Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Mashooque Ali vs The State2018 YLR 1533 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 20 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, as well as section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and auxiliary terms. The core legal questions involve the legal effect of an inordinate three-day delay in lodging the First Information Report, the commencement of police investigation prior to formal FIR registration, the non-compliance with mandatory provisions regarding independent witnesses under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the omission to confront the accused with incriminating recovery during his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Federal Shariat Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant on the grounds that the prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, highlighting that investigative flaws, suppression of facts, and material discrepancies in ocular and medical evidence create a strong presumption of a concocted case.
Questions settled- What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when an investigation into a cognizable offense is initiated prior to the formal registration of the FIR?
- Does an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR vitiate the trial and create a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused?
- Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to associate independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality as mashirs for searches and recoveries in violation of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What is the consequence under criminal jurisprudence of omitting to confront the accused with the alleged recovery of a crime weapon during his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Masaud vs The State etc2018 PHC 1447 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
- Masaud vs The State and another2018 PHC 1447, 2018 YLR 1798 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner Masaud seeking bail in case FIR No. 01 dated 01.01.2017 registered under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and Sections 458, 459, 460, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given his delayed nomination, inconsistencies in statements, lack of recovery, and completed investigation. The Peshawar High Court held that since the petitioner was not named in the FIR, was subsequently nominated with discrepancies regarding the number of culprits, no recovery was made from him despite police custody, and investigation was complete, he had made out a case for bail. The Court laid down the principle that mere abscondence is not sufficient ground to decline bail if the case of the accused is otherwise on merits found fit for the concession of bail.
Questions settled- Whether mere abscondence is a sufficient ground to decline bail if the case of an accused is otherwise found fit for bail on merits?
- Does the absence of the petitioner's name in the initial FIR and subsequent inconsistent nominations entitle him to post-arrest bail?
- Is an accused entitled to bail when the investigation is complete, no recovery has been made from his possession, and his further incarceration serves no useful purpose?
- Maryam Noor and another vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1429 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, seeking the quashment of FIR No. 17/2018 registered under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Ramna. The petitioner, the former wife of the complainant, alleged that the FIR was lodged with mala fide intent to harass her and gain leverage in pending family court litigation regarding the custody of their minor children and the dissolution of marriage. The core legal question was whether the criminal proceedings constituted an abuse of the process of law, given the underlying civil nature of the dispute. The Court held that the FIR was tainted with mala fide and represented a colourable exercise of authority, as the allegations lacked criminal intent and the dispute was essentially a family matter. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR, establishing the principle that constitutional courts must intervene to protect citizens from malicious prosecution and the abuse of criminal machinery to settle civil or family disputes.
Questions settled- Can a High Court quash an FIR if the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil or family nature?
- Does the registration of an FIR to settle family disputes constitute an abuse of the process of law?
- Under what circumstances can a High Court exercise its discretion to quash criminal proceedings?
- Marie-Eve Magoon and another vs Her Majesty the Queen2018 SCMR 1284 · Supreme Court of CanadaRead full judgment →
- Maqsood Pervaiz CH vs Mst. Nausheen Chaudhary, Etc2019 PLD Lahore 102, 2018 LHC 2696 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
- Maqbool Hussain, Excise Constable (dismissed) vs Commissioner Inland2019 PLC (C.S.) 512, 2018 P.S.C. 1663 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-06-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the judgment of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Council Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal on the grounds of non-maintainability. The appellant, a dismissed Excise Constable, had filed a direct appeal to the Service Tribunal without first exhausting the mandatory departmental remedy. The core legal question was whether, under the Council Service Tribunals Act, 1973, a civil servant is required to file a departmental appeal before approaching the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the appeal was rightly dismissed by the Service Tribunal. The Court affirmed that Section 4(1)(a) of the Council Service Tribunals Act, 1973, creates a mandatory condition precedent requiring an aggrieved civil servant to exhaust departmental remedies—such as filing an appeal, review, or representation—and wait for a period of ninety days before approaching the Tribunal. The Court distinguished this from the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act, 1975, where such exhaustion is not mandatory, and concluded that the appellant's failure to comply with this statutory requirement rendered the direct appeal incompetent.
Questions settled- Is it mandatory for a civil servant governed by the Council Service Tribunals Act, 1973, to exhaust departmental remedies before filing an appeal to the Service Tribunal?
- Does the Council Service Tribunals Act, 1973, impose a different requirement regarding the exhaustion of departmental remedies compared to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act, 1975?
- Can a direct appeal to the Service Tribunal be maintained if the mandatory ninety-day waiting period following a departmental representation has not been observed?
- Maqbool Hussain Constable vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 91 · Federal Service TribunalRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, an Excise Constable, challenged an order of dismissal from service before the Federal Service Tribunal without first filing a departmental appeal before the appellate authority. The core legal question was whether an appeal directly to the Service Tribunal is maintainable without exhausting the remedy of departmental appeal or representation. The Tribunal held that filing a departmental appeal is a mandatory prerequisite under the law before approaching the Tribunal, and bypassing the departmental hierarchy renders the appeal non-maintainable. The key principle laid down is that the Service Tribunals Act requires strict adherence to the exhaustion of departmental remedies, and negative statutory phrasing regarding appeals makes this requirement mandatory, precluding direct invocation of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal directly to the Service Tribunal is maintainable without filing a departmental appeal?
- Does the requirement of exhausting departmental remedies before approaching the Service Tribunal constitute a mandatory condition?
- What constitutes a departmental authority for the purpose of filing an appeal under the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
- Maqbool Hussain Awan vs Zain Malik2019 PLJ Lahore 270, 2019 YLR 123, 2018 LHC 3108 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-28Read full judgment →
- Maqbool Associates, etc. vs Lahore Development Authority, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 898 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-07Read full judgment →
- Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. vs Environmental Protection Agency, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 448 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. Sughran Bibi vs The State2018 SCP 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition seeking the registration of a separate First Information Report (FIR) for a different version of an incident where an FIR had already been registered. The core legal question was whether multiple FIRs can be registered for different versions of the same incident. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the law does not permit the registration of multiple FIRs for the same occurrence. The Court clarified that upon the registration of an FIR, a "case" is created, and all subsequent information regarding the same incident, regardless of the source or version, must be recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The investigating officer is duty-bound to investigate the case from all angles to discover the truth, rather than being restricted to the initial FIR's narrative. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that arrest is not a mandatory consequence of FIR registration but must be based on sufficient evidence. The judgment establishes that the investigation process is not driven by the initial FIR but by the pursuit of actual facts.
Questions settled- Can a separate FIR be registered for every new version of the same incident?
- Is an investigating officer bound by the version of the incident narrated in the initial FIR?
- How should an investigating officer record a new version of an incident after an FIR has already been registered?
- Is the arrest of an accused mandatory immediately upon the registration of an FIR?
- Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. vs Environmental Protection Agency2018 PLD Lahore 255 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
- Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd vs Environmental Protection Agency2018 PLD Lahore 255, 2018 CLD 153 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner challenged an order by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stopping the construction of a cement plant expansion on the grounds that the petitioner lacked written environmental approval. The core legal question was the scope and effect of the 'deemed approval' provision under Section 12(4) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997 when the Agency fails to communicate a decision within the statutory four-month period. The Court held that the deeming provision is mandatory; failure by the Agency to meet the statutory timeline results in a deemed approval of the Environmental Impact Assessment. Consequently, the Agency cannot stop a project solely because written approval was not issued. The Court emphasized the principle of sustainable development and the precautionary principle. While the EIA was deemed approved, the Court applied the principle of In Dubio Pro Natura, directing the petitioner to maintain status quo pending a survey report regarding mining concessions in the Salt Range, effectively balancing economic development with environmental protection by ensuring that deemed approval does not override necessary environmental safeguards in uncertain circumstances.
