Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Commissioner of Income Tax Legal vs M/s chashma Sugar Mills D.I.Khan2019 PCRLJ 533, 2018 PTD 2154, 2018 PHC 1697 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-12
  Income TaxDeemed IncomeUndistributed ReservesRetrospective TaxationTax ReferenceExcise Duty ExpenseIncome Tax Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference application filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 sought the advisory opinion of the Peshawar High Court on three questions relating to the interpretation of "reserves" and the applicability of Section 12(9A) of the repealed Income Tax Ordinance 1979 to a public limited company. The respondent company had claimed an amount earmarked for excise duty as an admissible expense for the tax year ending September 30, 1998, which the tax authorities later attempted to treat as undistributed reserves subject to deemed taxation. The court held that rules framed under a statute cannot enlarge the scope of the parent statute to tax revenue rather than profits, that liabilities legally payable such as excise duty are admissible expenses, and that a deeming provision creating a new tax liability cannot be applied retrospectively to a prior income year. Consequently, the tax reference was dismissed and the questions were answered in the negative, upholding the Appellate Tribunal's order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in interpreting the term reserves independently when defined under the explanation to Section 12(9A) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether rules framed under a statute can enlarge the scope of the parent statute regarding the definition of reserves and revenue?
  • Whether Section 12(9A) of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 creating a fictional income liability can be given retrospective effect to prior income years?
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• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Regional Tax Office, Peshawar2018 PTD 2154 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Large Tax-payer Units, Islamabad vs (M/s.)2018 P.C.T.L.R. 995 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-03-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner of Income Tax (Legal), Islamabad vs Messrs Askari2018 PTD 1089 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-03-13
  income tax referenceaccrual basismercantile systemgovernment securitiesbad debtsnon-performing loanswritten off loansconcessional loans
  Summary & questions settled

  These consolidated Income Tax References before the Islamabad High Court arose from judgments of the Appellate Tribunal Income Tax involving banking companies. The primary legal questions concerned: (i) whether interest derived by banks from Government securities is taxable on an accrual or actual receipt basis under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; (ii) whether provisions for non-performing loans are deductible as bad debts prior to being written off as irrecoverable; and (iii) the tax treatment of concessional loans granted by banks to employees under section 24(i) of the 1979 Ordinance. The High Court held that banks regularly employing the mercantile/accrual system of accounting are required to offer interest on Government securities for tax on an accrual/earned basis rather than upon actual receipt. Furthermore, prior to the insertion of Section 100A and the Seventh Schedule in 2007, deductions for bad debts were strictly limited to irrecoverable loans actually written off under the applicable SBP regulatory framework, excluding non-performing loans. Finally, deletions regarding concessional employee loans were upheld as no actual expenditure was proven by the Department.

  Questions settled

  • Are banking companies regularly employing the mercantile accounting system obliged to offer interest income on Government securities for tax on an accrual basis rather than actual receipt basis?
  • Whether non-performing loans classified as doubtful or loss are deductible as bad debts under section 23(1)(x) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 or section 29 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 without being actually written off as irrecoverable?
  • Does the difference between market interest rates and concessional interest rates on loans advanced to employees attract tax additions under section 24(i) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 in the absence of proof of actual expenditure?
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• Commissioner Inland vs M/s. Ali Hassan Metal Revenue. Works2018 PTD 108, PTCL 2018 CL. 16 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue. vs M/s. Haier Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd2018 P.C.T.L.R. 626, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1147, PTCL 2018 CL. 588, 2018 PTD 1582, · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue. vs M/s. Golden Pearl Cosmetics.PTCL 2018 CL. 72 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-10Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue. vs Muhammad Khalid SethiPTCL 2018 CL. 95 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue-Rto vs Dr. Ghulam Rasool2018 PTD 612 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-22Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV vs Occidental Oil and Gas2018 P.C.T.L.R. 537, 2018 PTD (Trib.) 1199 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-09-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-IV vs Messrs Hazara Efficient Gas, Karachi2018 PTD (Trib.) 1188 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-12-13Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III vs Messrs Igi Insurance2018 PTD 114 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-18
  General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR)tax avoidance schemeinsurance business taxationFourth Schedule Income Tax Ordinanceinterpretation of fiscal statutespurposive approachtax mitigation vs tax avoidancerecharacterisation of transactions
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application concerns the applicability of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) under Section 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to an insurance company. The Department challenged the taxpayer's share transactions, arguing they constituted a tax avoidance scheme to evade tax on investment appreciation. The core legal questions were whether Section 109 applies to insurance companies governed by the special rules of the Fourth Schedule and whether the transactions were a tax avoidance scheme. The Court held that Section 109 applies to insurance companies because neither Section 99 nor the Fourth Schedule contains a non-obstante clause. However, the Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer, finding that while the transactions were contrived, the taxpayer had a legitimate non-tax avoidance purpose—complying with mandatory accounting regulations to reflect market value—which was a "main purpose." Consequently, the tax avoidance purpose was not a "main purpose" under Section 109. The judgment establishes that GAAR requires a purposive interpretation and that tax mitigation remains lawful, distinguishing it from impermissible tax avoidance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) under Section 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, apply to insurance companies governed by the special rules in the Fourth Schedule?
  • Can the Department recharacterize transactions of an insurance company under Section 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, when the Fourth Schedule lacks a non-obstante clause?
  • Is the "one unit" or "one basket" concept of insurance taxation an absolute bar to the application of general anti-avoidance provisions?
  • What constitutes a "main purpose" of tax avoidance under Section 109 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office, Faisalabad2018 PTD 775 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-30
  sales taxinput tax adjustmentrefundblacklisted suppliersreference applicationadvisory jurisdictionfindings of facttax fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application filed under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 challenges an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had ruled in favor of the respondent taxpayer regarding input tax adjustment and refund claims. The core legal question concerned whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing input tax adjustments where supplier units were subsequently blacklisted. The Lahore High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal's findings—specifically that the supplier units were not blacklisted at the time of the transactions and that the department failed to discharge its initial burden of proof regarding allegations of tax fraud, non-payment, or connivance—were findings of fact. The Court reiterated the principle that in its advisory jurisdiction, the High Court cannot disturb findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal as the final fact-finding forum. Consequently, the reference application was decided against the applicant department, and the Court declined to answer the proposed questions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in its advisory jurisdiction?
  • Does the subsequent blacklisting of a supplier operate retrospectively to invalidate input tax adjustments claimed at a time when the supplier was active?
  • Whether the department can reject an input tax claim without discharging its initial burden of proof regarding allegations of tax fraud or non-payment of tax?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Karachi vs Messrs Security2018 PTD (Trib.) 1391 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-03-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto, Hyderabad vs Dr. Nazir2018 PTD 453 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-29Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Rto Rawalpindi vs M/s. Khan CNGPTCL 2018 CL. 40 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  definite informationamended assessmentdeemed assessmentconversion formulatax auditCNG stationsincome tax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of 'definite information' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, specifically whether the application of a conversion formula to determine CNG sales constitutes such information to justify amending a deemed assessment order. The tax authorities scrutinized the income tax returns of CNG station operators, noting a disparity between natural gas purchases and declared CNG sales. By procuring data from the Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), and applying OGRA's conversion formula (accounting for 11% wastage), the Commissioner amended the assessment orders. The High Court had previously ruled that the conversion formula did not constitute 'definite information'. The Supreme Court held that the information procured from competent authorities regarding gas volume and pricing, when processed through a recognized scientific/mathematical formula, qualifies as 'definite information' under Section 122(8) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court emphasized that the Commissioner is empowered to conduct audits and investigations, and the application of a conversion formula is a valid method to ascertain tax liability, not a prohibited change of opinion. The appeals were allowed and the amended assessment orders restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does the application of a mathematical or scientific conversion formula to determine sales volume constitute 'definite information' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can the Commissioner of Inland Revenue amend a deemed assessment order under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, based on information processed through a conversion formula?
  • Is the scope of 'definite information' under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, identical to the scope of 'definite information' under the repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Regional Tax Office vs Messrs2018 PTD (Trib.) 1533 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-04-03
  deemed assessmentwithholding taxtaxpayer in defaultrecovery of taxassessment vs collectiontransactional failure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter before the Full Bench of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue addressed whether proceedings under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for recovery of un-deducted withholding tax, can be initiated or sustained after the finalization of a deemed assessment under Section 120 or an assessment under Section 122. The core legal question was whether the existence of a deemed assessment order precludes the tax authorities from invoking recovery provisions under Section 161. The Tribunal held that provisions relating to assessment (such as Sections 120 and 122) and collection or recovery (such as Section 161) are distinct in nature; hence, the presence of a deemed assessment order does not bar the invocation of Section 161. However, the Tribunal emphasized that invoking Section 161 requires establishing a specific transactional failure of non-withholding or non-collection of tax based on concrete material. The Tribunal rejected the taxpayer's contention that Section 161 orders are barred in the presence of Section 120 assessments, set aside the lower appellate order, and remanded the case for factual inquiry and fresh determination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the existence of a deemed assessment under Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 precludes the tax authorities from invoking recovery provisions under Section 161?
  • Are the provisions of Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 charging, assessment, or collection provisions?
  • Is the determination of a specific transactional failure a condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can an order under Section 161 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 be used to amend an assessment of income and tax liability?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, WHT, Zone, Rto-II, Karachi vs Messrs2018 PTD 900 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-07
  default surchargeIncome Tax Ordinance 2001wilful defaulttax referenceAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenuemens rea
  Summary & questions settled

