Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mrs. Uzma Moinuddin vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority, Karachi2019 YLR 380 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shagufta Shaheen and others vs The State through D.G. NAB, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and anotherPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 583, 2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 600, 2019 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-29
  freezing of propertyNational Accountability Ordinanceconfirmation of freezing ordercorruption and corrupt practicesfair trialdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses appeals arising from an order passed by the Chairman NAB freezing the appellants' properties under Section 12 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether a freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB lapses if not confirmed by the Accountability Court within 15 days, and whether delay by the court in deciding the confirmation application and objections affects the validity of the order. The Supreme Court held that once the prosecution files an application for confirmation within the initial 15 days, the freezing order continues to subsist until the court adjudicates upon the matter, as the statute prescribes no specific timeframe for the court's decision, though expeditious disposal is mandated. The Court ruled that delay by the judiciary does not invalidate the Chairman's order, but cautioned that inordinate delays violate the fundamental right to fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB lapses if the Accountability Court fails to confirm it within 15 days?
  • Does a delay by the Accountability Court in deciding a confirmation application affect the validity of the freezing order passed by the Chairman NAB?
  • Can objections against a freezing order be filed during the initial 15-day period before confirmation?
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• Mrs. Shabeena Farhat vs M/s. Highway Housing Project and others2019 SHC 328 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-02Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Rukhsana Yahya vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division2019 PLC (C.S.) 178 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06
  service duescontractual employmentdamages for breach of contractgratuityreimbursement of expensesproject directorcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit instituted by the plaintiff, a former Project Director appointed on contract basis in the Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, seeking recovery of unpaid service dues, expenses incurred from personal resources for official work, and damages. The core legal questions involve determining the plaintiff's entitlement to unpaid salary, medical bills, gratuity, vehicle and petrol expenses, leave encashment, miscellaneous office expenses, and damages for breach of contract and mental anguish. The court held that the plaintiff proved her entitlement to unpaid salary balances, medical bills, additional gratuity based on condonation of service length under Civil Service Regulations, and personal expenses incurred due to the defendant's failure to provide proper infrastructure and an official vehicle. The court further held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for breach of contractual obligations, mental anguish, and humiliation caused by the defendant's conduct. The key principles laid down include that a government employer is liable to reimburse verified personal expenses incurred by an employee due to lack of mandated official facilities, and that damages are awardable for breach of employment contracts resulting in financial harm and mental distress.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract employee is entitled to reimbursement of personal expenses incurred due to the employer's failure to provide stipulated official facilities and transport?
  • Can deficiency in the qualifying length of service for gratuity be condoned under the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Whether damages can be awarded against a government department for breach of employment contract and causing mental anguish and financial harm?
  • Is an employee entitled to encashment of earned leave where the employment contract and service rules do not provide for it?
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• Mrs. Rubina Junejo vs Commissioner Hyderabad Division, Hyderabad2019 PLC (C.S.) 1503 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-19
  government accommodationallotment cancellationretrospective policyvested rightsdiscriminationdue processcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Professor holding a BPS-18 government post, challenged the cancellation of her allotted government accommodation by the Commissioner Hyderabad Division. The core legal question was whether a validly made government accommodation allotment could be arbitrarily cancelled and affected retrospectively by a subsequent change in allotment policy. The Sindh High Court held that the impugned cancellation order was illegal, discriminatory, and void ab-initio, as executive policy changes cannot operate retrospectively to impair vested rights or lawful allotments unless expressly authorized by a retrospective legislative dispensation, and that public authorities must act fairly under Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897. The court set aside the cancellation order, ruling that an allottee cannot be arbitrarily ejected without due process of law or for reasons outside the terms of the original allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a change in government accommodation allotment policy can be applied retrospectively to cancel prior lawful allotments?
  • Can a government accommodation allotment be revoked at the whim of an official without following due process of law?
  • Does an official exercising public power have a duty to act fairly, reasonably, and justly under administrative law?
  • Whether the allotment of government residential accommodation constitutes a mere revocable license or creates enforceable rights?
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• Mrs. Rozina Ali through attorney and others vs Karachi Metropolitan2019 CLC 1081 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-04
  residential zoningcommercial conversioninjunctive reliefnuisanceeducational institutionlease covenantsCantonment Boardbalance of convenience
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for injunction filed by a resident against the operation of a college in an adjacent residential property. The core legal questions were whether a residential property can be used for an educational institution without formal conversion, and whether such an institution constitutes a commercial activity. The Court held that running an educational institution on a residential plot without proper conversion is illegal, regardless of the public service nature of education. The Court rejected the argument that such operations are not commercial, affirming they are business-oriented ventures. The Court established that where an act is inherently unlawful, an aggrieved neighbor need not prove specific nuisance through evidence to obtain an injunction. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the existence of other unauthorized schools in the vicinity does not justify further violations, as two wrongs do not make a right. Consequently, the Court granted the injunction restraining the defendants from operating the college, while providing a grace period to vacate to minimize student disruption.

  Questions settled

  • Can a residential property be used for an educational institution without formal conversion under the applicable building regulations?
  • Does the operation of an educational institution on a residential plot constitute a commercial activity?
  • Is an aggrieved neighbor required to prove specific nuisance through evidence when the act complained of is a clear violation of zoning laws?
  • Does the existence of other unauthorized schools in a vicinity justify the operation of a new school in a residential area?
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• Mrs. Rehana Jadoon vs Arab Khan2019 MLD 337 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-18
  malicious prosecutionsuit for damagesfalse FIRreasonable and probable causegeneral damagescancelled class reportpre-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit for damages for malicious prosecution arising from the lodging of a false first information report by the defendant against the plaintiff. The core legal questions involve whether the initiation of criminal proceedings that terminated in a police report under the cancelled 'C' class accepted by a judicial magistrate constitutes malicious prosecution despite the accused not being sent for trial, and whether general damages can be awarded when specific pecuniary loss is not quantified. The court held that an accused need not always face a full trial for a malicious prosecution suit to lie, provided the essential elements of malice and want of reasonable and probable cause are established through the circumstances, such as an inordinate delay in filing the FIR and failure to challenge the magistrate's discharge order. The court laid down the principle that the rigors of pre-arrest bail and police investigation resulting from a false accusation inflict actionable humiliation, and while specific damages must be proved, courts may award general damages under a rule of thumb when the malicious initiation of criminal proceedings is proven.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit for malicious prosecution lie where the criminal proceedings terminated upon the acceptance of a police report under the cancelled class by a judicial magistrate without a full trial?
  • Can malice and the absence of reasonable and probable cause be inferred from an inordinate delay in lodging an FIR and the failure to challenge a magistrate's discharge order?
  • Whether general damages can be awarded under a rule of thumb when a plaintiff fails to specifically quantify the damages claimed in a suit for malicious prosecution?
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• Mrs. Neeraj Dutta vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 796 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-02-28
  prevention of corruptionillegal gratificationprimary evidenceinferential deductionstatutory presumptiontrap proceedingsbribery
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order affirming the appellant's conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for demanding and accepting a bribe. The primary legal question addressed was whether the prosecution must provide direct, primary evidence of the demand for illegal gratification, or if such demand can be established through inferential deduction when the complainant is unavailable due to death or hostility. The appellant relied on P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, which suggested that inferential deduction is impermissible. Conversely, the State cited precedents like Hazari Lal and M. Narsinga Rao, which permitted proving demand via circumstantial evidence and statutory presumptions under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court observed a conflict in judicial opinion regarding the necessity of direct evidence versus circumstantial proof. Consequently, the Court held that the issue of whether inferential deduction of culpability is permissible in the absence of primary evidence of demand warrants reconsideration by a larger Bench, referring the matter to the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can the demand for illegal gratification be proved through inferential deduction in the absence of direct evidence?
  • Does the death or hostility of a complainant preclude a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?
  • Is the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 applicable when direct evidence of demand is unavailable?
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• Mrs. Kausar Rasheed and 2 others vs Project Director, National2019 CLC 1718 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Ifrah Murtaza and another vs Government of Pakistan and others2019 PLD Lahore 565 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-24
  habeas corpusproclamationproclaimed offenderExit Control Listred noticesNAB inquiryfundamental rightsextradition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in the nature of habeas corpus by the wife of the detenu, challenging his detention by the Interpol in Dubai (UAE) based on red notices, warrants of arrest, and other proceedings initiated by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and orders passed by the Accountability Court, Lahore. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition by a spouse when the detenu is abroad and has been subsequently released, whether such a petition becomes infructuous upon release, and the legality of the proclamation proceedings, perpetual warrants, and placement on the Exit Control List (ECL). The Lahore High Court held that the petition was maintainable, did not become infructuous upon release, and that the actions taken by NAB and the Accountability Court were tainted with mala fides, lacking evidence and independent application of mind, and violating statutory procedures. The court laid down key principles regarding the protection of personal liberty, mandatory procedural requirements under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 17(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, and the unconstitutionality of mechanical placements on the Exit Control List without a hearing or independent reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition in the nature of habeas corpus can be maintained by the wife of a detenu who is detained outside Pakistan?
