Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Shifa International Hospitals Ltd. and others vs Mst. Hajira Bibi and others2018 IHC 57, 2018 PLD Islamabad 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-20
  medical negligenceconsumer complaintmaintainabilityjurisdictioninterlocutory ordersspecial laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was preferred against an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII (West) Islamabad, which dismissed the appellants' objection regarding the maintainability of a consumer complaint filed by respondent No. 1 under the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 concerning alleged medical negligence. The core legal questions involved whether a consumer complaint regarding medical negligence is maintainable before a Consumer Court in the presence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962, and whether an appeal against an interlocutory order is maintainable under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995. The Islamabad High Court held that the Consumer Court has jurisdiction to entertain consumer complaints regarding medical negligence for the purpose of granting compensation, a remedy absent under the PMDC framework, while establishing that the Consumer Court should seek an expert opinion from PMDC authorities before finalizing the matter. Furthermore, the court held that appeals under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995 lie only against final orders of conviction or acquittal and that interlocutory orders are not appealable. The key principles laid down include the harmonious application of overlapping special laws and the non-appealability of interim orders under consumer legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consumer complaint regarding medical negligence is maintainable before a Consumer Court in the presence of the PMDC Ordinance, 1962?
  • Does the PMDC Ordinance, 1962 provide for the award of damages and compensation to a consumer?
  • Are interlocutory orders passed by a Consumer Court appealable under section 10 of the Islamabad Consumers Protection Act, 1995?
  • What is the procedure when two special laws seemingly overlap regarding medical negligence claims?
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• Shezan Services Limited (Now known as Shezan Services (Private)2018 CLD 1305 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-19Read full judgment →
• Sherin Zada vs Bakht Biland and 3 others2018 PHC 1329, 2018 MLD 1537 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-25
  private complaintforgerycognizance of offenceBoard of RevenueacquittalSection 195 CrPCpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an acquittal order passed by a Judicial Magistrate regarding a private complaint filed for offences under sections 419, 420, 468, 471, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a Judicial Magistrate could take cognizance of such offences when the alleged forgery involved a document submitted in proceedings before the Member, Board of Revenue, without a formal complaint from that forum. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board of Revenue acts as a court, and under Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a court cannot take cognizance of offences involving documents produced in judicial proceedings unless a complaint is made by the court concerned. The court affirmed that ancillary offences cannot be used to circumvent mandatory procedural requirements. Consequently, the trial court correctly acquitted the respondents under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as it lacked the competence to proceed without the requisite complaint from the Board of Revenue.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Board of Revenue constitute a 'Court' for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a Judicial Magistrate take cognizance of offences under Sections 419, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 without a complaint from the court where the forged document was produced?
  • Does the inclusion of ancillary offences in a complaint allow a complainant to bypass the procedural requirements of Section 195(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Sherin Zada vs Bakht Biland & others2018 PHC 1329 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-25Read full judgment →
• Sheraz Zaka vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and Ministry of Finance and 2 others2018 PTD 336 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-19
  fiscal policyreasonable classificationtax basejudicial reviewconstitutional challengeequal protectionIncome Tax (Amendment) Act 2016
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the constitutionality of the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2016, specifically provisions relating to traders. The petitioner alleged that the Act violated Articles 14 and 25 of the Constitution by creating discriminatory classifications and granting preferential treatment to a specific class of traders regarding tax audits. The core legal question was whether the legislative classification of traders who had not filed tax returns for the preceding ten years constituted unconstitutional discrimination. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the legislation was a valid exercise of fiscal policy aimed at broadening the tax base and increasing revenue. It established that the legislature enjoys wide latitude in economic and fiscal matters to select persons or subjects for taxation. The Court affirmed that reasonable classification is permissible, provided it is based on intelligible criteria with a nexus to the law's purpose. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality regarding legislative enactments, placing the burden of proof on the challenger to demonstrate clear discrimination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the legislature enjoy wide latitude in selecting persons and subjects for taxation under fiscal policy?
  • Can a fiscal statute be struck down solely on the basis of alleged discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution?
  • Is there a presumption of constitutionality in favor of legislative enactments concerning economic activities?
  • Does the classification of traders who have not filed tax returns for a specific period constitute a reasonable classification?
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• Sheraz vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 600 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-31
  post-arrest bailnarcotic traffickingpossession of narcoticsheinous offensebail restrictionControl of Narcotic Substances ActCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application arose from the arrest of the applicant, who was apprehended while driving a vehicle containing 135 kilograms of charas, leading to charges under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given the substantial quantity of narcotics recovered and the statutory restrictions on bail for such offenses. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the applicant failed to establish grounds for relief. The Court emphasized that offenses under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 are heinous and directed against society at large. It affirmed that when narcotics exceed one kilogram, the offense falls under section 9(c), which carries severe penalties, including death or life imprisonment, thereby triggering the restrictive bail provisions of section 51 of the Act. Furthermore, the Court established that a driver of a vehicle transporting narcotics is prima facie responsible for the contraband, regardless of exclusive possession, and that deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the driver of a vehicle transporting narcotics bear responsibility for the contraband under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  • Is an accused charged with an offense under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 entitled to bail when the quantity of narcotics exceeds one kilogram?
  • Can a court conduct a deep appreciation of evidence at the bail stage in narcotics cases?
  • Does section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 restrict the grant of bail for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment?
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• Sher Zada vs Dsitrict Collector etc2018 PHC 1355 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-17Read full judgment →
• Sher Rehman vs Mst. Kharo and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 84, 2018 MLD 476 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-17Read full judgment →
• Sher Rehman vs Mst. Kharo & others2018 PLJ Peshawar 84 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-17Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad Zafar and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 SHC 440 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitymaster and servantpassage policystatutory rulesterms and conditions of servicediscriminatory policy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, retired employees of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), filed a constitutional petition seeking the extension of benefits under a revised passage policy (Admin Order No. 07 of 2012) to retired employees, alleging discrimination as it was granted to specific management groups. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition against PIAC under Article 199 of the Constitution and whether PIAC's passage policies constitute enforceable statutory rules. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that PIAC's passage rules are non-statutory instructions meant for internal management, and the relationship between PIAC and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant. Consequently, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to challenge internal policy decisions regarding passage benefits unless a violation of statutory rules or fundamental rights is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether or not a writ could be issued against the Respondent-PIAC under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Whether Passage policy issued under Admin Order No. 07/2012 dated 09th February, 2012 is a policy decision of Respondents/PIAC?
  • Are the passage rules and policies of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation of a statutory nature enforceable through constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Sher Khan vs The State and another2018 YLR 477 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-09
  criminal appealacquittalocular evidencedelayed FIRhouse trespassoutraging modestyburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mianwali, which convicted the appellant under sections 354 and 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the charges of house trespass and outraging the modesty of a woman beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged contradictions in the ocular account and the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, noting significant discrepancies in the witnesses' testimonies, the implausibility of the alleged mode of entry, and the unexplained seven-day delay in reporting the incident. Furthermore, the Court found the allegation of abscondence unsubstantiated. The key principle laid down is that the prosecution must stand on its own evidence and cannot rely on the failure of the accused to prove a defense plea. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that a conviction cannot be sustained on evidence lacking credibility and natural touch.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an accused to prove a defense plea strengthen the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution's ocular account is contradictory and lacks credibility?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR affect the reliability of the prosecution's case?
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• Sher Jan vs The State2018 MLD 1352 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Sher Jan vs Mehrab Khan/State2019 MLD 50, 2018 PHC 1718 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-09-04Read full judgment →
• Sher Ali vs The State through Advocate General, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa2018 YLR 1836 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-20
  Qatl-i-amdbenefit of doubtchance witnessfatal improvementcapital punishmentFIR authenticitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded by the trial court for the offence of Qatl-i-amd. The core legal question is whether the prosecution established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, given substantial discrepancies in the evidence. The High Court found that the post-mortem examination occurred prior to the lodging of the FIR, casting doubt on the FIR's authenticity. Furthermore, the court identified fatal improvements in witness testimonies regarding the direction of the gunshot, which contradicted the site plan and the FIR. The court also noted that the alleged eyewitnesses were chance witnesses whose presence was doubtful, and the motive, though alleged, remained unproven. Consequently, the High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, and the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused. The conviction and sentence were set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and the murder reference for confirmation of the death sentence was answered in the negative, establishing the principle that material contradictions and improvements in prosecution evidence necessitate acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the conduct of a post-mortem examination prior to the registration of the FIR render the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material improvements in witness testimony that contradict the initial FIR and site plan?
  • Is the testimony of a witness recorded under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 admissible if the witness was not subjected to cross-examination?
  • Does the failure to prove an alleged motive entitle an accused to the benefit of the doubt in a murder case?
