Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs Exceed Private Limited vs Pakistan Housing Authority2019 YLR 427 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-07
  stay of legal proceedingsarbitration agreementready and willingstep in the proceedingsdispute resolution mechanismcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal challenges an order passed by the Civil Judge, Islamabad, whereby an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 filed by the respondent was accepted and proceedings in the appellant's civil suit for declaration, recovery, and injunction were stayed pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The core legal questions involved whether a defendant's mere silence or failure to respond to pre-suit demands constitutes a lack of readiness and willingness to arbitrate, whether seeking an adjournment for a written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings, and whether a suit can be stayed when the contractual pre-condition of referring disputes to the engineer had not been met by the plaintiff. The Islamabad High Court held that mere inaction or failure to reply to demands for money does not establish unwillingness to arbitrate, that routine adjournment for a written statement without a specific request by the defendant does not constitute a step in the proceedings, and that a plaintiff who bypasses the contractual dispute resolution mechanism cannot defeat the defendant's right to seek a stay under Section 34. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a defendant's failure to respond to pre-suit letters and demands for money constitute a lack of readiness and willingness to arbitrate under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Whether an adjournment granted in routine by the court for filing a written statement amounts to taking a step in the proceedings so as to disentitle a party from seeking a stay under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a plaintiff who initiates a civil suit in disregard of a contractual dispute resolution mechanism successfully object to the staying of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1940?
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• Messrs Engro Foods Pvt. Ltd. and 2 others vs Competition Commission2019 CLD 981 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2019-01-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Emran Momin Tokhi Ltd through Representative vs The Principal2019 PTD (Trib.) 704 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-10-23Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ekada Corporation, Karachi vs The Deputy Collector of Customs, Group-II, MCC of PMBQ, Karachi and another2019 PCTLR 1238, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1506 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-10-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Educational Excellence Limited, Lahore vs Commissioner Inland2020 P C T L R 491, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 2076 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-06-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eastern Medical Technology Services vs Province of Punjab2019 PLD Lahore 395 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-29
  partnership dissolutiondeath of partnerpublic procurementpre-qualificationgrievance committeesubstantial complianceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the decision of the Grievance Committee which declared the petitioner firm, Messrs Eastern Medical Technology Services (EMTS), non-compliant and ineligible to participate in a public procurement bidding process on the ground that the two-member partnership stood dissolved upon the death of one of its founding partners. The core legal question revolves around whether the death of a partner in a two-member firm results in automatic dissolution despite an express saving clause in the partnership deed providing for the continuation of the business by the surviving partner, and whether the reconstituted firm was a valid legal entity at the time of submitting its pre-qualification proposal. The Lahore High Court held that dissolution upon the death of a partner is subject to the contract between the partners, and an intention to continue the partnership with legal heirs can be established through express terms or implied conduct. The Court ruled that the petitioner firm was a valid and existing partnership at all relevant times and not dissolved. The Grievance Committee's decision was set aside, and respondents were directed to proceed with the bidding process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a partner in a two-member partnership firm automatically dissolve the firm by operation of law despite a contrary provision in the partnership deed?
  • Can an agreement to continue a partnership after the death of a partner be implied from the conduct of the surviving partner and the legal heirs of the deceased partner?
  • Does a Grievance Committee have the authority to ignore certification and conclusive proof issued by the Registrar of Firms regarding the existence of a partnership?
  • Whether failure to immediately notify the Registrar of Firms regarding a change in the constitution of a partnership affects the legal existence of the partnership?
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• Messrs Divine Developers (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Bank of Punjab2019 CLD 489 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Diamond Metals (Aop) through Attoney vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and 3 othersPTCL 2019 CL. 707, 2019 PTD 1296 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Deans Industries vs Collector of Customs (Adjudication) and another2019 PTD (Trib) 281 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-09-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Crescent Star Insurance Ltd. through Authorized Officer and another vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Chairman and others2019 CLD 134 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cosmos International, Karachi vs The Commissioner Inland2020 P C T L R 690, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 2233 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-08-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cie Computers through Proprietor and 2 others vs Nib Bank Limited2020 P C T L R 1278, 2019 CLD 760 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bronx International through Proprietor vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division and 3 others2019 PTD 1230 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mazagi and 3 others vs Mst. Ashraf Bibi and 2 others2019 MLD 304 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-12-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bismillah Cotton Factory through Proprietor and others vs Bank2019 CLD 1010 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bhimra Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized representative2019 CLC 1247 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-14
  gas meter configuration defectunder-billingOGRAconstitutional jurisdictionwrit of certiorariconsumer complaintnatural gas
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged orders passed by the designated officer and the full bench of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) regarding a demand notice issued to the petitioner consumer by Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) for under-billing caused by a defective gas meter configuration. The core legal questions involved whether SNGPL could lawfully recover arrears for the disputed period under the contract terms and whether OGRA's decisions suffered from jurisdictional or legal flaws. The Lahore High Court held that the concurrent findings of OGRA validating the under-billing demand based on comparative consumption data and contract clauses 14 and 15 were unexceptionable. The Court laid down that under its constitutional supervisory jurisdiction, it cannot interfere with technical factual determinations of administrative forums regarding meter readings and consumption data when no excess of jurisdiction or violation of natural justice is established, and that an unexecuted draft contract under a new gas policy cannot override the subsisting binding contract between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a gas utility company can raise a demand for under-billed gas consumption resulting from a defective meter configuration based on average monthly consumption under the governing contract?
  • Can unexecuted draft contracts introduced under a subsequent gas policy override the terms of a subsisting contract between a consumer and a gas utility company?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's constitutional supervisory jurisdiction under a writ of certiorari when reviewing technical and factual determinations made by administrative regulatory bodies like OGRA?
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• Messrs Benson Pharmaceuticals, Islamabad vs Commissioner Inland2019 PTD (Trib.) 206 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-11-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bashir Pipe Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan and another2019 PCTLR 861, 2019 PTD 980 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bank Al-Habib Limited through Branch Manager and 14 others vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau, Mirpur through Chairman and 7 others2019 CLD 1209 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bank Al-Habib Limited through Branch Manager and 14 others vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Mirpur through Chairman and 7 others2019 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 14 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aziz Impex, Karachi and others vs Assistant Director, Directorate General of Pca, Karachi and 3 others2019 PCTLR 1324, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1786 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2019-04-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Avicon Aviation vs Assistant Commissioner, SRB, Karachi2020 P C T L R 911, PTCL 2020 CL. 87, 2019 PTD 2280 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Attock Gen Ltd vs Additional Commissioner (Audit), Large2019 MLD 870 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asio African Co. (Pvt) Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan2019 PTD 1368 · Sindh High Court · 2019-01-04
  tax exemptionadvance taxsubordinate legislationultra viresequal protectiondiscriminatory classificationindustrial undertakingimport duty
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, industrial undertakings engaged in flour manufacturing, challenged condition (v) of SRO No. 717(I)/2014, which restricted the issuance of advance tax exemption certificates under Clause 72B of Part-IV of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to importers who had imported the same raw material in the previous year. The core legal question was whether this condition created an arbitrary, discriminatory classification and whether subordinate legislation could impose restrictions not envisaged by the parent statute. The Court held that condition (v) was illegal and ultra vires. It reasoned that the condition created an unreasonable classification between similarly placed importers of the same commodity, violating the fundamental rights to equal protection and fair competition under Articles 4, 18, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that subordinate legislation cannot impose restrictive covenants that conflict with or exceed the scope of the substantive statutory provisions. Consequently, the impugned condition was declared void, as it lacked a rational basis and undermined the legislative intent of the exemption scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Can subordinate legislation impose restrictive conditions not envisaged by the parent statute?