  • Does a habeas corpus petition become infructuous merely upon the subsequent release of the detenu from foreign custody?
  • Can an Accountability Court issue a proclamation under Section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without recording evidence to satisfy itself that the accused has absconded?
  • Whether the placement of a citizen's name on the Exit Control List (ECL) mechanically on the recommendation of NAB without an opportunity of hearing is sustainable in law?
  • Are red notices issued by the Interpol sustainable when the underlying proclamation and perpetual warrants of arrest issued by an Accountability Court are declared illegal and void?
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• Mrs. Hanya Usman vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior2019 IHC 116 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-06-18Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Gulnar and 9 others vs Karachi Metropolitan Corporation2019 CLC 1653 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-20Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Faryal Talpur vs Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and 6 others2020 PLD Lahore 122, 2019 LHC 3171 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farheen vs The State2019 SHC 556 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Bilquis Mohsin Butt and 3 others vs Ghulam Rasool Unnar and 42019 CLC 1227 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Asma Hassan and another vs Askari Bank Limited2019 SCMR 1873 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-08
  running finance facilityrecovery suitmarkupcost of fundsbanking courtconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a recovery suit instituted by a financial institution for a markup-based running finance facility. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the bank to markup beyond the stipulated date of repayment and the liability of the borrower based on admitted financial facilities and statements of accounts. The Supreme Court held that where the financial facility agreement specified a repayment date, the Banking Court and the High Court rightly limited the grant of contractual markup up to that date, awarding only the cost of funds for the subsequent period during which the amount remained outstanding. The key principle laid down is that where the availment of a financial facility is admitted and no calculation errors or specific objections to the statement of accounts are raised, concurrent findings regarding financial liability will not be interfered with, and cost of funds is appropriately awarded for the period beyond the contractual maturity date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a financial institution is entitled to contractual markup beyond the date stipulated in the running finance facility agreement?
  • Can a borrower challenge a recovery suit based on alleged forged documents when there is a clear admission of availing the financial facility and no specific denial of the quantum?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding financial liability where no calculation errors in the statement of accounts are pointed out?
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• Mrs. Aasia Rizvi and others vs Mian Muhammad Aslam and others2019 CLC 1333, 2019 LHC 288 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-24
  partition suitrejection of plaintpiecemeal rejectionjoint holdingco-ownershipamendment of pleadingsnecessary party
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a suit for partition of an undivided joint holding against several respondents. During the proceedings, the petitioners impleaded respondent No. 26. Subsequently, respondent No. 26 filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for rejection of the plaint specifically against him, which the trial court granted, and the appellate court upheld. The core legal question was whether a plaint can be rejected in part (piecemeal) against a specific defendant under Order VII, Rule 11. The High Court held that the concept of partial rejection of a plaint is alien to the law. The court ruled that Order VII, Rule 11 does not permit piecemeal rejection; instead, if a plaint suffers from defects, the court should exercise its powers under Order VI, Rule 17 to allow for amendments. The court emphasized that a purchaser of land from a joint holding becomes a co-owner, and the suit for partition must proceed against all necessary parties, setting aside the lower courts' orders.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected in part or piecemeal against a specific defendant under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a purchaser of land from an unpartitioned joint holding considered a co-owner of that holding?
  • Should a court reject a plaint for technical defects or allow an amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Mr. Waheed Shahzad Butt vs Qazi Faez Isa2019 SCP 294 · Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan · 2019-08-19Read full judgment →
• Mr. Shafqat Raza Thaheem vs Mr. Mehroz Aziz Khan NiaziPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 462 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-10
  juvenile justicedetermination of ageossification testcriminal revisionjuvenile accusedprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, which dismissed the petitioner's application to be declared a juvenile in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the application for juvenility without conducting the mandatory inquiry prescribed by law, particularly when the petitioner relied on NADRA records to assert he was under 18 at the time of the alleged occurrence. The High Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable because the trial court failed to follow the procedural mandate of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000. The Court set aside the order and remanded the matter, directing the trial court to conduct a proper inquiry, including an ossification test, to determine the petitioner's age. The key principle laid down is that the determination of juvenility is a mandatory statutory duty that requires a formal inquiry, including medical evidence, regardless of the stage of trial at which the plea is raised, as the statute imposes no time limitation for such an application.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court required to conduct a formal inquiry, including a medical report, when a plea of juvenility is raised by an accused?
  • Does the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 impose a time limitation or specific stage for filing an application to determine the age of an accused?
  • Is the trial court obligated to determine the age of an accused through an ossification test when the accused claims to be a juvenile?
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• Mr. Kanwar Anwaar Ali vs The State2019 SCP 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-22
  test identification paradecircumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtabduction for ransomjoint identificationlast-seen evidencecriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for abduction for ransom and murder, where the appellant challenged his sentence based on circumstantial evidence. The core legal question concerned the evidentiary value and proper procedure of test identification parades, alongside the assessment of circumstantial evidence including last-seen testimony and medical reports. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to lack of proximity in last-seen evidence, flawed joint identification parades, and fabricated recoveries, thereby setting aside the conviction and extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant. Furthermore, the Court consolidated comprehensive guidelines and safeguards for conducting valid test identification parades, emphasizing that separate parades must be held for each accused person, that identification is merely corroborative rather than substantive evidence, and that strict adherence to established legal precedents and rules is mandatory for all judicial officers.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of a test identification parade in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a joint test identification parade involving multiple accused persons be considered legally valid?
  • What precautions and standards must a magistrate observe while conducting a test identification parade?
  • Is the failure to hold a test identification parade always fatal to the prosecution's case?
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• Mr. Justice Nadeem Akhtar vs Mr. Justice Adnan-ul-Karim Memon2019 SHC 546 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-17Read full judgment →
• Mr. Justice Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs Division, Government of Pakistan, Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and 4 others2019 SCP 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  inter se seniorityHigh Court Judgesoath of officeappointment notificationconstitutional petitionestoppel against lawjudicial seniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This Constitution Petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order re-fixing the inter se seniority of High Court Judges. The Petitioner, appointed as an Additional Judge, argued that seniority should be reckoned from the date of the appointment notification, despite taking the oath one day after the other appointees. The core legal question was whether the appointment of a High Court Judge is complete upon notification or upon the administration of the oath. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appointment of a High Court Judge is not completed until the final stage of taking the oath as prescribed by Article 194. Consequently, the Court affirmed that seniority must be determined from the date the oath is administered, as the office remains vacant until that point. The judgment established that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution, and that administrative rosters or seniority lists issued in violation of the law cannot confer permanent rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appointment of a High Court Judge take effect from the date of the notification or the date of the oath?
  • Can a seniority list issued in violation of the law confer permanent rights upon a judge?
  • Is there any estoppel against the Constitution or the law regarding the determination of seniority?
  • Does a person become a judge for all purposes upon appointment, or only after taking the oath of office?
  Read full judgment →
• Mr. Justice Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, Judge, Lahore High Court, L_65892dfa2019 P.S.C. 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  seniority of judgesadditional judgeoath of officeconstitutional petitionestoppel against constitutionappointment of judgesHigh Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order of the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court regarding the inter se seniority of High Court Judges. The petitioner and respondents were appointed as Additional Judges via the same notification but took the oath of office on different dates, with the respondents taking it earlier. The core legal question was whether seniority should be reckoned from the date of the appointment notification or the date of taking the oath of office. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the appointment of a High Court Judge is not complete until the oath is administered in accordance with Article 194 of the Constitution. Consequently, the seniority of an Additional Judge must be determined from the date they enter upon their office by taking the oath. The Court further affirmed that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution, and administrative rosters reflecting incorrect seniority do not confer permanent rights. The judgment clarifies that the oath is the final stage of the appointment process, and until it is taken, the office remains vacant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the seniority of an Additional Judge of a High Court commence from the date of the appointment notification or the date of taking the oath of office?
  • Is the appointment of a High Court Judge complete upon the issuance of the notification or upon the administration of the oath of office?
  • Can a party claim seniority based on an administrative roster that contradicts the constitutional requirement for oath-taking?
  • Does the doctrine of estoppel apply against the provisions of the Constitution regarding the seniority of judges?