  This Reference Application arises from an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue Pakistan Karachi, which deleted the default surcharge imposed on the respondent under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the default surcharge. The Sindh High Court held that the calculation of default surcharge is conjunctively linked with the fixation of a clear time span, including the determination of opening and terminal dates, and requires proof of wilful default or mens rea. Citing precedent from the Supreme Court, the Court noted that the levy of default surcharge cannot be done on a hypothetical basis without establishing a deliberate omission or wilful default by the taxpayer. The Court answered the proposed question in the affirmative, upholding the Appellate Tribunal's decision to delete the surcharge and dismissing the application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the learned Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was justified to order deletion of the default surcharge under sections 161 and 205 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Is the levy of default surcharge dependent upon the determination of a specific default period with clear opening and terminal dates?
  • Does the imposition of default surcharge require proof of wilful default or mens rea on the part of the taxpayer?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office, Peshawar vs Messrs Sheraz Arena Deans Trade Center, Peshawar and another2018 PTD 2212 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-12Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, R.T.O., Sukkur vs Messrs Nabi Bux Gold2018 PTD (Trib.) 991 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-10-30Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Mirpur vs Shakeel Ahmed and others2019 PCRLJ 561, PTCL 2019 CL. 263, 2018 PTD 2228 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-05-08
  tax assessmenttax yearassociation of personsretrospective legislationvalidation clauseremandstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding tax assessment disputes for the tax year 2010. The core legal question was whether the Finance Act, 2010, as adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, could validly impose a 25% tax rate on the taxable income of an Association of Persons (AOP) for the 2010 tax year, given the timing of the adaptation and the filing of tax returns. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the lower forums, including the High Court and the Appellate Tribunal, failed to address critical legal propositions, specifically whether the taxpayers actually qualified as an Association of Persons and the effect of the validation clauses within the AJ&K Income Tax (Adaptation, Enforcement and Validation) Act, 2002. The Court emphasized that the High Court is statutorily required to resolve all questions of law raised in a reference. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the references to the High Court for a fresh decision, mandating that all material legal propositions be properly appreciated and resolved within four months.

  Questions settled

  • Is the High Court required to resolve all questions of law raised in a tax reference under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the definition of 'tax year' under Section 74 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, preclude the application of tax rate changes introduced by a Finance Act enforced after the tax year has ended?
  • Can a court determine the validity of a tax assessment without first establishing whether the taxpayer falls within the statutory definition of an 'Association of Persons'?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Karachi vs Pakistan Beverages Limited, Karachi2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1025, 2018 P.S.C. 1655, PTCL 2018 CL. 865, 2018 PTD 1559, 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-06-14
  Sales Tax Actstatutory interpretationdiscretionary poweradministrative lawmonitoring of premisesInland Revenue officerstax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, specifically whether the power to post Inland Revenue officers at a registered person's premises for monitoring purposes is subject to an implied time limitation. The appellant, the Commissioner Inland Revenue, challenged a High Court observation that required such posting orders to be time-bound, arguing that the statute imposes no such requirement. The Supreme Court held that while Section 40B grants discretionary power, such discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised in accordance with administrative law principles. The Court reasoned that 'monitoring' is not intended to be indefinite and must conclude once its purpose is served. Consequently, the Court affirmed that an order under Section 40B must specify a timeframe or period, as the authority cannot leave the duration of such monitoring to its own unfettered discretion. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the necessity for time-bound orders in the exercise of this statutory power.

  Questions settled

  • Does the power to post Inland Revenue officers under Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 allow for indefinite monitoring?
  • Must an order issued under Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 specify a timeframe for the posting of officers?
  • Is the discretionary power conferred by Section 40B of the Sales Tax Act 1990 unfettered?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Faisalabad vs Messrs Al-Zamin Textile2018 PTD 986 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  sales tax refundblacklisted suppliersretrospective operationburden of prooftax fraudinput tax adjustmentreference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 challenged an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had allowed a sales tax refund claim to the respondent taxpayer. The core legal question concerned whether zero-rated supplies and tax refunds can be denied based on invoices issued by units that were subsequently blacklisted, and whether a blacklisting order operates retrospectively. The Lahore High Court held that a blacklisting order does not operate retrospectively to invalidate transactions or invoices issued prior to the blacklisting, unless the taxation department establishes through a self-speaking order that the invoices were fake, flying, or that the tax was not deposited in the government exchequer. The initial burden of proof lies heavily on the revenue department to demonstrate a nexus between the blacklisting and the disputed invoices or to establish tax fraud. The reference application was decided in the negative against the applicant department, following established precedent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a blacklisting order passed against a supplier can operate retrospectively to invalidate invoices issued prior to such blacklisting?
  • Does the initial burden lie upon the taxation department to establish that invoices issued by a supplier are fake or flying before denying a refund or tax credit?
  • Can the provisions of Section 21(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 be invoked to reject tax credit or refund for invoices issued prior to blacklisting without proving that the tax was not deposited in the National Exchequer?
  • Under what circumstances does the burden of proof shift to a registered person claiming a sales tax refund or tax adjustment in cases of alleged tax fraud?
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• Mst. Suhagan vs Ashiq Muhammad and others2018 LHC 667 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue, Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, Mirpur vs Mohammad Naseer Qureshi and others2018 PTD 693 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-11-13
  tax concessionfull time teacherIncome Tax Ordinanceconstitutional writ petitiondepartmental circularretrospective tax recoveryalternative remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from appeals filed against a High Court judgment that accepted writ petitions filed by retired and serving Headmasters and Principals. The respondents challenged a tax circular and subsequent departmental letters seeking to recover income tax arrears based on an interpretation of 'full time teacher' excluding administrative staff from a 75% tax reduction. The core legal questions involve whether administrative duties disqualify teachers from tax concessions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, and whether an administrative circular can alter longstanding tax application without statutory amendment. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that amendments in the Finance Act, 2013 did not alter the definition or category of full-time teachers, and administrative circulars cannot override settled departmental practice or introduce new exclusions without legislative backing. The Court laid down that subordinate tax circulars must remain consistent with the parent statute and cannot be used to retrospectively alter statutory tax concessions enjoyed by taxpayers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether teachers performing administrative jobs such as Principals and Headmasters are excluded from the definition of full-time teachers entitled to tax concessions under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a circular issued by the Federal Board of Revenue under Section 206 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 introduce new restrictions not warranted by statutory amendments?
  • Are constitutional writ petitions maintainable against an administrative tax circular when no alternate remedy of appeal is provided under Section 127 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the Federal Tax Ombudsman have jurisdiction to investigate matters where no legal remedy of appeal, review, or revision is available under the relevant legislation?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue, (Zone-III), Ltu, Islamabad vs Messrs2018 PTD (Trib.) 1244 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-10-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-v vs M/s T.N.W. Engineering Works2020 PCTLR 147, PTCL 2019 CL. 330, 2019 PTD 46, 2018 LHC 2472 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-24
  tax referenceinterlocutory orderstay of recoveryAppellate Tribunal Inland RevenueIncome Tax Ordinance 2001reference jurisdictionfinal order
  Summary & questions settled

