Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Haider Ali vs The Managing Director, Bank of Khyber2019 PHC 152 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-06-18
  writ jurisdictionstatutory rulesBank of Khybermaster and servantmisconductdisciplinary proceedingsright of audienceback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a larger bench judgment of the Peshawar High Court addressing the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of writ petitions against the Bank of Khyber under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The core legal question was whether the employees' service rules of the Bank of Khyber are statutory or non-statutory in nature, determining whether the bank qualifies as a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the province. The court held that the Bank of Khyber, established under the Bank of Khyber Act 1991 where the provincial government holds majority shares, is a statutory body and that its Human Resource Manual and service rules—framed under section 24 of the parent statute—are statutory rules having broad efficacy complementary to the parent statute. Consequently, the bank is amenable to the constitutional writ jurisdiction. On merits, where employees were dismissed for alleged misconduct without observing the mandatory procedure of issuing show-cause notices, conducting inquiries, or granting a personal hearing under the service rules, the court set aside the dismissal orders, directed reinstatement without back benefits, and permitted fresh proceedings strictly in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service rules of the Bank of Khyber are statutory in nature?
  • Is the Bank of Khyber amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can an employee of a statutory body be dismissed for misconduct without observing the mandatory procedure of show-cause notice and personal hearing prescribed under the service rules?
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• Haider Ali Ravjani vs Gulzar Feroz2019 MLD 1625 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
• Hafizullah vs The State2019 SHC 570 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-20Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Tahir vs State & anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 76 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-27
  explosive substancesanti-terrorismbenefit of doubtacquitted co-accusedsafe custody of samplescriminal appealrejection of evidencepolice recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, handed down by the trial court. The core legal questions involve whether evidence disbelieved against an acquitted co-accused can sustain the conviction of the appellant without independent corroboration, and whether glaring contradictions and failure to prove safe custody of recovered explosive materials create reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond a reasonable doubt due to major discrepancies in recovery proceedings, lack of independent corroboration following the final acquittal of the co-accused based on the same set of witnesses, and failure to prove the safe custody and proper transmission of forensic samples. The court laid down the principle that a single material infirmity creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to an acquittal, and that eye-witness testimony disbelieved against one accused cannot be used against another without independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evidence disbelieved against an acquitted co-accused can be relied upon to convict another accused without independent corroboration?
  • Does failure to prove the safe custody and proper transmission of explosive material samples to the forensic science agency vitiate the prosecution case?
  • Can a single material infirmity creating a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution's story form sufficient ground for the acquittal of an accused?
  • Whether inconsistencies in recovery memos and police proceedings are sufficient to reject the prosecution's case?
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• Hafiz Muhammad SALEEMand another vs Board of Revenue through Member (Judicial-v) and others2019 YLR 610 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-23Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Iqbal vs Gul-E-Nasreen and others2020 PLJ Supreme Court 63, 2019 SCMR 1880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-06-28
  benami transactionallotment of plotsbona fide purchasermilitary service entitlementspecific performancesecond appealconcessionary price
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning residential and commercial plots allotted by the Defence Housing Authority, Karachi, to respondent No. 2 by virtue of her service in the Pakistan Army, the purchase price of which was allegedly paid by her sister, respondent No. 1, who claimed to be the real owner under a benami arrangement. During the pendency of the suit, the appellant intervened, claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for value of the residential plots through transactions entered into with respondent No. 2. The trial court and first appellate court dismissed respondent No. 1's suit, but the High Court allowed her second appeal and declared her the sole owner. None of the legal heirs of respondent No. 2 challenged the High Court's decision, leaving the appellant as the sole appellant before the Supreme Court. The core legal question involved the extent of proprietary rights arising from financial contribution versus military service entitlement in plot allotments, and the validity of the appellant's purchase agreements. The Supreme Court held that since the plots were allotted at a concessionary price due to respondent No. 2's military service entitlement, financial contributions alone by respondent No. 1 did not make her the absolute owner; rather, both sisters held equal equitable shares. Consequently, the Court modified the High Court's judgment, upholding the appellant's purchase of one residential plot (Plot No. 57/1) and granting respondent No. 1 ownership of the other residential plot (Plot No. 57/2) along with a 50% share in the commercial plot.

  Questions settled

  • Does financial contribution alone make a person the absolute owner of property allotted at a concessionary rate due to another person's military service?
  • Can specific performance of a contract for the sale of immovable property be claimed as a matter of right?
  • What is the effect of an allotment made on the basis of a privilege or service entitlement on the determination of ownership rights between a benamidar and a financial contributor?
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• Hafiz Mohammad Shehzad vs The State2019 MLD 1588 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-01
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquirychemical reportunseen offencedelayed FIRcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of poisoning under sections 324, 511, and 337-J of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the nature of the evidence and the status of the trial. The court observed that the FIR was delayed, the offence was unseen, and the only incriminating evidence was a positive chemical report, which did not definitively establish that the applicant administered the poison. Furthermore, the court noted the victim's hesitation during cross-examination regarding her desire to live with the applicant. Relying on the principle that a positive chemical report alone does not necessarily implicate an accused and that the case required further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court held that the applicant had made out a case for bail. Consequently, the court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that the observations were tentative and should not prejudice the trial court's final decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a positive chemical report alone constitute sufficient evidence to deny pre-arrest bail in a poisoning case?
  • When does a criminal case qualify for 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can pre-arrest bail be confirmed when the trial is at the verge of conclusion and the offence is unseen?
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• Hafiz Kalu etc vs Muhammad Bakhsh etc2019 PHC 44 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-17Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Kalu and others vs Muhammad Bakhsh and others2019 YLR 1523 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-01-17
  consolidation proceedingsmutationfraudulent mutationjurisdiction of civil courtconcurrent findingscivil revisiontransfer during consolidation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the petitioners' suit for declaration and permanent injunction was dismissed and the respondents' counter-suit for declaration regarding ownership of the suit property was decreed. The core legal questions involved the validity of mutations attested during pending consolidation proceedings without the sanction of the Consolidation Officer, the burden of proof regarding fraudulent mutations, and the jurisdiction of civil courts to examine mutations vitiated by fraud notwithstanding the bar under the consolidation laws. The Peshawar High Court held that mutations attested during consolidation proceedings without the mandatory prior sanction of the Consolidation Officer under Section 24 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960, are invalid and void. The Court further affirmed that civil courts of plenary jurisdiction retain the inherent authority to examine and set aside revenue mutations procured through fraud or misrepresentation, as such fraudulent acts fall outside the exclusive domain of consolidation authorities. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether mutations attested during consolidation proceedings without the sanction of the Consolidation Officer are valid under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to examine and set aside revenue mutations attested through fraud during consolidation proceedings despite the bar under Section 26 of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960?
  • What is the burden of proof on a beneficiary when a revenue mutation is challenged as forged and fraudulent?
  • What is the limitation period for filing a suit for declaration against the sanctioning of a disputed revenue mutation?
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• Hafiz Imran alias Abbas alias Hamza vs The State2020 KLR Criminal Cases 1, 2019 LHC 3675 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-22
  criminal appealdeath sentenceidentification paradedishonest improvementreasonable doubtanti-terrorismocular evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence imposed by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses including abduction and terrorism. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt based on the provided ocular evidence and identification parade. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the case, citing multiple fatal flaws. The court found that the prosecution witnesses made dishonest improvements to their statements to fill evidentiary gaps, rendering their testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the identification parade was deemed legally invalid due to the lack of adequate lighting at the crime scene, the possibility of the accused's identity being exposed prior to the parade, and the failure to produce key evidence like CCTV footage and forensic reports. Applying the principle that a single reasonable doubt is sufficient for acquittal, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The judgment reinforces that dishonest improvements by witnesses and the withholding of best evidence are fatal to the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of dishonest improvements by prosecution witnesses render their entire testimony unreliable?
  • Is an identification parade valid if the accused was not immediately sent to judicial lockup and had the opportunity to be exposed to witnesses?
  • Does the failure to produce available best evidence, such as CCTV footage and forensic reports, create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be maintained on a capital charge when the prosecution withholds material evidence and relies on witnesses who have made significant improvements to their statements?
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• Hafiz Allah Ditta vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 507 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-05
  post-arrest bailabductionfurther inquirystatement under section 164 Cr.P.C.consent of abductee
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 09 dated 11.01.2019 registered under Section 365-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Okanwala Bangla, District Sahiwal, on the allegation of abducting the complainant's sister to commit zina. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that since the victim stated under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 during cross-examination that she left her house with her own consent and was not medically examined, the case fell within the scope of further inquiry. The petition was consequently allowed, admitting the petitioner to post-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that inconsistent victim statements and lack of medical examination at the tentative assessment stage can constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement by the victim denying abduction during cross-examination bring the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether post-arrest bail should be granted when the accused is no longer required for investigation and the victim's statement contradicts the FIR?
  • Is the absence of a medical examination of the victim a relevant factor for granting post-arrest bail in an abduction case?
