Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Ammad Aslam Cheema vs Tariq Ali Sheikh and 2 others2018 CLC 342 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-07Read full judgment →
• Amjad vs The State2018 MLD 1541 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-27
  illegal weaponsSindh Arms Actunlicensed pistolballistic reportcriminal appealreduction of sentenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine. The core legal question revolves around the legality and validity of the conviction based on the recovery of an unlicensed weapon and the reliability of the supporting prosecution evidence. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution successfully proved its case through consistent testimonies of witnesses that remained unchallenged during cross-examination, and that an acquittal or stoppage of proceedings in a connected robbery case does not automatically warrant acquittal in a separate firearms possession case. The court laid down the principle that each criminal case must be decided independently on its own merits and available evidence, and while upholding the conviction, the High Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment and fine considering the appellant's young age and clean criminal record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal or stoppage of proceedings in a connected robbery case constitutes a valid ground for acquittal in a separate trial for illegal possession of a weapon?
  • Can unassailed testimonies of prosecution witnesses regarding the recovery of an unlicensed weapon sustain a conviction under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013?
  • Does a positive ballistic examination report of a recovered weapon corroborate the prosecution's case for illegal arms possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Pervez vs KPK Ehtisab2018 PHC 1345 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-06Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali Khan vs Ministry of Energy (Power Division,) Islamabad etc2019 P.C.T.L.R. 148, 2019 PLC (C.S.) 300, 2018 LHC 1266 · Lahore High Court · 2018-06-28
  MD/CEO terminationpolitical victimizationCompanies Ordinance 1984superannuationultra viresratification of illegal actconstitutional petitionlegitimate expectancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an Office Order issued by the Ministry of Energy, which compulsorily retired the petitioner from his position as Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer (MD/CEO) of National Engineering Services Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited (NESPAK) on grounds of superannuation. The core legal questions concerned whether the Ministry possessed the authority to terminate the MD/CEO of a limited liability company and whether the subsequent ratification of this order by the company’s Board of Directors cured the procedural illegality. The Lahore High Court held that the Ministry of Energy lacked the jurisdiction to issue the termination order, as the power to appoint or remove the MD/CEO exclusively vests in the Board of Directors under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Court further ruled that an act performed by an unauthorized authority cannot be validly ratified by the competent body. Emphasizing that government interference in the internal management of an autonomous company is unlawful, the Court set aside the impugned order, finding it tainted by political victimization and procedural non-compliance with the statutory requirements for removal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Ministry of Energy have the legal authority to terminate the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of a limited liability company like NESPAK?
  • Can an order passed by an unauthorized authority be validly ratified by the competent authority to cure the procedural defect?
  • Does the government have the power to interfere in the internal management and appointment of the Chief Executive of a company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance?
  • Is a petition challenging the termination of a Chief Executive of a company maintainable under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali Arbab vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa2019 PLC (C.S) 1129, 2018 PHC 1829 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-20
  writ petitionselection committeeappointment processjudicial reviewmala fideservice matterfit and proper test
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the selection process for the position of Managing Director of the Bank of Khyber, alleging mala fide, discrimination, and procedural irregularities. The petitioner, an applicant for the post, contended that his candidature was improperly dropped due to biased information presented by the Selection Committee Chairman and that the recruitment lacked a structured mechanism. The core legal questions concerned whether the recruitment process was authorized by the competent authority, whether a structured mechanism existed, the effect of a committee member's dissent, and whether the process was vitiated by mala fide. The Court held that the selection process was conducted transparently, based on approved criteria, and that the petitioner's lower merit position, rather than bias, resulted in his non-selection. The Court affirmed that it cannot sit as an appellate authority over a selection committee's expert assessment. The principle laid down is that courts will not interfere with administrative selection processes absent clear proof of illegality or mala fide, and that a committee's unanimous decision, approved by the competent authority, remains valid despite a member's withdrawn dissent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court sit as an appellate authority to review the merits of a selection committee's assessment?
  • Does the non-participation of a single member in a multi-member selection committee vitiate the entire recruitment process?
  • Is a selection process rendered invalid if one committee member initially raises allegations of bias but subsequently withdraws them and agrees with the committee's unanimous decision?
  • Does the executive authority of a province, exercised under Article 129 of the Constitution, extend to the approval of recruitment processes for statutory bodies?
  Read full judgment →
• Amjad Ali and another vs The State2018 MLD 57 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-24
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtdelayed FIRappreciation of evidenceacquittalItlaf-e-Salahiyyat-e-Udwhostile witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the trial court's judgment convicting the appellants for causing injuries under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given the twenty-one-day delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of corroborative evidence, and inconsistencies between the FIR and the testimony provided at trial. The High Court held that the conviction was unsustainable. The court observed that the unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with significant improvements made by witnesses during trial regarding the weapons used, rendered the prosecution’s case unreliable. Furthermore, the medical evidence failed to substantiate the charge of Itlaf-e-Salahiyyat-e-Udw as defined under the law. Emphasizing that conviction must rest on unimpeachable evidence, the court reiterated that any reasonable doubt arising from the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned judgment, acquitted the appellants, and ordered their release, affirming that the rule of benefit of doubt is a fundamental principle of criminal justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained inordinate delay in lodging an FIR render the prosecution's case unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when prosecution witnesses make material improvements to their testimony during trial?
  • Is the benefit of doubt applicable when medical evidence fails to support the specific charge of Itlaf-e-Salahiyyat-e-Udw?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to produce the alleged crime weapon during a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Muhammad Shah Khan & another vs Haji Abdur Remo & others2018 PLJ Peshawar 154 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-10Read full judgment →
• Amir Muhammad Shah Khan & another vs Haji Abdur Rehman & others2018 PHC 1297 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-10Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan vs The State2018 MLD 1545 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-30
  post-arrest bailtrial delayjudicial disciplinesubordinate courtsnon-compliance with court ordersmurder trialGilgit-Baltistan judiciary
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, who was charged under sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following the death of the injured victim. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail due to the trial court's failure to comply with a previous order of the Chief Court, which had mandated a day-to-day trial and completion within 90 days. Upon review, the Court observed that the trial court ignored the specific directions regarding the timeline and the production of witnesses, leading to significant and unnecessary delays. Consequently, the Court granted bail to the petitioner, emphasizing that the trial court's failure to adhere to judicial directives necessitated this relief. The judgment establishes the principle that subordinate courts are strictly bound to obey the directions of the Chief Court in letter and spirit to maintain judicial discipline, and failure to comply with such mandates—particularly those concerning trial timelines—can constitute valid grounds for granting bail to an accused, irrespective of the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to comply with a High Court's directive for a day-to-day trial constitute a valid ground for granting bail?
  • Are subordinate courts legally bound to follow the directions of the Chief Court in letter and spirit?
  • Can a trial court's disregard for judicial timelines justify the grant of bail to an accused in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Khan vs The State and another2018 MLD 1777 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2018-03-16Read full judgment →
• Amir Jamil vs University of Karachi through Registrar and 2 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 542 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-18
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitymaster and servantcontractual employeeforged degreetermination of serviceuniversity employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Sindh High Court by the petitioner, a former contract employee of the University of Karachi, challenging his removal from service, the termination order, and seeking various writs including reinstatement and restraining the university from filling the post through a new recruitment process. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of a constitutional petition against a university governed by non-statutory service rules, the rights of a contract employee whose service is terminated on allegations of submitting a forged degree, and the applicability of the master-and-servant principle. The court held that the service rules and statutes of the University of Karachi framed under the University of Karachi Act, 1972 are non-statutory in nature, meaning constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked. Furthermore, the court held that a contractual employee has no vested right to regularisation or reinstatement, and the employment relationship is governed by the principle of master and servant. The petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is maintainable against the University of Karachi in service matters?
  • Does a contract employee have a vested right to seek reinstatement or regularisation of service?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to the employment contracts of university employees governed by non-statutory rules?
  • Can disputed questions of fact regarding the submission of a forged degree be adjudicated in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Hayat vs Punjab Public Service Commission, etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 639 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Amir Hayat vs Punjab Public Service Commission and others2018 PLJ Lahore 639, 2018 PLC (C.S.) 971 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  merit list validitypublic service commissionappointment of substituteconstitutional petitionright to appointmentservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Sub-Inspector (BS-14) following the failure of selected candidates to join their posts. The petitioner, who stood at merit position 32, sought a direction for his appointment against three vacant seats left by candidates who did not join. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as the next candidate in the merit list, was entitled to be appointed against these vacancies under the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2016, or if the department could re-advertise the posts. The Court held that under Regulation 59, a substitute can be provided from a valid merit list if requested by the department, and Regulation 62 mandates the validity of such lists for twelve months. The Court determined that the department's decision to re-advertise the posts was an afterthought intended to frustrate the petitioner's rights. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to issue an appointment letter to the petitioner, affirming the principle that a candidate next in merit has a right to be considered for vacancies arising within the validity period of a merit list.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate be appointed as a substitute from a merit list if the originally selected candidate fails to join the post?
  • What is the validity period of a merit list for recommending substitutes under the Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2016?
  • Does a government department have the discretion to re-advertise vacant posts instead of appointing the next candidate on a valid merit list?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Ghulam alias Chorra vs The State and othersPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 384, 2018 YLR 1137 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-17
  narcotic substancecriminal appealbenefit of doubtchain of custodysafe custodyacquittal of co-accusedchemical examiner report
