Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Tariq Zaman vs Muhammad Shafi Khan and 2 others2018 MLD 854 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-02-08
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtocular accountabscondenceidentificationacquittalrevaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Karak, whereby the appellant Tariq Zaman was convicted under Section 302(b) and Section 324 PPC, receiving a death sentence and imprisonment along with a murder reference for confirmation. The prosecution case involved an FIR alleging that the appellant and co-accused participated in a scuffle and subsequent indiscriminate firing resulting in the death of the deceased. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the ocular testimony, the identification of the accused during night-time firing, and the evidentiary value of the appellant's abscondence. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of the complainant, the specific role of the appellant who was described as empty-handed in the FIR, and the identity of the assailant given the darkness and general allegations. The court established that abscondence is merely corroborative and cannot sustain a conviction when primary ocular evidence is untrustworthy, and that any reasonable doubt must benefit the accused. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused's conviction for murder be sustained solely on abscondence when the primary ocular testimony is found unreliable?
  • Whether the benefit of reasonable doubt should be extended to an accused when the FIR and eyewitness accounts fail to attribute specific firearms or fatal roles during an incident of simultaneous firing at night?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused cure the inherent defects and infirmities present in the prosecution's ocular account?
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• Sultanat Khan vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1563 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-28
  private defenceqatl-i-amdta'zirmitigating circumstancescriminal appealappreciation of evidencesentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Sultanat Khan, for the murder of his daughter-in-law and attempted murder of his son, arising from a property dispute. The trial court had convicted the appellant under sections 302(b), 324, and 337-F(iii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who sustained injuries in the same occurrence, was entitled to the benefit of the right of private defence, despite not explicitly pleading it, and whether the conviction under section 302(b) was appropriate given the circumstances. The Court held that while the appellant did not formally plead self-defence, the evidence of his own injuries and the suppression of facts by the complainant party indicated he acted in self-defence but exceeded its limits. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction from section 302(b) to 302(c), reducing the sentence to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment. The key principle laid down is that courts may infer a right of private defence from the material on record even if not specifically pleaded by the accused, provided the circumstances justify such an inference.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be granted the benefit of the right of private defence if the plea was not specifically raised during the trial?
  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused by the prosecution entitle the accused to a reduction in sentence?
  • Under what circumstances can a conviction for qatl-i-amd be converted from section 302(b) to section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Sultan Zareen & another vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal [Slat] & 022018 SHC 1146 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-26
  constitutional petitionseasonal workerspreferential right of re-employmentconcurrent findingsgrievance petitionlabour dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the Sindh Labour Court and the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the grievance petitions filed by seasonal workers seeking reinstatement in service against a sugar mills management. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of the grievance applications and whether seasonal workers possess an absolute right to reinstatement or preferential re-employment without proving infringement of statutory rights. The Sindh High Court held that seasonal and temporary workers cannot claim reinstatement as a matter of right, and while they enjoy a preferential right of re-employment, such right only accrues if junior or new workers are hired in preference to them, a fact not established in the case. Furthermore, the court held that concurrent findings of fact by lower tribunals cannot be interfered with under constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of any illegality, infirmity, or material irregularity. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether seasonal workers can claim reinstatement in service as a matter of right?
  • Under what circumstances does a seasonal worker's preferential right of re-employment accrue?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower labour forums in its constitutional jurisdiction without proof of illegality or material irregularity?
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• Sultan Qamar Siddiqui vs National Accountability Bureau and others2018 P Cr. L J 1145 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-31
  constitutional petitionremand orderNational Accountability Bureaumala fidefundamental rightsillegal detentionaccountability courtprocedural compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a remand order passed by an Accountability Court, seeking the petitioner's release from jail custody. The core legal question concerned whether the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) acted lawfully in arresting the petitioner while withholding material information from the High Court and failing to comply with mandatory procedural requirements. The Court held that the NAB authorities acted with mala fide intent by discreetly filing a reference and obtaining non-bailable warrants without disclosing these facts in pending proceedings. Furthermore, the Court found that NAB failed to comply with Section 24(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, which mandates the delivery of a copy of the reference to the accused. Consequently, the Court set aside the remand order and directed the petitioner's immediate release. The judgment establishes that statutory authorities must act transparently, and any failure to adhere to mandatory procedural safeguards, particularly when depriving a citizen of liberty, renders such actions unlawful and subject to judicial intervention under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the National Accountability Bureau to disclose the filing of a reference in pending proceedings constitute mala fide conduct?
  • Is the delivery of a copy of the reference to the accused under Section 24(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 a mandatory requirement?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to set aside a remand order if the arresting authority has acted in violation of statutory procedural requirements?
  • Does the procedure under Section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 supersede the specific requirement of Section 24(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 regarding the delivery of a reference?
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• Sultan Muhammad vs The State2018 MLD 1680 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-13
  fratricidemurderdeath penalty mitigationunproven motiveocular testimonycriminal appealmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for the murder of his real brother under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt, whether the plea of suicide was tenable, and whether the failure to prove the alleged motive warranted mitigation of the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The Lahore High Court held that the ocular testimony of the real sister and mother, supported by medical evidence and the recovery of the weapon matching the crime casing, firmly established the appellant's guilt, while rejecting the suicide theory. However, because the prosecution failed to establish a clear motive and given mitigating circumstances, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction but altered the death sentence to imprisonment for life. The key principle laid down is that the unproven nature of an asserted motive or obscured background circumstances in a murder case serves as a mitigating factor sufficient to substitute the death penalty with life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive can serve as a mitigating circumstance to alter a sentence of death to imprisonment for life?
  • Can a plea of suicide be accepted when the physical and medical evidence, including the trajectory and locale of the firearm entry wound with blackening and charring, renders it impossible?
  • Does the close familial relationship between eyewitnesses and the accused inherently render their ocular account unreliable in a murder trial?
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• Sultan and others vs The State2018 YLR 204 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-27
  pre-arrest bailcross-version casefurther inquiryprohibitory clauseproperty disputedelayed FIRmala fide
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of assault and property disputes. The applicants were charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following an FIR lodged with a 36-day delay. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the existence of a cross-version case, the delay in FIR registration, and the nature of the injuries sustained by both parties. The Court observed that the case involved two conflicting versions of the same incident, with both parties sustaining injuries and alleging aggression by the other. Noting that the offenses charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and considering the admitted enmity and the lack of objection from the State, the Court held that the applicants' involvement required further inquiry. Consequently, the Court confirmed the interim pre-arrest bail, establishing that where cross-cases exist and the determination of the aggressor requires trial evidence, the case warrants further inquiry, favoring the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a cross-version case where both parties allege aggression entitle the accused to pre-arrest bail?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute grounds for further inquiry in bail proceedings?
  • When injuries sustained in a criminal case do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, is the grant of bail generally favored?
  • Can bail be confirmed when the determination of the primary aggressor requires the evaluation of evidence at trial?
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• Sultan Ahmed Soomro vs Ali Mohammad & others2018 SHC 513 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-19Read full judgment →
• Suleman Sultan vs The State and another2018 MLD 661 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-16
  post-arrest bailmedical evidence contradictionocular accounttwo versionsfurther inquirystatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in respect of offences including murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve the reconciliation of contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence at the tentative assessment stage, and the legal effect of conflicting versions emerging from the initial complaint versus the police investigation. The Lahore High Court held that where medical evidence contradicts the specific role attributed to the accused in the FIR, and where divergent versions exist between the complainant and the investigating agency, the case falls squarely within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that contradictory medical evidence, conflicting investigative findings, and prolonged incarceration without material trial progress entitle an accused to the concession of post-arrest bail as a matter of right, notwithstanding the general heinousness of the charged offence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the specific injury attributed to an accused justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Does the emergence of conflicting versions between the FIR and the police investigation render a case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be denied solely on the ground of the heinousness of the offence when the accused has established a case for further inquiry?
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• Suleman Khan vs The State2018 IHC 154 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-06
  narcotic substancesrepresentative samplecriminal appealrecovery of narcoticsburden of proofsentencing guidelineschemical examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a jail appeal and a criminal appeal challenging a conviction under Section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, for the possession of 285 kilograms of charas. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the quantity of narcotics recovered when samples were taken from packets but not from every individual slab contained within those packets, and whether the trial court could estimate the weight of the narcotics based on mathematical hypotheses. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of the full quantity, as the failure to take samples from each individual slab violated the mandatory guidelines established in Ameer Zeb vs The State. The Court ruled that in cases involving narcotics in separate forms, a representative sample must be taken from every individual unit; otherwise, the accused can only be held liable for the quantity from which samples were actually taken and tested. Consequently, the conviction was reduced to the quantity proven by the samples (2,260 grams), and the sentence was modified to the period already undergone.