  Read full judgment →
• Moulvi Muhammad Rafique and another vs Malik Munsif and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1361 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-06Read full judgment →
• Moulana Abdul Salam vs Government of Sindh through its Chief Secretary, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and 3 others2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 110 · Sindh Service Tribunal
  Ph.D. allowanceservice tribunalcivil servantrevised ratesarrears of allowanceAuqaf Department
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was preferred under Section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973, seeking the implementation of an order dated September 1, 2015, for the grant and extension of a Ph.D. allowance at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per month along with arrears up to the date of the appellant's retirement. The core legal question concerned whether a civil servant holding a Ph.D. in Islamic Culture was entitled to the revised Ph.D. allowance at Rs. 10,000 per month as notified by the Finance Department, irrespective of the category of subjects or place of posting. The Sindh Service Tribunal allowed the appeal, holding that pursuant to the notifications issued by the Finance Department, Government of Sindh, the appellant was entitled to the enhanced Ph.D. allowance at the rate of Rs. 10,000 per month from the effective date until retirement. The key principle laid down is that the revised Ph.D. allowance is admissible to all qualified degree holders irrespective of their subject category, place of posting, or assigned job.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant holding a Ph.D. degree is entitled to the enhanced Ph.D. allowance regardless of the category of their subject?
  • Can the payment of a revised Ph.D. allowance be withheld on the basis of the place of posting or job assigned to a civil servant?
  • Whether an appeal under Section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is maintainable for the implementation of an official notification regarding departmental allowances?
  Read full judgment →
• Mosawar Khan vs Govt of KPK & others2019 PHC 62 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-29Read full judgment →
• Mono vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 90 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-01-07
  Section 482 CrPCunreasoned orderremandapplication of mindcriminal procedurespeaking order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order that summarily dismissed an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which sought to challenge a charge sheet in a criminal case involving charges under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the application through a non-speaking, unreasoned order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order was legally deficient as it failed to set out the factual matrix of the case, failed to apply relevant legal principles to the grounds urged by the appellant, and failed to disclose any application of mind. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits. The key principle laid down is that a High Court, when exercising its jurisdiction, must provide a reasoned order that demonstrates an understanding of the facts and an application of mind to the legal issues raised by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court order dismissing an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, legally sustainable if it fails to set out the factual matrix or provide reasons for the dismissal?
  • Does a court have a duty to record findings on the grounds urged by an appellant when disposing of a criminal application?
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• Momin vs The State and another2019 PHC 316, 2020 PLD Peshawar 70 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-07
  juvenile justiceunnatural offenseframing of chargespecial law vs general lawoverriding effectremand for de-novo trialchild protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal under Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018 challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge IV/Judge Juvenile Court, D.I. Khan, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. The FIR had been registered under Section 377 PPC read with Section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010; however, the trial court framed charges solely under Section 377 PPC. The Peshawar High Court addressed whether framing charges under general penal law while omitting the relevant special law provision violates statutory procedure. The High Court held that under Section 61 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010, the special law possesses an overriding effect over general provisions such as Section 377 PPC. Reaffirming that special law prevails over general law and later statutes supersede earlier ones, the High Court set aside the conviction and remanded the case for a de-novo trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether special law provisions override general criminal law provisions when both address the same offense against a child?
  • Does Section 53 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Child Protection and Welfare Act 2010 prevail over Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the effect on a conviction when the trial court omits to frame a charge under an applicable special law containing an overriding clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Momin Khan vs Special Judge Anti Terrorism Court-II, Quetta and another2019 PLJ Quetta 26, 2019 PLD Balochistan 12 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-07-16Read full judgment →
• Moinuddin, etc vs The State, etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 749, 2020 PLJ SC 174, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 317, 2019 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-11
  Anti-Terrorism Actcompoundable offencenon-compoundable offencesentence reductioncompromisemitigating circumstancemercy petitionjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether a compromise in a compoundable offence (e.g., murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860) allows for the acquittal or sentence reduction of a non-compoundable offence (e.g., terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997) committed in the same transaction. The Court held that a non-compoundable offence remains non-compoundable despite any compromise in a coordinate offence, prohibiting acquittal on that basis. However, the Court ruled that such a compromise may be considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the sentence for the non-compoundable offence, subject to the court's discretion. The judgment established that this reduction is not automatic. Furthermore, the Court delineated the procedural stages for seeking such relief: by the trial court at sentencing, by appellate or revisional courts during pending proceedings, via a review petition if a final order exists, or through a Mercy Petition to the President of Pakistan if all judicial remedies are exhausted. This judgment consolidates scattered precedents to clarify the legal position regarding the interplay between compounding and non-compoundable offences.

  Questions settled

  • Can a non-compoundable offence be treated as a compoundable offence for the purpose of recording an acquittal if a coordinate compoundable offence has been compounded?
  • Can the sentence passed in a non-compoundable offence be reduced on the ground that a coordinate compoundable offence committed in the same case has been compounded?
  • At what stage and by which forum can a reduction in the sentence for a non-compoundable offence be ordered if a coordinate compoundable offence is compounded?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Arif and others vs Secretary to Government of Punjab and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 77 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29
  contractual employmentfixed-term contractmaster and servantvested rightconstitutional petitionservice tenuretermination of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by contract employees of the Population Welfare Department, Government of the Punjab, challenging an order dated 22.06.2018. The impugned order informed relevant authorities that the petitioners' contracts would expire on 30.06.2018, as per the terms of their engagement. The petitioners alleged this constituted premature termination without the required one-month notice. The core legal question was whether the expiration of a fixed-term contract constitutes termination requiring notice, and whether contract employees possess a vested right to the extension of their service tenure. The Court held that the impugned order was merely an intimation of the natural expiry of the contract term, not a premature termination. Consequently, no notice was required. The Court affirmed that contract employees have no vested right to the extension of their service, which remains the prerogative of the employer. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that employees not governed by statutory service rules fall under the principle of Master and Servant, rendering the constitutional petition non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expiration of a fixed-term contract constitute a termination that requires a notice period?
  • Do contract employees have a vested right to the extension of their service tenure?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable for employees governed by the principle of Master and Servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali vs Safdar Hussain Birlas and others2019 CLC 1951 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-29Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Ali and others vs Province of Sindh2019 SHC 590 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-24Read full judgment →
• Mohsin Abbas Shah vs The Provincial Police Officer, Punjab, Lahore, etc2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 75 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-09-19
  service appeallimitationPEEDA Actdismissal from servicewrong forumrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a service appeal filed by a dismissed police constable challenging his removal from service following disciplinary proceedings under the PEEDA Act, 2006 for misconduct involving the fraudulent recruitment measurement of his brother. The core legal question was whether the service appeal was barred by limitation when the appellant pursued a revision-cum-mercy petition before an incompetent authority instead of filing an appeal before the Tribunal within the statutory period following the rejection of his departmental appeal. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that the appeal was time-barred and not maintainable, as availing a remedy before the wrong forum and pursuing a revision petition which is not a matter of right does not extend the limitation period. The key principle laid down is that the time for filing a service appeal starts from the rejection of the departmental appeal, and pursuing a misconceived remedy before a wrong forum or authority does not condone or save the delay in filing the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a service appeal filed beyond the statutory period after the rejection of a departmental appeal is barred by limitation?
  • Does filing a revision petition before an authority not empowered under the relevant law extend the period of limitation for filing a service appeal?
  • Can availing a remedy before a wrong forum save an appellant from the consequences of delay under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohib Ali vs Returning Officer Ward No.4, Khairpur and 17 others2019 YLR 1854 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Qasim and another vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 1218 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-16
  post-arrest baildouble murderforensic science laboratory reportadmissibility of confessionnon-bailable offencepointation of crime scenecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by two accused persons charged with double murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the accused were entitled to bail despite the prosecution’s reliance on forensic evidence, specifically a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report matching crime scene empties to a weapon recovered from one of the accused, alongside confessions and pointation of the crime scene, particularly after the case was initially classified as "A" Class. The Court held that while confessions made to the police are inadmissible under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, the FSL report provided sufficient corroborative evidence to prima facie connect the accused to the commission of the non-bailable offence. Consequently, the Court declined the bail application, ruling that the existence of reasonable grounds to believe the accused were involved, combined with the fact that the trial had already commenced, necessitated the denial of relief. The principle established is that forensic matching of crime scene evidence can provide the necessary prima facie connection to deny bail, even where other evidence like police confessions is inadmissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Forensic Science Laboratory report matching crime scene empties to a weapon recovered from an accused constitute sufficient grounds to deny post-arrest bail?
  • Can a confession made to the police during investigation be used as primary evidence to deny bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail if the initial police report was submitted as 'A' Class?
