Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Javed Akhtar Khan vs DCO/District Collector Sheikhupura2020 MLD 900, 2019 PLJ Lahore 647, 2019 LHC 2188 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-23Read full judgment →
• Javed Akhtar and 8 others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, through Secretary Local Bodies_Government, Peshawar and 5 others2019 CLC 1185 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-25Read full judgment →
• Janat Wali and another vs The State2019 MLD 54 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-09-03
  surety forfeiturebail bondcriminal revisionprocedural irregularityabsconding accusedjudicial lock-up
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, Diamer, which forfeited the surety amount of the petitioners and committed them to judicial lock-up following the absence of the accused for whom they stood surety. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted in accordance with the law when it forfeited the surety amount and imprisoned the sureties without properly following the procedural requirements of Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, particularly after the accused subsequently appeared before the court. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the trial court acted in a hasty manner by failing to obtain a proper reply to the notice issued under Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court established the principle that the primary purpose of a surety is to ensure the production of the accused; once the accused appears before the court, the liability of the surety is effectively discharged. Consequently, the Court set aside the forfeiture and imprisonment orders, ruling that there was no valid ground to detain the sureties after the accused had surrendered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the appearance of an accused before the court discharge the liability of the surety?
  • Is a trial court required to obtain a reply to a notice issued under Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 before forfeiting a surety bond?
  • Can a court legally commit sureties to judicial lock-up after the accused has surrendered?
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• Jan Muhammad vs State of Haryana2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 136 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-12-14
  criminal appealquantum of sentenceembezzlementmitigating circumstancessentencing discretioncriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a criminal conviction for embezzlement involving a former Haryana Roadways driver. The appellant was prosecuted for offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, specifically relating to the misappropriation of diesel. Following concurrent findings of guilt by the Trial Court and the High Court, the appellant challenged the conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of conviction, it exercised its discretion to review the quantum of punishment. Considering the appellant's advanced age, his ailing health, the significant passage of time since the incident in 1999, and his lack of prior criminal involvement, the Court determined that the original sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment was disproportionate. Consequently, the Court upheld the conviction but modified the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant, while simultaneously enhancing the fine from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000. This decision underscores the principle that appellate courts may exercise discretion to mitigate sentencing in light of mitigating personal circumstances and the passage of time.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court modify the quantum of sentence while upholding a concurrent conviction?
  • Does the advanced age and health condition of a convict constitute valid grounds for reducing a custodial sentence?
  • Is it permissible for an appellate court to substitute a term of imprisonment with an enhanced fine?
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• Jamshaid Ali vs Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, etc2019 [M] C.L.R. 33 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-18Read full judgment →
• Jamil Ahmed & others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Communication, Islamabad & others2019 PLD Lahore 298, 2019 PLJ Lahore 587, 2019 LHC 96 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-22Read full judgment →
• James L. Kisor vs Robert Wilke, Secretary of Veterans Affairs2019 SCMR 1229 · Supreme Court of United StatesRead full judgment →
• Jameela Bibi and others vs Muhmmad Aslam Mehmood and others2020 [M] C L R 1621, 2019 CLC 1945 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-17Read full judgment →
• Jameel Akhtar and others vs Chairman National Accountability2019 P Cr. L J 475 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-13
  pre-arrest bailrule of consistencycorrupt practicessales tax refundNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  Through these petitions, the petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in Reference No. 51 of 2016 relating to corruption and corrupt practices involving fraudulent sales tax refunds. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail on the rule of consistency given that a co-accused with a similar or greater role had already been granted bail by the court. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioners were prima facie entitled to have their pre-arrest bail confirmed based on the rule of consistency, noting also that the amount involved was relatively minor in the context of mega corruption cases under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and that recalling pre-arrest bail would serve no useful purpose as they would be granted post-arrest bail in any event. The key principle laid down is that the rule of consistency applies to extend bail when a co-accused facing similar allegations has been granted relief, preventing needless incarceration when the ultimate grant of post-arrest bail is inevitable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed on the basis of the rule of consistency when a co-accused with a similar role has been granted bail?
  • Does the relatively minor amount involved in a corruption reference influence the consideration for bail under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Whether the absence of a challenge to a co-accused's bail order by the prosecution makes the rule of consistency applicable to other similarly situated accused persons?
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• Jameel Ahmad Zahid vs Rasheeda Begum and others2019 KLR Civil Cases 173, 2019 MLD 485 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-06Read full judgment →
• Jamal Khan vs The State and another2021 P Cr. L J 427, 2019 LHC 3490 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-14
  narcotic substancescriminal appealpolice witnessdirectory vs mandatory rulesforensic analysisrecovery of narcoticssafe custody of case property
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Jamal Khan, for an offence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of 7000 grams of Charas. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of police-only witnesses, the necessity of independent corroboration, and whether the failure to dispatch forensic samples within the 72-hour period prescribed by the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, vitiates the prosecution's case. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent and coherent testimony. The Court reaffirmed that police officials are competent witnesses whose testimony is as credible as any other, provided no mala fides are established. Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, specifically regarding the 72-hour dispatch period, are directory rather than mandatory. Consequently, substantial compliance is sufficient, and mere delay in dispatching samples does not invalidate the forensic report absent evidence of tampering or prejudice to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is the association of independent public witnesses mandatory in cases involving the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, regarding the 72-hour dispatch of samples mandatory or directory?
  • Does the testimony of police officials require independent corroboration in narcotic cases?
  • Does a delay in sending samples to the forensic laboratory automatically invalidate the forensic report?
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• Jam Mitha Khan vs Province of Sindh & Others2019 SHC 388 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-23
  post-retirement benefitspensionary benefitspermanent absorptionrepatriation of employeescivil servantsuperannuationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner, initially appointed in WAPDA and later permanently absorbed into the Irrigation and Power Department of the Government of Sindh pursuant to a policy decision and transfer of administrative control of a project, sought directions for the issuance of his post-retirement pensionary benefits. His services were subsequently affected by orders of repatriation passed in light of Supreme Court judgments concerning absorption cases, though he attained the age of superannuation during the ensuing litigation without joining his parent department. The core legal question was whether a permanently absorbed employee who retired during litigation, and whose repatriation order was not given effect, is entitled to pensionary benefits from the Sindh Government. The Sindh High Court held that the Supreme Court's repatriation rulings do not apply to retired employees, and directed the Sindh Government to pay all perks, privileges, and pensionary benefits to the petitioner within two months. The key principle laid down is that orders regarding the repatriation of absorbed employees do not affect those who have already attained superannuation, and retired personnel are entitled to their terminal benefits from the employing provincial department.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee permanently absorbed into provincial service from an autonomous body can be repatriated after attaining the age of superannuation?
  • Does a judgment directing the repatriation of absorbed employees apply to personnel who have already retired from service?
  • Can a high court under Article 199 enforce and interpret Supreme Court directions regarding the status of absorbed civil servants?
  • Whether a permanently absorbed employee whose lien with the parent department was terminated is entitled to pensionary benefits from the provincial government upon retirement?
