Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Dilabaz Khan vs The State and another2023 PHC 390 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-09-05Read full judgment →
- Dil Nawaz etc vs Malik Naeem Khan etc2023 PHC 536 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-11-07Read full judgment →
- Dil Murad & Another vs The State2023 SHC 260 · Sindh High Court · 2023-04-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a bail application filed by two accused persons seeking confirmation of their pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving charges of murder and assault. The core legal question was whether the applicants, who were specifically nominated in the First Information Report (FIR) for causing fatal injuries to the deceased, were entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail. The High Court held that the applicants were not entitled to such relief, noting that they were specifically attributed with causing fatal blows to the deceased, Fida Hussain Laghari, with an iron rod and a lathi, respectively. The Court reasoned that pre-arrest bail is reserved for cases where an accused is prima facie falsely implicated due to mala fide or ulterior motives, which was not established here. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application and recalled the ad-interim pre-arrest bail previously granted. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy not available to accused persons who are specifically implicated with active roles in fatal injuries, absent evidence of mala fide or false implication.
Questions settled- Is an accused specifically nominated in an FIR for causing fatal injuries entitled to pre-arrest bail?
- What is the threshold for granting pre-arrest bail in cases of serious criminal offences?
- Does the presence of specific allegations of fatal blows preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
- Dil Ahmed vs The State2023 SHC 592 · Sindh High Court · 2023-07-20Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted of murdering his wife under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, the admissibility and evidentiary value of an oral dying declaration, and the implications of a negative chemical examiner's report regarding flammable substances. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish motive, that an oral dying declaration is a weak piece of evidence requiring strict corroboration, and that the negative chemical report completely demolished the prosecution's theory of the victim being set on fire with petrol. The ratio decidendi is that where material discrepancies and missing links exist in a circumstantial case, and the foundational elements of the crime are unproven, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- What is the evidentiary value of an oral dying declaration in a murder trial?
- Whether an accused is entitled to acquittal when the chemical examiner report contradicts the prosecution's core allegation of using a flammable substance?
- How should a court evaluate a criminal case built entirely on circumstantial evidence and missing links?
- Digri Sugar Mills Limited vs The Additional Collector of Customs, Sales Tax2023 PTD 825 · Sindh High Court · 2022-04-22Read full judgment →
- Digital Bridge (Private) Limited through authorized representative vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Information Technology and Telecom and 6 others2023 CLC 560 · Sindh High Court · 2021-11-03Read full judgment →
- DG Khan Cement Company Limited etc vs Federal Board of Revenue etc.2023 LHC 1074, 2025 PTD 424 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-24Read full judgment →
- Deputy Registrar of Companies vs Mukhtar Textiles Mills Limited and 82023 LHC 1032 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-21Read full judgment →
- Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue Services (Aec) and 4 others vs Messrs Clariant Pakistan Limited2023 PTD 1292 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-30Read full judgment →
- Deputy Administrator Evacuee Trust Property, Rawalpindi vs Sakhi2023 PLD Supreme Court 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order that had permitted the registration of sale deeds and leases for properties situated on land declared as a katchi abadi. The petitioner, the Evacuee Trust Property Board, contended that the land was evacuee trust property and, therefore, could not be declared a katchi abadi. The Supreme Court held that the Board failed to provide any evidence or record of rights establishing the land as evacuee trust property or part of the Trust Pool. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the validity of the katchi abadi declaration. Furthermore, the Court addressed the practice of affixing photographs of political figures on public documents, such as ownership deeds. It ruled that such self-projection on government records is unconstitutional, violates the oath of office, and constitutes an improper use of public office for personal gain. The Court emphasized that public office holders must act as trustees of the people, and public funds or documents must not be used for self-glorification or partisan purposes.
Questions settled- Can land be classified as evacuee trust property without evidence establishing its status in the Trust Pool?
- Is the affixing of a politician's photograph on public government documents permissible under the Constitution?
- Does the declaration of land as a katchi abadi override claims of evacuee trust property status when such status is not proven?
- Defence Housing Authority through Secretary vs District and Sessions2023 MLD 339 · Lahore High Court · 2021-12-24Read full judgment →
- Deedar Hussain and others vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Education, Civil Secretariat, Quetta and others2023 PLJ Quetta 118 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-06-06Read full judgment →
- Deedar Ali Meerani S/O Ghulam Hyder Mirani vs Spl. Judge Anti Corruption2023 SHC 136 · Sindh High Court · 2023-01-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged a conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Provincial), Karachi, regarding the appellant's involvement in the misappropriation of case property (Charas) while serving as an Excise & Taxation Inspector. The appellant was convicted under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. During the pendency of the appeal, the jail authorities reported that the appellant had already completed his sentence and was released from custody. Neither the appellant nor his counsel appeared for the hearing, demonstrating a lack of interest in pursuing the appeal. The Court held that while the right of appeal is a statutory right that cannot be denied, an appeal cannot be kept pending indefinitely due to the appellant's persistent non-appearance and lethargy. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution, while granting the appellant liberty to apply for the restoration of the appeal upon his appearance, subject to notice to the prosecution and a decision on the merits.
Questions settled- Can a criminal appeal be dismissed for non-prosecution due to the persistent absence of the appellant and their counsel?
- Does the dismissal of an appeal for non-prosecution preclude the appellant from seeking its restoration at a later date?
- Is the right of appeal a statutory right that cannot be arbitrarily denied?