  • Does the pointation of a crime scene by an accused provide sufficient grounds to connect them to a non-bailable offence for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Ali vs The Returning Officer, PS 16 Kambar, Shahdadkot-III2019 MLD 267 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-12Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Zikria Butt vs Mst. Mohinat -Ul- Islam2019 MLD 1502 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-27Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Waseem vs Kashif Irshad2019 YLR 541 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-10-11
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailprohibitory clausemurderous assaultfurther inquirycriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed by the complainant seeking the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the accused-respondent by the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Hajira, in a case arising from FIR No. 19/201 registered under sections 324, 337-A to Z, 34, A.P.C. and section 15A-2 of the Arms Act. The core legal question was whether bail could be granted to an accused charged with a murderous assault falling under the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. without any change of circumstances or proper finding of further inquiry. The Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir accepted the petition and recalled the bail, holding that the accused was prima facie connected to the crime through the promptly lodged FIR, medical reports showing a compound fracture, and witness statements under section 161, Cr.P.C. The court laid down the principle that the mere need for further inquiry or the presentation of a challan does not justify granting bail unless the court records a tentative finding that reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused is not guilty of a non-bailable offence falling within the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted shortly after its refusal without any change of circumstances in the case?
  • Does the mere need for further inquiry constitute a sufficient ground for the grant of post-arrest bail under section 497(2), Cr.P.C.?
  • Can an accused charged with an attempt to murder under section 324, Azad Penal Code be admitted to bail when supported by medical evidence and eyewitness accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Usman vs P.O Sindh & others2019 SHC 300 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Tahir and 3 others vs Ghulam Mohammad and others2019 CLC 1862 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sohail Munir and others vs Addl. District Judge & others2019 LHC 1883 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-03Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shahid Murtaza vs Warid Telecom Private Limited & Others2021 MLD 433, 2019 SHC 404 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sallah through Attorney and 5 others vs The Federation of Pakistan through Chairman WAPDA and 4 others2019 MLD 2088 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-06Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Saleem vs Aamir and others2019 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 9 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-14
  post-arrest bailcancellation of bailcriminal revisionAzad Penal Codefurther inquirybail as punishmentcompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition for the cancellation of bail granted to the accused respondents by the trial court in a case involving charges under the Azad Penal Code. The core legal questions were whether the trial court erred in granting post-arrest bail after the submission of the challan, and whether the complainant’s appeal against the bail order was maintainable. The High Court held that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in granting bail, as the investigation was complete and the accused were no longer required for police purposes. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an appeal against a bail order is not competent under the Code of Criminal Procedure, converting the appeal into a revision petition. The Court established that once bail is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be cancelled without demonstrating strong and exceptional grounds, such as the misuse of the concession of bail. Bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment, and the mere nomination of an accused in an F.I.R. does not preclude the grant of bail if the case requires further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal competent against an order passed on a bail petition?
  • What are the requirements for the cancellation of bail once it has been granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Does the submission of a challan and completion of investigation constitute a change of circumstances justifying the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Can bail be withheld as a form of punishment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Rahim Shah & others vs Muhammad Ghamash & others2019 MLD 1745, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 143, 2019 PHC 118 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Rahim Brohi vs The State2019 MLD 950 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-26
  pre-arrest bailsurety bondforfeiture of bondcriminal revisionbail bond validityinterim bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, imposing a penalty of two lacs on the applicant for failing to produce an accused, Nabi Dad, for whom the applicant had stood surety. The core legal question was whether a surety bond executed for interim pre-arrest bail remains enforceable after the dismissal of the bail application. The court held that upon the dismissal of the pre-arrest bail application, the bail bond executed by the surety dies a natural death and ceases to be alive. Consequently, the court found the forfeiture of the bond and the subsequent imposition of the penalty legally unsustainable, especially given that the accused had subsequently joined the trial and was acquitted. The court set aside the impugned order, establishing the principle that a surety bond for interim bail cannot be forfeited once the underlying bail application has been dismissed, as the bond's validity is contingent upon the subsistence of the interim bail order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a surety bond executed for interim pre-arrest bail remain enforceable after the dismissal of the bail application?
  • Can a penalty be imposed on a surety for failure to produce an accused after the interim bail bond has ceased to exist?
  • What is the legal status of a bail bond once the underlying application for pre-arrest bail is dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Naseeruddin vs The State2019 MLD 558 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-04
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaymurder trialfundamental right to fair trialbail cancellationcriminal proceduremisuse of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application in a murder case registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The applicant sought confirmation of bail, primarily citing the inordinate delay in the conclusion of his trial and the absence of specific role attribution in the FIR. The core legal question was whether the applicant’s continued incarceration was justified given the trial's stagnation and the lack of evidence linking him to the fatal injury. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, noting that the delay in the trial was not attributable to him. The Court emphasized that an expeditious and fair trial is a fundamental right, and keeping an accused in custody indefinitely without trial progress is contrary to the spirit of the law. Furthermore, the Court observed that the applicant had not misused the concession of bail during his previous period of liberty. Consequently, the Court confirmed the bail, reaffirming that the presumption of innocence prevails and that bail should not be recalled without compelling grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the trial has been delayed for an inordinate period without fault on the part of the accused?
  • Should bail be cancelled if the accused has enjoyed the concession of liberty for a significant period without misusing it?
  • Does the lack of a specific role attributed to an accused in the FIR provide a ground for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Mukhtar vs Abdul Hameed (known as Majeed) and another2019 KLR Criminal Cases 125 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-09-18Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Moazam Khan vs Mohammad Iqbal & another2019 CLD 1241, 2020 P C T L R 1099, 2019 SHC 168 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Miskeen vs The State and others2020 KLR Criminal Cases 42, 2019 P Cr. L J 1423 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-05-13
  qatl-i-amddeath sentencemitigating circumstancesinfluence of eldersocular evidencemurder referencejail appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment of the Islamabad High Court addresses Murder Reference No. 11 of 2011 and Jail Appeal No. 29 of 2011 arising from a trial court judgment convicting the appellant, Muhammad Miskeen, under sections 302(b), 324, and 337-F(iii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder and causing injuries. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and whether mitigating circumstances, specifically the alleged influence of the appellant's father upon an accused over fifty years of age, warranted a reduction of the death sentence. The court held that the prosecution successfully established guilt through unimpeachable ocular and medical evidence, and that the principle of influence by elders is strictly confined to offenders of impressionable ages and cannot be extended to mature adults committing brutal acts. The court confirmed the death sentences by answering the murder reference in the affirmative and dismissing the jail appeal, laying down the principle that mitigation of sentence cannot be claimed on unproved facts or generalized pleas of elder influence for mature offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the plea of influence of elders can be invoked as a mitigating circumstance to reduce the death sentence of a mature and elderly offender?
  • Can a court decide a question of law or grant mitigation of sentence on the basis of facts that have not been proved during the trial?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and recovery of crime weapons is sufficient to prove a charge of qatl-i-amd beyond a reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Khan and 2 others vs Government of Balochistan through its2020 [M] C L R 28, 2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 252 · Balochistan Service Tribunal
  regularisation of servicecontract employeesvested rightdoctrine of locus poenitentiaeage criteriaservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed under Section 4 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974 by the appellants seeking regularisation of their services in the Sports Department. The core legal question was whether the respondents could lawfully convert the appellants' regular appointments into contract appointments on the ground that they were overage, after they had already been appointed on regular posts following the recommendations of the selection committee. The Balochistan Service Tribunal held that once an appointment letter is issued and the employee joins service, a vested right is created in their favour which cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn or destroyed by executive authorities under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae. The Tribunal accepted the appeal and directed the respondents to regularise the services of the appellants from the date of their appointment against regular posts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the regular appointment of an employee can be converted into contract service on the ground of being overage after the issuance of an appointment letter?
  • Does a vested right accrue to an employee upon joining service pursuant to a valid appointment letter?
  • Can an accrued right of an employee be withdrawn or destroyed by an executive authority under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ishaque vs Province of Sindh and Ors2021 PLC (C.S.) 51, 2019 SHC 382 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-20
  work-charged employeecontingent paid staffservice regularizationregularization policysuperannuationconstitutional petitionterms of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking directions for the respondents to regularize his service as a Helper in the Highways Division, Thatta, where he had worked on a temporary work-charged basis for over twenty-three years, along with back benefits. His representation for regularization had previously been rejected by the department as per the prevailing Finance Department policy. The core legal question was whether a work-charged or contingent-paid employee could claim regularization of service under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013 or applicable government policy. The High Court held that the petitioner's appointment was on a contingent, part-time, non-pensionable work-charged basis and that the 2013 Act explicitly excludes employees appointed on contingent or daily-wages basis. Having accepted the terms of contingent employment, the petitioner could not demand regularization. However, considering his long service, the court directed that his service continue until superannuation and his pending salary be resolved. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on a work-charged or contingent basis is entitled to regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013?