  • Does a condition in an SRO that restricts tax exemptions to previous importers violate the constitutional right to equal protection?
  • Is a classification that distinguishes between new and existing importers of the same raw material constitutionally valid?
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• Messrs Ashrafi Bread Industries vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 PTD 1858 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asean International Service, Islamabad vs The Commissioner2019 PTD (Trib.) 1235 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-01-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asean International Islamabad vs Commissioner Inland2019 PTD (Trib.) 1227 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-02-19Read full judgment →
• Messrs Arshad Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs The C.I.R.2019 PTD (Trib.) 176 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-08-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Apple Paper Products (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director Chief Executive2019 PTD 787 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amtex Limited, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2019 PTD (Trib.) 160 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-08-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amreli Steel Ltd., Karachi vs The Commissioner (Ir), Ltu, Karachi2019 PTD (Trib.) 792 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-12-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Allied Bank Ltd vs Assistant Commissioner SRB2019 PTD (Trib.) 263 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-08-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Noor through Partner vs The Province of Sindh through Chief2019 PLD Sindh 400 · Appellate Tribunal Sindh Revenue Board · 2019-01-10
  public procurementtender evaluationtransparencymala fideengineer's estimateinjunctive reliefgovernment contracts
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for declaration and injunction challenging the award of seven government contracts by the Karachi Development Authority. The plaintiff alleged that the tender process was non-transparent, tainted by favoritism, and manipulated to benefit specific contractors. The core legal question was whether the procurement agency acted lawfully in its evaluation of bids, specifically regarding the application of Clause 11.3.4 of the procurement regulations, which allows for the rejection of bids more than 30% below the Engineer’s Estimate. The court found that the agency manipulated decimal figures up to nine places to circumvent this threshold and improperly accepted bids in paisa denominations. Holding that the process lacked transparency and fairness, the court set aside the contract awards. It established the principle that public functionaries dealing with public funds must act with absolute fidelity, transparency, and impartiality. The court ordered the agency to re-advertise the tenders, obtain realistic Engineer’s Estimates, and implement a proper acknowledgment procedure for bid submissions, emphasizing that arbitrary discretion in awarding government largess is unconstitutional and invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Can a procurement agency manipulate decimal percentages to circumvent the 30% rejection threshold for bids?
  • Is a suit challenging a public procurement process maintainable when the agency fails to establish a functional Grievance Redressal Committee?
  • Does the failure to provide acknowledgments for submitted tenders and the keeping of tender boxes open constitute a procedural irregularity warranting the setting aside of the tender process?
  • Can a court interfere with the award of government contracts if the process is found to be tainted by favoritism and lack of transparency?
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• Messrs Al-Muiz-1 CNG, Fateh Jang vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 CLC 851 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-07-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Khair Gadoon Ltd vs The Appellate Tribunal and others2020 PLJ SC 72, 2020 P SC 168, PTCL 2020 CL. 180, 2020 PTD 18, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-21
  central excise dutyshow cause noticewrong provision of lawad valorem assessmentretail price assessmenttax appealremand of matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from leave to appeal granted against the Islamabad High Court's decision in tax appeals, which had declined the appellant's challenge regarding show-cause notices issued for alleged central excise duty evasion under section 4(2) of the Central Excises Act, 1944. The core legal questions concerned whether the citation of a wrong statutory provision in a show-cause notice vitiates recovery proceedings, and how appellate forums should handle mixed questions of law and fact not initially addressed. The Supreme Court held that the mere mention of a wrong provision of law or an incorrect legal label in a show-cause notice does not automatically vitiate proceedings, provided the notice contains necessary facts and causes no prejudice to the recipient in preparing a defense. The Court laid down the principle that substantial compliance and the absence of prejudice to the assessee are paramount, and matters involving mixed questions of fact and law must be remanded to the competent specialized tribunal for adjudication rather than decided prematurely by superior courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the citing of a wrong provision of law in a show-cause notice vitiate the entire recovery proceedings under the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • What are the essential distinctions between ad valorem assessment under subsection (1) and retail price assessment under subsection (2) of section 4 of the Central Excises Act, 1944?
  • Whether the non-mentioning of a specific section in a show-cause notice causes prejudice to an assessee when substantial compliance and necessary facts are stated?
  • Should an appellate court decide mixed questions of law and fact for the first time or remand the matter to the Appellate Tribunal?
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• Messrs Al-Haq Autos, Rawalpindi vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O2019 PTD (Trib.) 179 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-03-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Amna International vs The Director, Directorate General2019 PTD (Trib.) 212 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-04-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al Bashir Cold Storage vs Commissioner (Appeals) Pra, Lahore2020 PCTLR 129, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1885 · Appellate Tribunal Punjab Revenue Authority · 2019-03-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ahmed CNG Station vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2021 PCTLR 1392, 2019 PTD 463 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-08
  constitutional petitionalternate statutory remedycustoms adjudicationconfiscation of goodsmaintainabilityappellate jurisdictiontax matters
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition impugning two orders-in-original passed by the Additional Collector of Customs regarding the outright confiscation of imported CNG cylinders and the imposition of penalties, following proceedings initiated under the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, to bypass an adequate alternate statutory remedy of appeal when the petitioner failed to invoke the appellate forum within the period of limitation. The court held that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a routine substitute for a regular appeal where a statute provides an adequate mechanism for redressal, and a party cannot bypass the statutory forum without lawful justification. The key principle laid down is that where a statute creates a right and provides a specific appellate mechanism, an aggrieved party must first exhaust that remedy before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and the High Court will be exceedingly slow to interfere unless exceptional jurisdictional defects or violations of fundamental rights are demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be maintained when an adequate alternate statutory remedy of appeal is available under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Whether the High Court should entertain a direct constitutional petition after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a statutory appeal?