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• Sher Alam Khan vs Abdul Munim and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 449, 2018 P.S.C. 763 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-23
  disqualification of MPApre-election disqualificationconstitutional petitionwrit of quo warrantoElection Commission of Pakistan jurisdictionArticles 62 and 63 of ConstitutionArticle 113 of ConstitutionArticle 184(3) of ConstitutionRepresentation of the People Act, 1976false declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that allowed a Constitutional Petition, setting aside an Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) order de-notifying a Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA). The core legal questions concerned the applicability of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution to Provincial Assembly members, the ECP's jurisdiction to de-notify a returned candidate after the statutory 60-day period, and the scope of constitutional jurisdiction (quo warranto) in cases of pre-election disqualification. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the High Court's judgment, thereby reviving the ECP's de-notification order. The Court held that Articles 62 and 63 apply to Provincial Assembly members via Article 113 of the Constitution. It found the respondent disqualified under Article 63(1)(k) for being a government employee within two years of contesting elections and not qualified under Article 62(1)(f) for making a false declaration. The Court affirmed its power to convert proceedings into suo motu under Article 184(3) of the Constitution to ensure disqualified persons do not remain in legislative bodies, emphasizing the fundamental right of the people to be governed by qualified representatives.

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• Sher Alam and other vs Govt and others2019 PLC (C.S.) 12, 2018 PHC 1675 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-06-28
  writ jurisdictioncontractual employmentreinstatementservice lawFATAcommunal school teachersdepartmental policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the termination of the petitioners, who were initially appointed as contract-based teachers in Communal Schools within the then Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The core legal question was whether the petitioners, having served for over a decade with unblemished records, were entitled to reinstatement following the deletion of a condition in a departmental letter that had previously justified the termination of under-qualified or ineligible teachers. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioners were entitled to relief, noting that a departmental directive had explicitly ordered the reinstatement of such teachers after deleting the restrictive clause regarding their eligibility. The Court emphasized that the petitioners had served for approximately 15 years and that their continued employment was supported by previous judicial precedents involving similarly situated employees within the same project. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, declaring the impugned termination letter to be without lawful authority and jurisdiction, thereby effectively reinstating the petitioners to their respective posts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a departmental directive ordering the reinstatement of contract employees overrides previous termination orders based on eligibility criteria?
  • Does a long-term service record of over a decade in a project-based appointment create a legitimate expectation for continued employment?
  • Can the High Court interfere with administrative termination orders under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 when departmental policy has been inconsistently applied?
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• Sher Afzal Khan vs Govt: of KPK & others2019 PLC (C.S) 1065, 2018 PHC 1858 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-18
  pensionary benefitsregularization of servicelength of servicefixed paycontract employmentvested rightcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by a retired Chowkidar seeking payment of pensionary benefits. The petitioner, appointed in 1995 and retired in 2016, challenged the respondents' refusal to grant full pensionary benefits for his entire length of service. The core legal question was whether the period of service rendered by an employee on a fixed pay or contract basis, prior to regularization, should be counted towards the total length of service for calculating pensionary benefits. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that when a contract employee is absorbed into regular employment without a break in service, the entire period of service, including the initial contract or temporary phase, must be computed for pension purposes. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition, directing the respondents to pay all pensionary benefits by counting the petitioner's service from his initial appointment date in 1995. The Court affirmed that the right to pension is a vested right and a legitimate expectation that cannot be arbitrarily abridged.

  Questions settled

  • Should the period of service on a fixed pay or contract basis be counted towards the total length of service for pensionary benefits upon regularization?
  • Does a retired civil servant have a vested right to receive pensionary benefits for their entire length of service?
  • Can the period of service rendered as a daily wager or contract employee be excluded when computing pensionary benefits after regularization?
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• Sher Afzal and others vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 153 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-17
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabscondanceQatl-i-amdevidentiary value of FIRcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by two accused individuals, Sher Afzal and Munawar, charged under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the alleged murder of the complainant's father. The core legal question was whether the accused were entitled to bail despite being directly charged in the FIR and having a history of unexplained abscondance. The Peshawar High Court held that the accused were entitled to bail, determining that their case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court reasoned that the complainant was not an eye-witness, the FIR was delayed by twenty-five hours, no incriminating evidence was recovered, the site plan did not support the prosecution, and the postmortem was not conducted. The key principle laid down is that mere abscondance is not sufficient to deny bail when the overall facts and circumstances of the case, including the lack of direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the accused to the crime, otherwise establish a case for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is unexplained abscondance alone sufficient to deny bail to an accused person?
  • Does the absence of a postmortem report and incriminating recovery constitute grounds for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted where the complainant is not an eye-witness and the FIR is based on hearsay information?
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• Sheikh Shahid Rafiq vs The Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore2018 PLC (C.S.) 1092 · Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal · 2016-01-22
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justicebiasfair trialjudicial misconductadministrative jurisprudencenemo judex in sua causa
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns disciplinary proceedings against a District and Sessions Judge, which resulted in the major penalty of compulsory retirement. The appellant challenged the decision, arguing that the proceedings were flawed. The core legal question was whether the participation of the Inquiry Officer—who had previously investigated the charges and formed an adverse opinion—in the Administration Committee meeting that finalized the disciplinary action against the appellant, violated the principles of natural justice and fair trial. The Tribunal held that the presence of the Inquiry Officer in the decision-making body constituted a significant illegality, as it created a reasonable apprehension of bias and violated the rule against pre-judging issues. The Tribunal emphasized that procedural fairness requires that decision-makers must not be biased or prejudiced. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned notification of compulsory retirement, ruling that the proceedings were vitiated by the improper constitution of the decision-making authority, and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Administration Committee without the participation of the Inquiry Officer.

  Questions settled

  • Does the participation of an Inquiry Officer in the final decision-making body of a disciplinary proceeding vitiate the proceedings due to bias?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require that a decision-maker in disciplinary proceedings must not have pre-judged the issue?
  • Is the presence of a biased member in a tribunal or committee a mere irregularity or an illegality that vitiates the entire proceedings?
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• Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and Others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others2018 SCP 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-21
  Party HeaddisqualificationArticle 62Article 63Election Act 2017political partyconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the constitutional validity of provisions within the Election Act, 2017 regarding the eligibility of a 'Party Head' of a political party. The core legal question was whether a person disqualified from being a Member of Parliament under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 could simultaneously hold the position of 'Party Head' and exercise powers under Article 63-A. The Supreme Court held that the Election Act, 2017 must be read, construed, and interpreted subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed in Articles 62, 63, and 63-A of the Constitution. The Court laid down the principle that any person suffering from a lack of qualification under Article 62 or a disqualification under Article 63 is debarred from holding the position of 'Party Head' and prohibited from exercising any powers associated with that capacity. Consequently, all actions, orders, and documents issued by a disqualified person acting as Party Head are declared void in the eyes of the law, and the Election Commission of Pakistan is mandated to remove such persons from party records.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 hold the position of 'Party Head' of a political party?
  • Are the provisions of the Election Act 2017 subject to the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the legal status of actions taken by a Party Head after their disqualification under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
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• Sheikh Muhammad Javaid vs Sartaj Saqlain and others2018 SHC 470 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-17Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Javaid vs Sartaj Saqlain and 5 others2018 CLD 1237, 2018 CLC 1676 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-17Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Ismaeel vs Lahore Development Authority and others2018 C.L.R. 1171, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 197 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Amin vs Election Appellate Tribunal and 2 others2018 MLD 1698 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-09Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Ahmed vs Province of Punjab and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 862, 2018 LHC 688 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-21Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Ghulam Farooq and others vs Muslim Commercial Bank, Islamabad and others2018 CLD 567 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-14Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Farooq Ahmad and 2 others vs Askari Bank Limited through Manager_Attorneys2018 CLD 886 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-06Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Faheem Ahmed vs Director, Directorate General of Intelligence2018 PTD (Trib.) 341 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-03-27
  customs seizureopen warehousesearch and seizureburden of proofsmugglingjurisdictiongoods declarationillegal detention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves an appeal directed against the Order-in-Original passed by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication-I) ordering the confiscation of motor oil, base oil, rubber processing oil, and calcium-based grease stored in an open warehouse in Karachi, which had been legally imported from Iran and cleared by the Model Customs Collectorate, Quetta. The core legal questions relate to the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation (Customs) to conduct searches and seize goods within city limits without complying with statutory search warrant provisions, and whether the burden of proof under Section 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 was duly discharged by the appellant upon production of valid import documents and bilties. The Customs Appellate Tribunal held that the search conducted under Section 163 without obtaining a warrant under Section 162 of the Customs Act, 1969 was without lawful authority and void ab-initio, and that goods freely available in the market or supported by valid transport documents carry a presumption of lawful import. The Tribunal set aside the confiscation order, holding that anti-smuggling agencies cannot arbitrarily harass businesses or demand import documents without establishing a prima facie case of smuggling.

