Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Dewan Khalid Textile Mills Ltd vs Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal2019 PLJ SC 301, 2019 SCMR 158, 2019 PTD 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-07
  definite informationreopening of assessmentIncome Tax Ordinance 1979change of opiniontax assessmentstatutory interpretationappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the validity of reopening a tax assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the Income Tax Officer possessed "definite information" to justify reopening an assessment that had been previously finalized. The appellant argued that the reopening was based merely on a change of opinion by the tax authorities, which is legally insufficient. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in relying on a subsequent judicial precedent as "definite information," because that judgment did not exist when the reopening proceedings were initiated. The Court reaffirmed that "definite information" requires the discovery of new facts or the existence of a binding superior court judgment at the relevant time. A mere change of opinion by tax authorities regarding the interpretation of statutory provisions does not satisfy the threshold for reopening an assessment. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Appellate Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that reopening powers cannot be exercised based on retrospective judicial interpretations or internal departmental shifts in opinion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mere change of opinion by an Income Tax Officer regarding the interpretation of a statute constitute "definite information" to reopen an assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Does a judgment of a Superior Court rendered after the initiation of reopening proceedings constitute "definite information" for the purposes of Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Is the reopening of an assessment under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 permissible in the absence of new facts or binding judicial precedent available at the time of the initiation of proceedings?
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• Devi Lal vs State of Rajasthan2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 164 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-01-08
  circumstantial evidencecriminal conspiracyextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtburden of proofmurder convictionchain of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for murder and conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Supreme Court held that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution, including alleged extra-judicial confessions and recoveries, was incomplete and incoherent. The Court emphasized that in criminal trials, suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute for legal proof. The prosecution failed to elevate its case from the realm of "may be true" to the plane of "must be true." Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions, granting the appellants the benefit of doubt. The judgment reaffirms the established principle that for a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, and form a complete chain excluding every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Where two views are possible, the view favoring the accused must be adopted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of events is incomplete?
  • Does suspicion, however grave, constitute sufficient proof for a criminal conviction?
  • When two views are possible regarding circumstantial evidence, which view must the court adopt?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession sufficient for conviction without corroborative evidence?
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• Devani vs Wells2019 SCMR 711 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2019-02-13Read full judgment →
• Deutsche Bank Ag vs Fateh Textile Mills Limited2019 CLD 285 · Sindh High Court · 2016-07-26Read full judgment →
• Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle C-4, Karachi vs (M/s) National2019 PCTLR 461 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Income taxGovernment securitiesInterest incomeAccrual basisReceipt basisMethod of accountingFinancial institutionsIncome Tax Ordinance 1979Hybrid accounting system
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, for assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, concerning the method of accounting for interest earned by financial institutions on Government securities. The core legal question is whether such interest should be taxed on an accrual basis, as contended by the Department, or on a receipt basis, as argued by the assessee-bank. The Department asserts that financial institutions, employing the mercantile (accrual) system, must compute income under Section 32(1) read with Section 17 of the Ordinance on an accrual basis. The assessee, however, maintains that it uses a 'hybrid' system, applying the accrual method generally but the receipt method for interest from Government securities, a practice previously accepted by the Department. The High Court ruled in favour of the assessee-bank, holding that the interest was taxable on a receipt basis. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the conformity of this decision with the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance. The judgment excerpt sets out the arguments but does not contain the Supreme Court's final decision or ratio.