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 9-B of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for possession of 350 grams of charas. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that the co-accused was acquitted on the same evidence, the spy informer was not produced, and there were significant gaps in the chain of custody regarding the narcotic sample. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. The ratio decidendi is that when co-accused persons with identical roles are acquitted on the same evidence, the same evidence cannot be relied upon to convict the remaining accused without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the unexplained involvement of an Excise and Taxation Officer in the transmission of samples, coupled with the failure to establish safe custody and transmission of the contraband, creates a fatal doubt in the prosecution's case. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, emphasizing that the benefit of doubt must always be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence used to convict an accused be relied upon if the co-accused with an identical role has already been acquitted on the same evidence?
  • Does the failure to produce a spy informer, who allegedly identified the accused, create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to establish the safe custody and transmission of narcotic samples to the Chemical Examiner?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the forwarding officer of the narcotic sample is an unauthorized official not connected to the investigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Ghulam alias Chorra vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 384 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-17
  narcoticscriminal appealbenefit of doubtsafe custody of samplespy informeracquittal of co-accusedcharas
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 9-B of The Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for possessing 350 grams of charas. The core legal questions involve the credibility of an unproduced spy informer, the implication of an absconding accused who was not apprehended at the spot, the effect of the co-accused's acquittal on the remaining accused based on the same evidence, and the legal consequence of broken safe custody and unauthorized intervention by an Excise and Taxation Officer in transmitting samples to the Chemical Examiner. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt given the non-production of the spy informer, the acquittal of the co-accused on identical evidence, and the lack of proof regarding safe custody and safe transmission of the narcotics sample. The court laid down the principle that the acquittal of a co-accused on the same set of disbelieved witnesses destroys the prosecution case against remaining accused without independent corroboration, and that a failure to prove safe custody of contraband warrants acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the unproduced spy informer's testimony is fatal to establishing the identity of an absconding accused?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained when a co-accused with an identical role on the same evidence has already been acquitted?
  • Does the involvement of an unauthorized official like an Excise and Taxation Officer in forwarding narcotics samples vitiate the proof of safe custody?
  • Is a fleeing accused reasonably expected to throw away a small quantity of narcotics that does not impede escape?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Bashir vs Mst. Nosheen Fatima an another2018 MLD 574 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-08Read full judgment →
• Aminullah Mandokhail vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Quetta and others2018 PLD Balochistan 30, 2018 PLJ Quetta 118 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-29Read full judgment →
• Aminullah Mandokhail vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs Department and 4 others2018 PLD Balochistan 30 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-09-29Read full judgment →
• Amin International Trading Company, Peshawar and others vs Superintendent, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR, Lahore and others2018 PTD (Trib.) 1260 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-10-20Read full judgment →
• Amin Arnim etc. vs Advocate General, Punjab etc.2018 PLJ Lahore 568 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Ameer Jan and 17 others vs Project Manager GRC and 5 others2018 CLC 1465 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-12Read full judgment →
• Ameer Bakhsh vs Assa and 2 others2018 CLC 1004 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-01-15Read full judgment →
• Ameena Haq vs Rab Nawaz Khan etc2018 LHC 1118, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1088 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-24Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs The State etc2018 PHC 1622 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-05-04Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah vs Station House Officer, Police Station Munda and 32018 PLD Peshawar 65 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-15Read full judgment →
• Aman Ullah vs 1ST Additional District and Sessions Judge and another2018 P Cr. L J 820 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-03
  surety forfeitureabsconding accusedproclaimed offenderbail bondcriminal miscellaneous applicationjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, which imposed a penalty of 50% of the surety bond amount following the forfeiture of the applicant’s bond due to the abscondence of the accused. The core legal question was whether the trial court’s imposition of this penalty was excessive or legally flawed given the applicant's failure to produce the accused. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the impugned order was legally sound and did not warrant interference. The court reasoned that the applicant, as a surety, had a bounden duty to ensure the accused's presence, and having failed to do so despite sufficient latitude, the forfeiture was justified. Furthermore, the court observed that the trial court had already exercised leniency by reducing the penalty to 50% of the original bond amount. The judgment affirms the principle that where a surety fails to discharge the liability of producing an accused who subsequently becomes a proclaimed offender, the court’s decision to forfeit a portion of the bond amount is a valid exercise of judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Is a surety liable for the forfeiture of a bond when the accused absconds and is declared a proclaimed offender?
  • Does a trial court have the discretion to reduce the penalty amount of a forfeited surety bond?
  • Can a surety challenge the quantum of a penalty imposed for the failure to produce an accused in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Aman Ellahi vs The Registrar of Trade Marks and another2018 SHC 394 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-12Read full judgment →
• Altaf-Ur-Rehman vs State, etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 532, PLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 485 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  pre-arrest baildishonour of chequeundated chequenegotiable instrumentstale chequedelay in FIRfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arose from a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the petitioner allegedly issued two cheques to the Food Department to settle a dispute over misappropriated wheat, which were subsequently dishonoured. The petitioner contended that the cheques were undated, issued in 2011 as part of an expected settlement, and that a criminal case on the same subject matter was already pending trial. The Lahore High Court observed that the cheques lacked dates, indicating they were not meant for immediate encashment, and noted that under Section 84(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, cheques must be presented within a reasonable time. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to explain a delay of over five years in registering the FIR, which pointed towards mala fide intentions. Consequently, the Court held that the matter required further inquiry and confirmed the petitioner's ad-interim pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an undated cheque issued for an expected settlement can attract criminal liability under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if presented years later?
  • What is the legal effect of a substantial, unexplained delay in registering an FIR under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 on an application for pre-arrest bail?
  • Does the pendency of a prior criminal trial on the same underlying transaction make a subsequent case of cheque dishonour one of further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Altaf-Ur-Rehman vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 532 · Lahore High Court · 2018-02-15
  pre-arrest baildishonoured chequestale chequenegotiable instrumentmala fidefurther inquirycriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an application for pre-arrest bail in a case involving an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from the alleged issuance of dishonoured cheques for the price of misappropriated wheat entrusted by the Food Department. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner is entitled to pre-arrest bail given that the cheques bore no dates, were issued six years prior to the registration of the FIR in connection with a pending dispute, and exhibited unexplained delay and possible mala fides on the part of the complainant. The court held that the absence of dates on the cheques, the pending parallel criminal proceedings over the same subject matter, the concept of stale cheques under Section 84(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, and an unexplained delay of five and a half years collectively establish mala fides and grounds for further inquiry. Consequently, the court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down principles regarding the essential requirements of negotiable instruments and the evaluation of mala fides in pre-arrest bail petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-arrest bail can be granted when the cheques in question bear no date of presentation and were allegedly issued years prior to the registration of the FIR?
  • What constitutes a stale cheque and how does the absence of a date affect legal proceedings under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does an unexplained, prolonged delay of several years in lodging an FIR reflect mala fides on the part of the complainant for the purpose of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Almoiz Industries Limited and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2019 PCRLJ 502, 2018 PTD 1633 · Lahore High Court
  sales taxspecial procedureconstitutional petitionultra viresdiscriminatory taxationdelegated legislationsteel meltersself-generated electricity
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the vires of certain provisions of Chapter XI of the Sales Tax Special Procedure Rules, 2007 and Sales Tax General Order No. 1 of 2013, which excluded steel-melting and re-rolling units operated by sugar mills or other persons using self-generated electricity from the beneficial special tax regime and lower fixed rates applicable to units consuming electricity supplied by public sector distribution companies. The core legal question was whether the Federal Government or the Board could validly create sub-categories of taxpayers based on the source of energy utilized for production rather than on the nature of the taxable supplies. The Lahore High Court held that the delegated powers under Section 3(6) and Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 only authorize the prescription of special procedures and rates in respect of supplies or classes of supplies, not on the basis of persons or their source of energy. The court laid down the principle that fiscal classifications must be based on intelligible differentia having a reasonable and just relation to the object of the taxing statute, and the executive cannot discriminate between manufacturers producing identical taxable goods merely due to differing energy sources or administrative difficulties in measuring power consumption.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Federal Government or the Board levy sales tax or prescribe special procedures by classifying taxpayers based on their source of energy rather than the nature of their taxable supplies?
  • Whether the exclusion of steel-melting units using self-generated electricity from the special tax regime violates the principle of reasonable classification under fiscal and constitutional law?
  • Does Section 71 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 empower the executive to create distinctions among manufacturers making identical taxable goods?
  • Is a notification issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ultra vires if it fails to comply with procedural requirements mandated for executive decision-making?
  Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited vs Judge Banking Court No, VII, Lahore, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 1449 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-12Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited vs Judge Banking Court No, VII, Lahore etc.2018 P.C.T.L.R. 549 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-12Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited through Principal Officers vs Messrs S.G.2018 CLD 199 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-29
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001Leave to defendRunning Finance facilityPower of attorneyBanking suitRecovery of financesAdmitted liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit was filed by a bank under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking recovery of outstanding amounts under a Running Finance facility. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the suit's institution by the bank's attorney, the alleged splitting of the cause of action, and whether the defendants raised substantial factual disputes regarding personal guarantees, mortgage instruments, and the statement of account to justify leave to defend. The Court held that the suit was competently filed as an officer holding a power of attorney is authorized to institute proceedings under the Ordinance without additional documentation. Furthermore, the Court found the defendants' objections regarding the statement of account and guarantees to be meritless, particularly given the admissions of liability in the defendants' audited balance sheets. Consequently, the application for leave to defend was dismissed, and the suit was decreed for the adjusted amount. The judgment affirms that admitted liabilities in audited accounts preclude subsequent disputes and that security-related objections are secondary to the primary determination of financial liability.

