Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Hassan Javed and another vs Punjab Education Foundation and 42018 PLJ Lahore 303 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hassan Gul vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 1032 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-15
  murderinjured witnessinterested witnessweapon recoverysentence mitigationlife imprisonmentland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the judgment of the Sessions Judge Musakhail Loralai, which convicted the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced him to death, alongside convictions under Sections 324 and 337-ADF of the same Code. The prosecution's case was that the appellant and his co-accused launched a firearm attack on a vehicle, killing one passenger and injuring another. The appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds of interested witnesses, lack of independent corroboration, and non-recovery of the crime weapon. The High Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the testimony of an injured eyewitness is highly credible and natural, and cannot be discarded merely due to relationship with the deceased. Furthermore, the Court ruled that non-recovery of the crime weapon is not fatal when direct, credible ocular evidence establishes the guilt. However, noting the mitigating circumstance of an ongoing land dispute between the parties, the Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of an eyewitness be discarded solely on the ground of relationship with the deceased?
  • Is the non-recovery of the crime weapon fatal to the prosecution's case when direct ocular evidence is available?
  • Does the presence of a land dispute between parties constitute a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Hasnain Obaid vs Asif Shakoor2019 MLD 76, 2018 PHC 1803 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-09-10Read full judgment →
• Hashmat Medical and Dental College vs Pakistan Medical and Dental2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 331, 2019 PLJ SC 21, 2018 SCMR 1310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  medical educationprivate medical collegePMDC registrationexcessive fee refundinterim reliefsuo motu jurisdictionstudent career protection
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Hashmat Medical and Dental College, sought leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court order declining interim relief to direct Riphah International University to conduct professional MBBS examinations for its students. The core legal questions involved whether a sub-standard private medical college lacking basic infrastructure, valid registration, and proper affiliations could be permitted to continue admissions and conduct examinations, and whether excess fees charged from students should be refunded. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that institutions failing to meet Pakistan Medical and Dental Council standards must be shut down and their registrations cancelled. The Court laid down key principles emphasizing that private medical education requires strict regulatory oversight, unauthorized and sub-standard medical colleges must be weeded out firmly, and students of affected institutions must be accommodated or granted refunds while criminal investigations are initiated against illegal managements.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unauthorized medical college lacking basic infrastructure and PM&DC registration is entitled to interim relief for conducting student examinations?
  • Can the Supreme Court direct the Federal Investigation Agency to lodge an FIR and investigate private medical colleges charging excessive fees?
  • Whether students of a disaffiliated and unrecognised medical college can be adjusted in other approved colleges upon qualifying their examinations?
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• Haseeb Ahmad vs Mst. Wajiha Wakeel and 2 others2018 YLR 20 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-03Read full judgment →
• Hascol Petroleum Limited vs Rent Registrar_Urban Sub-Registrar, Sialkot and another2018 PLD Lahore 713 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
• Hascol Petroleum Limited vs Rent Registrar/Urban Sub Registrar, Sialkot2018 PLD Lahore 713, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1032, 2018 LHC 896 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
• Hascol Petroleum Limited vs Competition Commission of Pakistan and 3 others2018 CLD 812 · Competition Appellate Tribunal · 2016-12-21Read full judgment →
• Haroon Zia Malik vs Mst. Fariha Razzak and 6 others2018 YLR 1557 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
• Haroon vs Abdul Aziz2018 YLR 53 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-29Read full judgment →
• Haroon Shafique vs The State and others2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 971, 2018 SCMR 2118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-16
  MurderAppeal by leaveReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtAcquittalEye-witness testimonyCorroborationMotiveRecovery of weaponUnexplained injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave before the Supreme Court challenging the appellant's conviction and life sentence for murder under Section 302(b) PPC, read with Section 149 PPC. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of evidence, specifically concerning the identification of the accused in a night occurrence, the non-production of natural and independent injured witnesses, unexplained injuries sustained by the appellant and co-accused, and the lack of independent corroboration. The Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from material doubts, including the absence of secured electric light, non-production of crucial witnesses leading to an adverse inference, and inconsistencies regarding motive and weapon recovery. The Court also noted that the High Court had itself concluded it was a case of a free fight without premeditation. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt, emphasizing that such benefit must be given when the prosecution's story is doubted in material particulars and corroboration is lacking.

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• Haroon Rashid vs Additional District Judge and others2018 MLD 1793 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-02Read full judgment →
• Haroon Rasheed vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1117 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-21
  criminal appealmurdersolitary eyewitnesscorroborationconfessional statementvoluntary confessionbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the murder of his wife. The core legal questions involved whether the solitary testimony of a related eyewitness without corroboration and an involuntary confessional statement procured through promise can form the basis of a conviction. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the sole eyewitness lacked necessary corroboration, especially when an independent eyewitness was unjustifiably abandoned by the prosecution, and that the confessional statement was tainted as it was not voluntary and resulted from a promise of making the accused an approver. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The key principle laid down is that a conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of a solitary related eyewitness lacking independent corroboration or on a confessional statement vitiated by duress, pressure, or promise.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be recorded on the solitary statement of a related eyewitness without independent corroboration?
  • Can a confessional statement obtained through an offer or promise of making the accused an approver be considered voluntary?
  • What is the legal effect of the prosecution unjustifiably abandoning a material independent eyewitness?
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• Haralambous vs Crown Court at St. Albans and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 173 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom · 2018-01-24Read full judgment →
• Haq Nawaz vs The State2019 P.S.C (Crl.) 641, 2018 SCMR 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-09
  criminal appealdeath sentencemitigating circumstancesproof of motivemurder convictionsentence reductionCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the death sentence was appropriate or if mitigating circumstances warranted a reduction to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but allowed the appeal to the extent of the sentence, reducing the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The Court held that the prosecution’s failure to prove the alleged motive, coupled with the non-production of key eye-witnesses, a delay in the post-mortem examination, and the complainant's lack of interest in the proceedings, constituted significant mitigating factors. The established legal principle applied is that when the prosecution asserts a specific motive but fails to substantiate it during trial, such failure may react against the imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, the Court maintained the compensation order while extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged motive in a murder case constitute a mitigating factor for the sentence?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to imprisonment for life based on the prosecution's failure to produce key witnesses?
  • Is a delay in the post-mortem examination a relevant factor in determining the appropriateness of a death sentence?
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• Haq Nawaz vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 69 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-02-20
  dying declarationmurder referencemitigating circumstancesdeath sentence conversionimprisonment for lifeprompt FIRocular accountpost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with a connected murder reference. The core legal question involved whether an FIR lodged by an injured person who subsequently succumbed to his injuries can be treated as a dying declaration and form the sole basis of conviction, and whether the sentence of death was warranted given mitigating circumstances. The Peshawar High Court held that the FIR lodged promptly by the injured person qualified as a dying declaration under Article 46(1) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, notwithstanding that the victim was not under expectation of death or that the injury was on a non-vital part, and that such a dying declaration is sufficient to sustain a conviction. However, considering mitigating factors such as the absence of motive, a single firearm shot on a non-vital part without repetition, and delayed medical first aid contributing to death, the court partially allowed the appeal, maintaining the conviction but converting the death sentence to imprisonment for life, while altering the compensation and extending the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR lodged by an injured person who later dies be treated as a dying declaration?
  • Is it necessary for the admissibility of a dying declaration that the deceased must be under the expectation of death at the time of making it?
  • Whether the statement of a witness recorded under section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be transferred and relied upon without affording the accused an opportunity of cross-examination?
  • What constitutes sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant the conversion of a death sentence to imprisonment for life in a murder case?
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• Haq Nawaz vs Ministry of Information and Technology and others2018 CLC 28 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Haq Nawaz and others vs The State and others2018 SCMR 95 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-23
  reappraisal of evidencesole eye-witnessbenefit of doubtmurdercriminal appealunnatural conductacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein convict-appellants Haq Nawaz and Muhammad Hayat challenged their conviction under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Nooran Bibi. The core legal question revolved around the reappraisal of evidence, specifically the reliability and trustworthiness of the sole eye-witness/informant whose testimony formed the basis of the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the testimony of the primary witness was unnatural, fraught with contradictions, and lacked corroboration, particularly in light of strained family relations and an unexplained two-month delay in recording her statement to the police. Furthermore, the same witness's testimony had already been disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused. Consequently, the Court laid down that when the sole ocular account is unnatural, uncorroborated, and comes from an interested witness with strained relations, it fails to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt, warranting an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eye-witness whose conduct is unnatural and improbable can form the basis of a murder conviction without reliable corroboration?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a belated statement recorded by the police after an unexplained delay of two months?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the testimony of the sole star witness has already been disbelieved by the courts regarding co-accused who were acquitted?
  • Does an interested witness with a background of strained family relations inspire confidence for capital punishment without strong corroborative evidence?
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• Hanif Khan vs Muhammad Hanif Khan2018 SC AJK 47 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-12-17Read full judgment →
• Hamza Haneef Awan & others vs Sher Ali Mengal & others2019 CLC 292, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1666, 2018 SHC 717 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-22Read full judgment →
• Hamood Mehmood vs Mst. Shabana Ishaque and 3 others2018 YLR 713 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-10Read full judgment →
• Hamidullah vs The State2018 PLD Balochistan 71 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-27
  sodomyunnatural offencesolitary statement of victimdelay in FIRmedical evidencedisclosure statementquantum of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing an unnatural offence. The core legal questions involved whether the sole testimony of the victim, coupled with medical evidence and disclosure statements, was sufficient to sustain a conviction despite a delay in lodging the First Information Report and the hostility of certain prosecution witnesses. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through confidence-inspiring ocular testimony of the victim corroborated by medical evidence and admissible disclosure statements under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and that delay in reporting such sensitive crimes involving family honor is natural. The court dismissed the appeals on merits while modifying the quantum of sentence from seven years to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The key principles laid down include that the solitary statement of a victim in sodomy or rape cases is sufficient to convict if it inspires confidence, and that natural delays caused by considerations of family honor do not vitiate a criminal case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for sodomy be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim?
  • Does a delay in lodging the FIR vitiate the prosecution case in offences involving family honor and prestige?
  • Is a disclosure statement leading to the discovery of facts admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What is the effect of hostility of witnesses who are not direct observers of the crime on the broader prosecution case?
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• Hamid Mustafa vs University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences and 62018 PLC (C.S.) 1082 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-28
  disciplinary proceedingsPEEDA Actright to cross-examinationnatural justicewrongful dismissalreinstatementadministrative negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the dismissal of the Petitioner, a PhD scholar and lecturer at the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, following allegations of providing fake email addresses for external thesis examiners. The core legal questions concern whether the Petitioner was responsible for administrative errors in the examiner selection process, whether the disciplinary inquiry violated the mandatory procedures of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, and whether the Petitioner was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses. The Court held that the responsibility for selecting examiners lay with the University administration, not the Petitioner, and that the inquiry proceedings were fundamentally flawed due to the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses and the reliance on a disputed confessional statement not confronted during the inquiry. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal orders, directing the Petitioner's reinstatement. The judgment reaffirms the principle that disciplinary proceedings must strictly adhere to statutory procedural requirements, including the right to cross-examination, and that no employee should suffer for the omissions of government functionaries.

