Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Civil Aviation Authority vs Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan etc2019 PLD Supreme Court 357, 2019 P.S.C. 169, 2019 SCP 22 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-17
  Gilgit-Baltistanfundamental rightsKashmir disputeconstitutional governanceSupreme Appellate Court GBjudicial reviewplebiscite
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter pertains to a historic and constitutional issue regarding the status, authority, and powers of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), its judiciary, and the fundamental rights of its people, raised through multiple consolidated constitution petitions. The core legal questions involve whether granting fundamental rights and constitutional status to GB prejudices Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir dispute, what rights can be granted to its people, and the nature of the GB Supreme Appellate Court as a constitutional court. The Supreme Court held that granting fundamental rights and self-governance to the people of GB does not prejudice Pakistan's principled position on the Kashmir dispute or a future UN-sanctioned plebiscite, but is an interim necessity to end their legal limbo. The ratio decidendi is that until a final plebiscite is held, the people of GB are entitled to enjoy fundamental rights and a constitutional framework of governance akin to other provinces, and the GB courts operate as constitutional courts with territorial jurisdiction limited strictly to GB. The key principles laid down are that fundamental rights must be accompanied by an effective system of governance, and that the executive orders governing GB must be given permanence and be protected from unilateral alteration without judicial oversight.

  Questions settled

  • Would granting fundamental rights and a constitutional status to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan prejudice Pakistan's stance on the Kashmir dispute?
  • Is the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court a constitutional court with powers to review federal legislation?
  • Can the executive order providing for the governance of Gilgit-Baltistan be altered or repealed without judicial intervention?
  • Are the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan entitled to constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights equivalent to citizens in other parts of Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Civil Aviation Authority through Director General Caa and 3 others vs Mst. Gul Yasmin2019 PLC (C.S.) 130 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court
  pensionary benefitscontinuous servicecivil revision petitionwork charge employeedepartmental transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of a challenge to the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge Gilgit, which accepted the respondent's first appeal and decreed her suit for the recovery of pension benefits of her deceased husband. The core legal question concerns whether a government employee whose continuous service spanned across Pak. PWD, the Airport Development Authority, and the Civil Aviation Authority from 1961 to 1991 without a break is entitled to pensionary benefits. The court held that continuous service without a break must be counted towards pension and that the respondent's husband, having completed 30 years of continuous service, was entitled to full pensionary benefits, aligning her case with similarly situated colleagues whose claims were upheld up to the Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit-Baltistan. The key principle laid down is that continuous government service transferred across transitioning departments without any break is reckonable for pensionary rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether continuous service rendered across different transitioning departments without a break can be counted towards pensionary benefits?
  • Is the widow of a deceased employee entitled to recovery of pension where the employee served continuously from 1961 to 1991?
  • Whether an employee transferred from Pak. PWD to the Airport Development Authority and subsequently absorbed into the Civil Aviation Authority is entitled to pension?
  Read full judgment →
• Civic Centres Company (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner of Income2019 SCP 60 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-28
  income taxwealth taxownershiptransfer of propertyfiscal statutestax liabilitystatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns tax liability for properties temporarily held by the appellant under a government directive. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having received possession of state-owned properties without a formal sale deed or payment of consideration, qualified as the "owner" for taxation purposes under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Wealth Tax Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not the owner. The Court emphasized that tax liability under these statutes is predicated on legal ownership, not mere possession. It ruled that the Prime Minister's directive could not override the statutory requirements for the transfer of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court clarified that "ownership" and the phrase "belonging to" require a valid legal conveyance, which was absent in this case. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, affirming that the appellant was not liable for income tax as an owner nor wealth tax on assets not belonging to it. The decision reaffirms that fiscal statutes must be interpreted based on legal title, not temporary possession.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere possession of property, without a formal sale deed or payment of consideration, constitute ownership for the purposes of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can a directive from the Prime Minister's Secretariat override the statutory requirements for the transfer of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Does the term "belonging to" in the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, imply full legal ownership or merely possession of an asset?
  • Is an assessee liable to pay tax under the head "Income from house property" if they do not hold legal title to the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Cir, Zone-II, Rto, Lahore vs M/s. Engineering Associates (Pvt) Ltd LahorePTCL 2019 CL. 258 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation Limited vs Hydro-Quebec2019 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of CanadaRead full judgment →
• China International Water and Electric Corporation through Authorized Representative and others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others2019 YLR 989 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-14Read full judgment →
• China Harbour Engineering Company (Chec) & Pemcon Geo Engineering2019 SHC 126 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Chief Regional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited vs Sirajuddin Khan2019 P.S.C. 1485 · Supreme Court of India
  back wagesno work no payunauthorized absencedisciplinary proceedingssuperannuationtermination of serviceconsequential benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Allahabad High Court partly allowing the respondent employee's writ petition and directing payment of salary and benefits for the period between 14.05.2009 and 20.06.2012. The respondent was an assistant/typist who had been marked absent without authorization from February 2007, faced disciplinary actions resulting in reduced basic pay and eventual termination after his superannuation date, and engaged in multiple rounds of litigation. The core legal question was whether an employee is automatically entitled to back wages and salary for a disputed period simply because a termination order passed after retirement was set aside. The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of an ineffective post-retirement termination order does not automatically entitle an employee to back wages on the principle of "no work no pay" where the employee was not kept away from work by the employer's illegal order during that specific timeframe. The Court set aside the High Court's direct award of salary and remanded the matter to the appellant company to consider the respondent's claim for back wages and pass a reasoned order.

  Questions settled

  • Does the setting aside of a termination order automatically entitle an employee to back wages and salary for the intervening period?
  • Does the principle of "no work no pay" apply when an employee remains absent from work without being restrained by an employer's order?
  • Whether an employee can be terminated from service after attaining the age of superannuation?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive of State Petroleum, Refining and Petochemical2019 CLD 1202 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2019-04-19Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive MEPCO and others vs Muhammad Fazil and others2019 PLJ SC 450, 2019 P.S.C 1295, 2019 SCP 246, 2019 SCMR 919 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-18
  back benefitsreinstatementunauthorized absencewrit jurisdictionlabour disputediscretionary powergainful employment
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed a challenge against a High Court judgment that had modified the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal by granting back benefits to a reinstated employee. The respondent, an Assistant Lineman, was dismissed for unauthorized absence. While the Labour Court and Tribunal ordered his reinstatement due to procedural lapses but denied back benefits on the grounds of willful absence without sanctioned leave, the High Court granted full back benefits under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent had remained absent without a signed or sanctioned leave application. It held that the grant of back benefits is not automatic upon reinstatement but remains within the discretion of the court or tribunal. The Court further ruled that where a lower forum exercises its discretion based on facts, the High Court cannot interfere in its writ jurisdiction unless the decision is without lawful authority or suffers from a patent legal defect. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding back benefits.

