Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Ms. Kalsoom Begum and others vs The Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan2019 PLC (C.S) 828, 2019 PLJ Peshwar 51, 2018 PHC 1735 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-18
  regular appointmentssurplus appointmentsprobationary periodtermination of serviceuniversity statutesconstitutional jurisdictionillegal appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter arises from 21 connected writ petitions filed before the Peshawar High Court challenging the termination of services of various university employees and non-appointment of certain petitioners at Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan (AWKUM). The core legal questions involve the legality of regular appointments made without sanctioned vacant posts, the validity of appointments made during a probationary period, and the extent of judicial review over university recruitment processes tainted by irregularities and surplus appointments. The Court held that appointments made against non-sanctioned and surplus posts, resulting from a colorful exercise of authority by the erstwhile university administration, are illegal, void, and create an extra burden on public financial resources. Furthermore, employees serving on probation can be terminated during the probationary period without a show-cause notice. The key principles laid down are that regular appointments made in the absence of sanctioned vacancies are unsustainable, and probationers have no vested right to challenge termination during probation when the foundational recruitment process is fundamentally tainted and illegal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether regular appointments made against non-sanctioned and surplus posts by a university administration are legally sustainable?
  • Can an employee appointed on probation be terminated during the probationary period without service of a show-cause notice?
  • Whether High Court can interfere in the termination of university employees whose initial recruitment process is found to be tainted with gross illegalities and irregularities?
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• Ms. Azra Muqeem vs Karachi Metropolitan Corporation & others2018 SHC 424 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-23
  out-of-cadre promotionservice cadreabsorptionmunicipal service rulesdepartmental promotion committeelaw departmentconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court by two Assistant Legal Advisors of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation challenging the promotion and transfer of respondents No.3 and 4 (belonging to the Accommodation and Land Departments respectively) to the posts of Director Law (BS-19) and Legal Advisor in the Law Department. The core legal questions were whether employees from one service cadre can be absorbed or promoted into a completely different cadre, and whether the promotion of unqualified officers from outside the department violated applicable service rules and binding judicial precedents. The High Court held that the promotion of respondents No.3 and 4 to the Law Department was illegal, out-of-cadre, and contrary to the West Pakistan Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1969 as well as the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court. The key principles laid down are that members of one service cadre cannot be appointed or promoted to a post borne on another cadre, and that out-of-cadre absorptions and promotions in statutory or local bodies are a nullity in law.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee belonging to one service cadre be appointed or promoted to a post borne on another cadre in a municipal committee?
  • Whether out-of-cadre promotions and absorptions of government or local body employees violate the established service rules and principles laid down by the superior courts?
  • Does a Departmental Promotion Committee have the lawful authority to recommend candidates from outside the designated departmental cadre for promotion?
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• Ms Sahar Gul Bhatti vs Province of Sindh & Ors2018 SHC 692 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-18Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Tahira Parveen Baloch, Ex.-District & Session Judge vs Hon'ble2018 PLJ Quetta 143 · Balochistan High Court
  service appealcompulsory retirementjudicial serviceservice tribunaltermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by the appellant, a former District and Sessions Judge, challenging a notification dated 23rd December 2014 issued by the respondent. The core of the dispute involves the appellant's compulsory retirement from judicial service. The appellant invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the court to contest the legality and validity of this retirement order. As the provided text is limited to the introductory paragraph of the judgment, it does not disclose the court's final holding, the specific legal reasoning applied, or the ultimate decision regarding the merits of the compulsory retirement. Consequently, the judgment's ratio decidendi and the specific legal principles established in this case cannot be determined from the available excerpt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Judicial Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a notification of compulsory retirement?
  • What are the grounds upon which a District and Sessions Judge can be compulsorily retired?
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• Mrs. Tahira Parveen Baloch, Ex-District & Sessions Judge, Killa Saifullah vs The Hon'ble Chief Justice, High Court of Balochistan, Quetta through its Registrar High Court of Balochistan, Quetta2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 26 · Balochistan High Court
  compulsory retirementjudicial servicemisconductcorruptionservice appealjudicial integrityefficiency and discipline rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant service appeal under Section 5 of the Judicial Service Tribunal Act, 1989 was filed by the appellant, an ex-District and Sessions Judge, challenging the notification whereby she was compulsorily retired from service following a departmental inquiry that found her guilty of misconduct under the Balochistan Civil Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1992. The core legal question revolved around whether the major penalty of compulsory retirement was lawfully imposed based on established charges of corruption and misconduct, and whether her service record justified such action. The Balochistan High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the inquiry was conducted fairly by a High Court Judge, the evidence sufficiently established financial irregularities and misconduct, and her overall service record justified the penalty. The court laid down the principle that judicial officers must maintain integrity beyond doubt, and while compulsory retirement does not entail forfeiture of pensionary benefits, an officer with doubtful integrity and average performance who has lost utility cannot be retained in judicial service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the major penalty of compulsory retirement can be sustained against a judicial officer found guilty of financial irregularities and corruption during departmental proceedings?
  • Does the law require the competent authority to consider the entire service record of a judicial employee when assessing the propriety of compulsory retirement?
  • Whether the standard of integrity and reputation expected of a judicial officer differs from that of ordinary civil servants?
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• Mrs. Tahira Parveen Baloch vs Chief Justice, High Court of Balochistan, Quetta through Registrar2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 26, 2018 PLJ Quetta 143, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 15 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-02
  compulsory retirementjudicial misconductservice appealembezzlementintegrity of judicial officersdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was filed by Mrs. Tahira Parveen Baloch, an ex-District and Sessions Judge, against a notification issued by the respondent compulsorily retiring her from service after a departmental inquiry found her guilty of misconduct involving corruption and embezzlement. The core legal question was whether the imposition of the major penalty of compulsory retirement and the findings of the departmental inquiry were justified based on the appellant's service record and evidence of misconduct. The Balochistan High Court held that the departmental proceedings, inquiry conducted by a High Court Judge, and subsequent decision by the Competent Authority were lawful and supported by sufficient evidence, and that judicial officers must maintain unblemished integrity and reputation. The court laid down the principle that the entire service record of a judicial officer must be considered in cases of compulsory retirement, and that judicial service cannot tolerate officers with doubtful integrity or those who have lost their utility, as maintaining a clean stream of justice is paramount.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire service record of a judicial officer must be considered by the authority while assessing compulsory retirement?
  • Can a judicial officer found to have doubtful integrity or poor reputation be compulsorily retired from service?
  • Whether compulsory retirement as a major penalty under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules differs from dismissal and removal regarding retiral benefits?
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• Mrs. Sumaira Malik and another vs Election Commission of Pakistan2018 PLJ Islamabad 216 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mrs. Shamshad Begum and another vs Syed Iftikhar Hussain Jafari and 5 others2018 CLC 1795 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-17Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Refat Seema & 4 others vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 1137 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-23Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Naveen Irfan Puri vs Mst. Shama Parveen and 3 others2019 YLR 1700, 2018 SHC 917 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nasreen Jahan Siddiqui vs Mrs. Amber and others2018 SHC 514 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Nasreen Jahan Siddiqui vs Mrs. Amber and 4 others2018 SHC 514, 2018 MLD 1866 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Najma Sultan vs Bank Islamic2018 PLD Sindh 126 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-13Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Khalida Azhar vs Viqar Rustam Bakhshi and others2018 SCP 1346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-12-08
  inheritance disputegift deedgift mutationagricultural landmesne profitspartition suitproof of gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a suit for declaration and partition filed by the appellant regarding the estate of her late father. The core legal questions concerned the validity of a registered gift deed transferring a house and the validity of gift mutations transferring agricultural lands to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the registered gift deed regarding the house was valid, as the appellant failed to impeach its authenticity despite a lapse of twenty-six years, and other legal heirs corroborated the transaction. Conversely, the Court held that the gift mutations regarding agricultural lands were invalid. It established the principle that mere mutation entries in revenue records do not constitute proof of a valid gift. To establish a gift of agricultural land, the beneficiary must independently prove the essential ingredients of a valid gift under Islamic law: a clear offer, acceptance, and the actual delivery of possession. As the respondent failed to prove these elements or the authenticity of the mutation process, the Court ordered partition of the agricultural lands and payment of mesne profits to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in revenue records alone constitute sufficient proof of a valid gift of agricultural land?