  Questions settled

  • Is a power of attorney sufficient for an officer of a financial institution to institute a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a defendant challenge the statement of account when the liability is admitted in their audited balance sheet?
  • Are objections regarding the validity of mortgage instruments a sufficient ground to grant leave to defend in a recovery suit?
  • Does the filing of a suit for one finance facility constitute an impermissible splitting of the cause of action when other facilities are intended to be pursued separately?
  Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited through Manager vs Anti-Corruption Establishment2018 CLD 145 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-20Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank Limited through Authorized persons vs Judge Banking Court2018 [M] C.L.R. 1449, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 549, 2018 CLD 1086 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-12Read full judgment →
• Allahdino and others vs H.H. Shaikh Zaid Bin Sultan Al Nahyan and others2019 YLR 247, 2018 SHC 810 · Sindh High Court · 2018-07-09Read full judgment →
• Allahdino alias Baboo vs StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. 716 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-17
  pauper accusedstate-funded defense counselright to fair trialdue processlegal aidcriminal courts practice and procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from criminal proceedings wherein the capability of a court-appointed counsel for a pauper accused was questioned, prompting the Sindh High Court to examine the mechanism for providing legal representation at State expense. The core legal question addressed is the proper procedure, authority, and standard for appointing and remunerating defense counsel for pauper accused persons to ensure constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and due process. The Court held that the appointment of defense counsel for indigent accused is an essential requirement under Articles 9 and 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with Section 340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and must be administered by the courts rather than the prosecution office to avoid prejudice. The key principles laid down include setting a comprehensive framework for District and Sessions Courts to maintain lists of consenting advocates, allowing accused persons to choose their counsel from such lists, establishing minimum fee standards per hearing, and ensuring prompt disbursement of legal fees through the Deputy Commissioner's office.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appointment of defense counsel for a pauper accused falls within the domain of the court rather than the prosecution office?
  • Does the right to security of person and fair trial under the Constitution encompass the provision of competent legal representation at State expense for indigent accused?
  • What is the correct procedure and mechanism for maintaining a panel of willing advocates and fixing reasonable fees for representing pauper accused persons in criminal courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Lahore vs Govt. of Punjab through Secretary Home Deptt. Lahore and another2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 17 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealpolice disciplinary proceedingsregistration of FIRcognizable offencemisconductillegal inquiryreversion penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal challenges the departmental penalty of reversion imposed upon the appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, for allegedly directing the registration of a criminal case without verifying facts. The core legal question was whether a police officer commits misconduct by directing the registration of an FIR upon receiving a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence without holding a preliminary inquiry into its veracity. The Tribunal held that under settled binding precedents, an officer receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence is bound to have an FIR registered without inquiring into its truth or falsity, and cannot be penalized for doing so. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned penalty order and accepted the appeal, laying down the principle that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated against a civil servant for strictly following the law laid down by the superior courts regarding the mandatory registration of criminal cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a police officer commits misconduct by directing the registration of an FIR upon a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence without holding a preliminary inquiry?
  • Is a competent authority obliged to issue a show-cause notice and provide reasons when differing from the findings of an inquiry officer?
  • Does an order initiating disciplinary proceedings contrary to the settled law of the Supreme Court vitiate the entire proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Wasaya vs The State and 8 others2018 MLD 489 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-21
  Section 540 Cr.P.C.additional evidencematerial witnesspublic prosecutorcriminal trialjust decisioncomplainant
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing an application under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon two injured witnesses previously 'given up' by the complainant’s counsel. The core legal questions concerned the authority of a complainant’s counsel to abandon prosecution witnesses and the trial court's duty under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that in cases initiated upon a police report, only the Public Prosecutor has the authority to give up witnesses under Sections 265-A and 493, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898; thus, the complainant's application was procedurally non-maintainable. However, the Court emphasized that the trial court retains an independent, mandatory duty under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to summon any witness if their testimony is essential for a just decision. The Court ruled that trial courts cannot summarily dismiss such applications based on allegations of filling lacunae or causing delay without evaluating the necessity of the evidence for the just decision of the case, as justice cannot be sacrificed for procedural convenience.

  Questions settled

  • Does a complainant's counsel have the authority to give up prosecution witnesses in a trial initiated upon a police report?
  • Is an application under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 maintainable if filed by the complainant instead of the Public Prosecutor?
  • Can a trial court summarily dismiss an application under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds of delay or filling lacunae?
  • Is the trial court obligated to summon a witness under Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if their evidence is essential for a just decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Wasaya and another vs The State and another2018 PHC 1492 · Peshawar High Court · 2012-04-03Read full judgment →
• Allah Nawaz vs Govt of KPK and others2018 PHC 1840, 2019 MLD 1016 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-12-03Read full judgment →
• Allah Jurio alias Jurio and 2 others vs The State2018 MLD 1661 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-19Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State2019 KLR Criminal Cases 6, 2019 PCRLJ 1316, PLJ 2019 Cr.C. 848, 2018 IHC 165 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-12-19
  juvenile justiceretracted confessionrape evidenceDNA profilingmurder convictioncriminal appealcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant, a juvenile, for murder, rape, and destruction of evidence. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the appellant's retracted judicial confession, the sufficiency of corroborative evidence, and whether the charge of rape could be sustained without DNA or semen grouping evidence. The Islamabad High Court held that the conviction for murder and destruction of evidence was supported by a voluntary, corroborated judicial confession and medical evidence regarding the victim's injuries. However, the Court set aside the conviction for rape, ruling that in the absence of DNA profiling or semen grouping, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof regarding the offence of Zina. The Court reaffirmed the principle that while a retracted confession may support a conviction if it is voluntary and corroborated by material evidence, the absence of forensic evidence in rape cases precludes a conviction under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The judgment emphasizes the necessity of strict adherence to procedural safeguards for juvenile offenders under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape be sustained in the absence of DNA profiling or semen grouping?
  • Under what conditions can a retracted judicial confession be relied upon to sustain a conviction?
  • Does the failure to conduct DNA testing or semen grouping necessitate the acquittal of a charge under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • What are the mandatory procedural requirements for recording a valid judicial confession under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs The State, etc2019 PLJ Lahore 33, 2018 LHC 1323 · Lahore High Court · 2018-05-02Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Pervaiz Akram and others2018 SCMR 1768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-18
  murderacquittalcircumstantial evidencebenefit of reasonable doubtmedical evidenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, which acquitted respondent No. 1 of the charge under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, after he was previously convicted by the trial court. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in a circumstantial evidence murder case involving an unwitnessed drowning. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was unexceptionable, noting that the murder was unwitnessed, the accused was implicated purely on suspicion, the alleged motive lacked timely disclosure and independent corroboration, and medical evidence established the cause of death as drowning without clarifying the surrounding circumstances, while injuries could be attributed to rocks and stones at the spot. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, reinforcing the principle that an appellate court's well-reasoned acquittal based on the appreciation of evidence will not be interfered with when the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an acquittal recorded by the High Court in a murder case based on circumstantial evidence warrants interference when the prosecution fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of suspicion alone when the alleged murder is unwitnessed and the motive lacks timely disclosure and independent corroboration?
  • Whether medical evidence showing death by drowning along with injuries attributable to surrounding rocks and stones supports a murder conviction without proof of the surrounding circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and others vs Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue and others2018 PLJ SC 550, 2018 SCMR 1177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-13
  writ jurisdictionremand orderland partitionnaqsha jeemspeaking orderjudicial reviewrevenue authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the maintainability of a writ petition against a remand order issued by the Board of Revenue in a land partition dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court should interfere with a remand order passed by the Board of Revenue under its constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while a remand order is not a final order and does not determine the rights of parties, it is not immune from judicial review. However, the Court established that constitutional courts must exercise care and circumspection, interfering only sparingly with such orders. The principle laid down is that while writ jurisdiction is generally not exercised against remand orders, it remains available where the order is facially perverse, without jurisdiction, or otherwise void. In the present case, the Supreme Court upheld the Board of Revenue's decision to remand, finding that the lower revenue authorities had failed to pass a speaking order addressing the appellant's specific objections regarding the exclusion of sold land from the partition scheme (naqsha jeem).

