Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• The State/Anti-Narcotics Force vs Parvez Hassan Haravi and another2018 PLJ SC 713, 2018 SCMR 1397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-04
  forfeiture of assetsnarcotics traffickingretrospective applicationControl of Narcotic Substances Actburden of proofforeign convictionconstitutional protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the refusal of the Special Court and the High Court to order the forfeiture of a property under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The Anti-Narcotics Force sought forfeiture based on the respondent’s conviction in a foreign court for narcotics trafficking. The core legal questions were whether the property was derived from illicit narcotics proceeds and whether Section 40 could be applied retrospectively to property acquired before the Act's promulgation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that forfeiture under the CNS Act requires a demonstrated nexus between the assets and illicit narcotics activities. The Court emphasized that Section 40 does not dispense with the necessity of proving that assets were acquired through drug-related proceeds. Furthermore, the Court held that applying Section 40 to property purchased in 1987, prior to the Act's 1997 enactment, would violate the protection against retrospective punishment under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Consequently, the lack of evidence linking the property to drug money and the constitutional bar on retrospective application necessitated the dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forfeiture of assets under Section 40 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 require proof that the assets were derived from illicit narcotics trafficking?
  • Can the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 be applied retrospectively to property acquired before the Act's promulgation?
  • Is a foreign conviction sufficient, on its own, to warrant the forfeiture of assets in Pakistan without establishing a nexus between the assets and illicit narcotics proceeds?
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• The State/Anti-Narcotics Force through Deputy Director (Law)2018 MLD 1257 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-20
  appeal against acquittalcontrol of narcotic substancesindependent witnessescontradictions in evidencedouble presumption of innocencespy informationpersonal search
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the State through the Anti-Narcotics Force against the judgment of the trial court acquitting the respondent of charges under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused on the basis of material contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the failure to associate independent private witnesses despite prior spy information. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the judgment of acquittal was based on sound reasons, material contradictions, and the lack of independent corroboration where available. The key principle laid down is that in an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys double presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is warranted only in cases of gross misreading of evidence or where the judgment is arbitrary or capricious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal when the trial court's findings are based on material contradictions and sound reasoning?
  • Is it mandatory to associate independent private witnesses during a recovery when prior spy information is available and potential witnesses are present?
  • What is the legal threshold for interfering with an acquittal order where the accused has acquired a double presumption of innocence?
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• The State, through D.G. FIA, Islamabad vs Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh and 262018 PCRLJ 1264, 2018 IHC 42 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-25
  judicial biaspecuniary interestacquittal appealillegal gratificationvitiated judgmentfair trialremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, filed under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, challenged an acquittal judgment passed by an Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerned the validity of a judgment rendered by a presiding judge who was subsequently dismissed from service for accepting illegal gratification in the very case he decided. The High Court held that the judgment was vitiated due to the presiding judge's direct pecuniary interest. Relying on established precedent, the Court affirmed that any pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies a judge from adjudicating a matter, as justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. The Court ruled that such bias renders the proceedings void on grounds of public policy, irrespective of the correctness of the decision. Consequently, the acquittal was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision by the Sessions Judge, with the prosecution's evidence preserved as requested. The respondents were ordered to surrender and furnish fresh bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge's direct pecuniary interest in a case, however small, disqualify them from adjudicating it?
  • Can a judgment be set aside solely on the ground that the presiding judge accepted illegal gratification?
  • Does the existence of pecuniary bias in a judge vitiate the entire judicial proceeding irrespective of the correctness of the final decision?
  • Is a judge who has accepted illegal gratification disqualified from acting as a judge on grounds of public policy?
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• The State vs Zulfiqar Ali alias Kamo and 3 others2018 P Cr. L J 410 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-04-26
  compromiseacquittalproxy compromiselegal heirsinjured personremandcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a criminal appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the trial court on the basis of a compromise between the parties under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether persons acting as proxies, such as cousins, brothers in the presence of mothers, or fathers and brothers acting for adult injured persons who were merely studying elsewhere, were legally competent to effect a valid compromise under the law. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the compromise suffered from inherent, incurable defects because Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not permit proxies on behalf of victims, and only competent legal heirs or injured persons themselves can compound an offense. Consequently, the court set aside the acquittal order and partially remanded the matter back to the trial court to summon the actual victims and proper legal heirs to record their statements and proceed in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a cousin or a brother can effect a valid compromise on behalf of an injured victim or deceased person under Section 345(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an acquittal order passed on a defective compromise be set aside by the appellate court?
  • Is a proxy permitted to record a statement of compromise on behalf of a victim who is absent due to studying in another city?
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• The State vs Zaheer-Ud-Din2018 MLD 314 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-19Read full judgment →
• The State vs Shahid Azeem2018 IHC 87 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncapital punishmentmurder referencerape and murdercircumstantial evidenceconfessional statementcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a murder reference and a criminal appeal arising from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant for the kidnapping, rape, murder, and subsequent concealment of the dead body of a seven-year-old girl. The core legal questions addressed by the court concern whether the judicial confessional statement of the appellant was made voluntarily despite its subsequent retraction, whether delay in recording it is fatal, and whether sufficient corroborative evidence exists to sustain a conviction for capital offences. The Islamabad High Court held that a retracted judicial confession can legally form the basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was voluntary and true, and that the prosecution successfully corroborated the confession through medical evidence, pointations, and recoveries. The court laid down principles regarding the evidentiary value of retracted judicial confessions, the necessity of corroboration in material particulars as a rule of prudence, and the non-fatal nature of administrative lapses or delays where voluntariness remains established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession alone form the basis of a conviction in a capital case?
  • Whether delay in recording a confessional statement under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is invariably fatal to its admissibility?
  • Does the alteration or reframing of a charge automatically necessitate a de novo trial in every instance?
  • What are the essential pre-requisites for accepting a judicial confession as true and voluntary?
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• The State vs Shah Raees Khan and 9 others2018 MLD 577 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-04
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailcompromiseindiscriminate firingcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The State filed a petition under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the order of the Anti-Terrorism Court Gilgit, whereby bail was granted to the respondents based on a compromise in a case registered vide FIR No. 1/2016 under sections 324/506(2)/147/149/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Sassi, Haramosh. The core legal question was whether bail granted by the trial court should be cancelled under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the petition was meritless and dismissed it, ruling that once bail is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, very strong and exceptional grounds are required to withdraw the concession of bail, and no such extraordinary or exceptional ground was made out to upset the trial court's order.

  Questions settled

  • What grounds are required to withdraw the concession of bail once it is granted by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  • Can the State challenge an order granting bail under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without showing extraordinary and exceptional grounds?
  • Whether a bail cancellation petition can succeed when the Deputy Attorney General fails to point out any illegality in the impugned order?
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• The State vs New National Stationeries through Proprietor2018 CLD 621 · Intellectual Property Tribunal · 2018-01-22Read full judgment →
• The State vs Mst. Kausar Bibi2018 LHC 298 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-27
  NarcoticsSentencing policyEnhancement of sentenceMitigating circumstancesControl of Narcotic Substances ActConfessional statementCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State under Section 48(1) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, seeking enhancement of the respondent's sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding a lenient sentence despite finding the prosecution's case proved. The core legal question was whether a trial court possesses the discretion to deviate from established sentencing policies in narcotics cases and what constitutes valid "special features" justifying such departure. The Court held that while sentencing guidelines exist, trial courts retain the discretion to depart from them provided they record specific reasons for doing so. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision, noting that the respondent’s status as a mother with minor children, her lack of prior convictions, her genuine repentance, and the potential ambiguity regarding the precise weight of the recovered contraband constituted valid "special features." The judgment establishes that the devastating impact of parental incarceration on children and the offender's personal circumstances are legitimate grounds for a court to exercise leniency in sentencing, particularly when the prosecution fails to object to the confession or provide evidence of prior criminal history.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court deviate from established sentencing policies in cases under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • What factors constitute 'special features' justifying a departure from standard sentencing policies in narcotics cases?
  • Is the impact of parental incarceration on minor children a valid mitigating factor for sentencing?
  • Does the failure to weigh contraband separately from its packaging create ambiguity that justifies a lenient sentence?