Questions settled- Does the failure of the Environmental Protection Agency to communicate a decision on an Environmental Impact Assessment within the statutory four-month period result in a deemed approval of the project?
- Can the Environmental Protection Agency stop a project solely on the ground that no written environmental approval was granted after the statutory period for review has expired?
- What is the scope of the 'deemed approval' provision under Section 12(4) of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997?
- Does the principle of 'In Dubio Pro Natura' allow a court to impose a status quo order on a project that has otherwise received deemed approval under the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act 1997?
- Manzoor Muhammad & others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 1139 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a contempt application filed under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, alleging willful disobedience of a Sindh High Court order dated 03.05.2010. The core legal question concerns whether the respondents, representing the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) and Port Security Force (PSF), fully complied with directions to regularize the petitioners' services and pay consequential monetary benefits. The court held that while the petitioners' services were regularized, the respondents failed to tender the required consequential monetary benefits, rejecting the defense that PSF personnel are governed differently from regular KPT workers. The court laid down the principle that once a judicial direction mandates regularization alongside consequential financial benefits, partial compliance or unjustified withholding of remuneration increments does not purge contempt, thereby warranting the issuance of show-cause notices for willful defiance.
Questions settled- Can the scope of a contempt proceeding be enlarged to re-argue the merits of the original case?
- Whether failure to pay consequential monetary benefits following the regularization of service constitutes willful disobedience of a court order?
- Are personnel of the Port Security Force entitled to KPT pay scales and associated financial benefits equivalent to regular KPT employees?
- Manzoor Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 596, 2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 40, 2018 IHC 38 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-22Read full judgment →
- Manzoor Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan and 4 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1224 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, an employee of Islamabad Electric Supply Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("IESCO"), filed a writ petition challenging the withdrawal of his promotion as Chief Engineer (BPS-20) by Pakistan Electric Power Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("PEPCO"), the rejection of his departmental appeal, and his transfer/assignment to Quetta Electric Supply Company (Pvt.) Ltd. ("QESCO"). The core legal question was whether a constitutional writ petition is maintainable against corporate entities like PEPCO and IESCO by their employees for grievances regarding terms and conditions of service in the absence of statutory rules. The Islamabad High Court held that since IESCO and PEPCO do not possess statutory service rules and are incorporated under company law, the relationship between the company and its employee is strictly governed by the principle of "master and servant." Consequently, a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable for individual service grievances in the absence of a violation of statutory rules. The key principle laid down is that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked by employees of government-owned companies for service matters unless the employer's adverse action violates express statutory provisions or statutory rules.
Questions settled- Is a constitutional petition under Article 199 maintainable against corporate entities like IESCO and PEPCO regarding employment disputes?
- Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of public sector companies that lack statutory service rules?
- Can an employee invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the absence of a violation of statutory rules or laws?
- Manzoor Ahmed Shahzad vs Muhammad Shakir Shan and others2019 MLD 1244, 2018 SHC 886 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a suit for the cancellation of a sale agreement for immovable property, wherein the defendants filed a written statement incorporating a counter-claim for specific performance. The plaintiff sought to strike out the issue regarding specific performance, contending that under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, counter-claims are restricted to money suits under Order VIII Rule 6. The Court examined whether such a counter-claim is maintainable. The Court held that while Order VIII Rule 6 CPC is limited to money claims, the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side) provide a broader framework. Specifically, Rule 162 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) expressly permits a defendant to set up a counter-claim against the plaintiff's claims, regardless of whether it sounds in damages or involves money. The Court affirmed that these rules prevail over the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the Original Side. Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's application to strike out the issue, ruling that the counter-claim was maintainable and could be treated as a cross-suit.
Questions settled- Does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 limit counter-claims exclusively to money suits?
- Can a court treat a counter-claim as a plaint in a cross-suit if it does not strictly fall under Order VIII Rule 6 CPC?
- Do the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side) prevail over the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the filing of counter-claims?
- Is a counter-claim for specific performance maintainable under the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Original Side)?
- Manzoor Ahmed alias Mavia alias Usama alias Habibullah vs The State2018 MLD 1512 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regarding the alleged recovery of hand grenades. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved the recovery beyond reasonable doubt given the contradictions in police testimony and the absence of private witnesses. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant, noting significant discrepancies in the recovery process, the failure to involve the Bomb Disposal Unit at the time of recovery, and the lack of investigation into the origin of the explosives. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reaffirms the principle that if a single circumstance creates a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind, the benefit must be extended to the accused as a matter of right. Furthermore, it cautions against the indiscriminate use of Anti-Terrorism Courts for ordinary criminal offences, emphasizing that such practices violate the constitutional rights of citizens and undermine the efficacy of the judicial system.
Questions settled- Does the failure to associate private witnesses during a recovery operation create reasonable doubt in a criminal case?
- Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a legal right for an accused when prosecution evidence is tainted?
- Can ordinary criminal offences be prosecuted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 without evidence of terrorist intent?
- Does the failure to call a Bomb Disposal Unit at the time of recovering alleged explosives undermine the prosecution's case?
- Manzar Ullah vs Asghar and 3 others2018 YLR 1508 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This common judgment disposes of three criminal appeals filed against the acquittal of the respondents for the offence of dacoity with murder under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular testimony, the evidentiary value of an identification parade where no initial description or specific role was attributed, the legal compliance and credibility of retracted judicial confessions, and whether an appeal against acquittal can be heard in the absence of absconding respondents. The Federal Shariat Court held that an appellate court has the authority to decide an appeal against acquittal in the absence of a fugitive respondent who loses the right of audience. However, upon reappraising the evidence, the Court found the eyewitness testimony doubtful, the identification parade worthless due to contradictions and lack of initial description, the judicial confessions flawed and un-corroborated, and the recoveries inconsequential. The Court laid down that failure to provide a physical description and specific roles in the FIR renders a subsequent identification parade devoid of legal sanctity, and that an exculpatory or legally non-compliant judicial confession cannot form the basis of a conviction.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court hear and determine a criminal appeal against acquittal in the absence of absconding respondents who refuse to surrender?
- Does the identification of an accused at a subsequent identification parade hold legal value when the initial FIR fails to provide a physical description or attribute a specific role to the accused?
- Can a retracted and legally non-compliant judicial confession be relied upon to convict an accused without strong independent corroboration?
- What is the evidentiary value of a weapon recovery and positive FSL report when the recovered weapon is attributed to an accused who was not alleged to have fired it?
- Mansoor-ul-Haq Solangi vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 SHC 591 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
- Mangat Hussain Butt vs The State2018 YLR 2018, 2018 SHC 445 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, to two years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine, while placing him on probation. The core legal questions involve the sustainability of the conviction based on the evidence and whether the trial court correctly extended the benefit of probation. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and minor contradictions in the evidence did not vitiate the conviction. However, the High Court held that the order granting probation was illegal and contrary to the record, as the appellant had multiple prior criminal involvements, was not a youth as observed, and the offense carried a punishment exceeding the threshold required for probation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were maintained, but the probation order was set aside.
Questions settled- Whether minor contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to set aside a conviction for possession of an illicit weapon?
- Can an order of probation be sustained when the trial court's findings regarding the offender's age and character are contrary to the record?
- Whether the provisions of Section 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 apply to an offense punishable with imprisonment exceeding seven years?
- Is the appellate court empowered to set aside an illegal probation order and direct the convict to serve the substantive sentence?