  Questions settled

  • Whether customs intelligence authorities have the jurisdiction to search an open warehouse located within city limits without a search warrant under Section 162 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does the failure of the seizing agency to file a counter-affidavit in response to an appeal render the appellant's factual assertions deemed correct?
  • Whether the burden of proof under Section 187 of the Customs Act, 1969 shifts to the customs authorities once the person in possession provides valid import documents and transport bilties?
  • Can goods freely available in the local market and supported by purchase receipts be presumed to be legally imported and duty-paid?
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• Shehzado vs Mst. Bashira2018 YLR 158 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-15Read full judgment →
• Shehzada Munawar Javed Khudai and another vs Election Tribunal2018 PLD Lahore 858 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-08
  election appealunder-age candidatenomination papersscrutiny of nomination paperselection petitionqualification of candidatejoint candidacyretrospective correction
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal under Section 46 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 challenged the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellants as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Union Council on the ground that appellant No. 2 was under-age on the nomination day. The core legal questions were whether an objection regarding a candidate's lack of qualification can be raised through a post-election election petition when it was not raised during the scrutiny of nomination papers, and whether subsequent correction of a candidate's date of birth in official documents can cure an inherent disqualification retrospectively. The Lahore High Court held that an objection regarding candidate qualification can be validly raised through an election petition under Sections 38 and 42 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 notwithstanding the absence of such objection during scrutiny under Rule 14 of the Punjab Local Government (Conduct of Election) Rules, 2013, and that subsequent modification of birth records cannot cure an initial lack of qualification on the nomination day. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an objection regarding the disqualification or lack of qualification of a candidate can be raised through an election petition after the election results when no such objection was raised during the scrutiny of nomination papers?
  • Does a subsequent correction of a candidate's date of birth in official records cure an initial lack of age qualification retrospectively on the last date fixed for filing nomination papers?
  • Whether the rejection of nomination papers for one candidate in a joint candidacy for Chairman and Vice-Chairman results in the rejection of the nomination of all joint candidates?
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• Shehzad vs The State2018 MLD 1495 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-27
  criminal appealrobberybenefit of doubtdelayed FIRocular evidencemedical evidenceacquittalburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas, which convicted the appellant under Section 397 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for robbery. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the substantial delay in lodging the FIR, material contradictions in the ocular evidence, and the absence of recovery of the alleged robbed items. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof. The Court observed that the 34-day delay in FIR registration, coupled with discrepancies between the medical evidence and the prosecution's narrative, rendered the case doubtful. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace, whenever the prosecution's case suffers from infirmities that create a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, with the Court emphasizing that a single material infirmity is sufficient to undermine the entire prosecution case.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Is a single material infirmity in the prosecution's evidence sufficient to warrant the acquittal of an accused?
  • Must the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused as a matter of right or as a matter of grace?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there are material contradictions between the ocular and medical evidence?
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• Shehzad Akhtar vs Muhammad Saleem Shad Qureshi and another2018 CLD 28 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-12Read full judgment →
• Shehwaar and 2 others vs Muhammad Riaz and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 1195, 2018 YLR 1938 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
• Shehryar Waqas Malik and another vs Muhammad Zafar Ali Khan and another2018 CLD 1040 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-29
  banking executioninterlocutory ordermaintainability of appealFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001exclusive jurisdictionFIA noticecompromise decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special High Court Appeal challenged an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in a banking execution proceeding, which had suspended a notice issued by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to a bank. The appellants, who were not parties to the original banking suit, sought to set aside this suspension, arguing that the Banking Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere with criminal investigations. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable because the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, expressly bars appeals against interlocutory orders that do not dispose of the entire case. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the Ordinance is to ensure the swift and expeditious recovery of banking debts, which would be frustrated if interlocutory orders were subject to frequent appellate challenges. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Banking Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to the execution of its decrees, and the appellants failed to establish any legal standing or merit for their challenge.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, override other laws regarding the challenge of interlocutory orders?
  • Can a Banking Court exercise exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to the execution of its decrees to the exclusion of other courts?
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• Shehrooz vs State and another2018 PLJ 619, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 342 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-19
  post-arrest bailjuvenile offendernarcotics possessionbail discretioncriminal recordjuvenile justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Shehrooz, who was charged under Section 9(c) of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following his arrest with 2025 grams of Charas. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, claiming to be a juvenile, was entitled to the concession of bail given his age and circumstances. The Lahore High Court, upon reviewing the record and the petitioner's NADRA B-Form, determined that the petitioner was approximately 12 years old at the time of the alleged offense. The Court held that the petitioner's status as a juvenile, combined with his lack of prior criminal antecedents and the fact that he had already been incarcerated for two months, warranted the grant of bail. The key principle laid down is that the juvenile status of an accused is a significant factor in bail adjudication, and where continued incarceration serves no useful purpose for the prosecution, the court may exercise its discretion to grant post-arrest bail, even in narcotics cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the juvenile status of an accused constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of post-arrest bail in narcotics cases?
  • Can a court consider the age of an accused as recorded in NADRA documents when determining bail eligibility?
  • Is the absence of prior criminal antecedents a relevant factor for the court in deciding a bail petition for a juvenile?
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• Shehriyar vs Zair Ullah and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 312 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-26
  benefit of doubtmurder convictioneye-witness credibilityabscondencemedical evidenceballistic reportcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence awarded by the trial court for murder and attempted murder under Sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the significant inconsistencies in the evidence. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court observed that the alleged eye-witnesses were likely not present at the scene, as they were not identified in the inquest or postmortem reports, nor did they show signs of blood-staining. Furthermore, the medical evidence regarding the nature of the wounds contradicted the ballistic report, suggesting the use of multiple weapons rather than the single rifle recovered. The court also noted that the complainant’s report was preceded by an unauthorized preliminary police inquiry. Emphasizing that abscondence is merely corroborative and not substantive evidence, and noting the failure to put incriminating motive evidence to the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court acquitted the appellant, granting him the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can abscondence of an accused serve as substantive evidence to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to put incriminating evidence regarding motive to the accused during a Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 examination weaken the case?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when there are material contradictions between medical evidence regarding wound patterns and ballistic reports?
  • Does the failure to cite eye-witnesses in the inquest or postmortem reports create doubt regarding their presence at the scene of the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Shehbaz Ahmed vs The State2018 YLR 2284 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-16
  extortionbhattaanti-terrorismbenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalcontradictions in evidencerecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under Section 7(h) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The prosecution alleged that the appellant made extortion ('Bhatta') demands via mobile phone, threatening the complainant, and was subsequently apprehended in a trap while receiving extortion money. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the numerous discrepancies in the evidence, unsealed recovered items, and doubtful mashirnamas vitiated the conviction. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution case was riddled with fatal lacunas, material contradictions among witnesses, and suspicious overwriting on police documents, which completely shattered the credibility of the prosecution's evidence. The court laid down the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution's failure to seal recovered extortion money and SIM cards casts serious doubt on the recovery proceedings?
  • Does material contradiction among prosecution witnesses and the mashir regarding the time and details of arrest vitiate the conviction?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Whether mere allegations of demanding extortion are sufficient to attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in the absence of tangible material regarding financial status?
  Read full judgment →
• Shazia vs The State2018 P Cr. L 1990 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-08
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesprohibitory clausestatutory delaycharas recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by the petitioner Shazia seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 2400 grams of Charas. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to the concession of bail considering the statutory period of incarceration, the non-commencement of her trial, and her no longer being required for investigation, notwithstanding the prohibitory clause attached to the offence. The Peshawar High Court held that since the petitioner has been in jail since 30.01.2018 and there is no prospect of the commencement of her trial in the near future, while she is no more required for investigation purposes, she is entitled to be released on bail. The court laid down the principle that protracted incarceration without the prospect of an early conclusion or commencement of trial serves as a valid ground for granting bail, even in cases falling within the prohibitory clause of offences involving narcotics.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to post-arrest bail when the trial has not commenced despite protracted incarceration?
  • Does the recovery of 2400 grams of Charas strictly bar the grant of bail under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 in circumstances of delayed trial?
  • Can bail be granted when the accused is no longer required for further investigation or interrogation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shauqat Qamar vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 CLC 771 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Zaib and 8 others vs Khuram Zaib and 3 others2018 CLC 970 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-16
  administration suitinheritanceHibapartitionco-sharerreceiverIslamic law of inheritanceestate administration
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit for administration, account, partition, and permanent injunction was filed by the plaintiffs against their siblings regarding the estate of their deceased parents. The core legal question concerned the maintainability of the administration suit where defendants claimed ownership of certain properties via alleged gifts (Hiba) and disputed the inclusion of other assets. The Court held that the suit was maintainable, emphasizing that an administration suit is the proper mechanism to determine the deceased's estate. The Court ruled that the burden of proving a valid gift lies heavily on the claimant, and the defendants failed to provide cogent evidence regarding the date, time, and delivery of possession for the alleged gift of 'Mukaram Market.' Consequently, the property remained part of the estate. The Court appointed the Nazir as Receiver to auction the property and distribute proceeds among the legal heirs according to Islamic law. The judgment reaffirmed that a plea of gift by a co-sharer does not oust the court's jurisdiction to inquire into the estate's composition, and possession by one co-sharer is deemed to be for the benefit of all heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Is an administration suit maintainable when a defendant claims ownership of a property via an alleged gift?