  • What are the essential ingredients required to prove a valid gift under Islamic law?
  • Can a registered gift deed be challenged after a significant lapse of time without evidence impeaching its execution?
  • Is a party entitled to mesne profits when a claim for inheritance in agricultural land is upheld?
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• Mrs. Hina Mumtaz Soomro and others vs Abdul Sami Soomro and others2018 PLD Sindh 671 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-03Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Hifsa Nawaz through Special Attorney vs Muhammad Haroon Zamir2018 MLD 498 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-25Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Farkhanda Farouq etc vs Defence Housing Authority etc2019 CLC 695, 2018 LHC 2940 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-05Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Asma Makhdoom vs Mrs. Yasmeen Azam through Attorney and 22018 MLD 976 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-02Read full judgment →
• Mrs Amna Nawaz vs Additional District Judge and others2018 MLD 1303 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mr.Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar Engro Foods Limited vs Province of Sindh2018 SHC 400 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-15
  trans-provincial establishmentnecessary and proper partyimpleadmentdominus litislabour legislationSindh Factories Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by a trans-provincial establishment seeking a declaration that the Sindh Factories Act, 2015 and the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 are inapplicable to its organization. During the proceedings, an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was filed by the Engro Dairy Farm Mazdoor Union seeking to be impleaded as defendant No.4. The core legal question concerned whether a workers' union of a trans-provincial establishment is a necessary and proper party in a suit challenging the applicability of provincial labour legislations. The court held that the intervener union is a necessary and proper party whose interests would be directly affected by any judgment determining the applicability of provincial labour laws, and therefore granted the application to implead them as a defendant. The key principle laid down is that persons whose legal interests are under challenge and whose presence is necessary for the complete and effective adjudication of the dispute ought to be impleaded as parties under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, notwithstanding the plaintiff's status as dominus litis.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a workers' union of a trans-provincial establishment is a necessary and proper party in a suit challenging the applicability of provincial labour legislations?
  • What are the principles governing the impleadment of parties under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the principle of dominus litis bar the court from adding a necessary party to a suit against the plaintiff's wishes?
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• Mr. Umar Akhtar vs Sher Said and others2018 YLR 2691, 2018 PHC 1662 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-08
  minor contractvoid ab-initioexchange deediqrar namacost of improvementstenantcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of consolidated suits for ejectment, recovery of rent, declaration, and permanent injunction concerning disputed landed property. The core legal questions involved whether a contract executed with a minor is void ab-initio, whether the disputed exchange deed and iqrar nama were legally proved, and whether the defendants were entitled to the cost of improvements made on the property. The Peshawar High Court held that any contract or transaction entered into with a minor is void ab-initio and cannot bind the minor without a duly authorized legal guardian. Furthermore, unverified plain-paper documents not proved through mandatory marginal witnesses under the law of evidence carry no legal weight, and improvements made by a tenant or unauthorized occupant without the landlord's prior consent are not compensable. The revision petition filed by the plaintiff was allowed, setting aside the lower courts' decree granting the cost of improvements, and the connected revision petition of the defendants was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a contract or transaction entered into with a minor is void ab-initio?
  • Can documents like an exchange deed and iqrar nama executed on plain paper be proved without examining the scriber and marginal witnesses?
  • Whether an occupant or tenant is entitled to claim the cost of improvements made on property without the prior consent of the owner?
  • Does a de facto guardian have the legal capacity to alienate or bind a minor's property under Muhammadan Law?
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• Mr. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Agp and Others vs Mr. Arif Nizami, Channel 24 and Others2018 SCP 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-28
  criminal investigationmedia ethicsjudicial inquirypolice custodyfair trialcontempt of courtpublic interest litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the ongoing investigation into a criminal case involving the accused, Imran Ali, who was remanded to police custody. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed concerns regarding the safety of the accused, directing the Inspector General of Police Punjab to ensure his protection. The Court further ordered the Inspector General of Police Punjab to provide profiles of police officers posted in jurisdictions where similar incidents occurred over the last five years. Addressing media conduct, the Court restrained the victim's family, their counsel, and media personnel from holding press conferences or participating in talk shows regarding the incident to prevent interference with a fair investigation. Furthermore, the Court investigated allegations made by Dr. Shahid Masood regarding the accused's financial status, specifically claims of multiple bank accounts, which were refuted by a State Bank of Pakistan report. Consequently, the Court constituted a high-level Inquiry Committee, headed by the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency, to probe the veracity of Dr. Shahid Masood's allegations and submit a report within 30 days.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court restrain media personnel and private parties from discussing an ongoing criminal investigation in the media?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to constitute an inquiry committee to investigate allegations made by a media personality regarding a criminal case?
  • Is the Supreme Court empowered to direct the Inspector General of Police to provide personnel profiles for administrative review in relation to criminal incidents?
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• Mr's Adamjee Insurance Company Limited, Lhr. vs Cir. Ltu, Lahore.2018 LHC 445 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-06-30Read full judgment →
• Mozam Khan vs Sher Afsar2018 PHC 1375 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-16Read full judgment →
• Moulana Naeem Khan vs Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and 10 others2018 CLC 1077 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-01-24Read full judgment →
• Moula Bux Khatian vs The Sui Southern Gas Company Limited through Managing Director and 4 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 462 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-02
  rejection of plaintorder VII rule 11 CPClimitation actres judicatadeputationlienretirement duesrecovery suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court appeal challenged an order rejecting the appellant's plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. on the grounds of limitation and res judicata. The appellant, formerly an employee of Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL), was relieved of his duties in 1989 on taking up a government deputation, subsequently got permanently absorbed in the Sindh Government service, and retired in 2009. In 2010, he filed a civil suit for recovery of retirement dues and service benefits from SSGCL for the period between 1989 and 2001. The core legal questions involved whether the suit was barred by limitation, hit by constructive res judicata, and whether an employee whose service rules did not provide for deputation could claim a subsisting lien and retirement benefits from their parent corporate employer after permanent absorption elsewhere. The court held that the suit was barred by the law of limitation as the cause of action arose in 1989, that the claim was barred by constructive res judicata due to prior finalized litigation, and that the appellant held no lien over a post in SSGCL. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit for the recovery of retirement dues filed more than a decade after the cause of action accrued is barred by the law of limitation?
  • Does a corporate employee who is permanently absorbed into government service retain a lien over their former position in the parent company?
  • Whether a claim for service benefits and retirement dues barred by earlier concluded constitutional petitions falls within the mischief of constructive res judicata?
  • Can a court's observation directing a party to seek remedy before a civil court be construed as an automatic condonation of delay for limitation purposes?
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• Mosam Khan vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 284 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-09
  post-arrest bailrule of consistencyjurisdictionabduction and murderabscondenceblood feudcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from a bail application filed by the accused-petitioner, Mosam Khan, seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 06 registered under sections 302/364/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Mattani, Peshawar, relating to the abduction and murder of the complainant's father. The core legal question involved the jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court to entertain the bail petition given that the murder occurred in tribal territory, as well as the rule of consistency where co-accused had been acquitted or granted bail. The Peshawar High Court held that it possessed jurisdiction under Section 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, overruling the objection, and granted bail to the petitioner on the ground of consistency with co-accused who were previously granted bail or acquitted, noting that abscondence alone is insufficient to deny bail when the case is otherwise fit for relief. The court laid down the principle that the rule of consistency applies in bail matters where the petitioner's case is at par with co-accused who have received favorable treatment from competent courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Peshawar High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a bail petition where the offence was committed in tribal territory but connected to an FIR registered in a settled area?