  Questions settled

  • Is interest earned by financial institutions on Government securities liable to be taxed on an accrual basis or a receipt basis under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Does Section 32(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 mandate the use of the accrual method for interest on securities under Section 17 for financial institutions?
  • Is a 'hybrid' method of accounting, where general income is on an accrual basis but interest from Government securities is on a receipt basis, permissible under the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
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• Deputy Commissioner Multan, etc vs Naheed Akhtar, etc2019 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 50 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2018-11-01
  labour lawworkman definitionteaching professiongrievance petitionregularization of servicesindustrial establishmenteducational institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the judgment of the Punjab Labour Court No. 09, Multan, which had accepted the grievance petitions of several school teachers seeking regularization of their services. The core legal question was whether school teachers fall within the definition of 'worker' or 'workman' under the relevant labour laws, thereby entitling them to seek relief from a Labour Court. The appellant contended that teachers do not perform manual or clerical work and are excluded from the ambit of labour legislation. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that teaching is an intellectual and sacred profession involving the imparting of knowledge, which cannot be classified as manual or clerical work under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that educational institutions are excluded from the application of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the trial court's judgment, ruling that teachers are not 'workmen' and therefore lack the status to maintain grievance petitions before a Labour Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the profession of a teacher fall within the definition of 'worker' or 'workman' under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  • Are educational institutions excluded from the application of the Punjab Industrial Relations Act 2010?
  • Can a teacher maintain a grievance petition before a Labour Court for the regularization of services?
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• Deputy Collector of Customs, Karachi vs Messrs Muneeb Steel, Lahore2019 PTD (Trib.) 165 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-06-10Read full judgment →
• Depilex Smileagain Foundation vs Security and Exchange Commission2019 CLD 861, 2020 PCTLR 109, 2019 LHC 1090 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-18Read full judgment →
• Faizan Ali vs The StatePLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-29
  narcotics recoverychain of custodybenefit of doubtcriminal appealtampering of evidencesafe custodyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, concerning the recovery of ten kilograms of charas from a motorcar. The appellant challenged his conviction, which had been modified by the High Court from section 9(c) to 9(b) of the Act. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the integrity of the recovered narcotics and the chain of custody. Upon reappraising the evidence, the Supreme Court found significant discrepancies: the number of slabs found in the packets at trial contradicted the initial recovery report, the required seals were missing from the case property, and the prosecution failed to produce witnesses to confirm the safe custody or the non-tampering of the substance during transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The Court reaffirmed the principle that any material doubt regarding the integrity of recovered case property must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the recovered substance and the property produced at trial regarding the number of slabs create reasonable doubt?
  • Is the failure to produce witnesses confirming the safe custody of narcotics at the police station fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does the absence of required seals on recovered parcels warrant the acquittal of an accused in a narcotics case?
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• Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad vs Multi-National Venture2019 CLD 566 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-12-03Read full judgment →
• Deepu alias Deepak vs State of Madhya Pradesh2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 159 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-12-14
  dischargesupplementary chargesheetsummoning of accusedtest identification paradecriminal revisionframing of charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which confirmed the Trial Court's order framing charges against the appellant under Sections 394, 460, 302, and 397 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, and Sections 25(1B)(a) and 27 of the Arms Act 1959. Initially, the appellant had been discharged by the Trial Court. However, the prosecution subsequently filed an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon the appellant based on a supplementary chargesheet containing critical evidence, including a Test Identification Parade and weapon recovery, which had been overlooked during the initial discharge. The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal, holding that where an earlier discharge order was passed without considering an existing supplementary chargesheet, there is no legal bar to summoning and proceeding against the discharged person under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, provided there is sufficient prima facie material on record to justify the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who was previously discharged can be summoned under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the initial discharge order overlooked an existing supplementary chargesheet?
  • What is the evidentiary standard required for a trial court to proceed against a discharged person under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the existence of an overlooked supplementary chargesheet containing identification and recovery evidence justify summoning an accused post-discharge?
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• Deedar Ali and others vs The State2019 YLR 2902 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-30
  extortionanti-terrorismsentence reductionmitigating circumstancescriminal appealillegal arms possessionfirst offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants by an Anti-Terrorism Court for offences related to extortion and illegal possession of firearms. The appellants were convicted under Section 7(1)(h) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, read with Sections 384, 386, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013. Upon appeal, the appellants’ counsel did not challenge the convictions on merits but sought a reduction in sentences, citing mitigating factors such as the appellants being first-time offenders, sole breadwinners, and having family responsibilities. The Sindh High Court, upon reviewing the prosecution evidence, found the convictions to be well-founded and supported by independent testimony. However, acknowledging the mitigating circumstances presented, the Court exercised its discretion to reduce the sentences while maintaining the convictions and fines. The judgment affirms the principle that while appellate courts may maintain convictions based on sufficient evidence, they may exercise leniency in sentencing when compelling mitigating factors are demonstrated by first-time offenders.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence based on mitigating circumstances when the conviction itself is not challenged on merits?
  • Does the failure to challenge a conviction on merits preclude an appellate court from reviewing the sufficiency of prosecution evidence?
  • Are first-time offenders entitled to leniency in sentencing for offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
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• Dcit, Cent. Cir. 8(4), Mumbai vs Sitara Builders (Pvt.) Ltd2019 PCTLR 1007 · Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · 2019-05-31Read full judgment →
• Dawood Khan and another vs Sultan Muhammad2020 [M] C L R 238, 2020 PLJ Quetta 10, 2019 PLD Balochistan 113 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-05-27Read full judgment →
• Dawlance Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited through Deputy Manager and another2019 CLD 920 · Sindh High Court · 2019-04-05Read full judgment →
• David Walsh vs Minister for Justice and Equality and another2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 564 · Supreme Court of Ireland · 2019-02-25Read full judgment →
• Darnley vs Croydon Health Services NHS Trust2019 SCMR 143 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2018-10-10Read full judgment →
• Dan Gunnar Bjarne Anderson vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior & 3 others2019 IHC 106 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-04-22Read full judgment →
• Dan Gunna R Bajrne Anderson vs Federation of Pakistan through2020 KLR Criminal Cases 53, 2019 PLD Islamabad 566 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-07-09Read full judgment →
• Daily Khabrain and others vs Iqbal Mustafa and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 541 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-08-19
  Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper EmployeesWage Board Awardrecovery of wageslimitation periodex-employeesnewspaper employeesindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves intra-court appeals and a writ petition arising from orders passed by the Chairman, Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, and a learned Judge-in-Chambers regarding the recovery of wages and arrears by employees and ex-employees of various newspaper establishments under the 7th Wage Board Award. The core legal questions addressed are whether an ex-employee can invoke the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal to recover wages, and whether the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to proceedings before the Tribunal. The Islamabad High Court held that ex-employees remain eligible to file applications for the recovery of wages for the period they were employed, as the statutory definition of newspaper employee is inclusionary. Furthermore, the Court held that since the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 and its rules prescribe no period of limitation, the Limitation Act, 1908 applies as a procedural law, specifically attracting Article 181 of the First Schedule, providing a three-year limitation period from the date the cause of action accrues, with recurring defaults giving rise to fresh limitation periods. Claims filed beyond three years were thus set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ex-employee of a newspaper establishment invoke the jurisdiction of the Implementation Tribunal to recover wages and arrears for the period of their employment?