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• Hafiz Abdul Karim vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Multan2019 PTD (Trib.) 982 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-11-14Read full judgment →
• Hadi Hussain and 7 others vs Officer Commanding 703 Pak Works2019 YLR 2413 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-04-23Read full judgment →
• Hadayatullah vs the State & anotherPLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 310, 2019 LHC 2858 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-09Read full judgment →
• Haday Khan vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 652 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-10-26
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirymurderabsconsioncriminal bail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal bail application filed by the applicant seeking post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail considering the tentative assessment of the record, the completion of investigation, and the circumstances surrounding the case including absconsion. The Balochistan High Court held that the applicant successfully made out a case for further inquiry upon a tentative assessment of the record, and that bail could not be withheld solely due to long absconsion when the guilt or innocence of the accused is yet to be determined by the trial court after recording evidence. The court laid down the principle that bail may be granted where the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, subject to furnishing adequate sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether long absconsion alone is sufficient to withhold the concession of bail when a case of further inquiry is made out?
  • Does the absence of a specific role assigned to the accused in the FIR warrant the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether bail should be granted when the guilt or innocence of the accused is yet to be determined by the trial court after recording evidence?
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• Habibullah son of Khadim Husain vs The State2019 SHC 434 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-06
  dacoitycriminal appealidentification paraderecovery on pointationpolice witnessesreappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 395 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for dacoity and sentencing him to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt despite the appellant not being named in the first information report, the absence of an identification parade, and contentions regarding weak or contradictory evidence and non-compliance with statutory provisions. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction, holding that the prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, the identification of the accused by the complainant at the police station and subsequently in court was reliable, and the recovery of looted property on the appellant's pointation was admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The court reaffirmed the principle that an identification parade is not mandatory in every case where the witness identifies the accused in court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade is strictly mandatory in every criminal case where the accused is not nominated in the first information report?
  • Is the in-court identification of an accused person by a victim or complainant sufficient to maintain a conviction?
  • Does the recovery of stolen property made on the pointation of an accused person remain admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Whether minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to discard an otherwise consistent and reliable prosecution case?
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• Habib Bank Ltd vs Bashir Ahmad, etc2019 SCP 122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-06
  auction purchaserbanking courtfinancial institutions recoveryrefund of depositunjust enrichmentmark-up on auction amountact of the court shall not prejudice any party
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the Banking Court's order and directed the appellant bank to return the auction purchase amount deposited by respondent No. 1 along with a 10% per annum penalty, as the funds remained in the custody and use of the bank for about nine years due to prolonged litigation. The core legal question involves the interpretation of Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, and whether an auction purchaser is entitled to compensation or mark-up when an auction is set aside through no fault of their own. The Supreme Court held that the auction purchaser is entitled to compensation because the bank had the use of the funds for over nine years, preventing unjust enrichment, but modified the penalty rate from 10% to 8% per annum to align with average bank returns on long-term deposits. The key principle laid down is that an auction purchaser whose deposit is retained by a financial institution during prolonged litigation through no fault of their own is entitled to fair compensation or mark-up to prevent unjust enrichment of the institution, and that acts of the court shall not prejudice any party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction purchaser is entitled to compensation or mark-up on the deposited amount when a court-sanctioned auction is set aside after prolonged litigation?
  • Does retention of an auction purchaser's funds by a financial institution for several years amount to unjust enrichment?
  • Can an appellate court modify the rate of compensation or mark-up awarded to an auction purchaser by the High Court?
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• Habib Bank Ltd vs Bashir Ahmad and others2019 CLD 348, 2019 PCTLR 372, 2019 SCMR 362, 2019 PLJ SC 196 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-06
  auction purchaserbanking courtunjust enrichmentrefund of depositmark-updecree holderfinancial institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the refund of auction money to an auction purchaser whose purchase was eventually set aside due to protracted litigation initiated by the judgment debtor. The core legal question was whether an auction purchaser, whose auction was set aside through no fault of his own after protracted legal proceedings, is entitled to compensation or mark-up on the deposited auction price retained and utilized by the decree-holder bank for nearly nine years. The Supreme Court held that allowing the bank free use of the deposited money would amount to unjust enrichment at the expense of an innocent party, and that an act of the court should not prejudice any party. However, finding the 10% per annum penalty awarded by the High Court to be on the higher side based on prevailing bank deposit rates, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to reduce the mark-up to 8% per annum. The key principle laid down is that an auction purchaser is entitled to a reasonable return or mark-up on auction money retained by a bank during prolonged litigation that resulted in the setting aside of the auction, preventing unjust enrichment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction purchaser is entitled to mark-up or compensation on the auction amount deposited with a bank when the auction is eventually set aside through no fault of the purchaser?
  • Can a financial institution retain and use auction money during prolonged litigation without paying any return to the innocent auction purchaser?
  • Whether the rate of mark-up awarded to an auction purchaser on refunded auction money should be adjusted in accordance with average bank deposit rates?
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• Habib Bank Limited vs Gulzar Khan and others2019 PLJ SC 455, 2019 PLJ SC 521, 2019 P.S.C 1306, 2019 SCP 252, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-11
  workman statuslabour court jurisdictionbank managerburden of proofmanagerial capacitygrievance petitionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a bank officer, specifically an Officer Grade-II and Branch Manager, qualifies as a 'workman' entitled to seek relief under labor laws. The respondent, having been dismissed from service, filed a grievance petition which the Labour Court allowed, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently set aside. The High Court remanded the matter, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether the respondent's duties—which included managing branch affairs, handling cash, and signing financial instruments—constituted managerial or supervisory functions. The Court held that the respondent was not a 'workman' because his duties were predominantly managerial and administrative, not clerical. It reaffirmed that the burden of proof lies on the claimant to establish their status as a 'workman' through evidence of their actual duties, rather than relying on job designation. Consequently, the Court held that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petition, set aside the High Court’s remand order, and dismissed the respondent's claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the employee to establish their status as a 'workman' when approaching a Labour Court?
  • Is a Bank Manager or Officer Grade-II considered a 'workman' under Pakistani labor laws?
  • Does the designation of a post determine whether an employee is a 'workman', or is it the nature of the duties performed?
  • Can a Branch Manager who is authorized to file suits on behalf of a bank be classified as a 'workman'?
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• Habib Bank Limited vs Gulzar Khan & others2019 SCP 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-11
  workmanbranch managerbank employeelabour court jurisdictiongrievance petitionburden of proofcompulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute regarding the maintainability of a grievance petition filed by a bank employee against his compulsory retirement. The respondent, employed as Officer Grade-II and Manager of a bank branch, was dismissed after a departmental inquiry found him guilty of mishandling bank funds. He challenged his dismissal before the Punjab Labour Court, which allowed his petition. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the Labour Court's order, but the Lahore High Court ultimately remanded the matter back to the Tribunal on the finding that the employee was a 'workman'. The core legal question was whether a branch manager and Officer Grade-II of a bank performing managerial and supervisory duties qualifies as a 'workman' under labor laws. The Supreme Court held that the nature of duties performed—such as issuing drafts, opening accounts, supervising cash, and managing branch operations—demonstrated that the respondent was not a 'workman'. The Court established that designation is not determinative, but rather the nature of duties, and the burden of proof lies squarely on the employee to establish their status as a 'workman'. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Officer Grade-II and Branch Manager of a bank falls within the definition of a 'workman' under labour laws?
  • Upon whom lies the burden of proof to establish the status of a 'workman' when a grievance petition is filed before a Labour Court?
  • Can a bank branch manager competent to file suits on behalf of a financial institution be considered a 'workman'?
  • Does the size of a bank branch have any nexus with determining the managerial and supervisory nature of a branch manager's duties?
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• Habib Bank Limited vs Bashir Ahmed, etc.2019 P.S.C. 1096 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-06
  auction purchaserbanking courtrecovery of financesrefund of depositunjust enrichmentmark-upmortgaged property auction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the refund of auction money to an auction purchaser after the underlying auction of a mortgaged property was ultimately set aside in prolonged litigation between a financial institution and a judgment-debtor. The core legal question was whether an auction purchaser, whose deposit remained in the custody and use of a decree-holder bank for approximately nine years through no fault of his own, is entitled to compensation or mark-up upon the refund of the principal amount. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the auction purchaser is entitled to a return on the deposited funds to prevent unjust enrichment by the bank, as the delay was caused by court proceedings and not the purchaser. However, the Court modified the High Court's order by reducing the rate of return from 10% to 8% per annum, aligning it with average bank deposit returns. The key principle laid down is that an auction purchaser whose deposit is retained by a financial institution due to prolonged litigation is entitled to reasonable compensation or mark-up for the period of retention, and that an act of the court shall not prejudice any party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction purchaser is entitled to mark-up or compensation on a deposited auction amount retained by a bank during prolonged litigation?
  • Can a financial institution be permitted to retain the free use of an auction purchaser's funds when the underlying auction is set aside through no fault of the purchaser?
  • What is the appropriate rate of return or mark-up to be awarded to an auction purchaser for funds held by a bank for an extended period?