  Questions settled

  • Is a remand order passed by the Board of Revenue amenable to writ jurisdiction?
  • Under what circumstances can a constitutional court interfere with a remand order?
  • Does a remand order constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta & others vs Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue, etc.2018 PLJ SC 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-03-13
  writ jurisdictionremand orderland revenuenaqsha jeemjudicial reviewspeaking orderpartition of land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a partition application filed under the Land Revenue Act, 1967, where the appellant challenged the preparation of the 'naqsha jeem' on the grounds that certain sold land was not excluded. After the Tehsildar, D.O. (R), and EDO (R) rejected the objections without addressing them in a speaking order, the Member, Board of Revenue remanded the case for reconsideration. The High Court subsequently set aside this remand order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine the maintainability of a writ petition against a remand order. The Court held that while a remand order is generally not a final order and thus not typically amenable to writ jurisdiction, this is not an absolute rule. Constitutional courts may interfere if a remand order is facially perverse, without jurisdiction, or void. The Court emphasized that such jurisdiction must be exercised with care and circumspection. Finding the lower revenue authorities' orders deficient for failing to address the appellant's specific objections, the Supreme Court upheld the necessity of the remand, directing the Tehsildar to pass a speaking order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition maintainable against an order of remand passed by the Board of Revenue?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court exercise writ jurisdiction to interfere with a remand order?
  • Does a remand order constitute a final order that determines the rights of the parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino vs The State2018 YLR 987 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-18
  criminal appealmurder convictiondelay in FIRbenefit of doubtocular evidenceprocedural lapseschemical analysis delayappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for murder under sections 302 and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned whether alleged delays in lodging the FIR, recording witness statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and submitting chemical samples for analysis created sufficient doubt to warrant acquittal. The Sindh High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled that a delay in lodging an FIR is not fatal when adequately explained by the complainant's priority to save the victim. Furthermore, the Court established that minor procedural lapses in investigation and minor discrepancies in testimony, particularly when evidence is recorded years after the incident, do not automatically vitiate a conviction. The Court emphasized that evidence must be evaluated holistically, and that FIRs, while important, do not supersede oral testimony given under oath. The conviction was upheld based on consistent ocular evidence corroborated by medical and chemical reports.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically render the prosecution's case fatal?
  • Can minor procedural lapses in a police investigation vitiate a conviction if the prosecution's case is otherwise consistent?
  • Is an FIR considered substantive evidence that supersedes oral testimony given under oath?
  • Does a delay in sending blood-stained samples for chemical analysis necessarily create reasonable doubt?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino Khaskheli vs Mr. Zakir Mahmood, President, Habib Bank Limited, Karachi & others2019 PLC (C.S) 999, 2018 SHC 1174 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-10
  master and servantwrongful dismissaldamagesdomestic inquiryservice lawemployment contractcivil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged a judgment and decree dismissing the appellant's suit for damages following his dismissal from service by Habib Bank Limited. The appellant, initially seeking reinstatement, confined his arguments on appeal to claiming damages for wrongful dismissal. The core legal question was whether an employee under a 'master and servant' relationship could claim damages for wrongful dismissal without proving specific loss, and whether the court could interfere with the findings of a domestic inquiry. The Court held that the relationship between the parties was governed by the 'master and servant' doctrine, which precludes reinstatement as a remedy. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellant failed to substantiate his claim for damages, as he did not provide evidence of mental suffering or special damages. The Court affirmed that it cannot substitute its own findings for those of a domestic inquiry. The key principle laid down is that in a 'master and servant' relationship, an employee is not entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal unless they specifically plead and prove actual loss, and courts will not interfere with domestic disciplinary proceedings absent significant irregularity.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee governed by the 'master and servant' doctrine claim reinstatement in service?
  • Is an employee entitled to damages for wrongful dismissal without specific proof of actual loss or mental suffering?
  • Can a High Court substitute its own findings for the conclusions reached in a domestic disciplinary inquiry?
  • Does Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 grant a substantive right of action for wrongful dismissal in master-servant relationships?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dino and 2 others vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 200 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-31
  Anti-Terrorism ActCriminal Procedure CodeSection 342 statementSection 353 Cr.P.C.Fair trialRemandEvidence in absence of accusedConviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and death sentences awarded by the Anti-Terrorism Court for offenses under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions concerned the legality of the trial court adopting prosecution evidence recorded in the absence of an accused after an amended charge was framed, and the validity of the accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. when not all incriminating evidence was put to them. The High Court held that the trial court’s procedure was fundamentally flawed. It ruled that Section 353 Cr.P.C. is mandatory, requiring evidence to be recorded in the presence of the accused; thus, adopting evidence recorded in the accused's absence is illegal. Furthermore, the court emphasized that all incriminating evidence, including that emerging from cross-examination, must be put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. to allow for explanation. Failure to adhere to these mandatory procedural safeguards vitiates the trial. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and remanded the case for a fresh trial in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court adopt evidence recorded in the absence of an accused after an amended charge is framed?
  • Is the requirement under Section 353 Cr.P.C. to record evidence in the presence of the accused mandatory?
  • Must all incriminating evidence, including that from cross-examination, be put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C.?
  • Does the failure to put all incriminating evidence to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. invalidate a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dina vs Inayatullah and 5 others2018 P Cr. L J 1383 · Federal Shariat Court · 2018-03-28
  appeal against acquittalabsconding respondentright of audiencedual presumption of innocenceSection 164 statementHudood casecross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of respondents in a Hudood case involving allegations of abduction and zina. The primary legal question concerned whether an appeal against acquittal could proceed when one respondent remained a fugitive despite repeated warrants. The Court held that, consistent with established Supreme Court precedents, an absconding respondent loses the right of audience, allowing the appeal to be decided on merits in their absence. Regarding the merits, the Court found the prosecution’s case unreliable. Specifically, the Court ruled that a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is inadmissible or lacks evidentiary weight if the accused was not afforded the mandatory opportunity to cross-examine the witness, as required by Section 164(1-A). Furthermore, the Court emphasized that appellate interference in an acquittal is extremely limited due to the dual presumption of innocence attached to the trial court's finding. Finding no perversity or misreading of evidence in the impugned judgment, the Court dismissed the appeal and maintained the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal against acquittal be heard and decided on merits if one of the respondents is an absconder?
  • Is a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 admissible if the accused was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the witness?
  • What is the scope of appellate interference in an acquittal judgment where the trial court's findings are based on a fair reading of the evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Dad Sangrah and another vs The State2018 YLR 2645 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-31
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtmedical corroborationocular testimonycontradictionschance witnessacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under sections 302(b), 148, 149, 34, and 337-H(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal questions involved the reliability of related and chance eye-witnesses, the corroborative value of medical and forensic evidence, and the benefit of reasonable doubt arising from material contradictions in the prosecution case. The Sindh High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the convictions, holding that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a complete lack of medical corroboration, dishonest and inconsistent ocular testimony, tainted investigation, unproved motive, and unconvincing recoveries. The key principle laid down is that where ocular testimony suffers from glaring contradictions and is irreconcilable with medical and forensic evidence, and the investigation is tainted with mala fides, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt resulting in an acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Does medical evidence corroborating or contradicting ocular testimony affect the reliability of eye-witnesses in a murder trial?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution case when eye-witness statements are recorded with an unexplained and inordinate delay?
  • Can an accused be convicted when the ballistic and forensic evidence stands in complete contradiction to the prosecution story?
  • What is the evidentiary consequence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when a material eye-witness is withheld and not examined at the trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bux and another vs The State2018 MLD 534 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-03
  criminal appealmurderocular evidenceinterested witnesscommon intentionrecovery of weaponbenefit of doubtsifting grain from chaff
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of two appellants for murder under Section 302(b) and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had established the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the evidentiary value of related witnesses and the applicability of the "interested witness" doctrine. The High Court held that the conviction of the primary appellant, who was identified as the shooter, was supported by consistent ocular testimony and medical evidence, and that the recovery of the weapon was valid despite challenges under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. However, the court acquitted the second appellant, who was merely holding a torch, finding that his role lacked sufficient overt acts to establish common intention, thereby creating reasonable doubt. The judgment reaffirmed that mere relationship with the deceased does not render a witness unreliable, and that courts must "sift the grain from the chaff" to determine guilt in cases involving multiple accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere relationship between a prosecution witness and the deceased render the witness 'interested' and unreliable?
  • Is Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable when an accused leads the police to the recovery of a crime weapon?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a solitary witness if it is corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Is it necessary to prove a specific motive to secure a conviction for a capital offence?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh through legal heirs vs Met. Bukhtawar and others2018 [M] C.L.R. 182 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19
  inheritance rightsfemale inheritancevoid ab initiolimitationco-sharerrevision petitionminoritypublic policy
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which decreed the respondent's suit for declaration regarding her inheritance rights. The core legal question was whether a mutation of inheritance excluding a female heir, sanctioned during her minority based on an alleged relinquishment of rights, was valid and whether the suit was time-barred. The High Court held that the mutation was void ab initio because the respondent was a minor at the time of attestation and legally incompetent to relinquish her inheritance. Relying on established principles, the Court affirmed that inheritance vests immediately upon the death of the predecessor, and a female heir's relinquishment of inheritance without consideration is against public policy. Furthermore, as the respondent was a co-sharer in the estate, the law of limitation did not apply to her claim for declaration. The Court dismissed the revision petition, finding no material illegality in the lower courts' findings, thereby upholding the protection of female inheritance rights under Islamic law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a minor legally relinquish her share of inheritance?
  • Does the law of limitation apply to a suit for declaration filed by a co-sharer regarding inheritance?
  • Is the relinquishment of inheritance by a female co-sharer without consideration valid under law?
  • Does the estate of a deceased Muslim vest in the heirs immediately upon death?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Bakhsh through L.Rs. vs Mst. Bakhtawar and 3 others2018 CLC 1070 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19Read full judgment →
• All Residents of Mouza Siksa, Chorbat, Tehsil Khaplu, District2018 YLR 1531 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-10-05Read full judgment →
• Ali Zahir Jafri Petitioner vs Chairman Federal Board of Revenue & another2018 SHC 594, 2019 PTD 1765 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-02Read full judgment →
• Ali Shah and 2 others vs Rehbar Hassan2018 YLR 1692 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-09-30
  civil revisionpartition of landburden of proofgift deedprivate documentmarginal witnessesQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition challenges the appellate court order setting aside the trial court's dismissal of a suit for possession and partition of land. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners successfully proved the transfer of the suit property through a valid gift deed. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the petitioners failed to legally prove the gift deed as an ancient or private document under the governing evidentiary rules, as the document lacked necessary signatures and the petitioners failed to produce required marginal witnesses or valid secondary evidence. The court dismissed the petition, affirming the first appellate court's judgment granting a share of the property to the respondent. The key principle laid down is that a party relying on a gift of property must strictly prove the document and its execution in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party setting up a defense of a gift is duty-bound to prove the same through strict compliance with evidentiary provisions for private documents?
  • Can an unproved gift document lacking signatures of marginal witnesses or scribes be relied upon to establish ownership?
  • Whether the appellate court's finding of fact based on proper evaluation of evidence warrants interference in revisional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Raza vs Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace,2018 PLJ Lahore 226 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-17Read full judgment →
• Ali Raza and 2 others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary2018 PLJ Lahore 826, 2018 PLC (CS.) 574 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-07
  constitutional petitionnatural justiceregularization of serviceslachesspeaking orderadministrative lawright to hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the withdrawal of an order regularizing the services of the petitioners as Naib Qasid/Security Guards. The core legal questions were whether the administrative withdrawal of a regularization order without providing a hearing or reasons is lawful, and whether the petition was barred by laches. The Court held that the impugned order was unlawful as it violated the principles of natural justice by failing to provide the petitioners an opportunity to be heard, and contravened Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, by failing to assign reasons for the adverse action. Furthermore, the Court determined that laches does not constitute an absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction if dismissing the petition on such grounds would perpetuate injustice. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned letter and remanded the matter to the competent authority, directing a fresh decision to be made after affording the petitioners a hearing and issuing a reasoned, speaking order.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative authority withdraw a regularization order without providing the affected employees an opportunity of hearing?
  • Does the failure to assign reasons for an adverse administrative order violate the General Clauses Act, 1897?
  • Is a constitutional petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches if such dismissal would perpetuate an injustice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Rahman & others vs Government of KPK & others2018 PHC 1512 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-13Read full judgment →
• Ali Murad Brohi vs Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. & others2018 SHC 1164 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-03
  maintainabilitydismissal from servicedomestic inquiryfake security documentsdepartmental appealnatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by a former employee of Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL) challenging his dismissal from service and the recovery of 50% of the outstanding loan amount. The petitioner was charged with recommending 81 loan cases against fake security documents, causing a multi-million rupee loss to the bank. An inquiry was conducted, finding him guilty, which led to his dismissal under the ZTBL Officers Service (Efficiency & Discipline) Regulations 1975. The petitioner argued that the inquiry was flawed, security documents were not properly scrutinized, and he was subjected to discriminatory treatment. The High Court first affirmed that a writ petition against ZTBL is maintainable. On the merits, the Court held that the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity of hearing, the domestic inquiry was conducted in accordance with the law, and no malice or violation of rules was shown. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the dismissal order and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan is maintainable against Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited?
  • Can a major penalty of dismissal from service be sustained if the employee was provided a full opportunity of hearing and the charges of financial negligence were established through a domestic inquiry?
  • Does the High Court have the mandate to interfere with the findings of a domestic inquiry in the absence of any violation of statutory rules, regulations, or natural justice?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad Khan vs Nazir-Ul-Islam and another2018 P Cr. L J 1372 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11
  criminal revisionjudgment writingmandatory provisionsprocedural defectremandpoints for determinationsentence enhancement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenged a trial court judgment that convicted the respondent under section 302, section 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13 of the Arms Ordinance (referred to as A.O. in the text). The petitioner sought enhancement of the sentence to death. However, the High Court identified a fundamental procedural defect in the trial court's judgment. Specifically, the trial court failed to formulate points for determination, record decisions thereon, and provide reasons for those decisions, as mandated by section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the use of the word "shall" in section 367 makes its provisions mandatory, and non-compliance renders a judgment inherently defective and illegal, an error not curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the High Court set aside the impugned judgment without addressing the merits of the case to avoid prejudice and remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh decision in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement under section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for a court to formulate points for determination and provide reasons mandatory?
  • Does a failure to comply with the requirements of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a curable irregularity under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the consequence of a trial court judgment failing to specify points for determination and reasons for its decision?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad and another vs The State2018 YLR 360 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-25
  surety bond forfeitureabsconding accusedbail bondcriminal revisionmitigating circumstancesproclaimed offender
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application impugns an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing an application under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and forfeiting the surety bond furnished by the applicant for an accused who subsequently absconded during trial. The core legal question revolves around the liability of a surety when the accused jumps bail and whether the entire surety amount is liable to be forfeited in the absence of mitigating circumstances. The Sindh High Court held that a surety is under a strict legal obligation to ensure the attendance of the accused on each and every date of hearing, and upon the accused absconding, the entire surety bond becomes liable to forfeiture unless valid mitigating circumstances are shown. The court affirmed that the trial court committed no illegality or irregularity in confiscating the surety and dismissing the application, thereby upholding the forfeiture and dismissing the revision application.