- Dawn Frozen Foods & others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through Chief Secratery, Peshawar and others2023 PHC 504, 2024 YLR 2670 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-11-28Read full judgment →
- Dawat Saraye vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 LHC 4338, 2023 PTD 1667, 2023 PLJ Lahore 793 · Lahore High Court · 2023-07-10Read full judgment →
- Dawa Khan & another vs Muhammad Izhar Khan2023 PHC 207, 2024 YLR 2349 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-02-16Read full judgment →
- Darya Khan and others vs The State2023 MLD 1751 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the trial court's judgment convicting four appellants for murder and robbery. The prosecution's case rested primarily on identification parades conducted after the appellants' arrest. The core legal question was whether the identification parade evidence was reliable given that the witnesses had previously seen the accused during their arrest and the appellants were not named in the FIR. The High Court held that the identification parade lacked evidentiary value because the witnesses had already encountered the accused before the parade, and the prosecution failed to provide specific descriptions or roles in the FIR. Consequently, the Court acquitted two appellants, Darya Khan and Zaheer Ahmed, granting them the benefit of the doubt. Regarding the remaining appellants, Gul Hassan and Khan Muhammad, the Court maintained their convictions but modified their sentences from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, citing mitigating circumstances and the absence of other incriminating evidence. The judgment reaffirms the principle that identification evidence is unreliable if witnesses have prior exposure to the accused, and that any reasonable doubt must accrue to the accused as a matter of right.
Questions settled- Does an identification parade lose its evidentiary value if the witnesses have already seen the accused prior to the parade?
- Is the benefit of doubt in a criminal case a matter of right or a matter of grace for the accused?
- Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) based on mitigating circumstances?
- Dargahi vs The State2023 MLD 1426 · Sindh High Court · 2022-12-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences including murder and terrorism arising from an alleged police encounter. The core legal questions involve the jurisdiction of the High Court versus the Federal Shariat Court over matters involving certain Hadd provisions, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt based on identification via motorcycle headlight and police investigation of a police encounter. The Sindh High Court held that under Section 25(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the appeal is maintainable before the High Court, and that the prosecution failed to prove its case due to weak identification evidence lacking corroboration, material contradictions, and the lack of an independent investigation in a police-involved incident. The key principles laid down include that identification on a motorcycle headlight in a dark night is a weak type of evidence requiring strong corroboration, that an incident involving police casualties must be investigated by an independent agency rather than the police acting as investigators of their own cause, and that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right.
Questions settled- Does an appeal against the final judgment of an Anti-Terrorism Court lie to the High Court under Section 25(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
- Is identification based solely on the headlight of a motorcycle during a dark night sufficient to sustain a conviction without strong corroboration?
- Must a criminal case involving a police encounter and police casualties be investigated by an independent agency rather than the local police?
- What is the effect on a criminal case when there is a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused?
- Danish Parabha Shankar Kaneria vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Inter Provincial Coordination and another2023 MLD 1464 · Sindh High Court · 2022-01-12Read full judgment →
- Danish Khan Afridi vs The State2023 YLR 1218 · Peshawar High Court · 2022-04-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition for post-arrest bail arose from FIR No. 229/2021, wherein the petitioner was charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, including murder and attempted murder, following the killing of a serving Anti-Terrorism Court judge and his family. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on claims of false implication and alibi, supported by affidavits and mobile data. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to relief. The court reasoned that the nature of the crime was exceptionally heinous and that the petitioner had remained a fugitive for eight months. The court established that a detailed appraisal of evidence, such as an alibi, is inappropriate at the bail stage as it risks prejudicing the trial. Furthermore, the court emphasized that bail is not a matter of course in cases involving grave offenses where the accused has absconded, and directed the trial court to expedite proceedings to ensure a speedy trial.
Questions settled- Is a detailed assessment of an alibi defense permissible at the bail stage?
- Does the status of an accused as a fugitive for a significant period impact the court's discretion to grant bail in a murder case?
- Can a court grant bail in a case involving a heinous crime where the accused is charged with multiple murders?
- Danish and others vs The State2023 PCRLJ 522 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves criminal appeals against convictions and death sentences awarded by the trial court for offences including Zina and abduction, alongside a death sentence confirmation reference. The core legal questions concern whether material procedural illegalities during trial—namely a vague and defective charge, joint trial of a juvenile offender with adult accused by improperly copying and pasting deposition records, and failing to put all incriminating pieces of evidence to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898—vitiate the trial. The court held that these grave violations caused serious prejudice to the appellants and were incurable under the law. The ratio is that where a trial suffers from fundamental procedural flaws such as joint juvenile-adult trials violating the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000, defective charges, and failure to properly examine the accused under section 342, the convictions must be set aside and the matter remanded for retrial. The court laid down the principle that trials of juveniles and adults must be conducted separately, charges must specify all essential ingredients, and all incriminating evidence must be specifically put to the accused.
Questions settled- Does the joint trial of a juvenile offender with adult accused violate the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 so as to vitiate the trial?
- Whether copying and pasting witness depositions from one case into another violates the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
- Can prosecution evidence not put to an accused during examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be used to maintain a conviction?
- What is the legal effect of framing a vague and defective charge that omits material particulars and ingredients of the offence?