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• Habib Bank Limited vs Abdul Sattar Siddiqui and others2019 IHC 20 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-14Read full judgment →
• H.M. Extraction Ghee & Oil Industries (Pvt) Ltd vs Federal Board of Revenue2019 PCTLR 446, 2019 P.S.C. 841, PTCL 2019 CL. 533, 2019 PTD 1479, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-15
  tax credittax exemptionadvance income taxexemption certificatefiscal interpretationincome tax ordinancerefund of tax
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals concern the interpretation of Sections 65D, 148, and 159 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically whether a 100% tax credit under Section 65D entitles a taxpayer to an exemption certificate under Section 159 regarding advance income tax collection under Section 148. The core legal questions were whether a tax credit and a tax exemption are legally synonymous and whether the term "exempt" in Section 159(1)(a) encompasses tax credits. The Supreme Court held that tax credits and tax exemptions are conceptually distinct; an exemption operates at the assessment stage, whereas a tax credit interposes between assessment and recovery. Consequently, a tax credit does not automatically entitle a taxpayer to an exemption certificate. The Court established that tax credits and exemptions are not interchangeable in fiscal statutes. While an exemption eliminates or reduces the assessment of tax, a tax credit only manifests after the assessment stage. The Court also issued specific directions for the refund of advance tax collected where no tax liability exists, emphasizing that public functionaries should not withhold citizens' money on technical grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Are a tax credit and a tax exemption legally synonymous under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does a 100% tax credit under Section 65D entitle a taxpayer to an exemption certificate under Section 159?
  • Does the term "exempt" in Section 159(1)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, include tax credits?
  • At what stage of the tax imposition process—leviable, payable, or recoverable—do tax credits and tax exemptions operate?
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• Gupteswa r Behera vs State of Odisha and another2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 154 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-12-14
  dying declarationmedical evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder convictionreliability of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the High Court's judgment confirming the appellant's conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the reliability of alleged dying declarations made by the deceased to prosecution witnesses, given the medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries. The Supreme Court observed that medical experts testified the deceased would have lost consciousness and died within ten minutes of sustaining the fatal injuries. Given that the witnesses reached the scene only after a significant delay—exceeding the time frame in which the deceased could have remained conscious—the Court found it physically impossible for the deceased to have made the statements attributed to him. Consequently, the Court held that the dying declarations were unreliable and the prosecution's case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, establishing that medical impossibility regarding the victim's consciousness at the time of an alleged dying declaration warrants the benefit of doubt for the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does medical evidence establishing that a victim would lose consciousness within minutes of injury render a subsequent dying declaration unreliable?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal when the timeline of witness arrival at the crime scene contradicts the possibility of the victim making a dying declaration?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on dying declarations if the medical testimony suggests the victim was incapable of speech at the time of the alleged statement?
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• Gulzar Ahmad vs Addl. District Judge, etc2019 LHC 341 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-20Read full judgment →
• Gulzar Ahmad vs Additional DIstrict Judge and others2019 CLC 1432 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-20
  amendment of pleadingswritten statementCode of Civil Procedurealternative pleasliberal constructionconstitutional petitioncivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the concurrent orders of the trial and revisional courts, which dismissed the petitioner's application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to amend his written statement in a suit for declaration. The core legal question was whether the proposed amendment, which sought to elaborate on the details of a property sale agreement already referenced in the original pleadings, constituted an impermissible change to the nature or complexion of the suit. The High Court held that the lower courts erred in their assessment, as the proposed amendment merely elaborated on existing facts rather than introducing contradictory, mutually destructive, or inconsistent pleas. The Court emphasized that the power to allow amendments must be exercised liberally to resolve the real controversy between parties, provided the fundamental character of the suit remains unchanged. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the application for amendment was accepted, reinforcing the principle that parties should be permitted to clarify their pleadings to ensure a fair adjudication of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party amend their written statement to elaborate on facts already disclosed in the original pleadings?
  • Does the introduction of an alternative or inconsistent plea in a written statement automatically change the nature of the suit?
  • What is the test for determining whether an amendment to pleadings should be allowed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Are contradictory and mutually destructive pleas permissible through an amendment of pleadings?
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• Gulsher Ahmed Chachar and others vs National Accountability2019 YLR 1016 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-28Read full judgment →
• Gulf Commercial Bank Limited vs Chaudhry Cables (Pvt) Ltd and Others2019 CLD 651, 2019 LHC 1161 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-04Read full judgment →
• Gulab Khan vs Abdullah Khan and others2019 MLD 191 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-12-08
  FIR cancellationquashment of proceedingsinherent jurisdictionalteration of chargePolice Rules 1934criminal trial procedureexcess of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged the order of a Judicial Magistrate who cancelled an FIR registered under sections 395/291 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The matter originated when an Additional Sessions Judge, upon receiving the case, returned it to the Judicial Magistrate, opining that the offence was merely theft under section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Subsequently, the Judicial Magistrate cancelled the FIR invoking Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules 1934. The core legal question was whether a Judicial Magistrate possesses the authority to cancel an FIR under Police Rules after a case has been submitted for trial, and whether an Additional Sessions Judge can return a case to a lower court instead of altering the charge. The Court held that the Judicial Magistrate acted in excess of jurisdiction by cancelling the FIR, and the Additional Sessions Judge erred by returning the case. The Court established that trial courts must proceed with the trial and utilize powers under section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to alter charges if necessary, rather than circumventing the trial process through unauthorized FIR cancellation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Judicial Magistrate have the authority to cancel an FIR under Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules 1934 after a case has been submitted for trial?
  • Can an Additional Sessions Judge return a case to a Judicial Magistrate on the ground that the offence is triable by a lower court instead of altering the charge?
  • Is an order cancelling an FIR subject to quashment under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if passed without jurisdiction?
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• Gul Sher and others vs Mst. Aslam Mai and others2019 CLC 978 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-09Read full judgment →
• Gul Sher Abat Khan vs Mumtaz Ali Khan & others2020 [M] C L R 1301, 2020 KLR Civil Cases 83, 2019 MLD 1991, 2019 PHC 162 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-04-22Read full judgment →
• Gul Munir vs The Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (Safron), Islamabad and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 645 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-01
  Federal Levies ForceCivil ServantService TribunalWrit JurisdictionTerms and Conditions of ServiceArticle 212Compulsory Retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of the Federal Levies Force, challenged the Federal Levies Force (Services) Rules, 2016, arguing that the amendments adversely altered their terms and conditions of service, resulting in compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate these service-related grievances or if the petitioners, as civil servants, were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Relying on the criteria established by the Apex Court, the Court held that the duties of the Federal Levies Force—including maintaining law and order and protecting government installations—have a direct nexus with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, the Court determined that the petitioners are civil servants and that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate their service terms. The key principle laid down is that where a force performs functions connected with the affairs of the Federation, its members constitute civil servants, and their service disputes must be resolved exclusively by the Federal Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Federal Levies Force considered civil servants under the law?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding the terms and conditions of service for Federal Levies Force employees?
  • What is the effect of Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 on the jurisdiction of the High Court regarding service matters of civil servants?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues arising out of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Hassan vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 957 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-10-29
  control of narcotic substanceschain of custodychemical examiner reportdelayed transmission of samplesfull protocolsbenefit of the doubtacquittalcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge CNS, Quetta, convicting the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the recovery of heroin and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involve whether an unexplained delay in sending samples to the Chemical Examiner and the non-compliance with statutory rules regarding the forensic report vitiate the conviction. The Balochistan High Court held that an inordinate, unexplained delay of twenty-five days in transmitting the sample, coupled with the failure to establish a safe and unbroken chain of custody and the omission of full protocols in the Forensic Science Laboratory report as required by the rules, renders the chemical report inconclusive and unreliable. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant on the benefit of the doubt, establishing that safe custody, unbroken chain of transmission of narcotics samples, and adherence to mandatory rules regarding forensic protocols are prerequisites for sustaining a conviction under narcotics legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in sending narcotic samples to the Chemical Examiner vitiate the prosecution's case?
  • Is compliance with Rule 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 regarding full test protocols mandatory for sustaining a conviction?
  • What is the legal effect of a broken or unestablished chain of custody of seized narcotics from the spot of recovery to the laboratory?
  • Can a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be sustained on an inconclusive and unreliable Forensic Science Laboratory report?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Hassan alias Gulan son of Abdul Rehman Shaikh vs Asif Ali son of Abdul Majeed Khoso2019 SHC 506 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gul Alam Khan etc vs Nadir Khan etc2019 PLD Peshawar 202, 2019 PHC 112 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-21Read full judgment →
• Guinault Sa Pa Orleans Sologne vs Federation of Pakistan & Others2019 SHC 596 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-24Read full judgment →
• Govt. of the Punjab etc vs Syed Muhammad Saleem Shah2019 LHC 3806, 2020 PLC (C.S.) 593 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-12
  promotionfitnesscivil servantsubjective evaluationconstitutional jurisdictionDepartmental Promotion Boardservice tribunalterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged an order of the learned Single Bench whereby a constitutional petition filed by the respondent against the minutes of the Departmental Promotion Board (DPB) denying his promotion to the rank of SP (BS-18) was allowed. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, can substitute its own opinion for the subjective evaluation of a civil servant's fitness for promotion made by the competent departmental authority, and whether such matters are barred from judicial review in the absence of mala fides, jurisdictional defects, or colourable exercise of power. The Lahore High Court held that the determination of fitness for promotion is exclusively within the domain of the competent authority based on subjective evaluation supported by objective criteria, and courts cannot sit in appeal over such assessment unless illegality, excess of jurisdiction, or mala fides is established. The Court laid down that while extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked if an order is passed without jurisdiction or in colourable exercise of power, courts must not substitute their own opinion regarding an officer's fitness for promotion, especially where departmental authorities and service tribunals lack interference powers regarding fitness determinations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can sit in judgment over the subjective evaluation of a civil servant's fitness for promotion by the competent authority under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Does the Punjab Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an order determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be promoted to a higher grade under Section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
  • Under what circumstances can extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction be invoked in matters relating to the promotion and fitness of a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Govt. of Punjab thr. Chief Secretary vs Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Azhar2020 SCP 547, 2019 SCP 81, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-19
  Federal Shariat CourtjurisdictionInjunctions of IslamPrinciples of Policywrit of mandamusArabic languageconstitutional law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil shariat appeal, filed by the Government of Punjab under Article 203(F) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenged a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court directing the Federation and Provinces to implement Article 31(2)(c) of the Constitution and the Shariat Act, 1991 regarding the promotion and teaching of the Arabic language. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court possesses the jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus or general directions for the enforcement of constitutional provisions and Principles of Policy. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment, holding that the Federal Shariat Court's original jurisdiction under Article 203D is strictly confined to examining existing laws for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam, and it lacks the broad writ jurisdiction enjoyed by the High Courts under Article 199 or the Supreme Court under Article 184(3). The Court laid down that Principles of Policy are not judicially enforceable by any court unless translated into positive statutory law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or general directions for the implementation of constitutional provisions?