  • Does mere abscondence of an accused disentitle him to post-arrest bail if his case is otherwise on a par with co-accused who have been granted bail or acquitted?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies when determining bail for an accused whose co-accused have already been granted relief by competent courts?
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• Morris-Garner and another vs One Step (Support) Ltd2018 SCMR 1057 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2018-04-18Read full judgment →
• Momin Shah vs The State2018 PHC 1420 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-02Read full judgment →
• Mohsin vs The State2018 SHC 397 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-17
  illegal weapon possessioncriminal appealappreciation of evidencetypographical errors in judgmenthabitual offenderrecovery of weaponminor discrepancies in testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the Appellant for illegal possession of a firearm under the Arms Act, 2013. The Appellant was apprehended by police during snap checking, and a 30-bore pistol with ammunition was allegedly recovered from his possession. The trial court convicted the Appellant, sentencing him to five years of rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon beyond reasonable doubt, despite alleged contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses and typographical errors in the trial record. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution's evidence was consistent, confidence-inspiring, and sufficient to establish the Appellant's guilt. The Court affirmed that minor discrepancies in testimony and clerical errors by the presiding officer, such as typographical mistakes in dates or cross-examination records, do not invalidate a conviction when the overall evidence remains credible and the witnesses are not shown to have any motive for false implication. The principle established is that evidence must be evaluated as a whole rather than in isolated, contradictory fragments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be set aside solely due to minor typographical errors in the trial record or cross-examination transcripts?
  • Should evidence in a criminal trial be evaluated as a whole or in isolated parts?
  • Does the existence of minor discrepancies in prosecution witness testimony automatically render a case doubtful?
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• Mohsin Ali vs The State and another2018 MLD 934 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryidentification paradeconflicting versionsbenefit of doubtvicarious liabilitycommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused in a murder case registered under sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the inconsistencies between the FIR and the subsequent investigation, specifically regarding his identification and the role assigned to him. The Court held that the petitioner is entitled to bail, determining that the case falls within the ambit of 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court reasoned that the prosecution presented two conflicting versions of the incident, the co-accused assigned the primary role was declared innocent, and the identification parade's evidentiary value remained questionable. The key principles laid down are that the benefit of doubt can be extended to an accused at the bail stage, and where the prosecution’s case involves conflicting versions or requires further inquiry into guilt, the grant of bail becomes a right of the accused rather than a mere concession.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of two conflicting versions of an incident by the prosecution render a case one of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the benefit of doubt be extended to an accused at the bail stage?
  • Is the grant of bail a right of the accused when a case falls under the ambit of further inquiry?
  • Does the declaration of innocence of a co-accused assigned the primary role in an FIR provide grounds for bail for other accused?
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• Mohsin Abbas Shah vs Provincial Police Officer, Punjab, Lahore, etc.2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 121 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-09-19
  service appeallimitationtime-barredmisconductdepartmental appealrevision petitionwrong forum
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a police constable, challenged his dismissal from service following charges of misconduct related to the recruitment of his brother. The appellant had initially filed a departmental appeal, which was rejected on February 17, 2011. Instead of filing a service appeal before the Tribunal within the statutory period, the appellant filed a revision-cum-mercy petition before the Provincial Police Officer, which was subsequently rejected on February 10, 2012. The appellant then filed the instant service appeal on March 6, 2012. The District Attorney raised a preliminary objection regarding limitation. The Tribunal held that the appellant's filing of a revision petition before an unauthorized forum did not extend the limitation period for filing a service appeal. The Tribunal clarified that Section 17 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 does not grant a right to file a revision petition to the appellant. Consequently, the appeal was found to be time-barred, as the limitation period commenced from the rejection of the departmental appeal. The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of a revision petition before an unauthorized forum extend the limitation period for filing a service appeal?
  • Does Section 17 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974 vest a right in a civil servant to file a revision petition?
  • When does the limitation period for filing a service appeal commence after the rejection of a departmental appeal?
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• Mohsan Hanif vs Superintendent Police Kotli and 4 others2018 PLJ AJ&K 28 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-02
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtabuse of processcriminal liabilitysuicideSection 561-A Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of an F.I.R. registered against the applicant for offences under Sections 109 and 511 of the Azad Penal Code. The applicant contended that the F.I.R. was based on fabricated allegations of harassment and telephonic calls leading to a suicide, arguing that no cognizable offence was disclosed and that the case was motivated by political rivalry. The State opposed the application, asserting that investigation was ongoing and that evidence, including call data records, linked the applicant to the deceased's depression and subsequent suicide. The Court examined the scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, noting it should be invoked sparingly to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court held that to establish criminal liability for death, there must be a direct link between the accused's act and the death. Finding that the allegations did not satisfy the essential ingredients for murder under the Azad Penal Code, the Court intervened to prevent the abuse of the criminal process.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 allow for the quashment of an F.I.R. where no cognizable offence is disclosed?
  • Is a direct causal link between an accused's act and the death of a deceased required to establish criminal liability for murder under the Azad Penal Code?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent powers to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice?
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• Mohiuddin Khan vs M/s. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2018 PLJ Karachi 1 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Asia Bibi vs The State etc2018 SCP 1322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-31
  blasphemycapital punishmentbenefit of the doubtextra-judicial confessioncontradictions in evidencedelay in FIRfair trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Mst. Asia Bibi, under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code for allegedly uttering derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet Muhammad. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt given the inordinate delay in lodging the First Information Report, material contradictions in ocular and extra-judicial testimony, and suppressed facts regarding a preceding altercation over water. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower courts' judgments, and acquitted the appellant by giving her the benefit of the doubt. The Court laid down the principle that in criminal cases, particularly those involving capital punishment and serious religious allegations, the prosecution must strictly prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and any material contradictions, unexplained delays, or false implications arising from personal grudges or suppressed initial disputes entitle the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report undermines the prosecution's case in a criminal trial?
  • Can a conviction for a capital offence like blasphemy be sustained solely on fragile extra-judicial confessions made in an intimidating public gathering?
  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent and unimpeachable evidence entitles the accused to an acquittal?
  • Does the principle that un-rebutted statements amount to admissions apply in criminal proceedings regarding the burden of proof?
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• Mohinder Singh vs The State of Punjab2018 SCInd 50 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-08-14
  NDPS Actacquittalchain of custodycontrabandoral evidenceappellate interferencenarcotic drugs
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a High Court judgment that reversed an acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The core legal question was whether a conviction under the NDPS Act can be sustained when the prosecution relies solely on oral evidence to prove the seizure and chain of custody of contraband, without producing the seized material before the Magistrate or providing documentary evidence of its deposit. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was unsustainable, as the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody through cogent evidence, and the trial court's finding regarding the lack of proof of production before the Magistrate was not a distorted conclusion. The Court laid down the principle that in NDPS cases, the best evidence is the production of the seized material before the court; mere oral testimony is insufficient to connect the forensic report with the seized substance. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and restored the acquittal, emphasizing that appellate courts should not interfere with acquittals absent compelling reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Is oral evidence alone sufficient to establish the chain of custody of seized contraband in an NDPS Act case?
  • Does the failure to produce seized contraband before a Magistrate vitiate a conviction under the NDPS Act?
  • Under what circumstances is an appellate court justified in interfering with an order of acquittal?
  • Does the search of a bag carried by an accused on a vehicle constitute a personal search requiring compliance with Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985?
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• Mohibullah and others vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 82 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-12-05
  seized propertyacquittalbenefit of doubtcriminal revisionproperty disposalfunctus officioSection 517 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This application was filed under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the release of a motorcycle confiscated by the trial court following the applicant's conviction, which was subsequently set aside in criminal revision. The core legal questions were whether the court, having already acquitted the applicant, remained functus officio regarding the disposal of seized property, and whether an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt entitled the applicant to the return of property seized from their possession. The Court held that an acquittal constitutes a formal exoneration, entitling the accused to the restoration of property seized from them, provided it was not the subject matter of the offense. Furthermore, the Court determined that it possesses independent, substantive jurisdiction under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to correct errors regarding property disposal even after a final judgment, and that such applications are not subject to a limitation period. The principle established is that property seized from an accused must be restored upon acquittal, and the court retains the power to rectify property disposal orders independently of the main case's conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Does an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt entitle an accused to the return of property seized from their possession?