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• Jam Meeran vs Adj etc.2019 [M] C.L.R. 1009, 2019 PLJ Lahore 409 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-18Read full judgment →
• Jam Meeran vs Additional Advocate General and others2019 CLC 1799 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-18Read full judgment →
• Jalil Ahmed & others vs Province of Sindh through Secretary and others2019 CLC 1872, 2019 PLJ Karachi 55 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-20
  fundamental rightslawful tradepublic healthhazardous foodpure food ordinancetobacco pan masalagutkaconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the interference by police with the business of manufacturing and selling "Tobacco Pan Masala," "Gutka," and "Mainpuri." The petitioners argued their businesses were lawful under Article 18 of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether these products constitute "food" under the Pure Food Ordinance, 1960, and whether their sale is protected as a fundamental right. The Court held that these products, being hazardous to public health, fall within the definition of "food" under the Pure Food Ordinance, 1960. Consequently, the protection of Article 18 is unavailable, as it applies only to "lawful" trade. The Court ruled that the state has a duty under Article 9 to protect life from hazardous substances. It directed the authorities to enforce licensing requirements, ban the sale of such hazardous items, and initiate legislative measures to address the menace. The principle laid down is that the right to trade is not absolute and does not extend to businesses that are inherently injurious to public health or violate statutory safety standards.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to trade under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 extend to the sale of products that are hazardous to public health?
  • Do tobacco-based mixtures like pan masala, gutka, and mainpuri fall within the definition of 'food' under the Pure Food Ordinance, 1960?
  • Can the High Court issue directions to the executive to initiate legislative measures to protect fundamental rights when the state fails to act?
  • Is a license required for the sale of manufactured tobacco products under the West Pakistan Tobacco Vend Act, 1958?
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• Jalaldin vs The State & another2020 P Cr.L J 451, 2019 SHC 176 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-21
  rash and negligent drivingabsconding accusedpolice negligencevehicle owner liabilityroad accident investigationdriving license verificationcontempt of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the failure of the police to apprehend an absconding appellant/accused in a case involving a fatal road accident. Despite repeated court directions and undertakings by the SSP Investigation, the accused remained at large, prompting the Court to address the broader issue of police negligence in investigating road accident cases. The Court observed that the vehicle owner was not impleaded as a co-accused alongside the driver, contrary to established legal principles. Relying on the precedent set in Atta Muhammad vs. The State (2005 P.Cr.L.J 1648), the Court held that in cases under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the owner or person in charge of the vehicle should be charged as a co-accused to ensure accountability and road safety. The Court directed the police to strictly follow these guidelines in all pending cases and warned of potential contempt proceedings for non-compliance. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the necessity for the Driving Licensing Authority to verify the fitness and licensing of drivers of transport vehicles to prevent future fatalities.

  Questions settled

  • Should the owner of a vehicle involved in a road accident be impleaded as a co-accused alongside the driver in cases under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the failure of the police to comply with judicial directions regarding the arrest of an absconding accused warrant the initiation of contempt proceedings?
  • What are the obligations of the Driving Licensing Authority regarding the licensing of drivers over 50 years of age operating transport vehicles?
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• Jalal vs The State2019 SHC 476 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-06
  criminal appealunlicensed riflearms ordinancerecovery doubtfulindependent witnessacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 13-(d) of the Arms Ordinance for possession of an unlicensed rifle and live bullets. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution proved the recovery of the weapon and ammunition beyond a reasonable doubt, given the absence of independent witnesses, contradictions in the mashirnama timing, and lack of proof regarding safe custody and transmission to the ballistic expert. The Sindh High Court held that discrepancies in the recovery proceedings and the absence of corroborative evidence render the prosecution's case doubtful. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant of the charge. The key legal principle laid down is that contradictory recovery timings without explanation, coupled with a lack of independent corroboration and proof of safe custody of recovered items, vitiates the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions in the timing of the mashirnama make recovery proceedings doubtful?
  • Is a conviction sustainable under the Arms Ordinance without independent corroboration when recovery is disputed?
  • Does failure to prove safe custody and transmission of recovered items to an expert warrant acquittal?
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• Jalal Hassan vs Ameer Hamza Awan and 2 others2019 MLD 1170 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-13
  acquittal appealcircumstantial evidencelast seen evidencebenefit of doubtpresumption of innocencemurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court in a murder case registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence presented—comprising last-seen testimony, mobile call data, and weapon recovery—was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby warranting interference with the trial court's acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances connecting the accused to the crime. The court emphasized that the scope of interference in an acquittal appeal is narrow, as the presumption of innocence is doubled once an accused is acquitted by a competent court. The judgment reaffirmed the principle that for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must provide a complete, unbroken chain of evidence where every link is established conclusively, leaving no room for any hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. Finding the prosecution's evidence unreliable and missing critical links, the court upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against an acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is broken?
  • Does the presumption of innocence increase after an acquittal by a competent court?
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• Jalal Din vs Mst. Saleem Bibi and another2019 CLC 2021 · Lahore High Court · 2019-07-25Read full judgment →
• Jahangir Khan Tareen vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, L.T.U., Lahore2019 PCTLR 1228, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1453 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-11-05Read full judgment →
• Jahangir Hussain vs Neghat Rehmat and others2020 CLC 249, 2019 IHC 158 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-10-08Read full judgment →
• Jahan Daraz alias Jahan Gully vs Khan Bahadar and another2020 KLR Criminal Cases 361, 2019 MLD 1283 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-07
  post-arrest bailabscondencemurderfugitive from lawcriminal trialSection 302 PPCbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous bail application concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by an accused charged under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the complainant's brother. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had been absconding for approximately twenty years following the incident, was entitled to the concession of bail despite the merits of the case and the commencement of the trial. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to bail. The court reasoned that the petitioner was specifically nominated in a promptly lodged FIR, his presence was supported by eyewitnesses, and the medico-legal report corroborated the prosecution's version. Crucially, the court established the principle that a fugitive from law loses certain procedural and substantive rights, and noticeable abscondence disentitles an accused to the concession of bail, regardless of the case's merits. Furthermore, the court noted that bail is generally discouraged when the trial has already commenced and charges have been framed.

  Questions settled

  • Does noticeable abscondence disentitle an accused to the concession of bail regardless of the merits of the case?
  • Should bail be granted when the trial has already commenced and the charge has been framed?
  • Does a fugitive from law lose normal rights granted by procedural and substantive law?
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• Jahan Ara vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department2019 MLD 1722, 2019 PLJ Karachi 39 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-02Read full judgment →
• Jaggu son of Ropo Bheel vs THe State2019 SHC 526 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-16
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubthostile witnessunexplained delay in FIRacquittalcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife, Sht. Rekha. The prosecution alleged that the appellant killed the deceased using a hatchet and poisonous substance. The trial court convicted the appellant while acquitting his co-accused. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt given the significant evidentiary gaps. The High Court found that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained one-day delay, suggesting deliberation. Furthermore, the key prosecution witnesses, including the witness upon whose information the FIR was based, failed to support the prosecution's case and were declared hostile. The Court noted that the same evidence used to acquit the co-accused could not reliably sustain the appellant's conviction without independent corroboration. Emphasizing that a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal as a matter of right, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses have been declared hostile and fail to support the case?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create a presumption of consultation and deliberation?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal if the same evidence used to acquit co-accused is insufficient to prove his guilt?
  • Is it necessary to have multiple circumstances creating doubt to entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt?