  Questions settled

  • Can a disciplinary inquiry be sustained if the accused is denied the right to cross-examine witnesses as required by the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006?
  • Is a confessional statement valid in disciplinary proceedings if it was not confronted to the accused during the regular inquiry?
  • Can an employee be held liable for administrative errors committed by university officials in the selection of thesis examiners?
  • Does a preliminary inquiry constitute sufficient evidence for a final order of dismissal in disciplinary proceedings?
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• Hamid Ali alias PIA vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 460 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-26
  criminal appealembezzlementforgerymisappropriationpublic documentspension fraudrecovery of embezzled amount
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court (Central-I) Karachi convicting the appellant under sections 409, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for manipulating public documents and fraudulently misappropriating pension funds amounting to Rs. 16,95,000 from Pakistan Railways. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully proved forgery and embezzlement through reliable oral and documentary evidence, including recoveries made on the appellant's pointation. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent witness testimony, recovery of embezzled amounts, and tampered pension vouchers. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the manipulation of public pension documents and fraudulent withdrawal of funds constitutes an offence under sections 409, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Can a conviction for corruption and criminal breach of trust be sustained when recoveries of embezzled amounts are proven through consistent witness testimonies?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a handwriting expert's report under section 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when left unchallenged during trial?
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• Hameed Ullah & 8 others vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan &2018 PHC 1520 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-07Read full judgment →
• Hakim through L.Rs and others vs Member, (R&S), Board of Revenue, Sindh, Hyderabad and 5 others2018 YLR 1735 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-31Read full judgment →
• Hakim Ali Abro vs Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation through Chairman2018 PLC 51 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2014-10-13
  grievance noticelimitation periodback benefitsreinstatementevidentiary valuedepartmental appealcondonation of delaylabour court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a grievance application by the Sindh Labour Court, which had declared the appellant's claim time-barred. The appellant, a skilled worker, was kidnapped and held for ransom, preventing him from attending work. Upon release, he discovered he had been dismissed ex parte. He filed a departmental appeal and subsequently approached the Federal Service Tribunal, which admitted his appeal, effectively condoning the delay. Following Supreme Court rulings on the abatement of service appeals, the appellant filed a grievance petition before the Labour Court. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Labour Court misdirected itself by ignoring that the departmental appeal served as a valid grievance notice and that the delay had already been condoned by the Federal Service Tribunal. Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized that the signatory of the employer's written statement was never produced for cross-examination, rendering the employer's evidence insufficient. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the Labour Court's order, allowed the appeal, and ordered the appellant's reinstatement with fifty percent back benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a departmental appeal or representation be treated as a valid grievance notice under labour laws?
  • Does the failure of the signatory of a written statement to appear for cross-examination render the employer's evidence inadmissible?
  • Can a worker dismissed under the Removal from Service Ordinance still invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court?
  • Is a Labour Court permitted to treat a grievance application as time-barred when a superior tribunal has already condoned the delay in the proceedings?
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• Hakas (Pvt.) Ltd. through Managing Director vs Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through Chairman and 2 others2018 YLR 412 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →
• Hajj Organizers Association of Pakistan through Authorized Officer2018 PLD Islamabad 323 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Haji Sultan Abdul Majeed (decd.), etc. vs Mst. Shamim Akhtar (decd.), etc2018 PLJ SC 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  amendment of pleadingsalternative pleaforgeryundue influencecoercionwillcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from a suit seeking a declaration that two wills were the result of coercion and undue influence. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioners sought to amend their plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add a plea that the wills were forged. The trial court and High Court rejected the application on the grounds that adding a plea of forgery alongside coercion and undue influence introduced a contradictory plea that would change the entire complexion of the suit and cause delay. The Supreme Court of Pakistan converted the petition into an appeal and allowed the amendment. The Court held that the proposed amendment did not introduce mutually destructive or contradictory pleas, but rather an alternative plea that could legitimately coexist with the main plea. The Court laid down the principle that while contradictory and mutually destructive pleas cannot be taken, alternative or inconsistent pleas that can naturally coexist may be introduced through an amendment to the pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party amend their plaint to introduce an alternative plea of forgery when the original suit was based on coercion and undue influence?
  • What is the distinction between an alternative plea and a contradictory or mutually destructive plea for the purpose of amending pleadings?
  • Whether an amendment to a plaint can be allowed if it introduces an alternative plea that does not alter the fundamental character of the suit?
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• Haji Sultan Abdul Majeed (Decd) through Mehboob Sultan and Habib2018 PLJ SC 466, 2018 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-10-13
  amendment of plaintalternative pleacoercion and undue influenceforgerycivil proceduremutually destructive pleas
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that two wills were executed as a result of coercion and undue influence. During the pendency of the suit, they filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking to amend the plaint to include the plea that the wills were forged and did not bear the testator's signatures. The trial court and the High Court rejected the application, holding that the amendment would change the complexion of the suit and introduce a contradictory plea. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether an alternative plea of forgery can be introduced alongside an existing plea of coercion and undue influence. The Court held that the proposed amendment did not introduce mutually destructive or contradictory pleas, but rather constituted a legitimate plea in the alternative that could co-exist with the original case. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgments, and permitted the amendment to the plaint, laying down that alternative or even inconsistent pleas may be raised by way of amendment provided they are not mutually destructive.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to the plaint introducing a plea of forgery can be permitted alongside an existing plea of coercion and undue influence?
  • Can alternative or inconsistent pleas be raised by way of amendment to pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the distinction between alternative pleas and mutually destructive contradictory pleas in civil litigation?
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• Haji Shahid Hussain and others vs The State and another2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  bail refusalfraudHajj tour operatorsconstitutional jurisdictionstatutory dutypublic interest litigationcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court order denying bail to petitioners accused of operating a fraudulent travel agency. The petitioners were charged under Sections 419, 420, and 468 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly defrauding citizens seeking to perform Hajj. The core legal question concerned the petitioners' entitlement to bail given the evidence of their involvement in the scheme. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners were prima facie connected to the crime and that no malice was attributed to the complainants. Emphasizing the gravity of frauds involving religious obligations, the Court held that such cases require distinct judicial treatment. Furthermore, the Court invoked its powers under Articles 184(3) and 187 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue mandatory directions to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other state authorities. The Court established the principle that state institutions have a constitutional and statutory obligation to proactively prevent such organized financial crimes through public awareness and strict regulatory oversight, rather than merely responding after the commission of offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Are petitioners entitled to bail when prima facie evidence connects them to a fraudulent scheme involving religious travel services?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to issue directions to government ministries to ensure public awareness and regulatory compliance regarding Hajj tour operators?
  • Is there a constitutional and statutory obligation upon state authorities to proactively prevent organized financial crimes?
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• Haji Said Meer and others vs Azad Government of State of Azad Jammu2018 CLC 678 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-11-16
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensation enhancementcompulsory acquisitionwilling buyer and sellerpotential valuereference court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals against a judgment of the Reference Judge, Muzaffarabad, which enhanced compensation for land acquired by the Azad Government for a Tourist Hill Resort. The core legal question involved the determination of the fair market value of the acquired land, specifically whether the compensation awarded by the Collector and subsequently enhanced by the Reference Judge reflected the true market potential. The High Court held that the compensation determined by the lower court was arbitrary and lacked evidentiary support. Applying the principle that market value must reflect what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, considering both current use and future potential, the Court rejected the government's plea to restore the original assessment and the landowners' claim for a higher valuation. Instead, the Court determined the compensation by averaging the prices from relevant, contemporaneous sale deeds produced in evidence. The judgment reaffirms that valuation must be based on objective evidence, such as comparable sales and potentiality, rather than arbitrary figures, establishing that the average of valid comparable transactions serves as a reliable metric for fair compensation.