  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive MEPCO & others vs Muhammad Fazil, etc2019 SCP 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-04-18
  reinstatementback benefitsunauthorized absencediscretionary reliefwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a service dispute where the respondent, an Assistant Lineman, was dismissed for unauthorized absence. The Punjab Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal ordered his reinstatement but denied back benefits, noting he proceeded on leave without obtaining formal sanction. Upon cross-petitions, the Lahore High Court modified these decisions by granting full back benefits, holding that the respondent was on sanctioned leave. The Supreme Court of Pakistan analyzed the record and found that the respondent's leave application was unsigned and lacked approval from the competent authority, establishing that his absence was unsanctioned. The Court held that the grant of back benefits is not automatic upon reinstatement but is a discretionary matter for the trial court or tribunal. Since the lower forums exercised their discretion lawfully based on the facts, the High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 by interfering with their concurrent findings. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order to the extent of granting back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of back benefits an automatic consequence of an employee's reinstatement in service?
  • Can the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretionary denial of back benefits by lower tribunals without a showing of patent illegality?
  • Does proceeding on leave without the formal sanction of the competent authority constitute willful absence from duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Ir, Ltu vs (M/s.) Ch. Sugar Mills & others2020 PTD 2160, 2019 PCTLR 697 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-07Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Inland Tax, through RTC, Zone-1, Federal Board of Revenue, Hyderabad and others vs Ghulam Mustafa Mari Ex-Inspector, Income Tax, Revenue Division, FBR, Hyderabad2019 PLC (C.S) 1388, 2020 PLJ Supreme Court 37, 2020 P SC 83, 2019 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-03-12
  res judicatapast and closed transactionservice terminationeducational qualificationreinstatementfinality of judgmentexecutive authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of the executive authorities re-opening a service termination case after it had attained finality through a Supreme Court judgment. The respondent, initially removed from service in 2003 for lacking the requisite educational qualifications, had his removal upheld by the Supreme Court in 2005. Despite this, the Prime Minister's Secretariat later directed his reinstatement in 2008. In 2012, the Federal Board of Revenue restored the original penalty of removal. The Federal Service Tribunal subsequently granted the respondent a de-novo inquiry. The Supreme Court held that the executive authorities lacked the legal authority to re-open a case that had already been decided by a final judgment of the Court, as such matters constitute past and closed transactions. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of res judicata bars the re-opening of such litigation. Furthermore, the Court clarified that passing remarks in prior judgments regarding executive rectification of mistakes do not constitute a rule of law authorizing the unilateral disregard of a Supreme Court judgment. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, setting aside the Tribunal's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can executive authorities re-open a service matter after it has been decided by a final judgment of the Supreme Court?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to service matters previously adjudicated by the Supreme Court?
  • Do passing remarks in a judgment regarding the rectification of mistakes by an executive body constitute a binding rule of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Wajid Ayub and another vs Malik Rizwan Ahmed and others2019 IHC 182 · Islamabad High Court · 2019-03-22Read full judgment →
• Chaudhary Muhammad Saleem and 5 others vs Vth Additional District2019 YLR 2013 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-09Read full judgment →
• Chanessar Bheel vs The State2019 KLR Criminal Cases 174 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-15
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyfree fightcounter-versionfurther inquirycriminal bailland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the applicant, who was charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following an altercation involving land disputes. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail despite allegations of specific injuries caused to the complainant, particularly in light of a counter-version of the incident and the fact that co-accused persons had already been granted bail. The court held that the applicant was entitled to the concession of bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the principle of consistency, noting that since co-accused persons were already on bail and both parties had sustained injuries in what appeared to be a free fight, the applicant’s case was at par with the co-accused. Furthermore, the court established that where there are conflicting versions of an incident and it is prima facie difficult to determine the initial aggressor, the case warrants further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, thereby entitling the accused to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency apply to a bail application when co-accused persons have already been granted bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when it is prima facie difficult to determine the initial aggressor in a free fight?
  • Should bail be granted when both the complainant and the accused parties have sustained injuries and filed cross-versions of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Champa Lal Dhakar vs Naval Singh Rajput and others2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 86 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-01-04
  attempt to murderframing of chargegrievous hurtcriminal revisionintention to killmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a criminal proceeding where the complainant challenged a High Court order that set aside the trial court's decision to frame a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (attempt to murder). The core legal question was whether the material on record, specifically the injuries sustained by the complainant, justified the framing of a charge for attempt to murder or if the High Court correctly intervened to modify the charge to grievous hurt. Upon reviewing the medical evidence, which indicated a fracture of the nasal bone but lacked sufficient proof of an intention to cause death, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision. The Court held that the ingredients for an offence under Section 307 were not prima facie established. The key principle laid down is that the framing of a charge for attempt to murder requires clear evidence of an intention or knowledge that the act, if successful, would result in death; where such intent is absent and only grievous hurt is evidenced, the charge must be restricted accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a fracture of the nasal bone alone constitute sufficient evidence to frame a charge for attempt to murder under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code?
  • Can a High Court in its revisional jurisdiction set aside a trial court's order framing a charge if the material on record does not support the specific offence charged?
  • What is the essential requirement for framing a charge under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code regarding the accused's intent?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad through Prosecutor- General Accountability, Islamabad vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif2019 SCP 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-01-14
  suspension of sentencegrant of bailcancellation of bailNational Accountability Ordinance 1999constitutional jurisdictionextraordinary circumstancesadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved civil appeals filed by the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), challenging orders of the High Court that granted post-conviction bail to the respondents by suspending their sentences during the pendency of their appeals. The Supreme Court observed several procedural and substantive flaws in the High Court's judgments, including excessive length contrary to guidelines for bail orders, an in-depth evaluation and conclusive determination on the merits of the case, and the failure to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship required for granting bail under Constitutional jurisdiction in NAB cases. Furthermore, the High Court misapplied precedents regarding Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 and prematurely evaluated evidence without considering Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. However, recognizing that the standards for cancellation of bail differ from those for granting bail, and noting that there was no allegation of misuse of bail, the Supreme Court refused to revoke the bail granted by the High Court and dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the principles for cancellation of bail differ from those governing the initial grant or suspension of sentence?
  • Can a High Court undertake a detailed evaluation of the merits of a case while deciding an application for suspension of sentence?
  • Are extraordinary circumstances and extreme hardship required to grant bail under Constitutional jurisdiction in cases under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad through Prosecutor-General Accountability, Islamabad vs (Mian) Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others2019 PLD Supreme Court 445, PLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 234, KLR 2019 Supreme · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  suspension of sentencebail cancellationNational Accountability Bureauconstitutional jurisdictionextraordinary circumstancesassets beyond meanscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) filed appeals against the Islamabad High Court's decision to suspend the sentences and grant bail to the respondents during the pendency of their criminal appeals. The Supreme Court identified several procedural and legal shortcomings in the High Court's judgment, including its excessive length (41 pages) contrary to the guidelines in 'Muhammad Shakeel v. The State', and its premature, detailed assessment of the case's merits. The Court emphasized that under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, bail through constitutional jurisdiction should only be granted in extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship, which were not established here. Furthermore, the High Court misapplied precedents regarding Section 9(a)(v) of the Ordinance by failing to distinguish cases where ownership was denied versus admitted. Despite these deficiencies, the Supreme Court declined to cancel the bail, noting that the criteria for bail cancellation differ from grant. Given that no misuse of bail was alleged, one respondent was already incarcerated in another case, one was a woman, and another had a short sentence, the appeals were dismissed.

  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, National Accountability Bureau through Prosecutor-General, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad vs Mir Faiq Ali Jamali2019 PLD Supreme Court 702, PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 138, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 928, · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-07-08
  disqualificationNational Accountability Ordinancecommencement of sentencepayment of finestatutory interpretationaccountability court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a dispute regarding the commencement date of the respondent's disqualification under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, following his conviction. The trial court had observed that the disqualification period began upon the payment of the fine, while the High Court set aside this observation without resolving the core issue of when the disqualification period actually commences. The Supreme Court addressed the legal question of interpreting the phrase 'to be reckoned from the date he is released after serving the sentence' under Section 15(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that, in light of Section 53 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, a sentence includes both imprisonment and the payment of a fine. Consequently, the Court ruled that the disqualification period under Section 15(a) commences only after a convict has served both the imprisonment and paid the fine. The Court clarified that the respondent's disqualification period began on the date he deposited the fine, as that was the date he had fully served his entire sentence.