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• Jagdish Chand and another vs State of Haryana2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 83 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-01-07
  dowry deathcrueltystatutory presumptionSection 304B IPCrebuttal of presumptionmatrimonial crueltycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellants, the parents-in-law of the deceased, for offences under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, relating to dowry death and cruelty. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the ingredients of dowry death, specifically regarding the timing of the death relative to the marriage and the existence of dowry demands, thereby triggering the statutory presumption of guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution proved the death occurred within seven years of marriage and that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for dowry demands. The Court held that once the prosecution establishes the essential ingredients of Section 304B, the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, must be drawn against the accused. In the absence of evidence from the defence to rebut this presumption, the conviction is legally sound. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment regarding the conviction and the modified sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of a woman within seven years of marriage due to burn injuries, following dowry demands, trigger the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
  • Is the conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sustainable when the prosecution establishes the ingredients of dowry-related cruelty and the defence fails to rebut the statutory presumption?
  • Can a conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, be upheld based on evidence of consistent ill-treatment and dowry demands leading to the victim's death?
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• Jadal and others vs Hassan Mukhtar and others2019 YLR 2446 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-07Read full judgment →
• Jacques Chagnon, in His Capacity as President of the National Assembly of Quebec vs Syndicat De La Fonction Publique Et Parapublique'du Quebec2019 SCMR 165 · Supreme Court of CanadaRead full judgment →
• Jabbar Hussain Shah and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 306 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-28
  pre-arrest bailcross-versionfurther inquirycriminal liabilityaggressiontrial court adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arises from a cross-version criminal case involving charges under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident of firing that resulted in multiple fatalities. The core legal question before the Court was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail in a situation where both parties to a conflict have lodged cross-FIRs, each claiming to be the victim of the other's aggression. The Court held that in cases involving cross-versions of the same incident, it is not possible to determine at the pre-trial stage which party was the aggressor and which was the victim. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court determined that such cases inherently fall within the scope of 'further inquiry' as contemplated under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court confirmed the petitioners' pre-arrest bail, ruling that the determination of the true aggressor is a matter to be adjudicated by the trial court after a full evaluation of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of cross-versions in a criminal case entitle the accused to bail on the ground of further inquiry?
  • Is the determination of the aggressor in a cross-version case a matter for the trial court after evidence is recorded?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when there is a possibility of false implication in a cross-version incident?
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• Izzat Ullah and another vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 130, 2019 SCMR 1975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-09-27
  narcoticsconfessional statementretracted confessionsafe custody of samplespublic witnessescriminal petitionheroin recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions challenging the conviction and sentencing of the petitioners for narcotics transportation. The core legal questions involve the validity of retracted confessional statements, the prosecution's proof of safe custody and transmission of samples, and the effect of the absence of public witnesses on recovery. The Supreme Court held that the retracted confessional statements were voluntary, natural, and truthful, supported by a brief interregnum, and that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent witness testimony and a positive forensic report. The Court reaffirmed that police officials are reliable witnesses if found trustworthy, public recusal does not vitiate recovery, and concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts warrant no interference. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Are retracted confessional statements admissible and reliable when made voluntarily shortly after arrest?
  • Does the absence of public witnesses invalidate a narcotics recovery attested by police officials?
  • Whether concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts in a narcotics case warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
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• Israr Hussain vs The State2019 YLR 2694 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-03-22
  quashment of FIRinherent powersbounced chequeabuse of process of courtcivil disputemalicious prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petition was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of an FIR registered against the petitioner regarding a bounced cheque under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an FIR can be quashed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. when it constitutes a malicious attempt to enforce a civil liability and involves repetitive registration of criminal cases on the same subject matter. The court held that the initiation of criminal proceedings in such circumstances amounts to an abuse of the process of the court, particularly where a previous similar FIR against another person on identical allegations had already been quashed by the court. The petition was consequently allowed and the FIR was quashed. The key principle laid down is that the High Court may exercise its inherent powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR when criminal machinery is being misused to enforce civil liabilities or to harass individuals through successive and malicious prosecutions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an FIR under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when it is used to enforce a civil liability?
  • Whether successive registration of FIRs on identical allegations amounts to an abuse of the process of the court?
  • What are the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers for the quashing of an FIR?
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• Ismail Memorial Trust vs Karachi Co-operative Housing Societies Union2020 CLC 331, 2019 SHC 154 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Islamabad Club, Islamabad through its Secretary vs Appellate Tribunal2019 PCRLJ 491, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1014 · Islamabad High Court
  Special Excise DutyFederal Excise DutyManufacturing vs ServiceTaxation of ClubsFiscal Statute InterpretationBinding Nature of FBR CircularsTax Reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference concerns whether the Islamabad Club is liable to pay Special Excise Duty (SED) on the supply of food and beverages to its members. The core legal question is whether the preparation and serving of food by a club constitutes 'manufacturing' or 'production' of goods under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, thereby attracting SED. The Court held that the activities of the club do not amount to manufacturing or production, as the food served is not a distinct commercial commodity produced for the open market, but rather an incidental service provided to members. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Federal Board of Revenue's circular, issued pursuant to a Ministry of Law opinion, was binding on subordinate officers under Section 42 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005. The key principle laid down is that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly in favor of the taxpayer, and the preparation of food in a service-oriented context, such as a club or hotel, is essentially a service rather than a manufacturing process, thus exempting it from excise duties applicable to goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the preparation and supply of food and beverages by a club constitute 'manufacturing' or 'production' of goods for the purposes of Special Excise Duty?
  • Are circulars and instructions issued by the Federal Board of Revenue binding on subordinate officers under the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  • Does the supply of food and beverages by a club to its members constitute a sale of goods or the provision of a service?
  • Is a club's supply of food and beverages to its members liable to Special Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Ur Rehman vs Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court-I Islamabad2019 PLJ Islamabad 126, 2019 P Cr. L J 800 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-03
  cognizanceanti-terrorism courttransfer of casespre-arrest bailinvestigation stage
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing the petitioner's application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether an Anti-Terrorism Court can transfer a case to a regular court under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, prior to the submission of a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and merely upon the pendency of a pre-arrest bail application. The Islamabad High Court held that taking cognizance of an offence by a court is distinct from police investigation or proceedings such as pre-arrest bail, and an application under section 23 for transfer of a case is premature before the court has formally taken cognizance upon completion of the investigation report. The court affirmed the impugned order, ruling that entertaining such an application during the investigation stage would amount to unwarranted interference in the police investigation. The key principle laid down is that the power of an Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer a case under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, arises only after cognizance of the offence has been taken, which cannot be equated with the mere pendency of a bail application or pre-trial steps prior to the submission of the challan.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a pre-arrest bail application before an Anti-Terrorism Court amount to taking cognizance of the offence for the purpose of transferring the case under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Can an application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the transfer of a case to a regular court be maintained before a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 has been submitted?
  • Does taking cognizance by a court under criminal law differ from the registration of an FIR and police investigation?
