Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mst. Sajeda Mushtaq vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 YLR 2364, 2018 SHC 1124 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saira Bibi vs The State etc2019 LHC 1580, 2019 PCRLJ 1363 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-28
  circumstantial evidencejudicial confessionextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtstatement of accusedqatl-i-amdcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The prosecution case primarily rested on circumstantial evidence, including an extra-judicial confession, recovery of a weapon, various personal effects, and a judicial confession made by the female appellant at a belated stage before the trial court. The core legal questions involved the evidentiary value and procedural legality of recording a confessional statement under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code at the verge of recording statements under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as well as the reliance on retracted confessions and uncorroborated circumstantial evidence where the prosecution fails to prove its primary case. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case through independent and reliable evidence, that the extra-judicial and judicial confessions were legally flawed and of no evidentiary value, and that an accused cannot be convicted solely on a statement under Section 342 when the prosecution fails. The court laid down that a confessional statement under Section 304 PPC cannot be recorded at an advanced stage of trial after prosecution evidence is closed, and that failure of the prosecution to prove the charge entitles the accused to acquittal regardless of any self-exculpatory or incriminatory statements made by the accused. The appeals were consequently allowed and the appellants were acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can record a confessional statement under Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the belated stage of the trial after the conclusion of prosecution evidence?
  • Can an accused person be convicted solely on the basis of a judicial confession recorded with undue delay and without following proper statutory procedures?
  • Is a joint extra-judicial confession made by multiple co-accused persons sufficient to maintain a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • What is the legal effect on a conviction if the prosecution entirely fails to prove its primary case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt?
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• Mst. Sahib Khatoon Keerio vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and 32019 PLC (C.S.) 1408 · Sindh High Court · 2019-01-22
  contempt of courtdeceased quotacivil servantsappointmentscope of contempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a contempt application under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan alleging willful disobedience of a previous High Court order dated 10.09.2015, which had directed the respondents to consider the petitioner's son for appointment under the deceased employees' quota. The core legal question was whether the scope of contempt proceedings could be enlarged to re-examine the merits of the case, and whether the respondents had complied with the court's earlier directions by offering a post in basic pay scale 1 instead of the desired post in basic pay scale 11. The Sindh High Court held that contempt proceedings are strictly between the court and the alleged contemnor, and their scope cannot be enlarged to review the case on merits. The court concluded that substantial compliance with its previous order had been made when the authorities offered an available post under the deceased quota, which the candidate had refused. Consequently, the contempt application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the scope of contempt proceedings be enlarged to allow parties to argue a matter on its merits?
  • Whether the offer of a lower post under the deceased employees' quota constitutes substantial compliance with a court direction to consider a candidate for appointment?
  • Do Rules 10-A and 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1974 mandate appointment to a specific higher pay scale without fulfilling recruitment formalities?
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• Mst. Safia Bibi, etc vs Addl. District Judge, etc2020 [M] C L R 1003, 2019 PLD Lahore 502, 2019 LHC 1402 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Bibi vs State etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1052 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-22
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailshort sentencecriminal appealbail bondfemale convict
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition concerns an application for the suspension of sentence filed by the petitioner, Mst. Safia Bibi, who was convicted and sentenced to seven years of simple imprisonment under Section 338-C/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and one year under Section 201/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chichawatni. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, a female convict, was entitled to the suspension of her sentence and release on bail pending the final adjudication of her appeal, given the duration of her remaining sentence. The Lahore High Court, after reviewing the record and noting that the petitioner had a remaining sentence of over five years and seven months, held that the sentence was sufficiently short to warrant relief. Relying on established judicial precedents regarding the suspension of short sentences, the Court accepted the petition. It held that the absence of a likelihood of the main appeal being fixed for hearing in the near future, combined with the petitioner's gender, constituted valid grounds for granting bail, subject to the furnishing of a bail bond.

  Questions settled

  • Does a remaining sentence of over five years qualify as a short sentence for the purpose of suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  • Is the gender of a convict a relevant factor when considering the suspension of a sentence pending appeal?
  • Can a sentence be suspended when there is no immediate likelihood of the main appeal being fixed for hearing?
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• Mst. Saeeda Begum and 4 others vs Mst. Habib-u-Nisa and 2 others2019 KLR Civil Cases 378 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-05-21
  co-sharersevacuee propertyexchange deedinheritancebona fide purchaserlimitationjoint property
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Trial Court decreeing a suit for declaration, cancellation of an exchange deed, partition, and mesne profits filed by the legal heirs of late Abdul Karim against the appellants. The core legal question revolved around whether the property in dispute was inherited joint property and whether an exchange deed executed by one of the co-heirs without the consent of others was valid, along with the applicability of limitation and the doctrine of bona fide purchase. The Balochistan High Court held that the property was indeed inherited joint property of Abdul Karim, and the appellant co-heir had no exclusive title or authority to execute the exchange deed, rendering the exchange and subsequent mutations illegal and void. The Court also laid down that a co-sharer is deemed to be in possession of every inch of joint property, and the plea of a bona fide purchaser under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires strict pleading and proof of reasonable care, which was absent here.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an exchange deed executed by a single co-sharer in respect of joint inherited property without the consent of other legal heirs is legal and binding?
  • Does the omission of a legal heir's name from revenue records deprive them of their title to inherited joint property?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to claim the protection of the equitable doctrine under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Whether a suit for partition and declaration by co-sharers regarding joint inherited property is barred by time when revenue entries are challenged?
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• Mst. Sabiha vs Dr. Akbar and 2 others2020 KLR Criminal Cases 38, PLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Quetta) 642, 2019 MLD 1873 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-07-01
  acquittal appealSection 249-A Cr.P.C.double presumption of innocencedelayed FIRmedical evidencemisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate-III, Quetta, under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The appellant sought to overturn the acquittal of the respondents, who were charged under Sections 337-AD and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly causing injuries. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in exercising its power to acquit the respondents at a preliminary stage. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court’s decision was well-reasoned and unexceptional. The Court emphasized that a significant, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with evidence that the investigation commenced prior to the formal registration of the FIR, undermined the prosecution's case. Furthermore, material contradictions between the eyewitness testimonies and the medical evidence rendered the prosecution's claims unreliable. The Court reiterated the principle that an acquittal order carries a double presumption of innocence, which cannot be disturbed on appeal unless the judgment is found to be perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from a gross misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the charge is found to be groundless?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR negatively impact the evidentiary value of the prosecution's case?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • What is the legal effect of conducting an investigation prior to the formal registration of an FIR?
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• Mst. Sabiha Ilyas vs The Federation of Pakistan & 02 others2019 SHC 286 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saba Gul vs Govt etc2020 CLD 251, 2020 PLJ Peshawar 51, 2019 PHC 366 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saadia Andaleeb vs Mst. Farzana Zia and 5 others2019 PLD ISB 280, 2019 PLJ Islamabad 22 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-06-13
  civil revisionregistered release deedpardanashin ladyfraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findingsburden of proofinheritance propertyrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this civil revision petition, the petitioner impugned the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby a suit for declaration, partition, and permanent injunction filed by the respondents against a registered release deed was decreed. The core legal question centered on whether the executants—well-educated, mature married women—had relinquished their shares in the inherited suit property through fraud and misrepresentation, and whether the protective legal cloak for illiterate and pardanashin ladies applied to them. The Islamabad High Court held that the plaintiffs, being educated professionals capable of understanding legal documents, could not claim the protection afforded to illiterate or pardanashin women, nor could they plead non est factum or fraud when they admittedly failed to read the document they willingly signed. Furthermore, the court held that registration of the release deed operates as public notice and that concurrent findings based on misreading and non-reading of evidence are open to interference in revisional jurisdiction. The court consequently set aside the judgments of the lower courts and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the protective legal presumptions available to illiterate and pardanashin women can be extended to educated and mature female litigants capable of understanding business and legal transactions?