- Malook and 5 others vs The State2018 MLD 1621 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-16Read full judgment →
- Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives vs State of Karnataka & Ors2018 SCInd 125 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal concerns the interpretation of the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, which grants victims a right to appeal against acquittals. The core legal questions were whether this right applies to cases where the offence occurred before the provision's commencement (31 December 2009) but the acquittal was passed after, and whether such an appeal requires leave of the court. The Supreme Court held that the right to appeal is a substantive right that accrues on the date of the judgment of acquittal. Consequently, if the acquittal is post-31 December 2009, the victim has a right to appeal regardless of the offence date. The majority held that the victim's right to appeal under Section 372 is an independent statutory right and does not require leave under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The Court emphasized that the proviso must be interpreted in a liberal, progressive, and beneficial manner to empower victims, aligning with international principles of victimology and access to justice.
Questions settled- Does a victim have a right to appeal against an acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 if the offence occurred before 31 December 2009 but the acquittal was passed after that date?
- Is a victim required to obtain leave to appeal under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 when filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 372?
- Does the right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 accrue on the date of the offence or the date of the judgment of acquittal?
- Mall Nigran Welfare Association vs Government of Sindh and others2018 YLR 848, 2018 SHC 405 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The plaintiff, a welfare association representing members who worked as Mal Nigran at the old wholesale vegetable market, filed a civil suit for declaration, permanent injunction, and specific performance, seeking allotment of plots and execution of leases in the new vegetable market. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff association was legally competent to maintain the suit and entitled to the reliefs claimed regarding unidentified properties and contracts. The Sindh High Court held that the suit was not maintainable, as the plaintiff failed to establish proper authorization under section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, failed to comply with annual filing requirements under section 4, and included objects inconsistent with section 20. Furthermore, the court held that individual proprietary rights could not be agitated by a welfare association for unidentified members regarding unspecified properties and prices, and no entitlement was proven on merits. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a registered society can maintain a suit without proper authorization by its governing body for the specific occasion under Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860?
- Does a welfare association have the legal capacity to agitate strictly personal and individual proprietary rights of its members in immovable property?
- Whether a civil court can grant a decree of specific performance in favor of unidentified plaintiffs in respect of unidentified immovable property for an unidentified price?
- What are the consequences of an association's failure to comply with mandatory annual filing requirements under Section 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860?
- Malik Zahoor Ul Hassan vs Appellate Tribunal, Multan and 2 others2018 MLD 1618 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-12Read full judgment →
- Malik Zaheer Arshad vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PLD Lahore 19 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-29Read full judgment →
- Malik Wali Muhammad, etc. vs Ac/SDM and Collector Saddar Sub-Division,2018 [M] C.L.R. 27 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
- Malik Tariq Ayub and another vs The State and 5 others2018 P Cr. L J 1719 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by an Anti-Terrorism Court deleting Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 from the challan and transferring the case to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether the alleged offence, involving a high-profile daylight or late-night shooting using automatic weapons on a thoroughfare causing widespread panic, fell within the definition of 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and whether previous personal enmity excludes the application of anti-terrorism laws. The Islamabad High Court held that the trial court committed an error of law by failing to properly appreciate binding precedents of the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the broader scope of 'design' and the psychological impact of crimes on public safety. The High Court ruled that the question of jurisdiction and applicability of anti-terrorism provisions cannot be determined solely on police investigation records without recording material prosecution evidence. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to decide the matter after recording evidence within sixty days.
Questions settled- Whether previous personal enmity between parties excludes the application of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
- Can an Anti-Terrorism Court decide an application for the deletion of anti-terrorism charges solely on the basis of police reports and investigation records without recording material prosecution evidence?
- What constitutes a 'design' to create fear, panic, or a sense of insecurity under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
- Does a judgment rendered by a larger bench of the Supreme Court prevail over a contrary view taken by a smaller bench?
- Malik Taj Ahmad vs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Member of Provincial2018 PLD Lahore 723 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
- Malik Taj Ahmad vs Malik Muhammad Nawaz, Member of Provincial2018 PLD Lahore 723, 2018 LHC 1367 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-28Read full judgment →
- Malik Sher Muhammad and another vs Malik Khair Muhammad and 42018 YLR 110 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-01-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of private respondents by a Judicial Magistrate regarding charges under Section 337-AD/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The central legal question was whether the trial court erred in its assessment of evidence, thereby warranting interference by the High Court. Upon review, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding the prosecution's case riddled with contradictions and dishonest improvements by witnesses. Specifically, the Court noted that the recovery of the alleged weapon was inadmissible due to failure to seal it at the crime scene, and the prosecution failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that an acquittal order carries a double presumption of innocence, and appellate courts must not interfere unless the judgment is perverse, arbitrary, or based on a gross misreading of evidence. It reaffirmed that the burden of proof lies strictly with the prosecution, and any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right, not grace.
Questions settled- Does an order of acquittal carry a double presumption of innocence that limits the scope of appellate interference?
- Is the failure to seal a recovered weapon at the place of incident fatal to the prosecution's case?
- What is the standard of proof required to overturn an acquittal in a criminal appeal?
- Does the benefit of doubt in a criminal case accrue to the accused as a matter of right?
- Malik Shakeel Awan vs Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and 21 others2018 SCP 1232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal under Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 arises from the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Rawalpindi, dismissing the appellant's election petition challenging the election of the returned candidate (Respondent No.1) to the National Assembly. The core legal questions concerned whether the respondent's alleged discrepancies and omissions in disclosing agricultural land holdings and the value of a residential property in his nomination papers constituted material misdeclarations or concealments attracting disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 99(1)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, and whether divergent judicial precedents regarding strict liability and asset disclosures required resolution by a full court. By a majority of two to one, the appeal was dismissed, the court holding that the discrepancies in land measurements resulted from an obvious miscalculation in the printed forms while the details were otherwise provided, and that no material concealment or misstatement regarding property value or income had been established on the evidence. The leading opinion by Sh. Azmat Saeed, J., emphasized that unintentional errors or discrepancies unaccompanied by a clear breach of a legal obligation or absence of a tenable explanation do not warrant disqualification.
Questions settled- Does every nondisclosure or misdeclaration in the nomination form result in the disqualification of a candidate or only those whereby one has circumvented some inherent legal disability to participate in an election?
- If a petition does not disclose the particular facts on the basis of which disqualification is sought, can these be considered when subsequently disclosed in the affidavit-in-evidence of the petitioner or discovered during the hearing?
- Does Article 225 of the Constitution exclude the application of Article 184(3) of the Constitution to election disputes?
- Does the court of law mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution include the Supreme Court when exercising jurisdiction under Article 184(3)?
- If a candidate is disqualified on account of nondisclosure or misdeclaration, does such disqualification subsist only till the next elections or is it permanent?
- Malik Sajjad vs Shafqat Zaman and others2018 IHC 127 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a civil revision petition challenging the dismissal of his appeal against the Executing Court's order, which had rejected his objections to an execution petition seeking enforcement of a rent eviction order. The core legal question was whether an appeal is maintainable under the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed by a Rent Controller during execution proceedings under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001. The Islamabad High Court held that while the procedural provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to execution proceedings before a Rent Controller, a Rent Controller acts as a persona designata and does not become a Civil Court. Consequently, substantive rights of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 do not automatically extend to such execution orders unless expressly provided. The petition was dismissed with costs, holding that the appeal before the lower appellate forum was rightly declared non-maintainable and that re-agitating settled pleas constituted an abuse of the court process.
Questions settled- Whether an appeal is maintainable under the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed by a Rent Controller during the execution of an eviction order?
- Does a Rent Controller function as a Civil Court while executing an eviction order under the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001?
- Are the substantive rights of appeal provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 automatically applicable to execution proceedings conducted by a Rent Controller?