  • Does a plea of gift by a legal heir oust the court's jurisdiction to inquire into the status of the property in an administration suit?
  • What is the burden of proof for a defendant claiming a gift (Hiba) in an administration suit?
  • Can a court appoint a Nazir as a Receiver to auction property in an administration suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat vs Jamshed and another2018 YLR 1442 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-08
  murderattempted murderbenefit of doubteyewitness credibilityabscondenceacquittalforensic evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his conviction and death sentence for the murder of the deceased and attempted murder of the complainant and another witness. The prosecution alleged the appellant and three co-accused, who had previously been acquitted, opened fire on the complainant party. The trial court relied on eyewitness testimony, the appellant's abscondence, and forensic evidence linking a recovered weapon to a crime empty. Upon review, the High Court found the eyewitnesses unreliable due to material contradictions, an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and the implausibility of their presence at the scene. The court noted that the same evidence had already been rejected in the trial of the co-accused, who were acquitted. Emphasizing that abscondence alone cannot sustain a conviction when other evidence is insufficient, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and the murder reference was answered in the negative, granting the appellant the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted solely on the basis of abscondence when other prosecution evidence is insufficient?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence necessitate the acquittal of the remaining accused?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the eyewitness testimony is marred by material contradictions and unexplained delays?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash vs Adil Tiwana, etc.2018 P.S.C. 757 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-08
  review petitionspecific performanceequitable reliefcompensationreturn of earnest money
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a review petition seeking modification of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan which had declined specific performance of a contract. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to interest or compensation on sums paid in part performance of the contract and utilized by the respondent for nearly two decades, as well as amounts deposited in court during litigation. The court held that while specific performance was rightly declined, it would be unjust to leave the petitioner uncompensated for the prolonged use of his funds. The court modified its earlier judgment to award a lump sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- over and above the returned principal amount to satisfy the equities of the case. The key principle laid down is that when equitable relief of specific performance is declined, the court must balance equities by compensating a party whose substantial funds were retained and utilized by the opposing party for a prolonged period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party is entitled to compensation or interest on sums paid in part performance of a contract when specific performance is declined?
  • Can an omission to award compensation for funds utilized during prolonged litigation constitute an error on the face of the record warranting review?
  • How are equities balanced when denying specific performance of a contract where substantial funds remained with the opposing party for decades?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ullah Khan Bangash vs Adil Tiwana and others2018 PSC 757, 2018 SCMR 769 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-08
  specific performancereview petitionequitable reliefcontract lawinterest on capitalrestitution
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition was filed against the Supreme Court's judgment that declined the specific performance of a contract. The petitioner argued that the court failed to award interest on the substantial sums paid to the respondent and deposited in court, which the respondent had utilized for nearly two decades. The petitioner contended that equity required compensation for the loss of use of these funds, especially given the finality of the trial court's order condoning the delay in depositing securities. The Supreme Court held that while the denial of specific performance was maintained, it was unjust to leave the petitioner without compensation for the long-term deprivation of their capital. The Court applied equitable principles, determining that the petitioner was entitled to interest on the amounts held by the respondent and the court. Consequently, the Court modified its earlier judgment to award a lump sum of Rs. 50,000,000 as compensation, establishing the principle that when specific performance is denied, the court must balance equities by ensuring the party who paid the consideration is compensated for the loss of use of their capital.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court award interest on funds held by a respondent when specific performance of a contract is denied?
  • Does the denial of specific performance of a contract preclude the court from granting equitable compensation to the party who paid the consideration?
  • Is a party entitled to compensation for the loss of use of funds deposited in court pursuant to a previous judgment that is later reviewed?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Shafi Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Executive Director, (PRPD), SECP, Islamabad2018 CLD 1194 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2018-06-21Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Hussain and others vs State and othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 322 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-16
  cross-version caseright of self-defensesuppression of injuriesappreciation of evidencecriminal appealacquittalproportionality of force
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in a cross-version scenario where both parties sustained injuries. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution witnesses were unreliable because they suppressed the injuries sustained by the accused party, which were medically proven. The Court observed that the complainant party had initiated the confrontation, and the appellant’s actions constituted a proportionate exercise of the right of self-defense. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, holding that where two versions of an incident exist, the version favoring the defense must prevail. The key principle laid down is that the suppression of injuries on the accused by prosecution witnesses renders their testimony untrustworthy, and the right of self-defense justifies the use of proportionate force when an accused faces a genuine apprehension of harm without a safe exit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party by prosecution witnesses render their testimony unreliable?
  • In a cross-version criminal case, which version should prevail when both parties offer conflicting accounts of the occurrence?
  • What are the legal requirements for a valid plea of self-defense in a criminal trial?
  • Can an accused be convicted when the prosecution witnesses have failed to explain the injuries sustained by the accused party?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali, Prop. Shaukat Oil Traders, Faisalabad vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Faisalabad2018 PTD (Trib.) 1115 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-06-18Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs Muhammad Razzaq2018 CLC 1624, 2018 LHC 1214 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-21
  specific performanceagreement to sellattestation of documentsQanun-e-Shahadatfinancial obligationsenforceability of contractmarginal witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This second appeal arises from the dismissal of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The appellant sought enforcement of an agreement involving land, which the trial and appellate courts dismissed due to the document's failure to meet legal requirements. The core legal questions were whether the agreement was validly attested by two witnesses as required by law and whether the document contained sufficient material terms to be enforceable. The Lahore High Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the agreement was fatally deficient. The Court affirmed that under Article 17(2)(a) and Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, an agreement involving financial obligations must be attested by two witnesses, and failure to produce them renders the document inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court held that the agreement lacked essential terms—such as specific land description, time for performance, and mode of payment—rendering it unenforceable under Section 21(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The Court emphasized that a suit based on such a deficient document is 'stillborn' and should be rejected at its inception.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell immovable property require attestation by two witnesses under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Can a document be considered validly attested if the witnesses signed as the scribe or in other capacities rather than as attesting witnesses?
  • Is an agreement to sell enforceable if it lacks essential terms such as the description of the property, time for performance, and mode of payment?
  • What is the consequence of failing to produce two marginal witnesses for a document requiring attestation under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary, Islamabad and others2019 PLJ SC 85, 2019 P.S.C. 1167, 2018 SCMR 2086 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-26
  electionsre-pollwomen's suffragepositive discriminationvires of statuteElection Commission of Pakistanconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing a re-poll in a constituency due to low female voter turnout, arguing that Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017, which permits such re-polls, violates the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination. The core legal question was whether Section 9(1) is ultra vires the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the provision is intra vires, affirming that it constitutes a permissible form of positive discrimination. The Court reasoned that Article 25(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 explicitly empowers the State to make special provisions for the protection of women, thereby validating measures aimed at ensuring their electoral participation. The Court further clarified that re-polls under this section are not automatic but require ECP satisfaction and justification, rendering the appellant's argument regarding the possibility of infinite re-polls merely theoretical. Consequently, the Court upheld the ECP's authority to order re-polls to safeguard women's constitutional right to vote.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 9(1) of the Elections Act 2017 unconstitutional for violating the principle of equality under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 permit positive discrimination in favor of women in the electoral process?
  • Can the Election Commission of Pakistan order a re-poll based on the presumption that women were restrained from voting when turnout is below 10%?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali alias Baba alias Shauki vs The State2018 SHC 967 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-10
  anti-terrorismpolice encounteridentification paradejudicial confessionrobbery and murdercriminal appealmodification of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellant under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 and various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder, attempted murder, robbery, and assault on public servants during a police encounter. The core legal questions involve the assessment of identification parade evidence, judicial confession, and whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's participation in the single transaction involving robbery of a police weapon and murder. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through a credible identification parade, a voluntary judicial confession, and incriminating evidence identical to that of a co-accused whose conviction was previously maintained. The court affirmed the conviction while modifying the default sentences for non-payment of compensation and fines from rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment, laying down that unexpected possession of a robbed weapon in a single transaction serves as presumptive evidence connecting the accused to robbery and murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexpected possession of a robbed weapon in a single transaction serves as presumptive evidence on charges of robbery and murder?
  • Can a conviction be maintained based on a credible identification parade and a voluntary judicial confession?