  Questions settled

  • How should the market value of acquired land be determined when there is conflicting evidence regarding its price?
  • Is the future potential use of land a relevant factor in determining compensation for compulsory acquisition?
  • Can a court determine compensation based on the average price of comparable sale deeds when other evidence is insufficient?
  • Does the principle of a 'willing buyer and willing seller' apply to the determination of compensation for acquired land?
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• Haji Rooh-Ul-Amin vs Saeed and others2018 P Cr. L J 50 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-08
  constitutional petitionJustice of Peaceregistration of FIRpublic servantanti-corruption establishmentjurisdictionrevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by the petitioner to impugn an order of the Additional Sessions Judge-III/Justice of Peace, Swabi, dismissing his application under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the registration of an FIR against private respondents and a public servant (Patwari) who allegedly tampered with land mutation records. The core legal question was whether a Justice of Peace or local police can order or register an investigation or criminal case against a public servant for corruption-related offenses, bypassing the specialized legal framework. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1999, local police and the Justice of Peace lack jurisdiction to register criminal cases of corruption against public servants, as such matters must be initiated exclusively through the Anti-Corruption Establishment following preliminary inquiries and proper administrative sanction. The key principle laid down is that corruption and record-tampering allegations involving public servants fall within the exclusive domain of the Anti-Corruption Establishment under its specific rules rather than ordinary police stations or Justices of Peace.