  • When can a party bypass an exclusive statutory appellate forum and invoke the extra-ordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
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• Messrs Ahmed Brothers vs Pakistan State Oil Company Limited through Managing Director and another2019 MLD 1797 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-21Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ah Textiles vs The Director, Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation FBR and 4 others2019 PCTLR 714, 2019 PCTLR 888, 2019 PTD 1088 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. through Authorized2019 CLD 526 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. Karachi vs Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise (Adjudication) Karachi-III, Karachi2019 PLD Supreme Court 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-31
  central excise dutyexcess duty collectionunjust enrichmentlimitation periodgovernment debtexpress trustretrospective operationinsurance premium
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the recovery of excess central excise duty collected by an insurance company under the Central Excises Act, 1944, prior to the omission of the proviso to Rule 96ZZF(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The core legal questions involved the retrospective applicability of Section 3-D of the 1944 Act (added via Finance Act, 1993), the limitation period for recovering such excess collections, and the applicability of penalties and additional duty. The Supreme Court held that Section 3-D has retrospective reach covering past collections by virtue of the phrase "has collected", and that amounts deemed to be arrears of duty under Section 3-D are recoverable as a debt by the Government through a civil suit, attracting a sixty-year limitation period under Article 149 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, rather than being held in an express trust under Section 10 of the Limitation Act. The key principle laid down is that taxes or duties uncollected or excess amounts recoverable under statutory deeming clauses lacking specific summary machinery may be recovered as a debt by the State under common law within the extended limitation period provided for Government suits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 has retrospective application to excess duty collected prior to its enactment?
  • Does an amount deemed to be an arrear of duty under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 constitute a trust for a specific purpose under Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for the recovery of excess duty collected and retained under Section 3-D of the Central Excises Act, 1944 when the statute provides no specific recovery mechanism?
  • Can the Government recover tax arrears or statutory debts by way of a civil suit under common law independent of summary departmental procedures?
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• Messrs Abid Foundry through authorized representative and another vs Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Finance and Revenue Division, Islamabad and 5 others2019 PTD 1652 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-03
  25th Constitutional AmendmentFATA mergertax exemptionelectricity bills tax collectionexemption certificateIncome Tax Ordinance 2001advance taxwithholding tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of twenty-four connected writ petitions filed by industrial units located in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) challenging the inclusion of income tax, sales tax, extra tax, and further tax in their electricity bills. Following the merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa via the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2018, the Federal Government issued S.R.O. Nos. 1212(I)/2018 and 1213(I)/2018 granting temporary fiscal exemptions until June 30, 2023. The central legal question was whether residents and businesses in the defunct FATA were required to obtain exemption certificates under Section 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to avoid advance tax collection on electricity consumption. The Peshawar High Court held that the notifications granted explicit exemption from the applicability of specific statutory provisions—specifically Division-III of Part-V, Chapter-X, and Chapter-XII of the Ordinance—rather than mere conditional tax exemptions. Consequently, the Court declared the collection of advance taxes on electricity bills illegal and ruled that no exemption certificates under Section 159 are required for statutory provisions rendered inapplicable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply to industrial units in erstwhile FATA following the 25th Constitutional Amendment in light of S.R.O. 1213(I)/2018?
  • Does a taxpayer require an exemption certificate under Section 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 when statutory provisions governing tax collection are made entirely inapplicable by notification?
  • Can advance tax on electricity consumption under Section 235 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be levied on businesses granted statutory immunity from withholding tax provisions?
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• Messrs 99-Star Corporation, Lahore and 3 others vs Additional2020 P C T L R 804, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 2284 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-06-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs 4-a Weaving Factory, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland2020 PCTLR 104, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1877 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• Member (Taxes), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, etc vs Qaiser Abbas2019 KLR Supreme Court 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  agricultural income taxretrospective operationnon-obstante clausetax assessmentrecovery noticestatutory interpretationtax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the recovery of agricultural income tax under the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997. The core legal questions addressed were whether Section 3B of the Act, introduced by the Punjab Finance Act, 2013, operates retrospectively to allow tax recovery for assessment years prior to its enforcement on July 1, 2013, and whether the tax authorities must follow standard assessment procedures or may issue direct recovery notices when tax is based on income declared under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court held that while tax statutes generally operate prospectively, Section 4(4) of the Act and Rule 14(3) of the Rules permit the recovery of tax for the two years preceding the assessment year in which income was first assessable. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Section 3B acts as a non-obstante clause, dispensing with the requirement for a formal assessment order when an assessee has declared agricultural income in their income tax return. However, where no such return is filed or agricultural income is not disclosed, authorities must adhere to the standard assessment and collection procedures prescribed by the Act and Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, have retrospective effect to allow recovery of tax for assessment years prior to its enactment?
  • Does the non-obstante clause in Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, dispense with the requirement for a formal assessment order when agricultural income is declared in an income tax return?
  • Are tax authorities required to follow standard assessment procedures under the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997, if an assessee has not filed an income tax return or has failed to disclose agricultural income therein?
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• Member (Taxes) Board of Revenue Punjab,Lahore,etc vs Qaiser Abbas2019 KLR Supreme Court 264, 2019 P.C.T.L.R. 136, 2019 PLJ SC 286, 2019 P.S.C. · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-08
  agricultural income taxnon-obstante clauseretrospectivity of tax statutesassessment orderrecovery noticesincome tax return
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions and appeals filed by tax authorities against judgments of the High Court that allowed constitutional petitions filed by respondents challenging recovery notices for agricultural income tax. The core legal questions relate to whether Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 operates retrospectively to permit recovery for assessment years prior to its enactment, and whether the tax authority must follow the standard assessment and collection procedure or can directly issue recovery notices based on income tax returns filed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that Section 3B, being a non-obstante clause, overrides Section 3 and acts as a self-contained provision allowing direct recovery notices based on self-declared agricultural income without a separate assessment order, provided the assessee declared such income. Furthermore, read with Section 4(4) and Rule 14(3), recovery is permissible for the two years prior to the assessment year when the income was first assessable. The appeal was partly allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 has an overriding effect on Section 3 of the Act?
  • Does Section 3B of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997 apply retrospectively to allow recovery of agricultural income tax for assessment years prior to its enforcement?
  • Is the tax authority required to follow the formal assessment procedure before issuing recovery notices when agricultural income is declared under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether the failure to pass an assessment order deprives the assessee of the right to challenge the tax under Section 7 of the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1997?
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• Mehtab vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 74 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-27
  criminal appealarms ordinancerecovery of weaponfirearms expert reportjudicial confessionillegal weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant-convict Mehtab challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Abbottabad, vide judgment dated 05.06.2015, arising from FIR No. 1057 registered at Police Station Cantt: Abbottabad. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon and the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution successfully established the recovery of the pistol from the crime scene where the appellant and the deceased were present, supported by the production of the weapon's license by the appellant's father and a positive Firearms Expert report, as well as the appellant's judicial confession. The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The key principle laid down is that where the recovery of a weapon from the crime scene is corroborated by forensic evidence, license ownership, and credible witness testimony, the conviction under the Arms Ordinance is sustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a weapon from the crime scene is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance when corroborated by forensic evidence and a judicial confession?