  Questions settled

  • Is it legally permissible for a trial court to estimate the weight of recovered narcotics based on mathematical hypotheses rather than actual weighing?
  • Does the failure to take a sample from every individual slab of a recovered narcotic substance invalidate the prosecution's claim regarding the total quantity?
  • What is the consequence under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, when the prosecution fails to take representative samples from each separate packet or slab?
  • Can an accused be convicted for the full quantity of recovered narcotics if samples were only taken from a portion of the recovered slabs?
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• Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited, (SNGPL) through General Manager vs Director (Legal), President Secretariat (Public), Aiwan-E-Sadar Islamabad and 2 others2018 PLD Islamabad 51 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-30
  writ petitiongas utility courtbilling disputejurisdictionFederal Ombudsmanrepresentation to Presidentspecial lawcoram non judicemaladministration
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL) challenging an order passed by the President of Pakistan, which had accepted a representation by a consumer (International Islamic University) and set aside the findings of the Federal Ombudsman regarding a gas billing dispute. The core legal question was whether the Federal Ombudsman and the President of Pakistan retain jurisdiction over gas billing and recovery disputes following the enactment of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016. The Islamabad High Court accepted the petition, declaring the President's order coram non judice. The Court held that the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 is a special law establishing exclusive jurisdiction in Gas Utility Courts for resolving disputes concerning "sums due", billing, and metering. The Court laid down the principle that a later special statute dealing with a specific subject-matter overrides prior general or special laws with conflicting provisions. Furthermore, because billing disputes involve factual controversies requiring the recording of evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, such matters must be adjudicated exclusively by the Gas Utility Courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Ombudsman and the President of Pakistan have jurisdiction to adjudicate gas billing and recovery disputes after the enactment of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016?
  • Which statute prevails when there is a conflict between two special laws containing overriding clauses?
  • Can the Federal Ombudsman entertain disputes that involve complex factual controversies requiring the recording of pro and contra evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
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• Suhail Jute Mills vs Govt. of Punjab etc2018 LHC 1183, 2021 YLR 1462, 2022 [M] CLR 1098 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-24Read full judgment →
• Suhabat Ali vs The State2018 MLD 850 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-21Read full judgment →
• Sudhir vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 909 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-28
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRmaterial contradictionsacquittalappreciation of evidenceattempt to commit qatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant under sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly firing at the victim. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering significant contradictions in witness testimonies, an unexplained nine-month delay in lodging the FIR, and discrepancies in medical evidence. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant. The court held that the complainant’s testimony was fundamentally unreliable due to contradictions regarding his presence at the scene, the distance of the fire, and the presence of co-accused. Additionally, the police's practice of obtaining thumb impressions on blank papers and the lack of explanation for the delayed FIR were fatal to the prosecution's case. The court reaffirmed the principle that the benefit of doubt is not a matter of grace but a right of the accused; if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit must be extended to them.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the complainant's testimony contradicts the medical evidence regarding the distance of the fire?
  • What is the legal effect of police obtaining thumb impressions on blank papers during an investigation?
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• Sudhir Ahmad and others vs The Speaker, Balochistan Provincial Assembly2018 P.S.C. 224 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  deputationabsorptionrepatriationcivil servantsservice rulesseniorityout of turn appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, converted and heard as review petitions, arose from the Balochistan High Court judgment dismissing the appellants' Constitution Petitions regarding their repatriation to their parent departments. The core legal questions involved the legality of appointing civil servants or employees on deputation and subsequently absorbing them into different departments or autonomous bodies without following the prescribed statutory rules and methods of recruitment. The Supreme Court held that appointments by absorption or deputation that deviate from governing service rules and statutory provisions, which exclusively provide for initial recruitment or promotion, are illegal and cannot be sustained. The ratio decidendi is that back-door entries and unauthorized absorptions of public servants into departments where no such rules permit them violate established legal norms, merit, and transparency. The key principles laid down include that public offices cannot be dolled out through arbitrary interventions without open competition, and employees absorbed against rules must be repatriated to their parent departments, save where a competent judicial determination conclusively establishes their lawful employment status.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on deputation can be legally absorbed into a department where the relevant service rules do not provide for appointment by absorption?
  • Can a civil servant holding a non-cadre post be absorbed against a cadre post in another department?
  • Whether the repatriation of public servants who were irregularly absorbed without following prescribed recruitment rules is lawful?
  • Does a judgment of a Service Tribunal upheld by the Supreme Court create a binding determination of an employee's parent department that cannot be arbitrarily disturbed?
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• Sudarsan Puhan vs Jayanta Ku. Mohanty & Ors2018 SCInd 87 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-20Read full judgment →
• Subedar Major Maqbool Ali Khan and others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary Safron Civil Secretariat Islamabad and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 15 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Subedar Major (R) Zulfiqar Ali Shah vs Abid Shah and another2018 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 53, 2018 P Cr. L J 270 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-07-05
  post-arrest bailsodomyheinous offencefurther inquirymedico-legal reportadmissibility of affidavitsprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the order of the High Court whereby the accused was released on bail in a case involving the alleged commission of sodomy with a minor under Section 377 of the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court exercised its discretion judiciously in granting bail to the accused on grounds of a delayed chemical examiner report and unverified affidavits. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the High Court erred in making a deeper appreciation of evidence and relying on inadmissible affidavits and a delayed chemical examiner report at the bail stage, given that the accused was nominated in a promptly lodged FIR and supported by the medico-legal report and statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The ratio decidendi is that where an accused is prima facie connected to a heinous offense falling within the prohibitory clause, bail cannot be granted on flimsy grounds or tentative deeper assessment. The Court laid down that affidavits not properly sworn or presented by deponents cannot be treated as evidence, and non-receipt of a chemical examiner report does not automatically make a case one of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-receipt of a chemical examiner report is a sufficient ground for granting bail in a heinous offence?
  • Can unverified affidavits produced in support of a bail application be treated as evidence?
  • Does a deeper appreciation of evidence by the High Court vitiate an order granting bail?
  • Whether an accused charged with sodomy involving a minor falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
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• Subay Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and Ministry of Law and 2 others2018 PLJ Lahore 224 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-09
  domestic workersminimum wagepublic interest litigationconstitutional petitionlabor rightsdevolution of power
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a public interest petition filed before the Lahore High Court seeking the fixation of a minimum wage for domestic workers. The core legal question revolved around whether domestic workers are entitled to a minimum wage and protections under existing labor laws and constitutional principles, particularly considering allegations of discrimination. The court noted that while international conventions carry persuasive value, and existing statutory frameworks like the Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961 and the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 address various labor rights, the specific fixation of minimum wages for domestic workers is primarily a matter requiring legislative policy action, especially given the devolution of labor to the provinces. Consequently, the court disposed of the petition while expressing the expectation that the Government of Punjab would consider enacting legislation on the subject, emphasizing that Article 3 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 underpins the principle of equal work for equal pay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether domestic workers are entitled to a minimum wage under the existing legal framework?
  • Does the issue of fixing minimum wages for domestic workers fall within the domain of legislative policy?
  • Does Article 3 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 support the principle that equal work must carry equal pay?
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• Sub-Engineers/Staff Welfare Association Sindh & others vs Government of2018 SHC 1110 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-09Read full judgment →
• Steel and another vs Nram Limited (formerly Nram Plc)2018 SCMR 1203 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2018-02-28Read full judgment →
• State vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Shahrif son of Mian Muhammad Sharif, ag_3d22399e2018 IHC 77 · Accountability Court · 2018-07-06Read full judgment →
• State vs Islam Jan2018 PHC 1650 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-23Read full judgment →
• State vs Aqeel Khan etc2018 PHC 1380 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-16Read full judgment →
• State through Special Public Prosecutor, Anti-Corruption vs Allah Dina---2018 YLR 187 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-15
  criminal acquittal appealcorruptionforgerydouble presumption of innocenceappreciation of evidencemutationbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Special Judge Anti-Corruption, which acquitted the respondent of charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, a Patwari, facilitated the illegal transfer of property for an accused person by falsifying mutation records to show the transaction occurred on September 22, 2008, while the accused was in judicial custody. The High Court examined the evidence and determined that the mutation was actually attested on October 14, 2008, a date when the accused was on bail. Finding no evidence to connect the respondent to the alleged offense, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that an order of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and warrants no interference unless the trial court's decision is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of acquittal carry a double presumption of innocence?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Is a mutation record conclusive proof of the date of property transfer when challenged by prosecution evidence?
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• State through Special Public Prosecutor, Anti Corruption Establishment vs Allah Dina2018 MLD 546 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-15
  acquittal appealforgery of mutationdouble presumption of innocencehandwriting expertanti-corruption
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the trial court whereby the respondent Patwari was acquitted of charges under Sections 409, 420, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The prosecution alleged that the accused fraudulently transferred the complainant's land through forged mutation entries by using fake signatures. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant setting aside an acquittal. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the allegations, notably by omitting to send the disputed signatures to a Handwriting Expert for verification and failing to produce confidence-inspiring evidence. The Court reaffirmed the principle that a double presumption of innocence is attached to an order of acquittal, which cannot be interfered with unless it is arbitrary or capricious, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of acquittal can be interfered with when the prosecution fails to prove its case through confidence-inspiring evidence?
  • Is it mandatory for the prosecution to obtain an opinion from a Handwriting Expert to prove fake signatures in forgery cases?
  • What is the standard of proof required to set aside a judgment of acquittal enjoying a double presumption of innocence?
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• State through Prosecutor-General, Punjab vs Jahangir Akhtar and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 577, 2018 SCMR 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-17
  double jeopardypremature acquittaldisciplinary proceedingscriminal prosecutionSection 249-A CrPCArticle 13 ConstitutionSection 403 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose out of orders acquitting the respondents under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. The respondents allegedly obtained police employment using fake and forged School Leaving Certificates, resulting in compulsory retirement from service and criminal prosecution via FIRs. The trial court acquitted the respondents on the premise that departmental compulsory retirement barred criminal prosecution under the doctrine of double jeopardy pursuant to Article 13(a) of the Constitution and Section 403 Cr.P.C., which decision was affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the acquittals, holding that departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are distinct in nature and purpose, and can proceed simultaneously or sequentially without violating double jeopardy principles. Furthermore, the court held that Section 249-A Cr.P.C. can only be invoked if the charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction, neither of which was established below. The status of the respondents as accused was restored for trial according to law.