- Daim vs The State2023 SHC 399 · Sindh High Court · 2023-06-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a post-arrest bail application filed by Daim Khaskheli in Crime No.55 of 2023 registered at Police Station Tando Jam, Hyderabad, under sections 324, 353, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question is whether the applicant is entitled to post-arrest bail under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when he was arrested on the spot following an alleged police encounter, but no injuries or scratches were sustained by any member of the police party. The Sindh High Court held that the absence of injuries to the police party renders the applicability of section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code debatable and brings the case within the scope of further inquiry. The court laid down the principle that in cases of alleged police encounters where no law enforcement personnel receive injuries, the matter of murderous assault requires further inquiry at the bail stage, and the benefit of doubt regarding penal applicability must be resolved in favor of granting bail.
Questions settled- Whether post-arrest bail can be granted under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when an accused is arrested at the spot during an alleged police encounter but no injuries are sustained by any police personnel?
- Does the lack of injuries to a police party in an alleged exchange of fire make the applicability of section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code a matter requiring further inquiry?
- Whether the recovery of a weapon from an accused at the spot is sufficient to deny bail when the foundational charge of murderous assault is open to further inquiry?
- Daewoo Pakistan Motorway Service Limited vs The Government of Pakistan2023 IHC 310, 2024 YLR 1457 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-10-26Read full judgment →
- Dadu Khan (Deceased) through LRs and 3 others vs Ghulam Abbas and 232023 PLJ SC 129 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court which set aside an appellate court decree and restored the trial court's dismissal of the appellants' suit for declaration and redemption of land. The core legal questions involved whether the Central Government acquired valid mortgagee rights in the suit property as evacuee property following the migration of the original mortgagee, and whether the civil court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter in light of statutory bars under evacuee settlement laws. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed limitation period, extinguishing their right, and that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit due to the express ouster of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, read with the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The key principle laid down is that disputes concerning property treated as evacuee property and dealt with under settlement laws must be assailed before the specialized forums provided therein, and civil courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.
Questions settled- Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a redemption suit concerning property treated as evacuee property under settlement laws?
- What is the effect of the ouster of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
- Whether the limitation period for filing a redemption or declaratory suit is tolled when a mortgagee migrates to India?
- When does the right of a mortgagor to redeem a simple mortgage stand extinguished?
- Dadabhouy Foundation & another vs Karachi Building Control Authority &2023 SHC 1152 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- Dad Muhammad vs The State and another2023 YLR 1595 · Balochistan High Court · 2022-07-07Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction and sentence of death awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, alongside a murder reference for confirmation of the death sentence. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on ocular evidence from related and chance witnesses, significant delays in recording statements, and material improvements in testimony. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. It found the ocular evidence unreliable due to the witnesses' unnatural conduct, their status as chance witnesses, and material contradictions in their testimonies. The Court emphasized that motive is a double-edged weapon and that abscondence, while relevant, cannot sustain a conviction in the absence of substantive evidence. The key principles laid down are that the benefit of reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused even in heinous crimes, that material improvements in witness statements render them untrustworthy, and that conviction cannot be based on suspect ocular evidence or motive alone.
Questions settled- Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of abscondence when the substantive ocular evidence is found unreliable?
- Does a material improvement in a witness's statement, when confronted with their previous testimony, render their entire evidence untrustworthy?
- Is the testimony of a chance witness admissible without a plausible explanation for their presence at the crime scene?
- Can motive alone serve as the basis for a conviction in a criminal case when the ocular account is disbelieved?
- Dad Gul alias Mangha and another vs The State2023 YLR 1702 · Sindh High Court · 2022-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for murder under sections 302, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death, alongside a connected appeal challenging the acquittal of co-respondents. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related eye-witness testimony, the evidentiary value of an accused's statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the admissibility of a co-accused's confession against other respondents, and the grounds for interfering with an acquittal. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt through consistent, confidence-inspiring eye-witness testimony and a clear inculpatory admission under section 342 Cr.P.C., but altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life since it could not be determined whose specific shot proved fatal. Furthermore, the court dismissed the appeal against acquittal, holding that an exculpatory or retracted confession and uncorroborated statements of a co-accused are insufficient to displace the double presumption of innocence enjoyed by acquitted persons. The key principles laid down include the rule that related eye-witnesses are credible in the absence of proven enmity, that an accused's statement under section 342 Cr.P.C. can be used when corroborated by reliable evidence, and that an acquittal cannot be set aside without showing the judgment was blatantly perverse.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses can be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased in the absence of proven enmity?
- Can an incriminating statement of an accused recorded under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to support the prosecution's case when corroborated by reliable ocular evidence?
- Under what circumstances can a death sentence be reduced to imprisonment for life when multiple accused fired at the deceased and the fatal shot cannot be attributed with certainty to a single individual?
- Whether a confessional statement or a co-accused's statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is sufficient by itself to overturn an acquittal and convict respondents who enjoy a double presumption of innocence?
- D-Watson Chemist and Super Store and others vs Federation of Pakistan2023 PTD 803 · Islamabad High Court · 2021-10-18Read full judgment →
- Controller General of Accounts, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others vs Abdul Waheed and others2023 SCMR 111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment which directed the Department to consider the respondent-employees for promotion to Assistant Accounts Officer (BS-17). The respondents, Senior Auditors who qualified the PIPFA examination before the 2020 Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) meeting, were denied consideration based on an 'Amendatory S.R.O.' (690(1)/2020) which introduced a requirement for sequential promotion by PIPFA batches. The Supreme Court examined whether the amendments applied retrospectively to candidates who qualified under the 'Original S.R.O.' (639(1)/2014). The Court held that statutes affecting substantive rights operate prospectively unless express language or necessary intendment provides for retrospectivity. Since the respondents qualified the PIPFA exam and met eligibility criteria before the amendment, their cases were to be governed by the previous rules. The Court affirmed that amendments impairing vested rights or creating new disabilities for past transactions cannot be applied retroactively. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.
- Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Messrs Attock Cement Pakistan2023 PLJ SC 308, 2023 PCTLR 56 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil appeal brought by the Commissioner, Inland Revenue against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, which affirmed an Appellate Tribunal order directing a sales tax refund to the respondent-company. The core legal questions pertained to whether the facility of adjusting input tax against output tax under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 was subject to any period of limitation prior to the statutory amendments of 1998, and whether an unadjusted input tax claim could be recovered via a refund application under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that while Section 7(1) contained no express time limitation prior to the Finance Act 1998, a taxpayer who inadvertently failed to adjust input tax in monthly returns and was subsequently precluded from doing so due to product exemption could seek a refund under Section 66. The Court clarified that Section 66 governed such claims subject to its statutory one-year limitation period.
Questions settled- Whether the adjustment of input tax from output tax provided under Section 7(1) of the Sales Tax Act 1990 could be availed without any limitation of time prior to the Finance Act 1998?
- Whether a taxpayer's failure to adjust input tax in monthly returns due to misunderstanding constitutes inadvertence under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
- Can a refund for unadjusted input tax be claimed under Section 66 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 beyond the prescribed one-year limitation period from the date of payment?
- Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Sindh Steel Corporation (Private) Limited, Karachi2023 PTD 231 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-12Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Mardan Zone, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs Mr. Imran Ahhad M_S Green Hill CNG Station By Pass Road, Malakand2023 PHC 358, 2024 PTD 584 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-06-21Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, Lahore vs M_s. Rafaqat Marketing, Lahore through Chairman and anotherPTCL 2023 CL. 772 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Legal Division, Regional Tax Office, Lahore vs Messrs Rafaqat Marketing, Lahore through Chairman and another2023 PTD 720 · Lahore High Court · 2022-12-09Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Islamabad and others vs2023 PTD 603 · Islamabad High Court · 2023-02-08Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax/W.Tax Companies Zone, Peshawar vs Islamic2023 PHC 330, 2024 PTD 1009 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-02Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad vs M/s Fauji2023 SCP 237, 2023 SCMR 1694, 2023 PTD 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-06-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
Civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against a judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing income tax references filed by the revenue department. The primary legal question was whether interest income derived from bank deposits by a welfare trust, established under the Charitable Endowments Act 1890, should be categorized as business income or income from other sources under the Income Tax Ordinance, and whether the tax department could re-agitate the issue in subsequent assessment years after leaving an earlier Appellate Tribunal order unchallenged. The Supreme Court held that the primary function of the trust is to invest surplus income to generate funds for welfare projects, making such interest income part of its business activities. Furthermore, the Court held that where a question of law and fact has been decided by the Appellate Tribunal and left unappealed by the department, the department is bound by the rule of consistency and cannot re-litigate the same issue on identical facts in subsequent tax years. The leave was accordingly refused.
Questions settled- Whether interest earned on bank deposits by a welfare foundation constitutes business income or income from other sources?
- Whether tax authorities are bound by the rule of consistency from re-agitating an issue decided in a prior assessment year that was not appealed?
- How should the nature of an assessee's income be determined when distinguishing between business income and income from other sources?
- Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Pak Land Travels (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad2023 PTD 1342 · Lahore High Court · 2020-11-25Read full judgment →
- Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Dye Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.2023 PLJ SC 270 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns whether respondent taxpayers enjoyed exemption from the payment of minimum tax charged under Section 80D of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 by virtue of Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 read with clause 122C of Part-I of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question is whether fiscal incentives promulgated prior to 7 November 1990 are protected under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 against the non-obstante minimum tax provisions of Section 80D. The Supreme Court held that the protection afforded by Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 is strictly limited to economic reforms and fiscal incentives announced, promulgated, or implemented on or after 7 November 1990. Since the fiscal incentive under clause 122C of Part-I of the Second Schedule was promulgated in 1987, it does not qualify for protection under the 1992 Act and is thus overridden by Section 80D. The Supreme Court allowed the Department's appeals and set aside the impugned orders of the High Court.
Questions settled- Whether taxpayers are entitled to exemption from minimum tax under Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 by virtue of Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992?
- Does the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 protect fiscal incentives promulgated prior to 7 November 1990?
- Does Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 override prior tax exemptions granted under the Ordinance?
- Commissioner of Income Tax vs Messrs Dye Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.2023 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns whether taxpayers were entitled to exemption from the minimum tax on income under Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, by invoking Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, read with Clause 122C of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. The core question was whether the fiscal incentive under Clause 122C, promulgated in 1987, fell within the ambit of economic reforms protected by the 1992 Act. The Supreme Court held that the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, only protects fiscal incentives announced, promulgated, or implemented by the Government on or after 07.11.1990. Since the incentive under Clause 122C was promulgated in 1987, it did not qualify for protection under the 1992 Act. Consequently, Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, being a non-obstante provision, overrides the earlier exemption. The key principle laid down is that the protection afforded by Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992, is strictly limited to fiscal incentives introduced on or after 07.11.1990, and does not extend to incentives predating this cutoff.
