Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Gujranwala Food Industries vs Deputy Collector (Refund)2018 P.C.T.L.R. 458 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-19Read full judgment →
• Griffen vs The StatePLJ 2019 Cr.c. 1707, 2018 SHC 740 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-30
  Section 342 statementfair trialmaterial evidenceremandcriminal procedureright of defenseincriminating evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a trial court judgment convicting the appellant for an offence under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's failure to confront the accused with material evidence—specifically the recovery of the weapon (dagger)—during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiated the conviction. The High Court held that the examination of an accused under Section 342 is not a mere formality but a mandatory requirement to ensure a fair trial, as it provides the accused an opportunity to explain incriminating evidence. The court established the principle that any material piece of evidence not put to an accused during their Section 342 statement cannot be considered against them. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to record a fresh statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, allow the accused to lead defense evidence if desired, and pass a new judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to confront an accused with material evidence during their Section 342 statement invalidate a conviction?
  • Is the examination of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a mandatory requirement for a fair trial?
  • Can evidence not put to an accused during their Section 342 statement be considered against them by the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Govt of KPK vs M/s Cemon (Pvt)2018 PLD Peshawar 154, 2018 PHC 1462 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-29Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab, Secretary Home Department through Deputy2018 [M] C.L.R. 173 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab, Secretary Home Department through Deputy Secretary (Police) Interior Department, Lahore etc. vs Qanoot Fatima etc2018 [M] C.L.R. 173, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 22, 2018 PLJ Lahore 341 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-02
  public sector employmentgender discriminationreserved quotaopen meritaffirmative actionsubstantive equalitygender stereotypingconstitutional mandate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a challenge to the Government of Punjab's decision to restrict the appointment of female candidates for the post of corporals in the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) to a 5% quota, despite the respondents qualifying on open merit. The core legal question is whether a reserved quota for women acts as a ceiling or a floor, and whether qualified female candidates can be denied appointment on open merit due to their gender. The Court held that the respondents, having qualified on merit, were entitled to appointment. The ratio establishes that reserved quotas for women are affirmative action measures intended to ensure minimum representation and substantive equality, not to limit female participation or create a ceiling. Consequently, treating a quota as a maximum limit to exclude meritorious female candidates constitutes discriminatory gender stereotyping, violating the constitutional mandate of equality. The Court affirmed that competence must be assessed based on established standards, not gender, and that quotas cannot be used to bar women from competing for and securing positions on open merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does a reserved quota for women in public employment act as a ceiling or a minimum floor for representation?
  • Can a government department deny appointment to female candidates who qualify on open merit by restricting them to a fixed quota?
  • Is it constitutionally permissible to exclude qualified female candidates from public sector jobs based on gender-based stereotypes regarding their suitability for field work?
  • Does the reservation of seats for women under Article 25(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 permit the exclusion of women who otherwise meet the merit criteria for non-reserved seats?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of the Punjab, Secretary Home Department through Deputy Secretary (Police) Interior Department and others vs Qanoot Fatima and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 22 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-02
  women quotaopen meritgender discriminationaffirmative actionpublic sector employmentsubstantive equalitygender stereotyping
  Summary & questions settled

  These intra-court appeals arise from a common order of the learned Single Judge directing the appointment of female respondents as corporals in the Counter Terrorism Department, Punjab. The appellants had restricted female appointments to a 5 percent quota of 75 seats, excluding the respondents who qualified on open merit because their merit fell outside the top 75 female candidates. The core legal question was whether female candidates competing on open merit can be restricted or ousted by a reserved 5 percent quota for women. The Lahore High Court held that quotas for women in public service represent a minimum threshold or affirmative action to ensure representation, not a maximum ceiling to restrict female employment. The court ruled that a quota does not bar women from competing on and securing appointments through open merit, and restricting them solely to reserved seats constitutes unlawful gender discrimination violating Article 25 of the Constitution. The appeals were consequently dismissed, affirming the appointment of the qualified female respondents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether female candidates who qualify on open merit can be restricted or excluded on the basis of a reserved women quota?
  • Does a fixed quota for women in public service employment act as a maximum ceiling or a minimum threshold for representation?
  • Whether restricting female employees to desk jobs based on gender stereotypes violates the constitutional guarantee of equality?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government and another vs Land Acquisition Officer and 3 others2018 YLR 2420 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05Read full judgment →
• Government of Sindh through Secretary Education vs Begum Aisha2018 PLD Sindh 431 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-28Read full judgment →
• Government of Punjab, Primary and Secondary Health Department, Lahore2018 P.C.T.L.R. 527 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Government of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue Division_CBR House, Islamabad and others vs Muhammad Junaid Talat2018 SCP 1220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-24
  tax evasioninformer rewarddefinite informationincome tax assessmenttax recoveryadministrative lawstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment directing the payment of a reward to an informant who had identified non-payment of income tax by Pakistani seafarers. The core legal question was whether merely pointing out a category of persons failing to pay tax constitutes 'definite information' regarding 'tax evasion' sufficient to entitle an informant to a reward. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The Court held that the concept of 'tax evasion' requires the adoption of deceitful mechanisms or manipulation to reduce tax liability. Consequently, merely drawing the tax department's attention to a class of persons who have failed to pay tax does not constitute 'definite information' of tax evasion, as the department is already aware of its obligation to collect tax. The Court established that for an informant to be eligible for a reward, the information provided must lead to the discovery of concealed income or assets that were intentionally hidden from the tax authorities through manipulation, rather than merely identifying a general failure to pay tax.

  Questions settled

  • Does merely pointing out a category of persons failing to pay tax constitute 'definite information' of tax evasion?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'failure to pay tax' and 'tax evasion' in the context of claiming an informer's reward?
  • Is an informant entitled to a reward when the tax department was already aware of the tax liability but failed to collect it?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary Works and Services2018 PLD Peshawar 154 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-29Read full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Senior Member Board of Revenue Peshawar and others vs Nizam Gul and others2018 PLD Peshawar 23 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Energy and Power Department Peshawar and others vs Ihsan Ullar and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-05
  regularization of servicecontract employeesproject employeescivil servantsemi-autonomous bodystatutory interpretationdiscrimination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a Peshawar High Court judgment that ordered the regularization of contract employees of the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organisation (PEDO), a semi-autonomous body. The core legal question was whether these project employees were entitled to regularization under Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, holding that the respondents were not entitled to regularization. The Court reasoned that Section 19(2) applies exclusively to provincial government civil servants, not employees of semi-autonomous statutory bodies. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondents were hired for temporary project posts, which are distinct from regular sanctioned posts. The key principles laid down are that the statutory fiction of regularization under Section 19(2) is limited to provincial government employees and does not extend to project employees of semi-autonomous organizations. Additionally, claims of discrimination require evidence that the claimant is similarly situated to those who received the benefit, which was not established in this case. The appeals were partly allowed, subject to a limited verification process.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 19(2) of the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973 apply to employees of semi-autonomous bodies?
  • Are project employees of a provincial government department eligible for regularization under the KPK Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  • Does the KPK (Regularisation of Services) Act, 2009 cover project employees?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary2018 MLD 35 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-13
  maintainability of suitimpleadment of governmentland acquisitioncivil revisionmandatory provisionsnon-joinder of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from concurrent judgments of the lower courts decreeing a suit for declaration and compensation regarding acquired land against various government functionaries. The core legal question was whether a suit against the government is maintainable under Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when the Provincial Government itself is not properly impleaded as a party. The Peshawar High Court held that the provisions requiring the government to be sued in its proper name and through the prescribed authority are mandatory, and a suit failing to implead the Provincial Government is not maintainable. Consequently, the revision was allowed, the concurrent findings of the lower courts were set aside, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit against government functionaries maintainable without impleading the Provincial Government as a party under Section 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can an objection regarding the non-maintainability of a suit due to failure to implead the government be raised at any stage including revision?
  • What is the effect of non-compliance with the mandatory procedural pre-conditions of suing the Provincial Government?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of K.P.K. through Secretary Home & Tribal Affairs Department2018 PLJ SC 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  pre-conviction detentionSection 382-B CrPCjail remissionsdiscriminatory treatmentrectification of omissionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The Government of KPK sought leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's judgment allowing the respondent the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 along with general and special remissions. The core legal questions concerned whether an omission by a court to grant the benefit of pre-conviction detention can be rectified through an independent petition without amounting to an impermissible review, and whether the recovery of a SIM-less cell phone from the jail premises justifies denying remissions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that granting the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B is mandatory unless reasons for refusal are recorded, and an inadvertent omission by the court can be rectified at any stage. Furthermore, denying remissions on flimsy grounds like possessing a SIM-less mobile phone constitutes discriminatory treatment prohibited under Article 25 of the Constitution. The key principles laid down are that the primary duty to apply correct law rests with the judges, and statutory benefits mandated by law cannot be denied due to technical court omissions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an omission by a court to grant the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be rectified through a subsequent petition?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to record reasons for refusing the benefit of pre-conviction detention under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the possession of a cell phone without a SIM card inside prison premises constitute a valid ground for denying general and special remissions?
  • Does the denial of earned remissions to a prisoner while granting them to co-prisoners violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Government of Balochistan, Industries Department vs Muhammad2018 CLC 396 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Government of Balochistan Industries Department through Managing2018 [M] C.L.R. 288 · Balochistan High CourtRead full judgment →
• Gojra Sumandry Sugar Mills, etc. vs Innovative Investment Bank2018 P.C.T.L.R. 545 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-28Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Yasin vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 991 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-25
  post-arrest bailmurderfurther inquiryocular and medical evidencestatutory delaycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 133 dated 22.06.2015 registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, 336, 460 and 337-L(ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Saddar Shujabad, District Multan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail given the discrepancies between the ocular account and the medical evidence, and the statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial. The Lahore High Court accepted the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, holding that the inconsistency between the FIR allegations regarding firearm injuries and the medical certificate warranted further inquiry into the petitioner's involvement under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, coupled with the principle that an accused cannot be incarcerated indefinitely pending trial. The key principle laid down is that divergence between ocular and medical evidence creates a case for further inquiry making the accused eligible for bail, and prolonged incarceration without trial conclusion justifies the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether discrepancy between ocular account and medical evidence creates a case for further inquiry entitling an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Does prolonged incarceration without conclusion of trial justify granting post-arrest bail to an accused?
  • Is an accused not specifically charged with firing at the deceased entitled to bail when involvement needs further consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shoaib Jally vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others2018 CLC 1311 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabir Shar vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 829 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-12
  narcotic possessioncriminal appealappreciation of evidencemashirnamafalse implicationrecovery of contrabandconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the Special Judge, Narcotics, Shikarpur, for possession of 2 kilograms of Charas under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appellant contended that he was falsely implicated due to an alleged prior arrest by a police official not involved in the case, and argued that the prosecution's evidence was unreliable due to contradictions regarding the signing of the sealed parcel by the mashir. The Sindh High Court examined the evidence, noting that the prosecution witnesses consistently corroborated the arrest and recovery details. The Court held that minor discrepancies in testimony, such as the location where a mashir signed a sealed parcel, do not inherently invalidate the recovery when the primary evidence of the arrest and seizure remains consistent and credible. Furthermore, the Court rejected the appellant's defence plea as an afterthought, noting the lack of prior complaints regarding illegal detention. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence, and ordered the appellant to be taken into custody.