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• Ishtiaq Hussain Shah vs Mushtaq Hussain Shah and another2020 [M] C L R 1134, 2019 MLD 314 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2019 P.S.C 1227, 2019 SCP 306, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 675, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-08-23
  video scandaladmissibility of evidenceadditional evidencejudicial conductforensic examinationAccountability Courtblackmailappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  These Constitution Petitions were filed following a public media briefing where a video was released allegedly showing an Accountability Court Judge admitting to convicting a former Prime Minister under external pressure and blackmail. The Judge subsequently issued a press release and an affidavit denying the allegations of pressure but admitting to various private meetings with the accused's associates and the accused himself. The Supreme Court addressed the legal status of the video and the conduct of the Judge. The Court held that since an appeal against the conviction is currently pending before the Islamabad High Court, that forum alone has the jurisdiction to consider the video as additional evidence under Section 428 Cr.P.C. The Court laid down stringent criteria for the admissibility of audio-visual evidence, including requirements for forensic authentication, proof of genuineness, and the identification of voices and sources. Regarding the Judge, the Court found his admitted conduct to be abhorrent and directed his repatriation to the Lahore High Court for disciplinary proceedings. The petitions were disposed of, leaving the evidentiary determination to the appellate court.

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• Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another vs Railway Board through its Chairman2019 PLD Supreme Court 602, 2019 P.S.C 1372, 2019 SCP 238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-11
  public interest litigationjudicial reviewpublic propertylease agreementtransparencyvoid ab initioconstitutional petitionbidding process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitution petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution challenged the lease of the Royal Palm Golf and Country Club by Pakistan Railways. The core legal question concerned whether the lease agreement was executed through a transparent, lawful process or was tainted by mala fides, nepotism, and material departures from advertised terms, causing significant loss to the national exchequer. The Supreme Court held that the entire process was non-transparent and unlawful, as the terms of the lease were materially altered after the bidding process to benefit the lessee, thereby denying a level playing field. Consequently, the Court declared the lease agreement non est, null, and void ab initio. The judgment reaffirms that public functionaries must exercise authority over public property fairly, transparently, and reasonably. It establishes that contracts involving public assets are subject to judicial review when they fail the test of fairness or involve procedural impropriety. Furthermore, the Court held that it possesses the jurisdiction to declare such contracts void while simultaneously referring matters of criminal liability to the National Accountability Bureau for independent adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract involving public assets can be subjected to judicial review under Article 184(3) of the Constitution?
  • Does a material departure from advertised terms in a public contract vitiate the bidding process?
  • Can the Supreme Court declare a contract void ab initio while simultaneously referring the matter to the National Accountability Bureau for criminal investigation?
  • Are public functionaries required to act with transparency and fairness when dealing with public property even in the absence of specific statutory provisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishaq etc vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 665 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-05
  criminal appealcompromisecompoundable offencesacquittalwaiver of qisas and diyatmurderhurt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants, Muhammad Ishaq and Mst. Hajra Bibi, under sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and causing injuries. During the pendency of the appeal, a criminal miscellaneous application was filed under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to effectuate a compromise reached between the convicts and the legal heirs of the deceased. The court referred the matter to the Sessions Judge, Sahiwal, to verify the genuineness and voluntary nature of the compromise. Upon submission of the report confirming that all major legal heirs had voluntarily compounded the offence and waived their right of Qisas and Diyat without coercion, and considering that the injured witnesses' medical reports revealed anomalies regarding the time of registration of the FIR, the court accepted the compromise. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the convictions and sentences of the appellants were set aside, resulting in their acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal appeal can be accepted on the basis of a compromise effected between the convicts and the legal heirs of the deceased?
  • How is the genuineness and voluntary nature of a compromise ascertained during the pendency of an appeal?
  • What is the effect of a valid compromise and waiver of Qisas and Diyat by the legal heirs in a criminal case?
  Read full judgment →
• Ishaq Ali and another vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 55 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-31
  pre-arrest baildacoitydelay in FIRenmitybailable offencebail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application was filed by the applicants seeking confirmation of interim pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 395 and 337-A(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the applicants committed dacoity at the complainant's house and subsequently assaulted and injured him. The High Court observed that there was an unexplained delay of nearly a month in reporting the dacoity and twelve days in reporting the assault. Furthermore, the police had initially recommended disposing of the FIR under 'C' Class, and there were counter-FIRs indicating a long-standing enmity between the parties, raising the possibility of false involvement. One applicant was not named in the dacoity charge, and the assault offence under Section 337-A(i) was bailable. No recovery of stolen property had been made. Consequently, the High Court held that the veracity of the prosecution's case could only be determined after evidence was led at trial, and confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained and substantial delay in registering an FIR for dacoity and assault can ground the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed where there is a history of counter-cases and long-standing enmity suggesting potential false involvement?
  • Is pre-arrest bail liable to be confirmed when the main offence alleged is bailable and the non-bailable charge lacks recovery or specific details in the FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Hussain vs State, etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 654 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-14
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsControl of Narcotic Substances Actrecovery of Bhangfurther inquiryfirst offender
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner Irshad Hussain sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, concerning the alleged recovery of two and a half kilograms of Bhang. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the lack of time of occurrence in the FIR and the failure to specify which part of the plant was recovered, failing the requirements of Section 2(d)(ii) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Lahore High Court held that the absence of the time of occurrence and lack of specification regarding the plant part brought the case within the scope of further inquiry, while noting that the petitioner had no previous criminal record, was a first offender, and was enduring prolonged pre-trial detention without material progress. The petition was consequently allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that ambiguity regarding statutory definitions of narcotics combined with protracted pre-trial incarceration without progress entitles an accused to post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure to specify the particular part of the plant recovered brings the case within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 2(d)(ii) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Does the absence of the time of occurrence in the crime report justify granting post-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on the ground of statutory right to a speedy trial and prolonged pre-trial detention without material progress?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Hussain vs Municipal Corporation Multan through Mayor and 32019 PLC (C.S.) 1203 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-01
  pensionwithholding of pensionaudit objectionsretirement benefitsdepartmental proceedingsconstitutional petitiontime limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired Assistant Land Officer of the Municipal Corporation, Multan, challenged an order withholding a portion of his pension to settle audit objections pertaining to fiscal years prior to his retirement. The core legal question was whether a government department could withhold pension benefits or institute departmental proceedings for recovery of losses beyond the time limit prescribed by the relevant pension rules and without establishing liability through proper proceedings. The Lahore High Court held that withholding pension amounts and failing to finalize recovery proceedings within one year of retirement, as mandated by the rules, is illegal and violative of settled jurisprudence. The court laid down the principle that departmental inquiries and recovery from a pensioner's dues cannot be initiated after the expiration of one year from the date of retirement, and pensionary benefits cannot be withheld arbitrarily to satisfy unresolved audit objections.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government department withhold pension benefits to settle audit objections years after an employee's retirement?
  • Whether departmental proceedings for recovery of losses from a pensioner can be instituted after more than a year from the date of retirement?
  • Is good conduct under Rule 1.8(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, 1963 applicable where a pensioner has not been convicted of a crime or found guilty of grave misconduct?