  • Can a party who admits signing a registered document avoid its legal effect by pleading ignorance of its contents without proving specific fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Does the registration of a formal deed operate as constructive notice to the public from the date of its registration?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mst. Rukhsana Majeed vs Additional District Judge and others2019 YLR 84 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Shamim vs Mehmood Hussain and 3 others2019 YLR 634 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rifat Rana vs Rashid Mehmood and 4 others2019 PLD Peshawar 230 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-22
  quashment petitionbreach of peaceimmovable property disputerevisiontitle disputeforcible dispossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition was filed by the petitioner to challenge the order of the Sessions Judge, Bannu, which had set aside the Judicial Magistrate's order and dismissed the petitioner's complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. were maintainable in a dispute between co-heirs over immovable property where a civil suit had been previously pending and no specific date of forcible dispossession was mentioned. The Peshawar High Court held that the revisional court rightly set aside the magistrate's order as Section 145 has a limited scope meant solely to avert an immediate breach of the peace and cannot be utilized to settle title disputes, claims of inheritance, or private property rights between siblings, especially when the application lacked a specific date of dispossession. The court laid down the principle that the existence of a dispute regarding immovable property is not per se sufficient to attract Section 145, Cr.P.C., and such summary proceedings cannot substitute for remedies under the Specific Relief Act 1877 or the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are maintainable for resolving title disputes or claims of inheritance between family members?
  • Can a complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained when the application fails to disclose the specific date or period of alleged dispossession?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 with a revisional order setting aside a magistrate's order under Section 145 where no jurisdictional error is shown?
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• Mst. Rifat Rana vs Rashid Mahmood & 4 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1388 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-22
  quashment petitionbreach of peaceimmovable property disputeSection 145 CrPCillegal dispossessioncivil litigationjurisdiction of Magistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal quashment petition challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Bannu, which set aside a Judicial Magistrate's order and dismissed the petitioner's complaint filed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are maintainable when a dispute involves claims of title or possession between family members and lacks evidence of an imminent breach of peace. The Court held that the revisional order was correct and dismissed the petition. It reasoned that Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is designed exclusively to prevent an immediate breach of peace and cannot be utilized as a substitute for civil litigation to resolve title disputes or claims of illegal dispossession, for which remedies exist under the Specific Relief Act 1877 or the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005. The Court emphasized that without a clear threat to public peace, a Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate property disputes under this provision, especially where the application fails to establish the requisite timeline of dispossession.

  Questions settled

  • Can proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to adjudicate title disputes or claims of illegal dispossession?
  • Does a Magistrate have jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the absence of an imminent breach of peace?
  • Is a complaint under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable when the application fails to specify the date or period of alleged dispossession?
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• Mst. Razia Sultana vs The State and another2019 SCMR 1300, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  Criminal appealNarcotic substancesControl of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997Chain of custodyChemical examiner's reportSafe transmission of evidenceAcquittalReasonable doubtConviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the appellant's conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appellant was initially booked under Section 9(e) and subsequently convicted under Section 9(c) of the Act, receiving a life sentence from the trial court, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had established the charge beyond reasonable doubt, particularly concerning the integrity of the evidence. The Court noted that the officer responsible for dispatching the narcotic drug sample to the Government Analyst for chemical examination was not produced to prove its safe transmission, thereby compromising the chain of custody. The Supreme Court held that a broken chain of custody renders the chemical examiner's report unreliable and unsafe to support a conviction. Consequently, the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant.

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• Mst. Rasoolan Bibi vs Muhammad Aslam etc2019 MLD 1041, 2019 LHC 110 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rahila widow of Fawad Ahmad Batra vs National Accountability2019 PLJ Karachi 116, 2019 PLD Sindh 96 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rahila Batra vs National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and 2 others2019 P Cr. L J 1082 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-09
  mental capacityunsound mindSection 465 CrPCaccountability courtmedical boardtrial procedurefair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order of the Accountability Court, which dismissed an application seeking the constitution of a medical board to assess the mental health of the accused, the petitioner's husband, who is facing trial for corruption. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in refusing to constitute a medical board under Section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court upheld the trial court's order, finding no legal infirmity. The Court held that Section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 requires the trial court to first exercise its own discretion and form an opinion on whether the accused appears to be of unsound mind and incapable of making a defense. Because the trial court had observed the accused's conduct as normal and concluded he was capable of defending himself, the "first hurdle" of the statute was not crossed, rendering the constitution of a medical board unnecessary. The principle established is that the trial court must independently assess an accused's mental capacity before invoking the formal procedures for medical evaluation under Section 465.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate the automatic constitution of a medical board upon an application by the accused?
  • Is the trial court required to form an initial opinion on an accused's mental capacity before initiating proceedings under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court refuse to constitute a medical board if it observes the accused's behavior to be normal and capable of conducting a defense?
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• Mst. Rabyia Ilyyas vs Asj, etc2019 PLJ Lahore 452, 2019 LHC 488 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia & another vs The State2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 198 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2018-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen vs The State etc2020 MLD 452, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1122, 2019 LHC 773 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-13
  acquittalprivate complaintpower to acquit at any stagesection 265-k cr.p.c.statement of accusedpresumption of truth in judicial proceedingsbenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bahawalnagar, acquitting the respondents in a private complaint under Sections 302, 34, and 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that the acquittal was illegal because it was done without recording the statements of the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that no written application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure was ever filed. The Lahore High Court held that a trial court is empowered under Section 265-K to acquit an accused at any stage without recording a statement under Section 342 if there is no probability of conviction, and that filing a written application is not strictly mandatory since the court can act on its own motion or oral request. Furthermore, judicial proceedings carry a presumption of correctness under Article 129(e) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Finding no perversity or illegality in the trial court's appreciation of evidence or the extension of the benefit of the doubt, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be acquitted under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 without recording his statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Is the filing of a written application mandatory for the exercise of powers by a trial court under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • What is the evidentiary value of judicial proceedings regarding the recording of an application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in light of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • On what grounds can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal once the accused has attained double presumption of innocence?
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• Mst. Parveen Raza Jadun vs Bashir Ahmed Chandio and 5 others2020 YLR 1494, 2019 SHC 226 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Bibi vs The State & 3 others2020 PLD Lahore 332, 2019 LHC 3649 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar vs Mian Salah-Ud-Din and 3 others2019 MLD 1630 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Afshan vs Muhammad Ghalib and 3 others2019 CLC 1787 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Neelam Ashfaq vs Muhammad Iqbal and another2019 PLD Sindh 247 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazia Perveen vs S.H.O etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 910 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-01
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsparental jurisdictionwelfare of minorshazanatillegal detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This habeas corpus petition was filed by the mother of three minor children, alleging their illegal detention by their father, the respondent. The core legal question was whether the High Court, exercising its parental jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, could restore custody of minors to the mother despite pending guardianship proceedings. The Court observed that the mother held the primary right of hazanat given the minors' ages and noted that one child was being denied education and forced into labor at a workshop. The Court held that while the Guardian Court is the final arbiter for permanent custody, the High Court is not precluded from intervening to protect the welfare of minors and restore custody to a parent unlawfully deprived of it. The petition was allowed, and custody was restored to the mother, with directions for visitation rights for the father and a mandate that the pending guardianship proceedings proceed independently on their own merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restore custody of minors when guardianship proceedings are already pending?
  • Does the pendency of a custody application before a Guardian Court preclude the High Court from passing interim orders regarding the welfare and custody of minors?
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• Mst. Nazia Parveen vs SHO Police Station Jaleel Abad Multan and 32020 KLR Criminal Cases 323, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 910, 2019 YLR 2244, PLJ 2019 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-01
  habeas corpuscustody of minorshazanatguardian courtwelfare of minorsparental jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a habeas corpus petition filed by a mother alleging the illegal detention of her three minor children by their father, who had snatched them from her custody. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional or statutory powers, can restore the custody of minors to a parent when guardianship proceedings are already pending before a Guardian Court. The Lahore High Court held that while the Guardian Court is the final arbiter for custody, the High Court exercises parental jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to ensure the welfare of minors and remedy unlawful deprivation of custody. The court allowed the petition, granted custody of the minors to the mother, and laid down the principle that the pendency of proceedings before a Guardian Court does not bar the High Court from granting immediate relief in habeas corpus to safeguard the physical and emotional well-being of minors.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the pendency of an application before a Guardian Court bars the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the recovery of minors?
  • Can a parent seek immediate restoration of custody through a habeas corpus petition when unlawfully deprived of a minor's custody by the other parent?
  • What are the parameters for exercising parental jurisdiction regarding the welfare and custody of minor children in habeas corpus matters?