  • Can a court exercise jurisdiction under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to return seized property after the final judgment has been delivered?
  • Is there a prescribed limitation period for filing an application for the release of seized property under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mohibullah and another vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 82, 2018 P Cr. L J 954 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-12-05
  return of case propertyseized motorcyclebenefit of doubtacquittalfunctus officiosupervisory powerslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal application was filed under Section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the release of a seized motorcycle following the applicant's acquittal. The core legal questions involved whether an accused acquitted on the benefit of doubt is entitled to the return of property seized at the time of arrest, and whether the High Court retains jurisdiction under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to dispose of case property after the main criminal revision has been decided without altering a final judgment. The Balochistan High Court held that an unconditional acquittal, even if based on the benefit of doubt, constitutes an exoneration entitling the accused to the logical consequence of the return of seized property not proven to be the subject matter of an offence or stolen. The Court laid down that proceedings under Sections 517 and 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are independent substantive remedies carrying no prescribed period of limitation, and that an acquittal by extending the benefit of doubt operates as a formal certification of innocence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person acquitted of a criminal charge by the extension of benefit of doubt is entitled to the return of property seized at the time of arrest?
  • Does a High Court retain jurisdiction under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to pass orders regarding case property after the main criminal revision has been decided?
  • Are proceedings under Sections 517 and 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 subject to any period of limitation?
  • Does an acquittal based on the benefit of doubt amount to an honourable acquittal for the purpose of restoring seized property to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohd. Sahid and Others vs Raziya Khanam (D) THR. LRs and Another2018 SCInd 112 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-10Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Zakir vs Shabana & Ors2018 SCInd 13 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-07-23
  Section 362 CrPCclerical errorarithmetical errorrecall of orderjudicial reviewcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the High Court which recalled its own previous order dated 18.04.2017, purportedly invoking Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed the authority under Section 362 to recall or review a judicial order on the grounds that it was patently erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in exercising its power under Section 362 for a correction on merits. The Court clarified that Section 362 is strictly limited to the correction of clerical or arithmetical errors and cannot be utilized to rehear a matter on merits, regardless of whether the initial order was perceived as patently erroneous. The key principle laid down is that judicial orders cannot be recalled or reviewed on merits under the guise of Section 362, as such corrections must follow established legal processes rather than summary recall. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and directed the relevant Sessions Court to expedite the pending criminal appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court recall or review its own order on merits under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973?
  • What is the permissible scope of correction under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973?
  • Does the power to correct clerical or arithmetical errors under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 extend to correcting patently erroneous judicial decisions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammed Hussain vs The State2018 MLD 1937 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-30
  plea of guiltycriminal appealstatutory barcondonation of delaysentence modificationfraudmaintainability of appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court for offenses under sections 468, 420, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant, having pleaded guilty at trial, sought modification of the sentence from consecutive to concurrent. The core legal question was whether an appeal is maintainable against a conviction based on a plea of guilt, and whether the appellant provided sufficient grounds for the significant delay in filing the appeal. The Court held that the appeal was not maintainable, citing the statutory bar under section 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which precludes appeals against convictions where the accused has pleaded guilty, except regarding the extent or legality of the sentence. Furthermore, the Court found the appellant failed to provide a valid explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The key principle laid down is that a plea of guilty serves as a complete bar to challenging the conviction itself under section 412, and any delay in filing an appeal must be satisfactorily explained for each day of the delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plea of guilty by an accused person bar an appeal against the conviction under Section 412 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an appellate court modify a sentence from consecutive to concurrent if the conviction was based on a plea of guilty?
  • Is an inordinate delay in filing a criminal appeal excusable without a satisfactory explanation for each day of the delay?
  • To what extent can an accused challenge a conviction and sentence after pleading guilty?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Sharif vs Jamshaid Ali and 7 others2018 MLD 1922 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Shahzaib vs Mishal Fatima and others2018 MLD 1131 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-22Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Raziq vs Mst. Farhana Bibi and 2 others2018 CLC 93 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-05
  Khuladissolution of marriagedowermaintenance allowancerestitution of conjugal rightsmarital aversionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which granted a decree for the dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula, awarded dower, and ordered maintenance allowance for the Iddat period. The petitioner-husband contended that the respondent-wife failed to prove allegations of cruelty and that she was not entitled to maintenance as she had left the matrimonial home voluntarily. The core legal question was whether a wife is entitled to dissolution of marriage via Khula and associated financial claims when specific allegations of cruelty remain unproven but intense marital aversion is established. The High Court held that the wife's expressed, deep-seated hatred for the husband, to the extent of preferring death over cohabitation, constituted sufficient grounds for dissolution via Khula, regardless of the failure to prove specific acts of cruelty. The court affirmed that dower and maintenance are essential legal consequences of a valid marriage and that the husband’s conduct justified the denial of his counter-claim for restitution of conjugal rights. The petition was dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Can a marriage be dissolved on the basis of Khula if the wife fails to prove specific allegations of cruelty but demonstrates intense hatred for the husband?
  • Is a wife entitled to dower and maintenance during the Iddat period even if specific allegations of cruelty are not proven?
  • Does a husband's history of alleged maltreatment and oral pronouncements of divorce disentitle him to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Raza vs Crescent Industrial Chemical Ltd. and 5 others2018 CLD 898 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Raheem vs Zubair Imran Malik and 2 others2018 PLC 301 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2018-01-16
  double jeopardynon-prosecutionrevisional jurisdictionlabour courtconsent orderreinstatementacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a Labour Court order that acquitted respondents of failing to implement a consent order for his reinstatement, citing the principle of double jeopardy. The Labour Court had previously dismissed the appellant's initial complaint as "not pressed" due to his absence. The core legal question was whether a dismissal for non-prosecution constitutes an acquittal on merits, thereby barring a fresh complaint under the doctrine of double jeopardy. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the principle of double jeopardy applies only to trials ending in acquittal or conviction on merits. Since the prior dismissal was due to non-prosecution and not a trial on merits, it did not bar the filing of a fresh complaint. Furthermore, the Tribunal affirmed its revisional jurisdiction under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013, noting it can be exercised on the motion of a party to ensure the sanctity of court orders. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Labour Court for disposal on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dismissal of a complaint for non-prosecution constitute an acquittal on merits that bars a fresh complaint under the principle of double jeopardy?
  • Does the Labour Appellate Tribunal have the authority to exercise revisional jurisdiction on the motion of a party?
  • Is the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal limited to proceedings of a civil nature, or does it extend to criminal proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Noman and 2 others vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1100 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-11
  criminal appealde novo trialframing of chargeexplosive substancesillegalities in trialcase propertymiscarriage of justicearms ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi-Central, convicting the appellants under sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and section 13-E of the Arms Ordinance, and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the legality of the trial due to failure in framing specific charges and omitting to put the recovered case property to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, causing prejudice to their defense. The Sindh High Court held that the trial court committed serious irregularities and illegalities by not framing separate charges for distinct offences as mandated and by failing to examine the accused regarding the recovered case property, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The court set aside the convictions and sentences, and remanded the matter back to the trial court for a de novo trial starting from the framing of fresh charges. The key principle laid down is that a fair and specific charge must be framed for every distinct offence, and all incriminating circumstances including recovered case property must be explicitly put to the accused during their examination under section 342, Cr.P.C., failing which the trial is vitiated.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the trial court to frame specific and separate charges for distinct offences causes prejudice to the accused warranting a de novo trial?
  • Can recovered case property that was not put to the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 be used as evidence against them?