  Questions settled

  • What is the liability of a surety when an accused person absconds after being released on bail?
  • Whether the entire surety amount becomes liable to forfeiture upon the breach of bail conditions by the accused in the absence of mitigating circumstances?
  • Is a trial court justified in dismissing an application under Section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the surety fails to produce the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Irtaza vs Additional District Judge, Multan and 2 others2018 PLJ Lahore 18, 2018 YLR 782 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-16Read full judgment →
• Ali Irtaza vs A.D.J. Multan & 2 others2018 PLJ Lahore 18 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-16Read full judgment →
• Ali Imran vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. 603 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-25
  pre-arrest bailcross-versionfurther inquirymala fidedelayed FIRcriminal investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 arises from a cross-version FIR involving allegations of assault and causing injuries under Sections 337-F(v), 337-L(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail given the conflicting versions of the incident, the inordinate delay in reporting, and the findings of the investigation. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail, confirming the ad-interim pre-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the fact that the Investigating Officer found the petitioner had not participated in the occurrence, creating a case for further inquiry into his guilt. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a significant delay of 45 days in reporting the incident, combined with the petitioner's cooperation in the investigation and the lack of recovery of any incriminating material, indicated that the arrest was unnecessary and potentially motivated by mala fide intent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding by the Investigating Officer that an accused did not participate in the occurrence constitute grounds for further inquiry into guilt for the purpose of pre-arrest bail?
  • Can an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging an FIR be considered a ground for granting pre-arrest bail?
  • Is pre-arrest bail justified when the prosecution presents two conflicting versions of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gul Abro and another vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 858 · Sindh High Court · 2017-06-02
  fair trialdying declarationde novo trialframing of chargefailure of justicecriminal appealmurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants for murder. The core legal questions concern whether the FIR lodged by the deceased could be treated as a dying declaration and whether the trial court's procedural errors—specifically the framing of charges and the recording of evidence—vitiated the trial and denied the appellants a fair trial. The Court held that the FIR did not qualify as a dying declaration under Article 46(1) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, as the deceased was not under an expectation of death at the time of lodging it. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial was fundamentally flawed because crucial prosecution evidence was recorded in the absence of a valid charge, leading to a failure of justice and a violation of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and sentence, remanding the case for a de novo trial to be concluded within six months, while maintaining the appellants' bail status.

  Questions settled

  • Does an FIR lodged by a victim who later dies from their injuries automatically qualify as a dying declaration?
  • Can a trial proceed where material prosecution evidence is recorded before a valid charge is framed against the accused?
  • Does the failure to frame a proper charge constitute a failure of justice requiring a de novo trial?
  • Is a trial conducted without a valid charge a violation of the constitutional right to a fair trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs Province of Sindh and others2018 CLC 1999 · Sindh High Court · 2017-12-20
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictiontitle disputeimmovable propertyalternate remedyclean hands doctrineconcealment of factspending civil suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, was filed seeking declarations and injunctions regarding an alleged encroachment on a plot of land measuring 10 guntas situated in Sector 22, KDA Scheme No. 33, Karachi, and to set aside a revised layout plan. The core legal questions involved whether disputed questions of title and property boundaries could be adjudicated within the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, and whether a petitioner who simultaneously pursues civil suits and conceals material litigation history is entitled to discretionary and equitable relief. The Sindh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that questions of title and immovable property disputes involving factual controversies cannot be resolved under writ jurisdiction, especially when alternate remedies via pending civil suits have been invoked and the petitioner has engaged in forum shopping and concealment of facts. The court laid down the principle that constitutional jurisdiction is not meant for deciding title disputes or substituting ordinary civil remedies, and litigants seeking equity must approach the court with clean hands without splitting claims or abusing legal processes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disputed questions of title and ownership of immovable property can be adjudicated in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable when the petitioner has already filed and is actively pursuing civil suits involving the same subject matter and cause of action?
  • Does the failure to disclose pending civil litigation and the simultaneous pursuit of multiple remedies disentitle a party from seeking discretionary and equitable relief?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a layout plan and alleged land encroachments where the petitioner lacks a clear, undisputed legal right and requires the recording of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bux and others vs The State2018 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-06
  MurderAppeal against convictionDeath sentenceLife imprisonmentMotive (criminal law)Evidence reappraisalFatal injuryCommon intentionCompensationSentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This case involved an appeal against convictions and death sentences for murder under Section 302(b) PPC read with Section 34 PPC. The appellants were accused of murdering Nasarullah in broad daylight, with the prosecution alleging a motive based on a long-standing suspicion of the deceased's involvement in a prior murder, despite an oath of innocence. The Supreme Court undertook a reappraisal of the evidence, finding the ocular account consistent and supported by medical evidence, thus upholding the concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts. However, the Court partly allowed the appeal regarding the sentences. It held that the prosecution's failure to prove the asserted motive, which was deemed weak and based on mere suspicion, could react against a death sentence. Furthermore, it was noted that it remained unclear which of the multiple culprits caused the fatal injury, a factor that ordinarily warrants withholding a death sentence. Consequently, the death sentences were reduced to imprisonment for life, while the convictions and compensation orders were maintained. The benefit under Section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also extended.

  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bakhsh alias Ali Dost vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 866 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-30
  criminal appealbenefit of doubtocular evidenceinterested witnessesforensic reportFIR by strangeracquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 337-F(v) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt given the inconsistencies in ocular, medical, and forensic evidence. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt, noting that the FIR was lodged by a stranger despite the presence of the victim and his father, and that prosecution witnesses provided contradictory accounts regarding the timeline and their presence at the scene. Furthermore, the forensic report contained significant discrepancies regarding the weapon and empties, rendering the supporting evidence unreliable. The court emphasized that when ocular testimony is not confidence-inspiring, supporting evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Consequently, the court set aside the trial court's judgment and acquitted the appellant, affirming that the benefit of doubt is a fundamental right of the accused when reasonable doubt exists in a prudent mind.