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• The State vs Manzoor Hussain2018 MLD 1931 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-08-15Read full judgment →
• The State vs Maheen Zafar and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 664, 2018 IHC 33 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-17
  child abusewillful neglectFIR validityprocedural irregularitySection 328-A PPCres gestaecriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the trial of two accused persons, Maheen Zafar and Raja Khurram Ali Khan, charged with multiple offences, including wrongful confinement, assault, and willful neglect of a minor maid servant, Tayyaba Bibi, under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions addressed whether the failure of the complainant to sign the First Information Report (FIR) vitiated the proceedings and whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that the absence of a signature on an FIR is a procedural irregularity that does not invalidate the trial, as the FIR merely sets the criminal law in motion. Regarding the merits, the Court acquitted the accused of charges involving assault and wrongful confinement due to insufficient evidence. However, the Court convicted both accused under Section 328-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for willful neglect and ill-treatment of a child, establishing the principle that custodians are legally responsible for the welfare of minors in their care, and failure to provide necessary care constitutes a punishable offence under the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a complainant to sign an FIR render the criminal proceedings illegal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under Section 328-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the neglect of a child maid servant?
  • Is the absence of a signature on an FIR a fatal procedural defect?
  • Does medical evidence alone suffice for conviction in the absence of ocular testimony?
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• The State vs Karam Dad Bhatti2019 P Cr. L J 902, 2018 LHC 2671 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-02
  dishonour of chequesecondary evidencejurisdiction of banking courtsfinancial institutionscriminal appealacquittalspecial law vs general law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent by the Additional Sessions Judge in a case involving the dishonour of a cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the non-production of the original cheque, and whether ordinary criminal courts possess jurisdiction to try offences involving the dishonour of cheques issued by customers to financial institutions. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. It held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, as the original cheque was not produced, and secondary evidence (a photocopy) was admitted without the court's permission, violating the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that, per Supreme Court precedent, offences committed by customers of financial institutions regarding cheque dishonour fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of Banking Courts established under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001, ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts. The key principle established is that special laws governing financial institutions override general criminal statutes in such matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can a photocopy of a cheque be admitted as evidence without formal permission of the court under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 have an overriding effect on the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding cheque dishonour cases involving financial institutions?
  • Do ordinary criminal courts have jurisdiction to try a customer for the dishonour of a cheque issued to a financial institution?
  • When prosecution evidence is rejected in its entirety, must the statement of the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted without scrutiny?
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• The State vs Azmat Ali and others2018 CLD 519 · Intellectual Property Tribunal · 2018-01-31
  intellectual propertycopyright infringementFIA jurisdictioncriminal complaintpower of attorneylocus standiprivate dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal complaints transferred to the Intellectual Property Tribunal regarding alleged copyright infringement. The core legal questions were whether the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) possesses jurisdiction to prosecute copyright offences involving private parties, and whether a criminal complaint or FIR can be validly lodged by an attorney on behalf of a complainant. The Tribunal held that the FIA lacks jurisdiction to prosecute copyright offences between private parties, as the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, is restricted to matters concerning the Federal Government, requiring a nexus between the offence and the State. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that a complaint for copyright infringement cannot be initiated by an attorney, as copyright is a personal right requiring the complainant's personal knowledge, which an attorney cannot provide. The Tribunal established the principle that the FIA's jurisdiction is not automatic for scheduled offences but requires a nexus with the Federal Government, and that criminal proceedings for copyright infringement must be initiated by the aggrieved owner, assignee, or licensee, not an attorney.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have jurisdiction to prosecute copyright infringement offences involving only private parties?
  • Can a criminal complaint or FIR for copyright infringement be validly lodged by an attorney on behalf of the complainant?
  • Is the jurisdiction of the Federal Investigation Agency over scheduled offences dependent on a nexus with the Federal Government?
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• The State through Regional Director ANF vs (1) Imam Bakhsh (2) FidaPLJ 2019 SC (Cr.C.) 90, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1089, 2018 SCMR 2039, 2018 SCP 1313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-12
  narcotic substanceschain of custodygovernment analyst reporttesting protocolsmandatory vs directory rulescriminal appealnarcotics testing laboratory
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment addresses multiple criminal appeals concerning the acquittal of individuals charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal questions involved whether the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 are mandatory or directory, and the impact of non-compliance with these rules and failures in the chain of custody on the evidentiary value of a Government Analyst's report. The Supreme Court held that while Rule 5 is directory, Rule 6 is mandatory regarding the inclusion of full testing protocols in the analyst's report. The Court ruled that a report lacking these protocols is inconclusive and unreliable, failing to support a conviction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the prosecution must establish an unbroken, secure chain of custody for seized substances from recovery to laboratory receipt. Any lapse in this chain or failure to document testing protocols renders the analyst's report insufficient for sustaining a conviction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the State's appeals against the acquittals, affirming that strict adherence to testing protocols and chain of custody is fundamental to the Act's statutory scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Are the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 mandatory or directory?
  • Does the failure to include full testing protocols in a Government Analyst's report invalidate the report for the purpose of sustaining a criminal conviction?
  • What is the legal consequence of a break in the chain of custody of a narcotic sample from the point of recovery to the laboratory?
  • Is the requirement for two signatures on the Government Analyst's report under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 a mandatory requirement?
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• The State through Prosecutor General, Balochistan vs Abdul Nafay and another2018 MLD 287 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-16Read full judgment →
• The State through National Accountability Bureau vs Pervaiz Iqbal2018 YLR 1635 · Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit Baltistan · 2018-01-30
  National Accountability Ordinancecorruption and corrupt practicesFIA investigationprocedural defectacquittalaccountability referencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the dismissal of the State’s appeal by the Chief Court, which had upheld the acquittal of the respondent, Pervaiz Iqbal, in a corruption case. The respondent was initially charged under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, following an investigation conducted by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The core legal question concerned the validity of the investigation and the subsequent reference filed against the respondent, specifically whether the FIA possessed the legal competence to conduct inquiries into matters under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and whether the procedural requirements for such investigations were met. The Trial Court had ultimately acquitted the respondent, finding the reference defective due to improper investigation procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Appellate Court found no infirmity or illegality in the Chief Court’s judgment. The Court held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the investigation and reference were conducted in accordance with the law, thereby affirming the acquittal and dismissing the State’s appeal. The judgment reinforces the principle that strict adherence to statutory procedural requirements is mandatory for the validity of accountability references.

  Questions settled

  • Is a reference filed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, maintainable if the investigation procedure is found to be defective?
  • Does the Federal Investigation Agency have the authority to conduct inquiries into cases falling under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Can an acquittal be upheld if the prosecution fails to demonstrate that the investigation was conducted in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions?
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• The State through DG FIA Islamabad vs Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh and 262018 P Cr. L J 1264 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-25
  pecuniary interestjudicial biasvitiation of judgmentcriminal appealacquittaljudicial misconductfair trialremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, preferred under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged an acquittal judgment rendered by an Additional Sessions Judge. The State contended that the presiding judge had been dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings where he admitted to accepting illegal gratification to secure the respondents' acquittal. The core legal question was whether a judgment rendered by a judge with a proven pecuniary interest in the outcome is vitiated, and if so, what the appropriate remedy is. The Court held that any direct pecuniary interest, however slight, disqualifies a judge and vitiates the resulting judgment, as it violates the fundamental principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned acquittal judgment. Applying established precedent, the Court remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision, while preserving the evidence already recorded, as the prosecution conceded that the proceedings prior to the judgment were not tainted by bias.

  Questions settled

  • Does a judge's pecuniary interest in a case, however small, disqualify them from adjudicating the matter?
  • Does a judgment rendered by a judge who has accepted illegal gratification stand vitiated regardless of the correctness of the decision?
  • Can a case be remanded for a fresh decision while preserving evidence recorded prior to the discovery of judicial bias?