  • Do executive authorities have a binding obligation under Article 189 of the Constitution to comply with Supreme Court directions regarding the timely release of pension benefits?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ali and 42 others vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary2019 PLD Sindh 596 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-15Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ali and 42 others vs Province of Sindh and others2019 SHC 60 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-15Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmed vs Port Qasim Authority through Chairman and 2 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 557 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-13
  back benefitssuperannuationdisciplinary inquirypensionary benefitsreinstatementconstitutional jurisdictionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns a claim for back benefits and pensionary adjustments by a former employee of the Port Qasim Authority. The petitioner was removed from service in 2003, a decision subsequently set aside by the High Court in 2011 with a conditional order allowing the department to conduct a fresh inquiry. The department failed to conduct the inquiry, and the petitioner reached the age of superannuation in 2007. Upon reinstatement in 2014, the department treated the intervening period as extraordinary leave without pay. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to back benefits and pensionary adjustments despite the department's failure to conduct the inquiry. The Court held that since the department failed to conduct the ordered inquiry and disciplinary proceedings cannot be maintained against a retired employee, the petitioner is entitled to full back benefits and pensionary adjustments. The judgment affirms that pension is a vested right, not a bounty, and that an employer cannot deny benefits based on administrative lapses where no inquiry was conducted.

  Questions settled

  • Can disciplinary proceedings be initiated or continued against a government employee who has attained the age of superannuation?
  • Is an employer entitled to deny back benefits to a reinstated employee if the employer failed to conduct the disciplinary inquiry ordered by the court?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain a petition regarding service matters of the Port Qasim Authority?
  • Is a pension considered a bounty from the state or a vested right of the employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad vs The State & three others2019 PCr.LJ 1475, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1109, 2019 LHC 1525 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-11
  hostile witnesscross-examinationinvestigating officercriminal revisionimpeaching credit of witnessfair investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajanpur, which declined the petitioner's request to declare the Investigating Officer (PW-9) a hostile witness. The petitioner argued that because the officer's testimony supported the innocence of one of the accused, as determined during the investigation, he was biased and should be cross-examined by the prosecution. The core legal question was whether an Investigating Officer who testifies consistently with his own investigation report, even if that report favors the accused, can be declared hostile under Article 150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that a witness is not hostile merely because their testimony is unfavorable to the party calling them. The Court affirmed that a hostile witness is one who demonstrates an unwillingness to tell the truth or varies from their previous statements. Since the officer merely recounted the facts established during his investigation, which were already known to the prosecution, no grounds existed to declare him hostile. The Court emphasized that the purpose of investigation is to uncover the truth, not merely to support the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can an Investigating Officer be declared a hostile witness merely because their testimony supports the accused?
  • Does a party have an absolute right to cross-examine their own witness under Article 150 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • What criteria must be met to establish that a witness is hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Irshad Ahmad vs State and 21 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 151 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-14
  acquittalSection 249-A Cr.P.C.non-prosecutionremandservice of summonscriminal appealdisposal on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Magistrate Section-30, Mailsi, acquitting the respondents under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case arising from FIR No. 117 of 2011. The core legal question is whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused for non-prosecution without ensuring proper service of summons on witnesses and without examining the process server. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court acted arbitrarily by prematurely invoking Section 249-A without exhausting all legal measures to procure witnesses, especially when the complainant and a witness were present in court and the accused had failed to cross-examine the complainant. The Court set aside the acquittal order and remanded the matter back for a decision on merits, laying down the principle that the law favors the disposal of cases on merits and courts must ensure proper service of process and afford both parties adequate opportunities to present evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in acquitting accused under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. for non-production of evidence without first ensuring proper service of summons and examining the process server?
  • Can an acquittal order be set aside and the case remanded for trial on merits when the prosecution witnesses were available and the trial court failed to adopt coercive measures for procuring attendance?
  • Is it incumbent upon the presiding officer to examine the process server when witnesses remain unserved despite repeated process?
  Read full judgment →
• Irrudiyanadan Francis vs Deutsche Bank A.G.2019 PLC (C.S.) 1028 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-15
  master and servantwrongful retirementspecific performancelimitation periodemployment discriminationprivate bankservice contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment and decree dismissing a suit for recovery of unpaid wages and compensation filed by a former bank employee against a private bank. The appellant, retired after thirty years of service, alleged unlawful retirement and discrimination, citing the retention of another employee. The core legal questions were whether the employment relationship was governed by the principle of Master and Servant, whether the suit was maintainable for specific performance, and whether the claim was time-barred. The Court held that in the absence of statutory service rules, the relationship between the private bank and its employee is governed by the principle of Master and Servant, which precludes specific performance of a service contract. The Court further held that the suit was time-barred under Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as it was filed seven years after the cause of action accrued. Additionally, the Court affirmed that an employer retains discretion in retaining staff, and mere allegations of discrimination without proof of mala fides are insufficient. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a contract of private service capable of specific enforcement under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does the principle of Master and Servant apply to employees of private banks where no statutory rules exist?
  • What is the limitation period for a suit claiming compensation for breach of an implied or express contract of service?
  • Does the retention of one employee beyond the standard retirement age constitute discrimination against another retired employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Iroko Mercy Chimizie alias Jeff Jack More and others vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 489 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-22
  electronic fraudcheatingpre-sentence detentionSection 382-B Cr.P.C.unauthorized accesscriminal appealimpersonationElectronic Transactions Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against a conviction by the Prevention of Electronic Crime Court, Islamabad, for offences under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002 and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The appellants were convicted of defrauding the complainant of 4.3 million rupees through a sophisticated email scam involving impersonation and false promises of a legacy transfer. The core legal question was whether the appellants' actions constituted a violation of privacy of information under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and whether the trial court correctly denied the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that the appellants' actions did not satisfy the elements of Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, as they did not gain unauthorized access to an information system. Consequently, the conviction under that section was set aside. However, the conviction under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, was upheld, with the sentence modified. The Court affirmed that the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is mandatory for pre-sentence detention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of sending a fraudulent email constitute a violation of privacy of information under Section 36 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is the grant of the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, regarding pre-sentence detention, mandatory for the court?
  • Can a trial court deny the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, without recording cogent and convincing reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Irfan Ilyas vs Mst. Neelum2019 SC AJK 146 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-07-02Read full judgment →
• Iqbal vs The State2019 SHC 280 · Sindh High Court · 2019-08-19Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Rabbani and 3 others vs Noor Ul Ain and 2 others2019 MLD 401 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Hussain vs Mushtaq Ahmed and 2 others2019 MLD 1947 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-26
  appeal against acquittaldouble presumption of innocencecontradictory evidencedelayed FIRidentification of accusedbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent by the trial court under Section 245(i), Cr.P.C. in a case registered under Sections 392, 427, 337-A(i), and 34 of the P.P.C. The core legal question revolves around whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused due to contradictions in prosecution evidence, delayed lodging of the FIR, and failure of eye-witnesses to identify the accused. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an order of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and appellate interference is warranted only in cases of gross misreading of evidence or perversity. The court established that minor contradictions, an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, and material witnesses failing to support the prosecution's case fully justify maintaining an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does an unexplained delay of nine days in lodging an FIR cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of eye-witnesses failing to identify the accused during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Hussain vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Information and Technology, Government of Pakistan and 7 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 475 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-05
  de novo proceedingscompulsory retirementregular enquirymajor penaltyservice lawback benefitsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a punishment order of compulsory retirement and the subsequent departmental appellate order. The petitioner, a former employee of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited, contended that the respondents failed to comply with the Federal Service Tribunal's direction to initiate 'de novo proceedings' by dispensing with a regular enquiry and relying on previous material. The core legal question was whether the initiation of proceedings from the stage of a show-cause notice, without a fresh regular enquiry, satisfied the requirement of 'de novo proceedings' and whether a regular enquiry is mandatory when a major penalty is imposed and the charges are specifically denied. The Court held that 'de novo' implies starting afresh as if no prior proceedings existed. It ruled that when a public servant denies the allegations, holding a regular enquiry is a mandatory prerequisite for imposing a major penalty, and dispensing with such an enquiry is legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the payment of back benefits, as the petitioner had already reached the age of superannuation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'de novo proceedings' require the initiation of fresh proceedings as if no previous proceedings had occurred?