  • Is the Limitation Act, 1908 applicable to proceedings before the Implementation Tribunal established under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
  • What article of the Limitation Act, 1908 applies to applications filed before the Implementation Tribunal for the recovery of wages?
  • Does the Implementation Tribunal possess the power to review its own orders under the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973?
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• Dad Raheem and 07 others vs Fed. of Pakistan and Others2019 SHC 378 · Sindh High Court · 2019-09-18
  maintainabilityconstitutional petitionwrit of mandamusservice disputeprivate cooperative societymaster and servantdisputed questions of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition filed by Dad Raheem and others challenging the termination of their services by the Administration Department of the Fishermen's Cooperative Society. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against a private cooperative society regarding a service dispute. The Sindh High Court held that the Fishermen's Cooperative Society is a private corporate body not performing public duties, and its internal service matters do not involve any public law element or violation of a mandatory statutory provision. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition in limine on the ground of maintainability, holding that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private entity and that disputed questions of fact relating to private employment cannot be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that service disputes involving private cooperative societies and their employees are internal matters of a private character outside the scope of the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against a private cooperative society regarding the termination of employment?
  • Does a writ of mandamus lie against a private corporate body that performs no public duties?
  • Can disputed questions of fact in a private service matter be adjudicated by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction without recording evidence?
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• Dad Muhammad vs The StatePLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 110, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 183, 2020 PSC (Crl.) 475, 2020 SCMR 128, 2019 SCP 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-11-06
  murdercircumstantial evidencerecovery of dead bodyconfessional statementcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition, converted into an appeal, arises from the conviction of the petitioner, Dad Muhammad, for the murder of his daughter under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a life imprisonment sentence upheld by the High Court of Balochistan. The core legal question was whether the circumstantial evidence, specifically motive and a disclosure leading to the recovery of the dead body, was sufficient to sustain the capital conviction. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to connect the petitioner to the crime, noting that the evidence of discovery was flawed, police statements regarding disclosure were inadmissible under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order 1984, and the volume and standard of evidence were insufficient. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgment, acquitted the appellant, and ordered his immediate release, laying down the principle that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained on weak, legally inadmissible, and inconclusive circumstantial evidence without risking grave judicial error.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal conviction can be sustained solely on weak circumstantial evidence and flawed recovery proof?
  • Is a police officer's testimony regarding a disclosure statement made in custody barred under Article 38 of the Qanun-e-Shahdat Order 1984?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to establish a definitive link between the accused and the crime warrant an acquittal?
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• Daan Khan (deceased) through legal heirs vs Assistant Collector2019 CLC 483, 2019 PLJ Lahore 185, 2019 LHC 67 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-23
  constitutional petitiondoctrine of electiondismissal for defaultrestoration of petitionres judicatalachesallotment cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal arises from the dismissal of a second constitutional petition challenging the cancellation of land allotment originally made in 1956. The core legal question revolves around whether a suitor, having initially elected to seek restoration of a constitutional petition dismissed for non-prosecution, can subsequently file a fresh constitutional petition for the same relief. The Lahore High Court held that under the doctrine of election, once a party chooses one of two co-existent remedies, they are prohibited from subsequently launching another proceeding or resorting to the alternative remedy. Consequently, the second constitutional petition was incompetent. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of election, founded on waiver, abandonment, and estoppel, bars a litigant from pursuing an alternative procedural remedy after an initial election has been made and prosecuted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second constitutional petition is maintainable after the first constitutional petition has been dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does the doctrine of election bar a litigant from filing a fresh constitutional petition after having already applied for the restoration of an earlier dismissed petition?
  • What remedies are available to a suitor under Order IX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a suit or petition is dismissed for non-prosecution?
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• D. Sridevi vs The State of Tamil Nadu and another2019 KLR Labour & Services Cases 293 · Madras High Court · 2019-07-09Read full judgment →
• Custom Public School Thr. Akbar Ahmed Khan vs Aftab Ahmed and others2019 CLC 1774, 2019 SHC 144 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Cosmic Resources (Private) Limited vs Government of Pakistan & Others2021 PLD Sindh 113, 2019 SHC 461 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-05Read full judgment →
• Control Risk (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Additional Registrar Companies Registration2019 SCP 126 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-31
  winding up of companyCompanies Ordinance 1984Memorandum of Associationultra viresstatutory interpretationRegistrar of Companiescorporate governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment ordering the winding up of the petitioner-company for engaging in activities beyond its Memorandum of Association (MOA). The core legal questions were whether the Registrar's power to petition for winding up under Section 309(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, is subject to the investigation requirements of Section 309(c), and whether the company's security-related activities were ultra vires its MOA. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the winding-up order. The Court held that Section 309(b) and Section 309(c) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, are distinct and independent provisions; therefore, the investigation requirement under Section 309(c) is not a condition precedent for the Registrar to file a winding-up petition under Section 309(b). Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the company's engagement in security-related services, such as tracking and intelligence gathering, clearly exceeded the scope of its authorized business activities. The Court also confirmed that the statutory requirement to provide the company an opportunity of being heard was duly satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Is the investigation requirement under Section 309(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 a condition precedent for the Registrar to file a winding-up petition under Section 309(b)?
  • Does the definition of 'registrar' under Section 2(1)(31) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 include an Additional Registrar?
  • Can a company be wound up for engaging in activities beyond the scope of its Memorandum of Association?
  • What constitutes a sufficient 'opportunity of being heard' under the proviso to Section 309(b) of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
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• Control Risk (Pvt.) Ltd vs Additional Registrar Companies2019 CLD 294, 2019 PLJ SC 366, 2019 P.S.C 731, 2019 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-31
  winding upCompanies Ordinance 1984Memorandum of AssociationRegistrar of Companiesultra viresstatutory interpretationcorporate law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a winding-up order against a company engaged in activities allegedly outside its Memorandum of Association. The core legal question was whether the Registrar of Companies must conduct an investigation under Section 309(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 before seeking sanction to file a winding-up petition under Section 309(b). The Supreme Court held that Section 309(b) and Section 309(c) are distinct, independent provisions. The Registrar is not required to satisfy the investigative conditions of Section 309(c) when acting under Section 309(b), provided the company is granted an opportunity for representation and hearing. The Court further affirmed that the company’s engagement in security services, including intelligence gathering and monitoring, clearly exceeded the scope of its authorized business objects. Consequently, the Court upheld the winding-up order, finding no legal or factual infirmity in the proceedings. The judgment establishes that the procedural requirements for winding up by the Registrar are separate from those governing the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, ensuring the Registrar’s statutory powers remain unencumbered by the Commission's specific investigative prerequisites.