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• The State through Advocate-General and another vs Mirza Hussain2018 MLD 1582 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-04-24
  bail cancellationpre-arrest bailforged documentscriminal breach of trustcheatingjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed by the State and a complainant under section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the vacation Judge Gilgit in FIR No. 67/2017 registered under sections 421, 468, and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Jutial Gilgit. The core legal question was whether pre-arrest bail was rightly granted to an accused charged with submitting forged property documents for official bidding. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the lower court exercised its discretion arbitrarily and failed to appreciate that pre-arrest bail requires proof of mala fides, enmity, or absence of a prima facie case, none of which were established. The court laid down the principle that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted casually when the lodging authority has no personal grudge and the involvement in submitting fabricated documents is apparent. Consequently, the bail-granting order was recalled and the application for bail cancellation was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted without establishing mala fides, personal enmity, or the absence of a prima facie case?
  • Does the submission of forged property documents for official bidding justify the cancellation of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can an agent escape criminal liability for submitting forged documents on behalf of a principal company during a government bidding process?
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• The State through 9 ANF Gilgit vs Nazir Rehmat and another2018 YLR 2695 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-08-30
  narcotics possessionplea of guiltsentence enhancementprocedural irregularityspecial courtlenient view
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the State against a judgment of the Special Judge, CNSA Gilgit, which convicted two respondents for narcotics possession (one kilogram of charas each) and sentenced them to the period already undergone plus a fine. The State sought enhancement of the sentence, arguing the trial court took an overly lenient view. The respondents argued they were from poor families and that the conviction should stand. Upon review, the Court noted a procedural irregularity: the trial court failed to strictly adhere to Section 265-E of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which mandates specific procedures for recording a plea of guilt. However, the Court observed that the accused had indeed pleaded guilty at the time of the charge framing. Determining that a harsh view would not serve the interests of justice and that the trial court's judgment was otherwise just, the Court dismissed the State's appeal, maintaining the original sentence despite the technical procedural defect.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure to strictly follow the procedure for recording a plea of guilt under Section 265-E of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically invalidate a conviction?
  • Can an appellate court maintain a conviction despite a technical procedural defect in the trial court's judgment?
  • Is the appellate court bound to enhance a sentence if the trial court has taken a lenient view of a plea of guilt?
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• The State of Tamil Nadu and Ors vs K. Balu and Anr2018 SCInd 9 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-02-23Read full judgment →
• The State and 4 others vs Tariq Hussain and another2018 MLD 1573 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-05-30
  circumstantial evidenceblind murdercall data recordjoint recoveryjoint pointationcriminal appealacquittalburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court convicting the appellants for murder and robbery. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including Call Data Records (CDR), the recovery of a mobile phone, and the joint recovery of a vehicle. The Federal Shariat Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The court affirmed the principle that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of events must be complete, natural, and conclusive, leaving no reasonable ground for the innocence of the accused; any missing link necessitates acquittal. Specifically, the court ruled that CDRs are inadmissible without authentication or issuance by the cellular service provider. Furthermore, the court held that joint pointation of stolen property by multiple accused is inadmissible, and the recovery of the mobile phone was unreliable due to discrepancies in its description. Consequently, the court found the trial court's judgment suffered from misreading and mis-appreciation of evidence, set aside the convictions, and ordered the immediate release of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Call Data Record (CDR) admissible as evidence if it is not authenticated or issued by the cellular service provider?
  • Does the joint pointation of stolen property by multiple accused persons constitute admissible evidence?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is incomplete?
  • Is the recovery of stolen property considered incriminating if the item was not described or identified by the complainant prior to recovery?
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• The Secretary Government of the Punjab, Irrigation Department and others vs Khalid Mahmood Butt and 118 others2018 PLC 278 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2017-06-13
  Big City AllowanceLabour Court jurisdictionindustrial disputeservice benefitsprovincial government notificationadministrative headquarters
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the order of the Punjab Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala, which granted 'Big City Allowance' to employees of the Irrigation Department stationed at Nandipur. The respondents claimed entitlement based on their headquarters being in Lahore and alleged discrimination compared to other employees in the same vicinity. The core legal question was whether employees stationed outside designated 'Big Cities' are entitled to the Big City Allowance based on administrative headquarters or proximity to municipal limits, and whether a Labour Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the impugned order was unsustainable. It ruled that only the provincial government, through official notification, can define city limits for such allowances. Departmental correspondence or revenue officer certificates cannot substitute for formal government notifications. Furthermore, the Tribunal held that claims for such allowances do not constitute an 'industrial dispute' under the relevant labour laws, and thus, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to award them. The appeal was accepted, and the grievance petition was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Labour Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for 'Big City Allowance' as an industrial dispute?
  • Can departmental correspondence or revenue officer certificates establish city limits for the purpose of government allowances in the absence of a formal government notification?
  • Are employees stationed at a camp office outside a designated 'Big City' entitled to Big City Allowance simply because their administrative headquarters are located within a 'Big City'?
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• The Punjab Employees Social Security Institution vs Zulfiqar Ali and 2 others2018 C.L.R. 1045 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-28
  social security contributionprovincial ombudsmanstatutory remedyjurisdictionmaladministrationconstitutional petitionexhaustion of remedies
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the Provincial Ombudsman and the Governor of Punjab, which directed the Punjab Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI) to withdraw a demand notice for social security contributions. The core legal question was whether an aggrieved employer could bypass the statutory grievance redressal mechanism provided under the Social Security Ordinance 1965 by approaching the Provincial Ombudsman. The Court held that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because Section 57 of the Ordinance explicitly mandates that disputes regarding contributions must be decided by the Institution, with an appellate remedy available under Section 59. The Court affirmed the principle that when a statute prescribes a specific procedure and forum for resolving disputes, that mechanism must be strictly followed. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned orders, ruling that the Ombudsman’s intervention was without jurisdiction and contrary to the legislative intent. The petitioner was directed to pursue the statutory remedy if aggrieved by the demand notice, reinforcing that administrative bodies cannot assume jurisdiction where special laws provide exclusive forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer bypass the statutory grievance redressal mechanism under the Social Security Ordinance 1965 by approaching the Provincial Ombudsman?
  • Does the Provincial Ombudsman have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding social security contributions when a specific forum is provided under the governing statute?
  • Is an order passed by the Provincial Ombudsman without jurisdiction liable to be set aside by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction?
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• The Punjab Cooperatives Board for Liquidation vs Dr. Nazir Saeed etc2019 MLD 201, 2018 LHC 2678 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-19Read full judgment →
• The National Highway Authority through Director (Legal) vs Lilley2018 CLC 627 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
• The Managing Director, Utility Store Corporation and 6 others vs Muddasir Shahzad and 230 others2018 PLC 63 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2017-08-17
  labour court jurisdictionutility store corporationappellate tribunalconstitutional petitionbinding precedentservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the Managing Director of the Utility Store Corporation challenging a judgment of the Labour Court-I, Quetta, dated 26-08-2015. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants requested an adjournment, noting that a related constitutional petition involving similar issues was pending before the High Court of Balochistan. The core legal question concerned the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal over the employees of the Utility Store Corporation. Subsequently, the High Court of Balochistan, in a separate constitutional petition (C.P. No. 947/2013), issued a judgment on 21-07-2017, explicitly setting aside previous judgments of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the same subject matter on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Labour Appellate Tribunal, following the binding precedent established by the High Court of Balochistan, recognized that the lower forums lacked the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The Tribunal effectively disposed of the appeal in light of the High Court's authoritative ruling on the jurisdictional status of the employees and the forum's competence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Labour Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving employees of the Utility Store Corporation?
  • Is the Labour Appellate Tribunal bound by a High Court judgment regarding the jurisdiction of labour forums over specific corporate entities?