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• Mst. Naveed Waseem vs Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee through Additional Deputy Commissioner2019 CLC 616 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naureen vs Nadir Ali Rajpur and 2 others2019 MLD 1936 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseer Bibi and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 374 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-07
  pre-arrest bailbail confirmationtheftmischieffirst offendermala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 466 dated 16.10.2018 registered under Sections 379 and 440 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Chouhara, District Layyah, regarding allegations of mischief and theft. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail in the absence of corroborative evidence, unexplained delay in reporting, and lack of recovery. The Lahore High Court held that the application should be allowed and the ad-interim pre-arrest bail confirmed, noting an unexplained delay of two days in reporting the incident, no eyewitnesses, general allegations, no recovery from the petitioners, minimal estimated cost of the stolen property, and no previous criminal record indicating first-offender status and potential mala fide. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the allegations are general, recovery has not been effected, the accused have joined investigation, and mala fide can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when there is an unexplained delay in reporting the incident and no eyewitnesses?
  • Is bail appropriate where the allegations are general in nature and no recovery has been effected from the accused?
  • How is mala fide deduced in matters relating to pre-arrest bail applications?
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• Mst. Naseem Zehra and others vs Ghayaz Ahmed and others2019 CLC 1925, 2019 PLJ Karachi 79 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Najma Nighat vs Mst. Hira Qureshi and Others2019 SHC 82 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naghmana Zaidi vs Tayyaba Begum (deceased) through L.Rs2019 PLJ Lahore 500 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naghma Imran vs The State and 6 others2020 PLD Sindh 717, 2019 SHC 484 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-06
  criminal revisionprivate complaintmaintainabilityoffice objectioninferior criminal courtjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application was filed directly in the High Court under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against a Magistrate's order dismissing a private complaint under Section 203 of the Code. The office of the High Court raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the revision application without first exhausting the remedy before the District and Sessions Judge. The applicant contended that a revision application lies directly to the High Court from a Magistrate's order. The High Court, interpreting Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, held that while the High Court possesses the power to call for and examine the record of any inferior criminal court, a litigant cannot file a revision application against a Magistrate's order directly before the High Court as a matter of right. The explanation to Section 435 clarifies that Magistrates are inferior to the Sessions Judge. Consequently, the High Court upheld the office objection, dismissed the revision application, and directed the applicant to approach the concerned Sessions Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision application against an order of a Magistrate can be filed by a litigant directly before the High Court without first exhausting the remedy before the Sessions Judge?
  • What is the legal effect of the Explanation clause to Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the status of Magistrates?
  • Does the High Court's power to call for and examine records under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle a litigant to bypass the Sessions Court in revision proceedings?
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• Mst. Mukhtar Mai vs Abdul Khaliq & othersPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 548, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 141, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 918, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-13
  criminal reviewscope of review jurisdictionre-appraisal of evidencejudicial fallibilitysupreme court review
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal review petitions were filed seeking review of a common judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arising out of criminal appeals and a suo motu case concerning charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The petitioner's counsel raised various formulations regarding corroboration of testimony, evaluation of evidence, and legal implications of tribal jirgas. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court, while exercising its review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution, can re-appraise evidence and re-examine the merits of the case to take a view different from the judgment under review. The Court held that review is not a synonym for an appeal, does not permit the re-appraisal of evidence or rehearing of the matter, and is strictly limited to correcting patent mistakes, glaring omissions, or manifest errors floating on the surface. The Supreme Court concluded that the grounds urged by the petitioner required re-appraisal of evidence and did not fall within the narrow scope of review jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the review petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can re-appraise evidence while exercising review jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution?
  • Is a review petition synonymous with an appeal or a rehearing of the matter in issue?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances and limits under which review jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court?
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• Mst. Mehrunisa through Legal Heir vs Muhammad Aslam Paracha and 22019 YLR 1301 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Meeran Mai vs Muhammad Ramzan2019 CLC 1706 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Maryam and another vs Managing Director Elementary Education2019 PLC (C.S.) 1463 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-22
  regularization of servicecontract employeesservice regulationsconstitutional petitionright to educationabsorptionstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the refusal of the Elementary Education Foundation to regularize the services of the petitioners, who were employed as Community School Teachers. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, employed on a contract basis, qualified for regularization under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elementary Education Foundation Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2013. The respondents contended that the Regulations applied only to regular employees, not project staff, and that the petitioners' services were terminated upon the closure of their schools. The Court held that the Regulations defined "employee" without distinguishing between regular and project staff. Consequently, as the petitioners were employees on the commencing day of the Regulations, they were entitled to absorption under Paragraph-10. Furthermore, the Court found the termination of services violated a prior restraining order and Article 25-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The Court set aside the termination orders and directed the regularization of the petitioners' services, establishing that statutory regulations governing service conditions must be applied strictly according to their text without reading in exclusions not explicitly provided.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer distinguish between regular and project employees for regularization purposes if the governing regulations do not explicitly provide for such a distinction?
  • Does the closure of a school and subsequent termination of staff violate a court's restraining order issued during the pendency of a petition?
  • Are contract employees who were in service on the commencing day of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elementary Education Foundation Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2013 entitled to absorption under Paragraph-10?
  • Does the closure of community schools by a state foundation conflict with the constitutional mandate of providing free and compulsory education under Article 25-A?
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• Mst. Marvi and another vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 1133 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-11
  narcotics controlcharas recoverybenefit of doubtindependent mashirscontradictory evidenceprevious enmitychemical examiner reportcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of charas. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt given the reliance solely on police officials as mashirs, material contradictions in ocular evidence, delay in sending the case property for chemical analysis, and established previous enmity between the accused and the raiding party. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge due to serious infirmities, including the failure to associate independent witnesses during a road search, unexplained delays in the custody of the case property, and glaring contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. The court laid down the principle that the evidence of a complainant who also acts as the investigating officer is a weak piece of evidence requiring independent corroboration, and that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to associate independent witnesses during a roadside search under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 renders the recovery doubtful?
  • Does the testimony of a complainant who also acts as the investigating officer require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Whether material contradictions between prosecution witnesses regarding the date, time, and vehicle registration number are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Lubna vs Muhammad Sohail and 3 others2019 MLD 173 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-20
  Civil RevisionRejection of PlaintCourt FeeValuation of SuitFair TrialProcedural TechnicalitiesBenamidar
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arose from a dispute over the ownership of a property, where the trial court initially rejected the plaintiff's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for failure to properly value the suit property. The appellate court subsequently reversed this rejection, allowing the plaintiff to rectify the valuation and pay the requisite court fees. The defendant challenged this reversal in the High Court. The core legal question was whether the appellate court correctly exercised its discretion in setting aside the rejection of the plaint after the plaintiff had cured the procedural defect. The High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that since the plaintiff had complied with the directions to value the property and pay the court fees, the matter must proceed on its merits. The Court emphasized that resolving disputes on technicalities rather than merits would violate the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the Court upheld the appellate order, prioritizing substantive justice over procedural technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the plaintiff cures the defect of valuation and court fee after the matter is remanded?
  • Does the dismissal of a suit on technical grounds regarding court fee valuation violate the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is an appellate court justified in setting aside the rejection of a plaint where the plaintiff has complied with the court's directions regarding the valuation of the suit property?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Laila Qayyum vs Fawad Qayum2019 PLJ SC 492, 2019 P. S. C. 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-18
  declaratory suitnegative declarationpaternity challengelegitimacyDNA testSpecific Relief ActQanun-e-Shahadatfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit filed by the respondent seeking negative declarations that the petitioner was not the biological daughter of his late father and had no right to his legacy, along with the cancellation of official educational and identification documents reflecting her parentage. The trial court allowed the respondent's application for a DNA test, an order ultimately restored by the High Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a declaratory suit under Section 42 and a suit for cancellation under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, were maintainable by a sibling challenging a sister's paternity, and whether a DNA test could be ordered. The Court held that a plaintiff cannot invoke Section 42 to seek a negative declaration or challenge another person's legitimacy where no right or legal character of the plaintiff is infringed. Furthermore, under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, only a putative father can challenge paternity within the prescribed time, and a sibling lacks standing. The Court also held that compelling a person to give a DNA sample violates fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy under Article 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, dismissed the suit in its entirety by invoking its powers under Article 187 to do complete justice, and laid down principles regarding the strict scope of declaratory suits and the protection of family legitimacy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff can maintain a suit under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, to seek a negative declaration regarding the paternity or legitimacy of another person without asserting an infringement of the plaintiff's own legal character or right to property?
  • Does Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, permit a putative brother or sibling to challenge the paternity or legitimacy of a child born during the continuance of a valid marriage?
  • Can a court order a person to undergo a DNA test for the purpose of determining paternity when doing so infringes upon guaranteed constitutional rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy?