  Questions settled

  • Does an admission by a mashir regarding signing a sealed parcel at the police station invalidate the recovery of narcotics if the mashirnama was prepared at the spot?
  • Should courts adopt a dynamic approach in appreciating evidence in narcotic cases regarding minor discrepancies?
  • Is a defence plea of false implication credible if the accused failed to report the alleged illegal detention to any authority prior to trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir etc. vs StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Quetta) 509 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-07-17
  murderbenefit of doubtocular evidenceidentification paraderecovery of weaponsforensic delaycriminal appealcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the reliance on ocular evidence, recovery of weapons, and disclosure statements. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. It observed that the appellants were not named in the FIR, and no identification parade was conducted, rendering the in-court identification unreliable. Furthermore, the Court determined that medical evidence only proves the cause of death, not the identity of the assailants. Regarding recoveries, the Court held that they are merely corroborative and cannot sustain a conviction in the absence of substantive evidence. Additionally, the unexplained delay in sending crime empties and weapons to the forensic laboratory undermined the expert report. Emphasizing that the benefit of doubt is a right, not a concession, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing that recoveries and disclosure statements made in police custody cannot substitute for direct, reliable evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Is an identification parade mandatory when the accused are not named in the FIR?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of recovery of weapons if the ocular evidence is disbelieved?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending crime empties and weapons to a forensic laboratory undermine the evidentiary value of the expert report?
  • Are disclosure statements made while in police custody sufficient to prove guilt without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir and 2 others vs The StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Quetta) 509, 2018 P Cr. L J 570 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-07-17
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtcircumstantial evidenceidentification paraderecovery of crime weapondelay in forensic analysis
  Summary & questions settled

  This common judgment disposes of criminal appeals filed by convicted appellants against their conviction and sentence for murder under Section 302(b) of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved the reliability of circumstantial evidence, uncorroborated dock identification, recoveries, police disclosures while in custody, and delayed forensic analysis of crime empties and weapons. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt, as the ocular testimony was uncorroborated, identification parades were not held, disclosures leading to recoveries were legally flawed, and a prolonged, unexplained delay in sending crime empties and weapons to the forensic laboratory compromised the evidentiary value of the firearms report. The court laid down the principle that corroborative pieces of evidence like recoveries and medical reports cannot substitute for direct substantive evidence, and any reasonable doubt arising from the prosecution's failure to maintain safe custody or explain delays must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeals were accepted, the convictions were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an uncorroborated dock identification of an accused for the first time during trial is sufficient to sustain a conviction when no identification parade was held?
  • Can a conviction for murder be recorded solely on the basis of recoveries and medical evidence in the absence of reliable direct or substantive ocular evidence?
  • What is the legal effect of an unexplained delay in sending crime empties and recovered firearms to the forensic science laboratory?
  • Does a disclosure statement made by an accused while in police custody have evidentiary value if the alleged recovery was effected prior in time to the disclosure?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Shabbir and 16 others vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Petroleum and 4 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 676 · Sindh High Court
  consequential back benefitsinter-se seniorityArticle 187(2) executionreinstatementservice lawcontempt proceedingsSui Southern Gas Company Limited
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Article 187(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the implementation of a Supreme Court judgment regarding the reinstatement and consequential benefits of the petitioners, who were former Management Trainees at Sui Southern Gas Company Limited. The core legal question was whether the grant of consequential back benefits in the Supreme Court's judgment included the right to inter-se seniority from the date of termination. The Court held that the petition was misconceived. It observed that the Supreme Court, in contempt proceedings arising from the same judgment, had already clarified that consequential back benefits do not include seniority, as seniority involves complex factors like performance marks and vacancies. The High Court ruled that it could not interpret the Supreme Court's judgment in a manner contrary to the Supreme Court's own interpretation. Furthermore, the Court held that petitioners cannot simultaneously pursue contempt proceedings in the Supreme Court and an implementation petition in the High Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that consequential back benefits do not ipso facto include seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the grant of consequential back benefits in a service reinstatement order automatically include the right to inter-se seniority?
  • Can a High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 187(2) of the Constitution, interpret a Supreme Court judgment in a manner contrary to the Supreme Court's own interpretation in contempt proceedings?
  • Is a petition for implementation of a Supreme Court judgment maintainable in the High Court if the petitioner has simultaneously filed contempt proceedings for the same relief in the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Thaheem vs Governor of Sindh_Controlling Authority of Sindh Board Education2018 SHC 1180 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-10
  compulsory retirementmisconductdisciplinary proceedingsnatural justicestatutory ruleswrit jurisdictionservice matterfair hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE) Larkana, challenged his compulsory retirement from service imposed in 2000. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in a major penalty, were conducted in accordance with the mandatory procedural requirements of the relevant service regulations, specifically regarding the necessity of a formal inquiry when charges are denied. The Court held that the disciplinary inquiry was fundamentally flawed because it was conducted as a mere fact-finding exercise without recording evidence on oath, without allowing the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses, and without following the procedure prescribed under the Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education Hyderabad Employees (E&D) Regulations, 1979. Consequently, the Court set aside the order of compulsory retirement, finding it violative of the principles of natural justice and the petitioner's right to a fair hearing. The key principle laid down is that when an employee denies allegations of misconduct, the competent authority must conduct a formal inquiry in strict compliance with the statutory rules, including the framing of charges, examination of witnesses, and the provision of a fair opportunity for defense.