  • Can a contingent employee who voluntarily accepted temporary terms of service subsequently claim regular status as a matter of right?
  • Whether pensionable and regular service benefits can be extended to temporary work-charged employees paid out of contingent funds?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Iqbal Khan and another vs Public-at-Large and another2019 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 1 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Imran, etc vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2019 P.S.C. 1607 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  freedom of trade and businessprivate school feesreasonable restrictionsArticle 18regulatory frameworkfundamental rightseducation policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant matters concern appeals against High Court judgments regarding the regulation of private school fees in the Provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The core legal question was whether statutory caps on annual fee increases (5% in Sindh, 8% in Punjab) and the regulatory frameworks governing private educational institutions violate the fundamental right to trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the regulatory frameworks, including the fee caps, are intra vires the Constitution. The Court affirmed that private educational services constitute a "business" or "trade" subject to regulation under Article 18. The state has a legitimate interest in preventing profiteering and ensuring affordable education, particularly given the scarcity of quality public education. The Court determined that the caps are reasonable restrictions rather than arbitrary prohibitions. The key principle laid down is that the right to conduct business under Article 18 is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, especially concerning essential services, to balance individual business rights with public welfare and the fundamental right to education.

  Questions settled

  • Does the regulation of private school fees by the state violate the fundamental right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are statutory caps on annual fee increases for private educational institutions considered reasonable restrictions under the Constitution?
  • Can the state regulate the salaries of teachers in private educational institutions as part of a fee regulatory framework?
  • Does the right to trade and business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include the right to earn unlimited profits from private educational services?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Imran vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others2019 P.S.C. 1419, 2019 SCMR 1132, 2019 SCMR 1753, 2019 SCP 318, 2019 SCP 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-12
  private educational institutionsschool fee regulationintra viresfee capfreedom of tradedelegated legislationrecalculation of fees
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals and petitions arose from High Court judgments in Punjab and Sindh concerning the legal validity of statutory provisions and rules regulating fee increases in private educational institutions. The primary legal questions centered on whether Section 7-A of the Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance, 1984 (as amended in 2017) and Rules 7(3), 7-A, and 10 of the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005 were intra vires the parent statutes and fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Supreme Court unanimously declared Section 7-A of the Punjab Ordinance and Rule 10 of the Sindh Rules intra vires the Constitution and relevant enactments. By a majority of two to one, the Court upheld Rule 7(3) of the Sindh Rules, setting aside the High Court judgments to the extent of declaring Rule 7-A invalid. The Court ruled that interim fee reduction orders ceased to operate, directing fee recalculations based on 2017 baseline rates, while barring private schools from recovering interim fee reduction arrears.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 7-A of the Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance, 1984 intra vires Articles 18, 23, 24, and 25-A of the Constitution?
  • Is Rule 10 of the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005 intra vires its parent statute and the Constitution?
  • Does statutory regulation and capping of tuition fees of private educational institutions violate the right to conduct lawful trade or business under Article 18 of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ibrahim through Duly Constituted Sub-Attorney vs Sindh2019 CLC 817 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Bilal vs The State2019 MLD 1291 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-30
  murderdeath sentencestatement of accusedincriminating evidenceremand of casecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death for murder, alongside a reference for the confirmation of the death sentence. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether the failure of the trial court to put all incriminating pieces of evidence, including the recovery of the crime weapon and the Forensic Science Laboratory report, to the accused during the recording of his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiates the conviction and warrants acquittal or a remand of the case. The High Court held that every piece of evidence used to form a conviction must be put to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to afford an opportunity of explanation, and failure to do so renders that evidence unusable for conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment, answered the confirmation reference in the negative, and remanded the matter back to the trial court to re-record the accused's statement from that stage and decide the case afresh on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether incriminating pieces of evidence not put to an accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be used for his conviction?
  • What is the legal effect on a trial judgment when material evidence relied upon by the court is omitted from the examination of the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should an appellate court acquit an accused or remand the case back to the trial court when a defect is found in recording the statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Awais s/o Ashiq Hussain vs Aj&K Government through its2019 SC AJK 75 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-03-26Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Askari and 7 others vs Qamar Abbas and 2 others2019 CLC 104 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Mitha Khan, Ex-Sub-Inspector, District Jaffarabad vs Inspector-General of Police, Balochistan, Quetta and another2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 173 · Balochistan Service Tribunal
  service appealdismissal from servicede novo inquirypolice disciplinary proceedingsmissing armsBalochistan Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed under Section 4 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974, challenging an order of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant, a former Sub-Inspector of Police, following allegations of missing arms and ammunition from the police station's Malkhana (Kot) while he was posted as Station House Officer. The core legal question involves the legality and propriety of the departmental proceedings, the subsequent de novo inquiry ordered by the Tribunal in previous litigation, and whether the major penalty of dismissal was warranted. The Balochistan Service Tribunal examined the procedural history wherein an earlier appeal had set aside a prior dismissal and remanded the matter for a de novo inquiry under the applicable rules. The Tribunal held that proper compliance with service rules and fair inquiry procedures must be adhered to. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary proceedings resulting in major penalties must strictly follow due process, and where a de novo inquiry is ordered, it must be conducted transparently in accordance with the relevant statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the major penalty of dismissal from service was imposed in accordance with applicable rules and due process?
  • Can a service tribunal remand a matter for a de novo departmental inquiry upon setting aside a defective penalty order?
  • Whether a police officer can be held liable for missing arms and ammunition from the police station kot during his tenure as SHO?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Rozina Parveen and 2 others vs Ghulam Nabi through L.Rs, and others2019 CLC 1012 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Miss Nusrat Yasmin vs The Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar & others2019 PLD Supreme Court 719, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 25, 2019 SCP 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-02
  judicial stricturesjudicial ethicssubordinate judiciaryadministrative controljudicial proprietyexpungementprofessional misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, an Additional District and Sessions Judge, challenged judicial strictures recorded against her by the High Court in an appellate judgment. The High Court had criticized her professional competence, knowledge of law, and judicial ethics, directing disciplinary proceedings against her. The Supreme Court addressed whether it is appropriate for a High Court to record such strictures in a judgment or summon a subordinate judge for public reprimand. The Court held that while High Courts possess appellate and revisional jurisdiction to correct legal errors, they must maintain judicial propriety and avoid personal remarks or public censure of subordinate judges. The Court ruled that strictures are not a reformative tool and cause irreparable damage to a judge's reputation. Instead, the High Court should address concerns regarding a judge's conduct or competence through administrative channels, such as confidential notes to the Chief Justice or administrative memoranda, rather than through public judgments. Consequently, the Court expunged the strictures against the appellant, emphasizing that the High Court's role is to correct legal reasoning, not to act as a critic of a judge's personal attributes.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a High Court to record personal strictures against a judge of the District Judiciary within an appellate judgment?
  • Can a High Court summon a judge of the District Judiciary to appear in open court for a public reprimand regarding their judicial performance?
  • What is the appropriate mechanism for a High Court to address perceived incompetence or misconduct of a subordinate judge?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate judge through remarks made in a judicial judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Naseem Baig vs K.E.S.C. Employees Cooperative Housing Society2019 YLR 2609 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-01Read full judgment →
• Mirza Kareem Baig vs The State2019 SHC 384 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-23
  pre-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustcorruptionadministrative liabilityfurther inquirymens reatentative assessmentconcurrent jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns pre-arrest bail applications filed by a former Secretary of the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) in connection with multiple FIRs alleging corruption, forgery, and embezzlement regarding a freight subsidy scheme. The core legal question was whether the applicant, in his administrative capacity, was prima facie liable for the misappropriation of funds despite the absence of evidence linking him to personal monetary gain or the specific approval of fraudulent claims. The Court held that the applicant’s case warranted further inquiry, confirming the interim pre-arrest bail. The ratio established that an administrative role, without evidence of mens rea or personal benefit, does not automatically establish criminal liability at the pre-trial stage. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that while a party should generally approach the trial court first, the High Court may exercise concurrent jurisdiction in compelling circumstances. The judgment reiterates that the basic concept of bail is to protect the liberty of an innocent person, and deep appraisal of evidence is impermissible during the tentative assessment required for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an administrative role in a government department, without evidence of personal gain or direct involvement in fraud, constitute sufficient grounds for denying pre-arrest bail?