  • Whether default sentences for non-payment of compensation and fines can be modified from rigorous imprisonment to simple imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharjeel Inam Memon vs National Accountability Bureau2018 SCMR 2023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-31
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsbail on medical groundsunder-trial prisonerspecialized treatmentjudicial custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged a High Court order dismissing the petitioner's post-arrest bail application on medical grounds. The petitioner, previously denied bail on merits, sought release citing serious medical conditions requiring specialized treatment. The Supreme Court reviewed various medical reports, including those from the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre and the Agha Khan University Hospital, which indicated that while the petitioner required physiotherapy and hydrotherapy, his condition was not life-threatening or disabling. The Court observed that the petitioner's medical evidence, including MRI reports, did not substantiate the necessity for the surgical intervention previously claimed. Relying on established principles, the Court held that the purpose of bail on medical grounds is to facilitate necessary medical treatment or surgical intervention, not to grant liberty until the trial's conclusion. Finding no merit in the claim that the petitioner's detention was hazardous to his life or that he required immediate release for treatment, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that medical bail is a temporary concession contingent on the necessity of treatment, not a permanent entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • What is the primary purpose of granting post-arrest bail on medical grounds?
  • Does the grant of bail on medical grounds entitle an accused to remain at liberty until the conclusion of the trial?
  • Can bail granted on medical grounds be withdrawn or cancelled once the prisoner recovers from the ailment?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail on medical grounds if the required treatment can be provided through hospital visits while remaining in judicial custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Shariq-ul-Haq and Others vs PIA Corporation Limited & another2018 SHC 788 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-03Read full judgment →
• Shariq-ul-Haq and Others vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation2018 PLC (C.S.) 975, 2018 SHC 455 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-08
  master and servantspecific reliefmemorandum of understandingservice benefitsinterim injunctioncivil procedurepromotion of employees
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs, senior B-777 First Officers, filed a suit for declaration and injunction against Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) seeking implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding their promotion to Captain on A-320 aircraft. The core legal question was whether the court could enforce the MOU and grant injunctive relief in a master-servant relationship where no statutory service rules existed. The court held that while specific performance of personal service contracts is generally barred, the present case involved serving employees seeking enforcement of collective benefits rather than reinstatement after termination. Consequently, the court ordered the Pakistan Airline Pilots Association (PALPA) to be impleaded as a necessary party and directed PIAC and PALPA to negotiate the methodology for promotion as stipulated in the MOU. The court established that in the absence of statutory remedies, civil courts possess jurisdiction to protect service benefits and ensure fair treatment, preventing the exploitation of employees under the guise of the master-servant doctrine, while maintaining the status quo regarding the plaintiffs' flying duties and licenses during negotiations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court grant injunctive relief for the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding in a master-servant relationship?
  • Is the principle of master and servant an absolute bar to seeking relief for service benefits other than damages?
  • Can a court suo motu implead a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the absence of statutory service rules allow an employee to file a civil suit for the enforcement of service-related rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Shariq-Ul-Haq and 5 others vs Pakistan International Airlines2018 PLC (C.S.) 975 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-08
  master and servantmemorandum of understandinginterim injunctionpilot promotioncareer planspecific reliefnecessary partyservice benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter involves lawsuits and interim applications filed by serving senior B-777 First Officers of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) seeking declaration, permanent injunction, and the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated March 18, 2016, executed between PIAC and Pakistan Airline Pilots Association (PALPA). The core legal question concerns whether the plaintiffs can enforce the terms of the MoU regarding their career progression and training without a pre-formulated methodology, and whether the relationship of master and servant bars serving employees from seeking remedies other than damages. The Sindh High Court held that the MoU is a binding agreement and that serving employees are not strictly limited to claiming damages when seeking enforcement of service benefits during employment. The court disposed of the applications by impleading PALPA as a defendant, directing PIAC and PALPA to negotiate and formulate the required methodology within a stipulated timeframe, and restraining PIAC from compelling the plaintiffs to join the transition training course or disturbing their seniority during the negotiation period. The key principles established relate to the enforceability of binding MOUs in collective employee relations, the non-exclusive application of the master-and-servant doctrine for serving employees, and the court's power to implead necessary parties under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee under the master and servant framework can file a suit for the implementation of service benefits and implementation of an MoU during active service, or if they are exclusively restricted to claiming damages?
  • Can a Memorandum of Understanding executed between an airline corporation and a pilots' association be legally enforced when a stipulated methodology for implementation is yet to be devised?
  • Does the failure to implead a collective bargaining association necessitate the dismissal of a suit filed by individual employees, or can the court exercise its powers under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. to implead the association?
  • Whether an interim injunction can be granted restraining an employer from forcing employees to attend a transition training course contrary to the terms of an agreed Memorandum of Understanding?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharif Ahmad vs Muhammad Bashir and 4 others2018 YLR 2304 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Shareefan Bibi vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 499 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-10
  pre-arrest bailcriminal lawFIR delaybodily injuryPakistan Penal Codefemale accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Shareefan Bibi in a criminal case registered under Sections 337-A(i), 336, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of causing the loss of a tooth. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case and the nature of the alleged injury. The Court observed an unexplained nine-day delay in lodging the FIR and noted that, based on established precedent, the loss of a tooth does not constitute the loss of an organ under Section 334 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the petitioner had joined the investigation, nothing was recovered from her, and as a female accused, incarceration would serve no useful purpose. Consequently, the Court confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's case is weakened by significant delay and the specific nature of the injury does not satisfy the statutory definition of an organ, bail should be granted, particularly when the accused has cooperated with the investigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the loss of a tooth constitute the loss of an organ under Section 334 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an unexplained nine-day delay in lodging an FIR a relevant factor for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Should a female accused be granted pre-arrest bail when she has joined the investigation and nothing has been recovered from her?
  Read full judgment →
• Shareef-Ud-Din vs Mir Afzal and 2 others2018 MLD 1324 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-24
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailattempt to murderprohibitory clausefurther inquiryrecovery of weapon
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition filed under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the respondents by the Additional Sessions Judge Gilgit in a case registered under Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Basin. The core legal question is whether the post-arrest bail granted to the respondents ought to be cancelled on grounds of active participation, eyewitness nomination, and recovery of a weapon. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that no overt act was attributed to the respondents, no crime empties were recovered to support the allegation of firing, and the intention to kill required determination at trial. Emphasizing that very strong and exceptional grounds are required to set aside a bail order once granted by a competent court, the court found no infirmity in the impugned bail-granting order. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that bail once granted will not be interfered with or cancelled absent exceptional circumstances or jurisdictional error, and declined the application.

  Questions settled

  • What grounds are required for the cancellation of post-arrest bail once it has been granted by a competent court?
  • Does the absence of crime empty recovery from the place of occurrence support further inquiry into a charge under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can bail be cancelled merely on the assertion of day-light occurrence and direct nomination in the FIR without showing exceptional grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Sharad Hiru Kolambe vs State of Maharashtra and others2018 SCInd 70 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-20
  default sentencenon-payment of fineconcurrent sentencesorganized crimequantum of finefinancial capacitycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a decision of the High Court of Bombay affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant for various offences under the Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act 1999. The core legal question addressed by the Supreme Court is whether sentences of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine can be directed to run concurrently inter se, and whether such default sentences are excessive given the appellant's financial capacity. The Supreme Court held that default sentences are a penalty for non-payment rather than a substantive sentence, and the statutory framework does not permit default sentences to run concurrently. However, taking into account the financial condition of the appellant, the Court exercised its discretion to reduce the quantum of default sentences under each count. The key principle laid down is that default sentences cannot be ordered to run concurrently inter se, but courts must consider the financial capacity of the offender when determining the quantum of default imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can sentences of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine be ordered to run concurrently inter se?
  • Is a term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine considered a substantive sentence under criminal law?
  • What factors should a court consider before ordering imprisonment in default of payment of fine?
  • Whether the court has the discretion to reduce the quantum of default sentences based on the financial condition of the offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Shan vs The State2018 MLD 702 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-27Read full judgment →
• Shan Mohammad vs The State2018 MLD 826 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-21Read full judgment →
• Shamsul Islam vs The State2018 MLD 1406 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-20
  quashment of FIRstay of criminal proceedingscivil-criminal overlapinherent powers of High Courtpendency of civil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of FIR No. 4/2016 registered at Police Station Goharabad, Diamer. The petitioner contended that the criminal proceedings were initiated to exert pressure, given that a related civil suit regarding the same property dispute was already pending before the Civil Judge Chilas. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of a parallel civil litigation. Upon examination, the Court observed that the criminal matter and the civil suit were so intimately connected that the outcome of one would inevitably impact the other. While noting that there is no invariable rule to stay criminal proceedings, the Court held that the interests of justice required a stay in this specific instance. The Court established the principle that criminal proceedings may be stayed pending the disposal of civil litigation where the criminal liability is dependent upon the result of the civil suit or is so closely connected that proceeding simultaneously would cause grave injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be stayed pending the outcome of a parallel civil suit?