- Malik Rizwan Shaukat vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 39 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal petition was filed under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner, who was accused of criminal breach of trust under Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly misappropriating Rs. 20 Lacs from his employer. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence, the significant delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the evidentiary status of the case. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court observed that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court noted a four-year delay in reporting the incident, which cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations, and emphasized that the prosecution's case relied on documentary evidence already collected by the investigating officer. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing that where an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause and the prosecution's case is primarily documentary, continued incarceration serves no useful purpose.
Questions settled- Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail if the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's allegations?
- Should bail be granted when the prosecution's case relies entirely on documentary evidence already in the possession of the investigating officer?
- Malik Riazullah vs Mst. Dilnasheen and others2018 CLC 1569 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-08-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision under Section 115 C.P.C. challenged a trial court's order dismissing an application to 'de-exhibit' documents produced by the plaintiff's witness during examination-in-chief. The dispute concerned inheritance rights where the plaintiff produced public and certified judicial documents not initially appended to the plaint or listed under Order VII, Rule 14 C.P.C. The High Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains no provision for 'de-exhibiting' or physically removing documents once received into evidence and marked as exhibits. The court clarified that Order XIII, Rule 2 C.P.C. gives trial courts discretion to receive documents after the first hearing upon showing good cause, especially where public or certified documents are concerned and no prejudice is caused. Merely marking a document as an exhibit does not conclusively prove its contents, genuineness, or admissibility, which remain open to challenge during trial. Additionally, orders admitting or refusing evidence do not constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 C.P.C., making the revision non-maintainable.
Questions settled- Does the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contain any provision allowing a trial court to de-exhibit or remove documents once they have been received in evidence and marked as exhibits?
- Does the mere marking of a document as an exhibit in trial proceedings establish its evidentiary value, genuineness, or admissibility?
- Can a trial court admit documents into evidence after the first hearing under Order XIII, Rule 2 C.P.C. without a formal application if good cause is shown?
- Does an order admitting or refusing to admit documentary evidence constitute a 'case decided' under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of revision?
- Malik Riaz Ullah vs Mst. Dilnasheen, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 1711 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
- Malik Rab Nawaz (deceased) through L.Rs vs Mst. Saban2019 MLD 1, 2019 PLJ Lahore 468, 2018 LHC 3072 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-24Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Shahid and another vs Election Tribunal, Gujranwala2018 CLC 415 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-06Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Saeed Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 42 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a criminal revision petition before the Lahore High Court challenging his conviction and sentence under Section 6(a) of the Punjab Essential Articles (Control) Act, 1973, following his confessional statement before the trial magistrate and the subsequent dismissal of his appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge. During the hearing, the petitioner's counsel did not challenge the conviction on merits but instead prayed for a reduction of the sentence to the period already undergone, noting the petitioner's status as a first-time offender and sole breadwinner, to which the Additional Prosecutor General expressed no serious objection. The core legal question concerned the appropriate quantum of sentence for a first-time offender who confessed. The Court held that while the conviction must be maintained, the sentence of imprisonment should be reduced to the period already undergone in the interest of justice, while upholding the fine. The key principle laid down is that courts may exercise discretion to reduce a sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone in light of mitigating circumstances such as a lack of previous criminal record.
Questions settled- Can the sentence of imprisonment be reduced to the period already undergone when the conviction itself is not challenged on merits?
- Whether the appellate or revisional court can modify a sentence based on the lack of previous criminal record of the convict?
- Malik Muhammad Ramzan Sabir vs Mst. Shahina Akhtar and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-04Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Ramzan Sabir vs Mst. Shahina Akhtar and 2 others2018 YLR 703, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 99 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Ijaz vs Pakistan through Secretary Defense Islamabad2018 PLJ Lahore 782 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Ijaz vs Pakistan through Secretary Defense Islamabad2018 CLC 1445, 2018 KLR Revenue Cases 1, 2018 KLR Revenue Cases 36, 2018 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-18Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Ijaz vs Pakistan through Secretary Defense Islamabad2018 CLC 1445 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-18Read full judgment →
- Malik Muhammad Ijaz vs Pakistan through Secretary Defence, Islamabad, etc2018 KLR Revenue Cases 1 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Malik Mohammad Riaz and another vs Mrs. Farhat Imrana and another2018 MLD 32 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-12Read full judgment →
- Malik Mehmod Nawaz vs Ccpo, Lahore etc.2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 147 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, initially appointed as a Cook, challenged the withdrawal of his subsequent appointment as a Driver Constable by the CCPO, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the department could lawfully rescind the appointment order under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, by relying on Supreme Court judgments concerning out-of-turn promotions and the transfer of non-cadre officers. The Tribunal held that the impugned withdrawal order was unsustainable, as the cited Supreme Court precedents were distinguishable and inapplicable to the appellant’s case, which involved a fresh appointment rather than an out-of-turn promotion or deputation. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the withdrawal order and restored the appellant to the rank of Driver Constable. The key principle established is that administrative authorities cannot invoke Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to rescind an appointment order by misapplying judicial precedents that address fundamentally different legal scenarios, such as out-of-turn promotions or the transfer of non-cadre officers, when the facts of the case do not align with the ratio of those precedents.
Questions settled- Can an administrative authority invoke Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897 to rescind an appointment order based on misapplied judicial precedents?
- Is the appointment of a police official as a Driver Constable equivalent to an out-of-turn promotion or a deputation of a non-cadre officer?
- Does the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Ali Azhar Khan Baloch apply to cases of fresh appointment to a new cadre?
- Malik Khan Muhammad Tareen vs M/s Nasir & Brother Coal Company thr.2019 KLR Supreme Court 19, 2019 PLJ SC 190, 2018 SCMR 2121, 2018 SCP 1318 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside orders returning a plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether a civil suit regarding a mining lease, situated outside the court's territorial limits, could proceed in Quetta, and whether the defendant had waived the right to challenge jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that mining leases constitute rights and interests in minerals, which are classified as moveable property, distinct from immovable property. Consequently, the suit was not restricted by the location of the lease under Section 16(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an objection to territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity before the trial court, and the objector must demonstrate a consequent failure of justice. Since the petitioner failed to raise the objection promptly and could not prove any prejudice or failure of justice, the objection was deemed waived. The petition was dismissed.
Questions settled- Are mining leases considered immovable property for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction of a civil court?
- What are the three mandatory conditions under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for an appellate court to entertain an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction?
- Can an objection to territorial jurisdiction be waived if not raised at the earliest possible opportunity?
- Does the location of a mining lease automatically dictate the territorial jurisdiction of a civil suit involving rights to that lease?
- Malik Khan Muhammad Tareen vs Messrs Nasir and Brother Coal2019 KLR Supreme Court 19, 2018 SCMR 2121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil petition challenges a High Court judgment regarding the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court in Quetta over a dispute involving a mining lease situated in Duki. The core legal question was whether the suit, concerning mining rights, was subject to the venue rules for immovable property and whether the defendant’s jurisdictional objection was validly raised under Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that mining leases are classified as moveable property, not immovable property, and thus the suit was properly instituted where the cause of action arose. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendant failed to raise the jurisdictional objection at the earliest possible opportunity, having instead engaged in protracted litigation in higher forums. The key principle laid down is that under Section 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, objections to territorial jurisdiction are waived unless raised at the earliest opportunity in the court of first instance, and the party must demonstrate that the court's exercise of jurisdiction resulted in a consequent failure of justice.
Questions settled- Are mining leases considered immovable property for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- What are the three conditions that must co-exist for an appellate or revisional court to consider an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Does the failure to raise an objection to territorial jurisdiction at the earliest possible opportunity constitute a waiver of that objection?
- Can a party successfully challenge the territorial jurisdiction of a trial court if they cannot demonstrate that a failure of justice has occurred?