  Questions settled

  • Can a major penalty of compulsory retirement be imposed on a board employee without conducting a formal inquiry when the charges are denied?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 to examine the propriety of disciplinary actions taken by a statutory board?
  • Is a fact-finding report sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for a disciplinary inquiry under the Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education Hyderabad Employees (E&D) Regulations 1979?
  • Does the doctrine of res judicata bar a petition when a previous petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sarwar Qureshi vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 1150 · Sindh High Court · 2018-11-29Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sabir vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary and 22018 CLC 213, 2018 PLJ Quetta 86 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-09Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Sabir through Special Power of Attorney vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Mines and Minerals Development and 2 others2018 CLC 213 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-09
  constitutional petitionprospecting licenselimitation actcondonation of delayappellate authoritymines and mineralscoal miningbalochistan mineral rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an appellate order passed by the Secretary Mines and Minerals Development Department, Government of Balochistan, along with a subsequent restoration order of a prospecting license for coal. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed with a delay of approximately twenty years against the cancellation of a prospecting license could be entertained under Rule 70 of the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002, without a cogent explanation for each day of delay. The Balochistan High Court held that the appellate authority arbitrarily condoned the inordinate delay of twenty years without any plausible reason, thereby violating settled principles of limitation which require the defaulting party to explain daily delay and respect the valuable legal rights accrued to the opposite party. The Court set aside the impugned appellate order and the consequential restoration of the prospecting license, establishing that limitation laws must be strictly construed and applied, and time-barred appeals cannot be entertained lightly or casually.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed with a delay of twenty years can be entertained under Rule 70 of the Balochistan Mineral Rules, 2002 without explaining the delay of each day?
  • Does the condonation of delay without plausible reasons by an appellate authority constitute an arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction?
  • Whether the law of limitation can be treated as a mere technicality or procedural formality in judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool vs The State and another2018 YLR 151 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-15
  summoning of additional witnessescourt witnessesessential for just decisionfilling lacunaeforged matriculation certificatedual national identity cardsanti-corruption trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, accused in a corruption and forgery case relating to a bogus matriculation certificate used to secure public employment, challenged an order of the trial court that allowed the complainant's application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon court witnesses and requisition an inquiry report. The core legal question was whether the trial court acted lawfully in summoning additional witnesses and evidence at the stage of final arguments. The Lahore High Court held that section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 confers wide discretionary and mandatory powers on the court to summon or recall any witness at any stage of the proceedings if their evidence is essential for a just decision of the case, and that such powers cannot be defeated merely because the application is belated or might incidentally benefit a party. However, reviewing the specific evidence allowed, the court found that while the testimony of the District Registrar, NADRA was essential to resolve the issue of dual National Identity Cards, the summoning of other witnesses and the inquiry report was unnecessary. The petition was partly accepted to modify the trial court's order accordingly. The key principle laid down is that the paramount consideration under section 540 is the ends of justice and the discovery of truth, unhindered by technical objections or the stage of the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can summon additional witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at the stage of final arguments?
  • Does the power of the court to summon material witnesses under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 depend upon whether the evidence benefits the prosecution or the defence?
  • Can an order for additional evidence be set aside merely on the ground that it is belatedly sought or might fill a lacuna in the prosecution case?
  • What is the primary test for invoking the mandatory and discretionary provisions of section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasool Saand vs Province of Sindh and Ors2018 SHC 599 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-05
  out of turn promotionservice structureconstitutional petitioncivil serviceseniority-cum-fitnessdemotionrecruitment rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the demotion of the petitioners, who were Secretaries of Union Councils, from higher grades (BPS-16/11) back to their original grades. The petitioners argued their promotions were regular, based on seniority-cum-fitness, and not "out of turn." The core legal question was whether these promotions were legally valid or constituted unconstitutional "out of turn" promotions as prohibited by the Supreme Court. The Court held that the promotions were indeed "out of turn" and lacked a valid legal basis, as no recruitment rules existed for those higher grades at the material time. Consequently, the government’s action to demote the petitioners in compliance with the Supreme Court’s judgment was lawful. The Court reaffirmed the principle that "out of turn" promotions are unconstitutional and that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the implementation of Supreme Court directives regarding service matters. Furthermore, the Court noted that promotion is not a vested right but depends on eligibility, fitness, and available vacancies under established rules, which were absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with the implementation of a Supreme Court judgment regarding 'out of turn' promotions?
  • Is promotion to a higher grade permissible in the absence of established recruitment rules?
  • Does the Supreme Court judgment declaring 'out of turn' promotions unconstitutional apply to non-civil servants?
  • Can a civil servant claim promotion as a vested right?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rabbani vs Governor State Bank of Pakistan & others2020 PLC (C.S.) 525, 2018 SHC 727 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-31
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitystatutory vs non-statutory rulesservice mattercompulsory retirementwrit jurisdictionState Bank of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former employee of the State Bank of Pakistan, challenged his compulsory retirement from service following his involvement in a criminal case, despite his subsequent acquittal. The core legal question was whether the High Court could exercise its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to adjudicate a service grievance against the State Bank of Pakistan, specifically regarding the nature of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulation, 2005. The Court, relying on the test established by the Supreme Court in Shafique Ahmed Khan v. NESCOM, examined whether the regulations governing the bank's employees were statutory or non-statutory. The Court held that the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulation, 2005, are non-statutory in nature, as they relate to internal control and management rather than being broader than the parent statute. Consequently, the Court determined that the petition was not maintainable, as constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked for service disputes governed by non-statutory regulations. The petition was dismissed in limine, with the petitioner granted liberty to pursue alternative legal remedies.