  • Are the Principles of Policy contained in Articles 29 to 40 of the Constitution of Pakistan enforceable by any court?
  • What is the extent and limit of the original jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court under Article 203D of the Constitution?
  • Can the Federal Shariat Court examine or base its directions on proposed draft legislation that has not been enacted into law?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab, Education Department through Secretary2019 P.S.C 705, 2019 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-28
  locus poenitentiaerecovery of salaryregularization of servicead hoc relief allowancecivil servicemisrepresentationpecuniary benefitadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The Education Department of the Government of Punjab sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that restrained the recovery of Ad hoc Relief Allowances paid to regularized lecturers. The core legal question was whether the provincial government could recover pecuniary benefits paid to civil servants without the approval of the Finance Department, where such payments were not obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the principle of locus poenitentiae and the authority's power to rescind orders under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, held that an exception exists regarding financial recoveries. The Court ruled that pecuniary benefits already received by an employee pursuant to an illegal or unauthorized order cannot be recovered unless the order was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of facts. Since the respondents had performed their duties and were not at fault for the administrative error, the recovery was deemed unlawful. The petitions were dismissed, and the Court ordered the return of any recovered amounts.

  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secretary Health Department vs Dr. Nadeem Rizvi etc2019 KLR Supreme Court 293, 2020 KLR Supreme Court Cases 107, 2019 P.S.C · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-17
  provincial autonomyfederal legislative listfundamental rightsright to lifedevolutionexecutive authorityconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals concerning the transfer and devolution of certain medical and cultural institutions—specifically the Sheikh Zayed Medical Complex, Lahore, Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, Karachi, National Institute of Cardiovascular Diseases, Karachi, National Institute of Child Health, Karachi, and the National Museum of Pakistan, Karachi—from the Federal Government to the Provincial Governments. The core legal question is whether the transfer/devolution of these federal institutions to the provinces was conducted in accordance with law and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and whether the Federal Government possesses the competence to establish and maintain such institutions for fulfilling fundamental rights obligations. By a majority of four to one, the Supreme Court held that the transfer of the said institutions by the Federal Government was done without due application of mind and without following the necessary legal procedures, and thus declared the devolution unconstitutional and without legal effect. The Court laid down the key principle that while provincial autonomy is sacrosanct, the Federation has the constitutional obligation and power to run projects for the enforcement of fundamental rights (such as the right to life) under the Constitution, and any transfer of federal properties or projects to provinces must be undertaken strictly in accordance with law and through proper legal instruments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of federal medical and cultural institutions to the provinces without following due legal procedure and application of mind is unconstitutional?
  • Does the Federal Government have the power and obligation under the Constitution to establish and run projects and institutions for the enforcement of fundamental rights such as the right to life?
  • Can federal properties and institutions be transferred to provinces without a formal legal instrument specifying the terms, conditions, and duration of such transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secratery Health Department and others vs Dr. Nadeem Rizvi and others2019 PLJ SC 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-16
  devolution of powerprovincial autonomyfederal legislative listfundamental rightsconstitutional interpretationadministrative lawpublic health institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutional validity of the transfer of several major medical institutions, including the Sheikh Zayed Medical Complex and Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Center, from the Federal Government to the Provincial Governments following the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government possessed the authority to operate these institutions and whether the devolution process adhered to constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court held that the transfer of these institutions was unconstitutional, having been executed without due process or proper application of mind. The Court ordered the return of these institutions to the Federation within 90 days. The ratio established that while provincial autonomy is sacrosanct, the Federal Government retains the power to operate projects and institutions to fulfill its constitutional obligations, including the enforcement of fundamental rights. Such federal projects, even when located within a province, remain subject to provincial regulatory control. The Court emphasized that any transfer of federal assets to provinces must be conducted through proper legal instruments and due process, rather than arbitrary administrative action.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to operate medical institutions within a province for the purpose of enforcing fundamental rights?
  • Can the Federal Government transfer its assets to a province without following due process and specific legal instruments?
  • Are federal institutions located within a province subject to provincial laws and regulatory control?
  • Does the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment preclude the Federal Government from maintaining projects that serve federal purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Planning and Development2019 PLC (C.S.) 220 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-15
  regularization of contract employeesdevelopment projectnon-development sidepromotion quotainitial recruitmentservice rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves interconnected intra-court appeals and writ petitions concerning the regularization of contract employees recruited for a development project of the Punjab Bureau of Statistics that was subsequently transferred to the non-development side (Schedule of New Expenditure). The core legal question is whether contract employees of a transferred project are entitled to unconditional regularization against all newly created permanent posts, or whether such regularization is subject to the existing service recruitment rules prescribing a specific quota for promotion versus initial recruitment. The Lahore High Court held that while contract employees of a transferred development project have a right to be considered for permanent absorption, their regularization must strictly adhere to the governing service rules, including any prescribed promotion-to-initial-recruitment ratios. The key principle laid down is that the conversion of a project from development to non-development does not override statutory service rules, and regularization of contract staff must accommodate the legitimate promotion rights of existing regular employees according to the established departmental quota.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contract employees of a development project transferred to the non-development side are entitled to automatic permanent regularization against newly created posts?
  • Does the regularization of contract employees override the statutory quota prescribed for promotion of existing regular employees under service rules?
  • Are newly created permanent posts resulting from the transfer of a project subject to the existing recruitment rules and quotas of the department?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Health Department, Lahore2019 PLJ Lahore 53 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-19Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works2019 P.S.C. 1338, 2019 SCMR 998, 2019 SCP 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-09
  ad-hoc employeestermination of serviceres judicatajurisdictionintra-court appealservice tribunalreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves civil appeals arising from judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning the reinstatement of former ad-hoc employees. The respondents were appointed as sub-engineers on an ad-hoc basis in 1996 for one year, after which their services were terminated. Although they initially obtained a stay order until their tenure expired in 1997, they did not pursue further remedies until filing writ petitions fourteen years later, relying on a Supreme Court judgment concerning work-charge employees. The High Court allowed the writ petitions and subsequently dismissed the appellants' intra-court appeals on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that the respondents were civil servants. The core legal question was whether former ad-hoc employees whose services terminated automatically can seek reinstatement years later based on judgments rendered in cases of other employees, and whether the principle of res judicata applies. The Supreme Court held that the respondents' termination attained finality in 1997 upon expiry of their tenure, and they could not reopen closed matters or claim the benefit of judgments rendered in separate cases concerning different employees. The Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the intra-court appeals to the High Court to be decided on merits in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad-hoc employee whose fixed-term appointment has expired can seek reinstatement years later based on judgments rendered in cases involving other employees?
  • Does the dismissal of an intra-court appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction preclude the examination of the underlying merits?
  • Whether the principle of constructive res judicata bars a party from reopening a terminated service matter after accepting the cessation of employment?
  • Do former ad-hoc employees retain the status of civil servants years after their appointment terms have expired without challenging the termination under service laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works2019 P.S.C. 1338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  ad-hoc employeestermination of serviceconstructive res judicatareinstatementservice tribunal jurisdictionintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal addressed whether ad-hoc employees whose services were terminated upon the expiry of their fixed term, and who accepted that position for fourteen years without challenge, could subsequently seek reinstatement based on a judgment rendered in favor of different employees. The respondents had been appointed as sub-engineers on an ad-hoc basis in 1996 for one year, after which their services ended, and they initially ceased employment without pursuing legal remedies. Years later, following a Supreme Court decision reinstating certain work-charged employees, the respondents filed writ petitions seeking reinstatement, which were allowed by the High Court, while subsequent intra-court appeals were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Supreme Court held that individuals who accept the termination of their ad-hoc employment and fail to challenge it cannot subsequently reopen closed matters or claim the benefit of judgments rendered in cases concerning third parties, as such attempts are barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. The Court further held that ad-hoc employees whose fixed terms have expired and who did not pursue legal remedies cannot be regarded as continuing civil servants for the purpose of invoking service jurisdiction years later. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the matters remanded to the High Court for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ad-hoc employee whose fixed-term service has ended can seek reinstatement many years later based on a judgment rendered in favor of third-party employees?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata bar a party from reopening a terminated employment matter after accepting the termination and failing to seek timely legal remedies?