  • Can a High Court entertain a bail application directly without the applicant first approaching the trial court?
  • Is a deep appraisal of evidence permissible at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  • What is the standard for granting pre-arrest bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd and Ors vs Province of Sindh & Others2020 CLC 232, 2019 SHC 72 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Mirchoomal Khatri vs The State2019 SHC 386 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-23
  post-arrest bailembezzlementfreight subsidyfinancial crimetrial delayrestitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for post-arrest bail by an accused facing charges under Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, regarding alleged embezzlement of freight subsidy funds from the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (TDAP). The core legal question was whether the applicant, a contractual employee, was entitled to bail given the protracted nature of the trial and his willingness to deposit the alleged embezzled amount, similar to relief granted to co-accused in related cases. The court held that, considering the applicant had been incarcerated since 2013 without charges being framed and that the prosecution conceded to the bail upon the deposit of the alleged embezzled funds, the bail should be granted. The court established the principle that in cases of alleged financial embezzlement, where the accused voluntarily offers to deposit the disputed amount, and where the prosecution does not oppose such a course, bail may be granted subject to the deposit of the amount, without prejudice to the final outcome of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can post-arrest bail be granted in embezzlement cases where the accused offers to deposit the alleged misappropriated amount?
  • Does the prolonged incarceration of an accused without the framing of charges provide sufficient grounds for the grant of bail?
  • Is a deposit of alleged embezzled funds made as a condition for bail subject to refund upon the final acquittal of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mira Jan vs Mir Abbas, etc2019 PHC 68 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-13Read full judgment →
• Mir Tariq Mehmood Khetran vs Returning Officer, Na-259 and others2019 KLR Civil Case 308, 2019 MLD 1335 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-12-07Read full judgment →
• Mir Shoaib Nosherwani vs Mir Muhammad Ismail Peerakzai and 5 others2019 CLC 261 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-06-21
  nomination paperselection disqualificationSadiq and Ameenfake degreeArticle 62(1)(f)permanent embargofalse declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a constitutional petition challenging the rejection of the petitioner's nomination papers for the 2013 Provincial Assembly election by the Election Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s past use of a fake bachelor's degree in the 2002 election, which resulted in a finding of dishonesty, constituted a permanent disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby rendering him ineligible for the 2013 election. The Court held that the petitioner had indeed submitted a false declaration regarding his academic qualifications in 2002 and failed to rebut the evidence of document tampering and disqualification by the University of Punjab's Disciplinary Committee. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that a finding of a lack of 'Sadiq' and 'Ameen' status due to the submission of fake educational credentials constitutes a permanent disqualification. The key principle laid down is that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, arising from a false declaration of qualifications, is not removed by the mere passage of time and creates a permanent embargo on candidature.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a fake educational degree in a past election result in a permanent disqualification from contesting future elections?
  • Can a finding of a lack of 'Sadiq' and 'Ameen' status under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 be cured by the passage of time?
  • Are findings regarding the falsity of academic documents in previous election petitions admissible as evidence in subsequent election proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Shakil Ur Rehman vs Messrs Creek Developers (Private) Limited and another2019 PLD Sindh 670 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-27
  criminal defamationcorporate criminal liabilityquashment of proceedingsEditor-in-Chief liabilityinherent powers of High Courtprocedural irregularityOaths Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Criminal Revision Applications challenging an order of the District Judge, Karachi South, taking cognizance of a private defamation complaint filed by a company against an Editor-in-Chief and a journalist. The core legal questions involved whether a company can initiate criminal defamation proceedings, the liability of an Editor-in-Chief for published content, the validity of corporate authorization for filing complaints, and whether procedural irregularities, such as the omission of an oath during inquiry, invalidate proceedings. The Court held that a company is a "person" under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 capable of initiating defamation proceedings regarding harm to its goodwill. It further determined that the Editor-in-Chief is a proper party, and procedural irregularities like the omission of an oath are curable under the Oaths Act 1873. The Court emphasized that inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 should not be invoked to bypass statutory remedies like acquittal applications under Section 249-A or 265-K. Consequently, the Court dismissed the applications, directing the trial court to expedite proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a company initiate criminal defamation proceedings for harm to its goodwill?
  • Does the omission of an oath during an inquiry invalidate the proceedings under the Oaths Act 1873?
  • Can the High Court exercise inherent powers under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings when statutory remedies like Section 249-A or 265-K are available?
  • Is an Editor-in-Chief liable for defamatory content published in a newspaper?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Shakil Ur Rahman and another vs Rai Muhammad Asad Khan and another2019 YLR 157 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-26
  criminal defamationeditor-in-chief liabilitydirect complaintissuance of bailable warrantspreliminary inquirycriminal revision applicationprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application assailed an order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi South, whereby a direct complaint filed under Section 200, Cr.P.C. for criminal defamation was registered and bailable warrants were issued against the applicants. The core legal questions involved whether an Editor-in-Chief can be held criminally liable for defamatory publications in newspapers and whether the trial court erred in issuing process without a detailed inquiry. The Sindh High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that the Editor-in-Chief does not enjoy statutory immunity from prosecution and that at the initial stage of issuing process in a direct complaint, the court is only required to see whether a prima facie case is made out without embarking on a full-fledged trial. The key principle laid down is that an Editor-in-Chief can be held responsible for defamatory content if knowledge and responsibility are established, and accused persons must seek remedies before the trial court rather than invoking inherent or revisional jurisdictions prematurely.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Editor-in-Chief of a newspaper be prosecuted for criminal defamation under Section 499 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the extent of inquiry required by a trial court when taking cognizance of a direct complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with an order issuing process in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a jurisdictional error?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Nasrullah Khan and another vs Mst. Khairunnisa and 7 others2019 YLR 121 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-18Read full judgment →
• Mir Mujib-Ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani vs Returning Officer PB-412019 MLD 1415 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-12-18Read full judgment →
• Mir Mujib-ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani Contesting Candidate from2019 [M] C.L.R. 906 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mir Muhammad Sadiq Umrani and others vs Returning Officer, PB-11, Nasirabad-I and others2019 KLR Civil Case 335, 2019 MLD 1130 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-12-07Read full judgment →
• Moiz Abbas vs Mrs. Latifa and others2019 PLJ SC 29, 2019 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-18
  oral agreement to sellspecific performancepower of attorneystrict constructionpleadingsevidence beyond pleadingsdeclarationmesne profits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute over the alleged oral sale of a residential property in Karachi. The appellant, residing abroad, had executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPOA) in favor of his sister for property management and rental purposes. The respondents claimed they purchased the property via an oral agreement and paid consideration to the SPOA holder. The High Court's Division Bench had decreed the respondents' suit for specific performance, reversing the Single Judge's decision. The Supreme Court examined whether the SPOA authorized the sale and whether the oral agreement was proved. The Court held that a Power of Attorney must be strictly construed; since the SPOA only authorized renting, any sale based on it was void. Furthermore, the respondents failed to plead essential details of the oral agreement—date, time, place, and witnesses—at the earliest stage. The Court ruled that evidence beyond pleadings cannot be considered and that oral agreements require stringent proof to prevent fraud. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the appellant's suit was decreed with costs.

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• Mir Muhammad Raza vs Trading Corporation of Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. & others2020 PLC (C.S.) 531, 2019 SHC 408 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-10
  suit for declarationinjunctioneducational credentialsfake degreemaster and servantshow cause noticeprima facie case
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit for declaration and injunction was filed by the plaintiff, a Manager at the Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., challenging a Show Cause Notice and an Office Order concerning his educational credentials. The plaintiff contended that his MBA mark sheet from Al-Khair University was genuine, as confirmed by a subsequent university letter, and that the inquiry was initiated out of malafides. Conversely, the defendants argued that the suit was not maintainable under the master and servant rule, and that the university had twice previously confirmed the plaintiff's mark sheet to be fake and bogus. The High Court of Sindh observed that the initial burden of proving academic credentials rests upon the employee. It further noted that the plaintiff had failed to produce a verified degree and had refused to cooperate with a newly proposed inquiry officer. Relying on Supreme Court precedents concerning fake degrees, the Court held that verification is a matter between the employer and employee. Finding no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable loss, the Court dismissed the injunction applications.

  Questions settled

  • Does the initial burden of proving and satisfying academic credentials for a job assignment rest upon the employee or the employer?
  • Can an employee seek an injunction to restrain disciplinary inquiry proceedings when there are conflicting reports regarding the genuineness of their educational degrees?
  • Does the doctrine of past and closed transactions protect an employee who allegedly obtained employment using fabricated academic documents?