- Malik Farzand Ali and another vs Asad Ali and others2018 PLD Lahore 46 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This election appeal challenged the dismissal of an election petition by the Election Tribunal, which had upheld the election of respondents as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of a Union Council. The appellants alleged that the respondents failed to correctly declare their assets in their nomination papers, thereby rendering their election invalid. The core legal question was whether the failure to declare assets in nomination papers constitutes a ground for disqualification under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013. The Court found that the respondents had provided evidence of a prior sale of the disputed property to family members, which was not rebutted. Furthermore, the Court held that the requirement to append a statement of assets and liabilities under the Punjab Local Government (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 is directory rather than mandatory. It concluded that the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 does not provide for the disqualification of a candidate solely for the incorrect declaration of assets. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that such an omission does not invalidate nomination papers or disqualify a candidate.
Questions settled- Does the failure to correctly declare assets in nomination papers constitute a ground for disqualification under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
- Is the requirement to append a statement of assets and liabilities under Rule 12(5) of the Punjab Local Government (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 mandatory or directory?
- Does the incorrect mentioning of assets and liabilities in nomination papers render a candidate's nomination invalid under the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013?
- Malik Board and Paper Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Tariq Saeed and others2018 MLD 1253 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-06Read full judgment →
- Malik Board and Paper Industries (Pvt.) Ltd vs Tariq Saeed, etc2018 MLD 1253, 2018 LHC 467 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-06Read full judgment →
- Malik Bashir Ahmad and 4 others vs Federal Government of Pakistan2018 PLD Islamabad 68 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioners challenged the acquisition of their land in Sectors F-14 and F-15, Islamabad, initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation. The core legal questions concerned whether the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 governs land acquisition in Islamabad, and whether the proposed housing scheme constituted a valid "public purpose." The Court held that the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 is a special, self-contained statute that prevails over the general Land Acquisition Act 1894 within the Islamabad Capital Territory. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings were declared illegal and void. The Court ruled that the scheme failed the "public purpose" test, as it involved the non-transparent distribution of state land as "largess" to specific groups, which constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. The judgment established that state assets must be disposed of through transparent mechanisms, such as public auction, and that executive authorities cannot distribute state property to privileged classes without express legislative authorization, as such actions violate fundamental rights and the principle of equality.
Questions settled- Does the Capital Development Authority Ordinance 1960 prevail over the Land Acquisition Act 1894 regarding land acquisition in the Islamabad Capital Territory?
- Can the acquisition of land for the distribution of plots to specific groups of government employees and professionals be classified as a "public purpose"?
- Are executive authorities empowered to dispose of state-owned land in a non-transparent manner without express legislative authorization?
- Does the distribution of state land as "largess" to specific categories of beneficiaries violate the fundamental rights of the public?
- Malik Arif vs The State2018 MLD 1613, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 216 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant for murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, following a shooting incident that resulted in one death and injuries to another. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular and medical evidence, the corroborative value of an injured witness, and whether the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting reduction of the death sentence. The Lahore High Court held that the ocular account was consistent, credible, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, thus sustaining the conviction. However, the Court held that the prosecution's failure to satisfactorily establish the alleged motive acts as a mitigating circumstance. The Court laid down the principle that while failure to prove motive does not negate the conviction where ocular and medical evidence is reliable, it serves as a mitigating factor justifying the substitution of the death penalty with imprisonment for life.
Questions settled- Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove the motive set up in a murder case constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life?
- Does the testimony of an injured witness provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder and hurt?
- Whether inconsistencies in establishing the precise background and origin of a chance encounter cast doubt on the core ocular testimony?
- Malik and another vs The State2018 YLR 738 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-16Read full judgment →
- Malik Ameer Haider Sangha and another vs Mrs. Sumaira Malik, etc.2018 PLJ SC 743, 2018 SCMR 1166, 2018 SCP 1205 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing a re-poll for the offices of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the District Council, Khushab. The core legal question was whether the ECP possesses the jurisdiction and power to order a re-poll before the official notification of election results, particularly when the secrecy of the ballot has been compromised. The Supreme Court held that the ECP, as a constitutional body mandated under Article 218(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to ensure elections are conducted honestly, justly, and fairly, possesses the inherent and implied power to order a re-poll to maintain the integrity of the electoral process. The Court affirmed that this power exists prior to the issuance of the official notification of returned candidates. The key principle laid down is that the ECP is not helpless in the face of electoral malpractice and can exercise its broad constitutional and statutory authority to ensure the sanctity of the secret ballot, regardless of whether specific enabling provisions exist in local government legislation.
Questions settled- Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction to order a re-poll before the official notification of election results?
- Is the Election Commission of Pakistan empowered to order a re-poll if the secrecy of the ballot is compromised?
- Can the Election Commission of Pakistan exercise its powers to ensure fair elections even in the absence of specific statutory provisions for re-polling in local government laws?
- Malik Ameer Haider Sangha and another vs Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others2018 SCMR 1166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the election of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of District Council, Khushab, where respondents Nos. 1 and 2 won by a single vote. The Presiding Officer and a candidate lodged written complaints regarding the violation of ballot secrecy. Consequently, the Election Commission of Pakistan set aside the election and ordered a re-poll. Respondents challenged this order in the Islamabad High Court, which allowed the writ petition, holding that the Election Commission lacked jurisdiction to order a re-poll and that the matter could only be resolved by an Election Tribunal via an election petition. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the Election Commission possesses the power to order a re-poll before notifying election results. The Supreme Court held that the Election Commission, being constitutionally mandated to ensure elections are conducted honestly, justly, and fairly, retains wide powers under the Constitution and applicable local government laws to order a re-poll prior to the official notification of returned candidates when ballot secrecy is compromised. The Court established that such powers are not contingent on explicit statutory provisions mirroring Section 103AA of the Representation of the People Act 1976 and that the intervention was justified given the established breach of secrecy.
Questions settled- Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction and power to order a re-poll before issuing the official notification of returned candidates?
- Whether the requirement of a secret ballot under Article 226 of the Constitution applies to local government elections?
- Can the Election Commission order a re-poll under its general constitutional and statutory powers in the absence of a specific provision similar to Section 103AA of the Representation of the People Act 1976?
- Is a dispute regarding the violation of ballot secrecy required to be adjudicated solely through an election petition before an Election Tribunal once polls have been closed?
- Malik Abdul Rauf vs Saboor Ahmad and 3 others2018 LHC 206, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 201 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
- Malik Abdul Rauf vs Saboor Ahmad & 3 others2018 LHC 206 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
- Malik Aamir Sultan and two others vs The State and another2018 MLD 1635, 2018 PHC 1495 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302(b) and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a murder trial. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt through the ocular testimony provided. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed and doubtful. The court observed that the eyewitnesses' presence at the scene was highly improbable, noting that they remained unhurt despite being in close proximity to the assailants during the firing, and that physical evidence, such as blood in the transport vehicle or utensils, was absent. Furthermore, the court found that the number of accused had been exaggerated to implicate parties due to enmity. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellants, granting them the benefit of the doubt. The judgment reinforces the principle that in criminal cases, any doubt regarding the prosecution's narrative must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.
Questions settled- Does the unhurt escape of eyewitnesses during a fatal attack cast doubt on their presence at the scene?
- Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the presence of eyewitnesses at the place of occurrence?
- Is the testimony of eyewitnesses reliable when the medical evidence and site plan contradict their account?
- Should the benefit of the doubt be extended to the accused when the prosecution case is riddled with material contradictions?
- Malik Aamir Sultan and 2 others vs The State and another2018 MLD 1635 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellants under sections 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside a revision petition for sentence enhancement. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution successfully established the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses at the crime scene and proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt in light of material contradictions, unnatural human conduct, and exaggeration in the number of accused persons. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the purported eye-witnesses was highly doubtful due to their unhurt escape despite being in close proximity, lack of corroborative physical evidence, and exaggeration in implicating multiple family members. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellants, and dismissed the sentence enhancement petition. The key principles laid down include that the unexplained unhurt survival of eyewitnesses in a fatal assault casts grave doubt on their presence, that exaggeration in the number of accused persons warrants careful circumspection, and that the benefit of any doubt in the prosecution case must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.
Questions settled- Does the unhurt escape of alleged eyewitnesses in close proximity to a fatal shooting render their presence at the scene doubtful?
- Whether exaggeration in the number of accused persons charged in a crime impacts the credibility of the prosecution case?
- Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right when the prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions?
- Can a criminal revision petition for enhancement of sentence survive after the underlying conviction and sentence have been set aside?
- Malal Din vs Maiz Ullah2019 CLC 517, 2018 PHC 1806 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking to set aside an appellate court order which dismissed the petitioner's application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for setting aside an ex-parte decree. The core legal question revolves around whether the petitioner had sufficient cause and made out a proper case for setting aside the ex-parte decree, and how the period of limitation and pursuit of wrong remedies (such as under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) affect the application. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for his absence, and having exhausted remedies including prior proceedings and petitions, could not establish grounds for setting aside the ex-parte decree either on law or equity. The court laid down that time spent pursuing a wrong remedy may be computed, but an applicant must still satisfy the mandatory requirement of showing plausible reasons and sufficient cause for default, failing which an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is unsustainable.
Questions settled- What is the limitation period for filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
- Does the time spent pursuing a wrong remedy affect the limitation for filing an application to set aside an ex-parte decree?
- Can an applicant successfully maintain an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 without showing plausible reasons and sufficient cause for absence?
- Malak Abdullah Khan vs Muhammad Rasool Khan2018 PLJ Peshawar 68, 2018 MLD 485 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
- Mal Nigran Welfare Association through Chairman vs Government of Sindh through Secretary Agriculture_Chairman and 2 others2018 YLR 848 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-19Read full judgment →
- Major Muhammad Nouman vs Usman Habib and another2018 IHC 112 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-09-19Read full judgment →
- Major Anees-Ur-Rehman vs Additional District Judge; Islamabad and another2018 MLD 454 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-19Read full judgment →
- Major (Rtd.) Sheikh Abdul Naeem vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing2018 YLR 2210 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-23Read full judgment →
- Major (R) Pervaiz Iqbal vs Munir Ahmad and othersK LR 2018 Supreme Court Cases 95, 2018 PSC 337, 2018 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell concerning a portion of an evacuee property. The core legal question revolved around whether the suit filed by the buyers was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, or whether the cause of action remained suspended until the petitioner himself acquired title to the property. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action for specific performance only arises when the vendor is in a position to perform their part of the contract effectively and the vendee can compel performance. The Court laid down the principle that limitation does not run while the vendor lacks title and the cause of action is inchoate, and further that a plea that a suit is premature is mutually destructive to a plea that it is barred by time. The petition was converted into an appeal and partly allowed with a modification regarding an equalizer payment.
Questions settled- Whether the period of limitation for a suit for specific performance commences when the vendor acquires title to the property in question?
- Can a defendant simultaneously raise pleas that a suit is both premature and barred by limitation?
- When does the cause of action for specific performance of an agreement to sell arise in cases where the vendor's own title is contingent upon pending litigation?
- Major (R) Muhammad Zulfiqar Ali vs National Accountability Bureau2018 P Cr. LJ 1555 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an Accountability Court order dismissing the petitioner's request to postpone the decision of a corruption reference (ACR No. 65/2008) until the maturity of another reference (ACR No. 06/2010) and to decide both through a consolidated judgment. The core legal questions involved whether distinct corruption references arising from separate allegations and accused persons can be jointly tried or decided via a single consolidated judgment under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Lahore High Court held that the provisions governing joinder of charges and trials are permissive rather than mandatory, and where references involve distinct facts, different sets of accused, and separate evidence, they must proceed independently. Furthermore, the court ruled that the Code does not provide for a consolidated judgment for separate trials. The petition was accordingly dismissed as devoid of merit.
Questions settled- Whether there can be a joint trial of separate accountability references by framing a joint charge?
- Are the provisions regarding the joinder of charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mandatory or permissive?
- Can two different criminal trials be concluded through a single consolidated judgment?
- Whether an accused can insist on the joinder of charges when the prosecution elects to split and try them separately?
- Major (R) Muhammad Zulfiqar Ali vs NAB etc2018 PCRLJ 1555, 2018 LHC 1157 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Accountability Court which declined the petitioner's request to postpone the decision of an accountability reference until the maturity of a connected reference and to decide both through a consolidated judgment. The core legal questions involved whether separate accountability references arising from distinct allegations can be jointly tried or decided through a consolidated judgment. The Lahore High Court held that separate trials must have separate charges and independent judgments unless the provisions for joinder of charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 apply and the court exercises its discretion to do so. The court found that the two references involved distinct offences, different sets of accused persons, and separate evidence, rendering them incapable of being clubbed or decided via a single judgment. The key principle laid down is that criminal cases cannot be consolidated like civil suits, and enabling provisions for joint trials under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 are permissive rather than mandatory, requiring distinct judgments for distinct trials.
Questions settled- Whether separate accountability references involving distinct facts and different accused persons can be consolidated for a joint trial?
- Are the provisions regarding the joinder of charges under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mandatory or permissive?
- Can a court pronounce a single consolidated judgment for two separate criminal trials?
- What constitutes distinct offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
- Major (R) Moeen Nawaz vs Chaudhary Shafaat Hussain and 2 others2018 YLR 939 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-07Read full judgment →
- Majeed Ullah vs The District Education Office2018 PHC 1655, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 507 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to count the petitioner’s service for seniority and promotion purposes following an intra-district transfer. The core legal questions were whether the respondent's refusal to implement departmental orders regarding the petitioner's seniority was lawful, and whether the petition was barred by Article 212 of the Constitution. The Court allowed the petition, holding that the respondent's adamant refusal to implement the orders of senior officials was unjustified. The Court clarified that Rule 8 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1989, which governs inter-provincial transfers, is inapplicable to intra-district transfers. The Court established that where departmental actions are not within the confines of law, the High Court may grant relief under Article 199. Furthermore, a request for the implementation of departmental orders regarding seniority and consideration for promotion does not necessarily fall under the bar of Article 212, as it does not strictly pertain to the terms and conditions of service precluding writ jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Does Rule 8 of the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1989 apply to intra-district or intra-province transfers?
- Is a petition seeking the implementation of departmental orders regarding seniority barred by Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
- Does the consideration for promotion of a civil servant fall within the terms and conditions of service that would bar the jurisdiction of the High Court?
- Mahmood-Ul-Hassan vs Munir Ahmad and 3 others2018 MLD 771 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Intra Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 challenged an order passed by a Single Judge in a contempt petition under Article 204 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Single Judge had, by consent of the parties, set aside a administrative order passed by the Commissioner dated 07.06.2014 and remitted the matter for fresh decision. The High Court examined whether a court exercising contempt jurisdiction can grant relief outside the scope of the pleadings and set aside substantive administrative orders not challenged in the contempt petition. The Division Bench held that contempt proceedings are primarily between the court and the contemnor, limited under Article 204 of the Constitution to punishing the contemnor, and do not confer jurisdiction to set aside underlying substantive orders. Courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings or grant relief not specifically sought, even with consent of parties, as consent cannot confer jurisdiction contrary to statutory limits. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order as being without jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Can a court grant relief that is not requested in the pleadings of the parties?
- Can a court in contempt proceedings under Article 204 of the Constitution set aside a substantive administrative order not challenged in the petition?
- Can consent of parties confer jurisdiction on a court to pass an order beyond its statutory or constitutional mandate?
- Mahmood Akhtar vs Mst. Shabana Rafique and 2 others2018 MLD 309 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-10-04Read full judgment →
- Mahmood Ahmad Aslam vs Govt2018 YLR 2169, 2018 PHC 1620 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
- Mahmood Ahmad Aslam vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary2018 YLR 2169 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
- Mahera Sajid vs Station House Officer, Police Station Shalimar & 6 others2018 CLC 1858, 2018 CLC 1858, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 300, 2018 IHC 85 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-07-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition concerns the enforced disappearance of the petitioner's husband, an engineer, who was abducted from his home in Islamabad by unidentified persons in uniform. The petitioner invoked the Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, alleging the State's failure to protect fundamental rights and investigate the crime. The Court found that the criminal justice system, including the police and relevant intelligence agencies, failed to act promptly or effectively, despite the incident's characteristics of enforced disappearance. The Court held that the State and its functionaries act as fiduciaries for the people and are strictly liable for protecting fundamental rights. The ratio of the decision is that when the State fails to protect a citizen from enforced disappearance and fails to investigate, it is liable to compensate the victim's family for the loss of their breadwinner. The Court established that enforced disappearance is a crime against humanity, and public functionaries are personally accountable for their failure to act, including liability for compensation and costs, which may be recovered from them personally by the State.
Questions settled- Can a High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, order the State to compensate a citizen for an established violation of fundamental rights?
- Does the failure of public functionaries to promptly investigate an alleged enforced disappearance constitute a violation of the fundamental right to dignity under Article 14 of the Constitution?
- Are public functionaries personally liable for costs when their conduct in handling a citizen's complaint is found to be degrading and negligent?
- Does the State have a fiduciary obligation to protect citizens from enforced disappearance, and can it be held liable for the failure of its instrumentalities to do so?
- Maham Shabbir and another vs Additional District Judge, West, Islamabad and 2 others2018 CLC 452 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-10-27Read full judgment →
- Mag Entertainment (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. and others2018 SCMR 1807 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment declaring Rules 13(3) and (4) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules 2009 ultra vires the parent statute, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002. The core legal question was whether the regulator (PEMRA) possesses the statutory authority to exclude broadcasters from bidding for Direct To Home (DTH) distribution licenses to prevent vertical integration and media monopolies. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court held that Section 23 and Section 39(e) of the Ordinance empower PEMRA to define and prevent "undue concentration of media ownership" to ensure fair competition and protect public interest. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a proviso must be construed strictly as a limitation or exception to the main enacting clause, and cannot be interpreted to create an absolute right or enlarge the scope of the enactment. Consequently, excluding broadcasters from distribution licensing to prevent anti-competitive vertical integration is a valid exercise of regulatory power under Article 18 of the Constitution.
Questions settled- Whether the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority has the statutory power to exclude broadcasters from bidding for Direct To Home distribution licenses to prevent vertical integration?
- How should a proviso to a statutory section be interpreted in relation to the main enacting clause?
- Does the restriction on broadcasters holding distribution licenses violate the fundamental right to conduct business under Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Mac Securities (Pvt.) Limited vs Asif Jalal Bhatti, Executive Director2018 CLD 1069 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
- M.L. Singla vs Punjab National Bank and Anr2018 SCInd 76 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-20Read full judgment →
- M.I. Traders. Lahore vs Director, Directorate General of Valuation, Customs House, Karachi and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 2437 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
- M.H. Mujahid, Advocate vs Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore and another2018 PLD Lahore 493 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-28Read full judgment →
- M. Waqar Monno O vs Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of2018 CLD 1399 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This Criminal Miscellaneous Application was filed against the dismissal of an application under section 265-K read with section 561-A, Cr.P.C. for quashing a complaint filed under section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 against an exporter for failing to deliver goods or refund advance payments received from a foreign buyer. The core legal question was whether the Special Commercial Court could take cognizance of the offence without a proper written authorization in terms of section 5-B(2) of the said Act. The High Court held that although the failure to place the written authorization on record during the trial proceedings constituted a serious lacuna affecting the due process rights of both the accused and the foreign buyer under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, quashing the proceedings entirely would prejudice the aggrieved foreign buyer. The Court laid down that while strict adherence to statutory authorization requirements is mandatory under the law, procedural omissions by prosecuting authorities should not defeat the substantive rights of aggrieved foreign complainants, and accordingly directed respondent No. 2 to file a fresh complaint after obtaining proper written permission.
Questions settled- Can a Commercial Court take cognizance of an offence under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 without a written complaint by an authorized officer?
- Does the guarantee of fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 extend to the complainant party as well as the accused?
- What is the legal status of an inquiry conducted by the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan on a complaint filed by a foreign buyer?
- M. Waqar Manno O vs Fed of Pak through Ministry of Commerce & Ors2018 SHC 768, 2018 CLD 1399 · Sindh High Court · 2018-06-04Read full judgment →
- M. Fuwad A. Mughal vs Federation of Pakistan and 4 others2018 YLR 26 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
- Lutufullah vs The State2020 PCr. L J 184, 2018 SHC 1074 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, charged with narcotics possession under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail due to the trial court's failure to comply with previous High Court directions to conclude the trial within a specified period, and whether the delay in trial proceedings constituted sufficient grounds for release. The Court dismissed the bail application, holding that while the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the statutory delay threshold under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, had been met for offences punishable by life imprisonment or death. The Court clarified that non-compliance with trial directions does not automatically entitle an accused to bail, particularly when the case was previously dismissed on merits. The key principle laid down is that while unreasonable delay in trial conclusion may amount to a denial of justice, bail is not automatically granted for procedural delays if the statutory period has not elapsed.
Questions settled- Does the failure of a trial court to comply with High Court directions to conclude a trial within a specified timeframe automatically entitle an accused to bail?
- Can an accused be granted bail on the ground of statutory delay if the offence is punishable by life imprisonment or death and the statutory period of two years has not elapsed?
- Does Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, exclude the applicability of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, regarding recovery witnesses?
- Lutuf Ullah vs The State2018 MLD 794 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The applicant sought post-arrest bail in a case involving the recovery of 3 kilograms of Charas, registered under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the recovery of narcotics, the alleged non-compliance with search procedures, and the principle of consistency regarding a co-accused who had been granted bail. The Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, noting that the recovery was witnessed by police officials and supported by a chemical examination report. The Court clarified that Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, excludes the applicability of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, at the bail stage. Furthermore, the Court determined that the case fell under the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, as the offence was punishable by life imprisonment. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, with a direction for the trial court to expedite the recording of evidence.
Questions settled- Does Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 exclude the application of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the recovery of narcotics?
- Is the rule of consistency applicable to a bail application where the accused fails to provide material suggesting false implication?
- Does the recovery of narcotics in a quantity punishable by life imprisonment fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Lutfullah Kalhoro and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 SHC 1099 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-01Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged the seniority list prepared by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), which granted retrospective seniority to private respondents by counting their ad-hoc service period towards their regular service. The petitioners, who were shown as junior to the private respondents, argued that this action violated established service jurisprudence. The core legal question was whether ad-hoc service can be counted for seniority purposes and whether retrospective seniority can be granted from the date of initial ad-hoc induction rather than the date of regularization. The Court held that seniority in a service, cadre, or post must be reckoned from the date of regular appointment, not from the date of ad-hoc induction. It reaffirmed that ad-hoc appointments are stopgap arrangements without vested rights for retrospective regularization or seniority. Consequently, the Court directed the KPT to decide the seniority matter afresh, ensuring compliance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the calculation of seniority from the date of regular appointment.
Questions settled- Can an employee claim seniority from the date of their initial ad-hoc appointment rather than the date of their regular appointment?
- Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to hear service matters of Karachi Port Trust employees?
- Does an acting or looking-after charge appointment confer a vested right to regular promotion or seniority?
- Can a statutory body regularize the service of an employee retrospectively to the date of their ad-hoc induction?
- Luqman Sajid vs Returning Officer and 5 others2018 YLR 2319 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns three constitutional petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging orders passed by a Returning Officer and an Election Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner sought to disqualify a candidate (Respondent No. 6) on grounds of concealment of material facts, specifically regarding the assets of the candidate's wife and contradictions in nomination declarations. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in its constitutional jurisdiction, could resolve disputed factual allegations regarding a candidate's disqualification. The Court held that the allegations raised by the petitioner constituted a factual controversy requiring a probe, which could not be undertaken in summary constitutional proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower authorities' decisions, noting that the Election Commission of Pakistan possesses the authority under the Elections Act, 2017 and Elections Rules, 2017 to investigate misdeclarations. The principle laid down is that constitutional jurisdiction is not the appropriate forum for determining disputed questions of fact regarding a candidate's qualifications or disqualifications, which require a detailed factual inquiry.
Questions settled- Can the High Court resolve disputed factual allegations regarding a candidate's disqualification in its constitutional jurisdiction?
- Is the Election Commission of Pakistan empowered to investigate allegations of misdeclaration and concealment of assets by a candidate?
- Does the summary jurisdiction of a Returning Officer or Election Appellate Tribunal extend to conducting a detailed factual probe into a candidate's declarations?
- Lucknow Cooperative Housing Society Limited through General2018 MLD 962 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-20Read full judgment →
- Lt. Col R. Saeed Ahmed Awan, Ex-Principal F.F.M.S., Mansehra vs Fauji2018 PLJ Peshawar 225 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a former principal of a school managed by the Fauji Foundation, filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and permanent injunction to enforce a contract extension based on internal institutional policy. The trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a decision upheld on appeal. The core legal question was whether a suit for specific performance or declaration regarding an employment contract is maintainable against a non-statutory body where the relationship is purely contractual. The Court held that the Fauji Foundation is not a statutory body, and its internal policies lack statutory force. Consequently, the relationship between the parties is governed by the principle of master and servant. Under Section 21(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877, a contract of service cannot be specifically enforced. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to establish a legal character under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Court affirmed that incompetent suits must be rejected at their inception, confirming the dismissal of the plaint.
Questions settled- Is a suit for specific performance of a service contract maintainable against a non-statutory body?
- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit has no prospects of success under the law?
- Does an internal policy of a non-statutory organization confer a legal character under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
- Are employment relations governed by the principle of master and servant when no statutory rules apply?
- Low Heng Leon Andy vs Low Kian Beng Lawrence (administrator of the estate of Tan Ah Kng, deceased)2018 P.S.C. 1572 · Court of Appeal of the Republic of SingaporeRead full judgment →
- Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. vs Acro Textile Mills Ltd.2018 P.C.T.L.R. 561 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
- Liaquat Ali vs Mst. Huma Faiz and another2018 PLD Sindh 251 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-08Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This miscellaneous appeal impugns an order passed by the District Judge in Succession Miscellaneous Application No. 66/2016 granting a succession certificate in favour of the widow of the deceased for all claimed financial benefits. The appellant, brother of the deceased, sought inheritance rights over benefits including provident fund, gratuity, group insurance, salary dues, leave encashment, benevolent fund, and welfare grant. The High Court determined whether these benefits constituted assets of the deceased. Following established precedent, the court held that service benefits which become payable only after an employee's death—such as provident fund, gratuity, group insurance, welfare grant, and benevolent fund—do not constitute heritable assets left by the deceased, and thus cannot be subject to a succession certificate. Such grant-based benefits are payable to designated nominees or entitled family members per service rules without needing a succession certificate. Conversely, salary dues and leave encashment payable during the employee's lifetime are heritable assets. The High Court partially modified the order, directing succession certification and distribution only for the salary dues and leave encashment.
Questions settled- Do post-demise service benefits like group insurance and benevolent fund constitute heritable assets of a deceased employee requiring a succession certificate?
- Are salary dues and leave encashment payable during an employee's lifetime heritable assets distributable among all legal heirs?
- Can a succession certificate be granted in respect of funds or benefits that do not form part of the deceased's heritable estate?
- Liaquat Ali and another vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 257 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Judge CNS convicting the appellants under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentencing them to life imprisonment with a fine for transporting 59 kilograms of charas concealed in a vehicle. The core legal questions involved whether the delay in sending samples to the chemical examiner vitiated the trial, whether police testimony required independent corroboration, and whether the driver and occupant of the vehicle could be held legally responsible for the narcotics found therein. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, that a person on the driving seat of a vehicle is presumed to have knowledge and control of contraband found within, that delay in dispatching samples under the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001 is directory rather than mandatory in the absence of tampering, and that police officials are competent witnesses whose testimony does not inherently require corroboration. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, laying down principles regarding narcotics transportation liability, sample dispatch timelines, and the evaluation of police evidence.
Questions settled- Whether the delay in sending narcotic samples to the chemical examiner beyond the period specified in the rules is fatal to the prosecution case?
- Can a person sitting on the driving seat of a vehicle be held legally responsible for narcotics recovered from a secret cavity within the vehicle?
- Does the testimony of police officials require mandatory independent corroboration in narcotics cases?
- What is the effect of shifting the burden of proof onto the accused under Section 29 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 once the prosecution establishes its initial case?
- Liaqat Khan vs Bakht Bibi2018 CLC 708 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-06Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging a consolidated judgment in a family dispute regarding dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The core legal questions involved the correct valuation of a dower house, the validity of a relinquishment deed allegedly executed by the wife, and the justification for a 35% annual maintenance increase for the minor. The Court held that the wife was entitled to the dower house itself or its market value, rejecting the nominal Rs.99 valuation. It further upheld the rejection of the relinquishment deed, emphasizing that the burden of proof lies heavily on the beneficiary to establish the genuineness of transactions involving Parda Nasheen or illiterate women. Regarding maintenance, the Court found the 35% annual increase excessive and unreasoned, reducing it to 15%. The judgment affirms that while High Courts generally do not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction, they must intervene where findings are based on misreading of evidence or where legal standards regarding the burden of proof for vulnerable parties are not met.
Questions settled- Does a nominal value assigned to property in a deed for registration purposes override the actual dower agreement?
- What is the burden of proof when a Parda Nasheen woman challenges the execution of a document in her name?
- Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Is an unreasoned, high percentage annual increase in maintenance for a minor legally sustainable?
- Liaqat and 4 others vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 13 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-22Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal matter arises from petitions seeking suspension of sentences awarded under Sections 302, 364, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following convictions by the trial court. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to suspension of sentence and release on bail pending appeal, particularly given their earlier exoneration during police investigation. The Lahore High Court held that once a trial court convicts accused persons after a proper appraisal of evidence—notwithstanding a biased police investigation—the concept of innocence is dislodged, and unless strong grounds are shown, sentences ought not to be suspended. The court laid down the principle that the findings of a flawed or biased police investigation cannot override the reasoned conviction recorded by a trial court based on evidence, and mere assertions of innocence during investigation do not warrant the suspension of sentence post-conviction.
Questions settled- Whether the sentence of a convicted person can be suspended under Section 426 Cr.P.C. merely on the ground that he was found innocent during the police investigation?
- Does a biased police investigation vitiate a trial court conviction that is otherwise based on a proper appraisal of evidence?
- What is the effect of a conviction by a trial court on the plea of innocence raised by an accused?
- Liaqat Ali Khan vs District Collector/District Revenue Officer Buner & others2018 MLD 1845, 2018 PHC 1365 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-09Read full judgment →