  • Whether intra-court appeals against the orders passed in writ petitions by ad-hoc employees are barred under the law.
  • When does the service of an ad-hoc employee stand automatically terminated under the law?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works2019 SCMR 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-09
  ad-hoc employeestermination of servicereinstatementres judicatacivil servantswrit petitionintra-court appealjurisdictionservice tribunalestoppel by judgment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of civil appeals concerning the termination of ad-hoc sub-engineers. The respondents, appointed for one year in 1996, were terminated in 1997 upon expiry of their term and accepted this position. Fourteen years later, they filed writ petitions in the Lahore High Court seeking reinstatement based on a Supreme Court decision in 2010 involving work-charge employees. The High Court Single Judge allowed the petitions, holding them to be civil servants. Intra-court appeals were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, citing a bar under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as ad-hoc employees were deemed civil servants. The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals, holding that ad-hoc employees whose fixed tenure expires cease to be civil servants, rendering their writ petitions not maintainable. The Court clarified that the principle from Hameed Akhtar Niazi's case, extending benefits to non-litigants, does not apply to appointment pleas decided on a case-to-case basis. It emphasized the principle of constructive res judicata, stating that a party accepting a decision cannot later benefit from its reversal in another party's litigation. The matter was remanded to the High Court Division Bench for a decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ad-hoc employee whose fixed term has expired be considered a civil servant?
  • Does the principle of constructive res judicata apply when a party accepts a decision but later seeks relief based on a reversal of that decision in another party's case?
  • Is the benefit of a judgment extending to non-litigants applicable to pleas for appointment decided on a case-to-case basis?
  • Are intra-court appeals maintainable against a Single Judge's decision regarding the service matters of ad-hoc employees?
  • Are writ petitions maintainable for ad-hoc employees whose fixed tenure has expired and who are no longer considered civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab though Secretary, Health Department, Lahore &2019 PLJ Lahore 538 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-24Read full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Local Government2019 SCP 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-29
  local government taxationtax vs fee vs cessstatutory interpretationprecedentpublic notice requirementstaxing powertransportation levy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa against a High Court judgment that struck down a notification imposing a 'tax/cess/fee' on the transportation of cement and construction materials. The core legal question was whether the District Council could legally impose such a levy on vehicles transporting these goods, given that the Supreme Court had previously invalidated similar levies in a prior judgment involving the same parties. The Supreme Court held that the impugned notification was illegal and void, noting that the government attempted to resurrect a previously struck-down levy through minor, immaterial changes in wording. The Court emphasized that taxing provisions must be drafted with clarity and precision, criticizing the government's failure to distinguish between a tax, fee, and cess, and its failure to comply with mandatory public notice requirements under the relevant local government legislation. The Court affirmed that the previous binding precedent remained applicable, dismissing the petition and upholding the High Court's decision to set aside the levy.

  Questions settled

  • Can a local government authority impose a tax or cess on the transportation of goods if the underlying legal basis for such a levy has been previously declared invalid by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a failure to clearly distinguish between a tax, fee, and cess in a notification render the taxing provision void for uncertainty?
  • Is compliance with public notice and objection procedures a mandatory prerequisite for the valid imposition of a tax under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act 2013?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Local2019 P.S.C. 1084, 2019 SCMR 46, 2019 PCTLR 361, 2019 PLJ SC 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-29
  taxationcesslocal governmentproduction cessultra viresstatutory interpretationpublic notice
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that struck down a tax/cess/fee levied on vehicles transporting cement, sand, and other materials under a letter dated January 8, 2015. The petitioners argued that the levy was authorized under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act 2013 and predecessor local government laws. The Supreme Court observed that the core legal issue regarding the legality of such a levy had already been settled in Lucky Cement Factory Limited v. Government of N.W.F.P (2013 SCMR 1511), where a similar loading/unloading tax was struck down because no services were provided by the local council to justify the fee. The Court held that minor changes in terminology did not alter the substance of the illegal levy. Furthermore, the public notice failed to specify the proposed tax proposal as mandated by Section 42(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act 2013. The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that taxing provisions must be drafted with clarity and precision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a local government resurrect a previously struck-down tax or cess by merely changing the terminology or wording of the levy?
  • Does a public notice for a tax proposal comply with statutory requirements if it fails to specify the actual proposed tax, cess, or fee?
  • Can a local council impose a transportation or loading fee on vehicles without demonstrating that any corresponding services are provided to those vehicles?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of GB through Chief Secretary and others vs Hadi Hussain2019 PLC (C.S.) 123 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court
  civil revisionexecution of decreeexecuting courtfinality of judgmentabolition of postarrears of salary
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges a judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, Skardu, which allowed an appeal by the decree holders and set aside an executing court's order dismissing their execution petition. The core legal question was whether an executing court can refuse to execute a final judicial decree on the ground that the relevant departmental financial head has been abolished subsequent to the decree. The court held that an executing court cannot go behind a final decree or re-determine liabilities, and that judgment debtors are bound to implement the decree even if they must create posts to do so. Furthermore, a plea not raised during the original trial or appellate proceedings cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. The court laid down the principle that the finality of a decree must be upheld by the executing court without entertaining belated pleas or looking behind the judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an executing court can go behind a final decree or re-determine the liabilities of the parties?
  • Can a judgment debtor raise a new plea regarding the abolition of a departmental head for the first time before the executing court?
  • Is an executing court justified in dismissing an execution petition on the ground that no vacant post exists when the decree has attained finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Gohar Ullah vs The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others2019 PLJ Islamabad 103, 2019 YLR 781, 2019 IHC 5 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-15Read full judgment →
• Gohar Khan and another vs State and another2020 YLR 195, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 515 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-02-22
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtjoint recoveryballistic reportcriminal appealmurderrobberychain of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for murder and robbery, based on an unseen occurrence and circumstantial evidence. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, as the evidence was tainted and insufficient. The Court emphasized that when a case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, every link must be complete and conclusive; any missing link or doubt necessitates acquittal. The Court found that the recovery of incriminating items was dubious due to joint pointation, unexplained delays in forensic analysis, and the failure to interrogate prime suspects. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the use of supplementary statements recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 as an afterthought to implicate the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the trial court's judgment, acquitted the appellants, and ordered their immediate release, reiterating that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence where the chain of events is incomplete?
  • Is a joint recovery of incriminating articles from multiple accused admissible in evidence?
  • Does the delay in sending crime empties and the weapon to the forensic laboratory render the ballistic report unreliable?
  • Can a supplementary statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to implicate an accused after an initial report?
  Read full judgment →
• Gohar Ayub vs The State etc2019 PCRLJ 1260, 2019 PHC 80 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-06
  quashment of FIRpublic servantPrevention of Corruption Actconstitutional jurisdictionJustice of Peacecriminal procedurejurisdiction of police
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the quashment of an FIR registered against him under sections 468, 419, 420, 471, 409, and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an order by a Justice of Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the local police lacked jurisdiction to register an FIR against a public servant when the matter was already subject to proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 does not grant public servants immunity from other criminal proceedings. Relying on section 5(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and section 8 of the West Pakistan Anti-Corruption Establishment Ordinance 1961, the Court affirmed that the Act of 1947 is not in derogation of other laws. Furthermore, the Court held that it should not exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to resolve factual controversies or quash an FIR when a prima facie case exists, as this would bypass the ordinary trial process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 grant public servants immunity from criminal proceedings initiated under other laws?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to quash an FIR based on disputed factual allegations?
  • Does the registration of a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 preclude the local police from registering a separate FIR for the same incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Gohar alias Chaman vs The State2019 YLR 1368 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-02-04
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencejudicial confessionmurder referencezina-bil-jabrcapital punishmentcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for the murder and rape of an eleven-year-old girl. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence—specifically 'last seen' testimony, recovery of incriminating items, and a judicial confession—to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the charges of murder and rape. It affirmed the conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, but acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 due to insufficient evidence. The Court laid down that circumstantial evidence must be of a conclusive nature, excluding every hypothesis except guilt, with an unbroken chain of events. Furthermore, it emphasized that while 'last seen' evidence is not inherently strong, it becomes conclusive when corroborated by other evidence. Judicial confessions are admissible only if recorded with strict adherence to procedural safeguards, ensuring voluntariness and the absence of police influence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what conditions does 'last seen' evidence become sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • What procedural safeguards must a Magistrate observe to ensure a judicial confession is voluntary and admissible?
  • Does the discovery of incriminating facts based on information provided by an accused in police custody satisfy the requirements of Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a conviction for screening of evidence under Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained in the absence of evidence suggesting the destruction of proof?