  • Does the production of a weapon's license by the accused's father aid the prosecution in proving a charge under the Arms Ordinance?
  • Whether minor discrepancies during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to set aside a conviction under the Arms Ordinance?
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• Mehtab Sheikh vs The Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and 2 others2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 96 · Sindh Service Tribunal
  compulsory retirementdouble jeopardyservice appealpolice serviceservice recordreinstatementdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a police constable, challenged his compulsory retirement from service, which was imposed following the recommendations of a screening committee constituted pursuant to Supreme Court of Pakistan directives to identify police personnel with unsatisfactory service records. The appellant contended that the compulsory retirement was unjustified as it was based on an allegation for which he had already received a minor punishment—the stoppage of one year's increment—thereby violating the principle against double jeopardy. The Sindh Service Tribunal examined the legality of the impugned orders and the appellant's service history, which included evidence of successful law enforcement actions. The Tribunal held that the impugned orders were unsustainable in law. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of compulsory retirement and directed the reinstatement of the appellant into service with all back benefits, emphasizing that a civil servant cannot be penalized twice for the same allegation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be subjected to a major penalty for an allegation for which they have already received a minor punishment?
  • Does the imposition of a major penalty based on a previously punished allegation constitute double jeopardy under the Constitution?
  • Are orders of compulsory retirement sustainable when based on a screening committee's recommendation that ignores prior disciplinary finality?
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• Mehran Hussain vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad and 52019 P Cr. L J 281 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-09
  Ex-Officio Justice of Peacepolice protectionconstitutional petitionapplication of judicial mindcivil disputecognizable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a constitutional petition filed before the Sindh High Court challenging an order passed by an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, whereby an application seeking legal protection for the petitioner and his family was dismissed under the misconception that it sought the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). The core legal question was whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can mechanically dismiss a petition seeking police protection by treating it as a prayer for an FIR and directing a direct criminal complaint instead. The High Court held that the Justice of Peace failed to apply his judicial mind to the actual contents and prayer of the application, and that complaints regarding insecurity and requests for police protection fall squarely within the functions and duties of police authorities. The Court set aside the impugned order, emphasizing that providing protection against insecurity is a statutory duty of the police, and directed the official respondents to provide necessary protection to the petitioner in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can dismiss an application seeking police protection by erroneously treating it as a petition for the registration of an FIR?
  • Does a failure or neglect by police authorities to provide protection fall within the scope of Section 22-A(6)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is it incumbent upon an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to examine the actual contents and specific prayer of a petition before passing an order?
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• Mehr Muhammad Yousaf Gill vs Government of the Punjab, etc2020 [M] C L R 1183, 2019 MLD 1738, 2019 LHC 1428 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-07Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Rangoonwala and others vs Furqan Ali Mustafa and others2019 P Cr. L J 1634 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-03
  Illegal Dispossession Actquashment of proceedingssection 265-K Cr.P.C.premature acquittalfunctus officiocivil and criminal proceedingsbanking court auction
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants filed a criminal miscellaneous application before the Sindh High Court seeking the quashment of proceedings pending before the Additional Sessions Judge under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and the suspension of non-bailable warrants issued against them. The core legal questions involved whether the rejection of an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. for one accused applies to all, whether established statutory procedure can be deviated from by changing names in subsequent petitions, and whether a court can re-examine its own final order. The court held that after cognizance is taken, an accused must seek premature acquittal through section 265-K, Cr.P.C. before the trial court rather than bypassing the forum through a petition for quashment of proceedings. Furthermore, parallel civil litigation or alternate remedies under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 do not bar independent criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The High Court dismissed the application as not maintainable, directing the applicants to approach the trial court for early acquittal if so advised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether rejection of an application under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. for one accused is sufficient to be taken as a decline for all accused persons?
  • Whether the procedure provided by law can be deviated from merely by a change of name in the petition?
  • Whether a High Court can examine its own order when presented under a different name?
  • Does the pendency of civil litigation or other remedies bar proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
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• Mehmood Hussain vs Imam Din2019 SC AJK 94 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-23Read full judgment →
• Mehdi Hassan through Legal Heirs and others vs Punjab Co-Operative2019 YLR 1 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-11
  condonation of delaylimitation perioddismissal in liminebanking courtrecovery of financestime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 against a judgment and decree of the Banking Court. The appellant sought to excuse a 15-day delay beyond the statutory limitation period, citing the death of their engaged counsel as the primary reason. The Court examined the timeline, noting that the appeal was filed 104 days after the decree. After accounting for the time spent obtaining certified copies, the appeal remained time-barred by 15 days. The Court held that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence that the deceased advocate had accepted the brief or that the delay was otherwise justified. Emphasizing that the law does not assist the indolent and that every day of delay must be explained, the Court ruled that the grounds presented were insufficient. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed in limine as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is the death of an advocate sufficient ground to condone a delay in filing an appeal if the engagement of the advocate is not proven?
  • Does the law require the explanation of each and every day of delay in filing an appeal?
  • Can the period of summer vacation be excluded from the limitation period if the appeal is filed after the court reopens?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1045 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-28
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirynon-vital injuryforensic evidencecriminal liabilityheinous offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Mehboob, facing charges under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, in connection with a murder case. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was assigned a specific role of causing a single firearm injury to a non-vital part of the deceased's body, was entitled to the concession of bail pending trial. The Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The holding was based on the fact that the medical evidence did not attribute the cause of death to the petitioner's injury, the forensic report indicated that the recovered crime empties did not match the petitioner's weapon, and the injured witness failed to nominate the petitioner during the initial investigation. The Court established the principle that mere involvement in a heinous offense does not preclude the grant of bail when the accused's specific role is distinguishable and requires further evidentiary inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the assignment of a single firearm injury to a non-vital body part justify the grant of bail in a murder case?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when the forensic report fails to link the recovered weapon to the crime scene?
  • Does the failure of an injured witness to nominate an accused during the initial investigation constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is mere involvement in a heinous offense sufficient to deny bail to an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Sultan vs Managing Director, FDC, Phase-v, Hayatabad, Peshawar and 3 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 587 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-10
  higher grade payofficiating allowancecivil servantown pay and scaleconstitutional petitionservice lawremuneration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Manager (BPS-17) in the Forest Development Corporation, sought constitutional jurisdiction to claim salary and allowances for the post of Deputy Director (BPS-18), which he held from 30.3.1998 to 30.6.2008. The respondent corporation contended that the petitioner was posted in his own pay and scale and had accepted the condition that such posting would not confer rights to higher pay or seniority. The core legal question was whether a civil servant performing duties of a higher post is entitled to the pay of that post, notwithstanding a condition in the posting order restricting remuneration to the employee's original pay scale. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to the salary and allowances of the higher post (BPS-18) for the duration he performed those duties. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court affirmed that a civil servant discharging the functions of a higher grade is entitled to the pay attached to that post, and conditions in a posting order restricting such pay are inconsequential and legally unenforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant entitled to the salary of a higher post if they performed the duties of that post despite being posted in their own pay and scale?