  The Commissioner Inland Revenue filed tax reference applications challenging the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue's orders that extended stay of recovery. The core legal question was whether an interlocutory order passed by the Tribunal under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 is amenable to the High Court's reference jurisdiction under Section 133(1) of the same Ordinance. The Court held that the reference applications were not maintainable. It established the principle that Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 restricts the High Court's reference jurisdiction exclusively to 'final orders' of the Tribunal, specifically those communicated under Section 132(7). Because orders passed under Section 131(5) are interim or interlocutory in nature, they lack the requisite finality to be challenged via a reference application. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 133 is to limit judicial review to substantive final determinations, thereby excluding procedural or interim stay orders from this specific appellate-style reference mechanism.

  Questions settled

  • Is an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 amenable to the High Court's reference jurisdiction under Section 133(1)?
  • Does the High Court's reference jurisdiction under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 extend to interlocutory orders?
  • What constitutes a 'final order' of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue for the purposes of invoking reference jurisdiction under Section 133(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayers Unit, Karachi vs Occidental Oil and Gas Pakistan Ltd, Karachi2018 P.C.T.L.R. 537 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-09-26Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Haier Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 P.C.T.L.R. 626 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s. Haier Pakistan (Pvt.) LtdPTCL 2018 CL. 588 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Sika Paint Industries2018 PTD 749 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-18
  definite informationamendment of assessmentincome tax assessmentsuppression of salesseized recordsreference applicationappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves reference applications filed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue against an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had vacated the amendment of income tax assessments of the respondent company. The core legal question was whether the material retrieved during a lawful sales tax raid, including seized business records, vouchers, and bank statements indicating suppressed sales, constituted 'definite information' under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, to justify the amendment of assessments. The Lahore High Court held that the seized records containing explicit financial data constituted indisputable and definite information, not requiring speculative or roving inquiries. The court ruled that the Appellate Tribunal was unjustified in setting aside the amended assessments, thereby deciding the question in the negative against the respondent. The key principle established is that documentary evidence directly acquired from a taxpayer's premises indicating escaped income or under-assessed total income qualifies as 'definite information' under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, warranting assessment amendment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether material retrieved from a lawful raid on a taxpayer's premises constitutes definite information under Section 122(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can an assessment be amended under Section 122(4) and (5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, on the basis of seized sales tax records showing suppressed sales?
  • What constitutes definite information for the reopening or amendment of an income tax assessment?
  • Does information obtained from seized documents require further inquiry so as to disqualify it from being treated as definite information?
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• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Haier Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.2018 PTD 1582 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-08Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue vs Messrs Ali Hassan Metal Works2018 PTD 108 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-01Read full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Ltu, Islamabad vs (M_s.) Wi-Tribe, Islamabad2018 P.C.T.L.R. 747 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal), Islamabad vs Messrs Wi-Tribe, Islamabad2018 PTD 1413 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-21
  Federal Excise Dutyinternet servicestelecommunication servicesfiscal statute interpretationtax exemptionarbitrary assessmentvoice content
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns Federal Excise Reference Applications regarding the taxability of 'voice content' services, such as Skype and WhatsApp, provided via internet by a Wireless Local Loop licensee. The core legal question was whether such services are liable for Federal Excise Duty (FED) despite the statutory exemption for internet services, and whether tax authorities may arbitrarily bifurcate internet usage into 'voice' and 'non-voice' components for taxation purposes. The Islamabad High Court held that under the Federal Excise Act, 2005, internet services are explicitly exempted from FED. Since the respondent provides internet services and no technical mechanism exists to segregate 'voice content' from general data usage, the Department’s attempt to levy FED on such usage was invalid. The Court ruled that the arbitrary bifurcation of services by tax authorities was whimsical and legally unsustainable. The judgment affirms the principle that fiscal statutes must be construed strictly, and in cases of ambiguity or lack of clear statutory mechanism for assessment, the interpretation beneficial to the taxpayer must prevail, as tax authorities cannot impose liability through implication or arbitrary estimation.