  Read full judgment →
• GN (through his litigation friend "The Official Solicitor") and another vs2019 SCMR 1173 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Glencore International Ag and others vs Commissioner of Taxation2019 SCMR 1704 · High Court of Australia · 2019-08-14Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yahya vs Asif Khan alias Kaku and 3 others2019 MLD 1910 · Federal Shariat Court · 2019-04-02
  appeal against acquittalbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencehudood ordinancemurderconfessional statementdouble presumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court, which acquitted the respondents of charges relating to murder and robbery. The core legal question before the Federal Shariat Court was whether the trial court's appreciation of evidence leading to acquittal suffered from perversity, illegality, or misreading of evidence, thereby warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction against acquittal. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that findings of the trial court were based on proper appreciation of evidence, entitling the accused to a double presumption of innocence. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal judgment unless it is perverse, arbitrary, or suffering from material misreading of evidence, and that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal when the findings of the trial court are based on proper appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the prosecution carry the burden of proving its case beyond a shadow of doubt in criminal trials?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  • What is the scope of appellate jurisdiction under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against an order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Umar vs The State2019 MLD 1411 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-29
  criminal revisionbenefit of doubtprosecution evidencematerial contradictionsacquittalpolice witnessesSindh Arms Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Kamber Shandadkot, which had set aside a trial court conviction and ordered a retrial for the applicant, who was originally convicted under the Sindh Arms Act. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, given the evidence presented. Upon review, the High Court identified numerous material contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly regarding the patrolling route, the duration of police procedures, and the sequence of events following the alleged encounter. The court held that these inconsistencies, coupled with the failure to secure independent witnesses in a populated area, rendered the prosecution's case unreliable. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the applicant, applying the established principle that if evidence creates a reasonable doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution's story, the benefit of that doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace. The judgment reaffirms that a single reasonable doubt is sufficient to warrant acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution's evidence entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Are material contradictions in the testimonies of police witnesses sufficient to discredit the prosecution's case?
  • Is the failure to associate independent witnesses in a populated area a ground for doubting the prosecution's version of events?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir alias Shabbira vs StatePLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1629 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-13
  abductioncriminal appealbenefit of doubtabscondencehearsay evidenceidentification paradeAnti-Terrorism Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for abduction and terrorism-related offences. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the primary evidence was hearsay and the co-accused had already been acquitted on the same evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The testimony of the abductee was found unreliable, and the servant present at the scene could not identify the perpetrators. The Court emphasized that hearsay evidence is inadmissible and that abscondence, while a suspicious circumstance, is not conclusive proof of guilt and cannot substitute for substantive evidence of the crime. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, as the prosecution failed to provide sufficient corroborative evidence to sustain the charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is abscondence of an accused person conclusive proof of guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on hearsay evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence necessitate the acquittal of the remaining accused?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a right of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar vs The State2019 YLR 2530 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-05
  criminal appealmurder convictiondeath sentenceocular testimonyinterested witnessnatural witnessmedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial court for the murder of a woman, punishable under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the defense's arguments regarding the credibility of the witnesses and alleged contradictions in the evidence. The High Court upheld the conviction, holding that the prosecution established its case through consistent ocular testimony corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence. The court affirmed that mere relationship with the deceased does not render a witness 'interested' or unreliable; rather, the test is whether there is a motive to falsely implicate the accused. Furthermore, the court ruled that minor discrepancies in witness statements, often arising from the passage of time, do not undermine the prosecution's case if the witnesses are natural and their testimony is confidence-inspiring. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death sentence, finding no material illegality in the trial court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a blood relationship with the deceased automatically render a witness 'interested' and unreliable?
  • Can minor discrepancies in witness testimony justify the acquittal of an accused in a murder case?
  • What is the legal test for determining whether a witness is a 'natural witness'?
  • Is medical evidence sufficient to corroborate ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Sindhu vs The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2019 IHC 176 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-11Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Khan vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 227 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-11
  pre-arrest bailcompromiseemigration offencebail confirmationcriminal settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 108/2016, registered under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, at Police Station FIA Circle, Multan. During the proceedings, the complainant appeared before the Court and confirmed that a compromise had been reached between the parties. The complainant explicitly stated he had no objection to the confirmation of the petitioner's pre-arrest bail and submitted an affidavit to that effect, which was verified by the Court. The core legal question was whether the existence of a compromise between the parties justified the confirmation of pre-arrest bail. The Court held that since the parties had resolved their dispute, the compromise would foster peace and harmony in society. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, subject to the petitioner furnishing fresh bail bonds. The key principle laid down is that a compromise between the complainant and the accused in criminal proceedings can serve as a valid ground for the confirmation of pre-arrest bail, provided the Court is satisfied with the authenticity of the settlement.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise between the complainant and the accused serve as a valid ground for the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  • Is a court empowered to confirm pre-arrest bail based on an affidavit of compromise submitted by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Jagirani vs Hussain Bux Jagirani2019 YLR 1161 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-29
  murderocular testimonysingle witness convictiondelay in FIRcommon objectunlawful assemblycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Nawaz. The core legal questions involved the reliability of a single eyewitness (the complainant), the effect of a one-day delay in lodging the FIR, the non-examination of certain eyewitnesses who died natural deaths prior to deposition, and the application of common object and active participation in a murder committed by an unlawful assembly. The Sindh High Court held that the testimony of a single ocular witness, if confidence-inspiring and natural, is sufficient for conviction based on the quality rather than quantity of evidence, that delay plausibly explained does not vitiate the prosecution case, and that the appellant actively participated with a common object. The appeal was consequently dismissed and the conviction upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction in a murder case be based solely on the testimony of a single witness?
  • Does a delay of one day in lodging the FIR necessarily prove fatal to the prosecution case?
  • What is the legal consequence of the non-examination of eyewitnesses who pass away before testifying during the trial?
  • How is the common object of an unlawful assembly determined when accused persons are armed and act together?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar (Deceased) through LRs and others vs Ghulam Sakina2019 SCMR 567 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-11
  Civil PetitionLeave to AppealConsent OrderInheritanceSale MutationBurden of ProofCo-sharerLaw of Limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved civil petitions for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In one petition, the core legal question was whether a party could challenge a consent order passed by the High Court at their own request. The Court held that a judgment or order passed with the consent of parties cannot be challenged by those parties, dismissing the petition. In other petitions, the legal questions concerned the burden of proof for beneficiaries of alleged sale mutations and the applicability of limitation law against co-sharers. The Court ruled that beneficiaries of sales recorded in mutations must prove their genuineness with strong evidence, as mutations are for fiscal purposes, not title. Mere assertion of deceased marginal witnesses was deemed insufficient. It was further held that the possession of one co-sharer is considered the possession of all, and the law of limitation does not apply against a co-sharer. Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal in all petitions.

  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sabir vs The State etc2019 LHC 3534 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-03
  murder referencedeath sentence confirmationfalsus in uno falsus in omnibuschance witnessbenefit of doubtacquittalocular accountdelayed FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected murder reference arise from a judgment convicting the appellant Ghulam Sabir and his co-convict Ghulam Qadir for the double murder of Mst. Kalsoom Bibi and Muhammad Asif under Section 302(b) PPC. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular account given by a chance witness, the implications of delayed FIR registration, the corroborative value of medical evidence and weapon recovery, and the application of the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish its case due to delayed and ante-timed FIR registration, untrustworthy eyewitness testimony, uncorroborated recovery, and discredited evidence against co-accused. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitted both the appellant and the non-appealing co-convict, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that where prosecution witnesses are found to have resorted to deliberate falsehoods, the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applies, rendering the evidence unreliable for sustaining convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Can the benefit of acquittal granted to an appealing convict be extended to a non-appealing co-convict under similar circumstances?
  • Does medical evidence alone suffice to establish the identity of the assailant in a criminal trial?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when the sole eyewitness is found to be unreliable and a chance witness whose presence is doubtful?
  • Whether motive alone can form the basis of conviction when the ocular account has been completely disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul and 3 others vs Muhammad Shamim Khan and 31 others2019 P.S.C. 959 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Shah vs Mst. Fatima Bibi, etc2019 P.S.C. 134 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Shah vs Mst. Fatima Bibi and 9 others2019 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 23, 2018 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 47 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool alias Gudda vs The State2020 KLR Criminal Cases 331, 2020 YLR 212, 2019 LHC 2115 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-13
  kidnapping for ransomidentification paradebenefit of doubtfalsus in omnibusdelayed statementcriminal appealanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Ghulam Rasool alias Gudda, handed down by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences including kidnapping for ransom and related charges. The core legal questions involved the reliability of a belated identification parade, the evidentiary value of uncorroborated ransom payment claims without call data records, the unexplained delay in recording statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the application of the rule of falsus in omnibus following the acquittal of co-accused. The Lahore High Court held that the identification parade lost its efficacy due to the absence of descriptive features in initial statements, the delayed police statements were unreliable without explanation, and material flaws in the prosecution's case created serious, reasonable doubts. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences, and ordered the immediate acquittal of the appellant based on the fundamental principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to its benefit as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an identification parade loses its evidentiary value when the complainant fails to describe the physical features of unknown accused persons in the initial police report or statement?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording the statements of prosecution witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render their testimony unreliable?
  • Can an accused be convicted solely on tainted eyewitness testimony when co-accused facing identical allegations have already been acquitted by the trial court?