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• The Management of Regional Chief Engineer P.H.E.D. Ranchi vs Their2018 SCInd 85 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-20Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Polo Club vs Additional District Judge etc2018 CLD 1214, 2018 LHC 1395 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-30Read full judgment →
• The Lahore Polo Club through Secretary vs Additional District Judge2018 CLD 1214 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-30Read full judgment →
• The Income Tax Officer vs Urban Improvement Trust2018 SCInd 134 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• The Federal Board of Revenue etc. vs M/s. Chenone Stores Ltd.PTCL 2018 CL. 141 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-17Read full judgment →
• The Federal Board of Revenue and others vs Messrs Chenone Stores2018 PTD 208 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-17Read full judgment →
• The Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution vs Punjab Labour Court No.5, Sargodha and another2019 PLC 38, 2018 LHC 2850 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-26
  Employees Old-Age Benefits InstitutionLabour Court jurisdictionindustrial disputeold-age pensionconstitutional petitionalternate remedywithout jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged orders passed by the Punjab Labour Court accepting a grievance petition and subsequent review filed by an employee regarding old-age pension benefits under the Employees Old-Age Benefit Act, 1976. The core legal questions involved whether a Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain a pension dispute under the 1976 Act and whether a grievance petition is maintainable when a specific statutory remedy of appeal is provided. The Lahore High Court held that the Labour Court acted completely without jurisdiction, as a dispute concerning old-age benefits against the Employees Old-Age Benefit Institution does not constitute an industrial dispute under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010, and the employee had bypassed the statutory appeal remedy under Section 35 of the 1976 Act. The Court established the principle that a Labour Court lacks jurisdiction over matters not falling within its statutory domain, and where an inferior tribunal acts without jurisdiction, constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 can be invoked directly without exhausting alternate remedies. The petition was consequently allowed and the impugned orders were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Labour Court can entertain a grievance petition filed by an employee in presence of the statutory remedy of appeal provided under Section 35 of the Employees Old-Age Benefit Act, 1976?
  • Whether the Punjab Labour Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition relating to old-age benefits under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable when the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction, despite the non-availment of an alternate remedy of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• The Corporation of Madras & Anr vs M. Parthasarathy & Ors2018 SCInd 23 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-08-10Read full judgment →
• The Competition and Markets Authority vs R (on the Application of Gallaher Group Ltd.) and others2018 SCMR 1342 · Supreme Court of United KingdomRead full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV, Large Tax¬payer, Karachi vs M_s. Hazara Efficient Gas, Karachi2018 PTD (Trib.) 1188, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 337 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-12-13Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, R.T.O., Hyderabad vs Messrs2019 P.C.T.L.R. 26, 2018 PTD (Trib.) 2235 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2018-06-01Read full judgment →
• The Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-Ill), Ltu, Islamabad vs M/s.2018 PTD (Trib.) 1244, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 352 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-10-26Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs, through Deputy Collector (Group-VI), MCC of Appraisement (East) Customs House, Karachi vs The Rangeela International 43-G, Gulberg II, Lahore and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 1774 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-02-04Read full judgment →
• The Collector of Customs, MCC (Appraisement), Lahore and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 1925 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-05-22Read full judgment →
• The Cir (Legal), R.T.O, Faisalabad vs M/s. Seth Muhammad Tufail & Sons,PTCL 2018 CL. 381 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-02-17Read full judgment →
• The Chief Executive and Directors, Mubarak Textile Mills Ltd vs Abid2018 CLD 111 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• The Chairperson, National Commission for Human Development, etc. vs Abdul Jabbar Memon, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1089 · Islamabad High Court
  Intra-Court AppealConstitutional jurisdictionStatutory rulesMaster and servantAggrieved personService regulationsAdditional charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenged a Single Judge's decision that set aside a notification granting additional charge to certain officials of the National Commission for Human Development. The core legal questions were whether the Commission's service rules were statutory in nature and whether the respondents had standing under Article 199 of the Constitution to challenge the notification. The Court held that the Rules of 2006 are non-statutory because the National Commission for Human Development Ordinance, 2002, does not reserve control for the Federal Government, nor does it fetter the Commission's discretion in framing rules. Consequently, the relationship between the Commission and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant. Furthermore, the Court found the respondents were not aggrieved persons under Article 199, as the impugned notification did not prejudice their seniority or promotion prospects. The key principle laid down is that for service rules to be statutory, the parent statute must either require Government approval for rule-making or demonstrate that the rule-making authority is under Government control, with rules having an effect broader than internal management.

  Questions settled

  • Are the service rules of the National Commission for Human Development statutory in nature?
  • What is the test for determining whether service rules of a statutory body are statutory or non-statutory?
  • Can an employee challenge an order of additional charge granted to other officials under Article 199 of the Constitution if it does not affect their seniority or promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairperson, National Commission for Human Development and others vs Abdul Jabbar Memon and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 1089, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 73 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-13
  Intra Court Appealstatutory rulesnon-statutory rulesmaster and servantaggrieved personadditional chargeconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges a judgment passed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers that had set aside a notification granting an additional charge of various posts to five officials of the National Commission for Human Development. The core legal questions involved whether the service rules of the Commission are statutory or non-statutory, whether the rule enunciated in Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani was overruled by Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM, and whether the respondents qualified as aggrieved persons under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Islamabad High Court held that the service rules of the Commission are non-statutory because the legislature intended to establish an independent and autonomous body without reserving control or rule-making approval powers to the Federal Government, and that the judgment in Shafique Ahmed Khan did not overrule the established test requiring governmental approval or implicit control. Furthermore, the court held that the respondents were not aggrieved persons as the mere issuance of an additional charge did not affect their seniority or promotion prospects. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the single bench judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service rules framed by the National Commission for Human Development under the National Commission for Human Development Ordinance, 2002 are statutory or non-statutory in nature?
  • Did the judgment in Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM overrule the principle established in Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani regarding government approval as a condition precedent for statutory rules?
  • Does the notification of an additional charge to certain employees give rise to a cause of action for other employees to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution as aggrieved persons?
  • What is the governing legal test for determining whether service regulations of a statutory corporation possess statutory force?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chairman NADRA, Islamabad and others vs Mohammad Ali Shah and others2018 P.S.C. 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional petitioncontractual employeesregularizationNADRAwrit jurisdictionterms and conditions of servicestatutory body
  Summary & questions settled

  These civil appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a common judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had altered the terms, designations, and pay scales offered by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) for the regularization of its contractual employees. The core legal questions pertained to whether contractual employees of a statutory body could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 to renegotiate or alter terms of regularization, and whether executive directives issued by the Ministry of Interior could override decisions of a statutory authority. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that contractual employees cannot invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge or alter the terms of regularization offered by a statutory organization prior to their formal regularization. The Court laid down that statutory authorities governed by their own enabling statutes and regulations are sole competent bodies regarding employee terms, and executive ministries lack legal authority to interfere or dictate terms contrary to statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can contractual employees of a statutory body invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to renegotiate or alter terms of regularization offered by the employer?
  • Does the Ministry of Interior have legal authority to order the regularization or determine service terms of contractual employees of NADRA?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to amend or rewrite the terms of an offer of regularization issued by a statutory authority?
  Read full judgment →
• The C.I.R. (Legal), R.T.O., Faisalabad vs Messrs Seth Muhammad Tufail &PTCL 2018 CL. 381, 2018 PTD (Trib.) 536 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-02-17Read full judgment →
• The Board of Directors through Chairman, Secretary Industry and another vs Lasbella Industrial Estate Development Authority through President2019 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 94, 2018 PLC 186 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2018-03-07
  Labour Court jurisdictionexecution of NIRC orderBalochistan Industrial Actindustrial relationstrans-provincial establishmentprovincial establishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Labour Court which allowed an execution application filed under section 41(6) of the Balochistan Industrial Act, 2010, for the execution of an order originally passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The core legal question was whether the Labour Court possessed the jurisdiction to execute an order passed by the NIRC when jurisdiction shifted due to statutory changes confining the NIRC to federal and trans-provincial matters. The Appellate Tribunal held that because the establishment was provincial and the NIRC lost its jurisdiction over such matters, the case automatically stood transferred to the Labour Court, which therefore possessed proper jurisdiction to execute the order. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as meritless, affirming that provincial Labour Courts can handle execution matters of cases transferred due to changes in jurisdictional scope under industrial relations laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a provincial Labour Court has jurisdiction to execute an order originally passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission lose jurisdiction over provincial establishments following statutory changes?