  Questions settled

  • Are internet services, including voice content rendered through applications, liable to Federal Excise Duty under the Federal Excise Act, 2005?
  • Can tax authorities arbitrarily bifurcate internet usage into voice and non-voice components to levy Federal Excise Duty in the absence of a statutory mechanism?
  • How should ambiguities in a fiscal statute be resolved regarding the interpretation of tax exemptions?
  • Is the determination of value for Federal Excise Duty on services dependent on the total charges imposed by the service provider?
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• Commession Inland Revenue, Regional tax office peshawar vs M/s Sheraz2019 PCRLJ 552, 2018 PTD 2212, 2018 PHC 1692 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-12
  sales taxcatererwedding halltaxable activitysupply of goodsdoctrine of severabilityFBR circularultra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This Sales Tax Reference filed under section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 challenges the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which had set aside sales tax assessments levied on a wedding hall operating as a caterer. The core legal question was whether a business providing food services and catering within a wedding hall is liable to pay sales tax on the supply of goods under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, notwithstanding provincial exemption of marriage hall services or contrary administrative circulars. The Peshawar High Court held that the supply of food and goods in a mixed transaction is subject to the doctrine of severability, making the supply of food items taxable under section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, regardless of the service component being a provincial subject or contrary FBR circulars. The court laid down the principle that subordinate legislation, administrative instructions, or FBR circulars cannot override the charging provisions of a parent statute, and instructions issued by the board are ultra vires if they contravene statutory taxability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the preparation and supply of food by a wedding hall or caterer constitutes a taxable supply of goods under Section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the doctrine of severability apply to mixed contracts involving the provision of both services and goods in a single transaction?
  • Can administrative circulars or instructions issued by the Federal Board of Revenue override the express charging provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Whether FBR circulars are binding on quasi-judicial forums and statutory authorities adjudicating tax disputes?
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• Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Gul Raqib Khan & others2018 PLJ SC 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-29
  Frontier Constabularycivil servant statusFederal Service Tribunalexclusive jurisdictionservice of Pakistanwrit jurisdictionconstitutional interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether employees of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) qualify as "civil servants" under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, thereby necessitating that their service-related grievances be adjudicated exclusively by the Federal Service Tribunal rather than through writ petitions in the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the FC employees' terms and conditions of service, regulated by the North West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915 and the North West Frontier Constabulary Rules 1958, satisfy the constitutional criteria for civil servants. The Court held that the FC employees perform sovereign functions related to the protection of frontiers, which constitutes service in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, they meet the definition of civil servants under Article 260 and Section 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act 1973. The Court ruled that the Federal Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction over their service disputes under Article 212 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeals, affirming that the appropriate remedy for FC employees lies before the Service Tribunal, barring the maintainability of writ petitions in the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered civil servants under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over service disputes involving employees of the Frontier Constabulary?
  • Do the terms and conditions of service of Frontier Constabulary employees satisfy the criteria for 'service of Pakistan' under Article 240 of the Constitution?
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• Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, Peshawar & others vs Gul Raqib Khan and Others2018 SCP 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-21
  Frontier Constabularycivil servantservice tribunalterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionaffairs of the Federation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals and petitions concerning whether employees of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) are civil servants, and consequently, whether writ petitions regarding their service terms and conditions filed before the Peshawar High Court are barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The core legal question is whether FC employees fall within the definition of 'civil servant' so that their exclusive remedy for service disputes lies before the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the terms and conditions of FC employees are governed by the North West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915 and the NWFP Constabulary Rules 1958, and that their duties involving the protection of the frontiers and maintenance of law and order have a direct nexus with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, they satisfy the constitutional tests under Articles 212, 240, and 260 of the Constitution to be classified as civil servants. The Court laid down the principle that FC employees are civil servants whose exclusive remedy for service grievances lies before the Federal Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered civil servants under the law?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate service disputes of Frontier Constabulary employees?
  • Do the duties performed by the Frontier Constabulary bear a connection with the affairs of the Federation?
  • Are writ petitions filed by Frontier Constabulary employees regarding service matters barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
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• Commandant, Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, Peshawar & others vs Gul Raqib Khan & others2018 PLJ SC 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-29
  civil servantsfrontier constabularyservice tribunaljurisdictional barwrit petitionservice grievancesovereign functions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from multiple appeals and petitions filed by the Commandant of the Frontier Constabulary challenging orders of the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question was whether employees of the Frontier Constabulary are 'civil servants' under the law, which would bar the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the Frontier Constabulary was established under the North-West Frontier Constabulary Act 1915, and its employees' terms and conditions are regulated by the North-West Frontier Constabulary Rules 1958. Applying the constitutional tests, the Court held that because the employees perform sovereign functions of protecting and administering the frontiers, their duties are directly in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, they qualify as civil servants, and their exclusive remedy for service grievances lies before the Federal Service Tribunal. The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the Frontier Constabulary qualify as civil servants under the Civil Servants Act 1973 and the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the Peshawar High Court have constitutional jurisdiction to entertain service grievances of Frontier Constabulary employees in light of Article 212 of the Constitution?
  • What are the primary constitutional tests to determine whether an employee of a statutory or federal body holds a post in connection with the affairs of the Federation?
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• Commandant, Frontier Constabilary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others vs Gul Raqib Khan and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 1001, 2018 PLJ SC 320, 2018 PLJ SC 540, 2019 P.S.C. 77, 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-29
  civil servant statusFrontier ConstabularyFederal Service Tribunalwrit jurisdictionservice of Pakistanterms and conditions of serviceArticle 212 bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a series of appeals and petitions challenging the maintainability of writ petitions filed by employees of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) before the Peshawar High Court regarding their service grievances. The core legal question was whether FC employees qualify as 'civil servants' under the Constitution of Pakistan, thereby necessitating that their service disputes be adjudicated exclusively by the Federal Service Tribunal rather than through the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that FC employees are indeed civil servants. The Court reasoned that their appointments and terms of service are governed by the North West Frontier Constabulary Act, 1915 and the North West Frontier Constabulary Rules, 1958, satisfying the requirements of Article 240(a) of the Constitution. Furthermore, because the FC performs sovereign functions related to the protection and administration of Pakistan's frontiers, their duties have a direct nexus with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, the Court established that the Federal Service Tribunal possesses exclusive jurisdiction over their service-related disputes, rendering the High Court petitions non-maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees of the Frontier Constabulary considered civil servants under the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction over service disputes involving employees of the Frontier Constabulary?
  • Do the duties performed by the Frontier Constabulary constitute service in connection with the affairs of the Federation?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector of Sales Tax, Faisalabad. vs M_s. United Industries Limited, FaisalabadPTCL 2018 CL. 91 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-03Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Model Customs Collectorate of Exports vs Messrs Asco International (Pvt.) Ltd. and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 700 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-03-05Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs, Karachi vs Messrs Shujabad Agro Industries2018 PTD (Trib.) 882 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-06-05Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Tabani Traders and others2018 PTD (Trib.) 2191 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs vs Messrs Sports One International Trading2018 PTD (Trib.) 2471 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-07-21Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs through Collector of Customs and 2 others vs Messrs Byco Petroleum Pakistan Ltd. and another2018 PTD (Trib.) 2335 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-03-01Read full judgment →
• Collector of Customs (Export) and others vs Saifuddin2018 PCTLR 236, 2018 P.S.C. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-17
  regulatory dutyexport dutycustoms clearancegoods declarationcharging sectionharmonious interpretationvested rightstax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an exporter was liable to pay regulatory duty imposed on copper, aluminum, and brass scrap under a notification issued by the Federal Government pursuant to Section 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969. The core legal questions involved the interplay between Section 18(2) and Section 18(3) of the Customs Act regarding the imposition of export duty, the determination of the relevant date for the rate of duty under Sections 31 and 131, and the applicability of Section 31-A concerning contracts concluded prior to the notification. The Court held that Section 18(3) operates as a valid exception to the general rule in Section 18(2) against export duties, authorizing the Federal Government to levy regulatory duties to stabilize the market. The Court further held that the rate of duty is determined by the date of delivery of the goods declaration under Section 131, rendering goods declared prior to the notification exempt from the duty, while those declared on or after the notification date are subject to it. The appeal was partly allowed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Federal Government has the legal authority under Section 18(3) of the Customs Act 1969 to levy a regulatory duty on exported goods notwithstanding the general rule against export duties in Section 18(2)?