  • Whether a suit seeking the cancellation of written instruments under Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is maintainable without establishing that the instruments cause serious injury to the plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Laila Qayyum vs Fawad Qayum, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 449, 2019 SCP 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-14
  paternityDNA testdeclaratory suitlegitimacy of birthSpecific Relief ActQanun-e-Shahadat Orderconstitutional privacyinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit filed by the respondent seeking a negative declaration that the petitioner was not the real daughter of his late father and was an 'abandoned infant' adopted in 1996. The respondent sought to cancel various educational and identity documents and requested a DNA test to determine paternity. The Supreme Court examined whether such a suit was maintainable under Sections 39 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court held that Section 42 only permits declarations regarding a plaintiff's own legal character or property rights, not a negative declaration regarding a defendant's status that does not infringe upon the plaintiff's own title. Furthermore, Article 128 provides conclusive proof of legitimacy for children born during a valid marriage, and only the putative father may challenge paternity within the prescribed period. The Court ruled that compelling a DNA test violates the petitioner's constitutional rights to liberty, dignity, and privacy under Article 14. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order, dismissed the frivolous suit, and awarded costs to the petitioner.

  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kubra Amjad vs Mst. Yasmeen Tariq and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-07
  specific performanceagreement to selllimitation periodreasonable timeejectment proceedingslandlord and tenantinordinate delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement to sell property, filed by a tenant against the heirs of her deceased landlord. The core legal question was whether the suit, filed over eight years after the alleged agreement, was maintainable or time-barred, given the plaintiff's prolonged inaction and the fact that the suit was initiated only after the respondents filed ejectment proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' dismissal of the suit. The Court held that while limitation generally runs from the date of refusal, a plaintiff cannot remain indolent for an unreasonable period. Even where time is not of the essence, a party must perform their contractual obligations within a reasonable time. The Court emphasized that "reasonable time" cannot be stretched to cover years of silence or indefinite delays. Consequently, a plaintiff who fails to act with dispatch and only initiates litigation as a reactive measure to eviction proceedings cannot seek the equitable remedy of specific performance, as such delay is fatal to the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff maintain a suit for specific performance if they have remained indolent for an unreasonable period after the execution of an agreement to sell?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit for specific performance start from the date of refusal if the plaintiff has failed to act within a reasonable time?
  • Can a suit for specific performance be dismissed for inordinate delay even if time was not originally of the essence in the contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Khalida Bibi and another vs Muhammad Naeem2019 CLC 1204 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-03
  civil revisionburden of prooffraud and misrepresentationpower of attorneymutationdeclaration and possession
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the appellate court's judgment and decree through a civil revision petition, which had set aside the trial court's dismissal of the respondent's suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and possession. The core legal question concerned the validity of a mutation and general power of attorney challenged on the grounds of fraud, and whether the plaintiff discharged the burden of proof. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellate court's findings were illegal and against the material on record because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of the alleged fraud and must succeed on the strength of his own case. The court laid down the key principle that the burden of proof lies heavily on the person alleging fraud and misrepresentation, and a plaintiff cannot derive benefit from the weaknesses of the defendant's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the person who challenges the validity of a document on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Can a plaintiff succeed on the strength of the weaknesses or shortcomings of the defendant's case?
  • Whether an appellate court can set aside a trial court's judgment without proper evidence supporting the plaintiff's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kausar Bibi vs The State and 5 othersPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (F.S.C.) 122, 2019 PLD Federal Shariat Court 27 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-04-30
  acquittalSection 265-K CrPCdying declarationQanun-e-Shahadat OrderabductionZinarelevancy of evidencestar witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an acquittal order passed by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in a private complaint involving charges of abduction and Zina. The core legal question was whether the victim's cursory statement, recorded prior to her death, could be admitted as a "dying declaration" under Article 46 or as relevant evidence under Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, thereby establishing a probability of conviction. The Federal Shariat Court held that the victim's statement did not constitute a dying declaration because the cause of her death was not in issue, nor was it admissible under Article 47, as the accused had no right or opportunity to cross-examine the victim during the preliminary inquiry stage. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that without the star witness, there was no reasonable probability of conviction. The principle laid down is that a statement cannot be treated as a dying declaration unless it relates to the cause of death, and preliminary statements lack admissibility under Article 47 absent a prior right of cross-examination.

  Questions settled

  • Can a victim's statement be admitted as a dying declaration under Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 if the cause of death is not in issue?
  • Does a person complained of have a right to cross-examine a witness during the preliminary inquiry stage of a private complaint?
  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the star witness dies before trial?
  • Is a cursory statement recorded during a preliminary inquiry admissible under Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Kalsoom Bibi vs Javed Iqbal and others2019 PHC 402 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irum-un-Nisa and 8 others vs Mst. Naz Parver and another2019 [M] C.L.R. 1321 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Irum UN Nisa and 8 others vs Mst. Naz Parver and another2019 CLC 335 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Huma Jameel vs Mst. Rabia Tariq Rizvi and 5 others2019 MLD 1101 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-26
  technical knockoutcriminal revisionsupply of copiessubstantive justiceprocedural technicalitycustody of vehicleremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenges an order passed by the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi Central, which dismissed a criminal revision application filed by the applicant on the sole technical ground of non-supply of copies of the revision memo and its annexures to the respondents. The core legal question revolves around whether a revisional court can dismiss a matter on technical grounds of non-supply of copies without verifying the record or addressing the merits, especially when the record indicates copies were provided. The Sindh High Court held that courts must decide matters on merits, avoid technical knockouts, and ensure substantive justice rather than defeating rights through procedural technicalities. The High Court set aside the impugned order, remanded the revision application back to the Additional Sessions Judge for decision on merits within two months, and established that courts should refrain from ousting parties based on unsubstantiated procedural defaults.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revisional court can dismiss a criminal revision application on the sole ground of non-supply of copies without verifying the court record?
  • Should courts decide legal disputes on merits rather than ousting parties on technical grounds?
  • What is the proper scope of interference by a High Court under its inherent jurisdiction against an appellate order passed on a technical default?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hira vs 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and another2019 MLD 804 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-23
  visitation rightswelfare of the minorguardianshipcustody of minorsconstitutional petitionfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the judgment of the Appellate Court which modified the visitation rights of a father regarding his minor children. The petitioner, the mother, sought to set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts that granted the respondent-father visitation rights and temporary custody. The core legal question was whether the father, despite the dismissal of his guardianship application, could be denied visitation rights with his children, and whether the appellate court's modification of these rights was legally sound. The High Court held that the father’s right to visitation and the children's right to their father's supervision and affection are paramount for their welfare, especially when the father is providing maintenance and is not at fault. The Court affirmed that denying such contact merely to satisfy a parent's ego is detrimental to the minors. The key principle laid down is that the welfare of the minor is the primary consideration in custody and visitation matters, and a father cannot be deprived of visitation rights absent compelling reasons, particularly when he is fulfilling his maintenance obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a father be denied visitation rights with his minor children if he is providing maintenance and there is no evidence of his unfitness?
  • Does the welfare of the minor principle allow for the restriction of a father's visitation rights rather than a total denial?
  • Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 maintainable against concurrent findings of lower courts regarding visitation rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Haleema vs University of Sindh, through Vice-Chancellor and 22019 PLC (C.S.) 386 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-22
  family pensionqualifying servicecontract servicetemporary servicepensionary benefitsSindh University Employees Pension Statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought family pension benefits as the widow of a deceased employee of the University of Sindh, who had served on contract/temporary basis from 1997 to 2004 and on a regular confirmed basis from 2004 until his death in 2008. The core legal question was whether temporary or contract service preceding regular appointment can be counted toward fulfilling the mandatory minimum ten-year qualifying service requirement for pension under the relevant university statutes. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a minimum of ten years of regular, qualifying service is a mandatory benchmark for pension entitlement. The court ruled that while temporary or contract service can be counted toward pension calculations if followed by confirmation, it cannot be used to make up the deficiency in the mandatory ten-year qualifying service period itself. The key principle laid down is that 'counting' temporary service for pensionary benefits presupposes that the employee has already independently fulfilled the minimum qualifying regular service period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether temporary or contract service can be used to make good the deficiency in the minimum ten-year qualifying service required for pension?
  • Does an employee appointed on contract basis take over charge of a post so as to qualify for pensionary benefits?