  Questions settled

  • Are the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulation, 2005, considered statutory or non-statutory rules?
  • Can an employee of the State Bank of Pakistan invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for service-related grievances?
  • What is the legal test to determine whether internal regulations of an organization are statutory in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir vs State and 2 others2018 PLJ Lahore 122 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Qadir Khan vs National Accountability Bureau and another2018 MLD 1 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-09Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Nabi vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 268 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-01
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlheroin recoveryfurther inquirydoubtful recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Peshawar High Court through a bail petition filed by Ghulam Nabi seeking post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 561 registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question revolves around whether the alleged recovery of 1100 grams of heroin, when considering potential discrepancies regarding weighing with or without the plastic bag and the unusual manner of concealment, constitutes a case of further inquiry under criminal procedure. The Court held that doubts surrounding the actual weight of the narcotic substance and the feasibility of carrying the contraband as alleged bring the case within the scope of further inquiry. Consequently, the petition was allowed, granting the petitioner post-arrest bail subject to surety bonds. The key principle laid down is that material ambiguities regarding the weight of recovered narcotics and improbable recovery circumstances create sufficient doubt to warrant bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Does ambiguity regarding whether recovered narcotics were weighed with or without their container constitute a case for further inquiry?
  • Whether the recovery of a large quantity of narcotics in an improbable manner creates sufficient doubt to justify granting bail?
  • Can a petitioner be admitted to bail under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the exact weight of the contraband falls into a grey area between statutory penal clauses?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa, etc. vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz, etc2018 PLJ Lahore 213 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs The State/ANF2018 P Cr. L J 1200 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-05
  narcoticscharas recoverysearch without warrantexclusion of section 103 Cr.P.C.anti-narcotics forcereduction of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Special Court-I (C.N.S.), Karachi, whereby the appellant was convicted under section 9-C of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 250 kilograms of Charas and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine. The core legal questions involved the applicability of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in narcotic cases, the legality of conducting a search without a warrant under section 21 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and the reliability of official witnesses without independent corroboration. The Sindh High Court held that section 103 Cr.P.C. is excluded in narcotics cases pursuant to section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and that the requirement for a search warrant under section 21 can be dispensed with in emergent situations involving paucity of time. The Court upheld the conviction on merits, finding the prosecution evidence confidence-inspiring, but altered and reduced the sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone, considering the mitigating circumstances and long incarceration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, are applicable to searches and arrests made under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Can a search and seizure be legally conducted without a search warrant under section 21 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, in emergent situations?
  • Does the non-inclusion of private independent witnesses vitiate a narcotics recovery case where police officials have deposed straightforwardly?
  • Whether an appellate court can reduce a sentence of life imprisonment to the period already undergone based on mitigating circumstances and protracted detention?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz and others2018 YLR 49, 2018 PLJ Lahore 213 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Mustafa and others vs Additional District Judge and others2018 CLC 1937, 2019 PLJ Lahore 55, 2018 LHC 1914 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-09Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 885 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-06
  pre-arrest bailfurther inquiryimpersonationillegal practicecriminal procedurebail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 168/2018 registered at Police Station Shehar Sultan, District Muzaffargarh, under Sections 419 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of impersonation as a qualified doctor and providing paramedic allopathic services without a valid degree. The core legal question is whether the petitioner has made out a case for confirmation of pre-arrest bail in the absence of immediate incriminating evidence from the spot. The Lahore High Court held that the absence of recovered medical apparatus, medicines, signage, or statements from patients present at the time of the raid constitutes grounds for further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt, and that potential malice in the FIR cannot be ruled out. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down the principle that where immediate corroborative evidence from the spot is lacking and no recovery is required, a previous non-convict petitioner is entitled to confirmation of bail as further inquiry is attracted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of incriminating recoveries from the spot justifies granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the failure to record statements of witnesses present at the scene attract further inquiry into the guilt of the accused?
  • Is an accused entitled to pre-arrest bail when he is a previous non-convict and no recovery is to be made from him?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs Mst. Khurshid Lubna and another2018 YLR 2003 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-27Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Secretary Housing, Urban Development Public2018 CLC 176 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-13
  allotment of plotcancellation of allotmentshow-cause noticenatural justicesecond appealdiscriminationexemplary damagesdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Housing, Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department (Respondent No. 1), which set aside the first appellate order of the District Co-ordination Officer (Respondent No. 2) and restored the cancellation of the petitioner's plot allotment. The petitioner had been allotted a plot under a Low Income Housing Scheme in 1976 but allegedly defaulted on installments and construction timelines, leading to a cancellation order in 1981. The High Court observed that the cancellation was done without a valid, properly served show-cause notice, violating natural justice and departmental instructions. Furthermore, the second appellate authority failed to address the reasoning of the first appellate authority or comply with prior remand directions. The Court held that where a second appellate authority's findings are at variance with the first, they must be supported by logical reasoning and evidence to be immune from constitutional interference. Finding the cancellation arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 10-A and 25 of the Constitution, the Court set aside the impugned order, restored the allotment, and awarded exemplary damages.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the findings of a second appellate authority prevail over those of a first appellate authority in a constitutional petition?
  • Does the cancellation of a plot allotment without a validly served individual show-cause notice violate the principles of natural justice and due process?
  • Can a public authority cancel an allotment for non-payment and non-construction when general extensions and concessions have been granted by the government?
  • Is a public authority's action void for discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution if it refuses restoration to one allottee while granting it to similarly situated persons?
  • Can the High Court award monetary compensation or exemplary damages under Article 199 of the Constitution for the flagrant violation of fundamental rights by public officers?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Ashiq Hussain, etc.2020 [M] C L R 199, 2018 MLD 1449, 2018 MLD 1449, 2018 PLJ Lahore 809, 2018 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Ashiq Hussain and 13 others2018 MLD 1449 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-30Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Muhammad Rasheed and 6 others2018 MLD 117 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-20Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jaranwala District2018 MLD 1804, 2018 LHC 1782 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain vs Judicial Magistrate, 1ST Class, Jaranwala, and 82018 MLD 1804 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Bhatti vs Election Tribunal and 4 others2018 CLC 1727 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-12
  election appealrecount of votesreturning officerfunctus officiolocal government electionconsolidation of resultselection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal challenges an order of the Election Tribunal which invalidated a vote recount conducted by a Returning Officer. The core legal questions were whether the Returning Officer became functus officio after the initial vote count, thereby lacking authority to recount, and whether an application for recount submitted to the District Returning Officer instead of the Returning Officer was procedurally defective. The Court held that the Returning Officer retains the authority to recount valid ballot papers under Rule 36(5) of the Punjab Local Governments (Conduct of Elections) Rules 2013, provided the formal consolidation of results has not yet occurred. As the consolidation was finalized after the recount, the process remained lawful. Additionally, the Court affirmed that submitting a recount application to the District Returning Officer is procedurally acceptable given their supervisory role under Rule 8. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order, restoring the recount results. The judgment establishes that the functus officio doctrine does not preclude a Returning Officer from exercising statutory recount powers prior to the final consolidation of election results.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Returning Officer become functus officio immediately after the preparation of initial election results?
  • Can a Returning Officer conduct a recount of valid ballot papers after the initial count but before the formal consolidation of results?
  • Is an application for a recount invalid if it is submitted to the District Returning Officer rather than the Returning Officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hiader vs The State2018 MLD 450 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-24
  criminal appealillicit weaponbenefit of doubtcontradictions in evidenceright of cross-examinationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 23(i)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, for the alleged possession of an illicit weapon and sentencing him to seven years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the face of material contradictions in witness testimonies, discrepancies regarding the weapon recovered, and the denial of the right of cross-examination. The Sindh High Court held that serious discrepancies among prosecution witnesses concerning the bore and nature of the recovered weapon, combined with the failure to afford an opportunity for cross-examination of a key witness and lack of independent corroboration, created profound and reasonable doubts in the prosecution's case. The court established the principle that even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt is sufficient to warrant the acquittal of an accused, and the benefit of any favorable inconsistency in evidence must be extended to the accused. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material contradictions among prosecution witnesses regarding the description and bore of a recovered weapon are sufficient to create reasonable doubt leading to acquittal?
  • Is the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine a prosecution witness fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Can an accused be convicted on circumstantial evidence and inconsistent testimonies without a seamless chain of proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hassan vs Mst. Wasso Mai (deceased) through L.Rs, and others2018 YLR 2331 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-04Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs The State2018 YLR 889 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-10-25Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs Habib Bank Limited2018 CLD 1451 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-10
  recovery suitleave to defendfinancial institutionfinance facilitybanking courtappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This regular appeal filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court, which decreed a recovery suit filed by the respondent bank after dismissing the appellant's application for leave to defend under Section 10 of the Ordinance. The core legal question revolves around whether the Banking Court erred in dismissing the application for leave to defend and decreeing the suit without recording evidence, despite alleged factual controversies. The Lahore High Court held that the respondent bank established the disbursement and withdrawal of the finance facility through substantial and unshaken documents bearing the appellant's signatures, rendering the refusal of leave to defend lawful and proper. The court laid down the principle that where a financial institution establishes its claim through undisputed documents executed by the borrower, leave to defend is rightly refused and the banking court is not bound to record oral evidence on mere unsubstantiated assertions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Banking Court is justified in refusing unconditional leave to defend under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 when the financial institution establishes its claim through undisputed documents?
  • Does a suit for recovery under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 necessarily require recording of oral evidence when the execution of finance documents is not shaken?
  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a judgment and decree of the Banking Court if the findings are based on a proper appreciation of record and documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs Additional District & Sessions Judge and others2018 PLJ Quetta 79 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-09Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider Buriro vs The State2018 MLD 469 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-31
  attempted murderminor offencecharge framingconviction alterationSection 238 CrPCfirearm injurycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant was convicted by the trial court under Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for attempting to commit Qatl-i-Amd, following a firearm injury inflicted upon the victim. On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction, arguing improper appreciation of evidence. The core legal question was whether an accused can be convicted for a minor offence not specifically included in the formal charge. The High Court observed that while the evidence did not support the charge of attempted murder under Section 324, it conclusively proved the commission of an offence under Section 337-F(iii), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding the specific injury sustained. Relying on Section 238, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the Court held that a trial court may convict an accused for a minor offence even if not charged, provided the accused is not prejudiced and the evidence warrants such conviction. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 324, convicted the appellant under Section 337-F(iii), and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone in custody.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted of a minor offence even if the charge was framed for a major offence?
  • Does the failure to frame a charge for a specific injury under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 preclude a conviction for that injury if the evidence supports it?
  • Under what circumstances can a court convict an accused for an offence not specifically charged in the indictment?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Fatima and others vs Muhammad Iqbal2018 PLJ Lahore 635 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Dastagir Khan, Ex-Principal (BS-19) F.G. Public High School, Murree Cantt. vs Prime Minister of Pakistan through Secretary Est. Div. and 2 others2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 6 · Federal Service Tribunal
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalmajor penaltyinquiry procedurecompetent authorityauthorized officermisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order of compulsory retirement imposed upon the appellant, a former Principal, following departmental disciplinary proceedings. The core legal questions were whether the inquiry procedure, conducted via a questionnaire without examining witnesses or allowing cross-examination, satisfied the requirements of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and whether the Authorized Officer acted beyond their jurisdiction by issuing the show-cause notice and conducting the personal hearing, which are functions reserved for the Competent Authority in cases involving major penalties. The Tribunal held that the inquiry was fundamentally flawed for failing to follow the mandatory procedure of examining evidence and witnesses, and for the Inquiry Committee exceeding its scope by considering allegations not present in the charge sheet. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that the Authorized Officer usurped the powers of the Competent Authority. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary inquiries must strictly adhere to the procedural safeguards of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and that major penalties require the Competent Authority, not the Authorized Officer, to conduct personal hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an inquiry committee in a departmental proceeding rely solely on a questionnaire without examining witnesses or allowing cross-examination?
  • Does the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 require the Competent Authority, rather than the Authorized Officer, to grant a personal hearing before imposing a major penalty?
  • Can an inquiry committee consider allegations against a government servant that were not included in the original charge sheet?
  • Is a departmental inquiry valid if it fails to provide the accused with relevant documents requested for their defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Jawad Khan vs The State and another2018 YLR 400 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Asghar Gadehi and others vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Dadu and 4 others2018 PLD Sindh 169 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-29
  bull cart raceanimal crueltycustomary practiceillegal gamblingex-officio Justice of PeacePrevention of Cruelty to Animals Act
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicants challenged an order of the Sessions Judge whereby their application under Section 22-C(ii) seeking directions to the police to permit a bull cart race was dismissed. The primary legal question before the court was whether bull cart racing and similar animal contests, defended as cultural or customary practices, can be legally permitted and protected by the police despite involving animal cruelty and gambling. The Sindh High Court held that customary practices cannot override positive laws, and that bull cart racing inherently involves the whipping, torture, and severe physical distress of animals, which is expressly prohibited. The court ruled that such activities constitute punishable offenses of animal cruelty and often serve as fronts for illegal gambling, and therefore neither custom nor popular sentiment can justify or legalize them. The court dismissed the petition, directing the provincial government to strictly enforce animal protection laws and ban all illegal animal cart races and fighting events across the province.