  • What is the relevant date for determining the rate and amount of duty applicable to any goods exported under Section 31 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • Does a subsequent amendment of a goods declaration regarding non-essential particulars affect the original date of its delivery for the purpose of calculating export duty under Section 31 of the Customs Act 1969?
  • What is the scope and relevance of Section 31-A of the Customs Act 1969 concerning contracts concluded before the imposition of regulatory duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Mirpur,(Commissioner Inland2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1043, 2019 P.S.C. 123, PTCL 2019 CL. 277, 2018 PTD 2270 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-06-26Read full judgment →
• Coca-Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd. vs The Customs, Excise & Sales Tax2018 P.C.T.L.R. 129 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Coca-Cola Beverages Pakistan Ltd vs The Customs, Excise and Sales2018 PCTLR 129, PTCL 2018 CL. 348 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Cmpak Limited vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2019 PLJ SC 217, 2019 P.S.C. 56, 2018 SCMR 1427 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-30
  telecommunicationwhite listed IP addressesgrey trafficinternational call terminationPakistan Telecommunication Authorityleave to appealregulatory penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an Islamabad High Court order upholding a Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) decision that dismissed the petitioner's appeal and levied a fine for unauthorized use of White Listed IP addresses. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner, a licensed cellular mobile service provider, misused White Listed IP addresses—allocated strictly for GPRS/EDGE data services—to terminate international calls through VoIP and SIP protocols in contravention of telecommunication laws and license terms. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower fora were supported by undisputed data obtained via the Grey Traffic Monitoring System from the petitioner's service provider, and that the petitioner failed to substantiate its defense or produce internal inquiry reports. The Court concluded that the penalty imposed was proportionate and that no illegality or perversity existed in the lower decisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the misuse of White Listed IP addresses allocated for data services to terminate international calls violates telecommunication regulatory laws?
  • Can the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority rely on data from a Grey Traffic Monitoring System and third-party service providers to penalize a licensee?
  • Whether concurrent findings of the lower fora regarding the unauthorized termination of international calls warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• CM Pak Limited vs The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2018 PLD Islamabad 243, 2018 IHC 15 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• CM Pak Limited vs Pakistan Telecommunication Authority2018 PLD Islamabad 243 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-02-26Read full judgment →
• Civic Centres Company (Pvt.) Limited vs Commissioner of Income2018 PLJ SC 603, 2018 P.S.C. 1178, 2018 PTD 1808, 2018 SCMR 1319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-28
  income taxwealth taxownershiptax liabilitytransfer of propertyfiscal interpretationstatutory construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the tax liability of a private limited company regarding properties temporarily transferred to its possession by a government directive. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having received possession of properties via a Prime Minister's directive without a formal conveyance or payment of consideration, could be deemed the 'owner' for the purposes of income tax assessment under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, and wealth tax assessment under the Wealth Tax Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not the owner of the properties. The Court reasoned that ownership requires a valid legal transfer, such as a registered sale deed, which was absent in this case. The Court emphasized that mere possession, even pursuant to a government directive, does not confer ownership or create tax liability under the relevant statutes. The key principle laid down is that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly; 'ownership' and 'belonging to' in tax law require legal title, not merely possession or administrative directives, and an owner cannot be deprived of property through executive fiat.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere possession of property pursuant to a government directive constitute ownership for the purposes of tax liability under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can an executive directive transfer legal ownership of property in the absence of a registered sale deed or payment of consideration?
  • Does the expression 'belonging to' in the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, require legal title or merely possession of an asset?
  • Is rental income derived from property by a non-owner assessable as 'Income from house property' or 'Income from business or profession'?
  Read full judgment →
• City School Private Limited vs Government of the Punjab, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 727 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• City School Private Limited vs Government of the Punjab etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 646 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• City School Private Limited vs Government of the Punjab etc2018 PLD Lahore 509, 2018 PLJ Lahore 646, 2018 LHC 495 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• City School Private Limited vs Government of the Punjab and others2018 PLD Lahore 509 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-05Read full judgment →
• City School (Pvt.) through Manager Administration vs Rubina Habib and others2018 CLC 793 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-11-21
  demarcation of landrevenue officerNaqsha Tajawazlocal commissioncivil procedurestatutory remedyland revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition challenging a trial court order that allowed an application for the appointment of a Local Commission for the fresh demarcation of property. The petitioner had previously obtained a demarcation report ('Naqsha Tajawaz') from the Revenue Officer, which the respondents sought to challenge during the civil suit proceedings. The core legal question was whether a civil court could order a fresh demarcation of land by a Local Commission when a demarcation report had already been prepared by the competent Revenue Officer under the land revenue laws. The Islamabad High Court held that the trial court acted with material irregularity in ordering fresh demarcation. The Court ruled that the demarcation of land falls exclusively within the domain of revenue authorities under the relevant statute. Since the respondents failed to avail themselves of the statutory remedies of appeal or revision against the Revenue Officer's report, they could not bypass the revenue hierarchy by seeking a fresh demarcation through a civil court. The Court emphasized that the veracity of the existing report could be challenged during the evidence phase of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the demarcation of land fall exclusively within the domain of revenue authorities under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  • Can a party bypass the statutory appellate hierarchy under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 by seeking a fresh demarcation through a civil court?
  • Is it permissible for a civil court to order a fresh demarcation of property when a report has already been prepared by a Revenue Officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Citibank N.A. vs Mrs. Anjum Saleem and 2 others2018 CLD 342 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-26Read full judgment →
• Choudhry Ghulam Rasool through L.Rs vs Mistri Ghulam Rasool2018 CLC 1099 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-13Read full judgment →
• Chodri Asif Khokhar, etc vs Federation of Pakistan, etc2018 PLJ Lahore 462, 2018 LHC 46 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-23
  public appointmentstatutory bodyWAPDAtransparencymerit-based recruitmentconstitutional governancejudicial reviewdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the appointment process for the Chairman and Members of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), arguing that the Federal Government made these appointments in an arbitrary, non-transparent manner without public advertisement. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government’s discretionary power to appoint heads of statutory bodies is unfettered or subject to the constitutional requirements of transparency, merit, and equality of opportunity. The Court held that appointments to public sector corporations must be based on a palpably fair, structured, and transparent process to ensure institutional effectiveness and accountability. While the Court did not invalidate existing appointments, it mandated that all future appointments must follow a rigorous, merit-based recruitment procedure, including open advertisement and competency frameworks. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that policies regarding WAPDA must be formulated in association with the Council of Common Interest, as per the Constitution. The judgment establishes that discretionary power in public appointments must be exercised reasonably and in the public interest, rejecting arbitrary selection in favor of inclusive, competitive, and transparent recruitment practices.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have unfettered discretion in appointing the Chairman and Members of the Water and Power Development Authority?
  • Are appointments to public sector statutory bodies subject to the constitutional requirement of equality of opportunity and transparent selection processes?
  • Must policies regarding the recruitment of WAPDA's leadership be formulated in association with the Council of Common Interest?
  • Is a court empowered to judicially review the integrity of the selection process for public offices?
  Read full judgment →
• Chodri Asif Khokhar etc. vs Federation of Pakistan, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 462 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-23
  WAPDAstatutory appointmentquo warrantopublic sector recruitmenttransparency in appointmentsCouncil of Common Interestjudicial review of administrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition challenged the appointment process for the Chairman and Members of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), alleging that appointments were made arbitrarily, without advertisement, and lacked transparency. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government's discretionary power to appoint these officials must be exercised through a structured, open, and merit-based process to satisfy constitutional requirements of equality and fairness. The Court held that while WAPDA is a statutory body with managerial autonomy, its appointments to key posts must adhere to principles of transparency, openness, and merit to ensure institutional effectiveness and public trust. The Court affirmed that even where explicit rules are absent, discretionary powers must be exercised reasonably and in the public interest. The judgment established that future appointments must follow a structured, transparent process, including job analysis, public advertisement, and merit-based selection, and that policies regarding such recruitment must be developed in association with the Council of Common Interest, as WAPDA falls under the Federal Legislative List.