  • What is the distinction between counting temporary service for pension and qualifying for a pension under the Sindh University Employees Pension Statutes, 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajira Bibi vs Civil Admin Officer, Paf Base, Peshawar and 2 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 692, 2020 PLJ Peshawar 45, 2019 PHC 346 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-04
  missing government employeepensionary benefitsconstitutional petitionenforced disappearancefundamental rightsfamily pensionQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the entitlement of the family of a missing Pakistan Air Force civilian employee to pensionary benefits and medical facilities. The petitioner sought relief after her husband went missing in 2016, requesting the release of his salary and restoration of family benefits. The core legal question was whether the family of a missing government servant is entitled to pensionary benefits before a formal declaration of death, particularly when the employee has been missing for over twelve months. The Court held that the petition should be allowed, ruling that pensionary benefits are not a bounty of the State but a fundamental right. Relying on the principle that an employee missing for over twelve months qualifies for family pension under applicable rules, and following Supreme Court precedent regarding the determination of a probable date of absence/death, the Court directed the respondents to process and revise the petitioner's pensionary benefits within two months. The judgment establishes that the family of a missing government servant is entitled to financial support and benefits when the employee has been missing for the prescribed statutory period.

  Questions settled

  • Is the family of a missing government employee entitled to pensionary benefits before a formal declaration of death?
  • Can a court determine a probable date of absence for a missing government employee to facilitate the calculation of pensionary benefits?
  • Does the right to pension constitute a fundamental right for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hajira Bibi vs Abidullah & others2019 PHC 179 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulshad vs Mansoor Qaim and another2019 MLD 1908 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-29
  criminal revisiontransfer of casereasoned orderjudicial discretionGeneral Clauses Actprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Khairpur, which transferred a direct complaint from the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-IV, Khairpur, to the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirwah. The core legal question was whether a judicial order transferring a case must contain reasons for such a decision. The Court held that the impugned order was legally deficient because it failed to assign any reasons for the transfer, thereby violating the statutory requirement to provide a reasoned decision. The Court set aside the transfer order and remanded the matter to the Sessions Judge, Khairpur, with a direction to pass a fresh order after providing an opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. The key principle laid down is that under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, any authority or office exercising powers under an enactment is mandated to provide reasons for its orders, particularly when those orders affect the rights of the parties involved, ensuring transparency and judicial accountability.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judicial order transferring a case from one court to another required to contain reasons for the decision?
  • Does the failure to provide reasons for a transfer order violate the requirements of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gulfama vs Mst. Jamsheda etc2019 CLC 1483, 2019 PHC 88 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Gul Nasreen and 2 others vs Mir Zaman and 4 others2019 CLC 847 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-08
  civil revisionsection 12(2) CPCrecording of evidencemortgage rightsex-parte decreefraud and misrepresentationremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a judgment and order passed by the District Judge, Mansehra, whereby a petition filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was allowed. The core legal question involved the propriety of deciding a petition under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 involving disputed factual controversies without recording evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that while recording evidence is not mandatory in every case under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, where the case involves factual inquiries and disputed questions of fact, the parties must be provided a proper opportunity to produce oral and documentary evidence. The court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the trial court for a fresh decision after recording evidence and affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, laying down the principle that mechanical disposal of applications involving disputed facts without factual inquiry is contrary to the administration of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recording of evidence is mandatory in every case arising under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a court decide a petition under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 involving controversial and disputed questions of fact without recording pro and contra evidence?
  • What is the proper course of action for a revisional court when the trial court passes an order in a summary manner without conducting a necessary factual inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fouzia vs The State2019 YLR 2544 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-19
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsControl of Narcotic Substances Actcrime against societywelfare of minorstentative assessmentwomen in custody
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, Mst. Fauzia, sought post-arrest bail in a narcotics case involving the recovery of 2 Kgs of Hashish/Charas under Section 6/9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail despite the nature of the offense being a 'crime against society.' The court held that the mere classification of an offense as a crime against society is insufficient to deny bail; there must be reasonable grounds to believe the accused is linked to the offense. Furthermore, the court noted that the FIR failed to detail the packaging or condition of the recovered narcotics, necessitating further probe. Additionally, the court emphasized the applicant's status as a woman with two dependent children as a significant factor favoring bail, citing the court's role in protecting the welfare of minors. Consequently, the court granted bail, establishing that tentative assessment of material, rather than the nature of the offense alone, determines bail eligibility, while also recognizing the specific protections afforded to women under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the classification of an offense as a 'crime against society' sufficient ground to deny bail?
  • Does the failure of an FIR to specify the packaging or condition of recovered narcotics constitute grounds for further probe in a bail application?
  • To what extent should the status of an accused as a woman with dependent children influence the court's decision on bail?
  • Must a court rely solely on the nature of the offense when deciding on bail, or is a tentative assessment of the available material required?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fatima and others vs Najeeb Ullah and another2020 CLC 780, 2019 LHC 4331 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-23
  civil revisionevidentiary valueexhibition of documentsinheritance suitremandburden of proofcourt witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing a suit for declaration of inheritance. The petitioners claimed to be legal heirs of the deceased, while respondents contested this, relying on documents that were merely "marked" rather than formally exhibited. The core legal question concerns the evidentiary value of unproved, marked documents and the appellate court's failure to consider a respondent's statement of no-objection. The High Court held that the lower courts committed material illegalities by relying on documents that were not formally proved through witnesses, which lacked legal sanctity. The Court emphasized that mere marking of a document does not dispense with the requirement of proving it in accordance with the law. Additionally, the appellate court erred by ignoring a recorded statement of no-objection from a respondent. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned judgments and remanded the case, directing the trial court to record evidence from relevant officials as court witnesses to ensure a just determination of the parties' rights rather than relying on technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Can a document that has been 'marked' but not formally exhibited or proved be considered as evidence by a court?
  • Is a court required to summon witnesses as court witnesses to unearth the truth when parties fail to produce them?
  • Does an appellate court have a duty to adjudicate upon a statement of no-objection recorded by a party during the proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farzana vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Education, Karachi2019 MLD 43 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farukh Sultan vs Haji Muhammad Younas and 6 others2019 YLR 1578 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farrah Naz and another vs Malik Shahbaz Ali and another2019 PLJ Lahore 455 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farhat vs Umair Hanif Ghanchi and others2019 CLC 1311 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farhat Fareed Sheikh vs Nib Bank Limited and 5 others2020 P C T L R 1110, 2019 CLD 632 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Farhat Bibi vs SHO, etc2019 PLD Lahore 380, 2019 PLJ Lahore 425, 2019 LHC 697 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Fareeda and another vs Mst. Khalida and 2 others2019 CLC 1243 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Faiza Ikram vs Imran Muzaffar etc2020 [M] C L R 1, 2019 PLD Lahore 715, 2019 LHC 1868 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-11
  civil revisionownership titleExcise and Taxation recordForm PT-1proof of possessionconcurrent findingsinheritance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for declaration, partition, and permanent injunction in favor of the respondents. The core legal question was whether an Excise and Taxation Department document (Form P.T.1) constitutes valid proof of ownership of the disputed property. The petitioner contended that the lower courts erred by disregarding the P.T.1 document in favor of an affidavit (Exh.P.2) executed by the predecessor-in-interest, Malik Nazar Muhammad. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the lower courts correctly determined ownership based on the affidavit and properly disregarded the P.T.1 form. The Court affirmed the principle that documents maintained by the Excise and Taxation Department, specifically Form P.T.1, are prepared solely for tax recovery purposes and do not confer title or ownership rights. The Court emphasized that such documents merely serve as evidence of possession, not ownership, and cannot override substantive evidence of title. Consequently, the concurrent judgments of the lower courts were found to be in accordance with law and facts.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Excise and Taxation Department Form P.T.1 constitute valid proof of ownership of property?
  • Can a document prepared for tax recovery purposes be used to establish title to immovable property?
  • Is a Form P.T.1 document admissible as evidence of possession in a property dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Chandni Asad vs Federation of Pakistan etc2020 PLC (C.S.) 96, 2019 LHC 2476 · Lahore High Court · 2019-07-15
  pensionary benefitsqualifying servicecivil service regulationsconstitutional petitionfundamental rightswidow's pensionforfeiture of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a widow seeking pensionary benefits for her late husband, a former employee of Pakistan Railways, after the department refused payment citing insufficient qualifying service and other alleged defaults. The core legal question was whether the deceased had completed the mandatory 25 years of service required for pension eligibility, considering periods of authorized leave and deputation. The Court held that the deceased’s service, including periods of authorized absence, met the qualifying criteria. Relying on the Civil Service Regulations, the Court determined that resignation under the circumstances did not entail forfeiture of past service and that authorized leave periods must be computed towards pensionable service. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that pension is a vested right, not a bounty, and its denial violates fundamental rights regarding dignity and property. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to release the pensionary benefits to the petitioner, affirming that the arbitrary withholding of such entitlements is unlawful and contrary to the constitutional protection of property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does resignation from government service automatically entail the forfeiture of past service for pension purposes?