  Questions settled

  • When does the period of disqualification under Section 15(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 commence for a convict?
  • Does the term 'sentence' under Section 15(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 include the payment of a fine?
  • Is a convict considered to have served their entire sentence if they have completed imprisonment but have not yet paid the imposed fine?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghafoor Khan etc vs State through Additional Advocate General and another2019 YLR 2060, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 817 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-03
  criminal appealmurderqatl-i-amdtransposed evidenceproclaimed offenderrelated witnessocular accountmedical corroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected criminal revision arise from a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge/Izafi Zilla Qazi, Dir Lower at Chakdara, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to life imprisonment with compensation. The core legal questions involved the reliability of transposed evidence under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the credibility of related eye-witnesses, and the sufficiency of ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence in establishing guilt despite the non-recovery of the weapon of offense. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the complainant properly transposed from Section 512 proceedings, corroborated by another eye-witness and medical evidence, was trustworthy and sufficient to maintain the conviction, and that mere relationship does not render a witness 'interested' without proof of enmity. The court laid down the principle that the evidence of related witnesses who are confidence-inspiring and unimplicated by deep-rooted enmity requires no corroboration, and that minor discrepancies resulting from lapse of time do not discredit otherwise consistent ocular accounts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony recorded during proceedings under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be legally transposed and relied upon as evidence in a subsequent trial upon the arrest of a proclaimed offender?
  • Does the mere relationship of an eye-witness with the deceased render them an interested witness whose testimony must be discarded in the absence of corroboration?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on ocular testimony and circumstantial evidence when the alleged weapon of offense is not recovered?
  • Whether minor discrepancies in the testimony of an eye-witness arising from a long lapse of time between the occurrence and the cross-examination are sufficient to discredit the witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, NAB through Prosecutor General Accountability NAB vs Sarfraz2019 PLD Balochistan 51 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-06-28
  acquittal appealcorruption and corrupt practicesburden of proofpresumption of innocenceillegal gratificationNational Accountability Ordinanceevaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court in a reference filed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, regarding allegations of corruption, illegal commissions on wheat sales, and bribery involving public officials and private persons. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully discharged its initial burden of proof to establish that the accused misused their authority and amassed ill-gotten wealth through bribery. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to produce cogent, direct, or circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the alleged illegal transactions, while the accused successfully offered a plausible defense supported by documentary evidence regarding legitimate commercial transactions, such as the sale of a vehicle and a plot. Laying down the key principle that an accused is presumed innocent and that an acquittal judgment—strengthened by this double presumption—cannot be interfered with merely because another view is possible upon re-analysis, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused through positive and affirmative evidence before the onus shifts to the defense?
  • Can a judgment of acquittal passed by a competent court be interfered with merely on the ground that another view of the evidence is possible?
  • Does the mere existence of bank deposits, in the absence of direct evidence connecting them to illegal gratification, constitute an offence of corruption under Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, FBR through Member Administration vs Muhammad Asfandyar2019 KLR Supreme Court 377, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 449, 2019 P.S.C. 646, 2019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-30
  civil servantpromotionlength of servicenotional seniorityactual joining dateacting charge basisFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter addresses whether time spent in litigation prior to the first appointment of a civil servant can be counted towards the mandatory length of service required for promotion. The respondent, who faced a delay in his induction due to a domicile dispute that he later successfully litigated, was granted notional seniority with his original batch. Subsequently, the Federal Service Tribunal directed the department to grant him promotion benefits based on this notional length of service. The Supreme Court granted leave and held that notional seniority cannot substitute for the actual length of service mandated by the rules for promotion. The Court ruled that seniority and eligibility for promotion must be reckoned from the actual date of joining the service upon successful completion of training, and that prescribing a minimum actual length of service ensures officers gain necessary practical experience before advancing to higher grades. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was set aside, establishing that actual service duration cannot be bypassed through retrospective notional seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Can time spent in litigation prior to the first appointment of a civil servant be counted towards the mandatory length of service required for promotion?
  • Whether notional seniority granted to a civil servant can serve as a substitute for the actual length of service prescribed under the rules for promotion?
  • From which date must the seniority of a civil servant upon initial appointment be reckoned?
  • Does the grant of retrospective seniority entitle a civil servant to bypass the requirement of actual continuous service in a grade for promotion to a higher post?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman NAB through Prosecutor-General Accountability vs Nadeem2019 PCr. LJ 1643 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2019-03-18
  National Accountability Bureaustatutory limitationcompetence of appealsanction of Chairman NABinvalid investigationdischarge of accusedmandatory conditionsjudicial scrutiny
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) against a trial court's judgment discharging the accused. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was time-barred and whether it was competent without the prior sanction of the Chairman NAB. The Court held that the appeal was incompetent on two grounds: first, it was filed with an unexplained delay of three days beyond the statutory period; second, it lacked the mandatory prior approval of the Chairman NAB at the time of filing. The Court rejected the ex-post facto sanction produced later, noting that such attempts only highlight administrative inefficiencies. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision to discharge the accused, ruling that the investigation was illegal because the authorization for inquiry under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 failed to specifically name the accused. The Court emphasized that mandatory statutory conditions for jurisdiction must be strictly fulfilled, and that NAB authorities cannot use their powers in an oppressive or selective manner, as they are subject to judicial scrutiny and the rule of law.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal filed by the National Accountability Bureau competent without the prior sanction of the Chairman NAB?
  • Can an appeal be entertained if it is filed beyond the statutory limitation period without an application for condonation of delay?
  • Does an investigation conducted without specific authorization against an accused under the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 vitiate the proceedings?
  • Is ex-post facto sanction for filing an appeal by the National Accountability Bureau legally valid?
  Read full judgment →
• CH. Tariq Mehmood vs Khadim Hussain (Deceased) through L.Rs, Etc2019 LHC 1714, 2020 [M] C L R 4 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-20Read full judgment →
• Ch. Mumtaz Hussain, S/o Ch. Karam Dad, R/o Panyam Chaksawari Tehsil2019 SC AJK 17 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Jamil vs Chaudhary Muhammad Ramzan and others2019 YLR 825 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-14Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Aslam vs District & Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh etc2020 P Cr. L J 742, 2019 LHC 2702 · Lahore High Court · 2019-04-30
  Illegal Dispossession Actimpleadment of partiescriminal trial procedurecivil and criminal jurisdictioncode of criminal procedurecode of civil procedurewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition and connected criminal miscellaneous petition challenge orders passed by the Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question is whether a criminal court possesses the power to add or strike out parties in pending criminal proceedings. The Lahore High Court held that unlike civil courts under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, criminal courts derive their jurisdiction and procedures strictly from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and governing special statutes, which contain no provision empowering a criminal court to implead third parties in criminal complaints or trials. Consequently, the trial court's order impleading respondents as parties was declared illegal and set aside, while the petition challenging the execution of the possession order pursuant to a finalized writ direction was dismissed as non-maintainable. The key principle laid down is that criminal courts cannot exercise inherent or implied powers to add or strike out parties to criminal proceedings in the absence of an express statutory provision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a criminal court have the power to add or strike out parties in pending criminal cases?
  • Are the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to criminal proceedings?
  • Can a criminal court entertain an application for impleading third parties as accused or respondents in a private complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• CH. Muhammad Anwar Gujjar vs Secretary of Chief Minister Punjab2019 PLJ Lahore 638 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-27Read full judgment →
• Ch. M. Shafi Kousar & others vs Azad Govt. & others2019 SC AJK 130 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-05-23Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ayaz Ahmed vs Collector Land Acquisition, Mangla Dam Raising Project, Mirpur2019 SC AJK 5 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-01-23Read full judgment →
• Ch. Asif Ali and others vs Muhammad Mehmood and others2019 CLC 920 · Lahore High Court · 2019-02-11Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ashiq Ali vs The State etc2019 PCRLJ 1430, PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1701, 2019 LHC 1753 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-26
  pre-arrest bailfertilizer adulterationdealer liabilitycriminal investigationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 437 dated 30.12.2018, registered under Sections 18(1) of the Punjab Fertilizers (Control) Order 1973 and Sections 6(1) and 10(1) of the Punjab Special Article Control Act, 1973. The petitioner, a fertilizer dealer, was accused of possessing adulterated fertilizer after a raid by the complainant. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given that he was a dealer rather than a manufacturer, and the seized bags were sealed. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to bail, confirming the ad-interim pre-arrest bail previously granted. The ratio of the decision rests on the fact that the statute provides for an alternate sentence of a fine, and the prosecution failed to investigate the actual manufacturer of the substandard fertilizer. The Court established the principle that where the investigation is complete and the accused is a dealer of sealed goods rather than the manufacturer, incarceration serves no beneficial purpose, particularly when the relevant statute allows for a fine as an alternative to imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Is a fertilizer dealer entitled to pre-arrest bail when the seized goods were sealed and the dealer is not the manufacturer?
  • Does the provision of an alternate sentence of a fine in a statute justify the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the investigation is complete and the prosecution has failed to associate the manufacturer of the alleged substandard goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Abid Mehmood vs Mirza Zafar Javed etc2019 PCRLJ 1241, 2019 LHC 921 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-05
  condonation of delayacquittal appealtime-barred appealcriminal procedurepower of magistratepublic prosecutorlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of the respondents by a Judicial Magistrate. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned based on the appellant's claim of ignorance regarding the trial court's proceedings and the subsequent judgment. The Court held that the delay could not be condoned, as the appellant had been actively involved in the trial proceedings, including receiving directions for expeditious trial disposal and facing non-bailable warrants for failing to produce evidence. The Court further clarified that under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Magistrate is required to hear the Prosecutor and the accused, not necessarily the complainant, to acquit an accused. Additionally, the Court affirmed that under Section 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Public Prosecutor has the primary authority to conduct prosecutions, rendering the appellant's claim of lack of notice legally invalid. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Is a complainant entitled to specific notice before a Magistrate exercises the power to acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the Public Prosecutor have the exclusive authority to conduct a prosecution under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a delay in filing an appeal be condoned where the appellant was actively participating in trial proceedings and aware of the case status?
  Read full judgment →
• Caretel Infotech Ltd vs Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & others2019 P.S.C 1353, 2019 PCTLR 953 · Supreme Court of India · 2019-04-09Read full judgment →
• Captain Javed Afzal & 05 others vs Pakistan International Airlines2019 SHC 136 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-09Read full judgment →
• Captain Faisal Ghazanfar Chaudhry vs Civil Aviation Authority2019 CLC 1737 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-12Read full judgment →
• Capt. Syed Muhammad Aslam vs The State and another2019 YLR 204 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-06
  criminal acquittal appealcriminal trespasshouse-trespasscheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of propertycriminal intimidationbenefit of doubtinterference with acquittalopen plot encroachment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the respondent was acquitted of charges under Sections 447, 448, 420, and 506-B of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully established criminal trespass, house trespass, cheating, and criminal intimidation beyond reasonable doubt regarding an open plot dispute. The Sindh High Court held that since the property was an open plot without a boundary wall, house trespass was not attracted, and mere interference with an open plot does not constitute criminal trespass or cheating involving dishonest inducement without independent corroborative evidence. The court concluded that the trial court's view resulting in acquittal was plausible and sustainable, establishing the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal judgment unless it is perverse or wholly unsustainable, and that civil or tortious disputes over open land or encroachments do not automatically warrant criminal liability.