  Questions settled

  • Does departmental compulsory retirement bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same matter under the principle of double jeopardy?
  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution against a public servant proceed simultaneously or sequentially?
  • Under what specific circumstances may a trial court invoke Section 249-A Cr.P.C. to acquit an accused person?
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• State through Prosecutor-General, NAB vs Farooq Choudhary through Executive Officer_Secretary, Cantonment Board. Quetta and others2018 P Cr. L J 300 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-11
  recovery of finelimitation perioddefault imprisonmentNational Accountability Ordinancecriminal appealexecution of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This Criminal Ehtesab Appeal challenged an order of the Accountability Court, which dismissed the State’s application for the recovery of fines imposed on the respondents following their conviction under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether the State could recover fines after the expiration of the six-year limitation period prescribed by Section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and whether such recovery is permissible after the offenders have already served the substantive imprisonment sentence and the imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The Balochistan High Court upheld the trial court's dismissal. The Court held that the application for recovery was time-barred, as it was filed well beyond the six-year period stipulated in Section 70, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle under Section 386, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, that once an offender has served the full term of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine, the court is precluded from issuing a warrant for the levy of that fine. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a fine be recovered after the six-year limitation period prescribed by Section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the service of imprisonment in default of payment of fine preclude a court from issuing a warrant for the levy of that fine under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an application for recovery of fine filed after the expiration of the statutory limitation period maintainable?
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• State through Prosecutor-General Accountability, NAB vs Ghulam2018 P Cr. L J 797 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-13
  assets beyond known sources of incomeNAB referenceacquittal appealburden of proofmisreading of evidenceremandbenami transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent by the Accountability Court in a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference concerning the accumulation of assets disproportionate to known sources of income. The core legal question was whether the trial court erred in its appreciation of evidence and misapplied the burden of proof regarding unexplained wealth. The High Court held that the trial court’s judgment was flawed, as it failed to properly evaluate the documentary evidence, ignored the legal requirement for the accused to justify assets under Section 14 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, and disregarded previous remand directions. The Court emphasized that when a trial court’s reasoning is speculative or based on a misinterpretation of evidence, the appellate court must re-examine the entire record. Consequently, the High Court set aside the acquittal, ruling that the trial court failed to apply the statutory presumption of guilt regarding unexplained assets. The matter was remanded for a fresh decision to be consolidated with the proceedings against the co-accused, ensuring a comprehensive adjudication of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof shift to the accused under Section 14 of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, when assets are disproportionate to known sources of income?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court set aside an acquittal and remand a case for fresh trial?
  • Is a trial court required to consolidate the trial of an accused with their co-accused when the allegations arise from the same set of facts?
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• State through Prosecutor General, Sindh vs Waseem Faraz2018 YLR 1695 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-26
  Criminal Acquittal AppealSection 249-A Cr.P.C.Unlicensed weaponTrial procedureProcedural delayFair trialRemand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal was filed by the State against an order passed by a Judicial Magistrate, which acquitted the respondent under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether a trial court is justified in acquitting an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely due to procedural delays in trial progression, despite the existence of prima facie evidence. The High Court set aside the acquittal order, holding it to be perverse and legally unsustainable. The court determined that the trial court improperly invoked Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 because the charge was not groundless. The key principle laid down is that criminal cases must be adjudicated on merits after recording prosecution evidence and hearing both parties, rather than being dismissed for procedural delays caused by external factors such as the non-production of the accused or judicial leave. The court emphasized that the fate of a criminal matter should be determined through a full trial process to ensure justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court acquit an accused under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 solely due to delays in trial progression?
  • Is the non-production of an accused by jail authorities a valid ground for acquittal under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Must a criminal case be decided on merits after recording prosecution evidence rather than being dismissed for procedural delays?
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• State through Prosecutor General Accountability, National AccountabilityPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 680 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• State through District Public Prosecutor and another vs Faqir Alam2018 MLD 822 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-28
  criminal appealacquittaldying declarationmaterial contradictionsburden of proofeyewitness testimonyreasonable doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent, Faqir Alam, by the Sessions Judge, Diamer, regarding a charge under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and a co-accused murdered the deceased following a dispute over a goat. The trial court acquitted the respondent, citing a lack of evidence and material doubts in the prosecution's case. On appeal, the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court examined the evidence, specifically the alleged dying declaration and the testimony of eyewitnesses. The Court found significant contradictions: the dying declaration named two accused, whereas the sole witness examined regarding it implicated only the respondent. Furthermore, the primary eyewitness admitted in cross-examination that the deceased died from falling off a mountain, not from gunfire. Additionally, the statement of the second eyewitness was recorded by police two days after the incident without explanation. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, affirmed the trial court's judgment, and dismissed the appeal as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between a dying declaration and the testimony of the sole witness examined regarding that declaration undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when a primary eyewitness admits during cross-examination that the death resulted from an accidental fall rather than the alleged criminal act?
  • Does the unexplained delay in recording the statement of an alleged eyewitness under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 render their testimony doubtful?
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• State through Advocate-General, Punjab vs Habib2018 P Cr. L J 936 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-03-07
  appeal against acquittalmaintainability of appealAdvocate-GeneralPublic Prosecutorbenefit of doubtappraisal of evidencemurderZina Hudood Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State through the Advocate-General, Punjab, challenging the acquittal of the respondent from charges under section 10 read with section 18 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of an appeal against acquittal filed by the Advocate-General rather than a Public Prosecutor, and the evaluation of contradictions between ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence. The Federal Shariat Court held that an appeal against acquittal filed by the Advocate-General is incompetent under section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the Advocate-General does not qualify as a Public Prosecutor. Furthermore, on merits, the court found the prosecution's case riddled with material contradictions regarding the alleged motive, the medical evidence, and the failure of witnesses to apprehend the lame accused. The court laid down the principles governing the strict limits of appellate interference in acquittals, emphasizing that the presumption of innocence is doubled upon acquittal and that a judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed if a reasonable view was taken by the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against acquittal filed by the Advocate-General is competent under section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Advocate-General be considered a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the scope of interference by an appellate court in a judgment of acquittal?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind?
  • Whether contradictions between ocular testimony and medical evidence are sufficient to maintain an acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar vs Gulham Hussain and another2018 YLR 1223 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-20
  acquittalSection 265-K Cr.P.C.criminal appealinsufficient evidencemurder trialsuspicion vs proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed by the State against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kohat, which acquitted two respondents of murder charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, pursuant to an application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to acquit the accused at an intermediate stage of the trial due to a lack of incriminating evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that the acquittal was justified. The Court observed that the prosecution case relied solely on rumors and suspicion, with no eye-witnesses or incriminating recoveries. Furthermore, the complainant explicitly exonerated the respondents during trial testimony. The Court affirmed that Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empowers a court to acquit an accused at any stage if there is no probability of conviction, and that recording the entire evidence is not a mandatory prerequisite for such an order. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case.