  Questions settled

  • Can a customary practice or local tradition override a statutory prohibition against animal cruelty?
  • Whether bull cart racing and similar animal contests involving physical torture can be permitted under the guise of cultural activities?
  • Does an activity primarily associated with illegal gambling and animal abuse qualify for police protection or legal sanction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali vs The State and another2018 YLR 1042 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-31Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali vs Muhammad Azam and another2018 P Cr. L J 1484 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-27
  criminal transfer applicationtransfer of casewitness securityconvenience of witnessesSection 526 CrPCadministration of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Criminal Transfer Application filed under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the transfer of a murder trial from the Court of the Sessions Judge, Sibi, to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Dera Murad Jamali or Dera Allah Yar. The applicant, the complainant in FIR No. 08/2016, alleged that he and the prosecution witnesses, who are residents of Dera Murad Jamali, faced serious security threats from the influential accused party, rendering it unsafe and inconvenient for them to appear at Sibi. The Court observed that the witnesses had submitted affidavits detailing these threats, which remained unrebutted by the respondents. Emphasizing that the High Court may order a transfer to ensure the general convenience of parties and witnesses, and to secure the administration of justice, the Court held that the apprehension of danger to the lives of the witnesses justified the transfer. Consequently, the Court allowed the application, directing the case to be transferred to the Sessions Judge, Dera Allah Yar, with instructions for the police to provide necessary security to the witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case be transferred between sessions courts due to security threats faced by prosecution witnesses?
  • Does the High Court have the authority under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to transfer a case for the convenience of witnesses?
  • Is a transfer application supported by unrebutted affidavits of witnesses sufficient grounds for moving a trial to another jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali vs Dost Muhammad2018 CLC 1578 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali Khaskheli vs The State2018 YLR 610 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-25
  surety bondforfeiture of bondjumping bailcriminal revisionpenalization of surety
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenges an order passed by the Sessions Judge, whereby the applicant, who stood surety for two accused persons in a murder case, was penalized for failing to produce the accused after they absconded and jumped bail. The core legal question revolved around the legality and propriety of imposing a penalty on a surety under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether mitigating financial circumstances warrant leniency. The Sindh High Court dismissed the revision application, holding that a surety is under a strict legal obligation to produce the accused on every date of hearing, and upon the accused jumping bail, the entire surety amount becomes liable to forfeiture. The court laid down the principle that courts must strictly adhere to the provisions of Section 514, Cr.P.C. and should not show unwarranted leniency when sureties fail to fulfill their binding undertakings, particularly given prevailing law and order concerns.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a surety is liable to pay the penalty when the accused absconds and jumps bail?
  • Can the entire surety amount be forfeited under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when an accused fails to appear in court?
  • Does financial hardship exempt a surety from discharging their liability under a bail bond?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Ali Gopang vs The Province Sindh and others2019 PLC (C.S) 1354, 2018 SHC 534 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-08
  Shaheed QuotaPolice recruitmentSindh Public Service CommissionStanding OrdersConstitutional petitionCivil service rulesPolice Act 1861
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns a claim for appointment as an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) in the Sindh Police under the 'Shaheed Quota' following the death of the petitioner's brother. The core legal questions were whether the Inspector General of Police (IGP) possesses the authority to issue Standing Orders for recruitment without provincial government approval, and whether the appointment of an ASI can bypass the competitive process mandated by the Sindh Public Service Commission. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that Standing Orders issued by the IGP without provincial government approval lack legal sanctity, as established by Supreme Court precedent. The Court further affirmed that recruitment to the rank of ASI must strictly adhere to the competitive process through the Sindh Public Service Commission. The key principle laid down is that the Police Act 1861 requires provincial government approval for rules framed by the IGP, and general civil service rules cannot override specific statutory requirements for a disciplined police force. Consequently, departmental quotas cannot be used to circumvent mandatory competitive recruitment procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Inspector General of Police issue Standing Orders for recruitment without the approval of the Provincial Government?
  • Is the appointment of an Assistant Sub-Inspector in the Sindh Police valid if it bypasses the Sindh Public Service Commission?
  • Do general civil service rules regarding job quotas for heirs of deceased employees override specific statutory recruitment procedures for the police force?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Akbar Khan through Attorney and 4 others vs Chief Executive2018 MLD 1341 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-02Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Abbas vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 780 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-12
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancerecovery of charasstatutory thresholdfirst-time offendercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Ghulam Abbas, who was charged under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 1300 grams of Charas. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the quantity of the narcotic recovered and the circumstances of his detention. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner should be admitted to bail. The court reasoned that the recovered quantity of 1300 grams only marginally exceeded the 1-kilogram threshold, casting doubt on whether the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute would be applicable. Furthermore, the court noted the petitioner was a first-time offender, had been incarcerated since January 2018, and was no longer required for investigation purposes. Relying on the principle established by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in similar circumstances, the court held that where the recovered substance marginally exceeds the statutory threshold and the trial is not likely to conclude soon, the balance tilts in favor of granting bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a narcotic substance marginally exceeding the one-kilogram threshold under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 justify the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Is the fact that an accused is a previous non-convict and no longer required for investigation a valid ground for granting post-arrest bail in narcotics cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghous-Ud-Din vs Abdul Manan alias Mano and another2018 YLR 304 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-02
  criminal acquittal appealmurdercross-version FIRaggressorocular testimonymedical evidencemisreading of evidencevicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal arises from a judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused-respondent of charges relating to murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions involve determining whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, and whether the trial court erred in treating the complainant party as the primary aggressor based on a cross-version FIR without supporting defence evidence. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court's judgment suffered from serious misreading and non-reading of material evidence, as the eyewitness testimonies remained unshaken, corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recoveries, and the defence failed to substantiate its counter-version at trial. The High Court consequently set aside the acquittal, convicting the respondent under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, among other provisions. The key principles laid down are that an appellate court may reverse an acquittal when the trial court's conclusions are based on arbitrary or imaginary findings, and that when an accused raises a defence or cross-version, the burden to prove it must be evaluated alongside the prosecution evidence rather than accepted on mere presumption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can set aside an acquittal when the trial court's findings suffer from material misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the accused to substantiate a defence plea or cross-version case raised during trial?
  • Can a trial court combine two cross-version cases into a single trial and acquit an accused based on unproved counter-allegations?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence and weapon recoveries is sufficient to establish guilt in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghewarchand & Ors vs M/s Mahendra Singh & Ors2018 SCInd 89 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-20Read full judgment →
• Ghee Corporation of Pakistan (Private) Ltd. vs Suraj Ghee Industries2018 CLD 1333, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1067, 2018 SCMR 1860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-08-24
  winding up petitionarbitration awardprivatization agreementrecovery suitestoppelbona fidelocus standicompany law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a winding-up petition filed by the petitioner against the respondent company. The core legal question was whether a winding-up petition remains maintainable when the underlying financial disputes between the parties have been resolved through arbitration and made a rule of court. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that the winding-up petition was not filed bona fide but served as a pressure tactic. The Court established that winding-up proceedings cannot be utilized as a substitute for a recovery suit. Furthermore, a party that has consented to and participated in arbitration proceedings regarding the underlying disputes is estopped from subsequently filing a winding-up petition based on those same issues. The Court emphasized that once an arbitration award is made a rule of court, the petitioner may lose the requisite standing as a creditor to maintain such a petition, particularly when the grounds for winding up are inextricably linked to resolved disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can winding-up proceedings be used as a substitute for a recovery suit?
  • Is a party estopped from filing a winding-up petition after consenting to and participating in arbitration proceedings regarding the same dispute?
  • Does an arbitration award made a rule of court affect the maintainability of a pending winding-up petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghani-ur-Rehman vs Khshhal Khan Khattak University, Karak, through its2019 PLC (C.S) 842, 2018 PHC 1851 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-11
  regularization of servicewrit petitioncontract employeefixed pay appointmentuniversity statutesconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, seeking regularization of the petitioner's services as a Lecturer in Computer Science at Khushhal Khan Khattak University from the date of his initial appointment in 2013, along with back benefits. The core legal question involves whether an employee appointed on a fixed-pay or contract basis and serving continuously for several years is entitled to regularization of service, particularly when subsequent university statutes lack retrospective effect. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioner, having served continuously and without interruption for several years under the rules applicable at the time of appointment, is entitled to regularization of his services, as the subsequent 2016 statutes of the university do not apply retrospectively to negate his continuous service. The key principle laid down is that long-term continuous service of an employee creates a legitimate expectation and entitlement for regularization, and subsequent statutory changes without retrospective effect cannot be used to defeat such rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee appointed on a fixed-pay or contract basis is entitled to regularization of service after serving continuously for a long period?
  • Do university statutes framed subsequent to an initial appointment have retrospective effect to govern past appointments without explicit provision?
  • Can past continuous service of an employee be dispensed with solely on the ground of failing a subsequent test?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghani Khan vs versus Inamullah Khan and others2018 MLD 306 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-06Read full judgment →
• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd vs Aeroflot Russian International Airlines2018 SCP 1089 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-20
  arbitration awardjudicial reviewarbitrator misconductwinding up petitionforeign company registrationCompanies Ordinance 1984Arbitration Act 1940specific performance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals arising from the enforcement of an arbitration award and subsequent winding-up proceedings against the appellant company. The core legal questions addressed the scope of judicial review regarding arbitration awards, the validity of arbitrator appointment under specific contractual clauses versus general statutory provisions, and the effect of a foreign company's non-registration under the Companies Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that courts cannot sit in appeal over an arbitrator's decision or re-evaluate evidence, as the arbitrator is the final judge of facts and law. Judicial interference is strictly limited to cases of patent illegality, misconduct, or errors apparent on the face of the award. The Court affirmed that specific contractual provisions regarding arbitrator appointment override general statutory provisions and that a foreign company's failure to register is a curable defect rather than a fatal one. The key principle laid down is that the judiciary must exercise restraint, avoiding a roving inquiry into the merits of an award, and should only intervene when the award is fundamentally flawed or the arbitrator has exceeded their jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court sit in appeal over an arbitration award to re-examine evidence or substitute its own view?
  • Does a specific contractual provision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator override general statutory provisions?
  • Is the failure of a foreign company to register under the Companies Ordinance a fatal defect that renders legal proceedings non-maintainable?
  • What constitutes misconduct by an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  Read full judgment →
• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Aeroflot Russian International2018 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-01
  arbitration awardsetting aside awardarbitrator misconductjurisdiction of courterror apparent on face of awardwinding upcompanies ordinanceforeign company registrationarbitrator appointmentcurable defect
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard appeals concerning an arbitration award made a rule of court and subsequent winding-up proceedings. The core legal questions revolved around the scope of Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the court's jurisdiction in reviewing arbitration awards, grounds for arbitrator misconduct, the validity of arbitrator appointment by IATA, and the maintainability of a suit by an unregistered foreign company under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Court dismissed the appeal against the arbitration award, affirming that courts cannot sit in appeal over arbitrators' factual conclusions or re-evaluate evidence unless there is an error apparent on the face of the award or arbitrator misconduct. It held that specific provisions in an agreement for arbitrator appointment override general ones, and that non-registration of a foreign company under Section 451 of the Companies Ordinance is a curable defect. For the winding-up appeal, the Court granted the appellant a two-month opportunity to pay the decretal amount and costs to avoid the company's winding up.