Questions settled- Does the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 protect fiscal incentives promulgated before 07.11.1990?
- Does Section 80D of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 override tax exemptions granted under earlier provisions of the same Ordinance?
- Is the date of setting up an industrial undertaking relevant to determining the applicability of fiscal incentives protected under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992?
- Commissioner of Income Tax Legal Division Rto, Lahore vs Messrs Meco2023 PCTLR 84 · Lahore High Court · 2021-06-09Read full judgment →
- Commissioner lnland Revenue Corporate Zone, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs M_S Al-Haj Steel Foundry, District Khyber2023 PHC 340, 2025 PTD 662 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-25Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Ir, Zone-IV vs M/s. Hamdam Paper Corporation (Pvt) Ltd.,2023 SHC 174 · Sindh High Court · 2022-08-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV vs Byco Petroleum Pakistan2023 PTD 1498 · Sindh High Court · 2022-05-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This reference application before the Sindh High Court arose from concurrent orders of the Commissioner Appeals and the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had set aside the imposition of default surcharge and penalties levied upon petroleum sector entities for late payment of sales tax. The core legal question was whether default surcharge and penalties under fiscal laws could be imposed without establishing willful default or mens rea, particularly where delays stemmed from a liquidity crunch caused by the national circular debt crisis. The Court held that fiscal penalties and default surcharges are quasi-criminal in nature and require proof of culpable intent or mens rea, which was absent given the peculiar circumstances and government-induced liquidity issues. The Court concluded that in the absence of willful default, the levy of default surcharge and penalties was unwarranted, and accordingly answered the reframed question of law in the negative and in favor of the respondents.
Questions settled- Whether the imposition of default surcharge and penalties under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 requires the presence of mens rea or willful default?
- Does a liquidity crunch resulting from the national circular debt crisis absolve a taxpayer from liability for default surcharge and penalties on delayed tax payments?
- What is the scope of reference jurisdiction of the High Court regarding factual determinations made by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue?
- Are penalties and default surcharges under fiscal statutes considered civil liabilities or quasi-criminal in nature?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Large Taxpayers, Karachi vs M/s.PTCL 2023 CL. 811 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Large Taxpayers, Karachi vs M/s2023 LHC 2252 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Officer (Rto), Mayo2023 PCTLR 76 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 arose from an order of the Lahore High Court, which decided a sales tax reference against the revenue petitioners. The taxpayer had filed an appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) under Section 45-B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which was decided after the expiration of 180 days. The Appellate Tribunal and the High Court held that the appellate order was void as a nullity in law. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 prescribing a time limit to decide an appeal is mandatory or directory. The Supreme Court held that the statutory period of 120 days plus an extension of no more than 60 days (totaling 180 days) is mandatory. Consequently, any decision rendered by the Commissioner (Appeals) beyond the maximum period of 180 days is invalid and void in law. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.
Questions settled- Is the statutory time period for deciding an appeal under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 mandatory or directory?
- What is the legal effect of an appellate order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) after the expiry of the maximum 180-day period under Section 45-B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
- Does negative and restrictive language used in a statute imposing a duty on a public official render the provision mandatory?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, (Rto) LahorePTCL 2023 CL. 272 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from income tax assessments where the Revenue Department, upon discovering suppressed homeopathic medical sales by the taxpayer, bypassed the standard assessment amendment procedure under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and instead invoked Section 111(1)(d) to tax the entire gross suppressed sales under 'income from other sources' without allowing deductions for business expenses. The core legal question was whether the phrase 'chargeable to tax' in Section 111(1)(d)(i) applies to suppressed production and sales, thereby requiring the taxation of net income rather than gross receipts, and whether the unfettered discretion of the tax authorities to choose between the two provisions violates constitutional equality principles. The Supreme Court held that 'chargeable to tax' applies to suppressed production and sales, meaning only net income (gross receipts minus permissible expenses) can be taxed. The Court ruled that allowing the tax authorities unguided discretion to choose between Section 122(5) and Section 111(1)(d) to impose vastly different tax liabilities violates the rule against arbitrary discretion established in Waris Meah v. The State. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Revenue's appeals and directed the Federal Board of Revenue to issue binding guidelines to regulate the exercise of these powers.
Questions settled- Whether the term 'chargeable to tax' in Section 111(1)(d)(i) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applies to suppressed production and sales, thereby requiring the taxation of net income rather than gross receipts?
- Can the tax authorities arbitrarily choose between proceeding under Section 122(5) and Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for the same suppressed sales without violating constitutional equality principles?
- Does the rule against unguided and unfettered statutory discretion laid down in Waris Meah v. The State apply to the choice of tax assessment procedures by Inland Revenue officers?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, (Rto) Lahore2023 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the interpretation of Section 111(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, regarding the taxation of suppressed sales. The core legal question was whether tax authorities could treat suppressed sales as "gross receipts" taxable under Section 111(1)(d) or as "net income" under Section 122(5), and whether the Commissioner possesses unfettered discretion to choose between these provisions. The Supreme Court dismissed the Commissioner's appeals, holding that suppressed sales must be taxed on a "net" basis, representing income properly so-called, rather than on gross receipts. The Court ruled that allowing tax authorities to arbitrarily choose between provisions that result in significantly different tax liabilities violates the principle of equality before the law, as established in Waris Meah v. The State. The Court emphasized that statutory powers must not be exercised through unguided discretion. Consequently, the Federal Board of Revenue was directed to issue comprehensive guidelines to regulate the application of these sections, ensuring that tax authorities provide justification when bypassing the standard assessment procedures of Section 122(5).