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• Mir Muhammad & another vs NAB through its chairman & others2020 P SC (Crl.) 588, 2020 SCMR 168, 2019 SCP 366 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-26
  pre-arrest bailmisappropriation of fundsNAB referenceextraordinary remedymala fidesaccountabilitycriminal prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by the petitioners, who are contractors and officials of the Irrigation Department, facing allegations of misappropriation of funds regarding the Annual Development Plan of Irrigation (E&W) Khairpur for the years 2013-14 and 2014-15. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail in the face of allegations supported by technical and documentary evidence of non-execution or partial completion of project works, resulting in a significant loss to the exchequer. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that in the absence of demonstrated mala fides, the petitioners could not claim judicial protection against prosecution. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, noting that the investigation was initiated following a court-directed probe into embezzlement. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary equitable remedy designed to protect innocent individuals from the abuse of legal process in cases tainted by mala fides; it is not a routine relief to be granted based on bald denials or parallel narratives in ordinary criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail a routine remedy available in all criminal prosecutions?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted in the absence of demonstrated mala fides?
  • Does the existence of technical and documentary evidence supporting a charge preclude the grant of pre-arrest bail?
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• Mir Jeeand Badini vs MCC AppraisementPTCL 2021 CL. 500, 2020 PTD 213, 2019 SHC 216 · Sindh High Court · 2019-07-05Read full judgment →
• Mir Ghulam vs The State2019 MLD 348 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-05-04
  juvenile justiceage determinationmedical boardossification testmatriculation certificatecriminal revisiondelay in filing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Sessions Judge, Astore, which determined the petitioner's age based on a medical board report rather than his matriculation certificate. The petitioner, charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought to be treated as a juvenile, relying on his matriculation certificate to claim he was under 18 at the time of the offense. The trial court had previously referred the petitioner to a medical board with the consent of both parties, which assessed his age as 19 years. The core legal question was whether a matriculation certificate takes precedence over a medical board's ossification test in determining the age of an accused under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Section 7 of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, and that school certificates are not conclusive proof of age. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, noting the lack of evidence to override the medical board's findings and the petitioner's inordinate delay in challenging the trial court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a matriculation certificate take precedence over a medical board's report for age determination in criminal proceedings?
  • Can a trial court determine the age of an accused by referring them to a medical board under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000?
  • Is a matriculation certificate considered conclusive proof of age in juvenile justice matters?
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• Mir Bat Khan vs Mst. Sherin Bibi and othersPLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 175, 2019 SCP 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-08
  child custodywelfare of minorhizanatjirga decisionmaternal custodyguardian and wards
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which had set aside the order of the District Judge, Hangu, and restored the Family Judge's decision granting custody of a minor girl to her mother. The petitioner father argued that the child did not recognize her mother and relied on a jirga decision that had conditioned the mother's divorce on relinquishing custody. The Supreme Court examined whether custody could be denied based on the child's lack of recognition, maternal poverty, or a jirga verdict. Dismissing the petition, the Court held that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody matters, poverty of a mother is no ground to deny her custody, and a jirga has no legal authority to determine child custody or use children to bargain for divorce. The principle laid down emphasizes that maternal hizanat must be protected in accordance with law and precedents, prioritizing the welfare and best interests of the minor above all else.

  Questions settled

  • Whether poverty on the part of a mother is a valid ground to disentitle her from the custody of a minor?
  • Does a jirga have the legal authority to decide the custody of children or compel a mother to barter her right to custody to secure a divorce?
  • Is the lack of recognition of a mother by a minor child a sufficient ground to deprive the mother of custody?
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• Mir Alam vs The State2019 P Cr. LJ 1741 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-02-26
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubtFIR credibilityexaggerated prosecution storycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 324, 337-F, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident of firing that caused injuries to two individuals. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail despite being named in the FIR, given that the investigation agency found other co-accused innocent and released them under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the principle that where a complainant provides an exaggerated account or 'half-truths' in the FIR, and the investigation agency finds parts of the prosecution's story to be false, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt at the bail stage as a matter of right. Consequently, the Court admitted the petitioner to bail, noting that the prosecution's case required further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the release of a co-accused under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle the remaining accused to the benefit of doubt at the bail stage?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail as a matter of right when the complainant's story is found to be partially false during investigation?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon without forensic verification necessarily preclude the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Akbar Shah, etc vs (Mst.) Rahmania, etc2019 KLR Revenue Cases 1 · Board of Revenue · 2016-12-27Read full judgment →
• Minhas Hussain and 9 others vs Government of Gilgit Baltistan2019 PLC (C.S.) 1429 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-05-09
  writ petitionjudicial appointmentsbanking courtadministrative courtsconsultation with chief judgedistrict judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by senior judicial officers of the District Judiciary of Gilgit-Baltistan seeking to declare null and void an advertisement inviting applications for the appointment of a Banking Judge, and seeking directions for future appointments to administrative courts and tribunals to be made from among local judicial officers in consultation with the Chief Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court. The core legal question concerned whether the appointment of judges to special and administrative courts requires mandatory consultation with the Chief Judge. The Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court allowed the petition, holding that statutory provisions mandate meaningful consultation with the Chief Judge prior to appointing judges to banking, accountability, and anti-terrorism courts. The court laid down the principle that appointments of judges to special or administrative courts and tribunals in Gilgit-Baltistan must be made in consultation with the Chief Judge of the Chief Court, with preference given to the judicial officers of the District Judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether consultation with the Chief Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court is mandatory for the appointment of judges to administrative and special courts?
  • Can the government invite applications for the post of Banking Judge without consulting the Chief Judge?
  • Are judicial officers of the District Judiciary of Gilgit-Baltistan entitled to be preferred for appointments as judges of special and administrative courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Minhaj Khan vs The State2019 SCP 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-14
  narcotics possessioncharaschemical analyst reporttesting protocolscontradictory testimonybenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner was convicted under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of narcotics, and his appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the reliability of the narcotics analysis report for omitting testing protocols pursuant to Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, while the State defended the report and questioned the correctness of precedent. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the chemical analyst report and the appreciation of inconsistent prosecution evidence. The Supreme Court did not reach the technical question regarding testing protocols, instead holding that numerous material discrepancies, contradictions, and inexplicable conduct of police witnesses rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that when key eyewitness and recovery testimonies suffer from major, unmitigated contradictions and suspicious delays, the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, warranting the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-mentioning of testing protocols in a Government Analyst report renders it unreliable under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 stand when material discrepancies exist in the testimonies of key police witnesses?
  • Whether inconsistencies regarding the distance of the place of occurrence and unexplained delays in lodging the FIR vitiate the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Miani Sahib Graveyard vs Encroachers and others2019 PLD Lahore 216 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-19Read full judgment →
• Miandad vs The State2019 YLR 954 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-29
  narcotic possessionbenefit of doubtprocedural irregularitychain of custodychemical examiner reportcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for possession of six kilograms of charas under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged procedural irregularities in the recovery and handling of the contraband. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing significant failures: the police did not associate independent witnesses despite having prior spy information; samples drawn from the seized contraband were not weighed, marked, or sealed individually; and there was an unexplained one-day delay in delivering samples to the chemical examiner, raising concerns about tampering. Furthermore, inconsistencies between the testimonies of the complainant and the mashir regarding the arrest details undermined the prosecution's credibility. The Court reiterated the principle that if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt as a matter of right, not grace, leading to the appellant's acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in the delivery of narcotic samples to the chemical examiner create a reasonable doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence?
  • Is the failure to associate independent witnesses during a recovery based on prior information fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal consequence when samples drawn from seized narcotics are not individually weighed, marked, and sealed at the spot?
  • Does a material inconsistency between the testimonies of the complainant and the recovery witness entitle the accused to an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Zia Ur Rehman and others vs Syed Nadir Ali Shah and others2019 P.S.C. 1058, 2019 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  quo warrantofalse declarationeducational qualificationArticle 62(1)(f)disqualificationnomination papersfake degree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that allowed a writ of quo warranto, setting aside the election of the petitioner due to a false declaration regarding his educational qualifications. The petitioner had previously declared himself a graduate in 2008 but claimed to be a matriculate in 2013, leading to allegations of dishonesty and the use of fake academic credentials. The core legal question was whether a candidate who provides false information in nomination papers regarding their educational background is disqualified from holding public office under the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a candidate who procures or relies upon fake educational documents lacks the requisite honesty and integrity to hold public office. The Court affirmed that making a false declaration on solemn affirmation in nomination papers constitutes a disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional requirement for a candidate to be honest and Ameen is strictly enforced, and any candidate found to have submitted false declarations regarding their credentials is ineligible to serve in legislative assemblies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of a false declaration regarding educational qualifications in nomination papers render a candidate disqualified under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a candidate who uses fake educational documents be considered an honest and Ameen person for the purposes of contesting elections?