  Read full judgment →
• Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd vs Aeroflot Russian International Airlines2018 P.C.T.L.R. 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-01
  arbitration awardrule of courtmisconduct of arbitratorpatent illegalitywinding upforeign company registrationcurable defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves two interconnected civil appeals arising from a commercial dispute between Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. and Aeroflot Russian International Airlines. The dispute originated from a General Sales Agreement (GSA) that was terminated, leading to arbitration proceedings and a subsequent unanimous award in favor of the respondent, which was made the rule of court. The appellant challenged the decree and the subsequent winding-up order initiated by the respondent under the Companies Ordinance 1984. The Supreme Court examined the scope of Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act 1940, clarifying that a court reviewing an arbitration award does not sit in appeal, cannot reappraise evidence, and must restrict its interference to patent illegalities or misconduct apparent on the face of the award. The Court also held that under the Companies Ordinance 1984, the failure of a foreign company to register is a curable defect that does not invalidate its contracts or permanently bar legal proceedings once cured. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal against the award and conditionally allowed the appellant two months to pay the decretal amount to avoid winding up.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope of the court's jurisdiction when deciding whether to make an arbitration award the rule of court under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Can a court reviewing an arbitration award re-examine and reappraise the evidence considered by the arbitrator to substitute its own view?
  • Whether the failure of a foreign company to register under Section 451 of the Companies Ordinance 1984 is an incurable defect that permanently bars it from initiating legal proceedings?
  • Does a specific contractual provision regarding the appointment of an arbitrator override a general governing law clause in the same agreement?
  Read full judgment →
• GEPCO etc. vs Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 594 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-12Read full judgment →
• GEPCO etc vs Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. etc.2019 [M] C.L.R. 263, 2018 PLD Lahore 399, 2018 PLJ Lahore 594, 2018 LHC 209 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-12Read full judgment →
• GEPCO and others vs Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. and others2018 PLD Lahore 399 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-12Read full judgment →
• General Manager SNGPL vs Safeer Ullah Khan and others2018 YLR 1721 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-31
  gas theftGas Utility Courtspecial lawdirect complaintcognizance of offenceCode of Criminal Procedurejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 13 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 challenged an order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Gas Utility Court, Peshawar, which had disposed of a gas theft complaint filed by the appellant company by holding that the company should have instead approached the local police to register an FIR and submit a challan through a Magistrate. The core legal question was whether a Gas Utility Court can directly take cognizance of an offence upon a direct complaint under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, or whether such complaints must be routed through the police and a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Peshawar High Court held that as a special law, the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 prevails over general law, and the Gas Utility Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction to entertain complaints directly without requiring police investigation or routing through a Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Gas Utility Court take direct cognizance of an offence under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 upon a direct complaint?
  • Must a complaint filed under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 be routed through the local police and an Illaqa Magistrate?
  • Does special law prevail over general law in matters of procedure regarding Gas Utility Courts?
  • Is a Gas Utility Court required to comply with Section 190(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when entertaining a complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Gazipura Securities and Services (Pvt.) Limited: In the matter of vs N/A2018 CLD 889 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-22Read full judgment →
• G. M. Niaz vs The State2018 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-09
  Criminal appealMurderReappraisal of evidenceBenefit of doubtOcular evidenceChance witnessMedical evidenceDelayed FIRMotiveAcquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302(b), P.P.C., where the High Court had reduced his death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal question involved a reappraisal of the evidence to determine if the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish its case. The ocular account provided by closely related and chance witnesses was deemed unreliable, as their presence at the scene was not established and was contradicted by the fact that the deceased was taken to the hospital by a police constable. Medical evidence also conflicted with the ocular account, showing unexplained blunt weapon injuries and a delayed post-mortem. Further doubts arose from a seven-hour forty-minute delay in lodging the FIR, unproven motive, inconsequential weapon recovery due to the absence of crime-empties, and unproven abscondance. The Court noted that the defense version, suggesting the appellant acted in response to an attempted rape on his sister, gained credence from the lack of blood-stained earth and clothes. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt.