  Questions settled

  • Does the local police have jurisdiction to register an FIR against a public servant for corruption-related offenses?
  • Can a Justice of Peace issue directions for the registration of a criminal case against a public servant under section 22-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the prescribed procedure for initiating inquiries and registering cases against public servants under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1999?
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• Haji Rauf Ali, etc. vs D.P.O. D.I. Khan, etc2018 PLJ Peshawar 55 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-05Read full judgment →
• Haji Qasim Khan vs Kabir Khan and 2 others2018 YLR 282 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-15Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Yunus vs Haji Usman through L.Rs, and another2018 YLR 1142 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Yasin vs The State and another2018 YLR 908 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-14
  post-arrest bailtax refund scamembezzlementrestitution of amountprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner Haji Muhammad Yasin facing trial in a case concerning a tax refund scam involving fake refund vouchers, forged electricity bills, and illegal financial transactions under sections 419, 420, 468, 471, 409, 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The core legal question revolves around whether a private person accused of receiving and withdrawing allegedly ill-gotten funds through their bank account is entitled to post-arrest bail when the principal liability has been deposited. The Lahore High Court held that since the petitioner was a private person, the applicability of section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was questionable, the remaining offenses fell outside the prohibitory clause, and the full amount attributed to him had already been deposited, further incarceration would amount to pre-mature punishment. The court laid down the principle that post-arrest bail should be granted as a rule in offenses not falling within the prohibitory clause, particularly where the financial loss to the exchequer has been fully restituted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a private person alleged to have received ill-gotten funds in their bank account entitled to post-arrest bail when the disputed amount has been deposited back?
  • Does an offense under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply prima facie to a private individual who is not a public servant?
  • Whether continued incarceration of an under-trial prisoner can be used as a tool for pre-mature punishment when the financial loss has been satisfied?
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• Haji Muhammad Naeem vs Siraj-Ud-Din and 6 others2018 PLJ Quetta 49 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-04-25Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Musa vs Major (Retd.) Nadir Ali2018 [M] C.L.R. 295 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-24Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Arif Khattak & two others vs Chairman Director General, NABPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 787, 2018 PHC 1608 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-08Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Akram vs The State and another2018 YLR 1226 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-29
  post-arrest bailmedical grounds for bailstatutory bailtrial delayprohibitory clausecommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 324, 336, 337 A(i), 379, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the dismissal of his previous bail application. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on medical grounds due to Ischemic Heart Disease and Diabetes Mellitus, and whether he qualified for statutory bail despite delays in the trial. The Court held that bail on medical grounds is not warranted when the accused's condition is treatable within the jail facility and does not pose an immediate threat to life. Regarding statutory bail, the Court held that an accused cannot claim the benefit of the statutory period if they have actively contributed to trial delays through repeated requests for adjournments. The key principles laid down are that medical bail requires evidence that the jail environment cannot adequately manage the patient's condition or that the detention is life-threatening, and that statutory bail may be refused where the accused is responsible for prolonging the trial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be granted bail on medical grounds if the condition is treatable within the jail hospital?
  • Does an accused qualify for statutory bail if they are responsible for delays in the trial proceedings?
  • Is bail on medical grounds permissible when the accused's condition is not life-threatening or contagious?
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• Haji Malik Adnan Khan vs Akram Khan Durrani etc2018 PHC 1837 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-20Read full judgment →
• Haji Karam Hussain etc vs Federal Land Commission etc2018 YLR 1894, 2019 [M] C.L.R. 1440, 2018 YLR 1894, 2018 LHC 1586 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Haji Karam Hussain and 10 others vs Federal Land Commission, Islamabad through Chairman and 13 others2018 YLR 1894 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-30Read full judgment →
• Haji Ihsan Ullah vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 42018 PTD 1419 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-06Read full judgment →
• Haji Hussain vs The State2018 YLR 876 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-06
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsinfirmityHepatitis-Cold agejail treatmentstatutory bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application was filed by the applicant seeking post-arrest bail on medical grounds and old age in a case registered under various sections including 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved were whether an accused suffering from Hepatitis-C and of advanced age is entitled to statutory bail under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on grounds of sickness or infirmity. The Sindh High Court held that to qualify for medical bail, the accused must satisfy the three-pronged test established by the Supreme Court: that the ailment cannot be properly treated in jail, requires specialized treatment, and continued detention is hazardous to life. The court dismissed the application, holding that Hepatitis-C is treatable within prison facilities and that advanced age alone, without proof of disabling bodily impairment or extreme weakness, does not constitute 'infirmity' under the law. The key principle laid down is that medical bail requires cumulative satisfaction of the inability of jail authorities to provide treatment alongside proof of actual disabling infirmity rather than mere old age or a manageable disease.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct legal test for determining whether an accused is entitled to bail on medical grounds under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does advanced age alone constitute an infirmity sufficient to warrant the grant of bail under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does suffering from Hepatitis-C automatically entitle an accused to post-arrest bail on medical grounds when treatment is available within jail premises?
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• Haji Gulzar Hussain vs Akhon Ali and 8 others2018 MLD 942 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-08-19
  criminal appealacquittaldelay in FIRadverse inferencewithholding best evidencebenefit of doubtdacoityappellate jurisdiction against acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was filed under section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the complainant against the judgment of the Sessions Judge Skardu, whereby the respondents were acquitted of charges under sections 395, 341, 337-A/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 20 Harabah. The core legal questions involved the assessment of unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the withholding of material eye-witnesses, and whether grounds existed to interfere with an acquittal judgment. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with the non-production of key eye-witnesses leading to an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and material contradictions in prosecution evidence, justified the acquittal. The court laid down the principle that an appellate court will not interfere with a judgment of acquittal unless the findings are perverse, illegal, or unwarranted, and that the benefit of any reasonable doubt in the prosecution case must always be resolved in favour of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR weakens the prosecution case?
  • What is the legal effect of withholding key eye-witnesses named in the FIR during trial?
  • When can an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
  • How is the benefit of a doubt resolved in criminal trials under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Gul Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 SHC 545 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-07Read full judgment →
• Haji Baz Muhammad Khan and another vs Noor Ali and another2019 PLJ SC 343, 2018 SCMR 1586 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-24
  specific performancenovation of contractarbitration awardtenancy rightscontractual obligationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the specific performance of an oral agreement to sell a shop. The respondent No. 1, a tenant, entered into an oral agreement to purchase the shop from the owner (respondent No. 2), but failed to complete the payment within the stipulated time. Subsequently, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration, resulting in an award where the respondent No. 1 agreed to vacate the premises in exchange for a specific monetary payment. This award remained unchallenged. The core legal question was whether the respondent No. 1 could maintain a suit for specific performance of the original oral agreement after the dispute had been settled by an arbitration award. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not maintainable, as the arbitration award constituted a novation of the contract. The Court established the principle that when parties mutually agree to substitute an existing contract with a new one, the original agreement is extinguished under Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872, precluding the enforcement of the earlier agreement unless rights thereunder were expressly reserved.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek specific performance of an original agreement after the dispute has been settled by an unchallenged arbitration award?
  • Does an arbitration award settling a dispute over a contract constitute a novation of that contract under Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872?
  • Is a party entitled to enforce an original agreement after entering into a subsequent agreement that substitutes the original terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Baz Muhammad Khan & Haji Dad Muhammad Khan vs Noor Ali and Shakil Ahmed2018 SCP 1262 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-13
  specific performancenovation of contractarbitration awardtenancy rightscontractual obligationsuit maintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the specific performance of an oral agreement to sell a shop. The respondent No. 1, originally a tenant, entered into an oral agreement to purchase the property, which he failed to complete. Subsequently, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration, resulting in an award where the respondent No. 1 agreed to vacate the premises in exchange for a specified payment. This award remained unchallenged. Despite this, the respondent No. 1 later filed a suit for specific performance of the original oral agreement. The Supreme Court held that the arbitration award constituted a novation of the original contract. Under Section 62 of the Contract Act, 1872, the original agreement was extinguished, and the respondent No. 1's rights were limited to the terms of the arbitration award. Consequently, the suit for specific performance was not maintainable. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court judgments, and directed the payment of the arbitration-awarded sum to the respondent No. 1, conditional upon the surrender of possession of the property.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unchallenged arbitration award regarding a disputed contract constitute a novation of the original agreement?
  • Can a party seek specific performance of an original contract after entering into a subsequent arbitration agreement that settles the dispute?
  • Under what circumstances does a new contract extinguish an existing one pursuant to Section 62 of the Contract Act 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ahmad Khan and another vs Province of the Punjab and 5 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 36 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-05
  Intra Court Appealalternate remedyconstitutional petitionPunjab Ombudsman ActLaw Reforms Ordinancerepresentationmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra Court Appeal challenges the order of a learned Single Judge dismissing the Appellants' constitutional petition against inquiry proceedings initiated against them under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The core legal questions involved whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an adequate alternate remedy exists, and whether an Intra Court Appeal is barred under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 where a statutory representation lies to a higher forum. The Lahore High Court held that the remedy of representation provided under Section 32 of the Punjab Ombudsman Act, 1997 partakes of the nature of an appeal and constitutes an efficacious alternate remedy, thereby barring both the constitutional petition and the consequent Intra Court Appeal. The court laid down the principle that the availability of an alternate statutory remedy precludes the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction, and that a representation before the Governor functions as an appellate remedy for the purposes of the bar contained in the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an adequate alternate remedy is provided under the law?
  • Does the remedy of representation under Section 32 of the Punjab Ombudsman Act, 1997 qualify as an appeal for the purposes of barring an Intra Court Appeal?
  • Whether an Intra Court Appeal is barred under the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 when a statutory remedy of appeal, revision, or review is available?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdur Rehman vs Umar Farooq Miankhel and others2018 PHC 1323 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-13Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdullah and Sons vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto, Hyderabad2018 PTD (Trib.) 2455 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-04-07
  limitationcondonation of delaybarred by timesuo motu revisionincome tax appealvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax appeal was filed by the taxpayer against the order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) dismissing the taxpayer's first appeal as being barred by limitation. The core legal questions involved whether the appeal before the appellate authority was barred by time, whether the delay could be condoned without sufficient explanation for each day's delay, and whether the revisional powers under section 122A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 can be invoked upon pointation by a taxpayer. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that provisions of the Limitation Act are mandatory, that valuable rights accrue to the opposing party by the lapse of time, and that negligence or delay cannot be condoned without explaining every day's delay, rendering the appeal rightly dismissed as time-barred. However, the Tribunal held that the Commissioner's view that suo motu revision cannot be initiated upon pointation by a taxpayer was misconceived, and remanded the revision petition to be decided on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed after the expiration of the limitation period is liable to be dismissed when every day's delay is not satisfactorily explained?
  • Can the bar of limitation be waived by parties or overlooked by courts?
  • Whether the Commissioner Inland Revenue can initiate suo motu proceedings under section 122A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 upon pointation or application by a taxpayer?
  • Does the non-filing of an appeal within the prescribed limitation period create a vested right in favour of the respondent?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Wahid vs Abdullah and 5 others2018 CLC 459 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Haji Abdul Jabbar Thebo vs Imdad Ali and 6 othersPLJ 2019 Cr.c. 1660, 2018 YLR 1964 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-05-14
  appeal against acquittalbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRsupplementary statementidentification from car headlightsadverse inferencerecovered weapons and spoilsocular testimony
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Tando Allahyar, whereby the respondents were acquitted of charges under section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 read with sections 302, 324, and 337(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through ocular testimony, medical evidence, and subsequent recoveries, and whether the trial court's acquittal suffered from perversity or illegality warranting interference. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an acquittal judgment enjoys a dual presumption of innocence and appellate courts will not interfere for mere re-appraisal of evidence unless the conclusions are perverse, shocking, or artificial. The court laid down key principles regarding appeals against acquittal, noting that delayed FIRs, improvements via supplementary statements, unreliable identification under car headlights in the dark without a light source, non-production of crucial eyewitnesses attracting adverse inferences under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and tainted recoveries cannot sustain a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • When will an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the non-production of a material eyewitness give rise to an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a supplementary statement recording the nomination of accused persons days after the incident?
  • Can identification of culprits in the dark relying solely on vehicle headlights be considered reliable without corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Ali vs The State through Additional Advocate-General, Khyber2018 P Cr. L J 1176 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-26
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailappraisal of evidencecriminal appeallife imprisonmentSection 426 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application filed under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the suspension of a sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant following his conviction for murder. The core legal question was whether the court should suspend the sentence and grant bail pending the disposal of the main criminal appeal. The court held that while the principles governing bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are relevant when considering an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426, the two provisions are distinct. The court reasoned that unlike pre-trial bail, where evidence is yet to be recorded, an application under Section 426 follows a conviction where the accused has already been adjudged guilty by a competent court. Consequently, the court must exercise extreme caution and refrain from re-appraising evidence, as doing so would prejudice the merits of the pending appeal. Finding the application devoid of merit, the court dismissed the request for suspension of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the court re-appraise evidence when considering an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is there a distinction between the criteria for granting bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and suspending a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the presumption of innocence persist after a conviction by a competent court of law?
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Ali vs State through Additional Advocate-General, KPK and another2018 P Cr. L J 1176, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 196 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-26
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailappraisal of evidencecriminal appealpresumption of innocencelife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the suspension of a sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the applicant, Haider Ali, by the trial court following his conviction for murder under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellate court should suspend the sentence pending the main appeal based on the arguments raised by the appellant. The Court held that while grounds relevant to bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, are to be considered, a distinction exists between pre-trial bail and post-conviction suspension of sentence. The Court emphasized that once a conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence is lost, and the appellate court must exercise extreme caution to avoid premature appraisal of evidence, which would prejudice the merits of the main appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application, holding that the arguments presented required a deeper evaluation of evidence unsuitable for the current stage of proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the scope of judicial review in an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, identical to that of bail under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the appellate court have the authority to appraise evidence when deciding an application for suspension of sentence under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the effect of a conviction by a competent court on the presumption of innocence during the pendency of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Abbas vs Versus FPSC through its Chairman2018 SCP 1297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-09-27
  CSS Competitive Examinationallocation of vacanciesquota systemmerit quotawomen quotareallocation of serviceFederal Public Service Commission
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, who appeared in the CSS Competitive Examination-2011 from the Gilgit-Baltistan-FATA region, was allocated to the Inland Revenue Service based on merit, whereas his first preference was the Foreign Service. He subsequently sought reallocation to a vacancy in the Foreign Service that arose due to the non-joining of a female candidate who had been selected against the women's quota, or alternatively, claimed that a vacancy should have been carried forward from the 2010 competitive examination. The Federal Public Service Commission rejected his representation, and the High Court dismissed his appeal. The Supreme Court upheld the lower decisions, holding that a vacancy reserved for a specific quota (such as the women's quota) cannot be claimed by a candidate on the general merit quota when it falls vacant, and that the calculation and allocation of vacancies for the 2010 examination were in accordance with the recruitment policy. The Court established that quota-specific vacancies must be filled within the same category upon a candidate's failure to join, and belated representations are barred by time.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate on the general merit quota claim a vacancy that originally arose and was reserved under the women's quota?
  • How are unutilized vacancies or fractions under specific regional quotas required to be handled in competitive examinations?
  • Whether a belated representation before the Federal Public Service Commission is maintainable.
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Abbas Bhindar vs DPO, etc.PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 65, 2018 LHC 676 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-12
  habeas corpusillegal detentionrestitution of conjugal rightsparental custodySection 491 Cr.P.C.family court jurisdictionmarriage without consent
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the recovery of his wife, Mst. Naila Shahzadi, alleging she was forcibly abducted by her parents and relatives following their marriage. The petitioner claimed the abduction occurred due to the parents' disapproval of the marriage. The Court observed a recurring trend of couples entering into marriages without parental consent, subsequently filing petitions to use the Court as a mechanism for 'Rukhsati'. The Court held that no evidence supported the claim of forcible abduction, noting the absence of witnesses or corroborating communication records. Relying on established precedents, the Court affirmed that a parent's restraint on a child, out of concern for their welfare or disapproval of conduct, does not constitute illegal or improper detention unless it is patently cruel or unjust. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the custody of the wife with her parents was not illegal. The Court directed the petitioner to pursue appropriate remedies, such as a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, before the competent Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a parent's restraint on a child out of concern for their welfare constitute illegal or improper detention under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, be invoked to facilitate the 'Rukhsati' of a wife from her parents' custody?
  • Is a suit for restitution of conjugal rights the appropriate legal remedy for a husband seeking custody of his wife held by her parents?
  Read full judgment →
• Haider Abbas Bhindar vs District Police Officer, Sheikhupura and 52018 MLD 1386 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-12
  habeas corpusillegal detentioncustody of wiferestitution of conjugal rightsmarriage without parental consentsection 491 cr.p.c.
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a habeas corpus petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the petitioner seeking the custody of his wife, alleging she was forcibly abducted by her family members after contracting a marriage without parental consent. The core legal question was whether the custody of an adult woman with her parents under such circumstances constitutes illegal or improper detention warranting interference through habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the custody of a daughter by her parents out of disapproval of an unapproved marriage does not amount to illegal detention unless it is patently unjust, cruel, or not in her best interest. The court established that habeas corpus proceedings cannot be utilized merely to effect a Rukhsati or substitute for matrimonial remedies, and that the appropriate forum for the aggrieved husband is to file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custody of a major daughter by her parents due to disapproval of her marriage constitutes illegal or improper detention under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can habeas corpus jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked by a husband to effect a Rukhsati?
  • Is a suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the Family Court the appropriate remedy for a husband seeking the company of his wife residing with her parents?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Saif Ullah vs DSP etc2019 P Cr. L J 1070, 2018 LHC 2589 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-20
  constitutional petitionpreventive actionbreach of the peacequashing of proceedingspolice powersalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking to declare illegal and quash proceedings initiated by the police under Section 107/150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and an agreement written by a Vasiqa Navees, along with a direction restraining interference in the affairs of a mosque. The core legal question was whether police proceedings under preventive sections and private agreements can be challenged and quashed through a constitutional petition under the Constitution of Pakistan. The Lahore High Court held that the police are legally empowered to act under Sections 107, 150, and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the prevention of offences and maintenance of peace, and that grievances against such proceedings must be contested before the Area Magistrate rather than via a constitutional petition. Furthermore, disputes regarding the legality of a document or agreement must be pursued through a civil court. The court laid down the principle that extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash statutory preventive police proceedings or to invalidate private documents where alternative adequate remedies are available before the concerned Magistrate or Civil Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether proceedings initiated by the police under Section 107/150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be quashed through a constitutional petition?
  • Does the police have the legal authority to act under Sections 107, 150, and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the prevention of offences?
  • Is a constitutional petition an appropriate forum to challenge the legality of an agreement prepared by a Vasiqa Navees?
  • Where should a petitioner contest grievances arising from preventive police proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Ismail vs Tariq Akbar Abbasi and another2018 MLD 1205 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-05
  quashment of criminal proceedingsinherent jurisdictionagricultural produce marketsmarket committeerepeal of statutealternate remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application was filed under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of a complaint registered against the applicant for violations of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 and its rules by failing to obtain a license and pay market fees. The core legal questions involved whether the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 stood fully repealed by the Sindh Wholesale Agriculture Produce Markets (Development and Regulation) Act, 2010 so as to render ongoing proceedings invalid, and whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal complaint while alternate remedies and regular trial procedures remain available. The Sindh High Court held that although the 1939 Act was repealed by the 2010 Act, statutory functions and powers under the 1939 Act continued to be exercised by the government and market committees because those functions had not yet been transferred to market companies. The Court further held that inherent powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. are extraordinary in nature, are neither an alternative nor a substitute for express remedies under the law, and should not be used to bypass the regular trial course in the absence of exceptional circumstances or gross miscarriage of justice. The application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the repeal of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 by the Sindh Wholesale Agriculture Produce Markets (Development and Regulation) Act, 2010 invalidates prior or ongoing proceedings initiated under the repealed Act before the formal transfer of functions?
  • Can the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked as an alternative or substitute remedy when other express remedies are available under the law?
  • What are the parameters for exercising extraordinary inherent powers under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings at an initial stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Imdad Ali vs Mst. Sakina and 2 others2018 MLD 1361 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-02Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Muhammad Akbar Shakir vs DCO/Chairman District Recruitment2019 [M] C.L.R. 1022, 2019 KLR Labour & Service Case 161, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1163 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Hafiz Junaid Mahmood vs Govt. of Punjab, etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 470 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-19Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Ghulam Haider vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 710 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-13
  pre-arrest bailoutraging modestyextortiondelayed FIRmala fideextraordinary relieffalse implication
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking confirmation of pre-arrest bail in a case registered under Sections 354 and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving allegations of outraging modesty and extortion. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the FIR. The Court observed an inordinate eight-day delay in lodging the FIR, which it deemed fatal to the prosecution's case. Furthermore, it noted a contradiction between the FIR, which claimed no weapon was used, and the medical report, which alleged the use of a blunt weapon, alongside the complainant's failure to appear for radiological examination. The Court held that the prosecution lacked sufficient incriminating material and that the petitioner's false implication could not be ruled out. Consequently, the Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, reaffirming the principle that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief intended to protect innocent individuals from victimization, harassment, and humiliation through the abuse of legal processes for ulterior motives.