  • What are the appellate court's powers under section 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 when an omission in framing a charge causes prejudice to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Mithal vs The State2018 MLD 363 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-05
  compromisediyatqisasminor legal heirscompounding of offencecriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns a conviction for murder wherein the appellant sought acquittal following a compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The core legal question was whether a compromise could be accepted and the appellant acquitted when the 'diyat' (compensation) amount had been paid by co-accused persons rather than the appellant himself, and whether the interests of minor legal heirs were sufficiently protected. The Court held that the compromise was valid and voluntary, noting that the 'diyat' amount corresponding to the minors' shares had been deposited in court and that the minors' mother, acting as their appointed guardian, had consented to the compromise. The Court affirmed that under Shariah principles, the purpose of 'diyat' is to safeguard the interests of the legal heirs, and it is permissible for the compensation to be paid by any of the co-accused. Consequently, the Court allowed the compounding of the offence under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and acquitted the appellant, finding no impediment to the compromise once the minors' interests were secured.

  Questions settled

  • Can a compromise in a murder case be accepted if the 'diyat' amount is paid by co-accused rather than the appellant?
  • Is a compromise valid where the interests of minor legal heirs are secured by the deposit of their share of 'diyat' in court?
  • Does the mother of minor legal heirs have the authority to compound an offence on their behalf after being appointed as their guardian?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Khalid Naeem vs Habib Bank Limited2018 CLD 1027 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  banking courtex parte decreelimitation periodspecial lawcondonation of delayrecovery of finances
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Banking Court dismissing the Appellant's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree. The core legal questions were whether the Appellant established grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction to warrant setting aside the decree, and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies to appeals filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001. The Court held that the Appellant failed to prove any fraud, misrepresentation, or jurisdictional defect, as the Banking Court had duly considered the Appellant's leave to defend application before decreeing the suit. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 is a special law prescribing its own limitation period; therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is inapplicable for condonation of delay in filing appeals under this Ordinance. The appeal was dismissed as both meritless and time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 be invoked to condone a delay in filing an appeal under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001?
  • What are the essential grounds required to successfully challenge a judgment or decree under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 exclude the application of the general provisions of the Limitation Act 1908 regarding the condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Karim Durrani through Legal Heir vs Ghulam Rasool through L.Rs, and another2018 YLR 183 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-01Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Jameel vs Eridania (Suisse) Sa & Others.2018 CLD 1478, 2018 SHC 780 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-22
  company liquidationwinding uplocus standiauction saleconfirmation of saleshareholder rightsauction purchaserinadequacy of price
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal was filed against an order confirming the auction sale and handing over of property of a company in liquidation. The appellant, a shareholder of the company who was not a party to the winding-up petition, challenged the sale confirmation on grounds of non-compliance with execution procedures under Order 21 CPC and inadequacy of sale price. The core legal questions were whether a shareholder, being distinct from the company, has locus standi as a stranger to appeal a liquidation auction order without having submitted objections prior to sale confirmation, and whether inadequacy of price constitutes a valid ground to set aside a confirmed auction sale. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a company is a corporate body distinct from its shareholders, and the appellant lacked standing. Furthermore, the Court held that alleged inadequacy of price is not a ground to set aside an auction, and once an auction sale is confirmed, it creates vested rights in favor of the bona fide auction purchaser that cannot be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a shareholder of a company in liquidation have locus standi to appeal an order confirming an auction sale of company property if they were not a party to the original winding-up petition?
  • Is alleged inadequacy of sale price a valid legal ground to set aside a confirmed public auction sale?
  • Can a party invoke Order 21 Rule 90 CPC to challenge an auction sale without having filed objections before the liquidator or depositing the statutorily mandated security amount?
  • What is the legal effect of a court's confirmation of sale on the rights acquired by an auction purchaser?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ismail and 9 others vs Abdul Jabbar and another2018 MLD 1462 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-15
  Illegal Dispossession Actco-sharersproperty disputecriminal complaintcivil disputepartition of propertyquashing of order
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants filed a criminal miscellaneous application against the order of the trial court which allowed a criminal complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, and took cognizance against them. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, are applicable to a dispute between co-sharers or co-owners of an unpartitioned property. The Sindh High Court held that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, is a special legislation intended to protect lawful owners and occupiers from property grabbers and has no application to cases of disputes between co-owners or co-sharers regarding unpartitioned properties, where a civil remedy for partition is the appropriate recourse. The court set aside the impugned order, ruling that a bona fide civil property dispute cannot be given the color of criminal action under the said Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 applies to disputes between co-sharers or co-owners of an unpartitioned property?
  • Can a co-sharer initiate proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 against another co-sharer in possession of joint property?
  • Is a dispute regarding the settlement of proper partition between co-owners amenable to criminal action under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Ashraf and another vs Mohammad Asghar Zardari and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 257 · Islamabad High Court · 2012-05-29
  service lawpromotion criteriaPakistan Engineering Councillocus poenitentiaestatutory interpretationintra-court appealprofessional engineering qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal arose from a challenge to the promotion of Capital Development Authority (CDA) employees to engineering posts. The core legal question was whether employees lacking professional engineering degrees and registration with the Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) could be promoted to such positions, notwithstanding amendments to the CDA Employees (Service) Regulations, 1992. The Court held that the CDA’s amendment, which mandated PEC registration for engineering appointments, was valid and enforceable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that employees not registered with the PEC were ineligible for promotion to engineering cadres. The judgment affirmed that professional regulatory requirements established by the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, must be strictly followed. Furthermore, the Court rejected the appellants' reliance on the principle of locus poenitentiae, holding that illegal promotions do not confer vested rights and that authorities possess the inherent power to rectify orders that violate established rules or laws. The decision emphasizes that statutory bodies must ensure their service criteria align with professional standards to maintain service efficiency and standards.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees lacking professional engineering registration are eligible for promotion to engineering posts in the Capital Development Authority?
  • Does the principle of locus poenitentiae protect illegal promotions from being rectified by the appointing authority?
  • Can a statutory body mandate professional registration with the Pakistan Engineering Council as a prerequisite for promotion to engineering positions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Akram vs Mst. Nooro Mai2019 YLR 1195, 2018 LHC 3043 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-21Read full judgment →
• Mohammad Afsar vs Mst. Nazir Begum and 20 others2018 CLC 259 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Model Town Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. vs Secretary to Govt.2018 [M] C.L.R. 642 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mobile Communication Limited vs Province of the Punjab and 7 others2018 PLD Lahore 504 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Moazzam Habib, etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2018 PLJ Islamabad 239 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-12Read full judgment →
• Moazzam Habib and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PLJ Islamabad 239, 2018 YLR 222 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-12
  constitutional petitionpro bono publicoIslamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance 2001SRO notificationurban area demarcationequal protection of lawwrit of mandamusreasonable classification
  Summary & questions settled

  This public interest constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by advocates challenging the exclusion of urbanized regions, specifically Zone-V, from the territorial application of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 under S.R.O. No. 83(K)/2002. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government acted arbitrarily and in violation of fundamental constitutional guarantees by excluding approved urban housing schemes in Islamabad Capital Territory from rent restriction laws without intelligible differentia. The Islamabad High Court allowed the petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Federal Government to amend S.R.O. No. 83(K)/2002 within thirty days to explicitly include specified urban areas in Zone-V under the Ordinance. The Court held that executive notifications classifying areas for statutory coverage must be based on intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus to the object of the legislation. Excluding modern urbanized zones without valid justification infringes equal protection of law under Article 25 and fundamental rights under Article 4. Additionally, the government retains authority under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to amend such notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court issue a writ of mandamus under Article 199 directing the executive to amend a notification that arbitrarily excludes urban areas from rent protection laws?