  • Does a condition in a posting order restricting an employee to their original pay scale bar them from claiming the salary of a higher post they actually occupied?
  • Can a civil servant claim higher grade pay for a period during which they discharged the functions of that higher post?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Hussain vs The State through Chowki Police Sarsawar and another2019 KLR Criminal Cases 131 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-12-22
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecriminal revisionconcurrent findingsbail after arrestprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition was filed by the accused-petitioner seeking post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving offences under Sections 504, 341, 337/AF, and 336 of the Azad Penal Code. The petitioner, having had multiple prior bail applications rejected by lower courts, contended that he was innocent, had no specific role in the injuries, and had already spent significant time in custody. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite the existence of prima facie evidence connecting him to the alleged offences. The Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the petition should be dismissed. The Court reasoned that there were reasonable grounds, supported by the FIR, witness statements, and medical reports, to connect the accused to the offences, which fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court affirmed the principle that bail is not to be granted merely because some prosecution witnesses have been examined, and that appellate courts should not interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts unless the orders are perverse or arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recording of statements of two prosecution witnesses constitute sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
  • Under what circumstances will an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if the offence falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ellahi and another vs The State2019 YLR 2144 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-11
  criminal appealvicarious liabilitycommon intentiondying declarationbenefit of doubtmurderacquittalcontradictory evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentencing of the appellants for murder and related offences arising from a fatal shooting incident. The core legal questions involved the existence of common intention under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the reliability of eyewitness testimonies, the admissibility and credibility of an alleged dying declaration, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish vicarious liability or a pre-arranged plan, noting numerous contradictions in witness statements, unexplained delays, missing medical and material evidence, and serious doubts regarding the purported dying declaration. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellants, allowed the appeal, set aside their convictions, and ordered their immediate acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mere presence at the scene of a crime and vague allegations are sufficient to establish vicarious liability under section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a statement recorded days after the incident be treated as a reliable dying declaration under Article 46 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 without proof of the declarant's fitness and independent corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary consequence under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when the prosecution fails to examine material witnesses and the medical officer who determined the cause of death?
  • Does a series of material contradictions and inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt resulting in acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Meera Shafi vs Office of the Governor Punjab & others2020 PLD Lahore 54, 2019 LHC 3402 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-11
  workplace harassmentemployee definitionindependent contractorOmbudsperson jurisdictioncontractual interpretationconstitutional petitionservice agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order by the Governor of Punjab, which upheld the Ombudsperson's dismissal of a harassment complaint filed by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, an artist engaged under a service agreement that explicitly disclaimed any employment relationship, qualified as an "employee" under the Punjab Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2012, thereby granting the Ombudsperson jurisdiction. The Court held that the petitioner was not an "employee" as defined by the Act. It determined that the legislative intent of the Act is to protect employees—whether regular or contractual—within an organizational structure, not independent contractors or self-employed individuals. The Court emphasized that courts must interpret the law as written rather than expanding its scope to include persons outside the statutory definition. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the Ombudsperson to entertain a complaint. The petition was dismissed, establishing that the Act does not cover independent service providers who lack the requisite administrative and supervisory relationship with an organization.

  Questions settled

  • Does the definition of 'employee' under the Punjab Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace (Amendment) Act, 2012 include independent contractors or self-employed individuals?
  • Is the existence of an employer-employee relationship a jurisdictional prerequisite for the Ombudsperson to entertain a complaint under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010?
  • Can a contractual clause explicitly disclaiming an employment relationship be ignored in determining the status of a complainant under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010?
  Read full judgment →
• Meera Shafi (Meesha Shafi) vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and another2019 SCMR 1104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  civil procedureexamination-in-chiefcross-examinationaffidavit-in-evidencetrial managementconsent orderexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a trial court order rejecting the petitioner's request to record the examination-in-chief of all witnesses before commencing cross-examination. The core legal question concerned the procedural management of witness testimony and the sequence of examination in a civil suit. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the parties reached a consensus to resolve the procedural impasse. The Supreme Court, exercising its jurisdiction, converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court. The Court held that the proceedings should continue based on the mutual consent of the parties, which stipulated specific timelines for filing affidavits-in-evidence and conducting cross-examinations. The key principle laid down is that parties in civil litigation may, by mutual consent, streamline procedural aspects of trial management, such as the sequence and timing of witness examination, provided such arrangements align with the overarching judicial mandate for the expeditious disposal of cases and avoid unnecessary delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to a civil suit reach a consent agreement regarding the sequence and timing of witness examination-in-chief and cross-examination?
  • Does the court have the authority to set aside a High Court order based on a mutual consent agreement reached between parties during appellate proceedings?
  • Is the filing of an affidavit-in-evidence a recognized procedural step under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Meer Nawaz and another vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 17 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-20
  murderocular testimonyprompt FIRmedical corroborationballistic reportmotivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellants to imprisonment for life under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Nawab. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the eyewitness accounts, the credibility of the prompt First Information Report, the establishment of the motive concerning a disputed second marriage, and the legal effect of the appellants' acquittal in companion cases under the Arms Ordinance. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, positive forensic and ballistic reports, and a promptly lodged First Information Report. The court ruled that an acquittal in a separate weapon recovery case does not automatically discredit the substantive murder trial when independent evidence is sufficient. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal in a companion case under the Arms Ordinance affects the conviction in a substantive murder trial?
  • Does the non-production of a marriage certificate blemish the prosecution case when confidence-inspiring ocular and medical evidence is available?
  • Whether a promptly lodged First Information Report eliminates the possibility of consultation and fabrication in a criminal case?