  Questions settled

  • Does an inordinate delay in lodging an FIR constitute grounds for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • What is the primary objective of granting pre-arrest bail in criminal proceedings?
  • Can contradictions between the FIR and medical evidence regarding the use of weapons support a plea for pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Amjad Saeed vs The State2018 LHC 185, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 454, 2018 YLR 2181 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-15
  Qatl-i-AmdQatl-i-Shibh-i-Amdvasovagal shockcriminal appealdeath sentencemedical jurisprudenceDiyatTazir
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence imposed by the trial court for the offense of Qatl-i-Amd. The core legal question was whether the appellant, who caused the death of the deceased by punching him, resulting in fatal vasovagal shock, was correctly convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or if the act constituted Qatl-i-Shibh-i-Amd. The Court held that while the appellant was responsible for the consequences of his assault, the act of punching was not in the ordinary course of nature likely to cause death. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 302(b) and altered it to Qatl-i-Shibh-i-Amd under Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing the appellant to Diyat and ten years of imprisonment as Tazir. The key principle laid down is that where an act causes death but lacks the specific intent or the nature of an act likely to cause death in the ordinary course, it falls under the definition of Qatl-i-Shibh-i-Amd rather than Qatl-i-Amd.

  Questions settled

  • Does an assault that causes death via vasovagal shock constitute Qatl-i-Amd or Qatl-i-Shibh-i-Amd?
  • Is an accused liable for the consequences of an assault even if the death results from an unforeseen medical condition like vasovagal inhibition?
  • When does an act of violence fall under the definition of Qatl-i-Shibh-i-Amd under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafiz Amjad Saeed vs StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 454 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-15
  murderqatl-i-shibh-i-amdvasovagal shockalteration of convictionmedical jurisprudenceocular account
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of the deceased by punching him, which caused vasovagal inhibition and sudden heart blockage leading to death. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular account and medical evidence established the charge beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the act constituted intentional murder (qatl-e-amd) or qatl-shibh-i-amd. The Lahore High Court held that while the assault and the causal link between the punches and the death were established by consistent ocular and medical evidence, the act of giving punches in the ordinary course of nature was not likely to cause death. Consequently, the court altered the conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, set aside the death sentence, and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for ten years along with payment of diyat.