  Questions settled

  • Does an open plot without a boundary wall attract the definition of house trespass under Section 448 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained in the absence of dishonest inducement to deliver property?
  • Under what circumstances should an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment rendered by a trial court?
  • Does simple encroachment or trespass on an open plot amount to criminal trespass under Section 441 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without proof of criminal intent?
  Read full judgment →
• Capri Autos, Motorcycle Dealers vs Dr. Masuma Hasan and others2019 YLR 2500 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-23
  eviction applicationwillful defaultchange of ownershipstatutory noticetrespassermoney orderdeposit of rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition before the High Court of Sindh challenged concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Appellate Court ordering eviction of the tenant on the ground of willful default under Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979. The applicant-landlady alleged default without disclosing the monthly rent quantum or period of default, while simultaneously maintaining that the tenant was a trespasser and illegal occupant. The High Court analyzed whether an eviction application lies against an alleged trespasser and whether willful default was established. The Court held that the landlady failed to serve a statutory notice of change of ownership under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 and that courier receipts produced to show service were fabricated. Upon gaining knowledge of ownership via newspaper publication, the tenant promptly tendered rent via money order and subsequently deposited it in a Miscellaneous Rent Case under Section 10(3). The High Court held the default to be engineered, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and dismissed the eviction application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a landlord maintain an eviction application under rent law while simultaneously alleging that the occupant is a trespasser rather than a tenant?
  • Whether default in payment of rent can be established against a tenant without prior service of notice of change of ownership under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction for default if rent is tendered by money order and deposited in court promptly after acquiring knowledge of the landlady's ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Capital Development Authority through Chairman vs Mrs. Ameer Fatima2019 YLR 1188 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-24Read full judgment →
• Cape Intermediate Holdings Ltd. vs Dring (for and on behalf of Asbestos2019 SCMR 1660 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• Cantonment Board Sialkot vs Provincial Environmental Protection2019 CLD 555 · Punjab Environmental Tribunal · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Bux Ali alias Dodo vs The State2019 YLR 324 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-22
  murder convictionmitigating circumstancesdeath sentence conversionmental health of accusedocular testimonyinterested witnessesabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded by the Sessions Judge, Umerkot, for the murder of the complainant's son. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, after an initial altercation with the complainant, returned armed with a gun and shot the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the lack of established motive and the appellant's mental health status. The High Court upheld the conviction, finding the ocular testimony of the eye-witnesses credible and corroborated by medical evidence, despite the failure to prove the specific motive. However, the Court held that the appellant's mental condition (Major Depressive Disorder) and the lack of a proven motive constituted mitigating circumstances. Consequently, the Court converted the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while maintaining the conviction and compensation order, with a modification to the default sentence. The judgment reaffirms that while related witnesses are not inherently unreliable, the court must carefully scrutinize evidence, and that mental health issues can be a mitigating factor in sentencing.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related witnesses be accepted in a murder case if there is no evidence of a motive to falsely implicate the accused?
  • Does a diagnosis of a mental disorder, such as Major Depressive Disorder, constitute a mitigating circumstance for the purpose of sentencing in a capital case?
  • Is the abscondence of an accused considered a relevant piece of evidence against them?
  • Can a death sentence be converted to life imprisonment if the prosecution fails to prove the motive for the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Bushra Sarwar and another vs Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and 6 others2020 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 99, 2019 P.S.C. 1716 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-15Read full judgment →
• Bushara Ghias vs Justice of Peace/Additional District and Sessions2019 YLR 1299 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-16Read full judgment →
• Brig. (Retd.) Syed Ali Mohsin vs Fazal Inam Sabir alias Saaien Inam and others2019 P Cr. L J 563 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-15
  Criminal RevisionIllegal Dispossession ActAcquittalLeave to AppealNon-cognizable offenceMaintainabilityCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Revision petition challenged an order of acquittal passed by the trial court in a private complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether a revision petition is maintainable against an order of acquittal passed under Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, or if the petitioner was required to file an application for leave to appeal under Section 417(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that since the offence under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is non-cognizable, the trial court correctly applied Section 247, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, resulting in the acquittal of the respondents. Consequently, the proper remedy was an application for leave to appeal. Relying on Section 439(5), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court ruled that where an appeal lies and is not filed, a revision petition is barred. As the petitioner failed to file the appeal or request conversion of the petition, the revision was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order of acquittal passed under Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the offence under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 constitute a non-cognizable offence?
  • Can a High Court entertain a revision petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an appeal lies but was not filed?
  Read full judgment →
• Brands for Less L.L.C. vs Brands 4 Less through Proprietor/2019 CLD 146 · Intellectual Property Tribunal · 2018-10-08Read full judgment →
• Bostan Khan Khattak vs Federation of Pakistan Through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence & 03 others2020 PLC (C.S.) 392, 2019 SHC 146 · Sindh High Court · 2019-05-16
  house rent subsidyconstitutional petitionmaintainabilitynon-statutory rulesdisputed questions of factservice lawNational Command Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by a retired employee seeking House Rent Subsidy (HRS) retrospectively, along with a challenge to an administrative order declining the same. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a writ petition to enforce non-statutory rules, the applicability of the National Command Authority (Amendment) Act, 2016, and whether disputed questions of fact regarding rent agreements and retrospective financial claims could be adjudicated in constitutional jurisdiction. The Sindh High Court held that the rules governing the petitioner's claim are non-statutory under the National Command Authority (Amendment) Act, 2016, and that claims based on disputed factual controversies and private lease arrangements cannot be resolved through a constitutional petition. The court laid down the principle that writ petitions for enforcing terms governed by non-statutory service rules or involving intricate factual disputes are not maintainable, and dismissed the petition accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 is maintainable for the enforcement of non-statutory rules and policies of an organization?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding rent agreements and financial claims be resolved under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether employees of organizations governed by the National Command Authority can seek judicial review of non-statutory service benefits through a writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan through Chairman and another vs Muhammad Sajid and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 539, 2019 SCMR 233 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-13
  regularization of servicedaily wage workerscontract employeesartificial breakspermanent nature of jobservice lawequal treatment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from writ petitions filed by daily wage employees of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Multan, seeking regularization of their services after years of employment. The High Court granted the petitions and dismissed the Board's intra-court appeals. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether daily wage workers performing jobs of a permanent nature are entitled to regularization despite artificial breaks in service created by the employer. The Supreme Court dismissed the Board's petitions, holding that the respondents had served for many years and were performing duties of a permanent nature. The Court observed that the practice of hiring workers for 89-day cycles to create artificial breaks in service was a 'clumsy attempt' to deny continuity of service. Following the precedent set in a similar case involving the BISE Rawalpindi, the Court ruled that similarly placed employees must be treated equally. The key principle laid down is that the nature of the job, rather than the nomenclature of the contract or artificial breaks, determines the right to regularization.