  • Does the failure to examine a person not present at the scene of the crime as a witness affect the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mda through Director General vs Collector Land Acquisition Mangla Dam2019 SC AJK 67 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-03-20Read full judgment →
• MCR (Pvt.) Limited through Authorized Attorney and another vs Soneri2019 CLD 492, 2020 P C T L R 1208 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-08Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Ltd vs Messrs Duty Free Shop Ltd2019 CLC 1136, 2022 [M] CLR 691, 2022 PCTLR 759 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-03Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Ltd through duly appointed Attorney vs Punjab Cooperative2019 YLR 805 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-07Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited vs Muhammad Saeed2019 PLJ Lahore 487, 2019 CLD 63 · Lahore High Court · 2018-08-20
  Banking Court jurisdictioninterim reliefleave to defendauto finance facilityrepossession of vehicleFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001interlocutory orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 challenges an order passed by a Banking Court allowing a customer's interim application for the release of a repossessed leased vehicle upon depositing defaulted instalments, prior to deciding the bank's application for leave to defend. The core legal question is whether a Banking Court has the jurisdiction to pass an interlocutory order or grant interim relief in favor of a plaintiff customer before deciding the defendant bank's application for leave to defend under the Ordinance. The Lahore High Court held that the Banking Court is vested with the power to grant interim relief and interlocutory orders under section 7 of the Ordinance read with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as such powers are neither prohibited nor regulated by the special law. The Court established that restrictions concerning leave to defend apply to defendants, not plaintiffs initiating suits, and a court empowered to grant final relief may competently issue interim orders to preserve property from deterioration pending final adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Banking Court can pass an interlocutory order for the release of a repossessed vehicle before deciding the application for leave to defend filed by the defendant bank?
  • Does the restriction of obtaining leave to defend under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 apply to a plaintiff customer who files a suit against the bank?
  • Can a Banking Court invoke the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to grant interim injunctions when the special law does not explicitly prohibit or regulate such interim relief?
  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a discretionary interim order passed by a Banking Court that is based on sound judicial principles and aims to preserve property from deterioration?
  Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited vs Emadul Hassan2019 CLD 352 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-15Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited through Duly Authorized Attorney vs Eden Developers2019 CLD 219 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-26
  execution petitionpecuniary jurisdictionconsent decreeout-of-court paymentBanking CourtOrder XXI Rule 2 CPCfinancial institutions recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application by judgment debtors seeking the transfer of an execution petition from the High Court to a Banking Court, contending that the remaining outstanding claim amount fell below the High Court’s pecuniary jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether the pecuniary jurisdiction for executing a consent decree is determined by the original decretal amount or by the reduced balance following partial payments made out of court. The Court dismissed the application, holding that the forum for execution is fixed by the original decree amount and cannot fluctuate based on subsequent out-of-court payments. The Court laid down the principle that out-of-court payments must be certified under Order XXI, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and cannot be utilized to manipulate the jurisdictional forum. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that execution proceedings are a continuation of the original suit, and the court that passed the decree retains jurisdiction over its execution, irrespective of partial satisfaction of the debt, thereby preventing the unsavory effect of causing a fluctuation in the forum with each payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pecuniary jurisdiction for executing a decree change based on partial payments made out of court?
  • Is an execution petition considered a continuation of the original suit for the purpose of determining jurisdiction?
  • Must out-of-court payments be certified under Order XXI, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to be recognized by the executing court?
  • Does the original decretal amount determine the forum for execution, or does the outstanding balance at the time of filing the execution petition determine it?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Munir vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Housing &2019 MLD 1026 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1202 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-26
  pre-arrest bailsupplementary statementfalse implicationcriminal procedurebail confirmationevidentiary doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed by the petitioner, Mazhar Iqbal, seeking confirmation of pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 132/2018, registered under Sections 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Saddar Mian Channu, District Khanewal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the subsequent evidentiary developments in the case. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner inflicted a hatchet blow to the complainant's head; however, the complainant later recorded a supplementary statement exonerating the petitioner and attributing the injury to a co-accused, Dilshad, who had already been granted pre-arrest bail. The Court held that, in light of the complainant's supplementary statement, the possibility of the petitioner's false implication could not be ruled out. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, determining that remanding the petitioner to police custody would serve no useful purpose. The judgment reinforces the principle that where a complainant's subsequent statement creates significant doubt regarding the accused's involvement, pre-arrest bail is appropriate.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the complainant has exonerated the accused in a supplementary statement?
  • Does the granting of bail to a co-accused for the same offense influence the court's decision regarding the petitioner's bail?
  • Is it appropriate to confirm pre-arrest bail when the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs Waseem Saleem and others2019 SC AJK 30 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-07Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs Principal, Nishtar Institute of Dentistry, Multan2019 PLJ Lahore 128, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 175 · Lahore High Court · 2018-08-15
  transfer and postingcivil servantwrit petitionmala fidedelegated powersadministrative exigencyvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two connected writ petitions filed by an Office Attendant challenging his transfer order within the same institute and another order regarding the taking over of store charge by a lab attendant, on grounds of alleged mala fide, victimization for approaching the court, and lack of jurisdiction. The core legal questions relate to whether an administrative transfer order passed under delegated powers without tangible proof of mala fide is amenable to writ jurisdiction, and whether a civil servant has a vested right to a specific posting. The Lahore High Court dismissed both petitions, holding that transfer and posting are exigencies of service, an employee has no vested right to remain posted at a place of choice, and routine administrative transfers passed under delegated powers without substance in allegations of mala fide do not warrant interference by courts under writ jurisdiction. The key principles laid down are that courts should refrain from interfering in routine departmental transfers unless clear mala fide or lack of jurisdiction is established, and that the executive authority possesses the prerogative to utilize staff services based on administrative considerations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant has a vested right to remain posted at a place of his own choice?
  • Can a routine administrative transfer order passed by an authority under delegated powers be interfered with by the High Court under writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the transfer of a government employee considered a punishment or a violation of the terms and conditions of service?
  • Does an employee's plea of mala fide against a transfer order require tangible material to be sustained?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali s vs The State etc2019 PHC 9, 2019 P Cr. L J 899, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 380 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-28
  post-arrest bailjuvenile justicebailable offenceunnatural offencemajor offenceminor offencefurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by a juvenile accused of attempting to commit an unnatural offence under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and offences under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act, 2010. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, being a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, was entitled to be treated as an accused of a bailable offence pursuant to Section 6(3) of the said Act. The Court held that the petitioner, as a juvenile, falls within the protective ambit of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. The Court determined that the offences charged, when analyzed under the definitions of 'major' and 'minor' offences provided in the Act, mandate that the juvenile be treated as if accused of a bailable offence. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecution's case lacked sufficient evidentiary support, rendering the charges a matter of further inquiry. Consequently, the Court allowed the bail petition, establishing the principle that Section 6(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, confers a mandatory right to be treated as accused of a bailable offence for juveniles.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 6(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, mandate that a juvenile accused of a major or minor offence be treated as if accused of a bailable offence?
  • Does an attempt to commit an offence under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, fall within the definition of a major offence under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018?