  • Does the pendency of a civil suit automatically require the quashment or stay of criminal proceedings?
  • Under what circumstances is it appropriate for a court to stay criminal proceedings due to a pending civil dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamrez vs The State2018 YLR 919 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-04-01
  criminal appealtheft of vehiclebenefit of doubtrecovery memo discrepancieschabi chor vehicleacquittalburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, Hunza-Nagar, for the offence of theft of a motorcycle under section 381-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Court was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given discrepancies in the identification of the stolen vehicle and the failure to establish the true ownership of the motorcycle. Upon review, the Court found that the prosecution's case was riddled with doubts, noting that the vehicle identification numbers in the recovery memo did not match the actual vehicle, and the chain of title was unclear, with the vehicle being identified as a 'chabi chor' (stolen/fake) vehicle. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge, thereby entitling the appellant to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The Court established the principle that where the ownership of stolen property is not clearly established and material discrepancies exist in the prosecution's evidence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the vehicle identification numbers in the recovery memo and the actual stolen article create reasonable doubt in a theft case?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish the true ownership of the alleged stolen property?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under section 381-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when the chain of title for the stolen vehicle is unclear?
  Read full judgment →
• Shamimuddin Ahmed and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 othersPTCL 2019 CL. 282, 2018 PTD 2112 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Shamim Bibi vs The State2018 YLR 415 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-12
  Damanenhancement of sentencecriminal revisionTazirquantum of compensationhurt offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition was filed by the complainant, Shamim Bibi, seeking enhancement of the sentences awarded to the respondents, who were convicted by the trial court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondents had been sentenced to pay Daman for injuries caused, but the complainant argued the amount was insufficient. The core legal question was whether the trial court's determination of Daman was inadequate and whether the sentence of imprisonment as Tazir should have been imposed. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine. The Court held that the determination of Daman is a matter of judicial discretion under Section 337-Y, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which requires consideration of treatment expenses, disability, and anguish. Since the victims failed to provide evidence regarding these factors and the injuries were simple, the trial court's assessment was deemed correct. Furthermore, the Court clarified that imprisonment as Tazir under Section 337-N(2), Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is not applicable in this context, as the convicts were not habitual offenders and Tazir is generally reserved for cases involving Arsh.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must a court consider when determining the amount of Daman under Section 337-Y of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a sentence of imprisonment as Tazir be imposed in cases where Arsh has not been awarded?
  • Is the determination of Daman amount subject to the discretion of the trial court based on the evidence of injury and loss?
  Read full judgment →
• Shameer Hussain @ Laal vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 44 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-21
  post-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances Actdubious FIRdelayed production of narcoticsfurther inquirycriminal antecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed by Shameer Hussain alias Lal seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 411 dated 23.10.2014 registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail given the dubious nature of the prosecution's story, where the complainant retained the alleged narcotic for twelve days before producing it at the police station and had prior criminal involvement in narcotic cases. The Lahore High Court held that the circumstances rendered the petitioner's case a fit one for the grant of bail under Section 51 of the act, noting the possibility of false involvement for ulterior motives, the petitioner's lack of previous criminal antecedents, and that he was no longer required for further investigation. The key principle laid down is that an unexplained and delayed production of narcotics by a complainant with a criminal record, coupled with suspicious circumstances, creates sufficient further inquiry grounds to warrant post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delayed production of recovered narcotics by the complainant at the police station makes the case one of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Does the previous criminal involvement of a complainant in narcotic cases warrant caution regarding the false implication of an accused?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when no further investigation is required and they have no previous criminal antecedents?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakoor Ahmad vs District Judge Okara & others2019 CLC 665, 2019 PLJ Lahore 180, 2018 LHC 2970 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-12Read full judgment →
• Shakir Jan vs Collector of Customs, Peshawar2018 PTD (Trib.) 1702 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-01-17Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Hyder and 2 others vs The Province of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Sindh and 11 others2018 YLR 1255 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-10Read full judgment →
• Shakeel alias Hakla vs The State2018 MLD 1396 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-28
  narcotics recoverysafe custodychemical examiner reportbenefit of doubtcriminal appealpolice encounterindependent witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the alleged possession of narcotics. The core legal question was whether the prosecution established the recovery and subsequent safe custody of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The court observed that despite the arrest occurring in a thickly populated area, no independent witnesses were associated with the recovery proceedings. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to provide evidence regarding the safe custody of the narcotics at the police station or their safe transit to the chemical examiner. Material contradictions in the evidence and unexplained overwriting in official documents further undermined the prosecution's case. The court reiterated the principle that the prosecution must affirmatively prove the safe custody and transit of recovered samples to the chemical examiner to rule out tampering. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted, receiving the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate independent witnesses in a populated area during a narcotics recovery create reasonable doubt?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove the safe custody and safe transit of recovered narcotics to the chemical examiner to secure a conviction?
  • Does the absence of evidence regarding the deposit of recovered narcotics in the malkhana entitle an accused to acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmad vs The StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. 651, 2018 MLD 279 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-12
  murdercapital punishmentbenefit of doubtocular accountacquittal of co-accusedreappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant awarded by the trial court under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for committing the Qatl-i-Amd of the deceased, alongside a connected murder reference for confirmation of the death sentence. The core legal question revolved around whether the ocular account, despite the acquittal of co-accused and inherent improbabilities in the prosecution's narrative, was sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's narrative was fraught with patent doubts, unnatural coincidences regarding the eye-witnesses' presence, and that evidence disbelieved against co-accused could not safely furnish the basis for the appellant's conviction without independent corroboration. Consequently, the court laid down the principle that when the foundational narrative is highly improbable and co-accused attributed heavier roles are acquitted, it is unsafe to maintain a conviction based on the same discredited ocular testimony, thereby extending the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, acquitting him, and answering the murder reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained upon an ocular account that has been disbelieved or discarded regarding the majority of the co-accused?
  • Does the presence of eye-witnesses who arrive at the crime scene by sheer coincidence under unnatural circumstances constitute reliable evidence?
  • Whether inconsistencies and improbabilities in the prosecution's genesis of the crime entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmad Siddiqui vs Muhammad Nauman Siddiqui and others2018 SCMR 511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-18
  de novo trialremand of casecriminal appealappellate reappraisalprocedural lacunaconviction and sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order passed by the Lahore High Court whereby a case involving charges under sections 302 and 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 was remanded to the trial court for a de novo trial. The core legal question revolves around the legality and justification of remanding a fully tried criminal case for a de novo trial without pointing out any procedural lacunae. The Supreme Court held that since the trial court had conducted a full-fledged trial, recorded statements of prosecution witnesses, examined the accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and recorded defence evidence, the High Court's order remanding the case without valid reasons was not sustainable in law. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate court cannot order a de novo trial without identifying concrete procedural defects or legal justifications in the trial court proceedings, and must instead decide the appeal on the available evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can remand a criminal case for a de novo trial without identifying any procedural lacuna in the trial court proceedings?
  • Is an order of de novo trial sustainable when the trial court has already conducted a full-fledged trial and recorded evidence?
  • How should the High Court deal with a criminal appeal and capital sentence reference when the trial has been lawfully concluded?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakeel Ahmad and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 651 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-12
  Qatl-e-Amdbenefit of doubtocular testimonycriminal appealdeath sentencemurder referenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of the deceased, resulting in a death sentence. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the credibility of ocular testimony and the impact of the acquittal of co-accused on the remaining appellant. The court held that the prosecution's narrative was inherently improbable, particularly regarding the witnesses' presence at the crime scene, which appeared to be a mere coincidence. Furthermore, the court established that where the prosecution's evidence is disbelieved regarding the majority of co-accused who were attributed heavier roles and subsequently acquitted, such evidence cannot sustain the conviction of the remaining appellant in the absence of strong, independent corroboration. Finding the prosecution’s case fraught with patent doubts and lacking necessary corroborative support, the court allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellant, and declined to confirm the death sentence, emphasizing that it is unsafe to maintain a conviction based on discredited testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained against an accused when the ocular evidence against the majority of co-accused has been disbelieved and resulted in their acquittal?
  • Does the presence of witnesses at a crime scene, which is deemed unnatural and coincidental, render the prosecution's case unreliable?
  • Is a conviction safe when the prosecution's narrative of the crime is inherently improbable and lacks independent corroboration?