  • Does the arbitrary exclusion of developed urban localities from rent laws violate Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can the Federal Government amend or vary an administrative notification regulating statutory application pursuant to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  Read full judgment →
• Mitho alias Muhammad Mithal vs Province of Sindh through Secretary2018 P Cr. L J 101 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-20
  further investigationre-investigationpolice reportsupplementary challancriminal procedurecognizance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged an order passed by the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police, Hyderabad, directing the re-investigation of FIR No. 16/2009. The petitioner, as the complainant, argued that the case was at an advanced stage and that the re-investigation order was improper, potentially intended to favor influential accused persons and undermine the prosecution's case. The core legal question was whether police authorities possess the legal power to order further investigation or re-investigation after the submission of a final report under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court held that the order for further investigation was lawful. It clarified that while the Code does not explicitly contemplate 're-investigation' as a fresh start, the police are empowered to conduct 'further investigation' as a continuation of the original process. The Court affirmed that there is no legal bar to such investigations, even after a final report is submitted, provided a supplementary report is filed. The Court emphasized that the trial court remains the ultimate arbiter, not bound by police findings, and the petitioner retains the right to challenge the supplementary report before the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prohibit the police from conducting further investigation after the submission of a final report?
  • Is a further investigation considered a fresh investigation that wipes out the original investigation?
  • Is a trial court bound by the findings of the police in a supplementary report submitted after further investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Robina Tabusam vs The State2018 YLR 913 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-15
  post-arrest bailstatutory delaymurderdelay in trialcriminal procedureconstitutional right to speedy trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner, Miss Robina Tabusam, in case FIR No. 143 dated 27.02.2014 registered under sections 365, 302/34, P.P.C. at Police Station Sabzi Mandi, Islamabad. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner is entitled to post-arrest bail on the statutory ground of delay in the conclusion of her trial under the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where she has been incarcerated for over three and a half years and the delay is not attributable to her. The Islamabad High Court held that since the petitioner has been detained for a period exceeding two years without her trial concluding, and the delay in the trial was occasioned by the prosecution and its witnesses rather than any act or omission of the accused, she is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The court laid down the principle that the right to bail on statutory grounds under the third proviso of section 497(1) Cr.P.C. is absolute once the statutory period has expired and the delay is not caused by the defence, and such right cannot be defeated by the discretionary powers of the court.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right under the third proviso of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when incarcerated for over two years without conclusion of trial?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to produce witnesses within the statutory period constitute a valid ground for granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can the right to bail on statutory grounds under section 497(1) Cr.P.C. be defeated by the discretionary power of the court when the delay is not attributable to the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mishqatullah vs The State and others2018 PHC 1653 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-25Read full judgment →
• Mirza Naseem-Ul-Hassan and others vs Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Punjab and others2018 PLD Lahore 704 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-29Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Waqas vs Sana Norani, Etc2018 LHC 1920 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-03Read full judgment →
• Mirza Muhammad Afzal vs Collector Land Acquisition, Mangla Dam2018 PLJ AJ&K 22 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Mirza Ghulam Sarwar vs Dow University of Health Sciences and 03 others2018 SHC 877 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-11Read full judgment →
• Mirza Ashfaq Ahmed Baig vs Karachi Metropolitan Corporation & others2018 SHC 1194 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-21
  disciplinary proceedingsmisconductmajor penaltynatural justiceright to fair trialservice lawjudicial reviewEfficiency and Discipline Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), challenged a notification imposing a major penalty of reduction to a lower post following allegations of misconduct, including tampering with service records and financial irregularities. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings violated the principles of natural justice, specifically the right to a fair hearing and the requirement for a regular inquiry. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the disciplinary action was lawful. The record demonstrated that an inquiry officer was appointed, the petitioner was granted a personal hearing, and the findings of misconduct were substantiated by documentary evidence and witness statements. The Court affirmed that where allegations of misconduct are established through a fair inquiry process, the imposition of a major penalty under the Efficiency & Discipline Rules 1973 is valid. The judgment reinforces the principle that judicial review is limited to ensuring procedural fairness and compliance with statutory rules, and where such compliance is evident, the court will not interfere with administrative disciplinary findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a major penalty of reduction to a lower post can be imposed without conducting a regular inquiry?
  • Does the failure to provide an opportunity of hearing during disciplinary proceedings violate Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a court interfere with administrative disciplinary findings where the inquiry officer has substantiated allegations through documentary evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs SHO, PS Chung, Lahore & others2018 SCP 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  habeas corpuschild custodyguardianshipparental jurisdictionminor's welfareex parte orderinterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a habeas corpus petition regarding the custody of two minor children. The core legal questions addressed were the maintainability of a father’s application for guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, and whether a High Court may exercise jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to restore custody when proceedings are pending before a Guardian Court. The Supreme Court held that while a natural guardian may seek a guardianship certificate, such proceedings cannot be used to facilitate deceit or unlawful detention. The Court found the High Court erred in dismissing the habeas corpus petition, noting that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 jurisdiction is not ousted by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Consequently, the Court set aside the ex parte guardianship order and restored the children's custody to the mother as an interim measure. The key principle laid down is that in exceptional cases involving the welfare of minors, courts must exercise parental jurisdiction to prevent harm, prioritizing the minor's best interest over procedural technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Is a father, as a natural guardian, barred from seeking a formal guardianship certificate under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings before a Guardian Court oust the High Court's jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the Supreme Court invoke its parental jurisdiction to restore a minor's custody to a parent pending final adjudication by a Guardian Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs SHO, Police Station Chung, Lahore and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 113, 2018 SCMR 427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-24
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsguardianshipex-parte orderwelfare of the minornatural guardianSection 491 Cr.P.C.parental jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Finnish national and mother of two minors, sought leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing her habeas corpus petition. The children, who were Canadian citizens, were brought to Pakistan by their father (Respondent No. 2) for a short visit but were subsequently detained through deceptive legal maneuvers. The father had obtained an ex-parte guardianship order from a Guardian Court by concealing the mother's actual address and the children's residency status. The Supreme Court addressed whether a father as a natural guardian can seek a guardianship certificate and whether a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is maintainable during the pendency of guardianship proceedings. The Court held that while a father may seek such certificates, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is not ousted by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, especially in exceptional cases involving trickery or urgent welfare concerns. Emphasizing the 'best interest of the child' and respecting the minors' expressed wishes to return to Canada for education, the Court set aside the ex-parte guardianship order and directed the restoration of interim custody to the mother.

  Read full judgment →
• Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho vs S.H.O., PS Chung, Lahore and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-24
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsguardianshipinterim custodyparental jurisdictionwelfare of the minorex-parte order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition by the Lahore High Court, which sought the recovery of two minor children from their father. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a guardianship petition by a natural guardian, the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while guardianship proceedings are pending, and the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction in such custody disputes. The Supreme Court held that while a natural guardian is not barred from seeking a guardianship declaration, the father’s ex-parte order was obtained through deceit and manipulation. Crucially, the Court ruled that Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 serve distinct purposes and are not mutually exclusive. The High Court erred by abdicating its jurisdiction; it possesses the authority to grant interim custody in exceptional cases to safeguard a minor's welfare. Consequently, the Court set aside the ex-parte guardianship order and restored interim custody to the mother.

  Questions settled

  • Is a natural guardian barred from seeking a declaration of guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890?
  • Does the pendency of proceedings before a Guardian Court oust the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court grant interim custody of a minor to a parent pending final adjudication by a Guardian Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Shabbir Ali Khan Bijarini and Others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 PLJ Karachi 143, 2018 SHC 820 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-10Read full judgment →
• Mir Najeeb-Ur-Rehman Jakhrani vs The Province of Sindh and others2019 PLC (C.S) 1124, 2018 SHC 442 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06
  departmental examinationretrospective effectsub-registrarconstitutional petitioncivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant in the Registration Department, filed a constitutional petition seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to declare his result for the Annual Registration Departmental Examination held on 15.09.2013 for the category of Assistant, enabling his induction into the Sub-Registrar cadre. The core legal question was whether an amendment to the Sindh Registration Rules, 1940, allowing Assistants to fill a percentage of Sub-Registrar posts and take the examination, applied retrospectively to the 2013 examination in which the petitioner had appeared. The Sindh High Court held that the rules in force at the time of the 2013 examination did not make Assistants eligible to appear for the purpose of promotion to Sub-Registrar, and that the subsequent amendment notified on 12.06.2015 operated prospectively rather than retrospectively. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition, ruling that the petitioner had no legal right to claim retrospective application of the amendment or declaration of his examination result.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to service rules can be applied retrospectively to examinations held prior to its notification?
  • Are Assistants eligible under the Sindh Registration Rules, 1940 to appear in the Annual Departmental Examination for promotion to Sub-Registrar prior to the amendment of 2015?
  • Does a candidate who appeared in a departmental examination without eligibility under the rules possess a legal right to the declaration of their result?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Mumtaz Ali vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 907 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-05Read full judgment →
• Mir Jawaz Khan and 2 others vs Gul Bath Khan and 2 others2018 CLC 805 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-14
  court feerejection of plaintdeficiency in court-feepre-emption suitconstitutional petitionlimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged orders passed by the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. for the rejection of a plaint on the ground of deficient court fee in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a plaint can be dismissed outright for a deficiency in court fee without first ascertaining the exact deficiency and providing the plaintiff an opportunity to make it good within a fixed time. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the policy of the law regarding court fees is flexible rather than rigid, aiming to secure State revenue rather than provide a weapon of technicality. The court laid down the principle that upon discovering a deficiency in court-fee, a court is bound to determine the exact amount and grant time to the plaintiff to make up the deficiency, and a plaint presented within limitation cannot be rejected without first affording such an opportunity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dismiss a plaint or appeal for deficient court-fee without first specifying the deficiency and granting time to make it good?
  • What is the legal effect under the Court Fees Act 1870 and Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a plaint is presented within limitation but with a deficient court-fee?
  • Whether the provisions regarding the payment of court fees should be interpreted rigidly or flexibly to penalize litigants on technicalities?
  • Under what circumstances can a plaint be lawfully rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to insufficient stamping?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Hakeem Khan and another vs Gulap Khan and two othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 797, 2018 YLR 2638, 2018 PHC 1441 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mir Afzal vs Muhammad Fareed and others2019 MLD 238, 2018 PHC 1712 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-08-09Read full judgment →
• Mir Afzal vs Mst. Naseem Bibi and another2018 YLR 1979 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-08Read full judgment →
• Minnesota Voters Alliance, Etal vs Joe Mansky, Etal2018 SCMR 1770 · Supreme Court of United StatesRead full judgment →
• Minhaaj Saqib and others vs Najam-Us-Saqib and others2018 CLC 506 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-16
  intra-court appealmaintainabilityinterim maintenancewrit petitionjurisdictionfamily courtadjudication on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal impugned a judgment of a learned Single Judge-in-Chambers in a writ petition to the extent of a modification made to an interim maintenance order passed by a Family Court. The Family Court had fixed interim maintenance at Rs. 50,000/- per month for each of the two minor children, which was challenged through a writ petition. The learned Single Judge-in-Chambers held that the writ petition against an interim maintenance order was not maintainable, yet proceeded to modify and reduce the quantum of interim maintenance to Rs. 25,000/- per month. The core legal question was whether a court, after holding a petition to be not maintainable, can legally interfere with the impugned order and adjudicate upon the merits of the case. The Islamabad High Court held that once a court determines a petition is not maintainable or lacks jurisdiction, it has no power to delve into the merits or interfere with the impugned order, rendering any such adjudication without jurisdiction and void. The appeal was accordingly allowed, restoring the original interim maintenance amount.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable against an interim maintenance order passed by a Family Court?
  • Can a court make observations or interfere with an impugned order on merits after holding that the petition before it is not maintainable?
  • Does a court lacking jurisdiction or finding a lis not maintainable have the power to decide the matter on merits?
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• Mikon Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner (SMD), SECP, Islamabad2018 CLD 1083 · Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
• Michael Nelson Currier vs Virginia2018 SCMR 1695 · Supreme Court of United States · 2018-07-22Read full judgment →
• Mian Zafar Haider vs Deputy Commissioner, etc.2019 PLC (C.S.) 658, 2018 KLR Civil Cases 256 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-19
  constitutional petitionsuspension from servicecompetent authorityPEEDA Actterms and conditions of serviceService Tribunalbar of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to challenge an order of suspension passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Muzaffargarh against the petitioner, a Junior Clerk, on allegations of wilful absence from duty. The core legal questions involved whether the Deputy Commissioner acted as a competent authority to suspend the petitioner under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, and whether the High Court can interfere with intermediate service proceedings and suspension orders in its constitutional jurisdiction in light of the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that suspension is a temporary measure that does not amount to a punishment, that the Deputy Commissioner acted as the competent authority, and that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to interfere with the intermediate stages of departmental proceedings relating to the terms and conditions of service. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked against interlocutory departmental orders or suspension passed under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, due to the constitutional bar of Article 212.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Deputy Commissioner is a competent authority to suspend a civil servant and initiate proceedings under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Does an order of suspension amount to a punishment under service laws?
  • Can the High Court interfere with intermediate stages of departmental proceedings and suspension orders in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 applies to constitutional petitions challenging interlocutory orders regarding terms and conditions of service?
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• Mian Syed Hussain & 11others vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 915 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-06Read full judgment →
• Mian Mushtaq Ahmed vs DGW & Ce (Army) GHQ2018 SHC 919 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-04Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad vs Mr. Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate2019 CLC 160, 2018 PHC 1715 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-09-03
  regular first appeallimitationcondonation of delayreturned memo of appealex-parte decreevoid decreedefamation
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal is directed against the ex-parte judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Peshawar, in a suit for recovery of damages for defamation and mental torture. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a fresh appeal filed instead of presenting the returned memo of appeal before the proper legal forum, the bar of limitation, and whether an ex-parte decree passed without cross-examination or issue-wise findings can be treated as a nullity or void. The Peshawar High Court held that filing a fresh appeal instead of the returned appeal, coupled with an unexplained delay of nearly three years without a proper application for condonation of delay, renders the appeal time-barred and not maintainable. The Court further held that a decree is only void if passed without jurisdiction as to subject-matter, pecuniary value, or territorial limits. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as time-barred and devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether filing a fresh appeal instead of presenting the returned appeal before the proper legal forum is maintainable without a formal application for condonation of delay?
  • When does an order or decree made by a court become void for lack of jurisdiction?
  • Does an ex-parte decree passed without cross-examination of witnesses render the judgment inherently void so that limitation does not run against it?
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• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State through Chairman, National2018 KLR Criminal Cases 154, 2018 P Cr. L J 521 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-04
  joinder of chargesconsolidation of referencesNational Accountability Ordinanceinterlocutory orderconstitutional petitioncorruption and corrupt practicesassets beyond known sources of income
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses petitions challenging the dismissal of applications for the consolidation of charges and references filed against the petitioner by the National Accountability Bureau under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions involved whether section 17(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 mandates the joint trial of offences of the same kind, whether an accused can claim joinder of charges as a matter of right, and whether constitutional petitions are maintainable against interlocutory orders in accountability matters. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the provisions regarding joinder of charges under section 17(d) are directory and enabling, rather than mandatory, vesting discretion in the trial court. The court established that an accused cannot demand joinder of charges as a vested right unless actual prejudice resulting in illegality is shown, and that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 should be exercised sparingly against interlocutory orders lacking patent illegality or jurisdictional defects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 17(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 makes joinder of charges mandatory or discretionary for the trial court?
  • Can an accused person claim the consolidation of multiple references or joinder of charges as a matter of right?
  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 is maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by an Accountability Court?
  • Does a separate trial of multiple references inherently prejudice the accused by disclosing the defence to common witnesses?