  Questions settled

  • Can supporting evidence sustain a conviction if the ocular evidence is not confidence-inspiring?
  • Does the registration of an FIR by a stranger, when the victim and family are present, create doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of grace or a right for the accused?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a forensic report that contains discrepancies regarding the crime weapon and empties?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Bahadar son of Baghi Shah, r/o Pakrari, District Swabi vs Toyota Indus2019 YLR 622, 2018 PHC 1744 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-10-25
  constitutional petitionvehicle seizuretampered chassis numbercustody of vehicleExcise and Taxation DepartmentProvincial Motor Vehicles Ordinancestatutory duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, seeking the unconditional return of a seized Toyota Pickup Hilux Double Cabin vehicle to the petitioner. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of the petitioner to the custody of a vehicle whose chassis number was found tampered with according to the FSL report, alongside issues regarding the prolonged, unlawful detention and mishandling of the vehicle by the Excise authorities without completing statutory disposal proceedings. The Peshawar High Court held that custody of the vehicle could not be handed over to the petitioner as doing so would permit the plying of a tampered and unauthorized vehicle on the road. However, the Court strongly criticized the Excise Department for failing to follow the mandatory statutory rules for safe custody, inventory, and timely disposal of seized vehicles. The Court dismissed the writ petition seeking the vehicle's return but directed the Secretary Excise and Taxation to probe the departmental delay, mishandling, and misuse of the vehicle, and to take legal action against the delinquent officials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether custody of a vehicle with a tampered chassis number can be handed over to a petitioner?
  • Does the seizure of a vehicle by Excise authorities permit its indefinite detention without completing statutory disposal proceedings?
  • What are the responsibilities of the Excise Department regarding the safe custody and disposal of seized vehicles under the relevant motor vehicle rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Azim Afridi vs Syed Waqar Shah etc2019 PLC (C.S) 1109, 2018 PHC 1822 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-13
  quo-warrantodeputationabsorptionrecruitment rulesnepotismProvincial Assemblyvoid ab initio
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the absorption of a Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C) employee into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly Secretariat as a Special Secretary to the Speaker. The petitioner argued that the appointment and subsequent absorption were illegal, violating recruitment rules and established judicial guidelines against nepotism. The court examined whether the transfer on deputation from a corporation outside the provincial or federal government service met the requirements of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Secretariat (Recruitment) Rules, 1974. The court held that the deputation was invalid from its inception because the respondent did not meet the essential prerequisites for transfer under the Recruitment Rules, 1974. Consequently, the subsequent absorption was also void ab initio. The court emphasized that the post was created in indecent haste to accommodate a specific individual, reflecting nepotism and a disregard for the law by the Speaker. The court reaffirmed that the High Court has the authority under Article 199 to issue a writ of quo-warranto upon the application of any person to challenge the holding of a public office.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee of a corporation be transferred on deputation to a Provincial Assembly Secretariat if they do not meet the criteria for transfer from the affairs of the Federation or Province?
  • Does the High Court have the authority under Article 199 to entertain a petition challenging the appointment of a public office holder filed by an outsider?
  • Is an absorption into a public office valid if the underlying deputation order was void ab initio?
  • Are employees of the Provincial Assembly considered civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunal Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Askar vs The State2018 MLD 1608, 2018 PHC 1509 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-06
  criminal appealillegal weaponArms Ordinancebenefit of doubtrecovery of crime weaponcorroborative evidencecondonation of delayacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance for the alleged recovery of a pistol. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution proved the recovery of the weapon beyond reasonable doubt and whether the uncorroborated recovery of a crime weapon can sustain a conviction when independent witnesses were not associated and material contradictions exist. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the recovery due to lack of independent corroboration, failure to associate public witnesses despite availability, and material contradictions in the testimony of police witnesses. Furthermore, the court reiterated that recovery of a crime weapon is merely corroborative in nature and cannot by itself sustain a conviction in the absence of primary direct evidence. The court established the principle that where recovery evidence is doubtful and uncorroborated, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt, leading to the setting aside of the conviction and the acceptance of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for illegal possession of a weapon under the Arms Ordinance be sustained solely on the basis of a disputed recovery without independent corroboration?
  • Does the recovery of an incriminating article or weapon of offence serve as substantive evidence or merely as corroborative evidence in a criminal trial?
  • Whether the absence of independent public witnesses associated with the recovery of an alleged crime weapon creates a fatal flaw in the prosecution case?
  • Under what circumstances can delay in filing a criminal appeal against conviction be condoned when the appellant was unaware of a separate conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Askar vs The State through Additional Advocate General and another2018 MLD 1608 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-06
  illegal weapon possessionrecovery evidencebenefit of doubtcorroborative evidencecriminal appealcondonation of delayArms Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant under Section 13 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for the illegal possession of a pistol and ammunition. The core legal question was whether the prosecution successfully proved the recovery of the weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, given the lack of independent witnesses and inconsistencies in the police testimony. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case, noting that the absence of independent witnesses during the recovery process and the appellant's failure to flee upon seeing the police raised significant doubts about the recovery's authenticity. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, granting him the benefit of the doubt. The judgment reaffirms the principle that recovery of incriminating articles serves only as corroborative evidence; when the primary evidence is weak or disbelieved, such recoveries are insufficient to sustain a conviction. Furthermore, the Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal, accepting the appellant's explanation regarding his lack of awareness of the specific conviction under the Arms Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Can the recovery of an incriminating weapon sustain a conviction if the prosecution's primary evidence is disbelieved?
  • Is the absence of independent witnesses during a police recovery sufficient to cast doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Can a delay in filing an appeal be condoned if the appellant was unaware of the specific conviction at the time of sentencing?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Anwar Gopang vs Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, Judge, Islamabad High Court2018 PLD Supreme Court 845, 2019 SCP 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-18
  Supreme Judicial Councilin-camera proceedingsjudicial conductArticle 209due processdomestic forumright to fair trialconstitutional inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, a High Court Judge, challenged Paragraph 13 of the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Inquiry 2005, which mandates in-camera proceedings for inquiries under Article 209 of the Constitution. The core legal question was whether proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) must be held in open court to satisfy fundamental rights, specifically arguing that in-camera proceedings violate Articles 4, 10-A, 14, and 25 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that the SJC is not a court of law but a domestic fact-finding forum. Consequently, proceedings before it do not constitute a trial determining civil rights or criminal liabilities, and the requirement for an open trial is inapplicable. The Court affirmed that the SJC is a constitutional forum for reviewing judicial conduct, not a court, and that in-camera proceedings are necessary to preserve the dignity of the judiciary and the judge involved, especially when allegations might prove frivolous. The Court emphasized that fairness and natural justice are maintained through procedural safeguards, not necessarily by public proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Judicial Council a court of law?
  • Are proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council required to be held in open court?
  • Does the requirement for in-camera proceedings under the Supreme Judicial Council Procedure of Inquiry 2005 violate the fundamental rights of a judge?
  • Do proceedings under Article 209 of the Constitution constitute a trial determining civil rights or criminal liabilities?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Akbar Spinning Mills vs National Bank of Pakistan, etc.2018 P.C.T.L.R. 523 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-18Read full judgment →
• Ali Ahmed Lund vs The State through Chairman National Accountability2018 YLR 491 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-14Read full judgment →
• Aleemuddin vs Balban Hameed and 2 others2018 YLR 41 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-18
  Illegal Dispossession Actcivil disputedemarcation of propertycriminal revisionland grabbingcognizance of complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order by the Sessions Judge, Malir, which dismissed a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, regarding a property dispute over a plot in Karachi. The applicant alleged illegal encroachment by the respondents, seeking restoration of possession and criminal prosecution. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly declined to take cognizance of the complaint, given the nature of the dispute and the absence of essential ingredients for an offence under the Act. The High Court held that the dismissal was proper, noting that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, involving demarcation issues between adjacent plots. Furthermore, the Court observed that the complaint lacked essential allegations, such as the use of force for dispossession and a specific date of dispossession, and that the applicant had previously filed a similar complaint that was dismissed. The Court affirmed that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, cannot be invoked to resolve civil disputes where the basic ingredients of criminal dispossession are absent and where the complainant has failed to establish possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 be invoked to resolve a civil dispute regarding property demarcation?
  • Is a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 maintainable if it fails to allege the use of force for dispossession?
  • Can a complainant file a fresh complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 on the same facts after a previous complaint has been dismissed?
  • Does the pendency of an application for interim relief under Section 7(1) of the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005 prevent a court from deciding on the maintainability of the main complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Ald Automotive Pvt. Ltd vs The Commercial Tax Officer Now Upgraded2018 SCInd 132 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-10-12Read full judgment →
• Alamzeb vs Jehanzeb and others2018 PHC 1338 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Alamzeb vs Jehanzeb and 5 others2018 PHC 1338, 2018 MLD 1262 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Al-Raheem Rice Mills vs Bank Alflah limited etc2018 CLD 1351, 2018 LHC 2219 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-17
  banking courtfinancial institutions recoverystatement of accountsdefault of obligationrejection of plaintrendition of accountsleave to defend
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a regular first appeal filed under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 against the judgment and decree of the Banking Court, which dismissed the appellants' suit for declaration and rendition of accounts. The core legal question revolves around whether the appellants complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 9 of the Ordinance by filing a statement of accounts and establishing a default in the fulfillment of an obligation. The Lahore High Court held that filing a proper statement of accounts and relevant finance documents along with the plaint is a mandatory pre-condition for both customers and financial institutions under Section 9(2) of the Ordinance, enabling the opposing party to understand the exact claim and frame a proper defense. The Court laid down the principle that a suit under Section 9 must disclose a cause of action based on a quantified default in the fulfillment of an obligation supported by a complete statement of accounts, and failure to do so renders the plaint defective, warranting its dismissal or rejection.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the filing of a statement of accounts along with the plaint is a mandatory requirement under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the failure to attach a proper statement of accounts to a suit filed under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 warrant the dismissal or rejection of the plaint?
  • What constitutes a valid statement of account under Section 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the Bankers Books Evidence Act, 1891?
  • Can a customer institute a suit against a financial institution under Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 without showing a default in the fulfillment of an obligation?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Raheem Rice Mills vs Bank Alfalah Limited and others2018 CLD 1351 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-17Read full judgment →
• Al-Noor Sugar Mills Limited and another vs Federation of Pakistan and others2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1048, 2019 PLJ SC 307, 2019 P.S.C. 325, PTCL 2019 CL. 337, 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  excise duty exemptionretrospective operationvested rightssugar factoriesfiscal statutesprospective applicationtax regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals challenged the applicability of SRO No. 1264(I)/91, which defined the "full crushing season" for sugar factories, to the financial year 1991-92. The appellants contended that this notification could not be applied retrospectively to deny them an excise duty exemption previously granted under SRO No. 505(I)/90, upon which they had relied to organize their production. The core legal question was whether the government could retrospectively impose new conditions on an existing tax exemption. The Supreme Court held that the notification dated 23.12.1991 could not be applied retrospectively to the 1991-92 financial year. The Court established the principle that while the government retains the power to regulate exemptions, such regulations must operate prospectively. Notifications that impose new liabilities or conditions cannot be applied to past and closed transactions or impair vested rights that have already accrued. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, directing that the appellants be granted the exemption, provided the tax burden had not been passed on to the general public.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative notification imposing new conditions on a tax exemption be applied retrospectively to impair vested rights?
  • Does the Federal Government have the power to regulate existing tax exemptions through subsequent notifications?
  • Is a company required to file a Board Resolution at the time of initiating a legal proceeding to establish authority?
  • Can a notification that does not explicitly state a retrospective effect be applied to past and closed transactions?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Khair University through Addl. Registrar Bhimber A.J.K vs Higher2018 PLJ Islamabad 85 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Al-Haj Deewan Bakhtiyar Syed Muhammad Diwan Azmat Said Muhammad2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 105, 2018 PLD Supreme Court 343, PLJ 2018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-22
  sajjadanashin successionshrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkarcustomary appointmentnomination of successorspiritual guidemutawaliappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals concerning the appointment of the twenty-sixth sajjadanashin of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar (RA). The core legal question revolves around whether a customary practice of succession allows the incumbent sajjadanashin to nominate a successor, the validity of a prior revocation of nomination, and whether the respondent was duly appointed. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a sajjadanashin is governed by custom and the absolute discretion of the incumbent sajjadanashin who holds the gaddi to nominate an agnate and mureed as his successor. Reviewing the extensive oral and documentary evidence, the Court found that the respondent's nomination was duly established and that the appellant failed to prove a valid claim. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment in favor of the respondent. The key principle laid down is that succession to the office of sajjadanashin of a Sufi shrine is strictly governed by established custom, practice, and the express or oral nomination by the preceding sajjadanashin, whose discretion is paramount.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the succession to the office of sajjadanashin of a shrine is governed by custom and the absolute discretion of the incumbent sajjadanashin?
  • Does a sajjadanashin possess the power to nominate his successor from amongst his agnates and mureeds?
  • Whether oral nomination by a late sajjadanashin can establish the appointment of a successor in the absence of written proof?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by appellate and revisional courts regarding the appointment of a sajjadanashin be interfered with without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Haj Deewan Bakhtiyar Syed Muhammad and other vs Deewan2018 PLJ SC 300 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  sajjadanashin successionshrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkarcustomary appointmentrevocation of nominationappreciation of evidencecivil appealspiritual guide
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a long-standing dispute regarding the appointment of the 26th sajjadanashin of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar (RA). The core legal questions involved the existence of a custom regarding the succession of the sajjadanashin, the validity of the respondent's appointment, the effect of a revocation notice published by the former sajjadanashin, and the evidentiary value of witnesses. The Supreme Court held that according to the established custom and history of the shrine, the nomination of a successor is the absolute discretion of the incumbent sajjadanashin, who must choose an agnate and a mureed. The Court found that the appellant failed to establish a valid claim or appointment, whereas the respondent successfully proved his entitlement through oral and documentary evidence, notwithstanding a prior revocation notice. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the judgment of the High Court in favor of the respondent's sajjadanashinship.

