDA's conduct amounted to frivolous litigation and misrepresentation. The petition was dismissed with special costs of Rs. 500,000 imposed on the CDA for wasting judicial time and failing to disclose material facts, emphasizing that public institutions must take responsibility for their internal decisions rather than burdening courts with meritless litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a public authority can challenge a transfer as illegal when its own records and prior conduct confirm the validity of such transfer?
  • Can a party invoke Section 12(2) of the CPC to allege fraud when it previously made a conceding statement in the same suit?
  • What are the legal consequences for a public institution that suppresses material facts and previous adverse judgments in its pleadings before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can impose special costs under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 for the filing of vexatious and meritless appeals?
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• Capital Development Authority through its Chairman vs Pakistan Television2023 IHC 248 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Cantonment Board Faisal and another vs Habib Bank Limited, Karachi and another2023 SCP 339, 2024 PTD 798, 2024 SCMR 1049 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-10-13
  professional taxcantonment boardconstitutional validityultra virestaxation powerprovincial autonomylocal governmenttax refunddelegated legislationjudicial precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard civil appeals challenging a High Court judgment regarding the levy of professional taxes by Cantonment Boards. The core legal question was whether Cantonment Boards, falling under the Federal domain, are empowered to impose professional taxes, particularly considering Article 163 and Article 140A of the Constitution, and amendments to the Cantonments Act, 1924. The Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that Article 163 of the Constitution exclusively empowers Provincial Assemblies to impose professional taxes through an Act, and this power cannot be delegated. It held that Article 140A does not alter this constitutional scheme, nor does the Federal Legislative List authorize the Federation or Cantonment Boards to levy such taxes. Consequently, Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924, and its Schedule VII, to the extent they authorize the imposition of professional taxes, were declared ultra vires the Constitution. The Court further directed that all professional taxes unconstitutionally recovered by the Cantonment Boards must be refunded.

  Questions settled

  • Can Cantonment Boards levy professional taxes under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does Article 140A of the Constitution empower the Federation or Cantonment Boards to impose professional taxes?
  • Is Section 60(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1924, and its Schedule VII, valid to the extent they authorize professional taxes?
  • Are unconstitutionally recovered taxes by a state entity subject to refund?
  • Can a Provincial Assembly delegate its power to impose professional taxes under Article 163 of the Constitution?
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• Cantonment Board Clifton vs Nadim Ahmed Ansari2023 SHC 1122, 2025 PLD Sindh 36 · Sindh High Court · 2023-12-06Read full judgment →
• Burshane Lpg (Pakistan) Limited through duly Constituted Attorney and 32023 PLD Sindh 346, 2023 PTD 1210 · Sindh High Court · 2022-06-20Read full judgment →
• Bohair vs The Collector of Customs, Mcc, Hyderabad and another2023 PTD (Trib.) 1299 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2023-03-30Read full judgment →
• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan through Chairman vs Muhammad Afzal2023 YLR 1283 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-19Read full judgment →
• Bismillah Din vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2023 PLC (C.S) 910 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-10-12
  constitutional petitionwrit of mandamusETEA testevaluation errorIslamic historynon-joinder of necessary parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed seeking a direction to correct the evaluation of a Multiple Choice Question in an ETEA test for the post of Primary School Teacher. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to marks for answering a religious history question correctly based on authentic Islamic texts, despite a discrepancy in official school textbooks. The Peshawar High Court held that while the petitioner's answer regarding the historical event associated with Surah Mubeen (Sulah Hudaibiya) was correct based on authoritative Islamic scholarship and certain school texts, relief could not be granted because the petitioner failed to array the affected competing candidates as respondents, which would result in injustice. The court disposed of the petition while directing the testing agency to exercise greater care in future test evaluations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition can be granted when the successful candidates who would be adversely affected have not been arrayed as respondents?
  • Does a candidate have a right to correct evaluation based on accurate religious and historical texts in competitive examinations?
  • What is the obligation of testing agencies in ensuring accurate key answers derived from educational syllabi?
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• Bisma Naureen/Ameer Jehan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary,2023 CLC 2038 · Sindh High Court · 2023-03-03Read full judgment →