  Questions settled

  • Is an investigation under Section 309(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 a condition precedent for the Registrar to file a winding-up petition under Section 309(b)?
  • Are the powers of the Registrar under Section 309(b) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under Section 309(c) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 co-dependent?
  • Does the definition of 'registrar' under Section 2(1)(31) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 include an Additional Registrar?
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• Container Corporation of India Ltd. and another vs (M/s.) Kandla Cargo2019 PCTLR 749 · Bombay High CourtRead full judgment →
• Complaint of Shagufta for Removal of Unauthorized encroachment vs N/A2019 KLR Supreme Court 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-20
  Zulfiqarabad Oil TerminalOil Tankers AssociationUnauthorized encroachmentKarachi Metropolitan CorporationSupreme Court order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter relates to a complaint concerning unauthorized encroachments and the operational readiness of the Zulfiqarabad Oil Terminal (ZOT). The core legal question addressed is whether the Oil Tankers Association should be directed to shift operations to the Zulfiqarabad Oil Terminal based on a consensual site visit report submitted by a court-constituted committee. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the terminal possesses sufficient developed facilities to commence operations, notwithstanding certain pending minor works. The Court directed the Oil Tankers Association to shift to the new terminal within four days, ordered the Board of Revenue to hand over specific land to the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) for parking purposes within three days, and mandated that concerned authorities complete remaining minor works on a fast-track basis.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Oil Tankers Association can be directed to shift to the Zulfiqarabad Oil Terminal based on a consensual site inspection report?
  • Can the Board of Revenue be directed to hand over land to the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation for oil tanker parking?
  • How are uncooperative elements refusing to park inside the Zulfiqarabad Oil Terminal to be dealt with?
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• Communication Components vs ACE Technologies Corp. and others2019 PCTLR 787 · Delhi High Court · 2019-07-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner, Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Large Tax-payer Unit, Lahore and another vs Berger Paints Pakistan Ltd., Lahore & others2019 PCTLR 687 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Poonch vs Mushtaq Sadiq & Others2019 SC AJK 42 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Super Fine Industry2019 PCTLR 1038 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Ibd vs Messrs Hi-Tech Plastic2019 PTD 878 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-11-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Machine Crafts Pvt. Limited, Lahore2020 PTD 788, 2019 PCTLR 699 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-16Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax vs Grays Leasing Ltd., Lahore2019 PCRLJ 655, PTCL 2020 CL. 358, 2020 PTD 153, 2019 LHC 1460 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-17
  Lease Key MoneyIncome TaxDouble TaxationSecurity DepositLeasing CompanyRevenue ReceiptResidual Value
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application addressed whether "Lease Key Money" (LKM) received by a leasing company is taxable as a revenue receipt under Section 12(19) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The Commissioner of Income Tax argued that LKM should be taxed upon receipt. The Court held that LKM is not taxable as a revenue receipt. The ratio of the decision is that LKM functions as a security deposit or residual value for the leased asset. Taxing it upon receipt would result in double taxation, as the amount is already offered for tax as sale proceeds upon the maturity of the lease. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to tax payments attributable to leasing, not security deposits that are adjustable against the sale of assets at the end of the lease period. Consequently, the Court answered the proposed question in the negative, ruling against the applicant-department and affirming that LKM is not taxable under the cited provision.

  Questions settled

  • Is Lease Key Money taxable as a revenue receipt under Section 12(19) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Does the taxation of Lease Key Money upon receipt, in addition to its treatment as sale proceeds upon lease maturity, constitute double taxation?
  • Are security deposits adjustable against the sale of assets at the end of a lease period considered taxable revenue receipts under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax vs (M/s.) Punjab Poultry Feed (Pvt.) Ltd.2020 PTD 224, 2019 PCTLR 662 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-15Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax Peshawar vs Director General, NWFPPTCL 2019 CL. 102, 2019 PTD 928, 2019 SCMR 439 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-09
  income taxstatutory contributionsfiscal exemptionretrospective effecttaxable incomeemployees' social security institution
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Department challenged a High Court judgment favoring a statutory body, the Employees' Social Security Institution, regarding its tax liability. The core legal questions were whether mandatory contributions received by the respondent under the (KPK) Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 constituted 'income' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and whether such receipts qualified for tax exemption under the 1979 Ordinance or retrospectively under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the contributions constituted 'income' given the term's widest possible legal connotation. The Court further held that because the contributions were mandatory and statutory, they did not qualify as 'voluntary contributions' required for exemption under Clause 62 of the 1979 Ordinance. Additionally, the Court ruled that fiscal exemptions cannot be applied retrospectively across different statutes, specifically rejecting the application of the 2001 Ordinance's provisions to assessment years governed by the 1979 Ordinance. The appeal was allowed, confirming the taxability of the receipts while permitting the respondent to seek relief from the Federal Government.