  • Are periods of authorized leave and deputation included in the computation of qualifying service for pension?
  • Is the right to receive pension a form of property protected under the Constitution?
  • Can a government department deny pensionary benefits to a widow based on alleged service defaults not established through disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra vs District Police Officer, etc.2020 MLD 1891, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1435 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-29
  HazanatCustody of minorParental jurisdictionIllegal detentionGuardian CourtHabeas corpus
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the recovery of a two-year-old minor son from the alleged illegal detention of his father, the respondent. The petitioner, being the mother, asserted her right of hazanat, claiming the child was forcibly taken from her. The respondent argued that custody matters should be exclusively determined by the Guardian Court, where proceedings under the Guardian & Wards Act 1890 were already pending. The Court held that while the Guardian Court is the final arbitrator for permanent custody, the High Court, in exercising its parental jurisdiction under Section 491, is not precluded from intervening to restore custody to a parent who has been unlawfully deprived of it, especially to ensure the minor's welfare. Consequently, the Court ordered the immediate restoration of the minor's custody to the mother, while directing that the pending Guardian Court proceedings continue on their own merits and ensuring the father's visitation rights were preserved.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to restore custody of a minor when proceedings are already pending before a Guardian Court?
  • Does the pendency of a case before a Guardian Court preclude the High Court from intervening to ensure the immediate welfare of a minor?
  • Is a mother entitled to the custody of a two-year-old child under the principle of hazanat when the child has been forcibly removed by the father?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra and another vs Government of Sindh through Chief2019 MLD 1594 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bushra Ameen Alvi vs Incharge Judge, Family Judge-VIII, Karachi2019 MLD 659 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Shah Ban vs Land Acquisition Collector, A.C., Mardan, etc2019 SCP 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompulsory acquisitioncompensationeminent domaindelay in awardfundamental rightsproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment regarding the adequacy of compensation for land compulsorily acquired by the government for the expansion of a public college. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the Collector, and subsequently maintained by the High Court, reflected the true market value of the land at the time of acquisition, considering the significant delay in the award process and the exclusion of land used for access pathways. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly evaluate the evidence of market value and the impact of the delay. The Court enhanced the compensation rate based on proven market transactions, awarded compensation for the diminished value of land used for approach roads, and revalued the structures on the land. The key principle laid down is that authorities must determine compensation based on the actual market value at the time of acquisition, and where land is rendered unusable due to acquisition-related infrastructure, the owner is entitled to compensation for that diminution in value.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to make an award within one year of a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 automatically entitle a landowner to additional compensation under Section 48-A?
  • Is a landowner entitled to compensation for land rendered unusable or diminished in value due to the creation of approach roads during the acquisition process?
  • Does the constitutional right to property under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 mandate prompt compensation at market value for compulsorily acquired land?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bibi Shah Ban (Deceased) through L.Rs, etc vs Land Acquisition2019 KLR Supreme Court 400, 2019 SCMR 599, 2019 P.S.C. 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitioncompensationmarket valuecompulsory acquisitionfundamental rightsproperty rightsaward delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals regarding the determination of compensation for land compulsorily acquired by the government for the expansion of a college. The core legal question was whether the compensation awarded by the Collector and subsequently maintained by the High Court was adequate, given the prevailing market value of the land, the significant delay in the award, and the exclusion of land used for approach roads from the compensation package. The Supreme Court allowed the private appellants' appeal in part, enhancing the compensation rate to Rs. 10,000 per marla, awarding compensation for land used for approach roads, and re-evaluating the value of structures on the land. The Court affirmed that compensation must reflect the fair market value at the time of acquisition, considering evidence of comparable transactions, and that authorities cannot arbitrarily exclude land from compensation if its utility is diminished by the acquisition process. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that while delay in making an award is unjustifiable, additional compensation under Section 48-A requires proof of specific damages suffered due to that delay.

  Questions settled

  • Is an owner entitled to compensation for land rendered unusable due to the creation of approach roads during compulsory acquisition?
  • Does a delay in making an award under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 automatically entitle the landowner to additional compensation under Section 48-A?
  • What is the standard for determining the market value of land when evidence of comparable sales is available?
  • Can a court enhance compensation for compulsorily acquired land based on evidence of market value that was disregarded by lower forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Baskia and another vs Gusher alias Gunair and another2019 YLR 484 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-08-31
  criminal appealabetmentacquittalinterested witnessesmurderbenefit of the doubtcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of respondent No. 1 by the Sessions Judge Diamer for charges of abetment in a murder case. The prosecution alleged that the respondent instigated his co-accused to commit the murder of the complainant's husband due to an old enmity. The core legal question was whether the prosecution produced sufficient, reliable, and corroborated evidence to prove the charge of abetment beyond a reasonable doubt against an accused not present at the scene of the crime. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, as the witnesses were interested, hostile, and related to the deceased, their belated allegations lacked prior reporting, and corroborative evidence was absent. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal in limine, upholding the acquittal and affirming that conviction cannot be sustained on uncorroborated testimony of interested witnesses in the absence of independent proof.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for abetment be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of interested and inimical witnesses?
  • Is the acquittal of an accused by the trial court liable to be interfered with when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the evidentiary value of belated allegations made by related witnesses against an accused who was not present at the scene of the crime?
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• Mst. Bano vs Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate No. XII, Hyderabad2019 YLR 2178 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Balqees vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 91 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-14
  criminal appealextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencemurderbenefit of doubtmedical evidenceacquittalstrangulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband, while her co-accused was acquitted. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, comprising an extra-judicial confession, medical evidence coupled with a chemical examiner's report, and a recovery. The core legal questions involved the reliability of an extra-judicial confession as a weak type of piece of evidence without independent corroboration, and whether a conviction for murder can be sustained solely on medical and expert evidence when the co-accused alleged to have committed the primary act has been acquitted. The Lahore High Court held that the extra-judicial confession was contradictory, uncorroborated, and did not inspire confidence, and that expert and medical evidence alone cannot pinpoint the culprit. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, laying down the principle that an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession and medical evidence without direct links are insufficient to sustain a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of an extra-judicial confession without strong independent corroboration?
  • Whether medical and chemical examiner reports alone can pinpoint the perpetrator of a crime in the absence of direct or reliable circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused charged with the primary fatal act impact the sustainability of a conviction against a remaining accused whose role is secondary?
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• Mst. Ayesha Abdul Maleek vs Addl. District Judge, etc2020 YLR 401, 2019 LHC 1191 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Asiya Ashraf Chaudhary vs Government of the Punjab etc2020 CLC 503, 2019 LHC 4039 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashi Munir vs National Accountability Bureau, Rawalpindi, etc.2019 PLJ Islamabad 121 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ashi Munir vs National Accountability Bureau, Rawalpindi and others2019 P Cr. L J 997 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-10
  National Accountability Bureautransfer of propertysection 23bona fide purchaserpenal statuteaccused personconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges a letter issued by the National Accountability Bureau refusing to permit the transfer of the petitioner's plot, which had been subjected to caution under section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question is whether section 23 of the Ordinance applies to properties owned by persons who are neither accused persons nor relatives, associates, or agents of accused persons in ongoing accountability proceedings. The court held that the provisions of section 23 are strictly restricted to properties owned by or in possession of an accused person, their relatives, associates, or those acting on their behalf. Since the petitioner was a bona fide purchaser and neither she nor the previous owners were arrayed as accused in the pending reference, section 23 was not attracted. The court laid down the principle that the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 being a penal statute must be construed strictly, and its restraint provisions regarding property transfer do not extend to persons who do not fall within the definition of an accused or their associates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 23 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 applies to property owned by a person who is not an accused in pending accountability proceedings?
  • Does the National Accountability Bureau have the jurisdiction to restrain a bona fide purchaser from transferring property when no inquiry or investigation is pending against them?
  • How should penal statutes such as the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be interpreted regarding restrictions on property rights?