  Questions settled

  • Are appointments to key posts in a statutory body like WAPDA subject to the requirement of public advertisement and merit-based selection?
  • Does the Federal Government's discretionary power to appoint the Chairman and Members of WAPDA allow for arbitrary or non-transparent selection processes?
  • Is the Council of Common Interest required to be involved in formulating policies for the recruitment of WAPDA's Chairman and Members?
  • Can a court judicially review the integrity of the selection process for public offices without substituting its own opinion for that of the Executive?
  Read full judgment →
• Chodri Asif Khokhar amid others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 PLC (C.S.) 282 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-23
  WAPDApublic sector appointmentsstatutory bodiestransparencymerit-based recruitmentjudicial reviewCouncil of Common Interestsadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), alleging arbitrary, non-transparent, and ad hoc appointments made by the Federal Government without public advertisement. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government possesses unfettered discretion in appointing heads of statutory bodies or if such appointments must adhere to principles of transparency, merit, and fairness. The Court held that WAPDA, as a distinct statutory body, must operate with managerial freedom and transparency. It emphasized that appointments to public offices must be based on a palpably fair, structured, and merit-based process to ensure institutional effectiveness. While the Court did not invalidate past appointments, it mandated that future appointments must follow a structured, transparent recruitment process, including open advertisement and competency frameworks. Furthermore, the Court directed that policies regarding these appointments must be developed in association with the Council of Common Interests to uphold the Federal Principle. The Federal Government and WAPDA consented to these principles, undertaking to implement a transparent recruitment mechanism within six months.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have unfettered discretion to appoint the Chairman and Members of WAPDA without a transparent, merit-based process?
  • Are appointments to public sector corporations subject to the constitutional requirements of equality of opportunity and transparency?
  • Is the Council of Common Interests required to be involved in formulating policies regarding the recruitment of WAPDA's Chairman and Members?
  • Must a statutory body, despite having autonomy, adhere to a structured and transparent selection process for its key leadership positions?
  Read full judgment →
• Chiraghuddin vs Muhammad Shareef and 2 others2018 YLR 1768 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-08Read full judgment →
• Chiragh Din vs A.D.J., etc2018 PLJ Lahore 8 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-29Read full judgment →
• China International Water and Electric Corporation vs Pakistan2018 CLC 188 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-12Read full judgment →
• Chief Secretary to Government of Punjab through Secretary Finance, Lahore vs Dr. Sajjad Hussain and others2018 PLC (CS.) 532 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-12
  medical reimbursementtreatment abroadliver transplantdiscriminationgovernment servantconstitutional equalityintra-court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenged the judgment of a learned Single Judge who directed the reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by a retired government servant for his daughter's liver transplant abroad. The core legal question was whether a government servant is entitled to full reimbursement of medical expenses for treatment abroad under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959, and whether denying such claim while granting it to another high-ranking official constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. The Lahore High Court held that once a special medical board certifies that the required treatment is unavailable in Pakistan and the statutory procedure is followed, the government cannot arbitrarily discriminate between employees by granting full reimbursement to high-ranking officials while denying it to others. The court laid down the principle that the executive cannot apply subjective, discriminatory criteria based on rank when deciding medical reimbursement claims, and that all similarly situated civil servants are entitled to equal treatment under the law and applicable rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retired government servant is entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses incurred for his daughter's treatment abroad?
  • Does the selective reimbursement of medical expenses for treatment abroad to certain high-ranking officials while denying the same to others constitute unlawful discrimination?
  • Can the government deny medical reimbursement for treatment abroad when a special medical board has certified that such treatment is unavailable in Pakistan?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Land Commissioner, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 2 others vs Chairman Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and 101 others2018 CLC 166 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-07Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive, GEPCO and 3 others vs Asghar Ali Rana2018 YLR 1391 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-12
  electricity connectionfundamental rightshousing schemeunapproved colonyGEPCO policyconstitutional petitionTMA approval
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal was filed by GEPCO against an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby a constitutional petition filed by the respondent for the provision of an electricity connection was allowed. The core legal question before the court was whether an individual consumer residing on private land within an unapproved and rejected housing scheme can be denied an electricity connection under the departmental policy applicable to housing societies. The court held that since the housing scheme had never been approved and its layout plan was ultimately rejected by the Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA), the area did not legally constitute a 'housing society', rendering the department's restrictive policy inapplicable. The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned order, laying down the key principle that enjoying the facility of electricity is a fundamental right of every citizen under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, particularly in modern times, and an individual cannot be deprived of it merely due to the unapproved status of a proposed housing scheme where they lawfully own property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an individual consumer can be denied an electricity connection on the basis of a departmental policy applicable to housing societies when the housing scheme itself has not been approved or registered by the competent authority?
  • Does the right to enjoy the facility of electricity constitute a fundamental right of a citizen under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Can the rejection of a housing scheme's layout plan by the Tehsil Municipal Administration exempt an individual resident from the restrictions imposed on electrified housing societies by power distribution companies?
  Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive MEPCO, Multan vs Muhammad Saleem Khan, etc2018 PLJ Lahore 1138 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-05Read full judgment →
• Chief Executive and Directors, Mubarak Textile Mills Ltd vs Abid2018 CLD 229 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-09-26Read full judgment →
• Chief Engineer vs M/s Zaradad2018 PHC 1630 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-15Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Office vs Messrs2018 PTD 1617 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-01-30Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue vs M/s Cherat Cement Company Ltd2018 PHC 1294 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-30Read full judgment →
• Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue Regional Tax Office vs M/s. Cherat2018 PHC 1294, PTCL 2018 CL. 325 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-30Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Muhammad Younas vs Muhammad Khursheed,etc2019 CLC 797, 2018 LHC 2949 · Lahore High Court · 2018-11-02Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Muhammad Saleem vs Additional District Judge, etc2019 CLD 205, 2019 PLJ Lahore 251, 2018 LHC 3103 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-16
  banking court jurisdictionmortgaged propertyexclusive jurisdictionreturn of plaintfinancial institutionscivil court jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the return of his plaint by the trial court, which had directed him to approach the Banking Court regarding a suit involving property mortgaged to a financial institution. The petitioner had filed a suit challenging sale deeds and subsequent mutations, as well as a mortgage deed created by the defendants in favor of a bank. The core legal question was whether a civil court retains jurisdiction over a suit challenging title documents when the property in question is subject to a mortgage with a financial institution. The Court held that the Banking Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the sale of mortgaged property and matters arising from finance facilities under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Court affirmed that because the property was mortgaged to secure a loan, the dispute fell squarely within the statutory ambit of the Banking Court, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit and maintainability.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving property mortgaged to a financial institution?
  • Can a civil court entertain a suit challenging title documents if the property is simultaneously subject to a mortgage with a financial institution?
  • Does the definition of 'customer' under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, extend to a mortgagor in a dispute over mortgaged property?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Liaqat Ali Pannu , Advocate, Sambrial vs Chairman Election Board, Sambrial, and others2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Pb.B.C.) 24 · Punjab Bar Council · 2017-08-12Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Asad-Ur-Rehman vs The Election Commission of Pakistan2018 CLC 1040 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-12-11Read full judgment →
• Changez vs Shahid and anotherPLJ 2019 Cr.c. 1674, 2018 MLD 1136 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-04-20Read full judgment →
• Chairman, NAB---Appellant vs Muhammad Usman and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-21
  criminal procedurewitness examinationcourt witnessesjudicial discretionconstitutional jurisdictionaccountability courtre-examination of witnesses