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• Shair Ali Shah vs The State2018 YLR 1777 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-01-22
  summoning court witnessespremature applicationprosecution evidencedefense evidencerevision petitionessential to the just decision
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant revision petition is directed against the order of the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Muzaffarabad, whereby an application moved by the petitioner-accused under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for summoning court witnesses before the conclusion of prosecution evidence was dismissed. The core legal question is whether an accused can invoke section 540 to summon witnesses as court witnesses or defense witnesses prior to the conclusion of the prosecution's evidence under section 265-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that the application was premature, as the statutory mechanism requires the prosecution to lead its evidence first, after which the accused is provided the opportunity to lead defense evidence. The court laid down the principle that while section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 contains the phrase 'at any stage', the exercise of such wide powers is contingent upon the totality of material legally brought before the court, and an accused must wait until the conclusion of the prosecution evidence before seeking to summon defense or court witnesses under the established trial procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can file an application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon witnesses before the conclusion of prosecution evidence?
  • Does the phrase 'at any stage' in section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 permit bypassing the procedural sequence of recording prosecution evidence first?
  • At what stage of a criminal trial is an accused entitled to adduce defense evidence or request the summoning of witnesses under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Muhammad Asghar vs Muhammad Abdullah and another2018 CLC 1409 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-29Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Atif Zia vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary Government2018 MLD 181 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-13Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Abdul Jabbar through his Legal Heirs vs Irfan Jami Rafique and another2018 SHC 760 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-08Read full judgment →
• Shaikh Aadil Jamil vs The Federation of Pakistan & others2020 PLC (C.S.) 160, 2018 SHC 570 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-19
  constitutional petitionBenazir Employees Stock Option SchemeCouncil of Common Interestslocus standiaggrieved personpublic moneyshare transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the president of a registered labor union seeking directives to transfer twelve percent of the Government of Pakistan's shares in Sui Southern Gas Company Limited to its employees under the Benazir Employees Stock Option Scheme, and to challenge the alleged arbitrary issuance of shares to select employees. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, the locus standi of a union not being a collective bargaining agent to claim such benefits, and the legality of the creation of employee empowerment trusts without the approval of the Council of Common Interests under Article 154 of the Constitution. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner lacked locus standi as an aggrieved person, that the matter involved policy decisions and contractual obligations not enforceable in constitutional jurisdiction, and that the creation of such trusts and transfer of public shares without Council of Common Interests' approval violated Articles 154 and 173 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a labor union that is not a collective bargaining agent has the locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan to claim shares for employees?
  • Does the creation of an employee empowerment trust and the transfer of government shares in state-owned entities require the prior approval of the Council of Common Interests under Article 154 of the Constitution?
  • Can contractual obligations and policy matters regarding the disbursement of state shares and dividends be enforced through the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Whether employees performing regular duties for which they receive salaries are legally entitled to additional benefits through shares under the Benazir Employees Stock Option Scheme without statutory sanction?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzeb alias Jooni vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 287 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-23
  murderdeath sentenceocular accountinterested witnessesmotiveres gestaemedical evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant, Shahzeb alias Jooni, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a four-year-old minor, Abdul Wadood, and sentencing him to death. The core legal questions involved the credibility of the ocular testimony of related witnesses, the establishment of motive regarding a marriage proposal refusal, the admissibility of the appellant's initial plea, and the corroborative value of medical and recovery evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a shadow of doubt through natural and consistent eyewitness accounts, a proven motive, corroborative medical evidence, and the recovery of the weapon and the victim's body from the appellant's premises. The court laid down the principle that the mere relationship of eyewitnesses to the deceased does not discard their testimony if it is trustworthy and corroborated by independent circumstances, and that an accused's spontaneous first plea upon arrest is a relevant fact forming part of the transaction under the law of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of eyewitnesses can be discarded solely on the ground that they are closely related to the deceased?
  • Does a delay in conducting the post-mortem examination automatically discredit the prosecution's case?
  • Whether an accused person's initial statement or plea made immediately after arrest is a relevant fact under the law of evidence?
  • Is the recovery of a crime weapon from the appellant's pointing out sufficient to corroborate ocular testimony in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzadi Umerzadi Tiwana vs Province of Punjab and others2018 CLC 641 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-15Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Sikandar ul Mulk & 4 others vs The Capital Development2019 KLR Civil Cases 220, 2019 PLD Islamabad 365, 2018 IHC 80 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-09Read full judgment →
• Shahzada Begum vs Syed Talib & others2018 SC AJK 25 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Shahzad Rauf vs Mst. Shabana Yaseen2018 SC AJK 37 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-12-12Read full judgment →
• Shahzad Khan vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 104 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-30
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaydelay in conclusion of trialstatutory right to bailmurderabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves a criminal bail petition filed by the accused Shahzad Khan seeking release on post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of his trial in a case registered under sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether an accused charged with an offense punishable with death becomes entitled to bail as a matter of statutory right under the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the trial is not concluded within two years and the delay is not attributable to the accused. The Peshawar High Court held that since the petitioner had been detained for over two years without the conclusion of the trial and the delay was not occasioned by his acts or omissions, he had earned the statutory right to bail. The court laid down the principle that the statutory right to bail based on prolonged detention under section 497(1) Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 cannot be defeated by objections relating to the gravity of the offense, previous abscondence, or hyper-technical grounds, provided the accused does not fall within the statutory exceptions.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused detained for an offense punishable with death for a continuous period exceeding two years without the conclusion of trial become entitled to bail under section 497(1) Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether previous abscondence disentitles an accused from claiming post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay in the trial?
  • Can the gravity of the offense override the statutory right to bail accrued due to prolonged detention under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzad alias Pakora and others vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 396 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-25
  illegal weaponsbenefit of doubtpolice encountertampering of case propertyarms act convictioncredibility of mashiroff-shoot caseappellate acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a common judgment passed by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Karachi, whereby the appellants were convicted under section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment, while being acquitted of the main charges under sections 353, 324, 427, 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question before the Sindh High Court was whether the conviction for illegal possession of weapons could be sustained on the same discredited police evidence and uncorroborated police encounter testimony that the trial court had already rejected for the main charges. The High Court allowed the appeals and set aside the convictions, holding that once the foundational police encounter story and the testimony of the private mashir were disbelieved, and safe custody as well as transit of the case property (weapons) were not established, the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The key principle laid down is that a conviction in off-shoot arms cases cannot be sustained on weak, contradictory, and uncorroborated police testimony when the main police encounter case has already been rejected by the court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for illegal arms possession under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 be sustained when the foundational police encounter story has been disbelieved by the trial court?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt must be extended to accused persons when safe custody and safe transit of recovered weapons to the forensic laboratory are not established?
  • Is the testimony of a police official and a private mashir sufficient for conviction without independent corroboration when material contradictions exist?
  • Does the acquittal of accused persons in a main encounter case under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 necessitate a re-evaluation of evidence in connected off-shoot arms cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahzad Ahmed vs The State2018 SHC 619 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-07
  extortionbhattabenefit of doubtcontradictions in evidencesafe custody of case propertyfirearm recoverycriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant recorded by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences relating to extortion and illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, along with an absconding accomplice, was apprehended red-handed while collecting extortion money following telephonic demands and threats, and that a pistol was recovered from his person. The core legal questions involved whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the recovery was free from suspicion, and whether the procedural lapses and contradictions in police testimonies warranted an acquittal. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment, and acquitted the appellant. The court held that numerous material contradictions, defective investigation, failure to prove safe custody of recovered case property, non-production of star private witnesses, and unexplained delays in sending the weapon for forensic analysis rendered the prosecution case highly doubtful, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in dispatching a recovered firearm to the forensic laboratory create a fatal doubt regarding the safe custody of the case property?
  • Whether material contradictions and discrepancies among police witnesses regarding the place and manner of arrest are sufficient to discredit the prosecution case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution's failure to produce material private witnesses cited in the crime report during trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahrukh Shakeel Khan and others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2018 SHC 525 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05Read full judgment →
• Shahrukh Shakeel Khan and 2 others vs Province of Sindh through Chief2018 SHC 466, 2018 SHC 525, 2018 PLD Sindh 498 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05
  private school feesArticle 18freedom of traderegulatory frameworkprice fixationconstitutional petitionadministrative lawreasonable restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Ordinance 2001 and the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Rules 2005, specifically regarding the regulation of private school fees. The core legal question was whether the 5% cap on annual fee increases imposed by Rule 7(3) of the 2005 Rules violates the fundamental right to conduct a lawful trade or business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that while the State may regulate private schools as a business under the licensing system condition of Article 18, the specific mechanism in Rule 7(3) is constitutionally impermissible as it imposes an unreasonable, one-stage restriction. The Court quashed Rule 7(3) but granted a 90-day interim period for the government to frame a new, constitutionally compliant regulatory framework. The key principle laid down is that while the State can regulate school fees, such regulation must be reasonable, structured, and provide for a two-stage procedure with a reversal of onus, rather than an arbitrary, one-stage cap.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sindh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2013 impliedly repeal the Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulation and Control) Ordinance 2001?