  • Are pending matters concerning provincial establishments automatically transferred to the Labour Court upon the National Industrial Relations Commission losing jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• The Agricultural & Research Department, Etc vs Muhammad Tariq2019 CLC 1972, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1128, 2019 PLJ Lahore 342, 2018 LHC 1258 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Thatta Cement Company, Ltd, Karachi vs he Commissioner Inland2018 PTD (Trib.) 388, PTCL 2018 CL. 398 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-01-02Read full judgment →
• Telecard Limited vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2018 SHC 1085 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-30Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Officer vs Amjad Hussain and 2 others2018 PLC 1 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-28
  regularizationdaily wagersconstruction industryworkmanjurisdiction of labour courtstanding orders ordinancetehsil municipal administrationback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment from the Lahore High Court addresses multiple constitutional petitions concerning the regularization of daily-wage and work-charged employees of the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) and their access to labor forums. The core legal questions involve whether TMA constitutes an industrial or commercial establishment under labor laws, whether employees governed by the Punjab Local Councils Servants (Service) Rules, 1997 can approach the Labour Court, and whether employees performing permanent nature duties acquire permanent status. The court held that TMA functions as a construction industry given its statutory municipal and water/sewerage responsibilities, making its workers amenable to labor laws despite having statutory service rules that lack provisions for daily wagers. The court reaffirmed that employees engaged in permanent duties for over nine months attain permanent status, and artificial breaks in service cannot deny them this right. Consequently, the departmental petitions were dismissed, and an employee's petition for back benefits was allowed. The key principle laid down is that local government entities engaged in municipal infrastructure and construction functions fall within the definition of construction industry, and daily-wage workers performing permanent duties are entitled to invoke labor laws and seek regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Tehsil Municipal Administration fall within the definition of an industrial or commercial establishment under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can daily-wage and work-charged employees of a local government approach the Labour Court when statutory service rules are silent on their recruitment and regularization?
  • Whether artificial breaks in service can deprive a daily-wage employee of attaining the status of a permanent workman after completing the statutory period?
  • Are government functionaries exempt from explaining each day's delay when filing appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Administration vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal-2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 105, 2018 PLC 224 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-22
  regularization of servicework charge basispermanent nature of dutiesLabour Court jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a challenge to the judgments of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered the regularization of the service of respondent employees who were initially appointed on a work charge basis by the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA). The core legal question concerns whether work-charge employees with continuous service performing duties of a permanent nature are entitled to regularization of their services through the Labour Court. The Lahore High Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower forums regarding continuous service for more than nine months against permanent posts warranted no interference under constitutional jurisdiction, as the case law cited by the petitioner was distinguishable and the regularization was permissible under the Industrial Relations Ordinance/Act. The key principle laid down is that employees engaged on a work charge basis whose duties are permanent in nature and who have served continuously for a substantial period can seek and be granted regularization through the Labour Court, and such concurrent factual findings cannot be disturbed in constitutional jurisdiction absent illegality or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether work-charge employees performing duties of a permanent nature for a continuous period are entitled to regularization of service?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding continuous service recorded by the Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are judgments concerning writ jurisdiction and damages for premature termination of contract applicable to cases where employees seek regularization of service before a Labour Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehsil Municipal Administration Etc vs Khalid Rafique Ahmad2019 [M] C.L.R. 65, 2019 PLJ Lahore 1, 2018 LHC 858 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-05Read full judgment →
• TCS Private Limited & others vs Pakistan Post & another2019 PLJ Karachi 1, 2019 PLD Sindh 69, 2018 SHC 857 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-03Read full judgment →
• Tauseef Ahmad and another vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 15 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-27
  acid throwingbenefit of doubtcommon intentionsifting grain from chaffanti-terrorismcriminal appealmedical evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated criminal appeals arose from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellants for acid throwing and related offences. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular and medical evidence, the application of common intention, and the principle of sifting grain from chaff when co-accused are acquitted. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove common intention and participation beyond reasonable doubt against the first appellant, granting him the benefit of doubt and ordering his acquittal, but maintained the conviction and sentence of the second appellant whose role was fully established by consistent eyewitness and medical evidence. The key principles laid down include that the benefit of a reasonable doubt accrues to an accused as a matter of right, and that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no universal application in Pakistani criminal jurisprudence, requiring courts to sift grain from chaff.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution successfully established common intention between co-accused in the commission of an acid attack?
  • Does the acquittal of one co-accused necessitate the acquittal of another when their roles are distinguishable?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 336-B of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applicable universally in criminal cases under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Tassadaq Nawaz vs Masood Iqbal Usmani, etc2018 LHC 1173 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-29Read full judgment →
• Tariq vs The State and another2018 YLR 578 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• Tariq Siddique vs Addl. Rent Controller, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 218 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Tariq Siddique vs Additional Rent Controller and others2018 PLJ Lahore 218, 2018 YLR 313 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Tariq Shah vs Provincial Police Officer Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2018 P Cr. L J 947 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-02
  Fourth ScheduleAnti-Terrorism ActWrit jurisdictionAlternative remedyExhaustion of remediesTerrorismStatutory appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated writ petitions were filed by various citizens challenging their inclusion in the Fourth Schedule list under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by the provincial government, which effectively branded them as terrorists associated with banned organizations. The petitioners, asserting their innocence and citing their social standing and past contributions, sought the removal of their names from the list. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction or require the petitioners to exhaust the statutory remedy of appeal provided under the governing legislation. The Court held that the petitioners must first exhaust the alternative remedy prescribed under Section 11-EE(3) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, the Court directed the Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department to decide all pending appeals within thirty days. Furthermore, the Court established that for petitioners who had not yet filed an appeal, their current writ petitions would be treated as formal appeals for the purpose of the statutory remedy, ensuring compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against inclusion in the Fourth Schedule list without the petitioner exhausting the statutory appeal process?
  • Can a writ petition be treated as a statutory appeal under Section 11-EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if no formal appeal was previously filed?
  • What is the time limit for the provincial government to decide an appeal filed under Section 11-EE(3) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Qureshi and 2 others vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Additional Registrar and 11 others2018 CLC 1048 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-18Read full judgment →
• Tariq Pervaiz vs Muhammad Pervaiz2018 PLJ Lahore 1093 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-11Read full judgment →
• Tariq Nazir and others vs Presiding Officer 4TH Sindh Labour Court2018 PLC 66 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-08-25
  refusal of promotionmisconductreinstatementback benefitsfresh inquirytrade union activitiesgrievance petitionindustrial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  These cross-appeals challenge a Sindh Labour Court judgment that reinstated a dismissed worker, ordered a fresh inquiry, and made back benefits dependent on that inquiry's outcome. The core legal questions involved whether refusing a promotion constitutes misconduct, whether a Labour Court can order a fresh inquiry absent a factual controversy, and whether back benefits are automatic upon reinstatement. The Tribunal held that an employee cannot be forced to accept a promotion unless specifically required by service rules, that holding a fresh inquiry is unwarranted when there is no factual dispute regarding the refusal, and that back benefits are not automatic and require proof that the worker remained unemployed despite efforts. The Tribunal upheld the worker's reinstatement, set aside the direction for a fresh inquiry, and denied back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee be forced to accept a promotion in the absence of a specific service rule or contract term?
  • Is a fresh inquiry justified when there is no factual controversy regarding the employee's act?
  • Are back benefits automatic upon a finding of wrongful removal from service?
  • Does a worker whose removal is not connected to an industrial dispute have a remedy under Standing Order 12(3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood Malik vs Chief Executive Officer and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 664 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-19
  constitutional petitiontransfer and postingnon-statutory rulesmaster and servantvested rightmaintainabilitypublic utility company
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner assailed his transfer order from Wazirabad Division to Shakargarh Division. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against transfer orders of an employee governed by non-statutory service rules of a corporate entity, and whether an employee has a vested right to claim a posting of choice. The Lahore High Court held that although the respondent company (GEPCO) performs functions in connection with the affairs of the State and is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction, the terms and conditions of service and transfer policies adopted by it are non-statutory in nature, meaning they cannot be enforced through a constitutional petition under the principle of master and servant. Furthermore, the court held that an employee has no vested right to remain posted at a place of their own choice, and transfer is an inherent incident of service. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether GEPCO is a body corporate performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State and amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can the terms and conditions of service of an employee governed by non-statutory rules be enforced through a constitutional petition?
  • Does an employee have a vested right to claim posting at a particular place or station of their own choice?