  Read full judgment →
• Bishop Humprey Sarfaraz Peterz vs Governor of KPK2020 CLC 219, 2019 PHC 264 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-01Read full judgment →
• Bilawal vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 238 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-17
  conviction in absentiaabscondencepunishment of absconderanti-terrorism trialfair trialbenefit of doubtproclamation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Bilawal, along with co-accused, was tried for offences including abduction and terrorism, but was acquitted of the main charge by the trial court. However, he was convicted under section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for abscondence and sentenced in absentia to five years' imprisonment. The appellant challenged his conviction before the Sindh High Court. The core legal question before the court was whether a conviction for abscondence under section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 can be sustained in absentia without strictly adhering to the procedural safeguards and trial requirements prescribed under section 19 of the said Act and the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. The High Court held that abscondence alone is a suspicious circumstance and not direct proof of guilt, and that an accused cannot be convicted under section 21-L without following the mandatory trial and procedural safeguards stipulated in section 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, read with Articles 9 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The court set aside the appellant's conviction and sentence, noting lack of incriminating evidence and parity with an acquitted co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person be convicted for abscondence under section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without following the trial procedure outlined in section 19 of the said Act?
  • Whether mere abscondence of an accused can be treated as substantive proof of guilt in criminal jurisprudence?
  • Does a conviction in absentia under section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 violate the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 if procedural safeguards are ignored?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal on the principle of consistency when a co-accused with an identical role has already been acquitted?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal vs The State and another2019 P Cr. L J 401 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-28
  criminal appealmurderchance witnessocular accountabscondencemotivebenefit of doubtjuvenile offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involves determining whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the credibility of ocular accounts, chance witnesses, motive, and corroborative evidence like abscondence and weapon recovery. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene, making them uncorroborated chance witnesses, and that the motive and weapon matching remained unproven. The court concluded that substantive ocular evidence was unreliable and could not sustain a conviction, setting aside the trial court's judgment. The key principles laid down include the rule that the testimony of chance witnesses requires strong, convincing corroboration, that failure to prove motive damages the prosecution case, and that abscondence alone cannot remedy substantive defects in evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an uncorroborated chance witness can form the basis of a conviction on a capital charge?
  • Can abscondence alone sustain a criminal conviction when the substantive ocular evidence has been disbelieved?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive damage the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an accused's refusal to produce defence witnesses or be examined on oath when threats have been reported?
  Read full judgment →
• Bilal Aslam vs Naseer Ahmad etc2019 CLC 533, 2019 PLJ Lahore 216, 2019 LHC 1 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-10Read full judgment →
• Bhooral alias Bhooro vs The State2019 SHC 188 · Sindh High Court · 2019-06-24
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilitydelayed FIRprevious enmityQatl-e-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 arising from a criminal case registered for offences including Qatl-e-amd. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of further inquiry, considering that the FIR was lodged with a delay of twenty days, no specific role of causing injuries was attributed to the applicant, and his role was limited to mere presence at the scene amidst an existing dispute and previous enmity. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant's vicarious liability called for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court granted post-arrest bail to the applicant, establishing that where an accused is attributed only presence at the scene of the crime and there is previous enmity with a delayed second FIR, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is only attributed presence at the scene of the crime without causing any specific injury?
  • Does a delayed second FIR coupled with previous enmity make out a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the question of vicarious liability requires deeper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bhai Khan vs The State & anotherPLJ 2021 Cr.C. (Lahore) 152, 2019 LHC 3365 · Lahore High Court · 2019-09-13
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseattempt to commit qatl-i-amdnon-bailable offencecriminal procedurebail as rule
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arising from FIR No. 264 of 2019 involving charges under Sections 337-F(vi), 337-F(i), 337-L(2), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the alleged offense fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically regarding the applicability of Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (attempt to commit qatl-i-amd). The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. It observed that the injuries were inflicted on non-vital organs, negating the requisite intent to kill, and that the medical examination was delayed by three days without explanation. Consequently, the offense was tentatively categorized under Section 337-F(vi) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which does not fall within the prohibitory clause. The Court reaffirmed the principle that for non-bailable offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, absent extraordinary circumstances like abscondence or tampering with evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of injuries on non-vital parts of the body negate the intent to commit qatl-i-amd under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule for non-bailable offenses that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What are the exceptional circumstances that justify the refusal of bail in cases not falling within the prohibitory clause?
  Read full judgment →
• Begum Mai vs Addl. Sessions Judge and others2020 PLD Lahore 394, 2019 LHC 4359 · Lahore High Court · 2019-11-27Read full judgment →
• Before Mrs. Ambreen Aslam, Judicial Member and Syed Tahir Raza Zaidi, Accountant Member Washdev vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Larkana Zone, R.T.O., Sukkur2019 PCTLR 1170, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 1286 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-09-10Read full judgment →
• Bashir Khan vs Ahmed Hussain2019 P.S.C. 1472, 2019 SC AJK 79 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-10Read full judgment →
• Bashir Khan vs Ahmed Hussain and another2020 PLJ Supreme Court (AJ&K) 10, 2019 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 25 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-04-13Read full judgment →
• Rao Naeem alias Goga vs The State2019 MLD 1659 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-05
  illegal arrestexplosive substanceunreliable police evidencesafe custody of weaponsbenefit of doubtmala fide prosecutionrecovery memoanti-terrorism
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act 1908 read with Section 7(1)(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act 2013. The core legal questions involved the reliability of police testimony regarding a nocturnal arrest and weapon recovery, the failure to establish safe custody and transit of recovered items to forensic experts, and the implications of an uninvestigated prior constitutional petition filed by the accused against police officials. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to glaring defects in the investigation, non-disclosure of the source of light during arrest, missing weapon descriptions in the recovery memo, and lack of proof regarding safe custody and transmission of the explosive and firearm. The court laid down that an arrest by police without a warrant must strictly satisfy the conditions of Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, that the simple recovery of weapons is inconclusive without positive forensic reports and proved safe custody, and that an accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when the investigation is tainted by mala fides and contradictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arrest made by police without a warrant under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is illegal and void per se when it fails to meet the threshold of reasonable suspicion and credible information?
  • Can the recovery of a weapon or explosive substance be considered a reliable corroborative piece of evidence without establishing its safe custody at the police station and safe transmission to the forensic laboratory?
  • Does the failure of prosecution witnesses to mention specific identifying descriptions of recovered items in the recovery memo create serious doubt regarding the authenticity of the alleged recovery?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt when the investigation is shown to be dishonest and tainted by a prior motive of false implication due to litigation against police officials?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed vs United Sugar Mills Limited and 2 others2019 CLC 526 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-27Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed vs Ghulam Muhammad and others2019 P Cr. L J 1312 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-30
  criminal revisioncross-examinationfirst version of accusedinvestigating officerrelevancy of evidencecourt witnessadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenged an order of the Sessions Judge, Mianwali, which sustained the complainant's objection during cross-examination and disallowed the petitioner from asking an Investigating Officer (CW-1) whether the accused's first version was found to be correct. The complainant argued that asking an Investigating Officer about the guilt or innocence of an accused is impermissible as it elicits the officer's opinion. The Lahore High Court distinguished opinion on guilt from the accused's initial account, holding that while determining guilt is the exclusive domain of the court, the first version of the accused given immediately after the occurrence is relevant under Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Court established that such first version may properly be brought on record through cross-examination of the Investigating Officer. Consequently, the High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the trial court's order, and directed that the petitioner be permitted to put the specified question to the witness.