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Peshawar High Court judgment that permitted the accused to summon 33 prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses after they had already been cross-examined. The Accountability Court had initially declined this request. The core legal question was whether the accused possesses an absolute right to recall prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the law. The Court clarified that prosecution and defence witnesses are distinct categories that cannot be intermingled. While Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 grants the court power to summon witnesses, such witnesses are designated as "Court witnesses," not witnesses for the defence, and this power is reserved for exceptional circumstances where evidence is essential for a just decision. The Court established that trial court discretion in managing witnesses should not be interfered with under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 unless it results in a grave miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Accountability Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused person as a matter of right summon prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses after they have already been cross-examined?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court exercise its power under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon or recall a witness?
  • Is it permissible for a High Court to interfere with the discretion exercised by a subordinate court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 regarding the summoning of witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad vs Atta Muhammad2018 [M] C.L.R. 14 · Islamabad High Court
  upgradation of postswrit of mandamusterms and conditions of servicepolicy matterdiscriminationadministrative discretioncivil service law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a challenge to a High Court order directing the Federal Board of Revenue to initiate the process of upgrading posts held by the respondents. The respondents, serving as Superintendents and Deputy Superintendents, sought this relief based on the principle of non-discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution, arguing that similar posts in other departments had been upgraded. The core legal questions involved whether upgradation constitutes a vested right, whether it falls under the terms and conditions of service, and whether a High Court can issue a writ of mandamus to compel such an administrative policy decision. The Court held that upgradation is not a statutory right but a policy matter governed by the Establishment Division's Office Memorandum dated 20.1.2001. It ruled that the decision to upgrade a post lies exclusively within the administrative domain of the relevant department, provided specific criteria are met. The Court established that upgradation is distinct from promotion, confers no automatic benefits to the incumbent, and cannot be claimed on the basis of discrimination or parity with other departments.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee have a vested right to claim the upgradation of their post?
  • Can a High Court, under Article 199 of the Constitution, direct a government department to initiate the process of upgrading a post?
  • Is the plea of discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution a valid ground for claiming the upgradation of a post?
  • Does the upgradation of a post automatically entitle the incumbent to the higher grade, pay, and privileges of that post?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Azad Jammu & Kashmir Council (Prime Minister of Pakistan_Authority) through Secretary. Aj&K Council, Islamabad and 2 others vs Muhammad Munir Raja and another2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 33 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service matterde novo inquiryfinality of judgmentdouble jeopardydisciplinary proceedingscompetent authoritycompulsory retirementjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter concerns the validity of a de novo disciplinary inquiry initiated by the AJ&K Council against a civil servant after a previous Supreme Court judgment declared the initial disciplinary proceedings void due to lack of jurisdictional competence. The core legal question was whether the authority could initiate a fresh inquiry on the same allegations after the apex court had upheld the Service Tribunal’s decision, which had exonerated the respondent on both legal and factual grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the previous judgment had attained finality on all legal and factual propositions. The Court ruled that executive authorities cannot reopen matters finally decided by the apex court or initiate de novo inquiries on the same allegations without express court permission, as doing so violates the principle of finality and the doctrine against double jeopardy. The Court emphasized that executive authorities must act in aid of the Supreme Court and cannot interpret or bypass its binding judgments, thereby affirming the Service Tribunal’s decision to set aside the de novo proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority initiate a de novo inquiry on the same allegations after a final judgment of the Supreme Court has upheld an exoneration?
  • Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to disciplinary proceedings where a civil servant has been exonerated by a Service Tribunal?
  • Is an executive authority permitted to interpret or bypass a binding judgment of the Supreme Court on the grounds of legal inconsistency?
  • Does a judgment declaring disciplinary proceedings void due to lack of jurisdictional competence automatically permit the authority to initiate a fresh inquiry without court permission?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman NAB vs Muhammad Usman and others2018 PLD Supreme Court 28, 2018 PLJ SC 42 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-21
  prosecution witnessesdefence witnessessummoning witnessesCourt witnessinquisitorial powerperjuryconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which set aside an Accountability Court's order declining the respondents' request to summon thirty-three prosecution witnesses (who had already been examined and cross-examined) as defence witnesses. The core legal question was whether an accused has an absolute right under Section 265-F and Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon and examine already-examined prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the trial court's order. The Court held that prosecution and defence witnesses are distinct categories that cannot be intermingled. While Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 grants the trial court inquisitorial powers to summon or recall witnesses as 'Court witnesses' to discover the truth, this power is discretionary and must be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice, not to allow the defence to recall prosecution witnesses at random, which would defeat the ends of justice and risk perjury.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused summon and examine already-examined prosecution witnesses as defence witnesses under Section 265-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court recall or summon a witness as a Court witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 when reviewing a trial court's discretionary order regarding the summoning of witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman NAB through Prosecutor General, Islamabad vs (1) Mian2018 SCP 1329 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-11-12
  bail pending appealsuspension of sentenceconstitutional jurisdictionNational Accountability Ordinancetentative assessment of evidenceburden of proofstatutory ouster of jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the grant of bail and suspension of sentences in cases under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Court grants leave to appeal to address several critical legal questions, primarily focusing on the scope of constitutional jurisdiction in granting bail when there is a statutory ouster of jurisdiction. The core issues involve determining whether the principles governing bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, apply to suspension of sentences in NAB cases, the parameters for tentative assessment of evidence versus deeper appreciation, and the propriety of High Courts issuing detailed findings on merits during suspension of sentence proceedings. Additionally, the Court seeks to clarify whether constitutional petitions can be used to bypass statutory procedures, the applicability of specific evidentiary burdens of proof under the Qanun-i-Shahadat Order, 1984, and the consistency of previous High Court judgments with established Supreme Court precedents regarding bail and sentence suspension. The matter is referred to a larger bench for adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked to grant bail in cases where there is a statutory ouster of jurisdiction to grant bail pending appeal?
  • Are the principles regulating bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, applicable to the suspension of sentences in NAB cases?
  • What are the parameters for the tentative assessment of evidence when considering the suspension of a sentence?
  • Can a High Court discuss the merits of a case and provide conclusive findings while dealing with a petition for suspension of sentence in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore and another vs Mst.2018 PLJ Peshawar 129 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Chack Matar vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 389 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-04-03
  post-arrest bailCNSAnarcotics recoverylocal police jurisdictionAnti-Narcotics Forceprohibitory clausecharas
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises from the refusal of post-arrest bail to the petitioner by the Special Judge ANF Gilgit, after he was booked under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for the alleged possession of 20 kilograms of charas. The core legal question before the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court was whether the local police lacked the competence to register an FIR and conduct proceedings for narcotics offenses, thereby rendering the arrest and investigation a nullity, and whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail despite the prohibitory clause. The Court held that while the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is the specialized agency created under the statute for investigation, local police can register a case of narcotics recovery provided the accused and the recovered material are handed over to the ANF for further proceedings. The Court found the petitioner prima facie connected to a massive recovery of contraband and dismissed the bail petition. The key principle laid down is that procedural technicalities regarding the investigating agency should not frustrate the intent of special narcotics legislation, and the local police's initial registration is curable upon transferring the matter to the ANF.