Questions settled- Does the phrase 'chargeable to tax' in Section 111(1)(d)(i) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply to suppressed sales or production?
- Can tax authorities exercise unfettered discretion to choose between Section 111(1)(d) and Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 when assessing suppressed income?
- Is the taxation of suppressed sales under Section 111(1)(d) limited to the net income rather than the gross receipts?
- Does the absence of guidance for applying Section 111(1)(d) versus Section 122(5) violate the constitutional principle of equality?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Ltu, Lahore vs M/s Shezan2023 LHC 1379, 2023 PLJ Lahore 504, 2024 PTD 758 · Lahore High Court · 2023-03-29Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Ltd, Lahore vs M/s. Shezan2023 PLJ Lahore 504 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto, Peshawar and another. vs Ajmal Ali Shiraz M_s Shiraz Restaurant, Peshawar2023 SCP 299, PTCL 2024 CL. 11, 2023 SCMR 2084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-09-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil review petition assails the previous order of the Supreme Court regarding the amendment of tax assessment under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue was lawfully delegated the power to amend assessments under section 122 of the Ordinance by the Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the purported delegation order relied upon by the petitioner neither referred to section 122 nor delegated the statutory power of the Commissioner to Deputy Commissioners, and further noted that the notification was neither gazetted nor published on the Federal Board of Revenue's website. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed with costs. The key principle laid down is that statutory powers of taxation authorities must be explicitly delegated, and all notifications affecting taxpayers must be duly gazetted and publicly displayed for transparency.
Questions settled- Whether the Deputy Commissioner has the power to amend an assessment under section 122 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without proper delegation of authority from the Commissioner?
- Can an ungazetted and unpublished delegation order be relied upon to exercise statutory powers against taxpayers?
- Whether the failure to produce delegation of authority during the hearing warrants the dismissal of a review petition seeking to establish such delegation?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Gujranwala vs Muhammad Khalid Chaudhry2023 LHC 5263, PTCL 2024 CL. 48, 2024 PTD 80 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-12Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad vs Messrs Ahmad Straw Board Private Limited, Faisalabad2023 PTD 1528 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Ltu, Lahore vs M/s. Marwat2023 PTCL 85 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Ltu, Lahore vs Messrs Marwat2023 PTD 732 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-28Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Ltu, Karachi vs Abu Dawood Trading2023 PTD (Trib.) 1069 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-11-29Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto-II, Faisalabad vs Messrs Crescent2023 PTD (Trib.) 789 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-07-13Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Sialkot vs Messrs General Fan2023 PTD (Trib.) 513 · Appellate Tribunal Inland RevenueRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Lahore vs Messrs Pakistan WAPDA2023 PTD (Trib.) 424 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-11-10Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Rto, Lahore vs Messrs Haq Bahu Sugar Mills2023 PTD (Trib.) 1347 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2022-12-20Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Muzaffarabad vs Malik Muhammad Yaseen2023 PLJ AJ&K 61 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2022-10-27Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lyallpur Zone, Rto, Faisalabad vs M/s. Ideal2023 PTCL CL. 33 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Lahore vs Messrs Adam Jee Insurance2023 PTD (Trib.) 1628 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2023-03-21Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Islamabad vs M/s Askari Cement2023 IHC 122 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Ltu, Islamabad vs Messrs Wi-Tribe Pakistan2023 PTD (Trib.) 499 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2020-08-18Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal-Zone-Lto, Lahore vs M/s Rasool2023 LHC 5946, 2025 PTD 121 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Lto, Multan vs Messrs Usman2023 PTD 679 · Lahore High Court · 2022-11-23Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Large Taxpayers Office, Lahore2023 PTD 44 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-30Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Legal Zone, Corporate Tax Office, Lahore vs LF Logistics Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore & another2023 LHC 5270, PTCL 2024 CL. 21, 2024 PTD 728 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-11Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers, Lahore vs M/s. SapphirePTCL 2023 CL. 100 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-01Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Sui Northern Gas Pipeline2023 PLD Supreme Court 241 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-09-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arose from civil petitions for leave to appeal flagged by the office for being belatedly filed. The petitioner contended that the delay occurred because the impugned judgments did not bear the date when they were written, signed, and pronounced, having only the original hearing date inscribed, and were only discovered upon being uploaded to the High Court website months later. The core legal questions addressed whether judgments must be dated, the consequences of failing to mention the signing date, and how limitation periods should be computed under such circumstances. The Supreme Court held that every judgment and order must explicitly inscribe the actual date it is written, signed, and pronounced, as mandated by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Supreme Court Rules 1980. The Court emphasized that inordinate delays in writing judgments undermine judicial quality and prejudice litigants, and no party should suffer due to a court's omission. Concluding that the petitions were filed within time, the Court directed all registries to ensure strict compliance with dating judgments.
Questions settled- Does a judgment have to be dated?
- What are the consequences if a judgment does not mention the date when it was written, signed and pronounced?