  Questions settled

  • Do mandatory contributions received by a statutory body under the (KPK) Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 constitute 'income' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Are statutory contributions considered 'voluntary contributions' for the purpose of tax exemption under Clause 62, Part I, Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can an exemption provision introduced in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be applied retrospectively to assessment years governed by the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, FaisalabadPTCL 2019 CL. 97, 2019 PTD 298 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-16
  input tax adjustmentsales taxblacklisted suppliersbanking channel paymentscredit transactionstax invoicereference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application was filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had allowed the respondent assessee's claim for input tax adjustment. The core legal questions concerned whether input tax adjustment is permissible against invoices issued by suppliers who were subsequently blacklisted, and whether an assessee is disentitled to input tax adjustment if payments are made through banking channels but exceed the 180-day period stipulated for credit transactions under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Court held that input tax adjustment cannot be denied for invoices issued by suppliers who were not blacklisted at the time of the transaction, provided there is no nexus between the invoices and the subsequent blacklisting. Furthermore, the Court held that where payments are made via banking channels as prescribed, the mere delay beyond 180 days in a credit transaction does not disentitle the assessee to input tax adjustment; such a delay may at most attract a penalty under the Act, but does not invalidate the adjustment itself. The reference application was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can input tax adjustment be denied for invoices issued by suppliers who were not blacklisted at the time of the transaction?
  • Does a delay in payment beyond 180 days for a credit transaction automatically disentitle an assessee from claiming input tax adjustment under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is an assessee liable to lose input tax adjustment rights if payment is made through banking channels but exceeds the 180-day period?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, R.T.O., Lahore vs Messrs2019 PCTLR 1347, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1825 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Peshawar vs Messrs PakistanPTCL 2019 CL. 697, 2019 PTD 1219 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, L.T.U., Karachi vs Messrs2019 PTD 447 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Islamabad vs Messrs Wise2020 P C T L R 974, 2019 PTD 2313 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-07
  sales tax referencefederal excise dutyapportionment of input taxexcisable servicestelecommunication servicesretrospective operationvested rightsprocedural amendment
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Islamabad High Court addresses a set of Sales Tax References (including S.T.R. No. 06 of 2012) concerning the applicability of the concept of apportionment of input tax under the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, and section 7 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005, to telecommunication services for tax periods in the year 2005. The core legal question was whether taxpayers providing excisable services were obliged to apportion excisable from non-excisable services when claiming input tax adjustments during a period when specific statutory provisions and rules regarding apportionment and recovery in the sales tax mode were not yet enacted. The Court held that statutory provisions and rules introducing apportionment and recovery mechanisms cannot be applied retrospectively to impair or affect vested rights of assessees regarding refunds already claimed for 2005. The ratio laid down is that even procedural amendments or subordinate legislation, such as notifications and rules governing tax apportionment and recovery modes, operate prospectively if their retrospective application adversely affects accrued substantive rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concept of apportionment of input tax under the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 is applicable to Federal Excise Duty on services for tax periods prior to their enactment?
  • Do procedural amendments or notifications that affect substantive rights of taxpayers operate retrospectively or prospectively?
  • Were telecommunication service providers legally obligated to apportion excisable services from non-excisable services while claiming input tax refunds for the year 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Large Taxpayer Unit-II, KarachiPTCL 2020 CL. 40, 2019 PTD 1342, 2019 SCMR 875 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-05
  Value Addition Taxmanufacturer definitionsales tax exemptionin-house consumptiontoll blending agreementproprietary rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court judgment regarding the liability of the respondent company to pay Value Addition Tax (VAT) on imported raw materials. The petitioner argued that the respondent, lacking its own manufacturing facility, did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and thus could not claim the VAT exemption provided by Rule 58B of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 for goods imported for 'in-house consumption'. The Supreme Court examined the definition of 'manufacturer' in Section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which includes entities that own proprietary rights to goods being manufactured on their behalf. The Court held that since the respondent owned the raw materials, controlled the specifications, and held the brand rights for the final product, it satisfied the statutory definition of a 'manufacturer'. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the respondent was entitled to the exemption, as the goods were used for its own business purposes. The petition was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a company that outsources the physical blending of raw materials to a third party qualify as a 'manufacturer' under the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Can an entity claim the status of a 'manufacturer' for VAT exemption purposes if it does not possess its own manufacturing facility?
  • Does the ownership of proprietary rights and brand names in a toll blending arrangement satisfy the criteria for 'in-house consumption' under the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules 2007?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Faisalabad vs Messrs Magna2019 PCRLJ 609, 2019 PTD 594 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-04
  sales taxrevisional jurisdictiondelegation of powerssuo motuAppellate Tribunalreference applicationdelegatus non potest delegare
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application filed by the department impugned the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had accepted the taxpayer's appeal against the Commissioner Inland Revenue's order. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner, after reopening a case under Section 45A(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, is competent to delegate or refer the matter for fresh adjudication to a subordinate officer. The Lahore High Court held that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the Commissioner under Section 45A(4) is exclusive and must be exercised personally, as the statute contains no provision empowering the Commissioner to delegate such powers to a subordinate officer. Applying the principle of 'delegatus non potest delegare', the Court ruled that the expression 'pass such order as he may deem fit' does not include the power to remand or refer the matter for fresh adjudication to a subordinate officer. Consequently, the High Court answered both proposed questions in the negative and dismissed the reference application, upholding the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue in exercise of powers under subsection (4) of Section 45A of Sales Tax Act, 1990, is competent to delegate or refer the matter for adjudication afresh to any subordinate officer?
  • Whether the expression 'pass such order as he may deem fit' under Section 45A(4) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 can be construed to include the order to refer the matter for adjudication afresh to any subordinate officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Tro, Faisalabad vs Faqir Hussain & another2019 PCRLJ 472, 2019 PCTLR 995, 2019 PTCL .CL 444, 2019 PTD 1828, 2019 LHC · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-18
  Reference ApplicationIncome Tax OrdinanceUnexplained incomeUnexplained assetsNoticeSection 111Section 122(9)TaxationAppellate Tribunal Inland RevenueLawful authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses consolidated Reference Applications filed under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning the necessity of a specific notice for adding unexplained income or assets. The core legal question was whether a separate notice under Section 111 of the Ordinance is required when the law mandates an explanation from the taxpayer, especially if a notice under Section 122(9) has already been issued. The Lahore High Court held that a specific notice under Section 111 is a prerequisite for including unexplained income/assets in a person's income chargeable to tax. The Court reasoned that for a taxpayer to "offer an explanation" as contemplated by Section 111, they must first be confronted with the proposed addition through a specific notice. Non-issuance of such a notice, even if a general notice under Section 122(9) was issued, constitutes a lack of substantial compliance and renders any subsequent addition without lawful authority. The Court answered the proposed question in the affirmative, deciding against the applicant-department.

  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTC, Rawalpindi vs M/s Trillium Pakistan2019 PCTLR 1121, 2020 PLJ Supreme Court 34, 2020 P SC 107, 2019 PTD 2072, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-31
  income tax penaltytax payableretrospective operation of statuteexplanation in statutewithholding taxlate filing of return
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether default by an assessee in filing an income tax return within the prescribed time attracts a penalty under Section 182(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 based on the tax payable with the return or the total tax chargeable for the year. The core legal question was whether the Explanation inserted into the Table appended to Section 182(1) by the Finance Act 2011, which expanded the definition of 'tax payable', applies retrospectively to tax years 2008 and 2009. The Court held that penal provisions are to be strictly construed, and an explanation that increases a burden or liability operates prospectively unless express language dictates otherwise. Consequently, for the tax years in question prior to the 2011 amendment, 'tax payable' referred to the amount due and to be deposited with the return. Since the respondent assessee had no tax payable with the return due to withholding tax deducted at source, the enhanced penal liability introduced later could not be applied retrospectively. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the default in filing an income tax return within the prescribed time attract a penalty under Section 182 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 based on the tax payable with the return or the total tax liability?
  • Does an explanation in a statute that increases the burden, obligation, or liability of a person operate retrospectively?
  • Can the expanded definition of 'tax payable' introduced by the Finance Act of 2011 be applied to defaults occurring in the tax years 2008 and 2009?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizan Shabbir vs Shaikh Abdul Wahab2019 PLD Sindh 559, 2019 SHC 130 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., Sukkur vs Al-Sana Oil Mills, Sukkur2019 PTD (Trib.) 503 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-09-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., Faisalabad vs Messrs R.J. Cotton2019 PTD (Trib.) 150 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-09-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Muzaffarabad vs (Kh.) Muhammad Anwer, Proprietor, Bismillah Traders, Distributor Haleeb Milk and others2019 PLJ AJ&K 105, 2019 PTD 1608, 2019 PCTLR 400 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-02-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lyallpur Zone, Faisalabad and 3 others2019 PTCL .CL 476, 2019 PTD 1213 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-14
  sales tax registrationdue processnatural justiceultra viresfair trialtax fraudadministrative lawfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Single Bench judgment that declared Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, ultra vires the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner’s power to suspend a taxpayer's registration without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing violates fundamental rights. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that Rule 12, to the extent it permits suspension without notice, is unconstitutional. The Court held that administrative actions affecting a person's property or business rights must strictly adhere to the principles of natural justice and due process. Emphasizing Articles 10A and 18 of the Constitution, the Court ruled that no adverse order, such as the suspension of sales tax registration, can be passed without confronting the affected person with the allegations and providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the power to suspend registration must be exercised in accordance with the principles of fair trial and due process.