  • Is a juvenile entitled to bail when the prosecution lacks eyewitness testimony or medical evidence to support the charges?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali Babar & another vs Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Govt.2019 SHC 308 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-27
  civil servantsconstitutional petitionterms and conditions of servicejurisdiction of High CourtFederal Service Tribunalpromotiondemotion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a constitution petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to set aside an order recalling their promotion as officiating Superintendent (Customs) Preventive (BS-16) following the bifurcation of Customs Preventive of Model Customs Collectorate, Port Muhammad Bin Qasim, Karachi. The core legal question addressed was whether a writ petition by civil servants is maintainable regarding service matters in light of the constitutional bar under Article 212 and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Sindh High Court held that the petition was not maintainable, ruling that matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including promotion and demotion grievances, fall exclusively within the domain of the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution and the Federal Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is ousted in respect of service matters of civil servants that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of service tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 in respect of terms and conditions of service?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of civil servants?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants under the Federal Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulana Muhammad Mohsin Faiz vs Sheikh Sikandar Hussain and 22019 MLD 1653 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-11
  private complaintpreliminary enquiryblasphemybailable warrantscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision and miscellaneous application arose from a private complaint filed under Sections 295-B, 295-C, 298-A, 423, 469, 464, 471, 196, 195, and 192/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court could register the complaint and issue bailable warrants against the accused without complying with prior judicial orders directing a preliminary enquiry and obtaining opinions from religious institutions, given the sensitive nature of the blasphemy allegations. The High Court of Sindh held that the trial court erred in registering the complaint and issuing warrants without conducting a preliminary enquiry. The Court emphasized that in cases involving highly sensitive allegations, a preliminary enquiry under the proviso to Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is essential. Consequently, the High Court set aside the trial court's order, discharged the bail bonds, and directed that a proper preliminary enquiry be conducted, utilizing assistance from specialized police branches if necessary.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court required to conduct a preliminary enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before registering a private complaint involving highly sensitive allegations such as blasphemy?
  • Can a trial court issue bailable warrants against accused persons in a private complaint without complying with prior judicial orders directing a preliminary enquiry and expert opinions?
  • What is the appropriate procedure for investigating sensitive religious allegations raised in a private complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Maula Bux Shaikh & others vs Chief Minister Sindh & others2019 SCP 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-03
  service tribunalpromotion quotadiploma holdersprofessional engineeraccredited engineering qualificationpakistan engineering council actcivil servants promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenged a notification issued by the Works and Services Department, Government of Sindh, providing promotion quotas for diploma holders and B.Tech degree holders to the post of Executive Engineer (BS-18), on the ground that it was ultra vires the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976. The core legal question was whether the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 restricts the Government's executive power to prescribe academic qualifications and promotion quotas for civil servants in engineering departments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is the exclusive domain of the Government to determine service qualifications and promotion policies for its employees, whereas the Pakistan Engineering Council regulates the engineering profession and professional engineering work. The Court laid down the principle that while the Government enjoys unfettered powers to structure service promotion rules, no person who is not a registered professional engineer possessing an accredited engineering qualification may be permitted to perform professional engineering work as defined under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 restrict the Government's power to prescribe qualifications for the promotion of civil servants?
  • Can diploma holders and B.Tech degree holders be appointed or promoted to posts in government engineering departments?
  • What constitutes professional engineering work under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976?
  • Are non-registered engineers permitted to perform professional engineering work under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Matloob Hussain and 8 others vs Government of Gilgit Baltistan through Chief Secretary and 4 others2019 CLC 1528 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-03-20Read full judgment →
• Mati-Ullah and another vs Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service2019 PLJ Peshawar 172 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mateen Hussain vs The State and another2019 LHC 1973 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-28
  post-arrest bailidentification paradeun-nominated accusedfurther inquirymurdercircumstantial evidencerecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the petitioner, who was not nominated in the First Information Report, was connected to the alleged offence through identification parade, mobile data, and weapon recovery, warranting further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that the identification parade of an un-nominated accused without prior description in the FIR has little evidentiary value, and the main accused attributed with the motive had been placed in column No. 2 by the investigating officer. Consequently, the court admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, ruling that his case fell within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that an identification parade of an un-nominated accused whose physical features were not detailed in the FIR does not constitute reasonable grounds for connection, and recovery alone cannot sustain a case in the absence of primary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the identification parade of an un-nominated accused without prior description in the FIR constitute reasonable grounds to connect him with the crime?
  • Can a weapon recovery serve as substantive evidence when no direct and substantial evidence is available against the accused?
  • Does the placement of the main accused in column No. 2 of the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bring an un-nominated co-accused's case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Masud Ur Rehman, Superintendent, Central Prison, Peshawar vs Amjad2019 PLC (C.S.) 70 · Peshawar High Court
  contempt of courtcivil service promotiondeferment of promotionexecutive domainSenior Management Coursetrichotomy of powersrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose out of a contempt of court petition filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, seeking action against the respondents for alleged non-compliance with a prior High Court order directing them to consider the petitioner for promotion to the post of Inspector General of Prisons (BPS-20). The legal core questions before the High Court were whether deferment of a promotion case constitutes contempt of court when the employer considers the candidate as directed, and whether the government possesses the executive authority to enhance qualifications or mandate additional administrative training for promotion. The Peshawar High Court held that once the competent authority considers a civil servant's promotion case pursuant to judicial directions, the court's order stands complied with, rendering contempt proceedings infructuous. Furthermore, the court held that deferment is not a punishment and that framing recruitment rules, altering promotion criteria, or mandating courses like the Senior Management Course falls within the executive's policy domain under the principle of trichotomy of powers, which courts cannot usurp. Consequently, the contempt petition was dismissed and show-cause notices were recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Does deferring a civil servant's promotion case after considering them pursuant to a court order amount to contempt of court?
  • Does the government have the executive power to enhance qualifications and standards for civil service promotion?
  • Can a civil servant claim a vested right in the terms and conditions for promotion to a higher post?
  • Does the judiciary have the jurisdiction to interfere with or alter executive recruitment policies under the principle of trichotomy of powers?
  Read full judgment →
• Master Motor Corporation (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2020 CLC 117, 2019 SHC 33 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-12Read full judgment →
• Masrafeen vs The State and others2019 YLR 1531 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-04
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtQatl-i-Amdrecovery proceedingsSection 103 CrPCcorroboration of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Masrafeen, for the murder of Rasheed Ahmad under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including witness testimony regarding the appellant's presence in a vehicle and the recovery of a weapon. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained based on such evidence, particularly when the same witnesses were disbelieved regarding an acquitted co-accused. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence. The Court ruled that testimony disbelieved against acquitted co-accused cannot be relied upon against the appellant without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the Court found the recovery of the alleged weapon illegal due to non-compliance with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and noted that medical evidence is merely confirmatory, not substantive for identification. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, emphasizing that the benefit of doubt is a right of the accused, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence that has been disbelieved against an acquitted co-accused be relied upon to convict another accused without independent corroboration?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to identify an accused in a case of unobserved occurrence?