  • Is a candidate liable to be de-notified retrospectively if the declaration provided in their nomination papers regarding Article 62 and 63 compliance is found to be incorrect?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sohail Ahmed vs The State, etc2019 SCMR 956, 2019 SCP 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-24
  Eyewitness identificationTest Identification ParadeReliability of evidenceEstimator variablesJudicial noticeBenefit of doubtAcquittalMurderRobberyCriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved appeals against convictions and sentences for murder and robbery. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the Test Identification Parade (TIP). The core legal question was how to assess the credibility of eyewitness testimony, especially in light of scientific research on memory and perception. The Court acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt, finding the prosecution's case and the TIP unreliable due to multiple infirmities, including inconsistencies between ocular accounts, medical evidence, and the site plan, as well as police suggestiveness. The Court laid down a two-step process for identification: first, the TIP, and second, an independent assessment of the eyewitness's credibility using "estimator variables" derived from scientific research. These variables include stress, weapon focus, duration of observation, distance, lighting, and memory decay. The Court held that judicial notice of credible scientific developments under Article 112, Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, is permissible to enhance the quality of identification evidence and justice.

  Read full judgment →
• Mian Sohail Ahmed and 2 others vs State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-20
  test identification paradeeyewitness reliabilityestimator variablesbenefit of the doubtwrongful convictioncriminal evidencejudicial notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal question concerns the reliability of eyewitness identification and the evidentiary value of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) conducted in the absence of proper procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from significant infirmities, including an unreliable ocular account, a flawed TIP, and impermissible suggestiveness by the police. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellants, extending them the benefit of the doubt. The judgment establishes that eyewitness identification is a two-step process: first, the conduct of a formal TIP; and second, an independent judicial assessment of the witness's credibility using "estimator variables"—scientific factors such as stress, weapon focus, duration, distance, and lighting conditions. The Court emphasized that judges should take judicial notice of credible scientific research regarding memory and perception to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions. By integrating these scientific principles into the appreciation of evidence, the Court aims to enhance the reliability of criminal justice outcomes and prevent misidentification.

  Questions settled

  • What are the legal consequences of conducting a joint identification parade for multiple suspects?
  • Does the failure to match a suspect's description in a Test Identification Parade with the First Information Report render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • How should courts assess the credibility of eyewitness testimony using scientific estimator variables?
  • Is it permissible for police to expose suspects to witnesses prior to a formal Test Identification Parade?
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• Mian Shaukat Ali vs Punjab Public Service Commission, etc2021 SCP 264, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 365, 2019 SCMR 118, 2022 PSC 1555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-14
  rounding off markspsychological assessmentpublic service commissioncompetitive examinationinterview marksexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment during a competitive examination for the post of Deputy Prosecutor General (BS-18) can be rounded off to the next whole number under the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) Policy Decisions. The appellant, who missed selection by a narrow margin, argued that psychological assessment forms part of the interview and should benefit from the rounding-off rule applicable to interview marks. The Supreme Court held that the PPSC Policy Decisions explicitly provide for rounding off average marks awarded in the viva voce interview by specific committees, but deliberately omit any such provision for the five marks allocated to psychological assessment. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court ruled that rounding off cannot be extended to psychological assessment where a 0.5 variation constitutes a substantial ten percent change in marks. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was declined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment by a candidate in a competitive examination can be rounded off to the next whole number?
  • Does the definition of interview under Regulation 3(o) of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2000 include psychological assessment for the purpose of rounding off marks?
  • Whether the omission of a rounding-off provision for psychological assessment in the PPSC Policy Decisions implies its exclusion under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius?
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• Mian Shaukat Ali and another vs Punjab Public Service Commission and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 365, 2019 SCMR 118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-14
  public service commissionrounding off markspsychological assessmentcompetitive examinationinterview marksinterpretation of policyexpressio unius est exclusio alterius
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses whether marks obtained in a psychological assessment during competitive examinations for the post of Deputy Prosecutor General (BS-18) can be rounded off to the next whole number, similar to interview marks under the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) Policy Decisions. The appellant missed selection by a narrow margin and contended that rounding off his psychological assessment marks would tie him with the last selected candidate. The Supreme Court held that the policy explicitly provides for rounding off average interview scores but does not extend this concession to psychological assessments. Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the Court noted that the omission is intentional, and further reasoned that rounding off a 5-mark component would cause a significant 10% variance, undermining the credibility of competitive evaluations. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's judgment, dismissed the petition, and declined to interfere with the selection process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether marks obtained in the psychological assessment by a candidate in a competitive examination can be rounded off to the next whole number under the Punjab Public Service Commission Policy Decisions?
  • Does the definition of 'interview' under Regulation 3(o) of the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2000 include psychological assessment for the purpose of rounding off marks?
  • What is the impact of applying rounding off to a small-scale scoring component like a five-mark psychological assessment in public service examinations?
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• Mian Nasser Hayat Maggo vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and others2019 IHC 3 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Mian Nasser Hayat Maggo through Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan2019 PLJ Islamabad 97, 2019 CLD 267 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Tariq Shah vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 593, 2019 PHC 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Sharif vs National Accountability Bureau and others2019 P Cr. L J 302 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-13
  post-arrest baildelay in trialconstitutional petitionNational Accountability Bureauright to fair trialstatutory delayNAB Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner sought post-arrest bail in Accountability Reference No. 13 of 2017 involving allegations of misappropriation and embezzlement during land acquisition. The core legal question was whether an accused person can be kept behind bars for an indefinite period when the trial has not concluded despite the lapse of significant time and without the delay being attributable to the accused. The Lahore High Court held that inordinate and undue delay in the conclusion of a trial, where the accused is not at fault, constitutes a valid ground for granting bail to prevent pre-trial punishment and to uphold the fundamental right to a fair and expeditious trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The court laid down the principle that prolonged incarceration without trial amounts to an abuse of the process of law, tipping the scales of justice in favor of bail rather than continued detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does prolonged incarceration without the prospect of a near-conclusion of trial entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether inordinate delay in the prosecution of an accused person amounts to an abuse of the process of law justifying the grant of bail?
  • Is an accused person entitled to a speedy and expeditious trial as a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs The State, etc2019 IHC 164 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-26Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif vs Federation of Pakistan and 42019 P Cr. L J 1123 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-26
  Exit Control Listfundamental rightsright to travelconstitutional petitionpendency of inquiryNAB investigationmalafide executive action
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 challenging the placement of the petitioner's name on the Exit Control List (ECL) on the recommendation of the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal question was whether the mere pendency of an inquiry or investigation by accountability authorities constitutes sufficient justification for curtailing a citizen's fundamental right to travel and movement. The Lahore High Court held that placing a citizen's name on the ECL based merely on a pending inquiry, without independent application of mind, adequate reasons, or finalized proceedings, constitutes an arbitrary exercise of executive power violating constitutional guarantees. The court established that the fundamental right of movement under Article 15 of the Constitution cannot be mechanically or restrictively curtailed through executive action without valid, objective, and sustainable grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mere pendency of an inquiry or investigation by the National Accountability Bureau is sufficient ground to place a citizen's name on the Exit Control List?
  • Does the right to travel abroad constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the federal government exercise its discretion under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 in a mechanical manner without recording independent reasons?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable against placement on the Exit Control List despite the availability of a statutory review remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and another vs The State through Chairman NAB and 4 others2020 PCr. L J 213, 2020 PLJ Islamabad 51, 2019 IHC 166 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-29
  suspension of sentencepost-arrest bailmedical groundsaccountabilitycorruption reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Islamabad High Court through a criminal petition seeking suspension of sentence and grant of post-arrest bail. The core legal question concerns the suspension of sentence and release on bail of Petitioner No.2, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who was convicted and sentenced by an Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, specifically for offences under Section 9(a)(v) read with Section 14(c). The court allowed the petition, suspending the sentence and granting bail for a period of eight weeks on medical grounds, subject to furnishing surety bonds. The court further held that the petitioner may approach the Provincial Government under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for extension or relief prior to the expiry of the bail period, failing which the bail shall automatically stand revoked upon the lapse of the stipulated time.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sentence handed down by an Accountability Court can be suspended and the convict released on bail on medical grounds?
  • Can a convicted person approach the Provincial Government under Section 401(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 during the period of suspended sentence and bail?
  • What is the legal consequence if a petitioner fails to approach the Provincial Government for relief within the granted period of bail?
  Read full judgment →