  Questions settled

  • Is Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, to the extent of suspending registration without notice, ultra vires the Constitution?
  • Does the power to suspend sales tax registration without a prior hearing violate the right to due process under Article 10A of the Constitution?
  • Can a statutory authority pass an adverse order affecting a person's business without providing an opportunity to be heard?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala vs S.K. Steel Casting, Gujranwala2019 PTD 1493 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-03
  sales taxcompulsory registrationregistered persontax invoicenatural justicetax recoverytaxable suppliesreference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment resolves a reference application and connected constitutional petitions concerning the recovery of sales tax from persons who were liable to be registered but remained unregistered. The core legal question was whether the tax authorities could raise a tax demand and recover sales tax for periods prior to a person's formal registration or compulsory registration under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Lahore High Court held that while the definition of a 'registered person' under Section 2(25) includes those 'liable to be registered,' the charging and procedural provisions of the Act—including the issuance of tax invoices and filing of returns—presuppose formal registration. The Court ruled that the department must first register a person compulsorily or otherwise in accordance with Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, before charging sales tax under Section 3. The key principle established is that tax authorities cannot bypass the mandatory procedural requirements of registration and natural justice (audi alteram partem) to fix liability and adopt coercive recovery measures against unregistered persons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Inland Revenue Department can recover sales tax from a person for a period prior to their formal registration under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Is the department required to compulsorily register a person under Rule 6 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, before raising a tax demand under Section 3 of the Act?
  • Can an unregistered person be legally required to file sales tax returns or issue tax invoices under Sections 23 and 26 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the definition of 'registered person' in Section 2(25) allow the department to bypass the procedural requirement of registration before fixing tax liability?
  • Whether the principles of natural justice require a show-cause notice and opportunity of hearing before a person is declared 'liable to be registered'?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Gujranwala vs M/s. S.K. Steel Casting2020 PCTLR 90, PTCL 2019 CL. 401, 2019 LHC 1245 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-23Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs Messrs Nagra Spinning2019 PCRLJ 590, 2019 PTD 257 · Lahore High Court
  sales tax referenceinput tax adjustmentblacklisted suppliersuspended registrationzero-rated suppliestextile sectortax refund
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Lahore High Court disposes of a batch of reference applications filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 against the appellate orders of the Tribunal Inland Revenue in favor of the taxpayer. The core legal questions involved whether input tax adjustment and refunds could be denied, and zero-rating benefits revoked, on the grounds that suppliers or buyers were subsequently suspended, blacklisted, or exhibited return discrepancies. The Court held that once a blacklisting order against a supplier is set aside by a competent forum, it cannot be used to disallow input tax, and subsequent blacklisting does not invalidate invoices issued while the supplier was active and duly registered. Furthermore, a registered taxpayer making zero-rated supplies in terms of S.R.O. 1125(1)/2011 to active buyers cannot be penalized for subsequent defaults or inactivity of the buyers. The reference applications were accordingly dismissed, establishing that past valid transactions are protected and tax benefits cannot be denied retrospectively based on later irregularities of third parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does subsequent blacklisting of a supplier invalidate invoices issued at a time when the supplier was active and duly registered?
  • Can an input tax adjustment be denied on the basis of a blacklisting order that has already been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal?
  • Whether a registered person can be denied the benefit of zero-rated supplies due to subsequent defaults or inactivity on the part of the buyers?
  • Are reference applications maintainable against findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal that are based on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Azad Jammu & Kashmir Council, Mirpur2019 KLR Supreme Court 314 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s.) Tetrapak Pakistan Limited2020 PTD 917, 2019 PCTLR 710 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s.) Ghani Glass Limited2020 PTD 937, 2019 PCTLR 993 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s.) Bridge Engineering Company2020 PTD 1994, 2019 PCTLR 1061 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Peshawar Electricity Supply2020 P C T L R 633, 2019 PTD 2228 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-07-25Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Education Excellence LtdPTCL 2020 CL. 130, 2019 PTD 1994 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs lrfan Ahmad2020 PTD 2076, 2019 PCTLR 1084 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Emco Industries Limited2019 PCTLR 1088 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Bank of Punjab2019 PCRLJ 634, PTCL 2020 CL. 135, 2019 PTD 1022 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-27
  tax referenceassessment orderaudit proceedingsretrospective operationincome taxdeemed assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference application arises from an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue regarding the jurisdiction of a taxation officer to pass an assessment order under Section 121 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 during audit proceedings for the tax years 2004 to 2006. The core legal question concerns whether Section 121(1)(d) read with Section 177(10) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applied retrospectively to cases where a return of total income had been filed prior to the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2010. The Lahore High Court held, following established precedents upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, that prior to the amendments brought about by the Finance Act, 2010, Section 121(1)(d) did not apply to cases where a return of total income had been filed and did not envisage a second assessment order. The key principle laid down is that amendments to Section 121 and the insertion of subsection (10) to Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 do not have retrospective effect, and actions taken under Section 121 prior to such amendments without statutory backing are without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 121(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 applied to cases where a return of total income had been filed prior to the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2010?
  • Do the amendments made to Section 121 and Section 177(10) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through the Finance Act, 2010 take effect retrospectively?
  • Does the legislative scheme prior to the Finance Act, 2010 provide for an assessment order under Section 121 during audit proceedings where a return has already been filed under Section 120?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Ameer Abdullah Khan Rokhari2019 PLJ Lahore 327, 2019 PTCL CL. 560, 2019 PTD 1278, 2019 LHC 819 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Z & J Hygienic Products (Pvt.) Ltd2020 PTD 948, 2019 PCTLR 716 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd.2020 PTD 804, 2019 PCTLR 689 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Shaheen Cloth Processing MillsPTCL 2021 CL. 334, 2020 PTD 1722, 2019 PCTLR 706 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Naeem Brothers2020 PTD 821, 2019 PCTLR 676 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Malik Usman2020 PTD 968, 2019 PCTLR 980 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Interloop Limited, Faisalabad2020 PTD 752, 2020 PTD 772, 2019 PCTLR 927 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-17Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Hilal Chemicals2020 PTD 232, 2019 PCTLR 666 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-04Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Greenvelly Premium Super Market2019 PCTLR 719, PTCL 2020 CL. 287, 2020 PTD 260, 2019 PCTLR 369 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-28Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Formanite Housing Scheme,2020 PTD 799, 2019 PCTLR 694 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-14Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Descon Engineering Limited,2019 PCTLR 1050 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Bhalwal Kinnow Grading, Factory2020 PTD 1977, 2019 PCTLR 702 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-18Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s.) Akram industries LimitedPTCL 2021 CL.546, 2020 PTD 1700, 2019 PCTLR 1081 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs (M/s) Irfan Industries (Pvt.) Ltd.2020 PTD 810, 2019 PCTLR 683 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) vs Messrs Pakistan2019 PTD 1668 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-01-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Income Tax vs Riaz Bottlers (Pvt.) Ltd2019 PTD 2305 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Azad Jammu and Kashmir Inland Revenue Department, Mirpur and others vs Zakir Hussain and others2019 PCRLJ 603, 2019 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 88, 2019 P.S.C. 1078, PTCL 2019 CL. 370, · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  direct appealSales Tax Appellate Tribunalcompetency of appealdefinition of courtconstitutional jurisdictionSales Tax Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This direct appeal before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir arose from an impugned judgment of the High Court, which had set aside an order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the competency of the direct appeal under Article 42(11) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, on the ground that the provision requires the High Court to have varied or set aside the judgment of a 'Court' immediately below, whereas the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is not a court. The core legal question was whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal qualifies as a 'Court' for the purpose of invoking direct appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is not a court established by the Constitution or law in the relevant sense, and therefore a direct appeal from the High Court's judgment setting aside a tribunal order is incompetent. The key principle laid down is that orders originating from administrative or sales tax appellate tribunals cannot be equated with judgments of a 'Court' for the purposes of constitutional direct appeal provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal qualifies as a 'Court' under the constitutional provisions governing direct appeals?
  • Is a direct appeal competent before the Supreme Court against a High Court judgment that sets aside an order passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal?
  • Does an appellate tribunal established under the Sales Tax Act share judicial power with regular courts of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Commandant, Elite Force, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Jamshed Ali2019 P.S.C. 1331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-28
  service lawdepartmental inquirycriminal compromisereinstatementback benefitsstare decisismaster of the roster
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the reinstatement of a government servant by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal following his acquittal in a criminal case via compromise. The core legal question was whether such acquittal automatically entitles a civil servant to reinstatement without a departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred by ordering reinstatement as an automatic consequence of the criminal compromise. The Court set aside the impugned judgment, directing that a fresh departmental inquiry be conducted within two months. The respondent was denied entitlement to back benefits pending the inquiry's outcome. While the judgment acknowledged conflicting precedents regarding whether a compromise results in automatic acquittal or merely affects sentencing, the Court declined to resolve this broader issue, focusing instead on the procedural necessity of departmental proceedings. Additionally, the Court clarified that the Chief Justice retains discretion as the master of the roster regarding the constitution of larger benches, and that horizontal stare decisis binds courts to existing precedents until a larger bench decides otherwise.