  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses during a recovery violate the mandatory provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the standard of scrutiny required for circumstantial evidence in a capital charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Masoom Jan vs Federation of Pakistan2020 PLD Peshawar 1, 2019 PHC 284 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-05Read full judgment →
• Masood vs The State2019 SHC 552 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-18Read full judgment →
• Masood Alam Niazi son of Rasheed Ahmed vs The State through Chairman2021 P Cr.LJ 99, 2019 SHC 258 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-07
  misuse of authorityburden of proofstatutory presumptioncorruption and corrupt practicesNational Accountability Ordinanceprocedural irregularityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Accountability Court convicting the appellants under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, for corruption, corrupt practices, and misuse of authority regarding alleged misappropriation in the payment of labour charges for lifting sugar. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully established the charge of misuse of authority and misappropriation, and whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 shifts the initial burden of proof onto the accused without the prosecution first establishing a reasonable case. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its primary burden of proving the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that a mere procedural irregularity does not constitute a punishable misuse of authority or corruption. The court ruled that the statutory presumption under Section 14 does not dispense with the prosecution's initial obligation to prove foundational facts. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mere procedural irregularity in the exercise of official duties amount to a punishable misuse of authority under Section 9(a)(vi) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 14 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 be invoked without the prosecution first establishing a reasonable case against the accused?
  • Does the burden of proof ever shift to the accused before the prosecution successfully discharges its initial onus of proving the essential ingredients of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt?
  • What constitutes mens rea in the context of a charge of misuse of authority under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
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• Masood Ahmad Bhatti vs Raja Imran Yaqoob and others2019 PLD Islamabad 577 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-28Read full judgment →
• Mashooque vs Province of Sindh through Deputy Commissioner and 42019 PLD Sindh 660 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-15Read full judgment →
• Mashkoor Ahmed Khokhar vs The Family Judge (East), Islamabad and others2019 CLC 1635, 2020 [M] C L R 72 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-18Read full judgment →
• Mashad Ali son of Awan Ali vs The State etc2019 PHC 286 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-06
  dying declarationocular evidencemitigating circumstancemotivesentence enhancementinterested witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of Maroof Ali, while the State seeks enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal questions concern the reliability of the deceased's dying declaration, the credibility of an interested witness, and whether the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive constitutes a mitigating factor for sentencing. The Court held that the conviction was sound, relying on the dying declaration, which was corroborated by consistent ocular testimony and medical evidence. Regarding the sentence, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that because the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive, the death penalty was not warranted, and the sentence of life imprisonment remained appropriate. The judgment reiterates that a dying declaration, if found truthful, requires no corroboration, and that the testimony of a close relative cannot be discarded solely on the basis of relationship if it is otherwise trustworthy. Furthermore, the failure to establish a motive serves as a valid mitigating circumstance in determining the quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a dying declaration be acted upon without corroboration?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive serve as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing?
  • Can the testimony of a close relative be discarded solely on the ground of their relationship to the deceased?
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• Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others vs The Registrar of Trade Marks and others2021 P C T L R 308, 2019 CLD 27 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-25Read full judgment →
• Maroof & others vs Daud & others2020 YLR 95, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 137 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• Mari Petroleum Company Limited through General Manager Finance, Islamabad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Islamabad and 3 others2019 PTD 1774 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-27Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed & 09 others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2019 SHC 354 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-12Read full judgment →
• Maqbool, etc vs State etc.2020 KLR Criminal Cases 77, 2020 YLR 736, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1021 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-19
  pre-arrest bailbail confirmationmedical contradictionmala fide intentrecovery of weaponcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a pre-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioners seeking protection in case FIR No. 472 of 2018 registered at Police Station Saddar Burewala, District Vehari, under various sections including 302 and 149 PPC. The core legal question examined by the court was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the contradictions between the medical evidence, witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the roles attributed to them, alongside pending previous litigation between the parties. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioners' involvement warranted pre-arrest bail as medical evidence did not support the specific roles attributed to certain petitioners, one injury was bailable, prior litigation suggested a possible malicious extension of the net of accused, and arrest was unnecessary solely for the purpose of recovery. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, establishing the principle that pre-arrest bail may be granted where mala fide is apparent, medical evidence contradicts ocular accounts regarding specific accused roles, and custodial interrogation or arrest solely for recovery is unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when the medical evidence contradicts the specific roles attributed to the accused in the FIR?
  • Is the arrest of an accused strictly necessary for the sole purpose of effecting the recovery of a weapon?
  • Does previous litigation between the parties support a finding of potential mala fide in the registration of a criminal case against extended family members?
  • Whether an offence falling under Section 337-A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is bailable under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Maqbool Hussain vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 228 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-08
  pre-arrest bailforgerycriminal breach of trustbank fraudbail confirmationcomplainant's consent
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition concerns an application for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, a bank official, in connection with FIR No. 18 dated 30.05.2016, registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 109, and 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The allegations involve the encashment of cheques using forged signatures with the petitioner's alleged connivance. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case. The Lahore High Court observed that the incident occurred in 2013, yet the matter was reported significantly later, and the prosecution's narrative appeared prima facie unbelievable, as it was unlikely a bank official would risk their career for the small sums involved. Furthermore, the complainant appeared in person and expressed no objection to the confirmation of bail. Consequently, the Court accepted the petition and confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, subject to the petitioner furnishing fresh surety bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, emphasizing the lack of credibility in the initial allegations.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the complainant has no objection to the relief?
  • Does a significant delay in reporting an FIR affect the prima facie credibility of the prosecution's case in bail proceedings?
  • Is the improbability of a professional risking their career for a small sum a valid consideration for granting pre-arrest bail?
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• Maqbool Hussain vs Provincial Government through Chief Secretary2019 CLC 2083 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-04-05Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Ahmad and others vs Environment Protenction Agency and others2019 CLD 946 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-08Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited vs Federal Investigation Agency2019 YLR 2296 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-27Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain and anothe vs Khalid Aziz and others2019 SCMR 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-22
  revenue record tamperingburden of prooforal sale transactionevacuee landfraudulent entriescivil declarationland title dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of agricultural land, originally granted as evacuee property to the respondents' parents. The appellants claimed title through subsequent sales, while the respondents, as legal heirs, sought a declaration of ownership, cancellation of documents, and possession, alleging the revenue records were fraudulent. The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, finding the alleged sales unproven. The Appellate Court reversed this decision, but the High Court restored the Trial Court's judgment, citing a lack of evidence regarding the sale transactions and irregularities in the revenue records. Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court found that the appellants failed to prove the alleged oral sale transactions, noting the absence of credible witnesses, lack of identification documents, and clear evidence of tampering in the revenue registers, specifically the insertion of a fabricated page. The Court affirmed that the burden of proving a sale transaction lies on the party asserting it, and fraudulent revenue entries cannot confer title or defeat a legitimate claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving an alleged oral sale transaction lie with the party asserting it?
  • Can revenue entries based on fabricated or tampered records be relied upon to establish title?
  • Is the absence of identification details and witnesses in an alleged oral sale transaction sufficient to invalidate the claim?
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