  • Can a competent authority dispense with a regular enquiry when a public servant categorically denies the charges levelled against them?
  • Is the holding of a regular enquiry a mandatory prerequisite for the imposition of a major penalty in service matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmed vs The State2019 YLR 2467 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-02-04
  pre-arrest baildishonour of chequecheatingmens reacriminal liabilityfinancial fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by an accused booked for offences under sections 420 and 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the dishonour of a cheque issued to the complainant. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail despite admitting to the issuance of a cheque that was subsequently dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The Court held that the petition for bail before arrest was not maintainable and declined the relief. The Court reasoned that the act of issuing a cheque that is dishonoured involves mens rea regarding dishonest and fraudulent representation, causing significant financial and psychological harm to the complainant. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had extended threats to the complainant rather than compensating for the financial loss. The principle laid down is that the dishonouring of a cheque is a serious offence that transcends a mere civil business transaction, and where such acts involve fraudulent intent and lack of compensation, the accused does not merit the leniency of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is the dishonouring of a cheque sufficient grounds to deny pre-arrest bail when the accused admits to the issuance of the cheque?
  • Does the issuance of a dishonoured cheque constitute a purely civil dispute or a criminal offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an accused who has issued a dishonoured cheque and subsequently threatened the complainant be granted pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmed vs Col. (R) Abdul Kabir through duly constituted lawful2019 YLR 89 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-08Read full judgment →
• Iqbal Ahmed and 6 others vs Maqbool Ahmed and 7 others2019 MLD 545 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-16Read full judgment →
• Intakhab Hussain Shah and another vs National Bank of Pakistan and another2019 CLD 1021 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-31Read full judgment →
• Inspector General Police & others vs Muhammad Fareed & others2019 SC AJK 24 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-06Read full judgment →
• Injum Saqib and others vs State, etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1405 · Lahore High Court · 2019-06-19
  pre-arrest bailintentional omission to apprehendillegal confinementmala fidepolice negligencecriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for pre-arrest bail filed by several police officers and a private individual accused in F.I.R. No. 135/2019, registered at Police Station City Pindi Bhattian, for offences including intentional omission to apprehend an accused and illegal confinement. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the lack of direct evidence linking them to the alleged escape of an accused person and the absence of material demonstrating their specific involvement. The Court held that the prosecution failed to provide cogent evidence establishing a prima facie nexus between the petitioners and the alleged crime. The Court observed that the petitioners had joined the investigation, nothing was recovered from them, and the then S.H.O. had already been granted post-arrest bail. The Court affirmed that while pre-arrest bail is not granted as a routine, it is appropriate in exceptional circumstances where mala fide is inferable from the facts and sending the accused to jail would serve no purpose. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail for all petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when the prosecution fails to provide prima facie evidence linking the accused to the alleged crime?
  • Is it appropriate to deny pre-arrest bail when the accused has joined the investigation and no recovery is required from them?
  • Can mala fide be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case to justify the grant of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Inhabitants of Village Prenia through Hafeez Ahmed and 4 others vs Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 9 others2019 P.S.C 761, 2019 MLD 564 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-10-05Read full judgment →
• Inhabitants of Village Khambal vs Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu &2019 SC AJK 11 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-01-28Read full judgment →
• Infospan (Private) Limited vs M/s Shaheen Foundation and another2019 CLC 750 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Industrial Development Bank Limited through Attorney vs Sajid Hameed2019 PLC (C.S.) 16 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionCivil servant definitionLabour CourtAzad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act 1974Industrial Development Bank LimitedStatutory rulesAdministrative Courts
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the jurisdictional dispute regarding the appropriate forum for an employee of the Industrial Development Bank Limited (IDBL) to challenge his dismissal. The core legal question is whether IDBL employees constitute "civil servants" under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, thereby falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, or whether they remain subject to labour laws. The Supreme Court held that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and Legislative Assembly's power to establish Administrative Tribunals is restricted to matters concerning persons "in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir." Since IDBL employees do not hold posts in connection with the affairs of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir, they do not qualify as civil servants under the constitutional framework. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over such employees. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional definition of "service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir" strictly limits the scope of administrative tribunals, and corporate employees cannot be brought under this jurisdiction merely by legislative amendments in federal statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Industrial Development Bank Limited considered 'civil servants' under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over the service disputes of employees of corporate bodies like the Industrial Development Bank Limited in Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  • Is the legislative power of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and Assembly to establish Administrative Tribunals limited to persons in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  Read full judgment →
• Indus Motor Company Limited vs Pakistan through Secretary Finance and anotherPTCL 2020 CL. 6, 2020 PTD 297, 2019 SHC 520 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-13Read full judgment →
• Indus Lyallpur Ltd. & another vs Federation of Pakistan2019 PTD 760, PTCL 2019 CL. 111 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-30Read full judgment →
• Independent Print Ltd and another vs Lachaux2019 SCMR 1397 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2019-06-12Read full judgment →
• Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Muhammad Azhar2019 KLR Criminal Cases 245, 2019 PLD Balochistan 27 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-12-03
  multiple FIRsquashment of FIRsame incidentconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsdouble jeopardycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by representatives of Independent Media Corporation and Geo News seeking the quashment of multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) registered across Balochistan regarding a current affairs programme, on the grounds that multiple FIRs for the same incident violate fundamental rights and the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The core legal question was which of the multiple FIRs registered across different cities for the same occurrence should hold the field and proceed to trial. The Balochistan High Court held that for a single incident, only one FIR can proceed, and subsequent reports regarding the same occurrence must be treated as statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. rather than separate criminal cases. The Court laid down the principle that multiple FIRs for the same transaction constitute an abuse of process and violate constitutional safeguards, ruling that out of the multiple FIRs registered within its jurisdiction, the one lodged earliest in time shall remain intact while the rest are quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether multiple FIRs can be registered for the same incident and transaction in different cities?
  • What is the legal status of subsequent FIRs registered for an occurrence when a first information report has already been recorded?
  • Does a proceeding under the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 bar criminal prosecution for the same broadcast under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Which FIR should proceed to trial when multiple identical reports are lodged across various police stations?
  Read full judgment →
• Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Limited through. Duly Authorized2019 P Cr. L J 262 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-24
  PEMRAproscribed organizationfreedom of informationreasonable restrictionsAnti-Terrorism Actmedia regulationbroadcasting code of conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a fine of one million rupees imposed by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) on the appellant for airing a message from a leader of a proscribed organization, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The core legal question was whether the appellant's broadcast of the proscribed leader's statement, which violated a specific PEMRA circular and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was protected under the right to information. The Court held that the appellant's actions constituted a clear violation of the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on Article 19-A of the Constitution, clarifying that the right to transmit information is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law, such as the prohibition against projecting proscribed organizations. The Court emphasized that airing such content, even under alleged threats, amounts to aiding and abetting terrorism. The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting that the regulatory authority had been lenient in imposing a fine rather than pursuing more severe penalties for the admitted violation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to information under Article 19-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protect a broadcaster from airing messages of proscribed organizations?