  Questions settled

  • Is a civil servant entitled to automatic reinstatement following an acquittal in a criminal case based on a compromise?
  • Does a request by a bench for the constitution of a larger bench mandatorily require the Chief Justice to constitute such a bench?
  • Does the principle of horizontal stare decisis require courts to follow existing precedents until a larger bench decides otherwise?
  Read full judgment →
• Commandant, Elite Force, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others vs Jamshed2019 PLC (C.S) 982, 2019 PLD Supreme Court 570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-04
  service matterdepartmental inquirycompromisecriminal convictionstare decisismaster of the rosterreinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment that ordered the reinstatement of a government servant following his acquittal in a criminal case due to a compromise. The core legal question addressed is whether the Service Tribunal correctly ordered reinstatement based solely on the compromise, and the broader issue of whether a compromise under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 results in automatic acquittal or merely affects the sentence. The Court held that the Service Tribunal erred by overlooking the necessity of a proper departmental inquiry into the allegations against the respondent. Consequently, the Court set aside the reinstatement order and directed that a fresh departmental inquiry be conducted within two months, with back benefits contingent upon the inquiry's outcome. The Court declined to resolve the conflicting legal precedents regarding the effect of compromises on convictions, noting that the principle of stare decisis requires adherence to existing binding precedents until a larger bench determines otherwise, and clarified that the Chief Justice retains discretion as 'master of the roster' regarding the constitution of larger benches.