  Questions settled

  • Is the recording of the entire prosecution evidence a mandatory condition precedent for a court to exercise its power of acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a trial court acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings if it determines there is no probability of conviction?
  • Does the mere naming of an accused in a supplementary statement based on suspicion, without corroborating ocular or circumstantial evidence, constitute sufficient grounds for conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs Mst. Irum and another2018 MLD 1731 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-22Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate-General of Islamabad vs Mati Ullah Jan and 4PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 120, 2018 P Cr. L J 899 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-21
  contempt of courtfreedom of speechmedia ethicsunconditional apologyconstitutional interpretationPEMRA regulationjudicial dignity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves contempt of court proceedings initiated against journalists and media personnel for broadcasting a program that allegedly maligned the judiciary. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents' conduct constituted contempt of court and if their subsequent unconditional apology warranted the discharge of proceedings. The court held that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, particularly regarding the dignity of institutions and contempt of court. Finding that the respondents admitted the allegations and tendered an unconditional apology, the court exercised judicial grace and dropped the proceedings. The court emphasized that media organizations must verify facts before airing content and that regulatory bodies like PEMRA have a statutory duty to monitor compliance with the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 and the Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisement) Code of Conduct 2015. It established that freedom of expression does not grant impunity to disgrace constitutional institutions or individuals.

  Questions settled

  • Does the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 include the right to malign the judiciary?
  • Can contempt of court proceedings be dropped upon the tender of an unconditional apology by the contemnors?
  • Is the freedom of the press subject to reasonable restrictions regarding the dignity of constitutional institutions?
  • What is the responsibility of PEMRA in monitoring talk shows to ensure compliance with the Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisement) Code of Conduct 2015?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate General, KPK, Peshawar vs Nazim Ali2018 YLR 1471 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-30Read full judgment →
• State through Advocate General KPK vs Sher Ali Khan and another2018 PLJ FSC 64 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-11-15
  condonation of delaylimitation periodsufficient causecriminal appealdepartmental sanctiondismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal miscellaneous application filed by the State through the Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, seeking condonation of a 66-day delay in filing a criminal appeal. The core legal question was whether the administrative delay in obtaining departmental sanctions for filing an appeal constitutes 'sufficient cause' under the relevant procedural rules to warrant condonation of delay. The Federal Shariat Court held that the application failed to establish sufficient cause. The Court reasoned that the government is not entitled to preferential treatment compared to ordinary litigants regarding limitation periods, and the petitioner failed to explain the delay of each day. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality and cannot be bypassed without demonstrating circumstances beyond the party's control. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and, as a result, dismissed the criminal appeal in limine. The judgment reaffirms that the burden of proof lies on the appellant to justify delay, and administrative negligence or slackness does not constitute sufficient cause.

  Questions settled

  • Does the administrative delay in obtaining departmental sanctions for filing an appeal constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay?
  • Is the government entitled to be treated differently from an ordinary litigant regarding the law of limitation?
  • Is an appellant required to explain the delay of each and every day when seeking condonation of delay?
  • Can the law of limitation be dismissed as a mere technicality that should not hamper the adjudication of cases on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• State through Additional Advocate-General, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad., Manzoor Ahmed Butt vs Rustam Khan and 13 others2018 P Cr. L J 34 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-05-24
  acquittal appealAdditional Advocate-GeneralPublic Prosecutorlimitation periodacquittal without recording evidenceAzad Jammu and Kashmir
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated appeal challenges two judgments of the High Court arising from the same FIR registered under sections 221, 222, 223, 225-B, 109, A.P.C., concerning the escape of a murderer from a judicial lockup. The trial court had acquitted the accused-respondents under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. The High Court dismissed the State's appeal on the ground that an Additional Advocate-General is not a Public Prosecutor competent to file an acquittal appeal under section 417(1), Cr.P.C., and dismissed the private appellant's appeal as barred by limitation. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir upheld the High Court's findings, holding that an Additional Advocate-General or Assistant Advocate-General does not fall within the statutory definition of a Public Prosecutor for filing acquittal appeals, and that the thirty-day limitation period prescribed under section 417(2-A), Cr.P.C., applies equally to acquittals passed under section 265-K without recording evidence. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Additional Advocate-General or Assistant Advocate-General is a Public Prosecutor competent to file an appeal against an acquittal under section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the thirty-day limitation period under section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to an acquittal order passed under section 265-K without recording evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation through Zonal Head vs Abida Firdous2018 CLD 1264 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-16Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Sami-Ur-Rehman and others2018 SCMR 443 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-28
  ejectment petitionhanding over of possessionsublettingrent defaultwaiver by conductcorporate veillandlord-tenant relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that reversed an order for the ejectment of tenants from commercial premises. The core legal questions concern whether the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a private limited company and the subsequent transfer of business operations to that company constitutes "handing over of possession" under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, and whether the landlord waived its right to eject by accepting rent. The Supreme Court held that the tenant’s unilateral conversion of the business into a separate legal entity and the resulting transfer of possession to that entity without the landlord’s consent constitutes "handing over of possession" under Section 15(2)(iii)(a) of the Ordinance. The Court affirmed that a company is a distinct legal entity from its directors; thus, parting with possession to such an entity exposes the tenant to eviction. Additionally, the Court ruled that acceptance of rent due to omission does not constitute a waiver of the right to eject, and rent deposited by an unauthorized entity does not satisfy the tenant's obligation, establishing grounds for default.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conversion of a sole proprietorship into a private limited company and the transfer of business operations to that company constitute "handing over of possession" under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Is a private limited company a distinct legal entity from its directors for the purpose of determining if a tenant has parted with possession of rented premises?
  • Does the acceptance of rent by a landlord through omission or ignorance constitute a waiver of the right to seek ejectment on the ground of unauthorized handing over of possession?
  • Can rent deposited with a Rent Controller by an unauthorized entity satisfy the tenant's obligation to pay rent to avoid default?
  Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan vs Messrs Group2018 MLD 948 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-03Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal2018 CLD 754 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-01Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Zonal2018 CLD 1250 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-05Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another vs Muzafar Ali2018 CLD 1300 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-14Read full judgment →
• State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another vs Messrs2018 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-28
  fair rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceper square feet rentlump sum rentrent controller jurisdictionperiodic rent increasecommercial tenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from appeals concerning the fixation of fair rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The appellant-landlord had initiated proceedings in 1992 seeking to increase the rent of a commercial shop on a per-square-foot basis, citing prevailing market rates and increased taxes. The Rent Controller and Appellate Court fixed a lump-sum rent, refusing to calculate it on a per-square-foot basis because the original agreement was for a lump-sum amount. The High Court partially accepted the landlord's writ petition, increasing the lump-sum rent and directing a 25% increase every three years. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that an agreement for lump-sum rent does not restrict the Rent Controller's jurisdiction to fix fair rent on a per-square-foot basis in accordance with prevailing market norms. The Court further held that under Section 9 of the Ordinance, subsequent inflation and economic conditions justify a periodic percentage increase to prevent multiplicity of litigation. The Supreme Court allowed the landlord's appeal, fixing the fair rent on a per-square-foot basis with a 25% increase every three years.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement between a landlord and tenant to pay rent in a lump sum bar the Rent Controller from fixing fair rent on a per-square-foot basis?
  • Can the Rent Controller or appellate courts ignore evidence of prevailing market rent of similar premises solely because the subject building is older than the comparison buildings?
  • Whether a court can direct a periodic percentage increase in fair rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, to account for inflation and prevent a multiplicity of litigation during long-pending cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Tarique and 3 others vs The State2018 MLD 745 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-04
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilityineffective firingaerial firingdelay in FSL reporttentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a bail application filed by the applicants Tarique, Bukhshal, and Ghulam Mustafa seeking post-arrest bail in Crime No. 360 of 2015 registered under sections 302, 120-B, 337-H(ii), and 35 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Badin. The core legal question involves determining whether the applicants, to whom no fatal injuries were attributed and whose role was limited to ineffective firing, aerial firing, or presence without causing injury, are entitled to bail under the rule of further inquiry, particularly considering the applicability of vicarious liability and delayed forensic analysis of weapon empties. The Sindh High Court held that since the applicants did not cause any injuries to the deceased or prosecution witnesses, and the question of their vicarious liability and common intention requires further inquiry, their case falls within the ambit of subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court laid down the principle that mere presence or aerial firing without causing injuries, coupled with unexplained delays in sending recovery empties to the forensic laboratory and lack of trial progress, makes out a case for further inquiry warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused assigned the role of ineffective or aerial firing without causing any injury to the deceased or witnesses is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • Does the unexplained delay in sending crime empties and weapons to the Forensic Science Laboratory create a ground for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the question of vicarious liability and common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be conclusively determined at the bail stage?
  • Does the mere pendency of other criminal cases, without proof of conviction, disentitle an accused from the concession of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan through Chief Manager, Peshawar and another vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others2018 CLD 177, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-27
  winding updelinquent directorsstatutory regulatorspromotersmisfeasanceliquidation proceedingspenal statutesstrict constructionState Bank of PakistanSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from liquidation proceedings involving Islamic Investment Bank Limited (IIBL), where official liquidators and depositors filed applications seeking to hold the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) liable under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for failure to properly regulate and supervise IIBL. The High Court rejected SBP and SECP's objections to maintainability, holding that as regulatory bodies, they fell within the definition of 'promoters' involved in the 'promotion' of the company. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, reversing the High Court's judgments. The Supreme Court held that regulatory authorities and central banks cannot be categorized as promoters or entities carrying on the business of a company under Sections 412 and 413. As penal provisions, these sections must be strictly construed. Statutory regulators acting in their supervisory capacity do not owe fiduciary duties as promoters, nor can they be held liable for misfeasance, breach of trust, or fraudulent trading without specific allegations and evidence of personal misapplication of corporate funds or property.