  Questions settled

  • Whether death caused by physical blows resulting in vasovagal inhibition and sudden heart blockage constitutes qatl-i-amd or qatl-i-shibh-i-amd?
  • Can an assault involving punches to the body be classified as an act which in the ordinary course of nature is likely to cause death?
  • Whether the High Court can alter a conviction under Section 302(b) to Section 316 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 based on medical and circumstantial evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hafeez Ahmed and 8 others vs His Highness Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur2018 YLR 425 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-02
  rejection of plaintrevenue recordfraudulent entryjurisdiction of civil courtcause of actionboard of revenuedeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts rejecting the applicants' plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit for declaration, possession, mesne profits, and permanent injunction. The core legal question concerned whether a civil suit is maintainable when the plaintiffs' title is based on revenue entries declared by the highest revenue forum to be fabricated and fraudulent, and whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is ousted regarding the correction and administration of land revenue records under the Sindh Land Revenue Act. The Sindh High Court held that the Board of Revenue possesses exclusive competence over the correction of revenue records and land administration, and where revenue authorities have validly found relevant entries to be fraudulent, civil courts lack jurisdiction to interfere, and no cause of action survives for a declaratory suit. The court affirmed that incompetent plaints should be rejected at their inception to prevent frivolous litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the jurisdiction of civil courts is ousted in matters concerning the correction of revenue records and entries under the Land Revenue Act?
  • Does a plaintiff acquire a valid cause of action for a declaratory suit based on revenue entries that have been authoritatively found to be fabricated and fraudulent by the Board of Revenue?
  • Can a court look into undisputed documents and material brought to its notice showing suppression of material facts when considering an application for the rejection of a plaint?
  • Whether a declaratory relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act can be granted to a party seeking discretionary relief on the basis of a fraudulent claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Habibullah vs Qadir Khan and 2 others2018 P Cr. L J 481 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-26
  post-arrest bailacquittal of co-accusedabscondenceqatl-i-amdfurther inquirytrial independencecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  Three bail applications were filed by petitioners seeking release in separate murder and attempted murder cases, primarily on the ground that their co-accused had been acquitted in earlier trials. The core legal question was whether the acquittal of co-accused in a previous trial entitles an accused, who remained an absconder during that trial and was subsequently arrested, to the concession of bail on the premise that the evidence against them is identical. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the bail applications, ruling that the acquittal of co-accused does not automatically entitle a subsequently arrested accused to bail. The court held that the trial of a subsequently arrested accused must be conducted independently of the previous trial. Evidence recorded in the absence of the accused cannot be considered at the bail stage or during their trial. The trial court retains the exclusive domain to evaluate evidence presented in the presence of the accused. Furthermore, the court emphasized that long-standing abscondence is a relevant factor connecting the accused to the offense, and granting bail solely due to the acquittal of co-accused would encourage fugitives to evade the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused in a previous trial automatically entitle a subsequently arrested accused to the concession of bail?
  • Can evidence recorded in the absence of an accused during the trial of co-accused be considered at the bail stage for the subsequently arrested accused?
  • Is long-standing abscondence a relevant factor to be considered when deciding a bail application for an accused charged with a non-bailable offense?
  • Does the trial court have the exclusive domain to evaluate evidence in the presence of the accused, regardless of the outcome of a previous trial involving co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Ullah vs The State and another2018 MLD 1265 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-05
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydiscrepancy in medical evidenceabscondencemurdercommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 whereby the petitioner, Habib Ullah, sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 231 registered under Sections 302, 324, 109, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Civil Line, Dera Ghazi Khan. The core legal question revolved around whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail when there was a discrepancy between the number of firearm injuries attributed to the accused in the FIR and those observed in the medical reports, and considering his period of abscondence and protracted incarceration without trial progress. The Lahore High Court held that the discrepancy in the number of injuries prima facie indicated further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt, and that bail cannot be withheld solely on the ground of abscondence if the case otherwise calls for further inquiry. The Court laid down the principle that where multiple accused are charged and the medical evidence shows fewer injuries than alleged, creating doubt as to who actually caused the injury, and where the accused has suffered prolonged incarceration, the case falls within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, warranting the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a discrepancy between the number of firearm injuries alleged in the FIR and those shown in the medical report justify granting post-arrest bail?
  • Can bail be withheld solely on the ground that the accused remained a fugitive from law for a prolonged period?
  • Whether prolonged incarceration without substantial progress in the trial brings a case within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Qadir vs Station House Officer, Sadar Khuzdar and 2 others2018 PLD Balochistan 17 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-14Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd. vs WRSM Trading Company, LLC and others2019 PLJ SC 45, 2018 CLD 1282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-02
  banking court jurisdictionforeign finance recoveryfinancial institutioninterest-based transactionState Bank circularsforum non-conveniensterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant bank's regular first appeal and upheld a Banking Court's order returning a plaint for lack of jurisdiction because the finance was extended by the bank's branch in Dubai, UAE. The core legal questions involved whether a Banking Court and the civil procedure laws cover financial transactions conducted by branches abroad of institutions incorporated in Pakistan, whether such interest-based agreements violated State Bank of Pakistan circulars rendering them void under contract law, and whether Banking Courts have jurisdiction over such matters. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Banking Court has jurisdiction over a customer residing in Pakistan for finance extended abroad, that State Bank circulars do not render interest-based agreements void under Section 23 of the Contract Act, and that special recovery laws encompass institutions operating through branches within or outside Pakistan. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Banking Court for fresh adjudication, establishing the principle that recovery mechanisms apply to defaulting citizens residing in Pakistan irrespective of where the finance was originally disbursed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 20 of the C.P.C. is applicable to banking courts when exercising their jurisdiction?
  • Whether branches abroad of financial institutions incorporated in Pakistan fall within the definition of financial institutions under section 2(a) of the F.I.O., 2001?
  • Whether loans extended by such branches in Pakistan fall within the definition of finance under section 2(d) of the F.I.O., 2001?
  • Whether SBP BCD Circulars No. 13 and No. 32 have the force of law?
  • Whether interest-based agreements made outside Pakistan are void in terms of section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Ltd vs Safeer Ahmed & others2018 SHC 517 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-02
  industrial relationsinterlocutory orderNIRC jurisdictionretirementunfair labor practicewrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by Habib Bank Ltd challenging an interlocutory stay order dated 16.01.2018 passed by a Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The NIRC had suspended the bank's retirement letters issued to twelve employees who had completed 25 years of service. The core legal question was whether the NIRC had the jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, regarding the retirement of employees who had already been retired under the bank's service rules, and whether an interim injunction suspending such retirement was appropriate. The Court, without deciding the merits of the underlying dispute, observed that the matter was still sub-judice before the NIRC. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition by directing the NIRC to decide the pending cases within 30 days in accordance with the law. The Court further ordered that no coercive action be taken against the bank in the interim, while granting the NIRC liberty to proceed with its own interim orders if the matter remained undecided after the stipulated period.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court entertain a constitutional petition against an interlocutory order passed by the National Industrial Relations Commission?
  • Does the National Industrial Relations Commission have jurisdiction to entertain a grievance petition from employees retired under a bank's internal service rules?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to issue an interim injunction suspending a retirement order while the question of jurisdiction is pending before the tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs Jan Mohammad Dadabhoy2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Banking Court) 174 · Banking Court · 2017-08-02
  leave to defendFinancial Institutions Recovery of Finances Ordinance 2001statement of accountsBankers Books Evidence Act 1891house mortgage financecertified copysubstantial questions of law and fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This order of the Banking Court arose out of an application under Section 10 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, filed by the defendant seeking unconditional leave to appear and defend a recovery suit instituted by Habib Bank Limited. The defendant disputed the outstanding amounts claimed, asserted payment of over Rs. 5.5 million against a principal of Rs. 5 million under a 20-year mortgage facility, challenged arbitrary rent increases, noted blank annexures, and asserted that the statement of account did not comply with statutory requirements under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance and Section 2(8) of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891. The Banking Court granted leave to defend, holding that the plaintiff bank failed to provide a properly formatted and certified statement of accounts under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance, 2001, and the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891, which is a mandatory statutory requirement rather than a formality. Finding that substantial questions of law and fact necessitating evidence had been raised, the court framed issues for trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement of filing a certified statement of account under Section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and Section 2(8) of the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891 mandatory?
  • Can an uncertified or improperly prepared statement of account submitted by a financial institution form the basis of a recovery suit without granting the defendant leave to defend?
  • Whether obtaining a customer's signature on a blank repayment schedule and presenting disputed accounting entries raises substantial questions of fact warranting the grant of leave to defend?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited vs Dynasel Ltd. and 7 others2018 CLD 1256 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-27Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited through Manager vs Haji Karim Dad and another2018 PLJ Quetta 7 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-19
  cantonment rent restrictionpersonal bona fide needeviction appealres judicatalandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 24 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 challenges the order and decree of the Rent Controller directing the eviction of the appellant-bank from the premises in question. The core legal questions involved were whether the eviction application was barred by the principle of res judicata due to the dismissal of a prior application for non-prosecution, and whether the respondents established their personal bona fide need for the premises. The Balochistan High Court held that the dismissal of a previous ejectment application for non-prosecution does not bar a subsequent application based on a fresh cause of action such as personal bona fide requirement, and that the unshakeable sole testimony of the landlord is sufficient to prove personal need. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the eviction order while granting the appellant six months to vacate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a prior ejectment application for non-prosecution operate as res judicata against a subsequent eviction application filed on a fresh cause of action?
  • Is the sole testimony of a landlord on oath sufficient to establish personal bona fide need for rented premises?
  • Can a tenant claim lifelong tenancy rights or resist eviction on the ground of a long-standing established business?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited through Litigation Officer vs Federation of Pakistan2018 CLD 1152 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-04-13
  Banking Mohtasib jurisdictionElectronic fund transfersImplied repealDuty of careMaladministrationConstitutional petitionTwo-factor authenticationFrivolous litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns consolidated constitutional petitions filed by Habib Bank Limited challenging the jurisdiction of the Banking Mohtasib to adjudicate complaints regarding unauthorized electronic fund transfers and alleged maladministration. The core legal question was whether the Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act 2007, being a special law, impliedly repealed the jurisdiction of the Banking Mohtasib conferred under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. The Court held that the Banking Mohtasib retains jurisdiction, as the two statutes are not irreconcilably inconsistent and can coexist. The Court affirmed that the Bank failed to implement mandatory State Bank of Pakistan security circulars regarding two-factor authentication, constituting clear maladministration and a breach of its duty of care toward customers. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed with costs. The judgment establishes that the Banking Mohtasib is empowered to address banking maladministration and failures to comply with regulatory guidelines, and that financial institutions bear a statutory duty of care to safeguard customers against electronic fraud, failing which they are liable for resulting losses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act 2007 impliedly repeal the jurisdiction of the Banking Mohtasib under the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962?
  • Does a financial institution have a statutory duty of care to protect customers from unauthorized electronic fund transfers?
  • Can a High Court award costs in excess of the amount prescribed under Section 35-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 while exercising writ jurisdiction?
  • Does the failure of a bank to implement State Bank of Pakistan security circulars constitute maladministration within the jurisdiction of the Banking Mohtasib?
  Read full judgment →
• Habib Bank Limited and others vs Cantonment Board Clifton, Karachi2018 CLC 116 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-15
  professional taxcantonment boardlegislative competenceconstitutional petitionprovincial taxesdouble taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petitions challenged the levy and recovery of professional tax by the Cantonment Board Clifton and Cantonment Board Faisal against various establishments and companies situated within their territorial limits. The core legal question was whether local governments or cantonment boards possess the legislative and executive competence to impose and collect professional tax under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and the Cantonments Act, 1924. The court held that the power to levy and collect professional tax rests exclusively with the Provincial Legislature under Article 163 of the Constitution, and local governments or cantonment boards lack the authority to impose such a tax. The court laid down the principle that subordinate legislation or local bodies cannot usurp the taxing domain reserved exclusively for the Provincial Assembly regarding professions, trades, callings, or employments.