  • Is transfer an inherent incident of service in the absence of statutory protection?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood and others vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 3 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-24
  free fightsudden combatright of private defenseexceeding right of self-defenseqatl-e-amdculpable homicidemutual injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court convicting Tariq Mehmood under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the Qatl-e-Amd of Amanat Ali and sentencing him to life imprisonment, alongside the conviction of Luqman under Section 337-F(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while acquitting other co-accused. The core legal question revolves around whether the sudden eruption of a fight over a khokha dispute and mutual injuries sustained by both parties attract the provisions of premeditated murder or sudden combat with an exceeded right of private defense. The Lahore High Court held that the incident occurred suddenly without pre-planning, constituting a free fight where both sides sustained injuries, and that the appellant Tariq Mehmood exceeded his right of self-defense. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeals with modifications, converting Tariq Mehmood's conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reducing his sentence to ten years of rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining Luqman's conviction with a modified sentence. The key principle laid down is that where an incident erupts suddenly without pre-meditation, resulting in mutual injuries and a free fight, and the accused exceeds their right of self-defense, the offense falls under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than calculated murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offense falls under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when a fight erupts suddenly without pre-meditation and results in mutual injuries?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) when the accused exceeds the right of self-defense during a sudden free fight?
  • Does the absence of prior enmity and sudden occurrence negate the element of pre-planning in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Mehmood and another vs The State2018 YLR 1668 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Tariq Maqsood vs Government of Pakistan and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 997 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-01
  civil servantsuspensionconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunaldue processfair trialterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a civil servant, challenged his suspension from service via a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, following the initiation of inquiry proceedings and a National Accountability Bureau reference regarding alleged financial embezzlement. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against the suspension of a civil servant, given the constitutional bar under Article 212. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, ruling that matters relating to the terms and conditions of service, including suspension, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the High Court's jurisdiction is ousted by Article 212. While dismissing the petition, the Court emphasized that under Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and Article 10-A of the Constitution, it is an inalienable right of an accused civil servant to be provided with all relevant materials and documents supporting a charge-sheet to ensure a fair trial and due process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to adjudicate a challenge against the suspension of a civil servant?
  • Is the suspension of a civil servant considered a matter relating to the terms and conditions of service falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Does an accused civil servant have a right to receive all materials and documents supporting a charge-sheet under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Javed vs Rom Purkash and 3 others2018 P Cr. L.J 771 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-24
  complaint dismissalSection 200 Cr.P.C.Pure Food Ordinancepreliminary inquirySection 561-A Cr.P.C.admissibility of documentscognizance of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Criminal Miscellaneous Applications challenging the dismissal of complaints filed under the West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance, 1960. The core legal question was whether a Magistrate may dismiss a complaint under Section 203, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, without first recording the complainant's statement under Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether a photocopy of an authorization notification is inadmissible at the preliminary stage. The High Court held that the Magistrate acted prematurely by dismissing the complaints without examining the complainant on oath as mandated by Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Sessions Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by prescribing a new, non-statutory mechanism for registering FIRs under the Pure Food Ordinance. The principle laid down is that a Magistrate must strictly follow the procedural requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, specifically recording the complainant's statement before considering dismissal under Section 203, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and should allow the production of original documents rather than dismissing a case based on preliminary objections regarding photocopies. The impugned orders were set aside and the cases remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate dismiss a complaint under Section 203, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without first recording the statement of the complainant under Section 200, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a photocopy of an authorization notification inadmissible at the preliminary stage of a complaint?
  • Does a Sessions Judge have the authority to create a new mechanism for the registration of FIRs that deviates from the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Jamil, etc vs Bank Alfala-h Limited2018 P.C.T.L.R. 281 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Tariq Iqbal and others vs DG Military Land and Cantonments2018 SCMR 335, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 502 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-14
  transfer of cantonment servantstransferable categoriesnon-transferable postscantonment board employeesservice policypower of Director-General Military Lands and Cantonmentsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a common order of the Sindh High Court rejecting the petitioners' constitutional petitions, which challenged the transfer orders of various employees of the Ministry of Defence (ML&C Department) serving in Basic Scales 7 to 10 across different Cantonment Boards. The core legal question was whether the posts held by the petitioners were non-transferable and whether the Director-General of Military Lands and Cantonments legally possessed the authority to declare such posts transferable under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, without a fresh notification or previous publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The Supreme Court held that Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, explicitly empowers the Director-General to specify posts with common designations as transferable in the public interest, notwithstanding other rules or terms of service, and that no fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, is required for such administrative categorization. The key principle laid down is that statutory rules once duly published can validly confer administrative powers on an authority to alter categories of service from non-transferable to transferable without repeating the rule-making publication process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Director-General of Military Lands and Cantonments have the power under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to declare previously non-transferable posts as transferable?
  • Is a fresh notification or previous publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, required when the Director-General specifies posts as transferable under Rule 5 of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Can cantonment board employees claim a right against transfer when the competent authority has validly placed their posts in the transferable category in the public interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Iqbal and others vs DG Military Land and Cantoments2018 SC MR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-14
  Cantonment Boardtransfer of civil servantsservice rulesadministrative discretionstatutory interpretationnon-obstante clause
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, employees of various Cantonment Boards, challenged their transfers, contending their posts were non-transferable and that the Director General of Military Lands and Cantonments lacked the authority to reclassify them as transferable without fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The core legal question was whether the Director General could exercise power under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to declare posts transferable without complying with the procedural requirements of Section 280 of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the transfers were valid. The Court ruled that Rule 5(1) of the 1954 Rules confers broad, non-obstante authority upon the Director General to specify posts as transferable in the public interest. This administrative power is distinct from the general rule-making process under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. Consequently, the Director General’s directive reclassifying posts as transferable did not require fresh gazette notification, as the underlying 1954 Rules were duly published.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Director General of Military Lands and Cantonments have the authority to declare non-transferable posts as transferable under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954?
  • Is a fresh publication under Section 280 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, required when the Director General exercises powers under Rule 5(1) of the Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, to reclassify posts?
  • Can a Cantonment servant claim a vested right to a non-transferable post based on previous administrative policies?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Hussain and others vs Govt. of Balochistan through Secretary2018 PLJ Quetta 1 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Tariq Aziz vs The State and another2018 YLR 747 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-19
  post-arrest baildelayed challanprohibitory clausecorruptionforged cause listright to liberty
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 161, 165-A, 109, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947, relating to allegations of preparing a forged cause-list and receiving illegal gratification. The core legal question concerned whether prolonged incarceration resulting from the sluggish and delayed submission of the challan under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitles an accused to post-arrest bail, particularly when the offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497. The Lahore High Court held that the unexplained and inordinate delay in submitting the police report, leading to indefinite detention without trial, constitutes an abuse of the process of law and justifies the grant of bail. The court laid down the principle that no person can be left to rot in jail indefinitely due to administrative delays in the investigation or prosecution, and non-compliance with statutory timelines for submitting challans strongly favors granting bail when the offense is outside the prohibitory clause.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delayed submission of a police report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Whether continued incarceration without the commencement of trial amounts to an unjustified detention warranting the grant of bail?
  • Does an offense not falling within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify the release of an accused on bail when the investigation is unduly prolonged?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanzeela Butt vs Additional District Judge, Sargodha and others2018 MLD 320 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-06
  constitutional petitiondower recoveryNikah NamaIqrar Namaburden of proofthird party to contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Sargodha, which dismissed the Petitioner's suit for recovery of dower. The core legal question concerns whether an agreement and entries in the Nikah Nama regarding a house could be enforced as dower during the husband's lifetime, and whether the Petitioner successfully proved her claim to the property and deferred dower. The Lahore High Court held that the agreement was executed between the Respondent and the Petitioner's brother rather than the Petitioner herself, that the document could only take effect after the husband's death and did not constitute a valid dower conveyance during his lifetime, that Column No.16 of the Nikah Nama was vague and did not specify the property in question, and that the Petitioner had admitted to receiving the full monetary dower amount after the divorce. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that the burden of proof rests on the claimant to substantiate dower claims with clear and cogent evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person enforce an agreement as dower if they were not a party or signatory to that agreement?
  • Whether an agreement stipulating property transfer upon the death of a spouse can be enforced as dower during the lifetime of the husband?
  • Does the acceptance of the monetary dower amount preclude a wife from claiming additional property mentioned vaguely in the Nikah Nama?