  Questions settled

  • Can statutory regulatory authorities such as SBP and SECP be categorized as promoters under Section 412 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Whether regulatory bodies can be held liable under Sections 412 and 413 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for statutory negligence in supervisory duties?
  • How should penal provisions under company law regarding offences antecedent to winding up be interpreted?
  • Are dictionaries the primary source for interpreting legal terms when constructing a statute?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of India vs V. Ramakrishnan & Anr2018 SCInd 39 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-08-14Read full judgment →
• Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Limited, Karachi vs Johar2018 MLD 1293 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-23Read full judgment →
• Sports Star International (Pvt.) Ltd. (" Ssi") through Chief Executive2018 CLC 1892 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-24Read full judgment →
• Spectre Consulting Limited through Attorney vs MT _Everrich_ 6 through Master and others2018 PLD Sindh 136 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-12
  admiralty jurisdictionaction in personamaction in remcarriage of goods by seamareva injunctiontemporary injunctionarbitration clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This lawsuit was brought under the Admiralty Jurisdiction of the High Courts Ordinance, 1980, where the plaintiff, a UK-based company, sought a decree for the recovery of an advance payment made to defendant No. 3 under a contract for the purchase and shipment of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) to Yemen, along with injunctive relief to restrain the vessel and cargo from leaving Karachi port. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiff's claim fell within the admiralty jurisdiction under Section 3(2)(h) of the Ordinance, whether an action in personam could be maintained in Pakistan against foreign entities without a local nexus, and whether the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive or attachment relief akin to a Mareva injunction. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action arising within Pakistan, that the bill of lading was never issued in the plaintiff's favour, and that the contractual dispute was subject to exclusive foreign arbitration in Dubai. Consequently, the court dismissed the interlocutory applications for injunction and attachment. The key principle laid down is that admiralty jurisdiction and interim injunctive relief cannot be invoked in personam where the contract was executed abroad, performance was destined for a foreign port, the defendant has no business presence in Pakistan, and the underlying dispute is subject to an exclusive foreign arbitration clause.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claim arising out of a contract for the sale and purchase of goods can be entertained under Section 3(2)(h) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980?
  • Can a court entertain an action in personam when the defendant has no ordinary residence or place of business in Pakistan and the cause of action did not arise within Pakistani territorial waters?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to interim injunctive relief or attachment of a vessel amounting to an arrest when the bill of lading was never issued in the plaintiff's favour?
  • Should a court decline to exercise jurisdiction when the contracting parties have mutually agreed to submit their disputes to foreign arbitration in Dubai?
  Read full judgment →
• Speaker, National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad and others vs Habib Akram and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 678 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-06
  Nomination FormsElections Act 2017Representation of the People Act 1976Candidate DisclosureInterim ReliefConstitutional InterpretationArticles 62 and 63Election TransparencyAffidavitGeneral Elections 2018
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involves appeals challenging a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the disclosure requirements in Nomination Forms for candidates for National and Provincial Assemblies under the Elections Act, 2017, as compared to the repealed Representation of the People Act, 1976. Key issues included the maintainability of appeals without prior Intra Court Appeals, the locus standi of the Speaker, National Assembly, and the interpretation of Articles 62, 63, 218-222 of the Constitution regarding candidate qualifications. As an interim measure, the Supreme Court directed all candidates to file a detailed affidavit disclosing additional information previously required under the 1976 Act but omitted in the 2017 Act. This decision was made to ensure greater transparency, facilitate the determination of candidate qualifications, and enable the electorate to make informed choices for the General Elections 2018. Failure to submit this affidavit would render nomination papers incomplete and subject to rejection, with false declarations entailing legal penalties.

  Read full judgment →
• South Asia Geophysical Services (Sageo) through Senior Officer vs New2018 CLD 273 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-12Read full judgment →
• Sophia Com B.V. through Duly Authorized Officer vs Pakistan through Secretary Revenue and 2 othersPTCL 2019 CL. 271, 2018 PTD 2208 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-06Read full judgment →
• Soomar Khan vs The State2018 MLD 1190 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-12-18
  criminal appealattempted murderbenefit of doubtcontradictions in evidenceappraisal of evidenceacquittalocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to eight years rigorous imprisonment with Arsh, arising from an FIR registered at Levies Thana Gandawah. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in light of material contradictions among star witnesses, discrepancies regarding the date and time of the FIR and investigation proceedings, and existing enmity between the parties. The Balochistan High Court held that glaring contradictions, inconsistencies between medical and ocular evidence, and questionable timing of the police report rendered the prosecution's evidence untrustworthy and created a reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's guilt. The court established the key principles that the testimony of independent witnesses must still be scrutinized for inherent probability rather than accepted blindly, that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, and that the benefit of doubt must be extended where the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of impartial or disinterested witnesses can be accepted without corroboration if their statements are improbable or inconsistent?
  • Does a single circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right?
  • How do material contradictions regarding the time and manner of lodging an FIR affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to acquittal when the prosecution witnesses contradict each other on material counts and the recovery of crime weapons is absent?
  Read full judgment →
• Sonia Raza vs Election Commission of Pakistan and others2018 CLC 1966 · Lahore High Court · 2018-08-08Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Limited through Principle Officers_ General Attorneys vs Messrs Bismillah Agro Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Directors and 2 others2018 CLD 1503 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-07
  recovery of financeleave to defendbanking courtmark-updeemed admissionfinance facilitiesexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a suit for recovery of finance facilities filed by a bank against a corporate entity and its guarantors. The defendants were duly served with summons under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, but failed to enter an appearance or file an application for leave to defend within the statutory period. The core legal question was whether the court could decree the suit in the absence of a leave to defend application. The Court held that under Section 10 of the Ordinance, the failure to file such an application results in the allegations of fact in the plaint being deemed admitted, allowing the court to pass a decree. However, the Court independently verified the claim and noted that the bank had improperly charged mark-up beyond the expiry date of the finance facilities. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit for the principal amounts and permissible mark-up, excluding the excess charges conceded by the plaintiff. The key principle established is that while a decree may follow the failure to file a leave to defend, the court retains the duty to verify the veracity of the claim, particularly regarding the calculation of mark-up.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, when a defendant fails to file an application for leave to defend after being served?
  • Does a Banking Court have the authority to verify the veracity of a claim even when the defendant fails to file a leave to defend application?
  • Is a plaintiff bank entitled to recover mark-up charged beyond the expiry date of the finance facilities as stipulated in the finance agreements?
  Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Limited through President vs Aurangzeb and another2018 PLC 117 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-21
  service terminationback benefitsmisconductdepartmental inquiryright to fair trialconstitutional petitionlabour appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which set aside the dismissal of Respondent No. 1 and directed his reinstatement with back benefits. The core legal question revolves around whether an employee of a bank can be terminated summarily on the basis of allegations of misconduct and corruption involving a previous employer and a pending inquiry by the National Accountability Bureau, without holding a regular departmental inquiry and without affording an opportunity of being heard. The court held that termination of service on the basis of unproven allegations and hearsay evidence without conducting a regular inquiry violates the principles of natural justice and the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution. The court laid down the principle that an employer cannot dispense with the requirement of a full-fledged inquiry and due process when terminating an employee for alleged misconduct, and findings of fact recorded by a competent labour appellate tribunal based on evidence will not be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction unless tainted by perversity or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can be dismissed from service on the basis of allegations of misconduct from a previous employer without conducting a regular departmental inquiry?
  • Does the summary termination of an employee without a show-cause inquiry violate the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the High Court interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal?
  • Is an employer required to prove allegations of misconduct in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 before terminating an employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Limited through Attorneys vs Grey Printers Pvt. Limited2018 CLD 1183 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• Sohail Zubair and 3 others vs Dildar Ali Khan and another2018 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 14 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-12-14
  post-arrest bailcardiac arrestmedical reportfurther inquirybenefit of doubtmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges an order of the District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction Bhimber, which rejected the post-arrest bail application of the accused-petitioners in a case involving charges of murder and causing hurt under the Azad Penal Code. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail in view of the medical report indicating death by cardiac arrest and the absence of visible external injuries. The Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir accepted the revision petition, setting aside the lower court's order and granting bail to the petitioners. The court held that where the medical opinion suggests sudden death due to cardiac arrest rather than direct physical trauma, and no visible external marks of violence are found on the body, the case falls within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entitling the accused to the concession of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the accused is entitled to post-arrest bail when the medical report attributes the cause of death to cardiac arrest rather than physical trauma?
  • Can the benefit of doubt arising from a tentative assessment of the medical report be extended to the accused at the bail stage?
  • Does the absence of visible injuries on the body of the deceased bring the case within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether bail can be withheld as a punishment when the connection of the accused to the offence requires further probe?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Asghar vs The State and another2018 YLR 214 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-04Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and others2018 PLJ Islamabad 143 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-02
  civil revision petitionoral giftIslamic lawdelivery of possessiontransfer of propertymental capacityinheritance rightsCapital Development Authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit for declaration and injunction regarding the estate of his deceased parents. The core legal questions centered on whether the oral gifts and subsequent transfers of two properties by the mother to two of her children were valid under Islamic law and statutory regulations, and whether the donor possessed the requisite mental capacity. The Islamabad High Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts were based on a proper appreciation of evidence, that the essential ingredients of an Islamic gift (declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession) were duly satisfied, and that a Muslim has unfettered powers during their lifetime to gift property to one heir to the exclusion of others. The Court reaffirmed that physical writing or registration is not mandatory for a valid Islamic gift, and that mere allegations of fraud or illness without concrete medical proof are insufficient to invalidate a transfer. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an oral gift of immovable property by a Muslim is valid without a registered instrument under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  • Does a Muslim donor have unfettered powers to gift property to one child during their lifetime to the exclusion of other legal heirs?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove a valid gift under Islamic law?
  • Are general allegations of fraud and illness sufficient to invalidate a property transfer without specific particulars and independent medical proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed Jan vs Siraj Ahmed Jan and 9 others2018 PLJ Islamabad 143, 2018 CLC 919 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Sofia Ashfaq vs Haseeb Ashfaq Bhatti and others2018 IHC 141 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-11-28Read full judgment →
• Sobia Hassan vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 448 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-07Read full judgment →
• SMT. Shamim vs State (GNCT of Delhi)2018 SCInd 65 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-19
  criminal appealreversal of acquittalinjured witnesschild witnessextra-judicial confessioncommon intentionremission
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court reversing the acquittal of the appellant and convicting her under Sections 302/307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (or Indian Penal Code equivalent as referred in the text) for murder and attempt to murder, while sentencing her to life imprisonment along with a restriction on remissions. The core legal question concerns the propriety of reversing an acquittal based on the reappreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the testimony of injured and child witnesses, extra-judicial confessions, and common intention. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly reversed the perverse acquittal by the trial court, as the testimonies of the injured witness and the daughter (who testified against her mother) were credible, consistent, and corroborated by recoveries. However, the apex court held that denying statutory remissions without special reasons was unjustified. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court may interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's view is perverse, and that the testimony of a related or child witness, if inspiring confidence and corroborated, forms a valid basis for conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can reverse an order of acquittal upon reappreciation of evidence when the trial court's view is found to be perverse?
  • Does the testimony of an injured witness carry greater evidentiary weight in a criminal trial?
  • Can the testimony of a child witness who witnessed a gruesome murder be relied upon without corroboration?
  • Is it lawful to deny statutory remissions in sentence to a convict without ascribing special reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Slackness in the Progress of Pending Enqu Iries Relating to Fake Bank2018 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-05
  suo motu noticeJoint Investigation Teammoney launderingfake bank accountsfinancial investigationconstitutional jurisdictionArticle 184(3)
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a suo motu notice taken by the Supreme Court concerning inquiries into fake bank accounts and suspected money laundering involving significant sums of money. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) reported that investigations were being hampered by the complexity of the financial data, a lack of specialized investigative expertise, and interference from influential figures. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possesses the jurisdiction to constitute a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to conduct an effective probe in such circumstances. The Court held that it has ample jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, to appoint a JIT in appropriate cases. It determined that technical inability to handle complex financial investigations and the necessity to protect national wealth justify such intervention. Consequently, the Court constituted a high-powered JIT comprising experts from various state institutions to ensure a transparent and incisive investigation, while also directing that security be provided to the investigators to prevent obstruction and intimidation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to constitute a Joint Investigation Team?
  • Can technical inability to conduct complex financial investigations justify the formation of a Joint Investigation Team by the Court?
  • Does the existence of an ongoing investigation by a statutory agency preclude the Supreme Court from appointing a Joint Investigation Team?
  Read full judgment →
• Sixon Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited, Lahore vs Presiding Officer, Labour2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Labour) 170 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  revision petitionpayment of wagesterritorial jurisdictionappealable orderlabour court
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the order passed by the Punjab Labour Court accepting an appeal against the dismissal of a wage claim petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction and remanding the matter to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The core legal question was whether an appeal lies against an order of the Authority dismissing a claim for want of jurisdiction where no direction was issued under sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The court held that under Section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936, an appeal is maintainable only against a direction issued under sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 15, and since the Authority merely dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds without issuing any such direction, the appeal before the Labour Court was incompetent. The impugned appellate order was accordingly set aside and the revision petition accepted, establishing that orders of dismissal not involving directions under Section 15(3) or (4) are not appealable under the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie against an order of the Authority dismissing a wage claim for lack of territorial jurisdiction?
  • Is an order dismissing a petition under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 appealable when no direction is issued under sub-section (3) or (4) of Section 15?
  • What constitutes an appealable order under Section 17(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936?
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• Sitara Aslam vs Family Judge and others2018 CLC 382 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
• Sirajuddin vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1179 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-02
  trial in absentiaabsconding accuseddue processAnti-Terrorism Actcriminal appealconviction in absentiaright to fair trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant, Sirajuddin, under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, recorded in absentia by the Anti-Terrorism Court. The core legal question was whether a conviction for absconsion can be sustained where no charge was framed, no evidence was recorded, and no finding was made regarding the appellant's status as a fugitive from law. The Court held that the procedure adopted by the trial court was illegal and violated the constitutional rights of the accused. Relying on established precedents, the Court affirmed that trial in absentia without due process is repugnant to the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court clarified that an appellant convicted in absentia is not required to first move the trial court under Section 19(12) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, before filing an appeal under Section 25 of the same Act. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted under Section 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, without a charge being framed or evidence recorded?
  • Is it mandatory for an accused convicted in absentia to file an application under Section 19(12) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, before filing an appeal under Section 25 of the same Act?
  • Does a trial in absentia without due process violate Articles 9 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj-ud-Din vs The State & 1 another2018 MLD 1917, 2018 PHC 1515 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-14Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ud Din vs State through Additional Advocate-General and another2018 MLD 1917 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-14Read full judgment →
• Siraj and others vs The State2018 YLR 1875 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ahmed vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 875 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-15
  appeal against acquittalcheatingforgeryburden of proofappreciation of evidencesmuggled vehiclecriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent by a Magistrate in a case involving allegations of cheating and forgery under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the respondent sold a smuggled and tampered vehicle to his wife, which was later seized by Customs authorities. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently established the elements of cheating and forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court upheld the acquittal, noting that the prosecution failed to produce the actual purchaser (the complainant's wife) as a witness, failed to prove the respondent had tampered with the vehicle, and that the investigating officer's testimony actually supported the respondent's innocence. The court affirmed that the trial court correctly appraised the evidence, finding no material to warrant interference. The principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to produce essential witnesses and fails to establish the foundational elements of the charged offences, an acquittal is unassailable and will not be disturbed in appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to produce the primary victim as a witness in a criminal trial for cheating and forgery warrant an acquittal?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment where the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of the charged offences?
  • Is an investigating officer's testimony that supports the accused's innocence sufficient to undermine the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ahmed through LRs vs Faysal Bank Limited and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 91 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-08
  execution proceedingscourt auctionreserve priceprocedural irregularitiescollusive salemiscarriage of justicebanking court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the dismissal of objections to an auction sale in execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether the auction proceedings, which suffered from procedural irregularities—including the failure to fix a reserve price, inadequate publicity, and the conduct of the auction at the decree-holder's premises—could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that the auction was neither fair nor transparent, noting that the property was sold at a throwaway price in violation of mandatory procedural requirements. The Court emphasized that technicalities should not be used to defeat substantive rights and that courts must guard against collusive auctions. The ratio established is that where an auction process is replete with procedural flaws and lacks transparency, the court must intervene to prevent manifest fraud and miscarriage of justice, even if the judgment debtor has not strictly complied with all procedural timelines, as the substance of justice prevails over mere technical form.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to fix a reserve price in a court-ordered auction invalidate the sale?
  • Can an auction sale be set aside if the auction process lacks transparency and proper publicity?
  • Should technical procedural objections prevail over the substantive rights of parties in execution proceedings?
  • Does an auction conducted at the premises of the decree-holder rather than the property location render the sale suspect?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ahmed through LRs vs Faysal Bank Limited & others2018 SCP 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  execution proceedingsauction salereserve pricefraudulent auctionprocedural irregularitydecreetal amountright of first refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing an appeal relating to execution proceedings in a bank recovery suit. The core legal question concerns the legality and transparency of property auction proceedings conducted in execution of a money decree, particularly regarding the mandatory requirements of proclamation, fixation of reserve price, and fair valuation. The Supreme Court held that the auction proceedings were replete with fatal procedural flaws, including the failure to fix a reserve price, lack of proper advertisement, and holding the auction on the premises of the decree-holder bank rather than the property site, resulting in a collusive sale at a throwaway price. The Court laid down that procedural technicalities cannot be permitted to defeat substantive justice, and that courts must jealously guard against clever maneuverings designed to dispose of a judgment debtor's property for a paltry sum through compromised or non-transparent auctions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction sale conducted in execution of a decree can be sustained in the absence of a fixed reserve price and proper public notice?
  • Does holding an execution auction on the premises of the decree-holder bank render the auction suspect?
  • Can technicalities and periods of limitation be used to uphold a property auction tainted by material procedural flaws and manifest unfairness?
  • What remedies are available to an auction purchaser when a court-ordered execution auction is set aside due to procedural irregularities?
  Read full judgment →
• Siraj Ahmed through L.Rs, vs Faysal Bank Limited & others2018 PLJ SC 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-08
  execution proceedingsauction salereserve pricethrowaway priceprocedural irregularitybanking courtsubstantive justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal concerning execution proceedings. Faysal Bank Limited obtained a recovery decree against the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, leading to execution and subsequent auction of agricultural property. The petitioner challenged the auction on grounds of procedural flaws, non-fixation of reserve price, lack of proper publicity, and that the auction was held at the bank's premises rather than the property location, resulting in a sale at a throwaway price. The core legal questions involve whether execution auctions conducted with severe procedural irregularities and lack of transparency can be sustained, and whether technicalities should override substantive justice. The Supreme Court held that the auction proceedings were replete with fatal flaws, lacked fairness, and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The Court set aside the impugned judgment, remanded the matter to the executing Court for a fresh auction in accordance with law, and laid down the principle that execution sales must be transparent, adequately publicized, and guarded against collusive manoeuvres to ensure properties fetch their fair value.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an execution auction conducted without fixing a reserve price and proper publicity is sustainable in the eyes of law?
  • Can technicalities be allowed to defeat substantive rights and prevent a court from remedying a fraudulent or defective auction sale?
  • What is the effect of holding property auction proceedings at the premises of the decree-holder bank instead of the location of the property?
  • Whether an auction sale conducted in violation of mandatory procedural requirements under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 warrants setting aside by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sinotec Co. Limited through Authorized Person vs Province of Sindh2018 PLD Sindh 303 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-15
  public procurementWorld Bank Guidelinestemporary injunctionpre-qualificationjudicial reviewSindh Public Procurement Rules 2010lowest bidderinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was instituted by Sinotec Co. Limited seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Province of Sindh and other defendants, challenging the pre-qualification and acceptance of the lowest financial bid of defendant No. 6 (M/s. Descon) for the World Bank-financed Sindh Barrages Improvement Project (SBIP/G2). The core legal questions were whether the procurement process was governed by the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010 or the World Bank Procurement Guidelines, and whether the plaintiff satisfied the prerequisites for interim injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, and Section 151 CPC.

  The High Court held that under Rule 5 of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010, the World Bank Guidelines prevail in cases involving international financing agreements, rendering the domestic rules and Review Committee's jurisdiction inapplicable. The Court found the procurement process transparent, non-discriminatory, endorsed by the World Bank, and free of mala fides. Lacking a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, the plaintiff's interlocutory applications for temporary injunction and stay were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the World Bank Procurement Guidelines override the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010 in projects funded by international financial institutions pursuant to Rule 5 of the Sindh Public Procurement Rules 2010?
  • Whether an unsuccessful bidder offering a substantially higher financial bid can claim a vested right or establish a prima facie case for an interim injunction against the award of a public contract to the lowest bidder?
  • What is the scope of judicial review over commercial and policy decisions involving the pre-qualification of bidders in foreign-funded infrastructure projects?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Rural Support Organization (Srso) vs Federation of Pakistan2018 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-20
  Auditor-General of PakistanConstitutional auditPublic fundsSubstantially financed bodiesConsolidated FundStatutory auditAccountability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a non-profit organization registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, challenged a High Court judgment upholding a notice from the Auditor-General of Pakistan requiring an audit of its accounts. The core legal question was whether an entity receiving substantial funding from the Provincial Government, though not established by the government, is subject to the audit jurisdiction of the Auditor-General of Pakistan under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Auditor-General possesses the constitutional and statutory mandate to audit bodies "substantially financed" by loans or grants from the Consolidated Fund of the Federation or Provinces. The Court established the principle that the Auditor-General’s mandate extends beyond entities directly established by the government to include any body substantially financed—defined as receiving 50% or more of its expenditure or at least five million rupees—by public funds. This constitutional audit serves a distinct purpose from standard statutory corporate audits, ensuring transparency and accountability for public funds utilized by private entities for public welfare programs.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Auditor-General of Pakistan have the authority to audit a private entity that is substantially financed by government grants?
  • What constitutes a 'substantially financed body' for the purpose of audit by the Auditor-General of Pakistan?
  • Does the constitutional mandate of the Auditor-General to audit public funds supersede the statutory audit requirements of a company?
  • Can the Auditor-General of Pakistan audit an organization that is not established by the Federal or Provincial Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board vs M/s. Meesam Construction Company2018 PTD 1827, PTCL 2018 CL. 564 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Sindh Revenue Board vs Messrs Meessam Construction Company2018 PTD 1827 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Silkbank Limited through Authorized Officers vs Messrs Imperial Agro2018 CLD 678 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-25Read full judgment →
• Sikander Sher vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited through Branch Manager2018 CLD 550 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-07
  mortgaged propertyauction proceedingsrecovery of financesbankers' books evidenceservice of noticebanking practicemark-up
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the Banking Court's order upholding the auction of the appellant's mortgaged property by the respondent-bank. The core legal question concerns whether the bank complied with the mandatory procedural requirements under Section 15 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, regarding the sale of mortgaged property. The Court held that the bank failed to establish proper service of notice upon the defaulter, failed to comply with the mandatory dual publication requirement for the auction, and relied on an uncertified statement of account that violated Section 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891. Furthermore, the Court found the bank improperly charged mark-up after the finance period expired and failed to demonstrate that the auction was a transparent public process. Consequently, the Court set aside the auction proceedings as illegal and without lawful authority, permitting the bank to initiate recovery proceedings afresh in accordance with the law, while directing the appellant to compensate the auction purchaser for the failed transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bank's failure to provide proof of service of notice to a defaulter invalidate the auction of mortgaged property under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is a statement of account admissible as evidence if it is not certified in accordance with Section 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  • Does the failure to publish auction notices in both Urdu and English newspapers violate the mandatory requirements of Section 15(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a bank charge mark-up on a financial facility after the expiry of the finance limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikander alias Sani vs The State2018 SHC 436, 2018 MLD 1220 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-22
  police encounterbenefit of doubtcontradictory evidenceanti-terrorismillegal weaponscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under sections 324, 353, and 23(1)-A of the Sindh Arms Act and section 7(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged that the appellant was apprehended during a police encounter after direct firing, resulting in the recovery of a repeater and a live rifle grenade. The core legal questions involved the credibility of uncorroborated police testimony, glaring contradictions regarding weapon serial numbers and the timing of the bomb disposal squad's intervention, and the benefit of the doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution case was marred by fatal discrepancies, including contradictory timings and mismatched weapon serial numbers, rendering the evidence untrustworthy. Setting aside the conviction, the court laid down the principle that the harsher the sentence, the stricter the standard of proof required, and that a single reasonable circumstance creating doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions between the testimony of police witnesses and expert evidence regarding the timing and place of recovery are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does a mismatch in weapon serial numbers across various police documents destroy the sanctity of the recovery?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the standard of proof required in cases carrying harsher criminal sentences?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikander @ Sani vs State2018 SHC 436 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-22
  benefit of doubtpolice encounterstandard of proofcriminal appealappreciation of evidenceanti-terrorismrecovery of weapons
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant by an Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code, the Sindh Arms Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Act. The prosecution alleged a police encounter involving an exchange of fire, leading to the appellant's arrest and the recovery of a grenade and a repeater. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt given significant evidentiary discrepancies. The High Court found the prosecution's case marred by fatal contradictions, including the BDU expert claiming knowledge of the incident before it occurred, conflicting serial numbers for the recovered weapon, and the absence of independent corroboration or physical evidence of the alleged encounter. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The ratio emphasizes that for the safe administration of criminal justice, the harsher the sentence, the stricter the standard of proof required. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, and ordered his acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy in the timing of a police encounter and the expert's knowledge of the incident create reasonable doubt?
  • Is the prosecution required to provide independent corroboration for police testimony in a contested encounter case?
  • Does the principle that the harsher the sentence, the stricter the standard of proof apply to convictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution provides conflicting serial numbers for the primary weapon allegedly recovered from the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Ali Shah & Others vs Province Sindh and others2018 SHC 930 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-04Read full judgment →
• Siddaling vs The State, through Kalagi Police Station2018 SCInd 18 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-08-09
  abetment of suicidecruelty to wifeillicit relationshipmental agonydowry harassmentcriminal appealsentencing leniency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant-husband under Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 for the abetment of suicide of his wife, Kavitha, within four months of their marriage. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s persistent illicit relationship with another woman, despite a prior panchayat agreement to cease such conduct, constituted cruelty and abetment to suicide. The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s conduct created severe mental agony and psychological imbalance for the deceased, directly inducing her to commit suicide. Consequently, the Court affirmed the conviction under Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, rejecting the appellant's plea for leniency in sentencing given the proximity of the suicide to the marriage and the panchayat intervention. The judgment reinforces the principle that persistent illicit relationships causing mental trauma can satisfy the ingredients of abetment to suicide, necessitating a careful assessment of the victim's psychological state induced by the accused's actions.