  Questions settled

  • Whether cantonment boards have the legal authority to levy and collect professional tax under the Cantonments Act, 1924?
  • Does the power to impose taxes on professions, trades, callings, or employments vest exclusively in the Provincial Legislature under Article 163 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can a local government or municipal body impose professional tax through notifications or subordinate legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• H. Nizam Din and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized representative- vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority through Secretary and 2 others2018 MLD 802 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-31Read full judgment →
• Gulzar vs The State2018 MLD 1567 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-19
  criminal appealhostile witnessrash and negligent drivingDiyatmurder by negligencespot arrestappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 320 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing the death of the complainant's father by a rash and negligent driving of a Datsun vehicle, sentencing him to pay Diyat and rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question revolves around whether the conviction can be sustained when the star witnesses and the complainant resile from their earlier statements and are declared hostile. The Balochistan High Court held that mere hostility or resiling of star witnesses does not automatically invalidate a conviction or absolve the accused where other corroborative evidence, prompt FIR nomination, spot arrest, and the accused's admission of owning and possessing the vehicle at the scene sufficiently establish guilt. The court ruled that such retraction often stems from out-of-court compromises designed to evade Diyat obligations, laying down the principle that courts must look to the totality of circumstantial and material evidence rather than relying solely on hostile witness turnarounds in criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for unintentional murder through rash driving can be sustained when the complainant and star eyewitnesses are declared hostile?
  • Does the resiling of star witnesses alone provide sufficient ground to acquit an accused in a criminal case?
  • Can an accused's admission of vehicle ownership during examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to corroborate guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulsher Ahmed Chachar vs National Accountability Bureau2020 PLJ Karachi 13, 2019 YLR 747, 2018 SHC 1168 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-03Read full judgment →
• Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited vs Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited2018 CLD 737 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-06
  Scheme of ArrangementCompanies Ordinance 1984Secured CreditorsCorporate InsolvencyBinding EffectClass of CreditorsDecree HolderCompany Court Jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a Company Judge's order that sanctioned a Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, but limited its binding effect to consenting creditors only. The core legal question was whether a court-sanctioned scheme, approved by the requisite majority of creditors, binds non-consenting creditors, and whether a decree-holder creditor constitutes a distinct class of creditor. The High Court held that the impugned clarification was legally unsustainable. It established that once a Scheme of Arrangement is approved by the requisite majority (three-fourths in value) and sanctioned by the court, it becomes binding on all creditors of that class, including dissenters. The Court further clarified that secured creditors, including those holding decrees, generally fall within the same class as other secured creditors. Additionally, the Court emphasized that objections regarding classification or the scheme's validity must be raised at the earliest opportunity; failure to object during the creditors' meeting estops a party from raising such objections at the final sanctioning stage. The appeal was allowed, and the restrictive clarification was struck down.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court-sanctioned Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 bind non-consenting creditors?
  • Do secured creditors who hold decrees constitute a separate class of creditors from other secured creditors for the purpose of a Scheme of Arrangement?
  • Is a creditor who fails to object to a Scheme of Arrangement during the creditors' meeting estopped from challenging it at the final sanctioning stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited and Others: In the matter of vs N/A2018 CLD 389 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-03
  Scheme of ArrangementCompanies Ordinance 1984Secured creditorsNon-consenting creditorsGuarantor liabilityCommonality of interestWinding up
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought the sanctioning of a Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, for the settlement of liabilities of Gulshan Weaving Mills Limited. The core legal question was whether a Scheme of Arrangement, approved by a majority of one class of creditors, could bind non-consenting creditors and extinguish their existing legal remedies, including rights against guarantors and sureties. The Court held that while the Scheme could be sanctioned, it would only bind the consenting creditors. It determined that the Scheme could not unilaterally extinguish the statutory or civil rights of non-consenting creditors, nor could it discharge the liabilities of guarantors or sureties without their consent, particularly where no commonality of interest existed between the consenting and non-consenting parties. The Court emphasized that a majority vote within a class cannot override the legal rights of minority or non-consenting creditors to pursue independent remedies. Consequently, the petition was allowed with the specific clarification that the Scheme’s binding effect is limited strictly to the consenting creditors, preserving the rights of the objectors to pursue their legal remedies under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Ordinance, 1984, bind non-consenting creditors who were not part of the consenting majority?
  • Does a Scheme of Arrangement approved by a majority of creditors extinguish the rights of non-consenting creditors to pursue guarantors or sureties?
  • Is a joint meeting of creditors with conflicting interests valid for the approval of a Scheme of Arrangement?
  • Can a company use a Scheme of Arrangement to unilaterally discharge the liabilities of its directors and guarantors?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulshan Polypack Pvt. Ltd. vs Faysal Bank Limited and others2018 CLD 1271 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. vs Soneri Bank Ltd. and another2018 P.C.T.L.R. 165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  banking recoveryinterim saleFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinanceres judicatainterlocutory orderspledged goodsspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Banking Court order directing the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit. The core legal question is whether a Banking Court possesses the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of security before the final adjudication of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court lacks such power. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance is a special, comprehensive code, and Section 16 exhaustively defines the interim measures available—such as restraint, attachment, and the appointment of receivers—which notably excludes the power of interim sale. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant applies; the special provisions of the Ordinance displace general procedural laws like the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, while res judicata applies to interlocutory applications, it does not bar a subsequent application if the prior dismissal was not on merits or if new facts or circumstances have emerged. The appeal was allowed, and the order for interim sale was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to interlocutory applications in banking recovery proceedings?
  • Can the general powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 be invoked by a Banking Court to order the interim sale of security, notwithstanding the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. and another vs Soneri Bank Ltd. and another2018 CLD 203, 2018 PCTLR 165, 2018 PLD 322, 2018 SCP 1040, 2018 PLJ SC 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interim salerecovery of financesbanking courtpledged goodshypothecated goodsspecial lawgeneral lawres judicataleave to defendfinancial institutions ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, granted leave by the Supreme Court, concerned an interim order by a Banking Court directing the sale of goods allegedly pledged/hypothecated by a customer to a bank, pending adjudication of a recovery suit. The core legal questions were whether a Banking Court possesses the power to order interim sale of such property under Section 16 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, prior to judgment, and if the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) (Order XXXIX Rule 6 or Section 151) could be invoked. Additionally, the Court considered if a second application for sale was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court held that Section 16 of the Ordinance does not grant Banking Courts the power to order interim sale of pledged/hypothecated goods before judgment, as its provisions are exhaustive and specific, overriding general CPC provisions. Sale is only permissible post-decree under Section 19(3) of the Ordinance. The Court further ruled that res judicata did not apply to the second application, as the first was dismissed as premature and new facts had emerged. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the interim sale order was set aside.