  Read full judgment →
• Fozia Khalid vs Election Appellate Tribunal, etc2018 PLD Lahore 895, 2019 PLJ Lahore 83, 2018 LHC 1947 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-14Read full judgment →
• Fozia Khalid vs Election Appellate Tribunal and others2018 PLD Lahore 895 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-14Read full judgment →
• Fouzia Bibi vs Station House Officer, Police Station City, Lodhran and another2018 MLD 369 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-18
  habeas corpuscustody of minorguardian courtSection 491 Cr.P.C.child abductioninterim custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the recovery of a six-year-old minor daughter from the custody of her father, the respondent. The petitioner alleged that the respondent forcibly abducted the child. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 491, Cr.P.C. to restore custody of the minor to the mother. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to establish that the minor was forcibly removed or that there was any urgency, such as a threat of removal from the country or danger to the child's life. The Court observed that the petitioner’s claims were contradicted by her own previous litigation and the lack of evidence regarding the child's recent residence. Relying on the principle established in Mst. Nadia Perveen v. Mst. Almas Noreen (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 758), the Court held that Section 491 jurisdiction is reserved for cases of recent abduction of tender-aged children where urgency exists. The matter of custody was left to the competent Guardian Court.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the custody of a minor?
  • Is a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable when there is no evidence of recent forcible removal or immediate danger to the minor?
  • Should the High Court interfere in child custody matters when the issue of guardianship is pending or can be adjudicated by a competent Guardian Court?
  Read full judgment →
• FM Securities (Private) Limited through CEO vs Executive Director, Securities Market Division (SMD), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2018 CLD 1143 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2018-06-27Read full judgment →
• Fizza Murtaza Mughal vs Joint Admission Committee2018 SC AJK 41 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-12-17
  medical college admissionwrit petition amendmentspeaking orderremandself-finance schemeprocedural fairnessappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that dismissed writ petitions filed by students seeking admission to medical colleges in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) under a self-finance scheme. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in rejecting the appellants' applications to amend their writ petitions to challenge subsequent government notifications regarding seat allocations and to implead nominated students as necessary parties. The appellants contended that the High Court failed to properly appreciate documentary evidence, specifically State Subject Certificates, which allegedly proved that the nominated candidates were refugees of 1947 and 1989, contrary to the High Court's finding that no such evidence was produced. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by ignoring the annexed documents and failing to provide a speaking order on the amendment applications. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the High Court with directions to decide the amendment applications afresh, considering the submitted documents, and to resolve the writ petitions within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court err by failing to consider documentary evidence annexed to an application for amendment of pleadings?
  • Is a court required to pass a speaking order when rejecting an application to amend a writ petition?
  • Can an appellate court remand a matter to the High Court if the initial judgment was based on a factual misapprehension of the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Fiza Naz vs Govt of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & others2018 PHC 1635 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-21Read full judgment →
• First Women Bank Limited vs Ms. Uzma Wahid and 2 others2018 PLC 249 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-28
  constitutional petitionback benefitscompensation in lieu of reinstatementwrongful terminationindustrial relationsbinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged an appellate tribunal judgment that awarded back benefits in addition to compensation to a terminated employee. The core legal question was whether a workman, upon being awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement under Section 46(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, is also simultaneously entitled to back benefits. The Lahore High Court held that granting both back benefits and statutory compensation simultaneously is impermissible under Section 46(5) of the Ordinance, as compensation is awarded specifically in lieu of reinstatement when a termination is found wrongful. The court laid down the principle that a worker compensated in lieu of reinstatement is not entitled to back benefits for the period spent out of service, following the binding precedent of the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can back benefits and compensation be awarded simultaneously under Section 46(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002?
  • Is a workman entitled to back benefits for the period spent out of service when awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement?
  • What is the binding effect of a reported judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on the interpretation of statutory provisions under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• First Women Bank Limited through Attorneys vs Messrs Bita Textile Mills2018 CLD 913 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-09Read full judgment →
• First Dawood Investment Bank Limited vs New Allied Electronics (Pvt.)2018 CLD 250 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-18
  recovery of financeSukuk certificatesleave to defendco-extensive liability of guarantormortgage by deposit of title deedscertified statement of accountsBankers Books Evidence ActFinancial Institutions Recovery of Finances Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a recovery suit filed under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 by an investment agent on behalf of various certificate holders against the defendants for the recovery of outstanding finances, rental payments, and agency fees arising from a Sukuk certificate arrangement. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree upon the defendants' failure to file an application for leave to defend within the mandatory statutory period. The Sindh High Court held that since the defendants were duly served and failed to seek leave to defend within thirty days, the factual allegations in the plaint stood deemed admitted under Section 10(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court established that certified statements of accounts under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 carry a presumption of correctness when left unrebutted, and that a guarantor's liability is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872. Consequently, the suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff for the revised principal and default amounts along with the cost of funds and a final decree for the sale of mortgaged and hypothecated properties.