  Questions settled

  • Does a compromise accepted under Section 345(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 result in the automatic acquittal of a convict or only affect the sentence?
  • Is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court mandatorily required to constitute a larger bench upon a judicial request from a bench of the Court?
  • Can a Service Tribunal order the reinstatement of a government servant solely on the basis of an acquittal via compromise without a departmental inquiry?
  • Does the principle of horizontal stare decisis bind a bench of the Supreme Court to follow the ratio of a previous bench of equal size?
  Read full judgment →
• Comcare vs Micheala Banerji2019 SCMR 1553 · High Court of Australia · 2019-08-07Read full judgment →
• Collector/Deputy Commissioner, Astore and 2 others vs Muhammad2019 CLC 49 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-10-01Read full judgment →
• Collector, Model Customs Collectorate, Multan vs CustomsPTCL 2019 CL. 688, 2019 PTD 1716 · Sindh High Court · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• Faiz-Ul-Hassan and 2 others vs Sh. Abdul Rasheed and 2 others2019 YLR 941 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-23Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate, Peshawar vs Tawab Jan and another2019 PTD (Trib.) 876 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-03-13Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Lahore vs Umar Khan2019 SCMR 619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-11
  Customs Referencewritten authorizationCollector of Customstechnical objectionstatutory presumptioncompetency of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court dismissing a Customs Reference filed under Section 196 of the Customs Act 1969 as incompetent, on the ground that the Collector of Customs had not signed the written authorization for the Additional Collector to file the reference. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the original office note sheets and found that the Collector had indeed signed and stamped the document in approval of the authorization, power of attorney, and letter of authority. The Court held that the High Court had misread the record. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that Section 196(10) of the Customs Act 1969, introduced in 2005, cures any such technical defect by creating a statutory presumption that any reference or appeal preferred with the approval of the Collector by an officer below the rank of Collector shall be deemed to have been validly preferred by the Collector. The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the reference was remanded to the High Court for decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Customs Reference is incompetent if the Collector's written authorization is recorded on an office note sheet rather than a separate prescribed form?
  • What is the legal effect of Section 196(10) of the Customs Act 1969 on references filed by subordinate officers with the approval of the Collector?
  • Can a technical objection regarding the authorization of an officer to file a Customs Reference defeat the reference if the record shows the Collector's approval was obtained?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs M/s Faisal Enterprises2019 SCP 304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  customs valuationtransaction valueimport dutysecondary quality goodsunder-invoicingCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Collector of Customs challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh regarding the customs valuation of imported HR Steel Sheets. The core legal question was whether imported goods should be assessed for customs duty on the basis of the actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, or under the alternate valuation methods provided in Section 25(5) based on subsequent staff endorsements of secondary quality. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that customs duty must be assessed on the actual transaction value reflected in the invoices, letters of credit, and goods declarations when such value is available and undisputed, and alternate methods under Section 25(5) cannot be invoked merely on an inconsistent appraisal staff endorsement. The key principle laid down is that recourse to alternate valuation provisions under Section 25 of the Customs Act is excluded when the transaction value under Section 25(1) is ascertainable and not proven to be an outcome of under-invoicing or damaged shipments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether imported goods should be assessed for customs duty on the basis of actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • When does the occasion arise to have recourse to alternate valuation methods under Section 25(5) of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can appraisal staff endorsements regarding goods quality override the actual transaction value reflected in import documents and letters of credit?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Faisal Enterprises2019 PCTLR 1117, 2020 PLJ SC 153, 2020 P SC 102, PTCL 2019 CL. 670, 2019 PTD · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-14
  customs valuationtransaction valueimport dutyin-bondingex-bondingHR steel sheetsCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Collector of Customs arose from a dispute regarding the valuation and assessment of imported HR Steel Sheets. The core legal question was whether customs duty should be assessed on the basis of the actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969, or under the alternative valuation methods such as Section 25(5) based on an endorsement by the appraising staff regarding secondary quality. The Supreme Court held that when imported goods can be assessed on the actual transaction value price paid or payable under Section 25(1)—which was duly reflected in the invoices, letters of credit, and goods declarations—recourse to alternative methods like subsection (5) of Section 25 does not arise, unless the transaction value is genuinely disputed as under-invoicing or damaged goods are established. The appeal was consequently allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether customs duty is to be assessed on the basis of the actual transaction value under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1969 when invoices and letters of credit reflect the true price?
  • When does the occasion arise to have recourse to alternative valuation methods under subsections (5) to (9) of Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can an endorsement by appraising staff regarding secondary quality override the actual transaction value declared in import documents without evidence of under-invoicing or damaged shipments?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Additional Collector Custom, MCC-2019 PCTLR 381, 2019 PTD 110 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-08-02Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs and 2 others vs Messrs Searle IV Solution (Pvt.)2019 CLC 634 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-26Read full judgment →
• Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Mirpur (Commissioner Inland2019 P.S.C. 123 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Colgate Palmolive (Pakistan) Limited vs Competition Commission of Pakistan and another2019 CLD 254 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2018-10-31Read full judgment →
• Civil Supply Officer Astore vs Muhammad Shah2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 355 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2018-05-24Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority, through Director General, etc vs Ahmad Ammar2019 [M] C.L.R. 796, 2019 LHC 1434 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-07Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority, through Director General and others vs Ahmad2021 [M] C L R 502, 2019 LHC 1434, 2019 CLC 1584 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-07Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority vs Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan, etc2019 KLR Supreme Court 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-17
  Gilgit-Baltistanfundamental rightsKashmir disputeconstitutional governanceSupreme Appellate Court GBjudicial reviewplebiscite
  Summary & questions settled

  This landmark judgment addresses multiple constitutional petitions concerning the status, governance, fundamental rights, and judicial powers in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). The core legal questions involve determining whether granting fundamental rights to the people of GB prejudices Pakistan's principled stance on the Kashmir dispute, the scope of rights extendable to them, and the status and jurisdictional limits of the GB Supreme Appellate Court. The Supreme Court held that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan are entitled to full fundamental rights and an empowered system of internal self-governance, and that extending these rights does not compromise Pakistan's position on the Kashmir plebiscite. The Court ruled that the GB Supreme Appellate Court functions as a constitutional court solely within its territorial jurisdiction and cannot review laws enacted by the Parliament or orders promulgated by the President of Pakistan. Finally, exercising powers under Articles 184(3) and 187 of the Constitution, the Court directed the immediate promulgation of a revised governance order for GB, ensuring its permanence and continuity against arbitrary executive changes.

  Questions settled

  • Does granting fundamental rights and a system of constitutional governance to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan prejudice Pakistan's principled stance on the Kashmir dispute?
  • What is the extent of the jurisdiction and judicial power of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court regarding legislative acts of the Parliament and orders of the President?
  • Are the citizens of Gilgit-Baltistan entitled to the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can an administrative order promulgated by the President for the governance of Gilgit-Baltistan be modified, repealed, or substituted without judicial oversight from the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →