Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Liaqat Ali and 2 others vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1351 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-02-21
  benefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittalforensic delayocular evidencemedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Judge, Jaffarabad, for offences involving theft and causing injuries. The core legal question is whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, given the alleged inconsistencies in the evidence and procedural lapses. The Court held that the prosecution's case was riddled with significant doubts, including unexplained delays in sending crime weapons and empty shells to the forensic laboratory, material contradictions in witness statements, and the failure to produce key injured witnesses. Furthermore, the Court noted that medical evidence, while confirming injuries, does not inherently connect specific accused persons to the commission of a crime. Emphasizing that the prosecution must prove its case without a shadow of reasonable doubt, the Court ruled that any single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and acquitted the appellants, extending them the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the delay in sending crime weapons and empty shells to a forensic expert destroy the evidentiary value of the recovery?
  • Can medical evidence alone be used to connect an accused to the commission of a crime?
  • Is the accused entitled to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right if the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • What is the legal consequence of withholding material evidence by the prosecution under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
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• Liaqat Ali alias Liaqi vs The State and another2018 YLR 550 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-06
  capital punishmentocular evidencemedical evidence contradictionbenefit of doubtjudicial noticemurder referencecriminal appealmotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a trial court judgment convicting the appellant for murder under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the credibility of the ocular account, the impact of conflicting medical evidence, the failure to prove motive, and the sustainability of the conviction following the acquittal of a co-accused on identical evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution’s case was riddled with reasonable doubts. The Court found the ocular testimony unreliable due to significant contradictions, the absence of artificial light at the crime scene during night hours, and a stark conflict between the firearm injuries described and the medical evidence. Additionally, the unexplained seventeen-hour delay in the post-mortem examination cast further doubt on the prosecution's narrative. The Court emphasized that when motive is asserted, it must be proven, which the prosecution failed to do. Furthermore, the acquittal of a co-accused on the same evidence necessitated independent corroboration, which was absent. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and declined to confirm the death sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court take judicial notice of sunset times and divisions of time under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is the conviction of an accused sustainable when the ocular account is disbelieved and no independent corroboration exists?
  • Does an unexplained delay in conducting a post-mortem examination cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Must the prosecution establish a motive if it is specifically set up in the FIR?
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• Letter of Administration and Succession Certificate in Respect of Moveable and Immoveable Properties of Deceased Jasim Rasool_ In the matter of vs Not2018 PLD Sindh 249 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05Read full judgment →
• LESCO through Chief Executive, Lahore etc. vs M/s. Taj International2018 PLJ Lahore 87 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-17Read full judgment →
• Legal Heirs of Late Sarwar Khan and others vs Provincial Government2018 MLD 2092 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-09
  Civil RevisionWritten StatementStriking off defenseProvincial GovernmentProcedural delayFinality of judgmentEx-parte proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a protracted property dispute where the trial court, after impleading the Provincial Government, struck off its defense for failing to file a written statement despite multiple adjournments and subsequently decreed the suit. The first appellate court set aside these orders, reasoning that the trial court failed to provide sufficient time for filing the written statement and did not comply with statutory requirements regarding notice to the government. Upon review, the Chief Court found that the appellate court erred in its assessment. The Court held that the trial court had provided ample opportunities for the Provincial Government to file its written statement, and the government’s failure to do so demonstrated a lack of interest in the proceedings. The Court established that a trial court is not bound to grant the maximum statutory period for filing a written statement when a party has already been afforded sufficient time. Consequently, the appellate court's order was set aside, and the trial court's original decree was restored, emphasizing the necessity of preventing indefinite litigation delays.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court required to grant the full statutory period for filing a written statement if a party has already been afforded ample opportunity?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a trial court's order striking off a defense when the defendant failed to file a written statement despite multiple adjournments?
  • Does the failure of the Provincial Government to file a written statement after being impleaded justify the striking off of its defense?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State2018 MLD 693 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-24
  rash and negligent drivingSection 320 PPCres ipsa loquiturcriminal appealDiyatroad traffic accidenteye-witness testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 320, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for causing the death of a pedestrian through rash and negligent driving. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution successfully established the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and whether the awarded sentence was excessive. The High Court upheld the conviction, finding the testimony of eye-witnesses, including police officials present at the scene, credible and consistent. The court affirmed that the appellant failed to exercise the duty of care required of a driver in a crowded area, leading to the fatal accident. Relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the court held that the circumstances of the accident—uncontrolled speed and failure to brake—sufficiently proved negligence. While the conviction was maintained, the court modified the sentence, ordering the appellant to remain in custody until the payment of the Diyat amount to the legal heirs. The judgment reinforces the principle that drivers bear an implicit duty to avoid endangering road users and that negligence can be inferred from the circumstances of an accident.

  Questions settled

  • Can the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be applied in criminal cases involving road traffic accidents?
  • Is the testimony of police officials who witnessed a road traffic accident admissible and sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does a driver have an implicit duty of care to ensure their driving does not endanger pedestrians on a public road?
  • Can a sentence of imprisonment be modified to be contingent upon the payment of Diyat in a case under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Lawyers Foundation for Justice vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2018 LHC 1851 · Lahore High Court · 2018-08-27Read full judgment →
• Latif Ullah Khan and 9 others vs Mst. Sakeena and 20 others2018 CLC 691 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-17Read full judgment →
• Latif Khan vs Altaf Khan and 9 others2018 CLC 608 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-11-22
  co-shareralienation of propertysale-deed revocationKhewat shareprivate partitionsecond appealmisreading of evidencejoint property
  Summary & questions settled

  The present appeal arises from a suit for declaration-cum-perpetual injunction and revocation of a sale-deed filed by the plaintiff/appellant against the defendants/respondents regarding land situated in Muzaffarabad. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant vendor executed a sale-deed exceeding his fractional share in a specific Khewat. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court maintained the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove private partition or possession. Upon second appeal, the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir examined whether a co-sharer can alienate land from a particular Khewat beyond his fractional share therein, and whether concurrent findings based on misreading of evidence can be interfered with. The High Court held that a co-sharer cannot transfer land from a specific Khewat or survey number beyond their actual share in that particular entity, and that concurrent findings resulting from mis-reading or non-reading of evidence are open to interference in second appeal. The appeal was accepted, and the sale-deed was set aside to the extent of the excess land transferred.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer alienate land from a particular Khewat in excess of their actual fractional share in that specific Khewat?
  • Under what circumstances can concurrent findings of fact recorded by lower courts be disturbed in second appeal?
  • Is a private partition legally recognized to exclude other co-sharers without being affirmed by a Revenue Officer under the Land Revenue Act?
  • Does the exclusive possession of a specific property by one co-sharer permit them to alienate property exceeding their overall share in the joint holding?
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• Lateef Anwar vs Khalid Mahmood Khattak2018 YLR 464 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-18
  security bondsurety bondleave to defendrecovery suitrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the order of the Additional District Judge dismissing the petitioner's application to direct the respondent to submit a security bond instead of a surety bond in a recovery suit. The core legal question revolves around whether the furnishing of a surety bond satisfies the requirement of a security bond ordered by the trial court while granting leave to defend. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the term 'security' is comprehensive enough to include a 'surety' or guarantee provided by a surety, and that the furnishing of a surety bond complies with the spirit and terms of the trial court's order. The principle laid down is that in legal proceedings, the word 'security' is broad enough to encompass a surety bond unless expressly excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the furnishing of a surety bond satisfy the requirement of furnishing a security bond?
  • Whether the term security is comprehensive enough to include a surety in judicial proceedings?
  • Does an order accepting a surety bond instead of a cash or property security suffer from any legal defect?
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• Land Acquisition Collector and another vs Khana Gul and 6 others2018 MLD 567 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-28Read full judgment →
• Lal Khan and others vs Qadeer Ahmed and others2018 SCMR 1590 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-01
  criminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidencepolice encounterinference vs conjecturefalse implicationmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent, Qadeer Ahmed, of charges related to a police raid on his residence, which resulted in the death of a police officer and the respondent's brother. The prosecution alleged that the respondent and his brother initiated firing, leading to the officer's death, and that the respondent surrendered with his weapon. The core legal question was whether the evidence sufficiently established the respondent's culpability, specifically regarding the firing incident. The Supreme Court upheld the acquittal, reasoning that the prosecution's narrative contained significant infirmities. Specifically, the Court noted that if both accused had fired, the police would likely have targeted both, yet only the brother was killed. The Court inferred that the respondent did not fire at the police, rendering the recovery of crime-empties from his weapon a result of police fabrication. The Court held that while conjectures are inadmissible in criminal law, logical inferences drawn from established facts are permissible. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the respondent's acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court draw logical inferences from established facts to determine the credibility of a prosecution story?
  • Is it permissible for a court to rely on conjectures in criminal proceedings?
  • Does the failure of police to return fire at all alleged assailants in a cross-fire situation undermine the prosecution's case?
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• Lal Dino alias Laloo vs The State2018 YLR 216 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-25Read full judgment →
• Lal Bux vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Industries2018 YLR 2297 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-14Read full judgment →
• Lal Bakhsh and another., the State. vs The State., Lal Bakhsh and others2018 PLD Balochistan 97 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-10
  honour killingAnti-Terrorism Court jurisdictionprivate offencecriminal appealterrorism definitionmens rearemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentencing of the appellants by an Anti-Terrorism Court for the double murder of two individuals, which the prosecution characterized as honour killings. The core legal question was whether honour killings, regardless of their brutal execution, fall within the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court or constitute private offences triable by an ordinary court. Relying on the Supreme Court’s dictum in Khuda-e-Noor v. The State, the High Court held that the Anti-Terrorism Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that honour killings, being private offences committed with private motives, do not satisfy the statutory requirements of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, which necessitates a specific design or purpose to create public alarm or insecurity. The Court affirmed that the gruesome nature of a crime does not, by itself, convert a private offence into a terrorist act. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Sessions Court for a fresh trial in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an honour killing constitute an act of terrorism triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Is the brutal or gruesome nature of a crime sufficient to bring it within the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Must an act be accompanied by a specific design or purpose to fall under the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
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• Lal Bakhsh aka Lal Muhammad vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 117 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-07-31
  murderocular evidenceinterested witnessdisclosure memorecovery of weaponballistic reportabsconsion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Sibi Division, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Sabzal Khan. The prosecution's case rested on ocular evidence from the deceased's relatives, medical evidence, and the recovery of the murder weapon (a T.T. pistol) on the appellant's pointation, which matched the crime empties recovered from the crime scene. The appellant contended that the ocular witnesses were related and interested, and challenged the admissibility of the disclosure memo and delayed recovery. The High Court held that mere relationship does not render witnesses 'interested' unless prior enmity is proved. It further held that information leading to the discovery of a fact under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 is admissible even if obtained after a period of absconsion. Finding the prosecution's case proved beyond reasonable doubt, the High Court dismissed the appeal and maintained the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of eye-witnesses to a deceased render them 'interested witnesses' in the absence of proven prior animosity?
  • Is information provided by an accused in custody that leads to the discovery of a weapon admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 despite a delay caused by the accused's absconsion?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained where ocular accounts are fully corroborated by medical evidence, recovery of the crime weapon, and matching ballistic reports?
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• Lakhra Coal Development Company Ltd. through Managing Director vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and another2018 CLC 896 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-01Read full judgment →
• Laiq vs Additional Collector Customs (Adjudication), Peshawar and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 792 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-01-10Read full judgment →
• Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited (LESCO) and others---2018 PLD Islamabad 20 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-06-22
  tariff determinationNEPRAright of hearingreconsideration petitionjudicial reviewcouncil of common interestsfiduciary dutyprocedural impropriety
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition and connected matters challenged the tariff determination by the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), its refusal to entertain review petitions, and the dismissal of a reconsideration petition by the Federal Government concerning electric power distribution companies (DISCOs). The core legal questions involved whether distribution companies are entitled to a meaningful right of hearing during tariff redetermination proceedings under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, whether the statutory period of 15 days for a redetermination is mandatory or directory, how the term 'anew' must be interpreted, and the binding nature of policies framed by the Council of Common Interests and the Federal Government upon the regulator. The Islamabad High Court held that proceedings to determine a tariff anew require a fresh, de novo approach where affected stakeholders such as DISCOs possess an essential right to a meaningful hearing, that the 15-day timeline is directory, and that constitutional policy frameworks and guidelines hold binding force on the regulator. The Court laid down key principles regarding procedural fairness, natural justice, the scope of judicial review over economic regulators, and the binding constitutional authority of policies formulated under Articles 153 and 154 of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether distribution companies have a right to a meaningful hearing when a tariff reconsideration petition is decided anew under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997?
  • Is the fifteen-day period prescribed under Section 31(4) of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 for determining a tariff anew mandatory or directory?
  • Are the policy guidelines formulated by the Council of Common Interests and the Federal Government binding upon the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority in the performance of its functions?
  • What is the scope of judicial review by superior courts over economic and regulatory determinations made in a quasi-judicial capacity?
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• Lahore Development Authority vs Manzoor Hussain2018 MLD 1434, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1015, 2018 LHC 1113 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-12Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority vs Ch. Asghar Ali Bhuta and others2018 MLD 581 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-13Read full judgment →
• Lahore Development Authority through Director General and another vs Manzoor Hussain2018 MLD 1434 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-12Read full judgment →
• Kundal Khan vs Fed. of Pakistan and Others2018 SHC 1027 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Kudrat Sandhu vs Union of India & Anr2018 SCInd 6 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-02-22Read full judgment →
• KPMG Taseer Hadi and Chartered Accountants and another vs Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2018 CLD 952 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-02-09Read full judgment →
• Kohinoor Sugar Mills. vs Federation of Pakistan etc2018 PTD 821, PTCL 2018 CL. 98 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-27
  income tax auditCommissioner Inland RevenueFederal Board of Revenueself assessment systemtax year 2009retrospective operation
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment addresses multiple constitutional petitions challenging the validity of notices issued by the Commissioner Inland Revenue for the audit of taxpayers' income tax affairs under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 for the tax year 2009. The core legal questions involve whether the Commissioner was legally competent to issue audit notices without selection by the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 214-C, whether notices were required to contain reasons, and whether the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 2010 applied retrospectively. The court held that the powers of the Commissioner under Section 177 are independent of the powers of the Board under Section 214-C, and that the Commissioner possessed the independent statutory authority to call for records and conduct audits. The key principles laid down are that Section 177 and Section 214-C provide distinct, non-overlapping mechanisms, that clarificatory amendments such as the 2013 explanation operate retrospectively, and that machinery provisions must be construed liberally to ensure effective tax administration while protecting the taxpayer's right to due process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue can issue notices under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without selection of the taxpayer's case for audit by the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 214-C?
  • Whether the powers of the Commissioner under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are independent of the powers of the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 214-C?
  • Whether notices issued under Section 177 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 are required to contain reasons for summoning the taxpayer's record to conduct an audit?
  • Whether the amendments introduced to Section 177 and Section 214-C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through subsequent Finance Acts apply retrospectively to completed tax years?
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• Kohinoor Sugar Mills vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PTD 821 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
• Klaas Lesetja Phakane vs The State2018 SCMR 536 · Constitutional Court of South Africa · 2017-12-05Read full judgment →
• Kitchen Stone Foods on Complaint Filed by Messrs Quick Food2018 CLD 778 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2017-12-29Read full judgment →
• Kishwar Abbas Shah alias Kas vs The State etcPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 856, 2018 LHC 849 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-16
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryconflicting versionsinvestigation reportmurderous assaultdelay in recording statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from a criminal case registered under Sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of a murderous assault. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the conflicting versions of the incident presented by the complainant and the investigating agency. The court observed that while the complainant alleged the petitioner caused firearm injuries, two successive police investigations concluded the petitioner was present at the scene but empty-handed, playing no active role. Additionally, the court noted a 19-day delay in recording the statements of injured witnesses, rendering the prosecution's case prima facie questionable. Holding that the existence of two conflicting versions of the incident necessitates further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt, the court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution's own investigation presents conflicting versions regarding the accused's role or presence at the crime scene, the case against the accused becomes one of further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of two conflicting versions of an incident between the complainant and the investigating agency render a case one of further inquiry?
  • Can an accused be granted bail when the investigating agency finds them present at the scene but empty-handed, contrary to the complainant's allegation of active participation?
  • Does a significant delay in recording the statements of injured witnesses affect the prima facie case for the purpose of bail?
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• Kirshan Lal vs Pertab Rai and another2018 YLR 1942 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-25Read full judgment →
• Kiramat ullah vs The State2018 PHC 1378 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-16Read full judgment →
• Kifayat and 3 others vs Sami Ullah and 2 others2018 YLR 96 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-21
  acquittal on basis of compromiseresiling from compromiseQisas and Diyatcompoundable offencescriminal petitionquashing of criminal case
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal revision petition filed under Section 439 read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 against the dismissal of an acquittal application under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns whether legal heirs of a deceased can resile from a genuine compromise reached during the bail stage where they waived their right of Qisas and Diyat and consented to the acquittal of the accused. The Peshawar High Court held that once a compromise in a criminal case has been acted upon and benefits such as bail have been availed, the complainant and legal heirs cannot subsequently be permitted to resile from it. The court laid down the principle that a compromise reached between parties in a compoundable criminal offense at the bail stage continues to enure to the benefit of the accused at the trial stage, barring the legal heirs from backing out.

  Questions settled

  • Can the legal heirs of a deceased resile from a compromise reached at the bail stage during subsequent stages of the trial?
  • Whether an application under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be dismissed when a valid compromise has been effected between the parties?
  • Does a compromise entered into at the bail stage enure to the benefit of the accused for the purpose of acquittal at the trial stage?
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• Khyber through Amjad Pervez vs Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission2018 P Cr. L J 964 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-06
  double jeopardyconstitutional petitioninquiry closurejurisdictionNAB inquiryEhtesab Commissionfinancial investment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Peshawar High Court seeking to quash an inquiry initiated against him by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission concerning the alleged illegal investment of the General Provident Investment Fund and Pension Fund. The petitioner contended that an earlier inquiry into the same allegations by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) had been closed, and that the initiation of a fresh inquiry violated the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The core legal question was whether the closure of an inquiry by NAB without the requisite judicial approval of an Accountability Court under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 operates as an acquittal or bar to subsequent proceedings by a provincial anti-corruption body. The High Court held that the mere administrative closure of an inquiry by NAB, absent compliance with statutory judicial discharge procedures, does not attract the constitutional or statutory bar against double jeopardy. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that a provincial Ehtesab commission is not legally precluded from inquiring into matters where no formal judicial acquittal or prior prosecution by a competent court exists.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the administrative closure of an inquiry by the National Accountability Bureau operates as an acquittal barring subsequent inquiry by a provincial Ehtesab commission?
  • Does the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 apply to a mere administrative closure of an investigation without a trial or conviction?
  • What are the statutory requirements for closing an inquiry under Section 9(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Whether a provincial Ehtesab commission has jurisdiction to initiate an inquiry when no parallel investigation is pending before a federal agency?
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• Khyal Mir vs Tahir Hassan and another2018 YLR 1698 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-10
  dying declarationqatl-i-amdbenefit of doubtcircumstantial evidenceacquittalcriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for the qatl-i-amd of the deceased, Karim Khan. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the FIR, treated as a dying declaration, and circumstantial evidence, as there were no eyewitnesses. The court held that a dying declaration is a weak form of evidence that requires strong, independent corroboration to sustain a conviction. In this case, the court found that the site plan was unreliable, the medical evidence was inconclusive regarding the cause of death due to the absence of a post-mortem report and a vague death certificate, and the forensic report regarding the weapon recovery was compromised by an unexplained delay. Emphasizing the principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and that any slight doubt warrants acquittal, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Consequently, the court set aside the trial court's judgment and acquitted the appellant, establishing that a conviction cannot rest on an uncorroborated dying declaration when the surrounding circumstances and medical evidence fail to support the prosecution's narrative.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on a dying declaration without strong independent corroboration?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a crime weapon to the forensic laboratory render the forensic report inadmissible or unreliable?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish the cause of death through a post-mortem report or reliable medical evidence?
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• Khuwaja Muhammad Waseem vs Syed Jalees Anjum and others2018 P Cr. L J 1230 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-19
  false FIRSection 182 PPCacquittal appealEx-Officio Justice of Peacemalicious prosecutionB-class reportlocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent in a case initiated under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for providing false information to a public servant. The core legal questions concern whether an accused person in a purportedly false FIR has the standing to pursue proceedings under Section 182, P.P.C., and whether the trial court correctly appreciated the evidence in acquitting the respondent. The Court held that the right to initiate proceedings under Section 182, P.P.C. lies solely with the public servant who suffered hardship or inconvenience due to the false complaint, not the accused person named in the FIR, who must pursue other remedies like malicious prosecution. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while police may file reports in 'A', 'B', or 'C' classes in Sindh, the mere failure to collect evidence does not automatically render an incident 'maliciously false'. The Court also observed that an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace should not direct police to initiate Section 182 proceedings upon registering an FIR, as this falls outside their mandate and conflicts with the procedural bar under Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does an accused person named in a false FIR have the legal standing to initiate or pursue proceedings under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is a failure by police to collect evidence sufficient to declare an incident 'maliciously false' for the purposes of Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace direct the police to initiate proceedings under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at the time of ordering the registration of an FIR?
  • Does Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a Magistrate from taking direct cognizance of an offense under Section 182, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Khushal vs The State2018 YLR 1605 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-18
  juvenile offenderage determinationossification testacademic recordbenefit of doubtcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges the trial court's order declining the applicant's request to be tried separately as a juvenile, wherein the trial court relied on an ossification test determining the accused's age to be about 20 years, overriding verified academic records showing his date of birth as 04.01.1997. The core legal question concerns the evidentiary value and weight of an ossification test versus undisputed educational records in determining the age of an accused under juvenile laws. The Sindh High Court held that an ossification test is a mere estimation or guess-work subject to an margin of error, and in the presence of verified, un-manoeuvred official academic or birth records prepared prior to the incident, such documentary evidence must be given preference over medical opinions. The Court laid down the principle that where academic records are verified and genuine, the margin of uncertainty in an ossification test should be resolved in favor of the accused, extending the benefit of juvenile status.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of an ossification test in the presence of undisputed educational records for age determination?
  • Does the medical opinion of a board override verified academic certificates when determining the age of a juvenile accused?
  • How should the margin of error in an ossification test be applied when assessing the age of an accused claiming juvenility?
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• Khurshid Khan vs Mst. Asia and 3 others2018 P Cr. L J 1051 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-08
  constitutional petitionquashment of FIRJustice of Peacecognizable offenceappraisal of evidencealternative remedycriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed seeking the quashment of an FIR registered under sections 376 and 457 of the Pakistan Penal Code pursuant to an order passed by the Justice of Peace under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerned the scope of powers of a Justice of Peace while dealing with an application for registration of an FIR and whether the High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, could quash an FIR based on an appraisal of disputed questions of fact. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition, holding that a Justice of Peace is merely required to examine whether a cognizable offence is disclosed from the application without entering into the veracity of the information. The court laid down the principle that the High Court will not convert its constitutional jurisdiction into an appellate forum to appraise evidence or resolve disputed questions of fact at the investigative stage, and that the petitioner has alternative remedies available under the law.

  Questions settled

  • What is the extent of jurisdiction and duty of an Ex-officio Justice of Peace under section 22-A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when considering an application for the registration of an FIR?
  • Can the High Court quash a first information report through a constitutional petition by conducting an appraisal of disputed questions of fact and documents?
  • Whether the High Court should interfere with the normal course of criminal investigation and trial through its constitutional jurisdiction when a prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed?
  • What are the alternative remedies available to an accused person seeking relief against the registration of an FIR and ongoing investigation?
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• Khurshid Ashraf through Attorney and 3 others vs Aftab Ashraf and another2018 PLJ Quetta 23, 2018 MLD 65 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-04-06
  partition suitimpleadment of partiesnecessary partyproper partyCode of Civil Proceduremultiplicity of proceedingsjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision arises from a partition suit where the trial court ordered the impleadment of third parties as defendants under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, based on the respondent's claim that the plaintiffs had sold property in Karachi to these individuals. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion to implead these parties without supporting documentation, given the plaintiffs' denial and the lack of evidence regarding the alleged sale. The High Court held that the trial court's order was premature and unsustainable because it lacked supporting documents to substantiate the claim that the Karachi property was part of the estate or that the third parties had a valid interest. The court reaffirmed that while it has discretion to add necessary or proper parties to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this power must be exercised based on reason and fair play, not on mere presumption. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned order, allowing the respondent to file a fresh application if they could produce relevant documentation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the impleadment of a party under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based solely on the presumption of a sale without supporting documentation?
  • What is the distinction between a 'necessary party' and a 'proper party' in the context of civil litigation?
  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to order the impleadment of a party against the wishes of the plaintiff if that person is not found to be a necessary or proper party?
  • Can a court exercise its discretion to implead parties at any stage of the proceedings to avoid multiplicity of suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ashraf and 3 others vs Aftab Ashraf and another2018 PLJ Quetta 23 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-04-06Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Anwar (Deceased) through legal heirs and 2 others vs Muhammad Altaf, etc_2019 KLR Supreme Court 78, 2018 P.S.C. 1316 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khurshid and 3 others vs The State2018 MLD 724 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-12-19Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Ahmad vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 601 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-10
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabductionrapecriminal investigationbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two consolidated petitions for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioners, who were accused in an FIR registered for offences under Sections 496-A and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the circumstances surrounding the alleged abduction and the subsequent evidence presented. The Court observed that the police investigation had previously found several co-accused innocent and recommended the cancellation of the FIR. Furthermore, the alleged abductee had filed a harassment petition against her father, acknowledging a marriage with a co-accused, and did not level allegations of rape against the petitioners in her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Holding that the case against the petitioners called for further inquiry and that the available material did not prima facie connect them to the alleged offences, the Court granted post-arrest bail. The key principle established is that where investigation findings are contradictory and the prosecution's case lacks prima facie connection to the accused, the matter warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a harassment petition filed by an alleged abductee acknowledging marriage with a co-accused constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the police investigation has previously recommended the cancellation of the FIR against the accused?
  • Does the absence of specific allegations against petitioners in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify the grant of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ali vs 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi2018 YLR 1749 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-22Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmed vs Ubaid Ansari and 2 others2018 MLD 1796 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-21Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad Khan vs Secretary Agriculture and Animal2018 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 92 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad Khan s/o Raja Shahzaman Khan r/o Kot Tarala, Tehsil2018 SC AJK 3 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khurram Farooq vs Bank Al-Falah Limited and another2018 CLD 1417, 2018 LHC 2423 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-03
  conversion of appeal into writ petitioninterlocutory orderpetition for leave to defendSection 10(11)forthwith judgment and decreeapplication of judicial mindremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This statutory appeal was filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 against an order of the Banking Court, Bahawalpur, which dismissed the appellant's petition for leave to appear and defend (PLA) in a recovery suit, but instead of passing a judgment and decree, fixed the matter for the plaintiff's evidence. The core legal questions were whether an appeal against an interlocutory order under Section 22(6) of the Ordinance could be converted into a Constitutional writ petition, and whether a Banking Court can adjourn a case for evidence upon rejecting a PLA instead of passing a judgment and decree forthwith. The High Court converted the appeal into a writ petition, holding that superior courts possess power to convert proceedings to prevent abuse of process. On the merits, the Court held that under Section 10(11) of the Ordinance, upon rejection of a PLA, the Banking Court must forthwith pass a judgment and decree with proper application of judicial mind, rather than fixing the suit for evidence. The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court convert an unmaintainable statutory appeal against an interlocutory order into a Constitutional writ petition?
  • Whether a Banking Court can adjourn a recovery suit for evidence after rejecting a petition for leave to defend under Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does Section 10(11) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 mandate the Banking Court to pass a judgment and decree forthwith upon the dismissal of an application for leave to defend?
  • Is a Banking Court required to examine the statement of accounts and apply its judicial mind before decreeing a claim under Section 10(11) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Khudai Noor vs District Judge Pishin and 2 others2018 PLJ Quetta 43 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-11Read full judgment →
• Khizar Hayat vs Judge Family Court, Sargodha and another2018 MLD 1480 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-01Read full judgment →
• Khayal Din vs The State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 220, 2018 YLR 920 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-26
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryineffective firingvicarious liabilitycommon intentioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 152/14 registered under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner sought bail after arrest, contending that he was not attributed any specific injury to the deceased, with the fatal act attributed to a co-accused. The court examined the record and noted that the petitioner was only alleged to have committed ineffective firing, and there was a discrepancy between the weapon allegedly used (Kalashnikov) and the weapon recovered (303-bore rifle). Furthermore, no crime empties were recovered from the scene. The court held that the petitioner's case fell under the category of further inquiry as per section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Emphasizing that the heinousness of an offense is not a standalone ground to refuse bail and noting the petitioner's status as a previous non-convict who had been incarcerated for a significant period without trial progress, the court granted bail. The key principle established is that where specific roles are not clearly attributed and evidentiary discrepancies exist, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allegation of ineffective firing without recovery of crime empties constitute a case of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground of the heinousness of the offence if the case otherwise falls under the category of further inquiry?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail when the specific role attributed to him is ineffective firing and no injury to the deceased is alleged?
  Read full judgment →
• Khayal Din vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 220 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-26
  post-arrest bailineffective firingvicarious liabilitycommon intentionfurther inquiryheinousness of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, whereby the petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who was attributed the role of ineffective firing and whose weapon recovered did not match the crime empties, made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2), Cr.P.C. The Lahore High Court held that since no specific role or injury was attributed to the petitioner, the question of vicarious liability and common intention required further inquiry, rendering the case one for bail. The court laid down the principle that mere heinousness of an offence is no ground to refuse bail to an accused otherwise entitled to it, particularly where delayed trial and lack of corroborative recovery bring the case within the scope of further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the accused is attributed only ineffective firing without causing any injury to the deceased?
  • Does a discrepancy between the weapon allegedly carried and the weapon recovered, coupled with the absence of crime empties, make a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the ground of the heinousness of the offence when the accused is otherwise entitled to the concession?
  • Whether long incarceration without fruitful progress in the trial justifies the grant of post-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Saad Rafique and others vs Hamid Khan and others2018 P.S.C. 1816 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-12
  election petitionmaterially affectedcorrupt and illegal practicesNADRA verificationthumb impression forensicreturning officerrepresentation of the people act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the judgment of the Election Tribunal, Faisalabad, which declared the election for NA-125, Lahore void under Section 67(1)(d) read with Section 70 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, following an election petition filed by the runner-up candidate. The core legal questions involved whether the election staff and Returning Officer failed to comply with election laws and whether such failures or alleged corrupt and illegal practices materially affected the election result. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petitioner failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof required to establish corrupt practices or that irregularities materially affected the election outcome, especially given the substantial victory margin. The Court laid down the principle that mere negligence or administrative lapses by election officials, in the absence of cogent evidence linking them to the returned candidate or demonstrating that they materially altered the election results, are insufficient to annul an election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether administrative lapses and non-compliance with guidelines by election officials are sufficient to declare an election void under the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish allegations of corrupt and illegal practices in an election petition?
  • Does a discrepancy between Form-14 and Form-16 necessarily warrant the annulment of election results?
  • Can an election be declared void without cogent evidence showing that irregularities materially affected the final outcome?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Rashidullah and another vs Khawaja Faridullah2018 PLD Sindh 129 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Asif vs Muhammad Usman Dar and others2018 SCMR 2128, 2018 SCP 1320, 2019 PLJ SC 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-10-19
  quo warrantoArticle 62(1)(f)disqualificationnon-disclosure of assetsconflict of interestelection lawsdishonesty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that disqualified the petitioner, a Member of the National Assembly and federal minister, under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether the petitioner’s failure to disclose foreign salary income and a dormant foreign bank account, alongside his employment with a UAE-based company, constituted "dishonesty" warranting lifetime disqualification. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the disqualification was unsustainable. The Court established that Article 62(1)(f) cannot be invoked for every omission or error in asset declaration. It held that disqualification requires proof of intentional dishonesty, corruption, or wrongdoing associated with the non-disclosure. Mere inadvertent omissions, bad judgment, or negligence—absent evidence of bad faith or illicit financial gain—do not satisfy the threshold for lifetime disqualification. The Court clarified that the test for honesty hinges on the intent behind the concealment, and since no wrongdoing or conflict of interest was established regarding the petitioner's foreign employment or assets, the writ of quo warranto was unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Does every non-disclosure of an asset in a nomination paper automatically result in disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Is a writ of quo warranto maintainable against an elected member for non-disclosure of assets after the election process has concluded?
  • What constitutes 'dishonesty' sufficient to trigger lifetime disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution?
  • Can a court in quo warranto proceedings determine tax liability in the absence of an assessment by the relevant tax authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Ahmed vs Muhammad Ayyub, etc2021 KLR Criminal Cases 124, 2019 P Cr. L J 1010, 2019 PLJ Lahore 539, 2018 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-25
  special leave to appealacquittallimitation periodcondonation of delayspecial lawcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal order passed by a Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner filed the application beyond the sixty-day limitation period prescribed by Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and sought condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, are applicable to applications for special leave to appeal against acquittal filed under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is not applicable to such applications. The ratio of the decision is that where a special or local law prescribes a specific period of limitation, it prevails over the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the Court ruled it lacked the power to condone the delay, dismissing both the application for condonation and the underlying petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can the delay in filing an application for special leave to appeal against an acquittal under Section 417(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Does the limitation period prescribed by a special law prevail over the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applicable to proceedings under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Azam Rasool & others vs Raja Sajjad Ahmed & others2018 SC AJK 8 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-01-22Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Abdul Rehrnan (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others vs Muhammad Farooq Mirza and 5 others2019 CLC 596, 2018 LHC 1351 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-26Read full judgment →
• Khanma Bi and 9 others vs Collector Land Acquisition, Mangla Dam2019 P.S.C. 127, 2018 MLD 1764 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-04-24Read full judgment →
• Khan Zeb vs The State2018 YLR 993 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-19
  post-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances Actrule of consistencyconscious knowledgefurther inquirycar driver narcotics
  Summary & questions settled

  This post-arrest bail petition arose from a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 and Section 15 of the Arms Act after police intercepted a motorcar during a blockade and recovered 3010 grams of opium along with a pistol from the co-accused. The trial court granted bail to two co-accused occupants but rejected the petition of the present accused-petitioner, who was alleged to be in the driving seat. The core legal questions before the High Court were whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of rule of consistency and whether his mere presence on the driving seat established conscious knowledge or possession of the recovered narcotics. The Peshawar High Court accepted the petition and granted post-arrest bail, holding that since there was no evidence establishing the petitioner as the owner or licensed driver of the vehicle, his role was similar to that of the co-accused already on bail, making his guilt a matter of further inquiry. The Court further laid down that mere presence on the driving seat does not, prima facie, establish conscious knowledge or involvement in the smuggling of narcotics.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a person in the driving seat of a vehicle prima facie establish their conscious knowledge or possession of hidden narcotics?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail under the rule of consistency if co-accused with similar roles have already been admitted to bail?
  • Whether the lack of proof regarding ownership or a driving license makes an accused person's involvement in a narcotics smuggling case a matter of further inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Munir vs The State and another2018 MLD 882 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad vs Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan2018 PLC (C.S.) 893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-22
  service lawposting and transferrules of businessministerial powerscivil servant tenureown pay and scaleadministrative disciplineconstitutional governance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal regarding the posting and transfer of a civil servant in the Balochistan Education Department. The core legal question was whether a provincial Minister possesses the authority to order the posting or transfer of civil servants, and whether such transfers can be made in violation of seniority and tenure principles. The Supreme Court held that the notification delegating the power of posting and transfer to the Minister was ultra vires the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012 and the scheme of governance envisaged in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the Court struck down the impugned notification and the transfer order, declaring that the Minister lacks the legal authority to interfere in administrative postings. The Court established that the Secretary is the official head of the department responsible for discipline and administration, and that civil servants cannot be transferred frequently or placed under subordinates without cogent reasons. Furthermore, the Court deprecated the practice of 'own pay and scale' appointments and emphasized that administrative discretion must be exercised in a structured, transparent, and reasonable manner.

  Questions settled

  • Does a provincial Minister have the legal authority to order the posting or transfer of a civil servant under the Balochistan Government Rules of Business, 2012?
  • Is the appointment of a civil servant on an 'own pay and scale' (OPS) basis legally permissible?
  • Can a senior civil servant be lawfully transferred to serve under a junior officer without cogent reasons?
  • What is the scope of a Departmental Secretary's duty when a Minister issues an order that departs from established rules or government policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Bahadar vs Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary2018 PLC (C.S.) 57 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-03
  quo warrantocurrent charge appointmentcivil serviceadministrative lawpublic officesenioritylocus standi
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired driver, challenged the appointment of a BS-14 official to the post of Additional Estate Officer (BS-18) on a current charge basis. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner had standing to file a writ of quo warranto against this appointment and whether the appointment of a junior official to a senior post on a current charge basis was legally permissible. The Court held that the appointment was illegal and set it aside. It established that quo warranto proceedings are inquisitorial, allowing any citizen to challenge public appointments without proving personal injury. Furthermore, the Court held that current charge appointments are strictly temporary measures intended for short durations and must be granted to the most senior, eligible officers. The practice of appointing junior officials to higher posts while ignoring eligible seniors violates established administrative guidelines, specifically those contained in the ESTACODE, which possess the force of law under the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Court declared the post vacant, ordering it to be filled in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner require the status of an aggrieved person to file a writ of quo warranto?
  • Are instructions contained in the ESTACODE legally binding on the executive?
  • Can a junior official be appointed to a higher post on a current charge basis if senior eligible officers are available?
  • Does an appointment on acting charge basis confer a vested right for regular promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalilur Rehman vs 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas and 62018 YLR 1711 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-14
  criminal transfer applicationtransfer of casesdelay in trialterritorial jurisdictionjudicial proceedingsadjournments
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal transfer application was filed by the applicant, Khalil-ur-Rehman, seeking the re-transfer of two Sessions Cases from the Court of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas, back to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Tando Allahyar. The applicant argued that both parties reside in Tando Allahyar and the incident occurred within that jurisdiction. The respondents and the Additional Prosecutor General opposed the application, citing that the applicant had been delaying proceedings through frequent adjournments. The Court observed that the cases had been previously transferred to Mirpurkhas via an exhaustive order dated 09.05.2016, which the applicant had not challenged. Furthermore, the record indicated that the applicant himself contributed to the delays in the transferee court. The Court held that no valid grounds for re-transfer existed and that the application was an attempt to hamper judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, affirming that a party instrumental in causing trial delays cannot seek a transfer on the basis of convenience.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who is instrumental in delaying trial proceedings seek the transfer of a case to another court?
  • Does the mere fact that parties reside within a specific jurisdiction necessitate the transfer of a case to that jurisdiction if a prior transfer order exists?
  • Is a transfer application maintainable when the applicant fails to challenge a previous exhaustive order transferring the case to the current court?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ur Rehman alias Heera vs The State and others2018 YLR 2243 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-20
  post-arrest bailnarcotics recoverysearch warrantfurther inquirypolice custodypossession of contrabandprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail concerns a case registered under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, involving the recovery of two kilograms of charas from the petitioner's house while he was already in police custody for another offense. The core legal questions were whether the failure of the police to obtain a search warrant, despite the accused being in custody, vitiated the recovery, and whether the lack of evidence connecting the accused to the premises warranted bail. The Court held that because the petitioner was already in custody, there was no risk of concealment or removal of narcotics, making the failure to obtain a search warrant under section 20 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, a significant omission. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to provide evidence linking the petitioner to the premises. The Court affirmed that while an in-depth scrutiny is not required at the bail stage, the case against the petitioner required further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the police to obtain a search warrant under section 20 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, when the accused is already in custody, provide a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Are the provisions of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, applicable to search proceedings conducted under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can a court consider the defense plea of an accused tentatively while deciding a bail application?
  • Does the lack of evidence connecting an accused to the premises from which narcotics were recovered constitute a case of further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Aziz vs District Coordination Officer, Rajanpur and another2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Service) 129 · Punjab Service Tribunal · 2017-09-26
  service appealdismissal from servicecriminal convictionacquittal on compromisehonourable acquittalback benefitssuperannuationPEEDA Act 2006
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal was instituted by a school teacher who challenged his dismissal from service following a criminal conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was subsequently set aside upon his acquittal by the Supreme Court of Pakistan pursuant to a compromise. The core legal question was whether an acquittal based on a compromise constitutes an honourable acquittal for the purpose of reinstatement and back benefits, and whether departmental proceedings and dismissal without holding a regular inquiry or awaiting the final verdict of the apex court were sustainable. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that all acquittals, including those based on a compromise, completely exonerate an accused person and are deemed honourable, rendering subsequent departmental punitive actions based on the conviction illegal and void. The Tribunal laid down the principle that an acquittal in a criminal case purges the individual of the charge for all service matters, making grant of back benefits and notification of retirement upon superannuation the rule upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal based on a compromise with legal heirs constitutes an honourable acquittal for a civil servant?
  • Is a departmental dismissal order passed without awaiting the final judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan sustainable?
  • Whether a civil servant reinstated after acquittal from a criminal charge is entitled to back benefits as a matter of rule?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed Jalil and others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 502 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-27Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 298 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-15
  pre-arrest bailprohibitory clausedelay in FIRvicarious liabilitybailable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Khalil Ahmad, Iqbal alias Papu, and Gulzar Ahmed seeking pre-arrest bail in case FIR No. 379/2017 registered under Sections 337-F(iii), F(i), A(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Thingi, District Vehari, involving allegations of assault and inflicting sota blows. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to pre-arrest bail given the nature of the injuries attributed to them and the unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report. The Lahore High Court accepted the petition and confirmed the pre-arrest bail, holding that the injury attributed to Khalil Ahmed falls under a bailable section, the injuries attributed to the other petitioners do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and an unexplained six-day delay in reporting the matter weakens the prosecution's case at the bail stage. The key principles laid down include that offences outside the prohibitory clause heavily favor the grant of bail when sufficient incriminating material is lacking, and an unexplained delay in reporting a crime is fatal to the prosecution at the preliminary stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the offenses charged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report fatal to the prosecution's case at the bail stage?
  • How is the question of vicarious liability determined when assessing a pre-arrest bail petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed and 2 others vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 298, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 194 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-15
  pre-arrest bailprohibitory clausedelay in FIRvicarious liabilitybail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from an application by Khalil Ahmad, Iqbal alias Papu, and Gulzar Ahmed seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 379/2017 registered under Sections 337-F(iii), F(i), A(i), 148, 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Thingi, District Vehari. The core legal question concerns the entitlement of the petitioners to pre-arrest bail given the nature of the injuries attributed to them, the applicability of the prohibitory clause, and an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The Lahore High Court accepted the petition and confirmed the pre-arrest bail. The court held that the injury attributed to one petitioner was bailable, the injuries attributed to the other petitioners fell outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and an unexplained six-day delay in reporting the matter weakened the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that pre-arrest bail may be confirmed when offenses do not fall within the prohibitory clause, there is an unexplained delay in reporting, and the prosecution lacks sufficient incriminating material at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when the offenses charged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an unexplained delay of six days in lodging the FIR considered fatal to the prosecution's case at the bail stage?
  • Can the question of vicarious liability under Sections 148 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be properly assessed at the trial stage after recording evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmad vs Atta Muhammad and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 15, 2018 YLR 1672 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-18Read full judgment →
• Khalida Idrees etc vs Anas Farooq Chaudhary etc2018 LHC 1413 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-07
  partition suitoral giftinheritanceAhmadi faithTransfer of Property Actco-sharerlimitationwomen's inheritance rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular first appeal challenged a trial court judgment dismissing a partition suit filed by two sisters against their brother regarding inherited property. The core legal question concerned the validity of an alleged oral gift and a prior Will Deed, which the respondent claimed excluded the appellants from ownership. The Court held that because the parties are of the Ahmadi faith, they are not governed by Muslim Personal Law; therefore, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies. The Court found the respondent failed to prove the essential ingredients of a valid gift—offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession—and failed to register the transaction as required by law. Additionally, the Court ruled that limitation does not operate against co-sharers in inheritance matters. Emphasizing the need for judicial caution in cases involving the disinheritance of women, the Court set aside the trial court's decision, finding the appellants entitled to their half-share in the estate. The appeal was allowed, and the partition suit was decreed in favor of the appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of limitation apply to a suit for partition filed by a co-sharer in an inheritance matter?
  • Are followers of the Ahmadi faith governed by Muslim Personal Law regarding gifts and inheritance?
  • What are the mandatory requirements for a valid gift of immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Can a party simultaneously rely on conflicting claims of ownership through a Will Deed and an oral gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid vs The State and another2018 MLD 398 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-11Read full judgment →
• Khalid Saleem Marwat vs National Accountability Bereau through Chairman and 3 others2018 MLD 1326 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
• Khalid Saleem Marwat vs NAB2018 MLD 1326, 2018 PHC 1472 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-03Read full judgment →
• Khalid Rashid Sheikh and others vs Judicial Officer, Punjab2018 CLC 1955 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-20Read full judgment →
• Khalid Nazir, etc. vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 642 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-11
  criminal revisionprivate complaintsecond complaintissuance of processsummoning orderabuse of processjudicial discretiondelay in filing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision challenged an order summoning the petitioners in a private complaint, following the dismissal of an earlier complaint regarding the same incident. The core legal question was whether a second criminal complaint is maintainable on identical facts without disclosing new circumstances, and whether a trial court must provide reasons when issuing summons. The Court held that while there is no absolute bar to filing a second complaint, it constitutes an abuse of process if it merely re-litigates facts already adjudicated upon without presenting fresh evidence. Furthermore, the issuance of summons is not a mechanical exercise; the trial court must scrutinize the complaint, assess the evidence, and consider the potential for harassment, particularly when there is a significant delay in filing. The Court emphasized that the trial court failed to apply its mind or discuss the evidence properly. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for a fresh decision, requiring the trial court to properly evaluate the material on record and the implications of the previous dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second criminal complaint maintainable on the same facts and circumstances after the dismissal of an earlier complaint?
  • Does the issuance of summons in a private complaint require the trial court to provide reasons and demonstrate an application of mind?
  • Can a criminal revision be maintained against an order issuing summons in a private complaint?
  • Does a significant delay in filing a criminal complaint affect the court's scrutiny of the allegations?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Nazir and others vs The State and othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 642, 2018 MLD 26 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-11
  criminal revisionprivate complaintsecond complaintsummoning orderabuse of processjudicial discretionpreliminary inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged an order summoning the petitioners in a private criminal complaint. The core legal question was whether a second private complaint is maintainable after the dismissal of a previous one on the same facts, and whether the trial court properly applied its judicial mind when issuing summons. The Court held that while there is no absolute bar to filing a second complaint, it is an abuse of process to entertain one without the disclosure of fresh, material facts and circumstances not previously considered. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the issuance of summons is not a mechanical exercise; a magistrate must scrutinize the complaint and supporting material to prevent harassment. The Court found that the trial court failed to adequately discuss the evidence or the previous dismissal, rendering the summoning order legally flawed. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, mandating that the trial court must properly evaluate the evidence and the history of the case before issuing any process.

  Questions settled

  • Is a second private criminal complaint maintainable after the dismissal of a previous complaint on the same facts?
  • Does the issuance of summons in a private criminal complaint require the trial court to record reasons and demonstrate application of mind?
  • Can a criminal revision be filed against an order issuing summons in a private complaint?
  • Does an unexplained delay in filing a private criminal complaint cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations?
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• Khalid Nadeem vs Government of Pakistan and others2018 MLD 149 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan etc.2018 PLJ SC 149 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitstermination simplicitercoerced undertakinglabour lawreinstatementpermanent employeeunfair labour practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that denied back benefits to the appellant, a Junior Office Assistant, following his reinstatement. The appellant’s services were initially terminated without cause, a decision overturned by the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal. The respondent-Corporation argued that the appellant waived his right to back benefits upon reinstatement by signing a charge assumption report and that the termination was valid under internal service regulations. The Supreme Court held that the termination of a permanent employee without assigning explicit reasons is illegal and that internal regulations allowing for "termination simpliciter" are ultra vires. Furthermore, the Court ruled that waivers or undertakings signed by employees under the duress of unemployment and financial hardship are not binding or enforceable. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's decision, upheld the findings of the Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal, and ordered the respondent-Corporation to pay the appellant's back benefits, rejecting the employer's belated, unsubstantiated claims regarding the initial illegality of the appellant's appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employer terminate a permanent employee without assigning explicit reasons?
  • Is a waiver of back benefits signed by an employee under financial duress legally binding?
  • Are service regulations allowing for termination simpliciter valid under the law?
  • Can an employer raise a new plea regarding the illegality of an appointment for the first time before the Supreme Court?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and others2018 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitstermination simpliciterreinstatementindustrial employmentwaiver and acquiescenceservice regulations
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the termination of the appellant's service as a Junior Office Assistant by the respondent-Corporation. The appellant's service was terminated without assigning reasons under Regulation 22(I)(a) of the State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973, prompting him to approach the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement. The Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Corporation's appeal, but subsequent writ proceedings led to the High Court partially accepting the Corporation's petition by denying back benefits due to the appellant's acceptance of reinstatement. The core legal questions involved the legality of termination without reasons under statutory regulations versus labour laws, and the entitlement of the employee to back benefits notwithstanding a purported waiver or charge assumption report. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that termination without explicit reasons violates the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and that forced waivers or charge reports signed under duress by jobless employees do not preclude back benefits. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Labour Court and Tribunal judgments and granting back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee's services can be terminated without assigning explicit reasons under service regulations in conflict with the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Is an employee entitled to back benefits upon reinstatement when the initial termination has been adjudicated as illegal by competent labour forums?
  • Does signing a charge assumption report or waiver under the compulsion of joblessness bar an employee from claiming legal back benefits?
  • Can a plea regarding the illegality of an initial appointment be raised for the first time in a concise statement after the judgment has been reserved?
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• Khalid Mehmood vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 32018 PLC 56 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-08
  domestic inquiryright of cross-examinationfair trialdue processmaster and servantdismissal from serviceaudi alteram partemconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenges the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside the Labour Court's decision and upheld the petitioner bank employee's dismissal from service for alleged embezzlement. The core legal question was whether the domestic inquiry was conducted in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice, particularly regarding the right of cross-examination. The Lahore High Court held that the inquiry proceedings suffered from inherent legal defects because the petitioner was denied the opportunity to cross-examine departmental witnesses, and the inquiry report was not supplied prior to dismissal in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court laid down the principle that domestic inquiries must strictly adhere to the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and ensure the right of cross-examination, and that failure to provide a fair hearing and inquiry report vitiates the dismissal order. The petition was allowed, setting aside the appellate tribunal's judgment and the dismissal order, while permitting the respondent bank to hold a fresh inquiry if it so opts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether denial of the opportunity to cross-examine departmental witnesses in a domestic inquiry violates the principles of natural justice and the right to a fair trial?
  • Does the failure to supply a copy of the inquiry report to an employee before passing a dismissal order render the order legally unsustainable?
  • Can a High Court interfere in a labor tribunal's decision under constitutional jurisdiction when mandatory legal procedures and due process have been violated?
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• Khalid Mehmood Khan and 13 others vs Board of Revenue, Azad Jammu2018 PLD High Court (AJ&K) 15 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-10-13Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and 4 others vs M/s. Multi Plus Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 PLJ Karachi 120 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-21
  extraordinary general meetingelection of directorsmandatory notice periodcompany lawinterlocutory injunctionshareholding disputetransitional board of directors
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter arose from multiple interlocutory applications challenging the legality of an Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM) held by a private limited company and the election of its directors, alongside underlying disputes concerning share transfers and breach of trust. The core legal question centered on whether the EOGM convened on twenty-one days including the notice date complied with the mandatory statutory notice requirements of company law. The Sindh High Court held that the failure to provide twenty-one clear days' notice rendered the EOGM and the decisions taken therein, including the election of new directors, a nullity in the eyes of law. The court laid down the principle that statutory provisions prescribing clear time periods for convening general meetings are mandatory, and participation under protest by members cannot cure a fundamental illegality in convening such a meeting. Consequently, the court set aside the actions taken at the impugned meeting, invoked transitional provisions to restore the prior Board of Directors solely to conduct fresh elections, and disposed of the pending miscellaneous applications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the requirement of giving twenty-one days' notice for an extraordinary general meeting under company law is mandatory?
  • Does participation under protest in an extraordinary general meeting cure defects in the convening notice?
  • Can a court at the interlocutory stage determine complex shareholding disputes and the authenticity of underlying trust agreements?
  • What is the legal status of an extraordinary general meeting convened without adhering to statutory notice timelines?
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• Khalid Mehmood alias Mooda & another vs The State2018 LHC 1804 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-03
  criminal appealrecovery witnessbeyond reasonable doubtillegal detentionanti-terrorismpolice record discrepancyacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court, Rawalpindi, for offences related to the possession of explosives, unlicensed weapons, and pamphlets of a proscribed organization. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt given the significant discrepancies in the evidence. The Lahore High Court found that the prosecution's case was fundamentally flawed. Specifically, the testimony of key recovery witnesses was contradicted by official police records (Roznamcha), which placed them in Lahore for official duties at the time of the alleged arrest. Furthermore, the Court noted that the appellants' defense of prior illegal detention by police—corroborated by the filing of a habeas corpus petition—cast serious doubt on the veracity of the recovery. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The principle laid down is that where prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions and official records refute the presence of recovery witnesses, the conviction cannot be sustained, necessitating an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contradiction between official police records and the testimony of recovery witnesses regarding their presence at the scene render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove the recovery of incriminating material beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Is the evidence of a recovery witness credible if official records place them at a different location during the time of the alleged occurrence?
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• Khalid Meer etc vs Faqeerullah Minhaj etc2018 PLD Lahore 697, 2018 LHC 1092, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 1635 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-06Read full judgment →
• Khalid Meer and others vs Faqeerullah Minhaj and others2018 PLD Lahore 697 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-06Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mahmood vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, etc. 4.2018 P.S.C. 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-12
  back benefitsillegal terminationtermination simpliciterlabour courtmaster and servantwaiver and acquiescencereinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the termination of the appellant's services as a Junior Office Assistant by the respondent-Corporation. The appellant's service was terminated without assigning reasons, prompting him to approach the Punjab Labour Court, which ordered his reinstatement—a decision upheld by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. Subsequent litigation led the High Court to hold that the appellant was not entitled to back benefits due to accepting reinstatement. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether an employee reinstated after an illegal termination without cause is entitled to back benefits, and whether a regulation allowing termination simpliciter overrides statutory protections. The Supreme Court held that the termination without explicit reasons violated the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and that regulations permitting termination without cause are ultra vires. The Court further held that an employee forced to sign a joining report under duress of joblessness cannot be denied back benefits through waiver or acquiescence. The appeal was accordingly allowed, restoring the Labour Court's judgment with an order for back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee whose termination is declared illegal by a labour court is legally entitled to back benefits for the intervening period?
  • Does a regulation permitting termination simpliciter without assigning reasons override the protections of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Can an employer rely on a charge assumption report or joining undertaking signed under duress to deny back benefits to a reinstated employee?
  • Whether a new factual plea regarding the illegality of an initial appointment can be raised for the first time in a concise statement after judgment has been reserved?
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• Khalid Khan vs Mst. Noreen Mumtaz2018 PHC 1755 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-25Read full judgment →
• Khalid Khan vs Fazal Riaz and 3 others2018 CLC 615 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Khalid Khan vs Director General Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), Karachi2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 87 · Federal Service Tribunal
  misconductdismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryconfessional statementPakistan Rangersservice appealdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a member of the Pakistan Rangers, challenged his dismissal from service following allegations of misconduct involving illicit relations with the wife of a fellow employee. A departmental inquiry was conducted, resulting in the imposition of a major penalty. The appellant appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal, contending that the evidence was insufficient, the alleged abductee was never produced, and the proceedings violated principles of natural justice. The respondents maintained that a regular inquiry was held, the appellant was afforded full opportunity for defense, and sufficient evidence, including witness statements, supported the charges. The Tribunal observed that the appellant had provided a written confessional statement before the inquiry committee regarding his illicit relations. Relying on established precedents regarding the weight of voluntary confessions in disciplinary proceedings, the Tribunal held that the disciplinary action was justified. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant’s confession and the regular inquiry process sufficiently established the misconduct, thereby upholding the dismissal order.

  Questions settled

  • Does a written confession made before an inquiry committee constitute sufficient evidence to uphold a dismissal order for misconduct?
  • Is a departmental inquiry valid if the accused is provided an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and participate in the proceedings?
  • Can a service tribunal interfere with a disciplinary penalty if the inquiry process followed the prescribed rules and the charge was proven?
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• Khalid Inayat & Ors vs Province of Sindh & Ors2018 SHC 660 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-25Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hameed vs The State2019 PCRLJ 1188, 2018 LHC 2920 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-05
  circumstantial evidencelast seen evidencedeath sentencerape and murderres gestaecriminal appealDNA evidenceabduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence handed down by the trial court against the appellant for the abduction, rape, and murder of a six-year-old girl. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution’s case, resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court upheld the conviction and confirmed the death sentence. The Court held that while the case was based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution successfully established a complete chain of incriminating facts. Specifically, the Court affirmed that "last seen" evidence is admissible and reliable when corroborated by proximity of time and distance between the event and the victim's death. Furthermore, the recovery of the deceased's body from the appellant's possession and the discovery of incriminating items in his rented room, linked via the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, provided sufficient corroboration. The Court emphasized that courts must adopt a pragmatic approach in cases of sexual violence against minors, rejecting the notion that inconclusive DNA evidence necessitates acquittal when other evidence is overwhelming.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence?
  • Is 'last seen' evidence sufficient to support a conviction without further corroboration?
  • Does the failure of DNA evidence to match the accused necessitate an acquittal in a rape case?
  • Can a recovery made under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 be valid without independent witnesses under section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
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• Khalid Hameed Hashmi vs Govt of Sindh & Ors2018 SHC 1152 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-30Read full judgment →
• Khalid Habib vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and others2018 YLR 383 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-08
  plea bargainNational Accountability Ordinancedisqualificationretrospective dismissaldiscriminationpublic officewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of the petitioner from service following a plea bargain entered into under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal questions were whether the departmental dismissal order, effective from the date of the plea bargain, constituted an illegal retrospective order, and whether the petitioner was entitled to relief based on alleged discriminatory treatment compared to other employees. The Court held that the petition was maintainable as the petitioner’s service was governed by statutory rules. On merits, the Court held that the plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, by operation of Section 15, mandates that an accused ceases to hold public office "forthwith" upon the acceptance of the plea bargain. Consequently, the departmental dismissal order was merely an administrative implementation of this statutory consequence rather than an illegal retrospective penalty. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an illegal act by an authority cannot establish a precedent for discrimination, as two wrongs do not make a right. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plea bargain under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, result in the automatic cessation of public office?
  • Can a departmental dismissal order based on a plea bargain be challenged as an illegal retrospective order?
  • Does the principle of discrimination apply when an authority has previously passed an illegal or unwarranted order in favor of another person?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against a company that was formerly a statutory corporation governed by statutory rules?
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• Khalid Farooq and another vs The State and another2018 MLD 569 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-26
  murderbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealdeath sentenceacquittalmedical evidenceocular testimonyrecovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of two brothers following an altercation, sentencing them to death and imprisonment for life. The Lahore High Court examined the evidence, noting discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative, the casting of a wider net involving multiple family members with dubious roles, unconvincing recoveries of weapons, and an obscure motive relating to a minor dispute over a soft drink payment. The Court held that when participation of some accused is found suspicious and the ocular and medical accounts do not inspire full confidence, it is unsafe to maintain convictions based on a guess game, adhering to the principle that it is better to err in acquittal than in conviction. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, acquitted the appellants, and answered the murder reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether convictions for murder can be sustained when the prosecution's narrative involves casting a wider net and exaggerating the roles of multiple accused?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused with similar or inconsequential roles require independent corroboration for the remaining appellants?
  • Whether delayed and suspicious recoveries of weapons can provide the requisite corroboration in a capital case?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the true genesis of the occurrence and the motive remain shrouded in doubt?
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• Khalid Farooq and another vs State and another2018 MLD 569, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 468 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-26
  murderbenefit of doubtcriminal appealmurder referencedeath sentenceappreciation of evidenceocular accountmedical corroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and sentencing them to death and imprisonment for life following a private complaint for a double murder. The core legal question revolves around whether the ocular account, corroborated by medical evidence and recoveries, is sufficient to maintain the conviction despite the acquittal of co-accused and discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative regarding motive and the manner of assault. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from significant doubts, including an inflated array of accused, an unconvincing trivial motive regarding a monetary dispute, suspicious recoveries of weapons, and a melee initiated under unclear circumstances. The court laid down the principle that once the participation of some accused is found suspicious and independent corroboration is lacking, it is unsafe to maintain convictions on the basis of a guess game, and it is better to err in acquittal than in conviction to ensure the safe administration of criminal justice. Consequently, the convictions were set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the murder reference was answered in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused with similar roles requires independent corroboration before maintaining the conviction of remaining accused?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on the basis of an ocular account when the motive is obscure and weapons recovery is deemed suspicious?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt should be extended to the accused when the prosecution's narrative regarding the origin and manner of the melee is doubtful?
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• Khalid Aziz and others vs Province of Punjab and others2018 MLD 102 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-10Read full judgment →
• Khaista Gul vs The State2018 YLR 368 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-19
  post-arrest bailforged CNICrecovery of liquorfurther inquiryprohibitory clausecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The accused/petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving alleged offenses related to forgery, cheating, possession of liquor, and violation of foreigner laws under FIR No. 304 registered at Police Station Gulbahar, District Peshawar. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the recovery, lack of an FSL report, and applicability of the penal provisions. The Peshawar High Court held that since the offenses did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the FSL report for the contraband was awaited, the CNIC genuineness required further probe, and bail cannot be withheld as a punishment or pre-conviction, the case warranted further inquiry. Consequently, the petition was accepted and the petitioner was admitted to bail. The key principle laid down is that bail should not be withheld as a form of preventive punishment and that offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. merit bail when further inquiry into the accused's guilt is required.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted when the offenses charged do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the absence of an FSL report regarding recovered contraband at the bail stage constitute grounds for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused?
  • Whether bail can be withheld as a form of advance conviction?
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• Khair Muhammad Shah vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 47 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-25
  rash and negligent drivingqatl-e-khatabenefit of the doubthearsay evidencevehicular accidentcriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Lasbela at Hub, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing the death of a motorcyclist through a vehicular accident while driving an oil tanker. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully established that the appellant was driving in a rash and negligent manner and whether the accident was a direct result thereof. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a shadow of doubt, noting that the complainant was not an eyewitness, his testimony regarding negligence was inadmissible hearsay, and the site plan was vague. The Court emphasized that negligence cannot be presumed merely from the occurrence of an accident or the payment of burial expenses by the accused, and that the benefit of any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained solely on the basis of hearsay evidence regarding rash and negligent driving?
  • Whether an accused's financial assistance to a victim's family or payment of burial expenditures amounts to an admission of guilt in a criminal trial?
  • Is a presumption of negligence raised merely because a person has died in a vehicular accident?
  • What is the duty of the prosecution when two possibilities or interpretations are open on the evidence presented in a criminal case?
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• Khair Muhammad alias Khario vs The State2018 KLR Criminal Cases 116 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-12
  Qatl-e-Amddeath sentenceocular evidencedying declarationinterested witnessdeterrencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Killa Abdullah, which convicted the appellant of Qatl-e-Amd and sentenced him to death with compensation. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular evidence, despite alleged contradictions and the absence of a working weapon, and whether the death sentence was appropriate. The Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt through consistent ocular testimony from the deceased's sons and the dying declaration (Fard-e-Bayan), which corroborated medical evidence. The Court affirmed that minor contradictions in witness statements do not invalidate the prosecution's case and that relationship to the deceased does not render a witness 'interested' or unreliable. The Court laid down the principle that in murder cases, the normal penalty is death, and courts should not hesitate to impose it absent mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the purpose of sentencing includes deterrence, retribution, and reformation, and that the judiciary owes a duty to society and victims' heirs to ensure sentences are commensurate with the gravity of the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship of a witness to the deceased automatically render their testimony unreliable or 'interested'?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon of offence a mandatory requirement for proving a murder case?
  • What is the standard for awarding the death penalty in a murder case where no mitigating circumstances exist?
  • Does the absence of motive invalidate a prosecution case supported by unimpeachable ocular evidence?
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