  Questions settled

  • Does a husband's persistent illicit relationship, causing mental agony to his wife, constitute abetment to suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the psychological imbalance induced by an accused's conduct satisfy the requirements for abetment to suicide?
  • Is leniency in sentencing appropriate when a suicide occurs shortly after marriage and following a failed reconciliation attempt?
  Read full judgment →
• Sibghatullah Sheikh vs Province of Sindh & Others2020 PLC (C.S.) 682, 2018 SHC 986 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-26
  constitutional petitionright to appointmentvested rightselection processcontractual appointmentdiscriminationservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking appointment as an Assistant Engineer (Civil) with the Sindh Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (STEVTA), alleging that despite qualifying the test and interview, the authority failed to issue an offer letter. The Petitioner contended that the competent authority had approved his appointment and that he was being discriminated against. The Respondent-Authority argued that the selection process was for contract-based positions, that only one candidate (who scored higher than the Petitioner) was recommended for the specific post, and that no vested right of appointment was created for the Petitioner. The Court held that mere selection in a test or interview does not confer an indefeasible right to be appointed or to receive an offer letter. Finding that the candidate selected for the post had obtained higher marks than the Petitioner and that no candidate with lower marks had been appointed, the Court rejected the claim of discrimination. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as being devoid of merit, affirming that the selection process did not create a vested right for the Petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Does mere selection in a test or interview confer an indefeasible right to be issued an offer letter for appointment?
  • Can a candidate claim a vested right to appointment based solely on qualifying a recruitment test?
  • Is a claim of discriminatory treatment in recruitment valid when the appointed candidate scored higher than the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Shuja and another vs Mst. Aqila Bibi and 2 others2018 PLJ Peshawar 41 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-30Read full judgment →
• Show Cause Notices Issued to Messrs Options International (SMC-2018 CLD 1461 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2018-08-17Read full judgment →
• Shoukat Khan & Company through Managing Director vs Chief Engineer2018 YLR 1151 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-01-09Read full judgment →
• Sumaia Bibi vs Addl. District Judge, Mailsi District Vehari and 2 others2018 PLJ Lahore 981, 2018 YLR 2562 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-19Read full judgment →
• Shoukat Ali vs Additional Sessions Judge, Tando Adam and 3 others2018 YLR 1546 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-26
  transfer of casecriminal procedurethreat to witnessesjudicial discretionbald allegationspolice protection
  Summary & questions settled

  This transfer application was filed by the applicant seeking the transfer of a Sessions case pending before the Additional Sessions Judge, Tando Adam, to another district. The applicant, who is also a witness in the case, alleged that he and other witnesses faced serious life threats from the private respondents, rendering them unable to appear before the trial court. The court examined the application and found that the allegations were entirely generic, lacking specific details regarding dates, times, or incidents of threats. Furthermore, the applicant failed to demonstrate that he had approached local law enforcement or the trial court for protection prior to seeking judicial intervention. The court held that transfer of a case under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be granted on the basis of bald, unsubstantiated allegations, as doing so would disrupt the smooth functioning of the judiciary. The application was dismissed, with the court directing the applicant to approach local police authorities for protection and to inform the trial court of any specific threats.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case be transferred under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 based on generic and unsubstantiated allegations of threats?
  • Is it a prerequisite for a party seeking case transfer due to threats to first approach local police or the trial court for protection?
  • Does the court have the authority to dismiss a transfer application that lacks specific details regarding the alleged threats?
  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib-ur-Rehman vs The M.D., Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 [M] C.L.R. 908 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Shoaib vs The State2018 PHC 1370 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-28Read full judgment →
• Shoaib ur Rehman vs The M.D., Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 IHC 6 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-01-23Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Ali vs The State2018 MLD 1835 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-29
  narcotics recoverychain of custodyreasonable doubtchemical examiner reportindependent witnessescriminal appealControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, following the alleged recovery of 12.5 kilograms of narcotics. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the integrity of the recovery proceedings and the chain of custody of the narcotic substance. The Sindh High Court set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. The Court emphasized that although Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is excluded by the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997, the failure to associate independent witnesses in a public place where they were available, combined with unexplained erasures in official records and overwriting in recovery memos, created significant doubt. Crucially, the Court held that the failure to examine the official responsible for transporting the case property to the chemical examiner broke the chain of custody, rendering the chemical report unreliable. Consequently, the appellant was acquitted, and the State's appeal for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to examine the official who transported the narcotic substance to the chemical examiner break the chain of custody?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 when there are unexplained erasures in the police roznamcha and overwriting in the recovery memo?
  • Is the prosecution required to associate independent witnesses in narcotics cases even if Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is excluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Shoaib Ahmed and others vs The State and others2018 YLR 176 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-13Read full judgment →
• Shiraz Ali vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 975 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-19Read full judgment →
• Shifa International Hospitals Ltd., etc vs Mst. Hajira Bibi, etc2018 IHC 57 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-24
  medical negligenceconsumer protectionmaintainability of appealinterlocutory orderjurisdiction of consumer courtspecial law interpretationcompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Consumer Court dismissing the appellants' objection regarding the maintainability of a consumer complaint alleging medical negligence. The core legal questions were whether medical negligence claims fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, and whether an appeal lies against an interlocutory order of the Consumer Court. The Court held that the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, is a beneficial legislation providing for compensation and damages—remedies absent in the PMDC Ordinance—and thus, the Consumer Court retains jurisdiction. However, the Court directed that in such cases, the Consumer Court should seek expert opinions from PMDC authorities. Furthermore, the Court held that Section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, only permits appeals against final orders, such as convictions or acquittals, and does not extend to interlocutory or interim orders. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. The judgment establishes that special laws must be interpreted to fulfill their legislative intent, particularly regarding consumer rights and the availability of compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995, provide jurisdiction for consumer courts to hear medical negligence claims despite the existence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962?
  • Are interlocutory or interim orders passed by a Consumer Court appealable under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • What is the procedure for a Consumer Court when determining medical negligence claims involving professional medical practitioners?
  • Does the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, provide a mechanism for awarding damages or compensation to a consumer?
  Read full judgment →