  • What is the effect of withholding best evidence, such as failing to produce a living party to an agreement as a witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanzeel-ur-Rehman vs Govt. of Sindh and another2018 SHC 1166 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-03
  civil service appointmentmoral turpitudeconvictionsuspension of sentencelachesconstitutional petitionjoining time
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the denial of appointment to the post of Lecturer (BPS-17) in the Education and Literacy Department, Government of Sindh. The petitioner, having qualified through the Sindh Public Service Commission, failed to join duty within the stipulated 15-day period due to his incarceration following a criminal conviction. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner could be allowed to join duty despite the delay and whether a convicted person whose sentence is suspended during appeal remains eligible for public service. The Court held that the petition was devoid of merit. It ruled that the failure to join within the specified time rendered the appointment offer cancelled. Furthermore, the Court held that under Section 15 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973, a person convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude is disqualified from public service. It clarified that the suspension of a sentence during appeal does not constitute an acquittal, and the conviction remains in effect, barring appointment. The petition was also dismissed on the grounds of laches.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suspension of a sentence during the pendency of an appeal amount to an acquittal for the purpose of appointment to a civil post?
  • Can a candidate who fails to join a government post within the stipulated time due to incarceration claim a right to appointment?
  • Does a conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude disqualify a person from appointment to a civil service post under the Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanvir Ahmad Butt vs The Director, Oratier Technologies (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 CLD 1064 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-22Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Khan vs District Judge and Others2018 SC AJK 23 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Tanveer alias Chand vs The State2018 YLR 2264 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-23
  benefit of doubtanti-terrorismrecovery of armsindependent witnessesstandard of proofcriminal appealacquittalevidentiary discrepancies
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant by an Anti-Terrorism Court for an alleged encounter and illegal possession of arms and explosives. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the significant evidentiary discrepancies. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, citing critical infirmities, including the failure to associate independent witnesses (mashirs) despite the arrest occurring in a public park, and contradictory evidence regarding the defusing of the recovered hand grenade. The court established that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a concession, and that a single reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that the "harsher the sentence, the stricter the standard of proof," and that the absence of independent evidence in cases relying solely on official testimony, coupled with unexplained delays in forensic procedures, necessitates the extension of the benefit of doubt to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a public arrest invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a legal right for an accused?
  • Does a significant delay in the forensic examination of recovered explosives create reasonable doubt?
  • What is the standard of proof required when the prosecution's case relies solely on the testimony of police or Rangers officials?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan and 02 others2018 SHC 640 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-20
  constitutional petitionproforma promotionservice tribunal jurisdictionterms and conditions of serviceback benefitssuperannuationPTCL employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a retired employee of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) seeking placement in BPS-16 and back benefits, claiming parity with colleagues who received promotions under a 2005 policy and citing Supreme Court precedents on proforma promotion. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner fulfilled the mandatory criteria for promotion to BPS-16 and whether a retired employee could claim proforma promotion from a back date. The Sindh High Court held that the petitioner failed to meet the requisite criteria—specifically lacking the necessary continuous service duration and qualifications—and that, per settled apex court jurisprudence, a retired civil or public servant cannot be granted promotion from a back date except under specific exceptions lacking in this case. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principles that promotion is based on eligibility, fitness, and vacancy availability rather than a vested right, and that proforma promotions are barred post-superannuation without valid departmental grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired employee can be granted proforma promotion from a back date?
  • Can promotion be claimed as a matter of right without fulfilling the prescribed eligibility and service criteria?
  • Whether the terms and conditions of service of transferred corporation employees are amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Does succeeding in training automatically render an employee eligible for promotion to the next rank?
  Read full judgment →
• Tanveer @ Chand vs State2018 YLR 2264, 2018 SHC 435 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-23Read full judgment →
• Tallat Mehmood vs The State, etc.2018 KLR Criminal Cases 189 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-05
  legal practitionerright of audiencepleaderHigh Court practiceadvocacy licensestatutory qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 4(r) and Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking permission for a legal practitioner, who is not yet licensed to practice before the High Court, to appear as a pleader in a pending case. The core legal question was whether the definition of "pleader" under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allows the Court to grant such permission to an advocate who lacks the requisite two-year practice experience mandated by the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973. The Court dismissed the application, holding that the definition of "pleader" cannot override the mandatory statutory qualifications required to practice before the High Court. The Court emphasized that the requirements under Sections 21, 22, and 27 of the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973 are mandatory, and an advocate must possess the specific license to appear before the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that it lacks the legal authority to grant a concession that would bypass these statutory licensing requirements.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant permission to an advocate to appear before the High Court if they do not meet the statutory practice requirements?
  • Does the definition of 'pleader' under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 override the licensing requirements of the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for an advocate to qualify for admission to practice before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Tallat Mehmood vs The State, etcPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 347, 2018 LHC 1 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-04
  pleaderadvocate of High CourtLegal Practitioners and Bar Councils Actlicensing procedureright of audienceCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application filed under Section 4(r) read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking permission for a counsel who is not an advocate of the High Court to appear as a pleader in the main case before the Lahore High Court. The core legal question is whether an advocate who does not possess the requisite practice period to be licensed as a High Court advocate under the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973 can be permitted to appear before the High Court by invoking the definition of "pleader" under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court dismissed the application, holding that the definition of "pleader" under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot override the mandatory licensing and practice requirements prescribed under Sections 21, 22, and 27 of the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973. The key principle laid down is that an advocate who fails to meet the statutory qualification period for practicing in the High Court cannot circumvent the provisions of the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973 through the general definition of a pleader under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can an advocate who is not licensed for the High Court appear before it by relying on the definition of pleader under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Do the enrollment and practice requirements under the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973 override the general definition of pleader in criminal proceedings?
  • Whether the High Court has the discretion to grant permission to an unqualified advocate to appear in a case contrary to the provisions of the Legal Practitioners & Bar Councils Act 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Tallat Mehmood vs The State and others2018 PLD Lahore 195 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-04Read full judgment →
• Tallat Mehmood vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 347 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-04
  legal practitionerright of audienceHigh Court practiceadvocacy licensepleader definitionstatutory qualificationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 4(r) read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking permission for a legal practitioner, who is not licensed to practice before the High Court, to appear as a pleader in a pending case. The core legal question was whether the definition of "pleader" under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, allows the Court to authorize an advocate lacking the requisite High Court license to represent a party. The Lahore High Court dismissed the application, holding that the definition of "pleader" in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, cannot override the mandatory qualification requirements stipulated in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973. The Court emphasized that an advocate must satisfy the statutory requirement of two years of practice in subordinate courts before being eligible to practice in the High Court. Consequently, the Court ruled that it lacks the legal authority to grant permission to an advocate who has not fulfilled these mandatory licensing procedures, thereby upholding the integrity of the established legal practice regime.

  Questions settled

  • Can the definition of 'pleader' under Section 4(r) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to bypass the licensing requirements for High Court practice?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to permit an advocate who lacks a High Court license to appear in proceedings?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for an advocate to qualify for admission to practice before the High Court under the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Tallat Ishaq vs National Accountability Bureau through its Chairman, etc.2019 PLD Supreme Court 112, 2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-01
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaytrial timeframedirectory vs mandatoryconstitutional jurisdictionhardshipcorruption reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment refusing post-arrest bail in a corruption reference filed under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question revolved around whether the thirty-day timeframe for concluding trials under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is mandatory and whether its non-compliance entitles an accused to automatic bail. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 16(a) is directory in nature rather than mandatory, and its expiry does not automatically confer a right to bail. The Court clarified that while Section 9(b) of the Ordinance ousts the statutory jurisdiction of courts to grant bail, the High Courts retain extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to grant bail in appropriate cases of undue hardship and shocking, unconscionable, or inordinate delay not attributable to the accused. The Court laid down detailed principles governing trial delays, hardship, and bail considerations under accountability laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the thirty-day time frame for conclusion of a trial provided under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is mandatory or directory?
  • Does the expiry of the thirty-day period under Section 16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 entitle an accused person to bail automatically?