  • Is a ransom payment claim credible in the absence of supporting bank records, call data records, or voice transcripts corroborating communication between the abductors and the witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Raheem vs University of Sindh through Vice-Chancellor and 22019 YLR 238 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qasim vs Government of Punjab etc2020 MLD 166, 2019 LHC 2992 · Lahore High Court · 2019-08-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qambar vs The State and 6 others2019 MLD 1766 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-28
  FIR registrationJustice of Peacecognizable offencespeaking ordercriminal procedurepolice dutySection 22-A CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application challenged an order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, which dismissed the applicant's request for the registration of an FIR regarding an alleged assault, characterizing the dispute as purely civil. The core legal question was whether the Justice of Peace erred in passing a non-speaking order and whether the Station House Officer (SHO) is mandated to register an FIR upon receiving information of a cognizable offence. The Court held that the impugned order was illegal, vague, and failed to provide valid reasons, violating the requirement for a speaking order. The Court reiterated that the Justice of Peace performs administrative functions and must dispose of applications through reasoned orders without conducting a mini-trial. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 154, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, imposes a mandatory duty on the SHO to record information of a cognizable offence, regardless of the existence of a parallel civil dispute. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the SHO to record the applicant's statement and proceed according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Station House Officer mandatorily required to register an FIR upon receiving information of a cognizable offence?
  • Does the existence of a civil dispute preclude the registration of an FIR for a cognizable offence?
  • Must an order passed by an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A/B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be a speaking and well-reasoned order?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadar others vs Patwari Halqa & others2019 CLC 1992, 2019 PHC 142 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-05-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs Syed Ahmed Shah and 6 others2019 MLD 1066 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-03Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi son of Suhailo Dall vs The state2019 SHC 486 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-09
  acquittal appealscope of interferencepresumption of innocencepublic sector appointmentdelay in FIRbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal is directed against the judgment of the trial court whereby private respondents were acquitted of the charges against them. The prosecution case was that the appellant paid a sum of rupees fifteen lac to the private respondents to secure a public sector appointment as a Sub-Registrar, and upon failure to secure the appointment and the subsequent dishonour of a guarantee cheque, the FIR was lodged after a delay of six months. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the trial court's acquittal order and the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that recruitment in the public sector must be on merit, that the transaction involving alleged bribery to secure public office was implausible, and that the FIR suffered from an unplausible delay. Reaffirming the principle that the scope of interference in an acquittal appeal is extremely narrow and the presumption of innocence is doubled, the court concluded that the trial court's judgment was neither perverse nor suffered from material misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in an appeal against an acquittal judgment?
  • Does an unplausible delay in lodging the FIR warrant the extension of the benefit of the doubt to the accused?
  • Can an appeal against acquittal succeed where the underlying transaction involves offering a bribe for a public sector appointment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Sheikh and another vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and another2019 IHC 24 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-02-14
  deputationrepatriationOffice Management Groupvested rightcivil servantstransfer and posting
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves a batch of writ petitions filed by civil servants and employees challenging a notification issued by the Establishment Division whereby they were repatriated to their parent departments from their deputation posts as Section Officers in the Federal Secretariat. The core legal questions pertained to whether deputationists have a vested right to complete their deputation tenure, remain on deputation indefinitely, or continue serving until they are considered for absorption or induction into the Office Management Group (OMG) against the reserved quota. Dismissing the petitions, the Islamabad High Court held that a deputationist has no vested right, legal basis, or enforceable claim to serve for a stipulated period or remain in the borrowing department indefinitely, and competent authorities possess the discretionary power to repatriate them at any time. The court laid down that prior to absorption or induction into the OMG, statutory criteria, including selection through the Federal Public Service Commission and consent from the parent department, must be strictly fulfilled, and completion of a three-year deputation does not bar immediate repatriation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a deputationist has a vested right to complete his full term of deputation in the borrowing department?
  • Can a civil servant on deputation challenge an order of repatriation before the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does serving for a minimum period of three years on deputation automatically entitle an officer to be considered for absorption or induction into the Office Management Group?
  • Whether the competent authority has the power to repatriate a deputationist to his parent department without assigning any reason?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi Shaikh vs Firdous Matri and 4 others2019 YLR 223 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs P.O Sindh & Other2019 SHC 498 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-10Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1284 · Lahore High Court
  murder referencebenefit of doubtocular evidenceindependent corroborationacquittalcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction and death sentence for murder, alongside an appeal against the acquittal of co-accused and a murder reference for sentence confirmation. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the acquittal of co-accused based on the same ocular evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the case, citing significant discrepancies in the ocular account, the lack of independent corroboration, and the failure to prove the alleged motive. The court emphasized that where eye-witnesses are disbelieved regarding some accused persons attributed with effective roles, their testimony cannot be relied upon against others without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the court noted that the medical evidence was inconsistent and failed to connect the appellant to the crime. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellant, dismissed the appeal against the acquittal of the co-accused, and declined to confirm the death sentence, reiterating the principle that any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses be relied upon against an accused if the same witnesses have been disbelieved regarding co-accused persons attributed with similar roles?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove motive and provide independent corroboration for ocular testimony entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Is a death sentence subject to confirmation by the High Court even if the underlying conviction is found to be based on doubtful evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs Muhammad Rafi2020 CLD 265, 2020 MLD 772, 2019 PLJ Lahore 629 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mujtaba vs Syed Hussam and 2 others2019 MLD 1994 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-30
  false informationSection 182 PPCmalicious prosecutionlocus standicriminal acquittal appealpublic servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged a trial court judgment that acquitted the respondent of charges under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which pertains to giving false information to a public servant. The appellant, who was a nominated accused in an FIR lodged by the respondent, sought to prosecute the respondent for providing false information to the police. The core legal question was whether a private individual, specifically a nominated accused in an FIR, has the standing to initiate or pursue proceedings under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or appeal an acquittal therein. The High Court held that Section 182 is designed to protect public servants from being misled into exercising their powers based on false information; therefore, only the aggrieved public servant has the authority to initiate such proceedings. The Court affirmed that a nominated accused in a false FIR has no standing to pursue a Section 182 complaint, as their proper remedy for such grievances lies in a suit for malicious prosecution, not in hijacking proceedings intended for the protection of public officials.

  Questions settled

  • Does a nominated accused in an FIR have the legal standing to initiate proceedings under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an order passed by a Magistrate on a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 considered a judicial order?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a person falsely nominated in an FIR if they wish to seek redress for humiliation or insult?
  • Can a private individual appeal an acquittal in a case initiated under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by a public servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Chief2019 CLC 1173 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-12Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad and others vs The State2019 YLR 2037 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-01
  criminal appealchance witnessbenefit of doubtcontradiction between medical and ocular evidencedelayed FIRmurderabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences of the appellants handed down by the trial court under sections 302(b), 364, and 506/2 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions revolved around the credibility of chance witnesses, delayed lodging of the First Information Report, inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, and the benefit of doubt in criminal prosecutions. The Sindh High Court evaluated the evidence and held that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the eye-witnesses were unconvincing chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was doubtful, the FIR was delayed and deliberated, and the medical evidence contradicted the ocular account regarding firing distances. The court laid down the key principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right, leading to the setting aside of the convictions and the immediate release of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses without a cogent explanation for their presence at the crime scene can be relied upon to sustain a conviction on a capital charge?
  • Does a delayed lodging of the First Information Report in the absence of a plausible explanation create room for consultation and deliberation?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when medical evidence directly contradicts the ocular account regarding the firing distance and absence of blackening?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mohy-ud Din vs The State etc2020 MLD 502, 2019 LHC 3525 · Lahore High Court · 2019-10-16
  qatl-e-amdextra-judicial confessioncircumstantial evidencecriminal appealforensic evidenceacquittalcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal against a conviction for qatl-e-amd and a criminal revision seeking sentence enhancement. The appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, based primarily on circumstantial evidence, including an alleged extra-judicial confession and the recovery of a weapon. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt given the nature of the evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court found the extra-judicial confession unreliable, noting it was made to relatives of the deceased rather than neutral parties, and lacked corroboration. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon was deemed inconsequential due to the significant delay in forensic analysis, rendering the blood evidence scientifically invalid. The court reiterated that extra-judicial confession is the weakest form of evidence and requires strong, independent corroboration. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and the revision petition for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for a capital charge be sustained solely on the basis of an extra-judicial confession?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon after a significant delay, where blood has disintegrated, provide valid corroborative evidence?
  • Can a prosecution witness who testifies to an extra-judicial confession also serve as the sole recovery witness to corroborate their own testimony?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession made to relatives of the deceased, rather than neutral parties, considered reliable?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hyder and others vs Chuttal Khan and others2019 MLD 1840 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-22
  Illegal Dispossession Act 2005interim reliefrestoration of possessionmutationburden of prooflawful possessioncriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal revision applications filed against orders of the Additional Sessions Judge, which dismissed the applicants' requests for interim relief under Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The applicants claimed they were forcibly dispossessed from landed property and sought restoration of possession pending trial. The core legal question was whether the applicants had established a prima facie case of lawful ownership or occupation to justify interim relief. The High Court held that the applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence of their prior possession or valid title. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that mutations are not documents of title and do not, by themselves, confer ownership; the burden of proving the validity of such transfers rests on the claimant. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the trial court's decision to dismiss the applications for interim relief, as the applicants failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for such intervention. The revision applications were dismissed, affirming that interim relief under the Act requires clear prima facie proof of dispossession from lawful possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records by itself confer title or ownership of property?
  • What must a complainant prima facie establish to obtain interim relief under Section 7 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie when claiming title through a mutation?