- When a judgment, which does not mention when it was written, signed and pronounced, is challenged, should the surrounding circumstances and record be considered to determine whether the challenge has been made within the prescribed period?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs M/s. Arco Plastics (Pvt.) LimitedPTCL 2023 CL. 718, 2025 PTD 552 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-21Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore vs Messrs Descon Engineering2023 PTD 492 · Lahore High Court · 2022-03-28Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore Bench, Lahore. vs Unique Cycle2023 LHC 4896, 2024 PTD 158 · Lahore High Court · 2023-09-26Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs Messrs Engineers Associated2023 PTD 393 · Lahore High Court · 2022-05-17Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue, Chenab Zone, Rto, Faisalabad vs Messrs2023 SCMR 2070 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Commissioner Inland Revenue sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that ruled against the Department in a reference application under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question concerned whether tax authorities could adjudicate tax liabilities based on new allegations arising from a post-remand audit/re-examination of records without issuing a fresh show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that the Department's actions violated the principles of due process and fairness guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court determined that the re-examination of records constituted an audit under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which required specific procedural compliance. Because the adjudication officer introduced new, distinct allegations beyond the original show-cause notice without providing the taxpayer an opportunity to respond, the proceedings were procedurally improper. The Court affirmed that tax authorities must confine adjudication to the specific charges in the show-cause notice and cannot arbitrarily expand the scope of proceedings without adhering to statutory requirements and the right to a fair trial.
Questions settled- Can tax authorities adjudicate allegations not contained in the original show-cause notice?
- Does the re-examination of taxpayer records during adjudication proceedings constitute an audit under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
- Is the issuance of a fresh show-cause notice mandatory when new allegations arise during post-remand adjudication proceedings?
- Does the failure to issue a proper show-cause notice violate the right to due process under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Dr. Tahir Kaleem Siddiqui vs Federation of Pakistan and others2023 PLC (C.S.) 374 · Islamabad High Court · 2022-12-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a former contract employee of the Directorate of Workers Education, was absorbed into the Workers Welfare Fund (W.W.F.) in 1998 and subsequently promoted to the post of Director General. In 2017, the W.W.F. declared his absorption illegal and void ab initio, citing procedural violations of the Workers' Welfare Fund (Employees Service) Rules, 1997, specifically the lack of a Selection Committee recommendation and his prior contractual status. The petitioner challenged this repatriation order. The core legal question was whether the department could retroactively invalidate an appointment and repatriate an employee after nineteen years of service due to procedural irregularities committed by the department itself. The Court held that the department could not penalize the petitioner for its own procedural lapses in the appointment process. Applying the principles of locus poenitentiae and estoppel, the Court ruled that the department cannot turn around and terminate an employee for its own failures, especially after long-term service. The impugned repatriation order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh, reasoned decision by the W.W.F.
Questions settled- Can a department terminate an employee for procedural irregularities in appointment committed by the department itself after a long period of service?
- Whether an employee absorbed into a department can be repatriated after nineteen years of service due to alleged procedural flaws in the initial absorption process?
- Does the principle of locus poenitentiae prevent the state from undoing an appointment after a significant lapse of time where the employee is not at fault?
- Can an appointment made by a superior body be declared invalid for non-compliance with rules requiring a recommendation from a subordinate committee?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-Iv, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi vs Messrs Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd., a-39, Manghopir Road, Site, Karachi2023 SCP 254, 2023 SCMR 1797, 223 PTD 1492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Commissioner Inland Revenue sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which had answered questions of law in favour of the taxpayer in a sales tax reference application. The core legal question was whether the sales tax authorities could lawfully raise a tax demand and disallow input tax adjustment on the mere presumption that invoices issued by certain suppliers were fake or flying, without conducting an independent inquiry or audit, and whether the burden of proof to establish non-payment of tax lay on the department or the taxpayer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the statutory scheme of the Sales Tax Act 1990 places the primary burden of proof on the sales tax authorities to establish tax evasion or default through proper evidence, rather than shifting a reverse onus onto the registered taxpayer without statutory backing. The Court laid down that fiscal statutes must be strictly construed, presumption of tax liability cannot replace evidence, and tax authorities must independently verify allegations before issuing a show cause notice and demanding recovery of input tax.
Questions settled- Does the burden of proof lie on the sales tax authorities to establish that an invoice is fake or flying and that tax has not been deposited?
- Can tax authorities lawfully issue a show cause notice and raise a tax liability against a registered person based solely on presumptions without conducting an audit or inquiry?
- Is a registered taxpayer legally required under the Sales Tax Act 1990 to prove that its suppliers actually manufactured and supplied goods and deposited tax, in the absence of a statutory reverse onus provision?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-II, Rto, Gujranwala vs Messrs Crystal2023 PTD 758 · Lahore High Court · 2022-09-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs M/s.2023 PLJ Quetta 27 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs Messrs Quetta Electric Supply Company Limited, Zarghoon Road, Quetta2023 PLJ Quetta 4 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, Regional Tax Office, Quetta vs Messrs Hajvairy Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Quetta and another2023 PTD 644 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-01-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The Commissioner Inland Revenue sought leave to appeal three concurrent decisions regarding the tax liability of steel re-rolling mills for tax years 2013-2016 under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The revenue department contended that subsequent amendments to section 3(1A) of the Act prevailed over section 71 and the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007. The respondents asserted that tax paid under the Special Procedure, which contained an overriding non-obstante clause, constituted a final discharge of their sales tax liability. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that section 71 empowered the creation of special procedures with non-obstante effect. Since rule 58H of the Special Procedure prescribed a specific payment mechanism explicitly deemed to be the final discharge of tax liability, it prevailed over general charging sections. The Court further clarified that a order declining leave to appeal without interpreting identical legal provisions does not operate as binding precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution.