  • Is the regulation of private school fees by the Provincial Government a violation of the fundamental right to conduct a lawful trade or business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can the State impose a fixed cap on the increase of school fees under the licensing system condition of Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the regulation of staff salaries in private schools fall within the permissible regulatory scope of the State under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahrukh Shakeel KHan & ors vs Province of Sindh & ors2018 SHC 466 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05Read full judgment →
• Shahneel Gul and 2 others vs The State2018 YLR 999 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-19Read full judgment →
• Shahnawaz Khatri vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 872 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-13Read full judgment →
• Shahnawaz Babar vs Federation of Pakistan another2018 SHC 1049 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-17Read full judgment →
• Shahmor vs M/s. D.P. World2018 PLJ Tr.C. (NIRC) 73 · National Industrial Relations Commission · 2017-01-10
  grievance petitionlimitationcondonation of delayforced resignationwrong forumindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a grievance petition filed before the National Industrial Relations Commission concerning a dispute over an alleged forced resignation and subsequent termination from service. The core legal question relates to whether a grievance petition filed after pursuing remedies in a constitutional forum (the High Court) can be entertained when it is barred by limitation, and whether the time spent before the wrong forum constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Commission held that the petition was hopelessly time-barred under the applicable labor laws and that pursuing a remedy before a wrong forum or awaiting replies without due diligence does not warrant the condonation of delay, especially where each day's delay remained unexplained. The key principle laid down is that statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and once time begins to run against a party, a belated petition filed beyond the mandatory prescribed period must be dismissed without entering into the merits of the controversy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a grievance petition filed beyond the prescribed period under the Industrial Relations Act is liable to be dismissed as time-barred?
  • Does the prosecution of a case before a wrong forum in constitutional jurisdiction constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under limitation laws?
  • Is each day's delay required to be explained when seeking condonation of delay in filing a labor grievance petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahmir Khan and Ors vs Province of Sindh & Others2018 SHC 1015 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-03Read full judgment →
• Shahid Mehmood vs The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and 22018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 1 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  dismissal from servicejudicial convictionregular departmental inquiryadmission of chargepolice disciplinary proceedingsservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed by an ex-sub-inspector of the Punjab Police challenging his dismissal from service following his judicial conviction in a criminal case, which conviction was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question was whether a regular departmental inquiry is a mandatory prerequisite for imposing a major penalty of dismissal even when the civil servant's criminal conviction is undisputed and admitted in response to a show-cause notice. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that while a regular inquiry is normally a sine qua non to resolve factual controversies in disciplinary proceedings, it becomes superfluous and unnecessary where the civil servant admits the charge of judicial conviction and sufficient material exists on record, allowing the competent authority to dispense with a regular inquiry under the applicable rules. The Tribunal laid down the principle that an admitted charge of a judicial conviction upheld by the apex court obviates the need for a separate factual inquiry in departmental proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a regular departmental inquiry mandatory when a civil servant admits to a judicial conviction upheld by the apex court?
  • Can a competent authority dispense with a regular inquiry under the Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975?
  • Does a criminal conviction substitute the prerequisites of a departmental inquiry in the presence of a factual controversy?
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• Shahid Iqbal Shaikh, Advocate vs The Government of Sindh & 04 others2018 SHC 635 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-20Read full judgment →
• Shahid Idrees vs Government of the Punjab, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 433 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-16Read full judgment →
• Shahid Idrees vs Government of the Punjab and others2018 PLD Lahore 284 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-22
  Overseas PakistanisPunjab Overseas Pakistanis Commissionjudicial powerseparation of powersadministrative overreachthird-party rightsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The case involves consolidated petitions challenging the actions of the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission and various Government Agencies in resolving private disputes between Overseas Pakistanis and private citizens. The core legal question is whether the Commission and Government Agencies possess the jurisdiction to adjudicate private disputes or determine third-party rights under the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014. The Court held that the Commission acts solely as a facilitation center for Overseas Pakistanis to address grievances related to Government Agencies. It ruled that neither the Commission nor Government Agencies have the authority to exercise judicial power or determine private rights between parties, as such functions are exclusively reserved for the judiciary under Article 175 of the Constitution. The judgment establishes that executive bodies cannot assume judicial functions to settle interparty disputes. Government Agencies may only act within their statutory mandates and cannot interfere in private litigation or summon individuals to resolve private disputes unless authorized by specific criminal or civil laws. Consequently, proceedings initiated by the Commission to determine third-party rights were declared unconstitutional and set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission Act, 2014 authorize the Commission to adjudicate private disputes between Overseas Pakistanis and private citizens?
  • Can Government Agencies exercise judicial power to determine third-party rights upon the recommendation of the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission?
  • Is the summoning of private individuals by Government Agencies to resolve private disputes with Overseas Pakistanis constitutional?
  • What is the scope of the Punjab Overseas Pakistanis Commission's authority regarding the redressal of grievances?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Hussain vs State and another2018 PLJ SC 813 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-02
  post-arrest bailfurther enquiryinvestigation reportinnocence in investigationmurder casebail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the findings of the police investigation. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had been found innocent during the investigation, no recovery was made at his instance, and a discharge report had been submitted, despite the Magistrate's disagreement. Furthermore, the Court noted that the co-accused were also declared innocent and were not arrested. Consequently, the Court held that the case against the petitioner fell within the ambit of 'further enquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, converted the petition into an appeal, and granted post-arrest bail to the appellant subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, establishing that investigation findings of innocence can constitute grounds for further enquiry justifying bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a police finding of innocence during investigation constitute grounds for further enquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is bail appropriate when the prosecution's investigation report declares the accused innocent and recommends discharge?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Azeem vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1653 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncapital punishmentcorroborationrape and murdercriminal appealmurder referenceevidentiary value
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted for the rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl and sentenced to death. The core legal questions concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of a retracted judicial confession recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the reframing of charges necessitated a retrial. The Islamabad High Court upheld the conviction and death sentence, concluding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held that a retracted judicial confession can legally sustain a conviction if the court is satisfied it was made voluntarily and is true. While corroboration is a rule of prudence to ensure reliability, it is not an absolute requirement if the confession is inherently credible. Furthermore, the Court determined that procedural lapses in recording a confession are not fatal if they do not undermine its voluntariness, and that the reframing of charges did not cause prejudice requiring a retrial. The confession was corroborated by medical evidence and the recovery of items linked to the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis for a capital conviction?
  • Does a procedural lapse in recording a confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically render it inadmissible?
  • Is corroboration of a retracted judicial confession a mandatory legal requirement or a rule of prudence?
  • Does the reframing of a charge during trial necessitate a de novo trial if no prejudice is shown to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Aslam vs The State and another2019 KLR Criminal Cases 1, 2018 IHC 156 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-13
  post-arrest bailfraudulent sale deedprohibitory clauseinvestigation lapseproperty disputecriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the petitioner, who was charged under Sections 420, 448, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, regarding the alleged fraudulent sale of property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the ongoing investigation, the nature of the alleged offences, and the delay in the investigation process. The Court held that the petitioner should be granted bail, noting that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that the petitioner had already been incarcerated for over three months. Furthermore, the Court expressed significant dissatisfaction with the police investigation, specifically the failure to question the Sub-Registrar involved in the fraudulent sale deed. The principle laid down is that where an investigation is ongoing and lacks diligence—particularly regarding the involvement of public officials in property fraud—an accused cannot be kept incarcerated indefinitely, especially when the alleged offences do not fall within the prohibitory clause of the relevant bail statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of forgery under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused be kept in indefinite incarceration when the investigation into the alleged offence is ongoing and incomplete?
  • Is the failure of the police to investigate the role of public officials in a property fraud case a relevant factor for the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Anwar Bajwa vs S.M. Asif and others2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 295, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 337, PLJ 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-25
  retired judgelegal practiceconstitutional interpretationjudicial independencebar on practiceArticle 207professional conduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether a retired permanent Judge of a High Court is constitutionally barred from practicing as a counsel before the same High Court. The appellant, a retired Judge of the High Court of Sindh, challenged a decision prohibiting him from appearing before that Court, arguing that the omission of specific language in Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, compared to the 1956 Constitution, removed the restriction on practicing before the High Court where he served. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional bar remains effective. The Court reasoned that the restriction is designed to maintain judicial independence, preserve the dignity of the judicial office, and prevent potential embarrassment to both the retired Judge and the sitting bench. Interpreting the legislative intent, the Court affirmed that the prohibition against pleading or acting within the jurisdiction of the High Court includes the High Court itself. The Court emphasized that such regulatory restrictions on legal practice are valid and do not violate fundamental rights, aligning with common law principles observed in other jurisdictions.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 prohibit a retired permanent Judge of a High Court from practicing as a counsel before the same High Court?
  • Is the restriction on a retired High Court Judge practicing before the same Court a violation of fundamental rights?
  • Does the omission of the phrase 'that Court' in Article 207(3)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, compared to the 1956 Constitution, allow a retired Judge to practice before the High Court where they served?
  Read full judgment →