  • Can a court grant interim restoration of possession under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 without evidence of the complainant's prior lawful possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs The State, etc2020 PLD Supreme Court 61, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 1, 2019 PSC CRI 969, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-10-30
  terrorismanti-terrorism actmens reanexus principlepersonal enmityprivate vendettajurisdictionheinous offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to resolve a long-standing controversy surrounding the interpretation, scope, and import of the term 'terrorism' as defined under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether ordinary heinous crimes committed out of personal enmity or private vendetta—despite causing shock, horror, or fear—fall within the ambit of terrorism based on their consequential effects, or whether a specific mens rea, design, or purpose to destabilize society or overawe the government is required. Reviewing legislative history, international standards, and divergent case-law, the Court held that an action constitutes terrorism only if it satisfies the actus reus under subsection (2) of section 6 and is accompanied by the specific design or purpose outlined in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1). The ratio laid down is that mere gravity, brutality, or the consequential generation of fear from an offense is insufficient to categorize it as terrorism if the true motivation is a private grievance or personal enmity. Consequently, ordinary crimes cannot be dragged into the fold of terrorism.

  Questions settled

  • Does the commission of a grave or gruesome crime inherently constitute an act of terrorism under section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Is the determination of terrorism dependent on the consequential fear generated by an offense or on the underlying design and motivation of the perpetrator?
  • Are offences committed out of personal enmity or private vendetta triable as acts of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • How must subsections (1), (2), and (3) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be construed together in determining the offense of terrorism?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Muhammad Ali and another2021 [M] C L R 858, 2019 LHC 4344 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-26Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs D.G. NAB and others2019 CLC 1621 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain alias Bau alias Chuhi vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1043 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-04
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesfurther inquiryweight of contrabandcriminal recordbail entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, who was charged under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 1120 grams of charas. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the ambiguity regarding the net weight of the recovered narcotic and his prior criminal record. The Court observed that the prosecution failed to clarify whether the weight of the contraband included the packaging material, creating a possibility that the offence might fall under Section 9(b) rather than Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court held that the case required further inquiry. Furthermore, the Court rejected the prosecution's argument that the accused's involvement in other criminal cases disentitled him to bail, affirming the principle that mere involvement in other cases, without a conviction, does not preclude the grant of bail. Finding that the investigation was complete and trial conclusion was uncertain, the Court accepted the bail application.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere involvement of an accused in other criminal cases, without a conviction, disentitle them to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  • Does ambiguity regarding whether the weight of a recovered narcotic includes its packaging material constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the investigation is complete and the trial is not likely to conclude in the foreseeable future?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hurr and 2 others vs District Collector Bhakkar, etc2020 PLJ Lahore 137, 2019 LHC 4169 · Lahore High Court · 2019-12-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider Jamali and others vs Chairman, National2019 MLD 884 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-11Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Habib vs The State2019 KLR Criminal Cases 269 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-05-29
  criminal appealmurderinjured witnessjudicial confessionweapon recoverymedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal jail appeal arises from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Pishin, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his son and under Section 337-F(i) for injuring his wife, sentencing him to life imprisonment and imprisonment respectively, with compensation. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, including a judicial confession and weapon recovery. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case, emphasizing the high evidentiary value of an injured eye-witness who is the wife of the appellant and mother of the deceased, corroborated by medical evidence, a voluntary confessional statement, and recovery of the crime weapon. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary weight of an injured witness in a criminal trial?
  • What are the essential requirements for accepting a judicial confession under criminal law?
  • Does the sole testimony of an injured witness corroborated by medical evidence suffice to maintain a conviction?
  • What is the legal effect of abscondence of an accused immediately after the commission of an offense?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fareed vs Muslim commercial Bank, Ltd2019 CLD 437, 2019 PCRLJ 498, 2019 LHC 1422 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-12
  financial institutions recoveryexecution of decreeautomatic conversion of suit to executionbanking courtlimitation for executiondismissal for non-prosecution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 assails the order of the Banking Court dismissing the appellant's objection petition against the execution of a recovery decree. The core legal questions involved whether a separate execution petition is required under the special banking law, whether the execution proceedings could be dismissed for non-prosecution, and whether the subsequent application was barred by limitation. The Lahore High Court held that under section 19(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, a suit upon pronouncement of judgment and decree automatically stands converted into execution proceedings without needing a separate application or fresh notice to the judgment-debtor, and such proceedings must be taken to their logical end without being subject to dismissal for non-prosecution. The court laid down the principle that the statutory mechanism under the special law supersedes ordinary procedural hurdles, rendering execution continuous and activation requests immune to standard default dismissals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit automatically stand converted into execution proceedings upon the pronouncement of a judgment and decree by a Banking Court without requiring a separate execution application?
  • Can execution proceedings initiated under section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 be dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Is a fresh notice required to be issued to the judgment-debtor upon the conversion of a banking suit into execution proceedings?
  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing subsequent applications for execution under the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fareed and 8 others vs Competition Commission of Pakistan2019 CLD 279 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2018-09-12Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali vs Abu Bakar2019 MLD 1163 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-28
  illegal dispossessionburden of proofbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencecriminal appealencroachmentacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, which convicted the appellant under Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, for allegedly encroaching upon the complainant's land. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the appellant's illegal possession of the disputed property to sustain a conviction, particularly when the trial court acquitted co-accused on the same evidence and the complainant failed to examine the authors of the revenue reports relied upon. The Sindh High Court held that the conviction could not be sustained. The court reasoned that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of illegal possession or unauthorized entry as required by the Act. Furthermore, the court emphasized that evidence cannot be selectively believed to convict one accused while acquitting others on the same set of facts without independent corroboration. The court reaffirmed the principle that the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and cannot be shifted to the accused, and that any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 be sustained if the complainant fails to prove the essential elements of illegal possession or unauthorized entry?
  • Is it legally permissible to convict one accused while acquitting co-accused on the same set of evidence without independent corroboration?
  • Does the filing of a counter-FIR by an accused regarding a different incident constitute proof of guilt for the charges brought against them in a separate complaint?
  • Can reports from revenue officials or police be relied upon as evidence in a criminal trial without the examination of their authors?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali and 3 others vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary2019 YLR 2593 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-16Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 1048 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-05
  cross-examinationright to fair trialnarcotics controlforfeiture of rightcriminal proceduredefense counsel duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal matter concerns a challenge to an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karor, which forfeited the appellant's right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in a case involving the possession of contraband under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted correctly in closing the right of cross-examination due to the repeated non-availability of the defense counsel. The High Court held that while the right to cross-examine is a fundamental component of a fair trial, it is not absolute and cannot be held in abeyance at the accused's convenience. The court affirmed that an accused must avail of opportunities provided for defense and that counsel has a statutory duty to be present. However, considering the nature of the charge and the potential severity of the consequences, the court exercised its discretion to grant the appellant one final, solitary opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The principle laid down is that while the right to cross-examination is vital, it is subject to the diligent conduct of the defense and the court's authority to manage proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court forfeit the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses due to the repeated absence of defense counsel?
  • Is the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses an absolute right that cannot be curtailed by the trial court?
  • Does a fair trial require that an accused be given unlimited opportunities to cross-examine witnesses?
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• Ghulam Abbas vs Atif Farooq2019 YLR 2464 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-22Read full judgment →
• Ghufran Shah vs Farid Khan ASI & others2019 PCRLJ 1346, 2019 PLJ Peshawar 164, 2019 PHC 114 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-03-11
  double jeopardyquashment of FIRmines accidentconstitutional petitionautre fois acquitcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed before the Peshawar High Court seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 322 and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a mine sliding incident that resulted in two deaths and property damage. The core legal question was whether the registration of the FIR under the Pakistan Penal Code, when the incident was also punishable under sections 38 and 40 of the Mines Act, 1923, violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution and section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the constitutional guarantee and statutory bar against double jeopardy only apply where there has been a prior trial ending in a conviction or acquittal. Since the case was merely at the investigation stage and no trial or prosecution had yet commenced, the plea of double jeopardy was premature and unfounded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of an FIR during the investigation stage constitute double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • What are the essential conditions for the applicability of the rule against double jeopardy and re-trial under Article 13 of the Constitution?
  • Can a person invoke the protection of section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 before a trial has commenced or concluded with a conviction or acquittal?
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• Ghouns Bukhsh and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 40 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-24
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtextra-judicial confessionmurderabductiondelayed FIRunidentified dead bodycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder following an alleged abduction, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment, alongside a criminal revision petition seeking the enhancement of the sentence to death. The core legal question revolves around whether a conviction for murder can be sustained entirely on circumstantial evidence when multiple crucial links—including timely reporting, eyewitness credibility, motive, extrajudicial confessions, body identification, and corroborative recoveries—are missing or unproven. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a continuous and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to the crime, rendering the case against the appellant highly doubtful. The court laid down the principle that in cases resting exclusively on circumstantial evidence, every circumstance must be conclusively linked to form an uninterrupted chain from the crime to the accused, and any missing link or significant doubt entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, leading to the acquittal of the appellant and the dismissal of the sentence enhancement petition.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession when it is joint and lacks specific details of the crime?
  • Does the failure to establish the identity and cause of death of a decomposed body weaken the prosecution's circumstantial case?
  • Can an accused be convicted on circumstantial evidence if there are missing links in the chain of events?
  • What is the effect of a delayed FIR without satisfactory explanation in a criminal trial?
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