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• Mst. Anwari vs Abdul Waheed and another2019 MLD 701 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aneela Zehra vs Kaleem Haider & Others2021 CLC 73, 2019 SHC 437 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Almas Ismail and 6 others vs Fayyaz Hussain and 5 others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1653, 2019 CLC 199 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-09Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allah Rakhi vs Commissioner Sahiwal Division/Chairman2019 PLC (C.S.) 1452 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-11
  service mattertransfer of civil servantjurisdictional barArticle 212writ jurisdictionService Tribunalterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by a civil servant challenging an order of transfer, alleging that she was ignored in favor of a candidate with lower merit marks. The petitioner sought a direction from the High Court to have her departmental representations decided. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to adjudicate upon the transfer of a civil servant, notwithstanding the bar imposed by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that matters concerning the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant fall exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal. The Court affirmed that Article 212 is a non-obstante provision that prevails over Article 199, thereby ousting the High Court's jurisdiction. It further clarified that the statutory process of filing departmental representations and awaiting a decision cannot be bypassed or frustrated by invoking constitutional jurisdiction, as the pendency of such representations does not render a civil servant remediless.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a petition regarding the transfer of a civil servant?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, prevail over the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters?
  • Can a civil servant invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court while a departmental representation is pending before the relevant authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Afsheen Atiq vs State through Advocate General & 2 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1418 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-15
  forfeiture of propertyanti-smugglingburden of proofdower propertytainted assetscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge, Customs, Taxation and Anti-Smuggling, whereby the appellant's residential house was forfeited to the Federal Government under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977, following allegations of assets acquired through smuggling by her husband. The core legal question concerns whether the appellant successfully discharged the burden of proof to establish independent, lawful ownership of the property through her dower and sale of personal jewellery. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellant failed to establish a legal source of income, as the documentary evidence regarding her dower, sale receipts, and prior house sale contradicted her claims and revealed the property to be tainted assets derived from her husband's illegal income. Consequently, the High Court dismissed both connected appeals, laying down the principle that failure to satisfactorily discharge the statutory burden of proof regarding legitimate acquisition of assets under the anti-smuggling laws warrants the forfeiture of such property to the State.

  Questions settled

  • Whether forfeiture of property under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 can be sustained when the claimant fails to prove a legal source of income?
  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977 to establish lawful acquisition of assets?
  • Can a claim of ownership based on dower and sale of personal jewelry succeed without corroborative and unimpeachable documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Adeeba Begum through Authorized Attorney vs Travel Corporation2019 YLR 2765 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Abeera Khan vs Adnan Jamil and another2019 CLC 1478 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-13
  interim custodyguardianshipHizanatwelfare of the minorconstitutional jurisdictionFamily Courts Actvisitation rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution Petition challenged a Family Court order granting interim custody of two minor daughters to their father under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The petitioner, the mother, argued that the lower court ignored her right to Hizanat and failed to properly assess the welfare of the minors. The High Court observed that the Family Court’s order was perverse, as it relied on the mother’s lack of male support and financial circumstances to deny her custody, without considering the necessity of evidence. The Court held that in guardianship matters, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minor, and courts exercise quasi-parental jurisdiction. It further established that financial constraints or the absence of male relatives do not automatically disqualify a mother from custody during the Hizanat period. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that visitation rights are an inherent right of parents, and directed the Family Court to decide the interim custody application afresh after hearing both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mother's lack of financial resources or male support automatically disqualify her from the custody of minors during the Hizanat period?
  • Is an order granting interim custody of minors without providing for visitation rights to the other parent legally sustainable?
  • What is the paramount consideration for courts when exercising quasi-parental jurisdiction in matters of child custody?
  • Can a court determine an application for interim custody under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, without recording evidence when material facts are disputed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst, Bibi Shah Ban (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others vs Land2019 SCMR 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-04
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationcompulsory acquisition chargesdelay in awardapproach roadsfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute regarding the determination of compensation for private land compulsorily acquired for the expansion of Fazle Haq College Mardan under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal questions involved the adequacy of the market value awarded for the acquired land, compensation for structures, diminution of value for land utilized for approach roads, and entitlement to additional compensation for delayed awards under section 48-A of the Act. The Supreme Court partly allowed the private appellants' appeal and dismissed the official appeals. The Court held that the market value of the land at the relevant time was established at Rs. 10,000 per marla based on un-rebutted evidence, and revised the compensation accordingly alongside 15 percent compulsory acquisition charges and 6 percent annual interest. The Court laid down that landowners are entitled to realistic market-based compensation reflecting the potential and location of the land, compensation for diminished value of land restricted to approach roads, and proper assessment of structures rather than arbitrary reliance on patwari estimates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the market value of compulsorily acquired land must be determined based on un-rebutted evidence of contemporaneous sale transactions?
  • Are landowners entitled to additional compensation for diminished value when portions of their land are restricted to serve as approach roads?
  • Whether landowners are entitled to additional compensation under section 48-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when an award is delayed beyond one year without establishing specific damages?
  • Does the constitutional right to property under Article 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan mandate prompt and fair compensation for compulsorily acquired land?
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• Mst Nazia vs State through SHO, etc2019 PLD Lahore 373, 2019 PLJ Lahore 281, 2019 LHC 694 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18
  writ petitionquashing of FIRlocus standiaggrieved personconstitutional jurisdictionabducteemaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by an alleged abductee seeking the quashing of an FIR registered under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The primary legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether an abductee or a prosecution witness possesses the locus standi to maintain a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 for the quashing of an FIR. The Court examined the definition of an "aggrieved person" in the context of constitutional jurisdiction, relying on established precedents from the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Court held that an abductee or a witness does not qualify as an "aggrieved party" because the registration of an FIR against others does not infringe upon their fundamental rights, nor does it cause them a legal grievance or loss. Consequently, the Court upheld the office objection regarding the maintainability of the petition, ruling that an abductee or witness lacks the necessary standing to invoke the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Does an alleged abductee have the locus standi to file a constitutional petition for the quashing of an FIR?
  • Can a prosecution witness be considered an aggrieved party for the purpose of invoking Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable by a person who is not an accused in the FIR but seeks its quashing?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst Afsheen vs Province Of Sindh & Others2019 SHC 80 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Ms. Urooj Fatima vs Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and three [03]2020 YLR 859, 2019 SHC 444 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-14Read full judgment →
• Ms. Shazia Akbar Ghalzai vs Khurram Mehboob and others2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 36, 2019 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-14
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsuckling babyterritorial jurisdictionguardian courtchild custody
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a habeas corpus application under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before the Islamabad High Court for the production and custody of her minor child, which was dismissed on the ground that the respondent had removed the minor beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in refusing jurisdiction where the minor was forcibly removed from the petitioner's custody within Islamabad. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in law, as the initial wrongful removal occurred within its territorial limits. The Court set aside the impugned order, converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and maintained the custody of the suckling infant with the mother, while reserving the respondent's right to approach the Guardian Court for visitation and custody determination. The key principle laid down is that the High Court maintains jurisdiction under Section 491 Cr.P.C. to entertain matters concerning the illegal removal of a minor when such removal originates within its territorial jurisdiction, and that the welfare of a suckling child is best served in the mother's custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Islamabad High Court has jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when a minor is forcibly removed from its territorial limits?
  • Does a mother have a prima facie right to the custody of a suckling baby?
  • Can custody of a minor be granted to the mother in habeas corpus proceedings when the welfare of the minor points towards her?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Serwat Azim vs Sindh Bank Limited through President/CEO and 7 others2020 PLJ Karachi 83, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 975 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-23
  master and servantdomestic inquirytemporary injunctionbank employeecharge sheetdepartmental proceedingspremature suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a suit for declaration, injunction, and recovery filed by the plaintiff, a bank branch manager, seeking to restrain the defendant bank from proceeding further with a charge sheet, suspension order, and inquiry. The core legal question involves whether the High Court should interfere at a pre-emptive stage in domestic departmental inquiries governed by the principle of master and servant, and whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case for an injunction. The court held that the plaintiff approached the court prematurely to thwart domestic inquiry proceedings after already submitting a detailed reply and failing to demonstrate any patent illegality or violation of due process. The court established that civil courts are generally reluctant to interfere in master-and-servant relationships and domestic inquiries at an intermediate or interlocutory stage unless there is a clear absence of opportunity or a patent illegality apparent on the face of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court can interfere in domestic inquiries and departmental proceedings at an interlocutory stage under a master-and-servant relationship?
  • Does the issuance of a charge sheet and supplementary charge sheet without a prior separate show-cause notice vitiate departmental inquiry proceedings?