  Questions settled

  • Can the first version of an accused given immediately after an occurrence be brought on record through the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer?
  • Is a question put to an Investigating Officer regarding the accused's first version admissible under Article 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does disallowing a question regarding the accused's first version during cross-examination of an Investigating Officer constitute a legal error subject to revision?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed through Legal Representative and others vs Muhammad2019 PLD Supreme Court 504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-02-28
  Section 12(2) CPCLimitation ActTime-barred applicationFraudConcealment of factPleading particularsWrit PetitionArticle 181 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved an appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of an application filed under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which challenged a High Court decision from 1982. The core legal question was whether the application, filed two decades later, was time-barred under The Limitation Act, 1908, particularly concerning the application of Section 18, Article 95, and Article 181 of the Act, and the pleading requirements for fraud or concealment of facts. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that applications under Section 12(2) CPC are governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, prescribing a three-year limitation period from when the right to apply accrues. While Section 18 of the Act allows for an extension if fraud kept the applicant from knowledge, such fraud or concealment must be specifically pleaded with clear particulars, not vague assertions. The appellant's application, filed after twenty years without a specific date of knowledge regarding the alleged fraud, was correctly deemed time-barred.

  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmed alias Bashoo vs The State2019 SHC 478 · Sindh High Court · 2019-12-06
  illegal possession of armsrecovery proceedingsindependent witnesscriminal appealacquittalreasonable doubtsafe custody of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, who was found guilty by the trial court for the illegal possession of a K.Kov firearm under the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon and the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The High Court observed significant discrepancies in the prosecution's case, specifically noting the absence of independent witnesses, the lack of explanation regarding the timeline of the recovery proceedings, the failure to obtain an expert report on the weapon, and the failure to prove the safe custody of the recovered item. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to examine the official who recorded the statements of the witnesses. Relying on the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained on testimony lacking independent corroboration when the prosecution's case is doubtful, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of independent witnesses in a recovery case render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to provide an expert report on the recovered weapon?
  • What is the legal consequence when the prosecution fails to prove the safe custody of recovered evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs The State, etcPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 575, 2019 SCMR 1417, 2019 SCP 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2019-05-07
  private complaintcriminal appealreasonable doubtnon-examination of investigating officersuppression of injuriesmurderacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and petition for leave to appeal arose from an incident on May 29, 2003, resulting in the death of Talib Hussain. The complainant, dissatisfied with the police investigation, prosecuted the accused through a private complaint. The trial court convicted the appellant, Bashir Ahmad, and sentenced him to death, which the Lahore High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the prosecution's case and identified several critical shortcomings, including the implication of an entire household, the presence of firearms with the deceased and complainant suggesting potential aggression, the suppression of injuries on the opposing side, and the non-examination of the investigating officer. The Court held that these factors cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's narrative and caused grievous prejudice to the accused. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the complainant's petition for enhancement of sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-examination of the investigating officer in a trial arising from a private complaint causes prejudice to the accused?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the opposing party during the same incident cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be safely maintained when there is a hypothesis of aggression supported by the presence of weapons with the complainant party and the implication of an entire household?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs The State etc2019 LHC 614 · Lahore High Court · 2019-03-11
  criminal revisionacquittal of co-accusedindependent corroborationmisreading of evidencehurt casebenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed against the judgments of the lower courts convicting the petitioner under Section 337-F(vi) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to three years rigorous imprisonment with daman. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the petitioner could be lawfully convicted on the same evidence when co-accused attributed similar roles had already been acquitted, in the absence of independent and strong corroboration. The Court held that since the petitioner's case was at par with an acquitted co-accused and the ocular account had already been disbelieved regarding other accused persons, the conviction could not be sustained without independent corroboration. The revision petition was accordingly allowed, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of the charge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be convicted on the same evidence when co-accused attributed similar roles have already been acquitted?
  • Is independent and strong corroboration required against a remaining accused when eyewitnesses have been disbelieved regarding other co-accused?
  • Does a difference in the locale of injury make a distinction when the overall role and weapon attributed are identical to an acquitted co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs The State and another2019 LHC 3103, 2020 MLD 52, 2019 LHC 3398 · Lahore High Court · 2019-08-30
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryconflicting prosecution versionsmurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking post-arrest bail in respect of offences including murder and hurt under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail when allegations against him are generalized, supported by conflicting versions from the prosecution and investigating agency, and lack specific attribution of fatal injuries. The Lahore High Court held that where the investigation concludes the accused did not participate and found no specific role or recovery, the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that contradictory stances between the complainant and the investigating agency, coupled with a lack of specific incriminating evidence and motive against the accused, render a case one of further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the investigating agency finds the allegations against the accused to be false during investigation?
  • Does a generalized and collective role attributed to an accused without specific injury make the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground of involvement in a heinous offence when the accused otherwise makes out a case for further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Addl. District Judge, etc2019 CLC 280, 2019 KLR Civil Cases 113, 2018 LHC 2486 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-06Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad vs Additional Sessions Judge_Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Taunsa Sharif, District D.G. Khan and 4 others etc2019 PLJ Lahore 521 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-06Read full judgment →
• Bashir Ahmad Khan vs Addl. Sessions Judge, etc2020 MLD 42, 2019 PLJ Lahore 554, 2019 PLJ Lahore 731, 2019 LHC 2614 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-02Read full judgment →
• Basher Ahmed and others vs Mst. Fatima Bibi (Deceased) through LRs and others2019 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-18
  tenancy rightsinheritanceIslamic law of inheritancesuccessionColonization of Government Lands Actfemale heirsBahawalpur State
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the inheritance of tenancy rights originally granted by the State of Bahawalpur in 1937 to two brothers, Mustali and Wali Muhammad, under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912. The core legal question was whether female heirs were entitled to succeed to these tenancy rights upon the death of the original tenant's sons, given the evolution of the law and the application of Islamic inheritance principles. The Court held that under Section 21(b) of the Colonization Act, once the original male lineal descendants (the sons) died, the succession opened up, and Islamic law applied, entitling female heirs to their shares. The Court rejected the argument that Section 19-A, inserted in 1951, operated to exclude female heirs, noting that such an interpretation would be perverse and defeat the rights of inheritance conferred under the un-amended law. Regarding the second brother, Wali Muhammad, who died issueless, the Court held that his tenancy rights devolved upon his nephews to the exclusion of his nieces.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19-A of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, operate to exclude female heirs from succeeding to tenancy rights?
  • Under Section 21(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, when does the succession to a tenancy open up for heirs other than male lineal descendants?
  • Are female heirs entitled to a share in tenancy rights governed by the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912, upon the death of the original tenant's sons?
  Read full judgment →
• Basharat Ali vs Riaz Noon2019 YLR 2601 · Lahore High Court · 2019-05-08Read full judgment →
• Barkat Mian vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief2019 PLJ Peshawar 96, 2019 PLD Peshawar 1 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-24Read full judgment →
• Baram Khan vs Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary2020 PLJ Quetta 1, 2019 PLD Balochistan 120 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-07-24Read full judgment →
• Baqir Hameed and another vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2019 PLJ Lahore 132 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Baqai Medical University & another vs Government of Pakistan & others2019 MLD 1455, 2019 MLD 1518, 2019 PLJ Karachi 181, 2019 SHC 54 · Sindh High Court · 2019-02-18Read full judgment →
• Bangul vs The State2019 PCr. LJ 1351 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-04