  • Does Section 9(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 bar the High Courts from granting bail under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • What are the governing principles for granting bail on the ground of delay in trials under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain Jatoi vs The State2018 YLR 469 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-12
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of the doubtocular and medical contradictionmotiveidentificationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Dadu, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for Qatl-i-Amd and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, given major contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, a weak identification source, non-recovery of the alleged crime weapon, and abandonment of the motive. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond a reasonable doubt due to severe inconsistencies in witness testimonies regarding injury seats, physical locations, identification under rickshaw headlights in the dark, and unproved motive. The court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the appellant. The key principle laid down is that material contradictions between ocular and medical accounts, abandonment of a stated motive, and weak uncorroborated identification in dark conditions are fatal to the prosecution's case, requiring the benefit of the doubt to be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the seats and nature of injuries are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Is the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive fatal when the conviction rests on circumstantial and ocular evidence?
  • Does identification of an accused by the headlight of a motorcycle rickshaw in a dark night constitute a reliable and sufficient source of identification without corroborative evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of the non-recovery and non-production of the alleged crime weapon during the trial in cases with conflicting ocular accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajbar Khan vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1096 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-08
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailabsconsionfurther inquirymurdercorroborative piece of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to respondent No. 2 by the Sessions Judge in a murder case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, following a prolonged period of absconsion spanning nearly four decades. The core legal question revolves around whether long-standing absconsion alone warrants the refusal or cancellation of bail when the accused otherwise makes out a case for further inquiry on merits. The Peshawar High Court held that mere absconsion is a corroborative piece of evidence and does not stand as a bar to the grant of bail if the accused is entitled to it on merits, particularly where the case involves delayed reporting, lack of medical examination, and single-shell recovery against multiple assailants. The court established the principle that grounds for bail cancellation differ from those for its initial grant, and an order granting bail will rarely be interfered with unless it is palpably illegal, arbitrary, or perverse.

  Questions settled

  • Does long-standing absconsion alone warrant the refusal or cancellation of post-arrest bail when a case of further inquiry is made out on merits?
  • Are the grounds for the cancellation of bail different from the grounds for its initial grant?
  • Can an order granting post-arrest bail be interfered with in the absence of any illegality, perversity, or arbitrariness?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajbar Khan vs The State & 1 another2018 PCRLJ 1096, 2018 PHC 1567 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-08
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailabsconsionfurther inquirymurdercriminal procedurecorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Court of Sessions Judge/Zila Qazi. The core legal question was whether the respondent's long-standing absconsion, spanning nearly four decades, necessitated the cancellation of bail despite the case otherwise qualifying for further inquiry. The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the lower court's decision to grant bail. The court found that the case against the accused was one of further inquiry, noting the lack of eyewitnesses, an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and the absence of a medical examination of the deceased. The court affirmed the principle that absconsion is merely a corroborative piece of evidence and does not, in isolation, justify the refusal or cancellation of bail if the accused is otherwise entitled to the concession on merits. Furthermore, the court emphasized that bail cancellation requires demonstrating that the initial order was palpably illegal, arbitrary, or perverse, which was not established in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does long-standing absconsion of an accused, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds for the cancellation of bail?
  • Is bail to be granted as a matter of right when a case requires further inquiry into the guilt of the accused?
  • What is the legal threshold for interfering with an order granting bail by a court of competent jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajammal Hussain Anjum alias Phalo vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 598 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-16
  post-arrest bailextra-judicial confessionjoint confessiondelay in FIRfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 through which the petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 442/2016 registered under Sections 302, 392, 201, 411, 364, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of a joint extra-judicial confession, the effect of delayed registration of the FIR and delayed supplementary statements, and whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2). The Lahore High Court held that a joint extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence and a weak type of evidence, and noted unexplained delays in reporting the crime and recording witness statements, coupled with a lack of recovery from the petitioner. The court granted post-arrest bail, establishing the principle that mere involvement in a heinous offence does not justify withholding bail when the case falls within the scope of further inquiry and no incriminating material or recovery links the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a joint extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence against an accused seeking bail?
  • Does mere involvement in a heinous offence disentitle an accused to the concession of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and recording statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 makes out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2)?
  Read full judgment →
• Tajamal Abbas vs Inamullah2018 CLC 1833, 2018 PLJ Lahore 620, 2018 LHC 343 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-28Read full judgment →
• Taisei Corporation vs A.M. Corporation Company (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 MLD 2058 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-07
  foreign arbitral awardres judicataexclusive jurisdictionprocedural lawretrospective applicabilityArbitration Act 1940Recognition and Enforcement Act 2011
  Summary & questions settled

  The Appellant challenged the dismissal of its suit seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011. The Single Judge had dismissed the suit on the principle of res judicata, citing prior decisions by a Civil Court and the Lahore High Court that characterized the award as domestic under the Arbitration Act, 1940. The core legal question concerned whether these prior decisions barred the current proceedings and whether the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. The High Court of Sindh held that the 2011 Act, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court for foreign arbitral awards, operates with retrospective effect as a procedural law. Consequently, the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the principle of res judicata was inapplicable because the Supreme Court had explicitly directed an independent determination of the application pending before the High Court of Sindh. The appeal was allowed, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the enforcement application under the 2011 Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 apply retrospectively to arbitration proceedings commenced before its enactment?
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of an award as foreign or domestic under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011?
  • Can a decision by a lower court operate as res judicata when a superior court has directed an independent adjudication of the same matter?
  • Does the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 confer exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court regarding foreign arbitral awards?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahirullah vs Muhammad Rafiullah & another2018 PLJ Peshawar 159, 2018 PHC 1529 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
• Tahira Bibi vs Muhammad Khan, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 829 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Tahira Bibi vs Muhammad Khan, etc2019 [M] C.L.R. 607, 2018 PLD Lahore 803, 2018 PLJ Lahore 829, PLJ 2018 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Tahira Bibi vs Muhammad Khan and others2018 PLD Lahore 803 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood @ Achoo vs The State and another2018 PLJ SC 477, 2018 SCMR 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-13
  re-appraisal of evidencethird probable storysuppression of material factsreduction of sentencelife imprisonmentAnti-Terrorism Actofficial duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence awarded to appellant Tahir Mehmood under Section 302(b) PPC and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, alongside convictions under Sections 324, 353, and 186 PPC. The prosecution alleged that the appellant fired upon a police constable on patrol duty. Upon re-appraising the evidence, the Supreme Court noted significant manipulations in police station records, suppression of material facts, and that the deceased constable was assigned watch and guard duty inside the police station rather than official patrol. The Court observed that both the prosecution and defense had suppressed material facts, compelling the Court to seek a third probable story based on established facts. The Court held that Section 7 ATA and Sections 353 and 186 PPC were inapplicable as the deceased was not on official duty. Consequently, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant under Section 7 ATA, Sections 353 and 186 PPC, and converted the death sentence under Section 302(b) PPC to imprisonment for life.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court obligated to deduce a third probable story when both the prosecution and defense suppress material facts?
  • Can a conviction under Sections 353 and 186 PPC stand if the deceased public servant was not performing official duties at the time of the incident?
  • Does an offense attract Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 when the incident arises from a private intrusion rather than an act aimed at creating terror?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Mehmood @ Achoo vs State and another2018 PLJ SC 477 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  murderappraisal of evidencethird probable storyanti-terrorismdeath sentence reductionsuppression of factscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The core legal question involved the appreciation of evidence and whether the prosecution successfully established its version of events regarding the police encounter and murder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that both the prosecution and the defence suppressed material facts, and upon analyzing the circumstances, deduced a third probable story indicating that the deceased constable was killed after an unauthorized intrusion into the appellant's house. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act and Sections 353 and 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code, and reduced the death sentence under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code to life imprisonment. The key principles laid down include the duty of the court to seek a third probable story when both rival parties conceal material facts, and the strict interpretation of anti-terrorism laws.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a court is obligated to deduce a third probable story when both the prosecution and the defence suppress material facts?
  • Does an unauthorized and uninvited visit by a police constable outside his official duty attract provisions like Section 353 and Section 186 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment when the evidence reveals concealed facts regarding the genesis of the occurrence?
  • When does an offence fail to attract the provisions of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan and two others vs The State etc2018 PHC 1746, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 146, 2019 YLR 545, 2018 PHC 1820 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-12Read full judgment →
• Tahir Khan & another vs The State2019 MLD 361, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 302, 2018 PHC 1724 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-08Read full judgment →
• Tahir Javed vs The State through A.G. KPK Peshawar and others2018 PLD Peshawar 162 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-03Read full judgment →