  Questions settled

  • Whether local police are competent to register an FIR for the recovery of narcotics under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does the statutory bar under Section 51 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 absolutely preclude the grant of bail in cases involving a prohibitory quantity of narcotics?
  • Whether the failure to associate public witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 vitiates the entire proceedings conducted by the local police in narcotics cases?
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• Ch. Shabbir Ahmad vs Riaz Bangash Head HR2018 LHC 1802 · Lahore High Court · 2018-07-03
  contempt of courtcompliance with court orderspeaking orderwrit jurisdictionadministrative decisionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a contempt application filed under the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, alleging non-compliance with a court order passed in a writ petition. The court had previously directed the respondent to decide the petitioner's application within 15 days via a reasoned speaking order after a hearing. Upon review, the court found that the respondent had indeed heard the petitioner in person, constituting sufficient compliance with the court's prior direction. Furthermore, the court observed that the contempt application failed to establish a violation under Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003. The petitioner attempted to challenge the validity of the respondent's subsequent decision, but the court held that contempt proceedings are not the appropriate forum to adjudicate the legitimacy or merits of an administrative decision. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court affirmed that it cannot sit in judgment over such findings as a court of appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to pursue appropriate legal remedies against the authority's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contempt application be used to challenge the validity or merits of an administrative order passed in compliance with a court's direction?
  • Does hearing a petitioner in person constitute sufficient compliance with a court order directing an authority to decide an application?
  • Is the High Court empowered to sit in judgment over the findings of an administrative authority in contempt proceedings?
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• Ch. Rehmat Ali Memorial Trust vs Punjab Employees Social Security2018 [M] C.L.R. 659, 2018 KLR Labour & Service Cases 210 · Lahore High Court
  social security contributionspecial vs general notificationdue processright of hearingaccrued rightsmaintainability of writ petitionalternative efficacious remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This Intra-Court Appeal challenges a Single Judge's order dismissing a constitutional petition on the grounds of the availability of an alternative, efficacious remedy. The Appellant, a charitable trust, had been granted an exemption from social security contributions via a specific notification issued in 2000. Subsequently, the Provincial Employees Social Security Institution (PESSI) issued a general notification in 2013, demanding contributions from the Appellant without prior notice or hearing. The core legal question was whether a general notification could override a previously issued special notification granting specific rights, and whether the Appellant was entitled to due process before the withdrawal of such rights. The Court held that the Single Judge erred in dismissing the petition, as no efficacious remedy existed for the Appellant to challenge the vires or applicability of the notifications before the institution itself. The Court ruled that rights accrued under a special notification cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by a subsequent general notification without affording the affected party an opportunity of hearing and due process. The appeal was accepted, and the impugned order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can a general notification issued by a statutory body override a previously issued special notification granting specific exemptions to an entity?
  • Is an entity entitled to a notice and opportunity of hearing before a statutory body withdraws a previously granted exemption?
  • Does a statutory body have the jurisdiction to determine the vires of its own notifications in a departmental proceeding?
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• Ch. Naseer Ahmed and another vs Rent Controller and others2018 YLR 29 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-24Read full judgment →
• Ch. Naseer Ahmad vs Chairman, PCBL, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 664 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-14Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Nawaz Hafeez vs Federation of Pakistan etc2019 PLD Lahore 174, 2018 LHC 2935 · Lahore High Court · 2018-10-08Read full judgment →
• Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, Advocate High Court vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman, NAB, Islamabad and 2 others2018 YLR 2107 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• Ch. Mohammad Nawaz and another vs The Federal Government2018 PLC (C.S.) 325 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-07-31
  plot allotment cancellationprinciples of natural justiceaudi alteram partemmove over vs promotionconstitutional jurisdictionhousing foundation
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra court appeal impugns an order of the Single Judge-in-Chambers dismissing the appellants' writ petition against the cancellation of a plot allotment by the Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation. The core legal questions involve whether a plot allotment can be cancelled without affording an opportunity of hearing, and whether a move over in pay scale constitutes a promotion for entitlement to a housing scheme category. The Islamabad High Court held that cancelling an allotment without a show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing violates the principles of natural justice, rendering the order void and coram non judice. The court also clarified that a move over is a financial extension and not a promotion. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the cancellation and the impugned order, and reaffirming that administrative authorities must strictly observe the audi alteram partem rule before affecting vested property rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an administrative authority can cancel a plot allotment without issuing a show-cause notice and affording an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does a move over from one pay scale to another amount to a promotion for determining plot category entitlement?
  • Is an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice considered void and coram non judice?
  • Can a housing authority rescind an allotment after full payment has been made and the plot transferred without adhering to procedural fairness?
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• Ch. Khalid Sultan, Superintending Engineer (S.E.), Public Health Eng_39d539452019 KLR Supreme Court 126, 2018 P.S.C. 1464 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  disciplinary proceedingscivil servicedouble jeopardynemo judex in sua causaservice tribunalremoval from servicemisconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against the dismissal of petitions by the Service Tribunal and the High Court regarding disciplinary proceedings against civil servants. The appellants were initially penalized with minor punishments under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001. Following subsequent litigation and a remand order, the competent authority issued a notification imposing minor penalties, which was later unilaterally cancelled by the authority. The core legal question was whether the authority could cancel a previously implemented penalty notification and initiate fresh proceedings on the same allegations, and whether the principle of nemo judex in sua causa applied given the involvement of the Prime Minister who had previously litigated against the appellants. The Court held that the cancellation notification was illegal. It established that once a civil servant is punished or acquitted, they cannot be subjected to fresh inquiry or trial on the same set of allegations, as this violates the principle against double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that no person can act as a judge in their own cause, rendering the authority's actions invalid.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be subjected to fresh disciplinary proceedings on the same set of allegations after being punished or acquitted?
  • Does the principle of nemo judex in sua causa prohibit an authority from adjudicating a matter in which they previously acted as a litigant against the accused?
  • Does a stay order issued in a writ petition survive after the dismissal of the main petition?
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• CH. Iftikhar Ahmed, I.-G.. Islamabad and others vs The State2018 PLJ SC 755, 2019 P.S.C. (Crl.) 24, 2018 SCMR 1385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-15
  contempt of courtunconditional apologysuo motu jurisdictionintra court appealmanhandling of chief justiceconstitutional protection of ordinancespolice misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  These Intra Court Appeals challenge the common order of the Supreme Court finding the appellants guilty of contempt of court under Article 204 of the Constitution and the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003, arising from the physical manhandling and obstruction of the then Chief Justice of Pakistan on 13.03.2007. The core legal questions involved whether the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 was a valid existing law, whether the office of the Chief Justice retained its dignity when not actively performing judicial functions, and whether the unconditional apologies tendered by the appellants warranted their discharge. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 received permanence via Article 270AA of the Constitution, that the status of the Chief Justice subsisted regardless of immediate judicial duties, and that the belated, qualified apologies did not satisfy the rigorous criteria laid down in established jurisprudence for purging contempt given the extreme gravity of physically assaulting the head of the judiciary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2003 stood repealed after 120 days or received permanence under Article 270AA of the Constitution?
  • Does a judge cease to hold the office or dignity of Chief Justice when not actively performing judicial functions on a given day?
  • Can an apology tendered at a later stage of proceedings after the framing of charges be considered an unconditional and bona fide apology capable of purging contempt?
  • Whether physical manhandling and obstruction of the Chief Justice by law enforcement personnel constitutes a grave contempt of court?
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• Ch. Ibrar Ahmed vs Station House Officer, Police Station, Thothal, Mirpur and 4 others2018 MLD 1402 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-03-08
  quashment of FIRinherent powersinvestigation stageabuse of processcriminal proceedingsrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  The captioned petition was filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashment of FIR No. 276/17 registered at Police Station Thothal, Mirpur under sections 448, 451, 34, A.P.C. and subsequently added Section 14 of the EHA. The core legal question concerned whether an FIR can be quashed under the inherent powers of the High Court at the investigation stage when questions of fact and mala fides are alleged, and whether the pendency of proceedings before a Rent Controller bars criminal proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that questions of fact and mala fides cannot be determined in a quashment petition, that interference with ongoing police investigation is unwarranted except in exceptional circumstances where no offence is made out from the bare reading of the FIR, and that the pendency of rent proceedings is no ground to stop independent criminal proceedings. The court laid down the principle that the High Court will not interfere with the investigative process under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., as investigation is the domain of the police.

  Questions settled

  • Can an FIR be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground of mala fides and disputed questions of fact?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the investigation proceedings of the police while exercising powers under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Does the pendency of a matter before a Rent Controller bar or halt parallel criminal proceedings arising from the same dispute?
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• CH. Gohar Qayyum another vs State and another2019 CLC 340, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 291 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-11
  pre-arrest bailforgerycheatingabetmentprohibitory clausemala fidedelay in FIR
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Ch. Muhammad Qayyum in respect of case F.I.R. No. 137/2017 registered under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station City Sammundri, Faisalabad, on allegations of abetting co-accused who tendered a forged document in a civil suit. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner has made out a case for the confirmation of pre-arrest bail, particularly regarding mala fide, absence of prohibitory clause applicability, and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR. The Lahore High Court held that the application should be accepted and pre-arrest bail confirmed. The Court based its decision on the unexplained delay of over 15 months in lodging the FIR, the non-applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the absence of direct evidence linking the petitioner to the alleged abetment or conspiracy, the potential over-implication of family members, and the petitioner's cooperation with the investigation. The key principle laid down is that mala fide at the pre-arrest bail stage may be deduced and inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case where direct positive evidence is difficult to establish.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be confirmed when there is an unexplained delay of more than fifteen months in lodging the FIR?
  • Does the offence under Section 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • How is mala fide established at the pre-arrest bail stage when direct solid evidence is lacking?
  • Is bail liable to be confirmed when an accused has joined the investigation and there is no allegation of misuse of concession of interim bail?
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• CDA and another vs Hashwani Hotels Ltd.2018 P.S.C. 421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-09-25
  limitation perioddecree-sheetcondonation of delaymemorandum of appealSupreme Court Rulescertified copy of judgment and decree
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from civil miscellaneous applications seeking the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred by 44 days due to the initial non-attachment of a decree-sheet along with the memorandum of appeal. The core legal question involves whether an appeal before the Supreme Court is incompetent or barred by time when filed with the impugned judgment alone without a decree-sheet, given that the preparation date of the decree-sheet by the High Court was obscure and unrecorded. The Supreme Court held that while Order XII, Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 mandatorily requires both the certified copies of the judgment and the decree to accompany the petition of appeal, an appeal filed without the decree-sheet can be cured upon its subsequent filing, and delay can be condoned where the exact date of the decree-sheet's preparation is uncertain and not attributable to the appellant's default. The key principle laid down is that the limitation period for filing an appeal commences from the date the decree-sheet is actually prepared and comes into existence, and in circumstances of obscurity regarding such date, the delay in filing the decree-sheet is condonable in the interest of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal filed before the Supreme Court without attaching the decree-sheet is incompetent under Order XII, Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • From what date does the period of limitation for filing an appeal commence when the decree-sheet is not prepared contemporaneously with the judgment?
  • Can the delay in filing a decree-sheet be condoned when the exact date of its preparation by the High Court office is obscure and unrecorded on the judicial record?
  • Do the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply automatically to proceedings and appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
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