  criminal appealanti-terrorismidentification evidencereasonable doubtacquittalnocturnal identification
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court, which convicted the appellant for murder, attempted murder, and terrorism-related offenses. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the reliability of nocturnal identification and the consistency of witness testimony. The Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. The evidence of police witnesses was deemed unreliable as they arrived after the incident concluded, and the identification of the appellant by the injured witness at night, from a distance of 100 yards under artificial light, was considered a weak and insufficient basis for conviction. Furthermore, the failure to produce the damaged police mobile and the lack of specific attribution of roles to the accused created reasonable doubt. Applying the principle that a single infirmity casting reasonable doubt on the truth of a charge renders the entire prosecution case doubtful, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on nocturnal identification from a distance of 100 yards under artificial light?
  • Does the arrival of police witnesses after an incident has concluded render their testimony insufficient to support a conviction?
  • What is the legal consequence when a single infirmity creates reasonable doubt regarding the truth of a criminal charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Balochistan University of Information and Technology and Management Sciences, Quetta vs Nawab Brother (Pvt.) Limited2019 CLC 1685 · Balochistan High Court · 2019-05-13Read full judgment →
• Bakht Roidar vs Bakht Baidar and others2019 YLR 2679 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-13Read full judgment →
• Bakht Nawas vs The State etc2020 YLR 1685, 2019 PHC 302 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-11-19
  criminal appealmurdereyewitness testimonybenefit of doubtfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusinterested witnesschance witnessacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given that the eyewitnesses were closely related to the deceased, inimical towards the accused, and their testimonies contained significant contradictions and improvements. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the appellants' guilt, as the purported eyewitnesses were interested and chance witnesses whose presence at the scene was not corroborated by physical evidence. The Court emphasized that the rule of 'sifting grain from the chaff' has been superseded by the principle of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' as established in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, ruling that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts, the benefit of which must be extended to the accused. The key principle laid down is that conviction must be based on unimpeachable evidence, and any material falsehood in a witness's testimony renders it unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses be relied upon for conviction in a capital charge without corroboration?
  • Does the principle of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' apply to criminal cases in Pakistan?
  • Is the mere abscondence of an accused sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the trial court applies the 'sifting grain from the chaff' rule instead of the 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' principle?
  Read full judgment →
• Bakhat Roider vs Bakht Baidar2019 PLJ Peshawar 168, 2019 PHC 128 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-13Read full judgment →
• Bahlool Khan vs The State2019 KLR Criminal Cases 436, 2019 P Cr. L J 769 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-11-09
  post-arrest bailcybercrimeblackmailingprohibitory clausePrevention of Electronic Crimes Actconfessional statementmodesty of women
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application was filed by the accused-applicant seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, for allegedly threatening, blackmailing, and demanding money from the complainant by uploading her private objectionable pictures on Facebook messenger. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to post-arrest bail given that the charged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Balochistan High Court held that bail is not to be granted as a matter of right merely because an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause, especially when the crime is heinous, anti-social, and supported by incriminating evidence such as confessional statements and recoveries. The court laid down the principle that the rule of granting bail in offences punishable with less than ten years imprisonment is subject to the facts and circumstances of each case, and courts can competently deny bail in heinous cases involving intrusions into personal privacy and blackmail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be refused in an offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does an accused have a right to bail merely because the punishment for the charged offence is less than 10 years imprisonment?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a confessional statement recorded under Section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahawal Khan and 2 others vs The State and 4 others2019 MLD 1114 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-08
  cognizance of offencefinal reportmagisterial powerscriminal procedurecharge sheetjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal miscellaneous application challenging a Magistrate's order that disagreed with the police's final report (which placed the applicants in Column No. 2 of the charge sheet) and instead took cognizance against the applicants, joining them as accused in a murder case. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate possesses the authority to disagree with an investigating officer's report and summon individuals as accused, even for offences triable by a Court of Sessions. The Court held that the Magistrate acted within their legal competence. The ratio of the decision is that a Magistrate is not bound by the police's opinion in a final report and is empowered to examine the material collected during the investigation to decide whether to summon persons as accused. The key principle laid down is that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence as a whole, and upon finding prima facie evidence connecting a person to the crime, they may summon that person regardless of the investigating officer's contrary opinion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence and join persons as accused despite the investigating officer placing them in Column No. 2 of the final report?
  • Is a Magistrate competent to take cognizance of an offence that is triable by a Court of Sessions?
  • Does a Magistrate have the authority to disagree with the opinion of the investigating officer regarding the innocence of an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahauddin vs The State2019 YLR 1897 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-21
  narcotics possessionchemical examiner reportdirectory rulescriminal appealsafe administration of justicestandard of proofprocedural delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Bahauddin, for the possession of 269 kilograms of charas, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of one million rupees by the Special Judge CNS, Shikarpur. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt despite the absence of independent witnesses, and whether procedural delays in sending samples to the chemical examiner vitiated the conviction. The Court held that the prosecution proved its case, noting that the appellant was caught with a substantial quantity of narcotics. Regarding the procedural delay, the Court held that the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 are directory rather than mandatory, and non-compliance does not invalidate the search or seizure absent evidence of tampering. The Court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing that substantial compliance with procedural rules is sufficient and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice or tampering regarding the seized contraband.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substance (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 mandatory or directory in nature?
  • Does a delay in sending narcotic samples to the chemical examiner render the recovery illegal or fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Is the conviction for possession of narcotics sustainable where the prosecution relies solely on official witnesses without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Bahar Begum vs The State2019 YLR 1585 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-30
  narcoticssafe custodysafe transitchemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtnon-examination of witnesscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, by the trial court. The core legal questions involved the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence regarding safe custody and transit of the recovered narcotics, the failure to examine material witnesses including the search witness and the official who transmitted the sample, and the legal value of a chemical examiner's report lacking prescribed protocols. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt due to multiple investigative flaws, non-examination of key witnesses, lack of safe custody proof, and a deficient chemical report. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to an acquittal as a matter of right, and that failure to establish safe transit and custody of narcotics proves fatal to the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-examination of the official who conducted the personal search and the official who transported the narcotics sample to the chemical examiner is fatal to the prosecution case?
  • Is a chemical examiner's report lacking details of the protocol adopted during analysis admissible for recording a conviction under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the safe custody of the recovered contraband at the police station Malkhana vitiate the conviction?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  Read full judgment →
• Badshah Zada vs The State and others2019 P Cr. L J 1341 · Lahore High Court · 2019-01-30
  confiscation of vehiclerelease of vehiclenarcotics transportinnocent ownercase propertyControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 challenges the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mianwali, who refused to release a seized vehicle on the ground that the convict's appeal against conviction was pending. The core legal question concerns the circumstances under which a vehicle used in a narcotics offense is liable to confiscation and when an innocent owner is entitled to its return. The court held that a vehicle is only liable to confiscation under section 32 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 if it is carrying unlawful narcotics alongside lawful ones, is part of assets derived from narcotics, or has narcotics concealed in secret compartments, and provided the owner had knowledge of the offense. The key principle laid down is that an innocent owner whose vehicle was not used with their knowledge or active connivance is entitled to the release of the vehicle after the trial's conclusion, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving such knowledge.