  • Whether an employee who has already submitted a detailed reply to a charge sheet can claim denial of due process for lack of certain documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Sarwar Mai vs The State and 2 others2019 YLR 2696 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-26
  criminal revision applicationsurety bondforfeiture of bondpenalty on suretymitigating circumstancesvoluntary surrendersubsequent conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Revision Application challenges an order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi East, which imposed a penalty on a surety for the accused's brief absence during trial. The core legal question revolves around whether penalty should be imposed on a surety under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the accused subsequently surrendered voluntarily, faced trial, and was ultimately convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Sindh High Court held that in view of mitigating circumstances, the voluntary surrender of the accused, the final conclusion of the trial resulting in conviction, and the financial hardship of the surety who is a maidservant and sister of the convict, the impugned order imposing a penalty must be set aside. The key principle laid down is that where an accused ultimately surrenders, faces trial to its conclusion, and is convicted, lenient view coupled with mitigating circumstances warrants setting aside surety bond penalties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether penalty can be imposed on a surety when the accused voluntarily surrenders after brief absence?
  • Does the subsequent conviction and sentencing of the accused affect the forfeiture of a surety bond?
  • Can financial hardship and mitigating circumstances be grounds for setting aside a surety penalty under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Sadaf Munir Khan vs Chairman, Reconciliation Committee and 22019 PLD Lahore 285 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-08
  territorial jurisdictiondivorce certificatenotice of talaqMuslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961overseas Pakistanisreconciliation committeeRule 3(b)
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court challenging an order and a Divorce Certificate issued by the Chairman, Reconciliation Committee, Cantonment Board, Walton Cantt., Lahore, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a local Union Council Chairman in Pakistan possesses territorial jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, read with Rule 3(b) of the West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, when both spouses were dual nationals permanently residing abroad at the time of the alleged pronouncement of talaq. The Lahore High Court allowed the petition, declaring the impugned order and Divorce Certificate to be of no legal effect. The Court held that under Rule 3(b), jurisdiction is primarily determined by where the wife resided at the time of pronouncement. It established that for Pakistani nationals residing permanently abroad, Notification S.R.O. No. 1086(K)/61 under Section 2(b) provides an enabling mechanism designating Pakistan missions abroad as the appropriate forum to exercise the powers of the Chairman under the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Which Union Council holds territorial jurisdiction under Rule 3(b) of the West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 to entertain a notice of talaq when the wife resides abroad at the time of pronouncement?
  • Does a local Union Council Chairman in Pakistan have jurisdiction to issue a divorce certificate under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 if neither spouse resided within his territorial jurisdiction at the relevant time?
  • What is the legal effect and application of Notification S.R.O. No. 1086(K)/61 issued under Section 2(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 regarding Pakistanis permanently residing abroad?
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• Ms. Saba vs The Province of Sindh & others2019 SHC 142, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 113, 2022 PLJ Karachi 77 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-17
  constitutional petitionpreliminary testpaper leakageretestjudicial reviewproportionalitywednesbury unreasonablenessvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court to challenge the cancellation and annulment of a preliminary test conducted for the recruitment of Additional District and Sessions Judges, and to seek a direction for the petitioner to appear in the subsequent written test without taking a retest. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of a preliminary test due to a potential conflict of interest and paper leakage, and the consequent requirement of a retest, violated the petitioner's fundamental rights or constituted an arbitrary administrative action. The court held that the cancellation of the tainted test and the holding of a retest were valid, reasonable, and proportionate measures to ensure transparency and merit, and that mere appearance in an unannounced preliminary test created no vested right. The key principles laid down are that administrative authorities possess the power to cancel examinations tainted by paper leaks to maintain institutional credibility, and that decisions satisfying the tests of Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality will not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the cancellation of a competitive examination due to a question paper leak infringe upon a candidate's fundamental rights under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Whether a candidate acquires a vested right to proceed to a main examination based on self-calculated marks from an unofficial answer key of a preliminary test that was subsequently cancelled?
  • Is a decision by testing authorities to conduct a retest following the discovery of a conflict of interest and paper leakage protected under the principles of proportionality and Wednesbury unreasonableness?
  • Does Article 199(5) of the Constitution of Pakistan bar a constitutional petition challenging an administrative or executive decision regarding recruitment processes?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms. Nazia Munir vs The Government of the Punjab etc2020 [M] C L R 1525, 2019 PLC (C.S) 1077, 2019 LHC 699 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-11
  ad-hoc appointmentregularization of servicelegitimate expectancynatural justiceconstitutional petitionarbitrary terminationsubstantial justicecivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the termination of the petitioner, who served as a Statistical Officer (BS-17) on an ad-hoc basis for over eight years. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to regularization of service given her long tenure and whether her termination, executed without notice or a hearing, was lawful. The Court held that the termination orders were arbitrary and violated principles of natural justice. It found that the petitioner’s repeated service extensions created a legitimate expectancy of regularization. The Court emphasized that technicalities must not obstruct substantial justice and that public authorities cannot act whimsically to the detriment of citizens. By terminating the petitioner after she had become overage, the authority effectively destroyed her future employment prospects. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the petitioner’s reinstatement. The judgment reaffirms that state functionaries must act fairly and that long-term ad-hoc appointees, whose services were consistently deemed satisfactory by the employer, are entitled to protection against arbitrary removal and are eligible for regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Does the repeated extension of an ad-hoc appointment create a legitimate expectancy for regularization of service?
  • Can a public authority terminate an employee who has served for several years without providing a show-cause notice or an opportunity for a hearing?
  • Should technicalities of law be allowed to defeat substantial justice in cases of employment termination?
  • Is a government authority permitted to act arbitrarily in the termination of an employee who has become overage due to the authority's own administrative delays?
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• Ms. Faryal Kaleem Shaikh vs Federal Ombudsman and Ors2021 PLC (C.S.) 374, 2019 SHC 370 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-17
  transfer and postingunmarried female civil servantadministrative policyEstacodewrit of mandamusservice jurisprudencegovernment service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the transfer of the petitioner, an Assistant Registrar (BPS-17), from Karachi to Peshawar, arguing it violated the government's policy regarding the posting of unmarried female civil servants. The core legal question was whether the transfer order, which relocated the petitioner away from her parents' residence, was arbitrary and contrary to established administrative guidelines. The Court held that while transfer is an incident of service, the government's established policy, as reflected in the Office Memorandum dated 17 December 1999 and the Estacode, mandates that unmarried female government servants should, as far as possible, be posted at the station of their parents' residence. The Court found that the petitioner's transfer violated these specific guidelines, which are applicable to autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies. Consequently, the Court declared the transfer notification illegal and set it aside, emphasizing that administrative authorities must adhere to established policy guidelines concerning the posting of female employees unless compelling public interest necessitates otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Does the government policy regarding the posting of unmarried female civil servants at the station of their parents' residence create an enforceable expectation?
  • Are the transfer guidelines for female government servants contained in the Office Memorandum dated 17 December 1999 applicable to autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Can a court interfere with a transfer order if it is found to be in violation of established government posting policies?
  Read full judgment →
• Ms Naheed Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2019 CLC 938 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-02-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Zarina Iqbal vs Haji Jaffar and others2019 SHC 220 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-06
  temporary injunctionchange of land useresidential plotflat-sitefloor area ratiobuilding regulationshigh-rise buildinglease conditions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved an application for a temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff to restrain the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) from approving a proposed building plan submitted by the defendant for the construction of a basement and ground plus two upper floors containing twelve flats on an open residential plot in Jamshed Quarters, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the construction of flats on a residential plot requires a formal change of land use under the Karachi Building & Town Planning Regulations, 2002, and whether lease conditions restricting construction to ground plus one floor prevail over the said regulations. The Sindh High Court held that the Karachi Building & Town Planning Regulations, 2002 prevail over inconsistent lease conditions, and that constructing flats on a residential plot does not constitute a change of land use unless it falls within a designated High Density Zone, provided the building complies with permissible Floor Area Ratio, height restrictions, and density standards. The court laid down the principle that while building flats on a residential plot does not generally require a change of land use under current regulations, the number of floors and units remains strictly governed by applicable Floor Area Ratio and height limits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 2002 prevail over inconsistent lease conditions restricting construction on a residential plot?
  • Does the construction of flats on a residential plot constitute a change of land use under the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 2002?
  • Under what circumstances is a formal change of land use required to construct multi-family flats on a residential property in Karachi?
  • Whether an interim injunction can be granted against the approval of a building plan where the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of statutory violation?
  Read full judgment →