  • Can a media broadcaster justify the airing of prohibited content on the basis of threats from terrorist organizations?
  • Does the dissemination of material glorifying or projecting a proscribed organization constitute an offence under Section 11-W of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Incomeon (Pvt.) Limited (Proposed) vs Director (Corporatization and Compliance Department) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others2021 P C T L R 1, 2019 CLD 1266 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-03-11Read full judgment →
• Income Tax Officer, Mumbai vs Ambika Metalchem Impex P Ltd., Mumbai2019 PCTLR 1071 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 2019-04-24Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah vs The State2019 PCRLJ 1392, 2019 PHC 94 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-25
  criminal appealocular evidencebenefit of doubtbelated witnessabscondencemotivemurderacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences of the appellants under Section 302(b) and Section 324 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and attempted murder. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the reliance on ocular testimony, alleged motive, and recovery of weapons. The Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed due to the belated introduction of an eye-witness not named in the initial FIR, significant improvements in the complainant's testimony, and contradictions between the medical evidence and the ocular account. The Court further held that when a motive is alleged but not proven, it weakens the prosecution's case, and that abscondence alone cannot substitute for substantive evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing that where the ocular account is unreliable and lacks the ring of truth, the entire prosecution structure fails, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness whose name was omitted from the initial crime report be relied upon as an eye-witness?
  • Does the failure to prove an alleged motive weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Is abscondence of an accused sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other substantive evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon and matching forensic report suffice for conviction if the ocular testimony is disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Inayatullah vs Mehboob Ellahi2020 CLC 1097, 2019 PHC 308 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-23Read full judgment →
• Inayat Ali vs Muhammad Ramzan and 13 others2019 CLC 1651 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-07Read full judgment →
• Inamullah Sheikh vs Muhammad Malik & Others2019 SC AJK 50 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-25Read full judgment →
• Inamullah Marwat vs Chairman NAB etc2019 MLD 1242, 2019 PLJ PESHAWAR 190, 2019 PHC 132 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-24Read full judgment →
• In the matter regarding deduction of high Tax/other charges by Mobile2019 SCP 112 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-27
  original jurisdictionfundamental rightsadvance income taxsales tax on servicesfederal excise dutycellular mobile operatorstaxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the levy and imposition of advance income tax, Federal Excise Duty, and provincial Sales Tax on Services, alongside service and maintenance charges collected by Cellular Mobile Operators. The core legal question is whether the Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to adjudicate this matter, specifically whether it involves the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Additionally, the Court seeks to determine the validity of the tax regimes applied to mobile consumers, including the scope of advance tax collection from non-taxpayers and the authority of the Federation and Provinces to impose these specific levies. The Court, noting that the previous interim order was passed by a three-member Bench, directed that the matter be referred to the Chief Justice of Pakistan for the constitution of a new three-member Bench to address these jurisdictional and substantive tax questions. The Federation, Provinces, and Cellular Mobile Operators were directed to submit written responses and relevant data regarding tax recovery for the specified period.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan regarding the imposition of taxes and service charges by Cellular Mobile Operators?
  • Can advance tax under section 236 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 be legally levied or recovered from non-taxpayers?
  • Is the imposition of Sales Tax by the Provinces on consumers under their respective regimes legally permissible?
  • Can Federal Excise Duty be imposed on services provided by Cellular Mobile Operators?
  Read full judgment →
• In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 805 · Supreme Court of IrelandRead full judgment →
• Imtiaz Khan vs The State2019 PHC 276 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-22Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ali vs The State2019 YLR 2807 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-11
  misappropriationcriminal breach of trustbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRfood inspectoranti-corruptionwheat shortageprosecution evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, a Food Inspector, for the alleged misappropriation of government wheat stock. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established the charge of embezzlement beyond reasonable doubt, given the significant, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and evidence suggesting the wheat shortage resulted from natural decay and poor storage conditions rather than criminal misappropriation. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof. The court emphasized that an inordinate, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR casts doubt on the entire prosecution case. Furthermore, the court noted that the investigation was flawed, failing to account for departmental reports regarding storage conditions and the lack of evidence implicating the appellant specifically. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, ruling that the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution evidence is insufficient or contradictory.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained, inordinate delay in lodging an FIR invalidate a criminal conviction?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
  • Can a conviction for misappropriation be sustained when the prosecution fails to account for natural decay or poor storage conditions of the subject goods?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in anti-corruption cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ali vs Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and others2019 YLR 510 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-24Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmed vs Secretary Forests, Muzaffarabad2019 SC AJK 164 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-11-13Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmed Barakzai vs Federal Tax Ombudsman and 2 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1145 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-12
  contractual employmentmaster and servanttermination of servicevested rightFederal Tax Ombudsmanconstitutional petitionmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court by the petitioner challenging the verbal termination of his contractual employment as an Advisor in the Regional Office, Karachi of the Federal Tax Ombudsman. The core legal questions involved whether a contractual employee's service period can be curtailed before expiry, whether the principle of master and servant applies to such contractual appointments, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against such termination. The court held that the petitioner's employment was governed by the principle of master and servant, and a contract employee has no vested right to claim regularization or complete the remaining portion of contractual service when terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract and Section 20 of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000. The court laid down the principle that temporary or contractual employees cannot challenge the exercise of discretionary termination by the competent authority when done pursuant to contractual stipulations, and such service disputes are not amenable to constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contractual employee has a vested right to complete the remaining portion of their contractual service?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to the contractual employment of an Advisor under the Federal Tax Ombudsman?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against the termination of a contractual employee whose service is governed by the principle of master and servant?
  • Is the Federal Tax Ombudsman empowered under Section 20 of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 to appoint and dispense with the services of advisors?
  Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz Ahmad vs The State, etc2019 KLR Criminal Cases 32 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-05Read full judgment →
• Imtiaz @ Taji and another vs State etc_PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 221, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 454, 2020 SCMR 287, PLJ 2019 SC · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-03
  murderdeath sentence conversionmitigating circumstancessingle fireunproven motivecriminal appealsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a sentence of death for murder. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction was sustainable based on the ocular and medical evidence, and whether mitigating circumstances warranted the reduction of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular accounts and medical evidence. However, considering mitigating factors such as a single fire attributed to the appellant without repetition, unproven motive, inconsequential forensic reports, and the compromise leading to the acquittal of co-accused, the Court partly allowed the appeal by upholding the conviction but converting the death sentence into imprisonment for life, alongside extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that mitigating circumstances, including a single unrepeated gunshot and an unproven motive, can constitute sufficient grounds to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment in murder cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single unrepeated fire attributed to an accused can serve as a mitigating circumstance for converting a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  • Does an unproven motive weaken the prosecution's case regarding the quantum of sentence in a capital charge?
  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused on the basis of a compromise can be considered a mitigating factor for the remaining convict?
  • Can a criminal petition against acquittal be dismissed on grounds of being barred by time when the explanation for delay is not legally plausible?
  Read full judgment →
• Imran Shafee, Lecturer Urdu, Govt. Degree College, Mirpur vs Saeed Ahmed, Lecturer, Govt. Boys Post-Graduate College, Muzaffarabad and 5 others2019 P.S.C. 1106 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Imran Shafee, Lecturer Urdu, Govt. Degree College, Mirpur vs Saeed Ahmed, Lecturer, Government Boys Post-Graduate College, Muzaffarabad and 5 others2019 P.S.C. 148 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Imran Masih vs Government of the Punjab etc2019 LHC 3955 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Imran Khan vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Chairman, Election Commission Secretariat, Islamabad and another2019 PLJ Islamabad 142 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Imran Khan Sahito vs Province of Sindh, Through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, & 04 others2019 SHC 116 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-08
  quo-warrantoup-gradation versus promotionout of turn promotionpublic officestatutory corporationservice structurecontempt of supreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed before the Sindh High Court seeking a writ of quo-warranto against Respondent No. 5 regarding his appointment, up-gradation, and promotion to BS-19 and BS-20 as Managing Director / Deputy Managing Director of Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Limited (SITE). The core legal question was whether the up-gradation of a post from BS-16 to BS-20 and the consequent promotion of an incumbent through person-specific up-gradation and change of cadre violated the binding judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning out-of-turn promotions and illegal absorptions. The Sindh High Court held that up-gradation is distinct from promotion, attaches to the office rather than the incumbent, and cannot be used to confer automated promotions or benefit specific individuals in violation of service rules and Supreme Court directives. The court declared the impugned notifications and orders promoting and posting Respondent No. 5 to BS-20 to be without lawful authority and set them aside, directing strict compliance with the Supreme Court's judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether up-gradation of a post is distinct from promotion and restricted to the office rather than the person occupying it?
  • Can a writ of quo-warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan be maintained against the unauthorized occupation of a public office in a statutory body?
  • Whether person-specific up-gradation and change of cadre to benefit an individual violate settled principles of service law and binding judgments of the Supreme Court?
  • Whether employees of statutory bodies controlled by the government are bound by Supreme Court mandates regarding the reversal of illegal and out-of-turn promotions?
  Read full judgment →
• Imran Khan and 2 others vs Deputy Director, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, Multan and another2019 PCTLR 1189, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1326 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-06-25Read full judgment →
• Imran Hussain vs Banker's Equity Limited through Authorized2019 CLD 272 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-27Read full judgment →
• Imran Hafeez vs Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority2019 PLD Lahore 587 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-29Read full judgment →
• Imran etc vs State etcPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 826 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-31
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirymala fidecross-versionprohibitory clausemedical evidencerecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arose from an FIR registered under Sections 337-A(i), 337-F(v), 337-L(ii), 148, 149, 354, and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners sought relief, arguing that the prosecution acted with mala fide intentions by suppressing injuries sustained by the petitioners during the occurrence, which were medically documented, and by failing to investigate the cross-version of the incident. The Court observed a seven-day delay in FIR registration and noted that the medical evidence contradicted specific allegations against the petitioners. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that co-accused persons facing more serious allegations had already been granted post-arrest bail. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that the recovery of weapons was of little legal consequence due to the passage of time, as blood evidence would have disintegrated. Concluding that the case fell within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and that the offenses did not fall within the prohibitory clause, the Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that denying bail for the sake of recovery would be a mockery of the judicial system.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused in a cross-version case establish mala fide on the part of the prosecution?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be refused solely for the purpose of recovering weapons when the passage of time renders the recovery of forensic evidence futile?
  • Does a case involving two versions of an incident, where the aggressor is yet to be determined, fall within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is it appropriate to deny pre-arrest bail when the alleged offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause and the accused would likely be granted post-arrest bail immediately upon surrender?
  Read full judgment →
• Imran and another vs The State and another2019 PHC 398 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-12-02Read full judgment →
• Imran and 3 others vs The State and another2019 YLR 1478 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-31
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirysuppression of injuriescross-versionprohibitory clauserecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed before the Lahore High Court seeking pre-arrest bail in a case arising out of FIR registered under sections 337-A(i)F(v)L(2), 148, 149, 354, and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the determination of mala fide on the part of the prosecution due to suppression of injuries, the applicability of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case of two cross-versions, and the viability of pre-arrest bail where recovery of weapons is inconsequential due to passage of time. The court held that the suppression of injuries of the accused, the existence of cross-versions, medical discrepancies regarding specific roles, and the non-applicability of the prohibitory clause brought the case within the ambit of further inquiry, confirming the pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail will not be refused merely for the purpose of recovery when the passage of time makes such recovery legally inconsequential, and sending an accused to jail only to be released on post-arrest bail later is unwarranted.

  Questions settled

  • Does suppression of accused persons' injuries by the police establish mala fide on the part of the prosecution warranting pre-arrest bail?
  • Whether the existence of a cross-version brings a criminal case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be refused solely for the purpose of effecting recovery of weapons when considerable time has elapsed rendering such recovery inconsequential?
  • Does a case where the alleged offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause justify the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Implementation of Judgment Dated 4.5.2018 in C.M. No. 376-K of 2014_ In the matter of vs N_a2019 SCMR 703 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-21
  implementation proceedingsthird-party rightsland regularizationfinancial settlementSupreme Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter pertains to the implementation of the Supreme Court judgment dated 04.05.2018 regarding Bahria Town Limited, Karachi (BTLK), specifically addressing the protection of third-party rights of over 140,000 allottees and the regularization of land measuring 16,896 acres across five dehs. The core legal question involved the determination of a fair financial value for the land to be paid by BTLK into the public exchequer while ensuring project completion and safeguarding allottee interests. The Supreme Court accepted BTLK's enhanced final offer of Rs. 460 billion to be paid in installments over seven years, backed by specific property securities and personal guarantees from company directors. The Court held that accepting the financial offer and allowing project completion was the most effective mechanism to protect third-party rights, while holding that pending National Accountability Bureau references would be kept in abeyance subject to strict compliance with the payment schedule and terms. The key principle laid down is that apex courts may facilitate structured financial settlements in implementation proceedings to protect mass public and third-party property rights while securing public revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can accept a revised financial offer from a developer during implementation proceedings to protect third-party allottee rights?
  • What are the legal consequences of a default in installment payments under a court-approved settlement regarding land acquisition?
  • Can the filing of a National Accountability Bureau reference be kept in abeyance subject to compliance with a judicial payment order?
  Read full judgment →
• Imdad Ullah Khan vs Vice Chancellor, Gomal University, D.I.Khan And 072019 CLC 1330, 2019 PHC 96 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-26Read full judgment →
• Imdad Ali vs Sessions Judge Ex Officio Justice of Peace Matiari2019 SHC 574 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-20Read full judgment →
• Ikramullah and Others vs Federation of Pakistan & OthersPTCL 2019 CL. 675, 2019 PTD 1702, 2019 SHC 74 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Ikhtiar Khan vs Raies Raza Muhammad and 19 others2019 CLC 651 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-12-31Read full judgment →
• Ikhlaq-e-Madina Tours and Travels Private Limited vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony, Islamabad etc2020 [M] C L R 701, 2019 PLD Lahore 382, 2019 LHC 1311 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-18Read full judgment →