  Questions settled

  • Whether there was any custom relatable to succession of Sajjada Nasheen of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar?
  • Whether the respondent was appointed as Sajjada Nasheen in terms of the said custom?
  • Whether the declaration published in national dailies regarding the cancellation of the appointment of the respondent as Sajjada Nasheen was ever rescinded during the lifetime of the declarant?
  • Whether the testimony of the defense witness remained unrebutted notwithstanding the cross-examination?
  • Whether the petitioner has any justifiable claim to be Sajjada Nasheen with reference to any custom, usage, or practice?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Haj Deewan Bakhtiyar Syed Muhammad and another vs Deewan2018 PLD Supreme Court 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-01-22
  sajjadanashinshrine successioncustomary lawspiritual guidenominationappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves appeals concerning the appointment of the 26th sajjadanashin of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar (RA). The core legal questions relate to the existence of any custom regarding the succession of the sajjadanashin, the validity of the respondent's appointment under such custom, and the effect of a revocation notice published by the former sajjadanashin during his lifetime. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of a sajjadanashin is governed by the absolute discretion of the incumbent via nomination from amongst agnates and mureeds, and that the respondent successfully established his oral nomination and entitlement through evidence, whereas the appellant failed to prove his own claim or any valid subsequent appointment. The Court laid down the principle that the spiritual office of a sajjadanashin is distinct from the secular office of a mutawali, and succession primarily depends upon the express nomination and intent of the preceding sajjadanashin in accordance with the established custom and usage of the shrine.

  Questions settled

  • Whether there was any custom relatable to succession of Sajjada Nasheen of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar (R.A.)?
  • Whether the respondent was appointed as Sajjada Nasheen in terms of the said custom?
  • Whether the declaration published in two national dailies regarding the cancellation of the respondent's appointment was ever rescinded during the lifetime of the declarant?
  • Whether the petitioner has any justifiable claim to be Sajjada Nasheen with reference to any custom, usage or practice?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Fatah Cricket Club through President vs Pakistan Cricket Board2018 PHC 1363, 2018 CL C 1427 · Peshawar High Court
  writ jurisdictionPakistan Cricket Boardstatutory bodyjudicial reviewcricket club scrutinymaintainability of writ petitionsports governance
  Summary & questions settled