  Questions settled

  • What is the legal consequence under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 when a defendant fails to file an application for leave to defend within the statutory thirty-day period?
  • Whether the entries in a statement of account certified under Section 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 are presumed correct in the absence of a rebuttal?
  • Is the liability of a guarantor co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 unless otherwise provided in the contract?
  • Whether a memorandum of deposit of title deeds is a mandatory requirement for creating a valid mortgage by deposit of title deeds under Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
  Read full judgment →
• Firdous Aziz vs Asif Aziz and 3 others2018 P Cr. L J 392 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-21
  quashment of FIRdishonoured chequecognizable offenceJustice of Peacecivil and criminal proceedingsinvestigation powersconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged an order passed by the Ex Officio Justice of Peace directing the registration of an FIR under Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regarding a dishonoured cheque. The petitioner sought the quashment of the FIR, arguing that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, evidenced by a pending civil suit, and lacked the requisite mens rea for criminal liability. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petition in limine. The Court held that the Justice of Peace acted within their legal authority under Section 22-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence. The Court emphasized that the High Court should not interfere with the police's statutory duty to investigate cognizable offences or assume the role of an investigator. It established that the mere pendency of a civil suit does not preclude criminal proceedings if the facts also disclose a criminal act. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that FIRs should not be quashed at the initial stage unless exceptional circumstances exist where no cognizable offence is disclosed on the face of the record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of a civil suit between parties bar the registration of a criminal case regarding the same transaction?
  • Can the High Court quash an FIR while exercising constitutional jurisdiction if the allegations require the recording of evidence to determine criminal liability?
  • Is the High Court permitted to assume the role of an investigating agency by interfering with the police's duty to investigate a cognizable offence?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances may a High Court quash an FIR?
  Read full judgment →
• Fimcotex Industries Private Limited through Authorized Representative2018 PLD Sindh 641 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-03
  natural gas allocationArticle 158 Constitution of Pakistancaptive power plantgas supply agreementCouncil of Common Interestsgovernment policycivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, a textile manufacturing company, filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and mandatory injunction against Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (Defendant No. 2) for the allocation and uninterrupted supply of an enhanced natural gas load of 6.9 MMCFD for its proposed captive power plant in Kotri, relying principally on Article 158 of the Constitution and various supply agreements. The defendants contested the suit, arguing that gas is a depleting resource governed by the Natural Gas Allocation and Management Policy 2005, that the supply agreements expressly provided for gas on an 'as and when available' basis subject to government policies and load management, and that Article 158 does not confer an absolute, justiciable right to individual commercial consumers in the absence of a firm contractual commitment or violation of fundamental rights. The Sindh High Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff's contractual entitlement was not absolute or guaranteed, but subject to contingencies and availability, and that Article 158 of the Constitution cannot be independently invoked by an individual commercial consumer as an actionable ground for mandatory injunctions in judicial proceedings when inter-provincial allocation policies and the Council of Common Interests govern the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Article 158 of the Constitution of Pakistan confers an absolute and justiciable right upon an individual commercial consumer to demand an enhanced supply of natural gas?
  • Can a gas distribution company be compelled through a mandatory injunction to supply gas on an uninterrupted basis when the underlying contract stipulates supply on an 'as and when available' basis?
  • Does an individual consumer have the locus standi to invoke Article 158 of the Constitution independently of the Provincial Government before a civil court?
  • Are governmental policies regulating the priority and allocation of natural gas subject to judicial interference in the absence of a demonstrable violation of fundamental rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Field General Court Martial vs Khani Zaman and others2019 KLR Supreme Court 93, 2018 SC AJK 19 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-10-27Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain vs Judge Family Court Muzaffargarh and 2 others2018 YLR 616 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-22Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain and 3 others vs Mst. Bakhat Jamala and others2018 PHC 1610, 2018 MLD 1491 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-14Read full judgment →
• Fida Hussain & others vs Mst. Bakht Jamala & others2018 PHC 1610 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-14Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Federal2018 PTD 1403 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-06
  burden of proofcustoms dutyimport restrictionorigin of goodsfactual disputeconstitutional jurisdictionimport policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a High Court judgment that placed the burden of proof on Customs authorities to establish the "Indian origin" of imported textile products, thereby exempting the importers from proving their claimed Chinese origin. The core legal question concerns the allocation of the burden of proof regarding the origin of imported goods under the Customs Act, 1969, and relevant import policies. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s approach was erroneous. It determined that the primary onus of proof rests upon the importer, who possesses the specific knowledge and documentation regarding the manufacturer, shipper, and movement of goods. The Court emphasized that the Customs Act empowers authorities to demand information to verify import legality, and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, reinforces that the party with special knowledge bears the burden. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority to resolve the factual dispute regarding the origin of the goods.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proving the origin of imported goods lie with the Customs authorities or the importer?
  • Can a High Court decide a serious factual dispute regarding the origin of imported goods in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Are importers required to provide documentation to establish the place of manufacture or production of imported goods under the Rules of Origin, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and another vs Bashir Ahmed, Sba in Mes, Ministry of Defence, Ge(Army), Nowshera2018 PLC (C.S.) 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-18
  unauthorized absencecompulsory retirementabsconsiondisciplinary proceedingsservice tribunalcriminal casecivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from a service dispute where the respondent, a civil servant, was involved in a criminal murder case and remained absent from duty without authorization, subsequently becoming an absconder. Following departmental disciplinary proceedings, the respondent was compulsorily retired from service. The Service Tribunal converted the major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty of withholding increments and ordered his reinstatement, viewing his absence as justified due to criminal charges and enmity. The core legal question was whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absconsion in a criminal case can be condoned and justified for setting aside departmental disciplinary action. The Supreme Court held that absconding and remaining a fugitive from law cannot be regarded as a reasonable ground to explain or condone absence from duty, as doing so would put a premium on unlawful conduct. The Court accordingly converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the Service Tribunal's judgment, and restored the departmental penalty of compulsory retirement, laying down the principle that absconsion from criminal proceedings does not constitute a valid defense against departmental action for unauthorized absence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unauthorized absence from duty resulting from absconsion in a criminal case can be condoned in departmental proceedings?
  • Does being a fugitive from law constitute a reasonable ground to explain absence from service?
  • Can the Service Tribunal convert a major penalty of compulsory retirement into a minor penalty on the ground of criminal involvement and subsequent acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Capital Administration and Development Division, Islamabad and others vs Nusrat Tahir and others2018 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-17
  Health AllowanceCivil ServantsLocus PoenitentiaeService TribunalExecutive FiatVested RightStatutory Interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals by the Federal Government challenging Federal Service Tribunal judgments that affirmed the entitlement of Directorate General of Special Education (DGSE) employees to a 'Health Allowance.' The core legal question was whether these employees, engaged in the education and rehabilitation of disabled persons, qualified as 'health personnel' under the Federal Government's Office Memoranda dated 04.02.2012 and 06.02.2012, which granted the allowance to health personnel in the BPS scheme. The Court held that the respondents were entitled to the allowance, as the definition of 'health personnel' incorporated by reference from the Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance, 2011, broadly covered those delivering services in the health sector, including the respondents. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the executive is barred by the doctrine of locus poenitentiae from unilaterally rescinding a benefit once it has been conferred and acted upon, absent a change in the underlying eligibility criteria. Consequently, the Court affirmed the respondents' entitlement, dismissing the government's attempts to restrict the allowance to specific hospital staff.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the executive from unilaterally withdrawing a benefit once it has been conferred and acted upon?
  • Are employees of the Directorate General of Special Education entitled to the Health Allowance granted to health personnel under the Federal Government's Office Memoranda of 2012?
  • Does the definition of 'health personnel' under the Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance, 2011, extend to staff engaged in the rehabilitation of disabled persons?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through Prime Minister and another vs Aftab Ahmad2019 PLC (C.S.) 623, 2018 IHC 125 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-10-10
  writ jurisdictionAJ&K Counciljudicial reviewmaintainabilitypersona designatawrit of mandamusterritorial jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged a judgment directing the appointment of the respondent as a Judicial Member (BS-20) of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (ATIR, AJ&K). The respondent had participated in a competitive process and was recommended by the Departmental Selection Committee, but the Prime Minister of Pakistan, acting as Chairman of the AJ&K Council, subsequently ordered a fresh recruitment process. The core legal question was whether the Islamabad High Court possessed the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue a writ of mandamus against the Prime Minister of Pakistan when acting in his capacity as Chairman of the AJ&K Council. The Court held that the AJ&K Council is a body created under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, and is not a creature of Pakistani law. Consequently, the Prime Minister, when acting as the Chairman of the AJ&K Council, is not performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province, or a local authority. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Islamabad High Court issue a writ of mandamus against the Prime Minister of Pakistan when acting in his capacity as Chairman of the AJ&K Council?
  • Is the AJ&K Council a body performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province, or a local authority under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the executive authority of the AJ&K Council extend beyond the territorial limits of Azad Jammu and Kashmir?
  Read full judgment →
• Federation of Pakistan through D.G. National Training Bureau vs Messrs2018 PLD Islamabad 1 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-08-16
  arbitrationarbitral tribunallegal misconductnatural justicewaiversole arbitratorcivil revisioncontractual dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges a Civil Court order removing a two-member arbitral tribunal and appointing a sole arbitrator to resolve a contractual dispute. The core legal questions concern whether the Civil Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940, to remove the tribunal for failing to act and whether the petitioner waived its right to insist on contractual pre-conditions by participating in the appointment of arbitrators. The Court held that the arbitral tribunal failed to proceed with reasonable dispatch and that one arbitrator committed legal misconduct by deciding the matter unilaterally without hearing the respondent, violating natural justice. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Civil Court's authority under Sections 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to remove the tribunal and appoint a sole arbitrator. The judgment establishes that arbitrators must act jointly, and failure to do so constitutes legal misconduct. Furthermore, a party waives the right to enforce contractual pre-arbitration conditions, such as prior reference to a consultant, by nominating an arbitrator without protest. The Court's power to appoint a sole arbitrator upon removal of a tribunal overrides contrary contractual provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appoint a sole arbitrator when removing an existing multi-member arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration Act 1940?
  • Does a party waive the right to insist on contractual pre-arbitration conditions by participating in the appointment of arbitrators?
  • Does an arbitrator's unilateral decision to decline jurisdiction without hearing the parties constitute legal misconduct?
  • Is a retired Supreme Court judge entitled to charge fees for arbitration in cases involving government interests under President's Order No. 1 of 2001?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation, Islamabad vs Abdul2018 [M] C.L.R. 464 · Islamabad High Court
  intra-court appealallotment of plotquota allocationcivil servant statusPTCL employeesservice conditionsautonomous bodies
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance 1972 was filed by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation against an order dated 02.07.2008 passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1608 of 2006. The dispute centered on whether Respondent No. 1, a retired employee of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. (PTCL), was entitled to allotment of a plot under the 75% quota reserved for Federal Government employees or the 8% quota for employees of autonomous/semi-autonomous bodies. The appellant contended that PTCL is a public limited company under the Companies Ordinance 1984, and allotment of a plot is not a service condition protected under statutory provisions. The High Court observed that Respondent No. 1 had initially applied specifically under the 8% quota reserved for autonomous bodies and failed to qualify. Consequently, he could not subsequently claim entitlement under the 75% quota for Federal Government employees, as allotment of a plot is not an inherent terms and conditions right of a civil servant. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory protection of terms and conditions of service for transferred government employees extend to future plot allotment housing schemes?
  • Can an applicant who applied for a housing plot under an autonomous bodies quota subsequently claim entitlement under the quota reserved for Federal Government employees?
  • Is the allotment of a residential plot considered a statutory term and condition of service for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Jawad-Ul-Haq vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 766 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-07
  criminal appealdouble murderbenefit of doubtunproved motivesolitary witnesscorroborative evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for double murder and under section 15 of the Arms Act. The core legal question revolved around whether the prosecution successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt through the ocular account, medical evidence, and alleged motive. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case as the complainant admitted during cross-examination that he was not an eye-witness, the motive remained unproved, and corroborative recoveries alone were insufficient to sustain a capital conviction in the absence of direct evidence. The court laid down the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the accused's guilt entitles him to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and the acquittal of the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for a capital charge can be sustained solely on the basis of corroborative recoveries in the absence of direct evidence?
  • Does a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when the alleged motive remains unproved?
  Read full judgment →