  Read full judgment →
• Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd and another vs Soneri Bank Ltd and another2018 CLD 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001interim sale of securityBanking Court jurisdictionres judicatainterlocutory applicationspledged goodshypothecated goodsspecial law vs general law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a recovery suit filed by a financial institution against a borrower under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether a Banking Court possesses the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit. The Supreme Court held that the Banking Court lacks such authority. The Court reasoned that the Ordinance is a comprehensive special law that exhaustively lists permissible interim measures under Section 16, such as attachment, restraint, and the appointment of receivers, but notably excludes the power of sale. The Court emphasized that the power to sell security arises only after a decree is passed, pursuant to Section 19(3). Consequently, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding interim sales are inapplicable due to the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant. The Court further clarified that while the principle of res judicata applies to interlocutory applications, it does not bar subsequent applications if new facts emerge or if the prior dismissal was merely on the ground of prematurity.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have the jurisdiction to order the interim sale of pledged or hypothecated goods during the pendency of a recovery suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to interlocutory applications in civil proceedings?
  • Can the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, be invoked to order the interim sale of security when the special law governing banking recovery provides exhaustive interim measures?
  • Does the dismissal of an interlocutory application on the ground of being 'premature' constitute a decision on merits that bars a subsequent application under the principle of res judicata?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulfam and another vs State2018 PLJ SC 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-12
  criminal appealmurderrobberybenefit of the doubtchance witnessesidentification paradedock identificationweapon recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeals were filed by leave of the Supreme Court against the judgments of the High Court upholding the conviction and death sentences of the appellants under Section 302(b) and Section 394 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and robbery. The core legal questions involved the reliability of chance witnesses, the legality of joint identification parades, the evidentiary value of dock identification after numerous witnesses, and the corroborative weight of unlinked weapon and vehicle recoveries. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt. The Court held that presumptions regarding the source of light cannot replace proof in criminal cases, that joint identification parades of multiple accused are legally flawed, that identification in court is unsafe when witnesses testify late after seeing the accused in the dock, and that recoveries of weapons and vehicles without supporting connecting evidence (such as crime empties or specific descriptive FIR details) are inconsequential.

  Questions settled

  • Whether presumptions regarding the source of light can form the basis of a conviction in a criminal case?
  • Is a joint identification parade of multiple accused persons legally sustainable?
  • Is the identification of an accused person for the first time in court during trial considered safe and reliable?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the recovery of a weapon when no crime-empty is secured from the place of occurrence?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulf College of Nursing vs Pakistan Nursing Council and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 780, 2018 YLR 2255 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-02Read full judgment →
• Gulab Shah vs The State and another2018 MLD 716 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-10
  criminal appealanti-terrorismexplosive substancesbenefit of doubtstatement of accusedtampering of evidencerecovery witnessacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court under section 7(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, for allegedly possessing explosive ammunition. The core legal questions involved the reliability of the recovery, contradictions in the description and sealing of the seized items, unexplained delay in sending the items for expert examination, and the failure to confront the accused with material evidence under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Sindh High Court held that multiple serious flaws, contradictions, and gaps in the prosecution's case created substantial doubt regarding the guilt of the appellant. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, laying down the principle that the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising from defective investigation, missing links, unsealed recoveries, and failure to put incriminating evidence to the accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a failure by the prosecution to establish the exact identity and description of recovered ammunition create a fatal doubt in its case?
  • Can a piece of evidence or expert report not put to an accused person during his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be considered against him for maintaining a conviction?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending seized explosive materials for examination by the Bomb Disposal Unit?
  • Whether contradictions among police witnesses regarding the spot-sealing and custody of recovered articles warrant the acquittal of the appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Zaman vs The State2018 YLR 1270 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-02
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlstatutory delayhardship bailexpeditious trialcapital punishmentControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal bail application concerns a request for post-arrest bail by the applicant, who is charged under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the recovery of 69.6 kilograms of charas from his residence. The applicant sought bail primarily on the grounds of statutory delay and hardship, citing a five-year trial period without conclusion. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail due to the prolonged trial duration despite the serious nature of the offense and the statutory prohibition on bail for offenses punishable by death. The court held that while the right to an expeditious trial is guaranteed under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, bail in narcotics cases involving large quantities is restricted by Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The court determined that the evidence against the applicant was strong and the trial could be concluded expeditiously. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, and the trial court was directed to conduct day-to-day proceedings to conclude the trial within three months.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to comply with a previous direction to complete a trial within a specified time automatically entitle an accused to bail?
  • Is bail available in cases under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 where the offense is punishable by death?
  • Can an accused be granted bail on the grounds of hardship and delay when the prosecution is ready to conclude the trial with a limited number of witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Sher Khan vs The State2018 MLD 1354 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-25
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtcontradictory evidenceweapon recoveryocular testimonytribal enmity
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under sections 396 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentencing him to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question involved the reliability of ocular testimony marred by contradictions, dishonest improvements, and the evidentiary value of corroborative pieces like weapon recovery in the absence of dependable direct evidence. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to material contradictions between eye-witnesses, doubtful identification, unexplained delay in sending the weapon to the ballistic expert, and failure to account for tribal enmity. The court laid down the principle that where ocular testimony is untrustworthy and uncorroborated, mere recovery of a crime weapon cannot form the basis for a conviction, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder and dacoity can be sustained solely on the basis of a recovered crime weapon when the direct ocular testimony is contradictory and unreliable?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a recovered weapon to the ballistic expert create sufficient doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Can the uncorroborated testimony of interested or related witnesses be relied upon without independent circumstantial support?
  • Whether the benefit of doubt should be extended to an accused when material improvements and contradictions riddle the first information report and subsequent depositions?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Munir vs The Govt. of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (Safron), Islamabad & others2018 PHC 1452 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-01
  civil servantFederal Levies Forcewrit jurisdictionService Tribunalterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212compulsory retirement
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the Federal Levies Force (Services) Rules, 2016, alleging that amendments adversely altered their service terms and resulted in compulsory retirement. The core legal question was whether members of the Federal Levies Force qualify as "civil servants," thereby ousting the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in favor of the Federal Service Tribunal. Relying on the Supreme Court's criteria for defining a civil servant, the Court held that the duties of the Federal Levies Force, which include maintaining law and order and protecting government installations, have a direct nexus with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, the Court ruled that these employees are civil servants, and the High Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate their service disputes. The key principle laid down is that the status of a civil servant is determined by the nature of the post held in connection with the affairs of the Federation, and all disputes concerning their terms and conditions of service are exclusively triable by the Federal Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Federal Levies Force considered civil servants under the law?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate service disputes involving members of the Federal Levies Force?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal possess exclusive jurisdiction over the terms and conditions of service for Federal Levies Force employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Muhammad Khan and another vs Additional Collector Customs2018 PTD (Trib.) 2452 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2018-02-07
  customs seizureredemption finesmuggled goodsconfiscation of vehicleCustoms Act 1969import documentationadjudication proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the Order-in-Original passed by the Additional Collector of Customs, which confiscated foreign-origin auto parts and the Hino truck used for their transportation due to the absence of import documentation. The appellants contended that the seizure and subsequent adjudication proceedings were time-barred, citing a significant delay between the initial recovery and the formal seizure report. The Customs Appellate Tribunal examined whether the goods were subject to absolute confiscation or redemption. The Tribunal held that while the half-cut engines (non-importable) remained confiscated, the used auto parts were redeemable under the relevant S.R.O. No. 499(I)/2009. The Tribunal partially accepted the appeal, ordering the release of the used auto parts and the transport vehicle upon payment of a redemption fine equal to 20% of their assessed value, in addition to applicable duties and taxes. The decision clarifies the application of redemption provisions for seized goods under the Customs Act, 1969, balancing enforcement against the statutory right to redeem non-prohibited goods.

  Questions settled

  • Are used auto parts of foreign origin redeemable under S.R.O. No. 499(I)/2009?
  • Can a vehicle used for the transportation of smuggled goods be released upon payment of a redemption fine?
  • Does the seizure of goods under the Customs Act 1969 require immediate reporting to avoid being time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Gul Majid vs Akhtar Mohammad & the State2019 YLR 318, 2018 PHC 1680 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-07Read full judgment →
• Gul Habib and another vs Amlook Khan through L.Rs and 4 others2018 MLD 1181 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-20Read full judgment →
• Gul Faraz and 2 others vs The State2018 MLD 1556 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-06
  post-arrest bailjudicial disciplineexpeditious trialnon-compliance of court orderprolonged incarcerationbail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioners, who were charged with offences under sections 354, 392, and 458 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners sought bail on the grounds of prolonged incarceration exceeding two years and the trial court's failure to comply with a previous directive from the Chief Court to conclude the trial by a specified date. The core legal question was whether the trial court's non-compliance with a superior court's explicit direction for expeditious disposal of the case, coupled with the accused's continued detention, constituted sufficient grounds for the grant of bail. The Court held that the trial court's failure to adhere to the timeline set by the Chief Court, despite receiving the order, amounted to a glaring defiance of judicial directives. Consequently, the Court granted bail to the petitioners, emphasizing that superior court directions must be strictly followed by the subordinate judiciary. The key principle laid down is that the failure of the trial court to comply with specific directives for expeditious trial disposal, resulting in undue delay, entitles an accused to the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to comply with a superior court's direction for expeditious trial disposal constitute grounds for granting bail?
  • Can a trial court's non-compliance with a specific deadline set by a superior court justify the release of an accused on bail?
  • Is the staff of a subordinate court bound to inform the presiding judge of specific directions issued by a superior court?
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• Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd vs The Collector of Customs, (Appraisement) & 2 others2019 PLD Sindh 144, 2018 SHC 829 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-19Read full judgment →