  These writ petitions challenged the Pakistan Cricket Board's (PCB) decision to classify several cricket clubs as "INACTIVE," effectively denying them voting rights and participation in cricket activities. The core legal questions were whether the PCB performs functions in connection with the affairs of the State, thereby rendering its regulations statutory and its actions amenable to judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, and whether the scrutiny process was fair. The Court held that the PCB performs functions under the control of the Federal Government, and its regulations, having been published in the official Gazette, possess statutory character, making the petitions maintainable. The Court observed that the petitioners were treated with undue harshness and potential discrimination compared to other clubs. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to grant the petitioners a fresh opportunity to prove their eligibility for "ACTIVE" status, excluding cases involving foreign nationals. The judgment establishes that statutory bodies performing public functions are subject to writ jurisdiction, and procedural fairness mandates providing clubs a reasonable opportunity to rectify deficiencies during scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Pakistan Cricket Board a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973?
  • Do the Pakistan Cricket Board Election Regulations 2015 possess statutory character?
  • Can a High Court direct a statutory body to provide a second opportunity to a cricket club for scrutiny of its status?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. vs Province of Punjab through Secretary Food and others2019 [M] C.L.R. 89, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 632, 2018 PLD Lahore 450, 2018 CLD 626 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-12
  cane growerssecured creditorspledge of goodsretention of titleCane Commissionersugar millsstatutory rightpreferential rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated matter before the Lahore High Court involved petitions filed by cane growers seeking recovery of unpaid dues for sugarcane supplied to various sugar mills, and cross-petitions by commercial banks challenging the seizure of sugar bags pledged to them by the mills as secured creditors. The core legal question concerned whether unpaid cane growers asserting statutory rights under special provincial legislation hold priority over banks holding pledged goods as secured creditors. The Court held that cane growers possess a statutory right to receive payment within a mandated timeframe and retain an implied statutory retention of title over the sugarcane supplied until paid, making them unpaid sellers whose claims take precedence over secured creditors. The Court ruled that the Cane Commissioner is legally competent to recover these dues under the relevant statutory framework, dismissing the banks' petitions and allowing those of the cane growers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether cane growers have a statutory right to receive payment for sugarcane supplied to sugar mills within the prescribed timeframe?
  • Does the Cane Commissioner possess the authority to recover unpaid dues of cane growers by exercising powers under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Whether the rights of secured creditors holding a pledge over sugar bags take priority over the statutory claims of unpaid cane growers?
  • Can an implied statutory retention of title be read into the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 for the protection of unpaid cane growers?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Ltd vs Province of Punjab through Secretary Food and others2018 PLD Lahore 450 · Lahore High Court · 2018-04-12
  cane growersCane Commissionersugar millspledged stocksecured creditorsretention of titleRomalpa clausearrears of land revenueCane Purchase Receipt
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves connected writ petitions involving competing claims between cane growers and financing banks over sugar stocks and sale proceeds from defaulting sugar mills. The cane growers supplied sugarcane under the regulatory scheme of the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950, but were unpaid, prompting the Cane Commissioner to seize sugar stocks. The banks claimed superior priority as secured pledgees under the Contract Act, 1872. The High Court ruled in favour of the cane growers, holding that their statutory right to payment operates as an implied statutory retention of title clause under the Act and Rules, meaning ownership of the cane and resulting sugar does not pass to the mills until payment is completed within fifteen days. Under the principle of 'nemo dat quod non habet', the mills could not create an unencumbered pledge defeating the growers' ownership rights. Consequently, the Cane Commissioner is lawfully empowered to seize and auction the sugar stocks and disburse proceeds to unpaid cane growers in priority over the banks.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Cane Commissioner has the statutory authority under the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 to recover unpaid sugarcane prices due to cane growers by using powers of a Collector under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967?
  • Whether an unpaid cane grower retains statutory title to delivered sugarcane and resulting sugar stocks under the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 and Rules framed thereunder?
  • Whether the statutory claim of unpaid cane growers for sugarcane prices takes priority over the security rights of banks holding a pledge over manufactured sugar stocks?
  Read full judgment →
• Al-Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Limited vs Province of Punjab through Secretary2018 P.C.T.L.R. 632 · Lahore High Court
  retention of titlecane growerssecured creditorspledgestatutory priorityCane Commissionersugar millsimplied trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This batch of petitions concerns a dispute between cane growers and banks regarding the priority of claims over sugar stocks held by sugar mills. The core legal question was whether the statutory right of cane growers to receive payment for supplied sugarcane, enforceable by the Cane Commissioner, takes precedence over the contractual rights of banks as secured creditors holding a pledge over sugar stocks. The Court held that the Cane Commissioner is the competent authority to recover cane growers' dues under the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950. It ruled that the statutory framework creates an implied retention of title in favor of cane growers, granting them priority over the banks' security interest. The Court determined that the sugar mills' obligation to pay for sugarcane is a statutory duty, and the failure to pay prevents the transfer of title, thereby rendering the pledge to banks subordinate to the growers' claims. Consequently, the Court allowed the cane growers' petitions and dismissed the banks' petitions, directing the disbursement of sale proceeds to the growers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Cane Commissioner have the authority to recover unpaid dues of cane growers as arrears of land revenue?
  • Does the statutory framework of the Punjab Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 create an implied retention of title in favor of cane growers?
  • Do the claims of cane growers for unpaid sugarcane prices take priority over the security interests of banks holding a pledge over sugar stocks?
  • Can a sugar mill validly pledge sugarcane or sugar products to a bank if the price of the sugarcane has not been paid to the cane grower?
  Read full judgment →
• Al -Fatah Cricket Club vs Pakistan Cricket Board, through Chairman and others2018 PHC 1363 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-07
  writ jurisdictionPakistan Cricket Boardstatutory bodyactive club statusjudicial reviewsports administrationconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns several writ petitions filed by various cricket clubs challenging the Pakistan Cricket Board's (PCB) decision to classify them as 'INACTIVE' clubs, thereby denying them voting rights and participation in official cricket activities. The core legal question was whether the PCB performs functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, rendering its regulations statutory and its actions amenable to the High Court's constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 199. The Court held that the PCB is a body performing functions under the control of the Federal Government, and its regulations, published in the official Gazette, possess statutory character. Consequently, the writ petitions were found maintainable. The Court observed that the petitioners were treated with inconsistency compared to other clubs and emphasized that sports promotion is a state responsibility vital for social development. Applying the principle that statutory bodies must act fairly and avoid discriminatory practices, the Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the PCB to provide the petitioner clubs a fresh opportunity to undergo scrutiny and demonstrate compliance with the requisite criteria, except for one club found to have ineligible members.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Pakistan Cricket Board a 'person' performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Do the election regulations framed by the Pakistan Cricket Board under the Sports (Development and Control) Ordinance 1962 possess statutory character?
  • Can a High Court direct a statutory body to grant a second opportunity for scrutiny to cricket clubs previously declared inactive?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhter Umar Hayat Lalayka and others vs Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhaira and others2018 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-05-13
  out of turn promotionpast and closed transactionsuo motu reviewpolice seniorityunconstitutional lawgallantry promotionIntra Court Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from multiple Intra Court Appeals, Criminal Original Petitions, and Review Petitions concerning out-of-turn promotions granted to police officers in Punjab. The primary legal question before the Court was whether out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to previous judicial orders or statutory provisions could be protected under the doctrine of past and closed transactions or through judicial exceptions. The Supreme Court exercised its Suo Motu Review Jurisdiction under the Constitution to withdraw the exception previously granted in Shahid Pervaiz's case (2017 SCMR 206), which had preserved out-of-turn promotions secured through judicial decisions. The Court held that statutes providing for out-of-turn promotions were unconstitutional and void ab initio, and thus no vested rights or past and closed transaction protections could flow from them for serving personnel. Consequently, all out-of-turn promotions granted to serving police officers were ordered to be undone, and the departmental authorities were directed to re-fix seniority alongside batch-mates as if such promotions had never occurred.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Article 188 of the Constitution to revisit and review its own earlier judgments suo motu without a formal application from a party?
  • Does the doctrine of past and closed transactions protect benefits and promotions acquired under a law that is subsequently declared unconstitutional and void ab initio?
  • Are out-of-turn police promotions granted pursuant to court or tribunal judgments immune from being re-examined and undone upon a declaration of unconstitutionality?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Umar Hayat vs Mushtaq Ahmed Sukhaira and others2018 PLJ SC 773, 2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  out of turn promotionpolice seniorityconstitutional lawsuo motu jurisdictionservice lawpast and closed transactionsfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the legality of "out of turn promotions" within the Punjab Police, specifically addressing whether a saving clause in the Supreme Court’s previous judgment, Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed (2017 SCMR 206), protected employees who obtained such promotions through judicial orders. The Court examined whether these promotions, previously declared unconstitutional, could remain intact for in-service employees based on prior judicial verdicts. The Court held that the exception created in paragraph 111 of Shahid Pervaiz was not absolute and that out-of-turn promotions are inherently unconstitutional, violating Fundamental Rights. Invoking its Suo Motu jurisdiction under Articles 184(3), 187, and 188 of the Constitution, the Court withdrew the protection previously afforded to such promotions, regardless of whether they were granted pursuant to judicial orders. The Court directed the relevant authorities to re-fix the seniority of all affected police officers with their batch-mates as if the out-of-turn promotions had never occurred. The principle laid down is that vested rights cannot be generated under an unconstitutional law, and no judicial protection can sustain benefits flowing from an instrument declared void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Can out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to judicial orders be protected if the underlying law is declared unconstitutional?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the power to withdraw a saving clause created in a previous judgment by invoking Suo Motu jurisdiction?
  • Are out-of-turn promotions in the police service protected under the doctrine of past and closed transactions?
  • Can a legislative instrument declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court create vested rights?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Kamal vs Mst. Samreen Akhtar etc2018 CLC 887, 2018 PHC 1343 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-02Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Kamal vs Mst. Samreen Akhtar and 2 others2018 CLC 887 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-02-02Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Jan vs Shah Murad through Levies Thana, Harnai and another2018 KLR Criminal Cases 149, 2018 YLR 1745 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-09
  appeal against acquittaldouble presumption of innocencedelayed FIRdishonest improvementmurder trialappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent by the trial court in a murder case. The core legal questions were whether the prosecution had proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and whether the trial court's acquittal was based on a misappreciation of evidence. The Balochistan High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case due to several fatal flaws: an unexplained two-day delay in lodging the FIR, material contradictions and dishonest improvements in the testimonies of eye-witnesses, and the absence of a post-mortem examination or inquest report to confirm the cause of death. Furthermore, the Court noted that recovery witnesses admitted the deceased's clothing lacked bullet marks. The Court reaffirmed the principle that in an appeal against acquittal, the accused enjoys a 'double presumption of innocence,' and an appellate court should not interfere unless the trial court's judgment is perverse, capricious, or arbitrary, which was not the case here.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR create a presumption that the allegations are an afterthought?
  • Can the testimony of a witness who makes material improvements to their statement be relied upon without corroboration?
  • What is the legal standard for interfering with a trial court's order of acquittal in a criminal appeal?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to conduct a post-mortem or inquest report to establish the cause of death?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Jan vs Shah Murad and another2018 KLR Criminal Cases 149 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-11-09
  appeal against acquittaldelay in F.I.R.improvements in testimonydouble presumption of innocencemurderocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the respondent of murder charges under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve the assessment of evidence in an appeal against acquittal, the effect of an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the reliability of eye-witness testimony containing material improvements and contradictions. The Balochistan High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt due to a two-day unexplained delay in filing the F.I.R., major improvements and contradictions in the statements of ocular witnesses, lack of a post-mortem examination, and the absence of bullet marks on the deceased's clothes. Reaffirming that an order of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and cannot be interfered with unless found to be capricious, perverse, or arbitrary, the Court dismissed the appeal in limine, upholding the respondent's acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report renders the prosecution case doubtful?
  • Does the testimony of an eye-witness containing material improvements and contradictions remain reliable without corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • What is the evidentiary value of blood-stained clothes lacking bullet marks in the absence of a post-mortem examination?
  Read full judgment →