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• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State through Chairman, National2018 KLR Criminal Cases 154 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State through Chairman, National2019 PLD Islamabad 38, 2018 PLJ Islamabad 491, 2018 IHC 115 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-19Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs The State through Chairman, NAB and another2018 PLJ Islamabad 284, 2018 PLD Islamabad 148 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-08
  fair trialvideo link testimonyaccountability courtconstitutional petitionwitness examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves constitutional petitions filed by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others challenging an interlocutory order passed by the Accountability Court, which permitted the recording of statements of two foreign witnesses via video link in a corruption reference filed by the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal question addressed is whether recording prosecution witnesses through video link without allowing the presence of the accused's authorized counsel or representative at the witness location compromises the right to a fair trial. The Islamabad High Court held that to ensure a fair trial, the petitioners must be granted access to have an authorized attorney, counsel, or representative present as an observer at the Pakistan High Commission in London during the video-link testimony. The key principle laid down is that the fundamental right to a fair trial under criminal jurisprudence encompasses the right of the accused to have legal representation or an authorized representative present during the examination of witnesses, even when conducted remotely via video link.

  Questions settled

  • Whether recording witness statements through video link without the presence of the accused's counsel violates the right to a fair trial?
  • Can an accused person be permitted to have an authorized representative present during the recording of video-link witness testimony abroad?
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• Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs State through Chairman NAB and another2018 PLJ Islamabad 284 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Mehfooz and 2 others vs Mian Muhammad Sarfraz and 43 others2018 YLR 872 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2013-03-15
  perpetual injunctionco-sharerfirst appellate courtpoints for determinationconcurrent findingssecond appealmisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises out of a judgment of the High Court whereby the appellants' second appeal was dismissed, maintaining the concurrent findings of the lower courts in a suit for perpetual injunction regarding co-shared land. The core legal questions involved whether the First Appellate Court was legally bound to record issue-wise findings under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the High Court decided the appeal without affording a hearing. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the First Appellate Court is required to formulate points for determination rather than necessarily recording issue-wise findings, provided the pivotal questions in the case are resolved upon proper consideration of the record, and that the appellate courts had committed no misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence cannot be disturbed in second appeal, and that Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not strictly mandate issue-wise findings if the main points for determination are substantially addressed and decided.

  Questions settled

  • Is a First Appellate Court strictly required to record issue-wise findings under Order XLI, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by two courts below be disturbed in second appeal when based on proper appraisal of the record?
  • Does the failure of an appellate court to write issue-wise findings render its judgment a nullity in the eye of the law if the pivotal points for determination are resolved?
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• Mian Mehmood-Ur-Rasheed vs Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory2018 PLJ Lahore 223 · Lahore High Court · 2016-08-12Read full judgment →
• Mian Khan and 3 others vs The State and another2018 MLD 226 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-24
  criminal appealmurderocular evidencemedical evidencebenefit of doubtfalse implicationenmityacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment sentences awarded by the trial court under Sections 302(b), 324, 440, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from a murder and assault case. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven the appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the ocular evidence and alleged discrepancies. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, citing significant contradictions between the ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the time of occurrence and the duration between injury and death. Furthermore, the court found the conduct of the eye-witnesses unnatural and noted that the Investigating Officer’s findings cast doubt on the presence of the appellants at the scene. Emphasizing that enmity is a double-edged weapon that can lead to false implication, the court held that the prosecution failed to provide independent corroboration. Consequently, the court acquitted the appellants, setting aside the trial court's judgment and dismissing the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant discrepancy between the time of occurrence as stated by eye-witnesses and the time indicated by medical evidence entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the conduct of the eye-witnesses is found to be unnatural and inconsistent with the circumstances of the incident?
  • Is the prosecution's case weakened when the Investigating Officer's findings contradict the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime?
  • Does the existence of previous enmity between the parties necessitate independent corroboration of the prosecution's evidence to secure a conviction?
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• Mian Gul vs Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation and another2018 PSC 739, 2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 117 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-11-23
  back benefitssuperannuationservice terminationreinstatementupgradationsupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by a retired employee of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation seeking further back benefits and promotion up to grade PG-VII after having been reinstated into service pursuant to a 1991 labor tribunal order. The petitioner retired on superannuation in 2006 and subsequently engaged in multiple rounds of litigation before the High Court regarding the computation of his back benefits and upgradation. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to further arrears and grade advancements beyond those already granted and settled to his satisfaction in earlier proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any entitlement to grade PG-VII or further benefits, noting that a subsequent 2008 CBA agreement was inapplicable to him as he had already retired in 2006, and that he had previously expressed satisfaction with the compliance report and calculations submitted by the employer. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Is a retired employee entitled to the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement executed after the date of his superannuation?
  • Can a petitioner reopen settled claims regarding back benefits after expressing satisfaction with the employer's compliance report before the High Court?
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• Mian Ghulam Ijaz and others vs The State and others2018 PLD Lahore 151 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-24
  physical remandjudicial remandCode of Criminal Procedureinvestigationmagisterial discretioncriminal revisionpolice custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, which set aside a Magistrate's refusal to grant further physical remand to the petitioners. The core legal question concerns the criteria for granting physical remand under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and the extent of a Magistrate's judicial discretion in such matters. The Lahore High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge erred in reversing the Magistrate's order. The Court ruled that physical remand is a judicial function that cannot be granted mechanically upon the police's request. It emphasized that remand to police custody is an exception, requiring 'real necessity,' such as the recovery of incriminating property, rather than mere general investigation or the hope of obtaining confessions. The Court affirmed that when investigation is incomplete, the appropriate course is to remand the accused to judicial custody and compel the police to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, restoring the Magistrate's original refusal of further physical remand.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate grant physical remand of an accused person mechanically upon the request of the police?
  • Is the refusal of a Magistrate to grant further physical remand a judicial function subject to revision?
  • Under what circumstances is a remand to police custody justified under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the non-completion of an investigation automatically entitle the police to further physical remand of an accused?
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• Mian Dad vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 1003 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-28Read full judgment →
• Mian Ayaz Anwar etc vs State Bank of Pakistan etc2018 LHC 2873, 2019 CLD 375, 2019 PLD Lahore 310 · Lahore High Court · 2018-12-24Read full judgment →
• Mian Asia vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and 22018 PLJ Lahore 155, 2018 PLD Lahore 54 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Asia vs Federation of Pakistan etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 155 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Aziz vs Presiding Officer and 2 others2018 PLC 80 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2016-05-19
  Sindh Industrial Relations ActCollective Bargaining AgentCBA certificate cancellationimpleadment of partyOrder I Rule 10 CPCLabour Court jurisdictiongrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application was filed before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal challenging an order of the Sindh Labour Court No. 7, Sukkur, which refused to implead the applicant as a party in a grievance petition filed by respondent No. 2 seeking restoration of its cancelled Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) certificate. The primary legal questions involved whether the Labour Court possesses the power under Order I Rule 10 CPC to join necessary parties, and whether a Labour Court has jurisdiction under Section 43 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 to adjudicate the cancellation or restoration of a CBA certificate. The Tribunal held that under Section 46(2) of the Act read with Order I Rule 10 CPC, the Labour Court has full powers of a Civil Court to implead necessary parties. However, the underlying grievance application itself was non-maintainable because a trade union ceased to be a CBA upon cancellation, and the Act confers no jurisdiction on Labour Courts to grant, cancel, or restore CBA certificates. Consequently, the grievance application was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Labour Court have the power under Section 46(2) of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 read with Order I Rule 10 CPC to implead a necessary party in proceedings before it?
  • Can a trade union registered for one establishment be legally certified as a Collective Bargaining Agent for another establishment?
  • Does a Labour Court have statutory jurisdiction under Section 43 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 to entertain an application for the restoration of a cancelled CBA certificate?
  • Can an entity whose CBA certificate has been cancelled maintain an application under Section 43 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013 in the capacity of a Collective Bargaining Agent?
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