  Questions settled

  • Under what statutory situations can a vehicle be seized and confiscated under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Is an innocent owner entitled to the return of a vehicle used in a narcotics offense without their knowledge?
  • Does the pendency of a convict's appeal bar the release of a vehicle ordered to be returned to its legitimate owner by the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Badar Computer Enterprises vs The Deputy Collector of Customs and 3 others2019 PTD (Trib.) 1045 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-09-05Read full judgment →
• Babu Lal vs The State2019 P Cr. L J 157 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-09
  criminal revisioncheatingdishonest inducementrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidencebreach of agreementmens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged the concurrent findings of the trial court and the appellate court, which convicted the applicant under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for cheating the complainant regarding the sale of a flat. The applicant had received full payment but failed to deliver possession, later entering into a court-sanctioned agreement to provide an alternative flat to secure pre-arrest bail, which he subsequently breached. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in their appreciation of evidence and whether the applicant’s conduct established the necessary elements of cheating. The High Court dismissed the revision, holding that the lower courts correctly exercised their jurisdiction and that no misreading or non-reading of evidence occurred. The Court affirmed that an accused's conduct, specifically retracting from agreements made during judicial proceedings to resolve grievances, serves as evidence of dishonest intent. Consequently, the conviction was upheld, as the prosecution successfully established the applicant's dishonest inducement of the complainant to part with her money without delivering the promised property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conduct of an accused in retracting from an agreement made during judicial proceedings constitute evidence of dishonest intent for the purpose of Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction regarding the appreciation of evidence by lower courts?
  • Can an accused be convicted for cheating under Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, when they fail to deliver possession of property after receiving full payment?
  Read full judgment →
• Baber Shah and others vs The State through Advocate General Azad2019 YLR 1340 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2019-01-23
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsborderline casecontrol of narcotic substanceschemical examinerprohibitory clausestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant appeals were directed against the orders of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge CNSA, Muzaffarabad, whereby post-arrest bail was declined to the appellants-accused in offences under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery of contraband slightly exceeding one kilogram constituted a borderline case warranting bail under Section 9(b) and 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001, and whether non-compliance with procedural timelines under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 vitiated the recovery. The High Court held that since the recovered quantities of Charas (1140 grams and 1120 grams) exceeded the one kilogram threshold specified for Section 9(b), the cases fell under Section 9(c), and the statutory limits could not be twisted. The Court further held that Rules 4 and 5 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 are directory rather than mandatory. The High Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the refusal of bail due to the bar contained in Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a narcotic quantity marginally exceeding one kilogram brings the case within the borderline category for the grant of bail under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001?
  • Do Rules 4 and 5 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 constitute mandatory provisions whose violation renders the seizure of contraband a nullity?
  • Does Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2001 operate as a statutory bar against the grant of bail for offences punishable under Section 9(c) of the said Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Babar Masih son of SabirMasih vs The State2020 YLR 1557, 2019 SHC 430 · Sindh High Court · 2019-11-04
  criminal appealmurderconfessionretracted confessionbenefit of doubtSection 342 statementcapital punishmentcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concern whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the voluntariness and reliability of the appellant's retracted confession, and the legal consequence of failing to put incriminating evidence to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, noting that the confession was neither true nor voluntary, and that the failure to confront the accused with incriminating evidence during his Section 342 statement rendered such evidence inadmissible against him. The key principles laid down are that a confession recorded while in police custody, particularly when retracted, requires strong corroboration to support a conviction in a capital case, and that any incriminating evidence not put to an accused during their Section 342 examination cannot be used to sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained if incriminating evidence was not put to the accused during their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a retracted confession recorded while in police custody sufficient to support a conviction in a capital case without strong corroboration?
  • Does the failure to put all incriminating evidence to an accused during their Section 342 examination warrant remanding the case for a fresh statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Babar Khan vs Rasheeda Ashraf2019 PHC 254 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-10-14Read full judgment →
• Azmatullah vs State and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.C. 874 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-13
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular evidencematerial improvementfree fightappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of significant contradictions between the FIR and the ocular evidence presented at trial, and the potential that the deceased’s fatal injuries resulted from a fall rather than the alleged assault. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution’s case was riddled with material improvements, unexplained delays in recording witness statements, and a failure to account for the counter-version reported by the accused. Furthermore, the court noted that the medical evidence did not conclusively rule out that the injuries were sustained from a fall. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case suffers from material infirmities and doubts, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material improvement in an eye-witness's statement at trial, which contradicts the FIR, render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is an accused entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution fails to explain injuries sustained by the accused party in a cross-version case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the medical evidence is consistent with both the prosecution's theory of assault and the possibility of accidental injury from a fall?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to examine all injured witnesses mentioned in the FIR create a reasonable doubt regarding the veracity of the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Aziz Ahmad vs Syed Irshad Hussain Shah & 18 others2019 YLR 355, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 524 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-31
  Anti-Terrorism Actrevisional jurisdictioncriminal revisionspecial lawmaintainabilitywrit jurisdictionprivate complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the maintainability of a criminal revision petition filed against an order of an Anti-Terrorism Court dismissing a private complaint. The petitioner challenged the dismissal, invoking the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise revisional powers over orders passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court, given that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is a special statute. The Court held that the revision petition was incompetent. It reasoned that the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is a special law designed for the speedy disposal of cases, and the mere application of the Code of Criminal Procedure for procedural purposes does not import the remedies of appeal or revision into the special statute. The Court affirmed that remedies like revision are statutory creations and cannot be inferred in the absence of an express provision. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revision petition as incompetent but, acknowledging the petitioner's long-standing grievance, converted the proceedings into a Constitutional petition to allow for review on merits under the Court's broader writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Does the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to a special statute automatically incorporate the remedy of revision provided in the Code?
  • Can the High Court convert a misconceived criminal revision petition into a Constitutional petition?
  • Does the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 provide for revisional scrutiny of orders passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Azimullah and another vs The Collector Customs, MCC, Peshawar and 3 others2020 P C T L R 638, 2019 PTD (Trib.) 2248 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-08-02Read full judgment →
• Azhar Mehboob vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 11 others2019 CLC 774 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-12-13Read full judgment →
• Azhar Mehboob vs Aj&K Government through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad & 10 others2019 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 62 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Azhar Hussain vs The State2020 MLD 1329, 2019 SHC 426 · Sindh High Court · 2019-10-30
  anti-terrorismhospital shootingpolice witnessesfsl reportarmed attackbail and convictioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal appeals arising from convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an incident of firing inside the emergency ward of a hospital resulting in a death and the creation of public panic. The core legal questions related to the validity of the trial court's anti-terrorism jurisdiction, the reliability of police officials as eye-witnesses when private witnesses do not turn up, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through medical, ocular, and forensic evidence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the convictions, holding that entering a hospital emergency ward while armed and opening fire to spread fear squarely falls within the definition of terrorism under Sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and that police officials who are present at the scene are natural and credible witnesses whose testimony can sustain a conviction if consistent and corroborated by medical and forensic reports. The court laid down the principles regarding the evaluation of police witness testimony and the applicability of anti-terrorism laws to violent acts causing widespread public terror.

  Questions settled

  • Does an armed attack inside a hospital emergency ward creating panic fall within the ambit of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of police officials who are present at the crime scene be relied upon to sustain a conviction when private witnesses are unavailable?
  • Whether the non-appearance of the primary complainant due to fear or shifting residence is fatal to the prosecution's case if other independent eye-witnesses support the charge?
  • Is a positive forensic science laboratory report matching crime empties with recovered weapons sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Azhar ALi and another vs SaLeh Muhammad and others2019 CLC 1647, 2019 PHC 92 · Peshawar High Court · 2019-02-19Read full judgment →
• Azhar Abbas and another vs The State and others2019 MLD 1808 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-14
  Qatl-i-Amdbenefit of doubtocular accountmedical evidenceforensic reportdishonest improvementacquittalmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of Azhar Abbas for the Qatl-i-Amd of Saddam Hussain under Section 302(b) PPC. The prosecution's case rested on ocular account, medical evidence, and the recovery of a Kalashnikov. Upon review, the High Court identified several fatal flaws: a purported eye-witness (PW-9) failed to testify regarding the incident, leading to an adverse inference; the injured witness (PW-6) failed to prove his injuries were sustained during the occurrence; and the complainant (PW-5) made dishonest improvements to his testimony. Furthermore, the forensic report (PFSA) confirmed that the recovered weapon did not match the empty cartridges found at the scene, and the motive remained unproven. The Court held that when ocular evidence is found to be untrustworthy and forensic evidence contradicts the prosecution's claim, medical evidence alone cannot sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction, and acquitted him of all charges.

  Read full judgment →
• Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Officer vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Finance, Revenue Division and 3 others2019 PTD 903 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-11
  income tax auditSection 214-Cparametric selectionrandom ballotinginjunctive reliefself-assessment schemeadverse actiontaxpayer rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns applications for permanent injunctions filed by various securities brokers against the Federation of Pakistan, challenging audit notices issued by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) under Section 214-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The plaintiffs contended that the audit selection process was opaque, discriminatory, and violated established legal precedents regarding the disclosure of risk parameters. The core legal question was whether the FBR is obligated to disclose the parameters used for selecting taxpayers for audit and whether such selection constitutes an actionable injury. The Court held that the selection of taxpayers for audit, whether through random or parametric balloting, is a valid exercise of statutory power. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner of Inland Revenue Sialkot v. Allah Din Steel and Rolling Mills, the Court ruled that mere selection for audit is not an adverse action, nor does it cause irreparable loss, as it is merely the beginning of a verification process. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Section 214-C(1A), the FBR is not required to disclose risk parameters, and injunctive relief is unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Is the selection of a taxpayer for audit under Section 214-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, considered an adverse action that justifies injunctive relief?
  • Does Section 214-C(1A) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, mandate the disclosure of risk parameters used by the FBR for audit selection?
  • Can a court grant an injunction against an audit notice on the grounds that the selection process was discriminatory or lacked transparency?
  • Is the process of audit selection by the FBR subject to judicial review regarding the specific parameters used for parametric balloting?
  Read full judgment →