Questions settled- Does a special tax procedure containing a non-obstante clause under Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 prevail over general charging provisions?
- Whether the payment of sales tax under rule 58H of the Sales Tax Special Procedures Rules, 2007 constitutes a final discharge of sales tax liability for steel re-rollers?
- Does an order declining leave to appeal constitute a binding precedent under Article 189 of the Constitution if it does not decide a question of law or enunciate a legal principle?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax2023 SCP 150, 2023 PTD 964, 2023 SCMR 1011 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2023-02-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These review petitions sought to challenge an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that had previously refused leave to appeal against a High Court judgment. The underlying dispute concerned the imposition of 'Super Tax' under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on taxpayers. The core legal question was whether the Super Tax, introduced by the Finance Act, 2015, constituted a distinct levy from the 'Super Tax' referenced in existing Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs), thereby rendering it either exempt or subject to reduced rates under those treaties. The Supreme Court held that the review petitions were meritless, reiterating that review jurisdiction is not an appellate remedy for rehearing a case. The Court affirmed that a judgment is final and can only be reviewed if there is an error apparent on the face of the record or a glaring omission. Finding no such error, the Court held that the previous decision was a conscious, deliberate determination that did not warrant interference, and dismissed the petitions.
Questions settled- Does the imposition of Super Tax under Section 4B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, fall within the scope of existing Double Taxation Treaties?
- Can a review petition be entertained as a substitute for an appeal or a rehearing of a decided case?
- What constitutes an 'error apparent on the face of the record' sufficient to invoke the Supreme Court's review jurisdiction?
- Does the doctrine of merger apply when a judgment of an appellate tribunal is affirmed by a High Court?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue Withholding, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar2023 PHC 279, 2023 PTD 1709, 2023 PLJ Peshawar 191 · Peshawar High Court · 2023-05-02Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Punjab Medical Store2023 PTD 1046 · Lahore High Court · 2023-06-07Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Rice Exporters Association ofPTCL 2023 CL. 260 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-31Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Niagra Mills (Pvt.) Ltd.2023 PLJ Lahore 66 · Lahore High Court · 2022-01-24Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Lahore Rubber StorePTCL 2023 CL. 555 · Lahore High Court · 2022-10-17Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Islamabad Electric Supply2023 PLJ Islamabad 171 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Habib Insurance Company Ltd.2023 PLJ SC 61 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns two appeals filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against a High Court judgment that set aside an Income Tax Appellate Tribunal order regarding the tax treatment of management expenses for an insurance company. The core legal question was whether the respondent insurance company could exceed the statutory limits on management expenses prescribed under the Insurance Act, 1938, and whether such excess expenditure was validly condoned by the Controller of Insurance under the proviso to Section 40-C(1) of the Insurance Act, 1938. The Supreme Court held that while the law allows for the condonation of excess management expenses by the Controller of Insurance, the burden of proof lies entirely upon the insurer to produce the formal order or certificate of condonation. As the respondent failed to produce the requisite evidence of such condonation before the Tribunal, the High Court, or the Supreme Court, the Court restored the Tribunal's original order. The key principle laid down is that an insurer cannot claim the benefit of condonation for exceeding management expense limits without producing concrete, verifiable documentation of the Controller of Insurance's approval.
Questions settled- Does an insurance company bear the burden of proving that the Controller of Insurance condoned its excess management expenses?
- Can an insurance company exceed the statutory limits on management expenses without a formal order of condonation from the Controller of Insurance?
- Is the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision regarding the disallowance of excess management expenses sustainable if the insurer fails to produce evidence of condonation?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Prime Commercial Bank Ltd2023 LHC 148 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-12Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Pakistan Cricket Board Lahore2023 LHC 5827 · Lahore High Court · 2023-10-29Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Mehran Business International (Pvt)2023 LHC 3960, PTCL 2024 CL. 406 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Gujranwala Electric Power Co.2023 LHC 6720, 2024 PTD 440 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Muhammad Afzal Cheema2023 LHC 2750, 2023 PTD 953, 2023 LHC 2710 · Lahore High Court · 2023-05-22Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Ryk Mills2023 SCMR 1856 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2022-11-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a tax dispute where the Commissioner Inland Revenue challenged the dismissal of Excise Tax References by the High Court regarding the short levy of Federal Excise Duty. The core legal question was whether tax authorities could adjudicate a matter based on grounds not specified in the initial show cause notice, specifically concerning compliance with SRO 77(I)/2013. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the adjudication was legally unsustainable. The Court affirmed that a show cause notice is a fundamental requirement of due process under Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. It established the principle that tax authorities cannot adjudicate on grounds extraneous to the original show cause notice. If a taxpayer's defense introduces new factual aspects requiring further inquiry, the department must issue a fresh or supplementary show cause notice to allow the taxpayer a fair opportunity to respond. Failure to do so renders the subsequent adjudication void, as it violates the principles of natural justice and fair trial.
Questions settled- Can tax authorities adjudicate a matter based on grounds not specified in the initial show cause notice?
- Is a fresh or supplementary show cause notice required when a taxpayer's defense introduces new factual grounds not covered by the original notice?
- Does the failure to issue a supplementary show cause notice for new allegations violate the principles of due process and fair trial under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Prime Commercial Bank Ltd2023 PTD 997 · Lahore High Court · 2023-01-12Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs New Allied Electronics Industries2023 PTD 264 · Sindh High Court · 2021-09-08Read full judgment →
- Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Mehran Business International2023 PTD 1687 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →