Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Akhtar Hussain and another vs The State2018 P Cr. L J 433 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-08-28
  de-novo trialjuvenile justicefair trialtransfer of evidenceQanun-e-Shahadatcriminal procedurejoint trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns revision petitions filed by accused persons challenging the trial court's refusal to grant acquittal following an order for a de-novo trial. The core legal question was whether evidence recorded during an initial, illegal joint trial of a juvenile and an adult could be transferred and relied upon in a subsequent de-novo trial, and whether the prosecutor's abandonment of the right to re-examine witnesses necessitated an acquittal. The Court held that the trial court correctly refused the acquittal petition but erred in allowing the transfer of previous evidence. The Court ruled that upon a de-novo trial, evidence must be recorded afresh, as the previous proceedings were vitiated by the illegal joint trial. It emphasized that Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 strictly governs the transfer of evidence, requiring specific conditions that were not met here. The Court affirmed that judges must ensure a fair trial and not blindly follow the prosecutor's concessions, directing the trial court to re-examine all prosecution witnesses and conclude the case expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence recorded in a previous trial be read into a de-novo trial without satisfying the conditions of Article 47 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
  • Does the abandonment of the right to re-examine prosecution witnesses by a prosecutor entitle an accused to an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a joint trial of a juvenile and an adult accused legally permissible under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000?
  • Is a trial court obligated to re-examine prosecution witnesses upon the ordering of a de-novo trial?
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• Akhlaque Ahmed Sohail vs Muhammad Yahya2018 CLC 523 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-16Read full judgment →
• Akber vs Province of Sindh & Others2019 PLJ Karachi 47, 2018 SHC 734 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Akbar Ali Dero vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 1001 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-28
  transfer and postingterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionService Tribunalcivil servantvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a constitutional petition filed by a civil servant, a Post Master General, challenging his transfer and posting orders issued by the Respondent Directorate General, Pakistan Post. The core legal question is whether a civil servant can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in respect of transfer and posting matters, given the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. The Sindh High Court held that matters relating to transfer and posting form part of the terms and conditions of service, which fall within the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution and the Sindh Service Tribunals Act 1973, thereby ousting the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The Court laid down the principle that civil servants have no vested right to a particular post or place of posting, that general transfers made in the exigency of service are valid, and that transfer matters cannot be agitated through a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain a writ petition filed by a civil servant against his transfer and posting orders?
  • Does the expression 'terms and conditions of service' under Article 212 of the Constitution include matters of transfer and posting?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to claim posting at a particular place or for a specific tenure?
  • Whether general transfer and posting orders issued in the exigency of service are open to challenge through a constitutional petition?
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• Ajmal Khan and another vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 1363 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-19
  accountability courtde novo trialabsence of accusedevidence in presence of accusedremand of casesupplementary referenceillegal trialNational Accountability Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Accountability Court-IV, Peshawar, whereby the appellants were convicted and sentenced under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether a trial court can legally convict an accused by relying on evidence recorded in his absence prior to his arrest, without conducting a de novo trial or examining witnesses in his presence. The Peshawar High Court held that relying on evidence recorded in the absence of an accused violates the principle that evidence must be taken in the presence of the accused, and that the consent of parties cannot cure such a fundamental illegality. The Court laid down the principle that when a co-accused is arrested subsequently in the same reference, the trial court must either conclude the trial separately for the already-tried accused or charge both accused afresh and conduct a de novo trial. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the convictions and sentences were set aside, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a fresh trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court legally convict an accused by relying on prosecution evidence recorded in his absence prior to his arrest?
  • Does the consent of an accused or his counsel to rely on previously recorded evidence cure the illegality of a trial conducted in his absence?
  • What is the proper legal course for a trial court when a co-accused is arrested after the trial of the initial accused has progressed?
  • Whether a trial court is required to frame a fresh charge and conduct a de novo trial upon the subsequent arrest of an absconding co-accused?
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• Ajay Kumar Singh & Anr vs The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors2018 SCInd 15 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-08-09Read full judgment →
• Ajay Bharwani and another vs Hmi Muhammad and others2018 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-12-06
  criminal appealmurderacquittalprivate defencereappraisal of evidencesuppression of facts
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of murder charges under Section 302(b) read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's acceptance of the plea of right of private defence and the reappraisal of evidence in an acquittal appeal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's findings were fully supported by the record, noting that the place of occurrence was a disputed land in possession of the accused party, the deceased was armed, and the complainant party had suppressed the murder of a person from the accused side during the same incident. Finding no jurisdictional infirmity, illegality, or perversity in the High Court's reasoning, and considering the lapse of time since the occurrence and acquittal, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the acquittal and dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal based on a valid plea of private defence and supported by the record unless perversity or legal infirmity is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal where the High Court has properly appreciated the plea of right of private defence?
  • Does the suppression of a cross-case or injury sustained by the accused party weaken the prosecution case?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence in an appeal against acquittal when no perversity or legal infirmity is found in the impugned judgment?
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• Aj&K Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and another vs Muhammad Siddique Khan and 3 others2018 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 7 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Aitbar Shah and 4 others vs The State and another2018 P Cr. L J 566 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-02
  criminal appealremandlegal infirmitymandatory requirementstrial court judgmentriotingcapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Swabi, which convicted the appellants under sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death and imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the trial court's failure to record a finding of either conviction or acquittal regarding the charge under section 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 constituted a legal infirmity requiring the judgment to be set aside. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court's omission to address the charge under section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 violated the mandatory requirements of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Sessions Judge, Swabi, for a fresh decision after providing a hearing to both parties. The key principle laid down is that a trial court must record findings on all charges framed against an accused, as failure to do so renders the judgment legally defective and necessitates a remand.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a trial court to record findings on all charges framed against an accused render the judgment legally infirm?
  • Is a judgment that fails to comply with the requirements of section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 liable to be set aside?
  • Can an appellate court remand a case for a fresh decision if the trial court failed to adjudicate upon a specific charge?
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• Airblue Ltd vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I2018 P.C.T.L. R. 1033, 2018 PTD (Trib.) 2445 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-03-09Read full judgment →
• Airblue Limited vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad2019 PTD (Trib.) 416, 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 951 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-03-08
  minimum taxturnover definitionincome tax ordinanceworkers welfare fundchange of opiniontax credit carry-forwardindustrial establishmentfare and freight
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by Airblue Limited against orders passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue regarding minimum tax liability, carry-forward of tax credits, and Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) payments. The core legal questions were whether airline "fare and freight" receipts constitute "gross fees" under the definition of "turnover" in Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001; whether tax authorities can disallow previously allowed tax credit carry-forwards based on a change of opinion; and whether the airline is liable for WWF. The Tribunal held that "fare and freight" are distinct from "fees" and do not fall within the ambit of "turnover" for minimum tax purposes. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that tax authorities cannot arbitrarily reverse previous assessments regarding tax credit carry-forwards based on a change of opinion. Finally, the Tribunal determined the airline is not an "industrial establishment" under the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971. The key principle laid down is that taxing statutes must be interpreted strictly based on their plain language, and authorities cannot impose tax liabilities on receipts not explicitly covered by statutory definitions.

  Questions settled

  • Do airline receipts from 'fare and freight' fall within the definition of 'gross fees' for the purpose of 'turnover' under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001?
  • Can tax authorities disallow a previously allowed carry-forward of excess tax paid under Section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 based solely on a change of opinion?
  • Is an airline company liable to pay Workers Welfare Fund under the Workers Welfare Fund Ordinance 1971?
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• Air Weapon Complex through DG vs Muhammad Aslam and others2018 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-02-09
  land acquisitioncompensation enhancementmarket valuefuture potentialReferee Courtlimitation periodcompulsory acquisition charges
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a Regular First Appeal and upholding the Referee Court's enhancement of land acquisition compensation awarded to landowners under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land was acquired by the Appellant (Air Weapon Complex) for defence purposes. The Supreme Court considered whether the enhancement of compensation based on market value, future potential, and proximity to major roads was legally sound, and whether the reference was time-barred. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts correctly evaluated key statutory factors, including market value, location, and potential for development. Unexecuted agreements to sell produced by the Appellant were rejected as unproven, and claims that land value decreased due to defence acquisition were unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the Court held that since the landowners filed the reference within time before the competent authority, any subsequent delay by the authority in sending it to the Referee Court could not penalize the landowners.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must be considered by courts when determining compensation for acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Can unexecuted agreements to sell be relied upon to determine the market value of acquired land in the absence of evidence showing completed transactions?
  • Is a landowner's reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 rendered time-barred if the competent authority delays transmitting it to the Referee Court after it was timely filed?
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• Aijaz Hussain vs The State2018 MLD 1164 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-27Read full judgment →
• Aijaz Ali Shah & 16 others vs Federation of Pakistan & others2018 SHC 1186 · Sindh High Court · 2018-12-12
  constitutional petitionquo-warrantodeputationabsorptionrepatriationfederal investigation agencycivil servantout-of-cadre transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment resolves a batch of constitutional petitions challenging the basic absorption of private respondents from various departments into the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The core legal question concerns whether civil servants or officials from other departments can be permanently absorbed into the FIA under Rules 15 and 16 of the FIA (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1975, without fulfilling competitive selection criteria and in light of pronouncements by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Sindh High Court held that Rules 15 and 16 do not permit permanent absorption or horizontal movement of officers into cadre posts without statutory backing or fulfilling required qualifications, and that deputationists possess no vested right to remain in an organization indefinitely. The court laid down the principle that appointment by transfer on deputation must be for a fixed term, does not equate to absorption, and that unauthorized absorptions must be undone by repatriating such officials to their parent departments pursuant to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can issue a writ of quo-warranto under Article 199 of the Constitution against officials holding public posts in a statutory body like the FIA?
  • Do Rules 15 and 16 of the FIA (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1975 empower the authorities to permanently absorb deputationists from other departments into the FIA?
  • Does a deputationist have a vested right to remain on a post indefinitely or claim permanent absorption without fulfilling prescribed qualifications and statutory procedures?
  • Whether an administrative authority can bypass competitive processes to effect horizontal movement and absorption of civil servants from non-cadre posts to cadre posts?
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• Ai-Haj Deewan Bakhtiyar Syed Muhammad and others vs Deewan2018 KLR Supreme Court Cases 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Sajjadanashinsuccession disputeshrine managementcustomary lawnomination of successorspiritual guidancefactual findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a succession dispute regarding the appointment of the 26th Sajjadanashin of the shrine of Baba Farid Ganj Shakkar (RA). The core legal questions involved whether the respondent was validly appointed as Sajjadanashin according to established custom and whether the previous incumbent’s revocation of the respondent's nomination was effective or subsequently rescinded. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court’s decision in favor of the respondent. The Court found that the appellant failed to prove his claim, while the respondent established his appointment through credible witness statements and evidence. The Court affirmed that the office of Sajjadanashin is a spiritual position distinct from a mutawali, and the nomination of a successor rests entirely within the absolute discretion of the incumbent Sajjadanashin. Furthermore, the Court reiterated its reluctance to interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts absent a clear misreading of evidence. The judgment emphasizes that the express nomination by the preceding Sajjadanashin remains the conclusive factor in determining the entitlement to the office.

  Questions settled

  • Is the office of a Sajjadanashin legally distinct from that of a mutawali?
  • Does the nomination of a successor to the office of Sajjadanashin rest within the absolute discretion of the incumbent?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent factual findings of lower courts regarding the appointment of a Sajjadanashin absent a clear misreading of evidence?
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• Ahsin Arshad, etc vs Advocate General, Punjab, etc.2018 PLD Lahore 9, 2018 PLJ Lahore 568, 2018 [M] C.L.R. 352 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Ahsin Arshad and others vs Advocate General, Punjab and others2018 PLD Lahore 9 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-03Read full judgment →
• Ahsanullah Lakho vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 522 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-02Read full judgment →
• Ahsan Nawaz and another vs The State, etc2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-07-11
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clausecriminal assaultbail as rulenon-bailable offences
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged an order of the Lahore High Court refusing them post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving allegations of assault with iron rods, registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the concession of bail after arrest given the nature of the alleged offences. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that in cases where the offences are outside the prohibitory clause, the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Finding no exceptional circumstances to warrant continued incarceration, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed the same, and granted bail to the petitioners subject to the furnishing of bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court. This judgment reaffirms the principle that bail is a right rather than a privilege in non-prohibitory offences absent exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception in cases involving offences outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 entitle an accused to bail as a matter of course?
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• Ahmed Saeed and others vs Province of Sindh, through the Secretary, Education Department and two others2018 SHC 537 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-06
  civil suit for possessionnationalization of schoolsproprietary rightsMartial Law Regulation 118eviction of governmentconstitutional protection of propertyrent default
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit for the recovery of possession of a residential property in Karachi, which had been taken over by the provincial government under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972 for use as a school. The core legal question was whether the government's takeover of the school management extinguished the plaintiffs' proprietary rights and whether the plaintiffs could seek eviction through a civil suit after being denied relief by the Rent Controller. The Court held that Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972 was intended to manage educational institutions, not to confiscate private property, and that the government's continued occupation without rent payment violated the owners' constitutional rights under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Furthermore, the Court found the premises were being used in violation of the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulation, 2002. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit, ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and pay outstanding rent, affirming that civil courts retain jurisdiction to order eviction where statutory rent laws are excluded.

  Questions settled

  • Does the nationalization of a private school under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 of 1972 extinguish the owner's proprietary rights over the premises?
  • Can an owner seek the eviction of the government from a property through a civil suit when the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is excluded?
  • Does the use of a residential property for a school in violation of the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulation, 2002 constitute valid grounds for eviction?
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• Ahmed Khan Floraid Company through owner vs Secretary Mines and Minerals Government of Balochistan and 2 others2018 YLR 718 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-02-16Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Khan Floraid Company through Owner vs Secretary Mines &2018 YLR 718, 2018 PLJ Quetta 136 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-02-16Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Khan and 2 others vs The State2018 YLR 1515 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-26
  murderbenefit of the doubtocular and medical discrepancyunnatural conduct of eyewitnessescriminal appealacquittalcontradictory evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b) read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the credibility of eyewitness accounts, inconsistencies between ocular and medical evidence, and the existence of an alternative motive. The Sindh High Court held that the eyewitnesses were related and interested, their conduct was unnatural, and there was a major contradiction between their testimony—alleging a gunshot injury to the deceased—and the medical evidence, which showed no bullet wounds. Furthermore, unexplained delays in forensic testing, suspicious police recoveries, and a plausible alternative defence regarding a marital dispute created reasonable doubt. The court laid down the principle that a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as of right, and major discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence destroy the trustworthiness of eyewitness testimony. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a major contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries render the eyewitness accounts untrustworthy?
  • Whether the unnatural conduct of eyewitnesses in failing to seek immediate medical assistance for a severely injured relative creates a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Does a single reasonable doubt arising from the totality of evidence entitle an accused person to an acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and an alternative defense is corroborated by defence witnesses?
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• Ahmed Hussain and another vs Messrs Meqsood Textile through Notified2018 PLC 245 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2018-01-15
  wrongful terminationburden of proofemployment documentswithholding of recordreinstatementcompensation in lieu of reinstatementlabour dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the order of the Sindh Labour Court dismissing the appellant worker's grievance application for reinstatement in service with back benefits after his alleged wrongful termination. The core legal question was whether the bare statement of an employee regarding his employment is sufficient to shift the onus of proof to the employer when the employer fails to issue employment documents and withhold employment records. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that where an employer has a practice of not issuing employment documents and withholds employee records, the bare statement of the worker is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the employer under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, and the worker's termination without a written order under Standing Order 12(3) is wrongful. The Tribunal further held that instead of reinstatement, where employer-employee relations are severely strained, courts possess the inherent equitable power to award reasonable compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the bare statement of a worker is sufficient to shift the onus to the employer to produce employment records?
  • Does the failure of an employer to issue employment documents permit drawing an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984?
  • Can a court award financial compensation instead of reinstatement in service when relations between the employer and employee are estranged?
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• Ahmadullah and 3 others vs Government of NWFP through Secretary2018 YLR 2328 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-11
  civil revisionforest landownership rightsprotected forestpresumption of ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court judgment and decree that set aside the trial court's dismissal of a declaration and permanent injunction suit concerning forest land. The core legal question involves determining ownership rights over disputed forest land measuring over 2300 kanals claimed by private individuals against the Forest Department under applicable statutory frameworks including the Forest Act, 1927 and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Peshawar High Court held that the appellate court rightly evaluated the evidence and that under the relevant statutes and notifications, forest land is presumed to belong to the Government unless proprietary rights are legally established and rebutted through credible documentary evidence rather than mere oral assertions. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed and the appellate judgment maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether private individuals can claim ownership of land declared as protected forest under the Forest Act, 1927 without strong documentary proof?
  • Does the presumption of ownership of forest and waste land under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967 lie in favor of the Government until rebutted?
  • Can a revisional court interfere with a concurrent finding of fact by the appellate court based on proper appreciation of evidence?
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• Ahmad Yar & another vs Muhammad Ali & another2020 [M] C L R 17, 2018 LHC 1956 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-13
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadservice of noticeacknowledgement duedocumentary evidenceburden of proofcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a suit for possession through pre-emption concerning land purchased via oral mutation. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners, finding they had performed the requisite Talbs. However, the first appellate court reversed this decision and dismissed the suit. The core legal question before the High Court was whether the petitioners had satisfied the mandatory statutory requirements for serving the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The High Court upheld the appellate court's dismissal, holding that the petitioners failed to discharge their mandatory obligation to prove the service of notice. The Court emphasized that under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the production of the acknowledgement due card is a sine qua non to prove service when the vendee denies receipt. The key principle laid down is that documentary evidence of the notice, including the acknowledgement card, must be produced and proven in court; oral testimony of a postman cannot substitute for the production of the essential documentary evidence required by law, and withholding such evidence is fatal to a pre-emption claim.

  Questions settled

  • Is the production of an acknowledgement due card mandatory to prove the service of notice of Talb-i-Ishhad in a pre-emption suit?
  • Can the oral testimony of a postman substitute for the production of the acknowledgement card in a pre-emption case?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to produce the acknowledgement card when the vendee denies receipt of the pre-emption notice?
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• Ahmad Shah vs Agriculture Inspector SMS Plant Production2018 P Cr. L J 512 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-13
  quashmentde-sealing of premisesfake fertilizerproperty rightsinherent jurisdictionKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Fertilizer Control Act 1999
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeks the quashment of an order dismissing a revision petition for the de-sealing of a basement premises. The petitioner, the owner of the premises, rented the property to an accused person involved in a case regarding fake fertilizer. The premises were sealed by the Agriculture Inspector following the recovery of fake fertilizer. The core legal question was whether the authorities could indefinitely seal the petitioner's property to store seized material when the petitioner was not an accused in the criminal case. The Court held that while Rule 24(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Fertilizer Control Rules 2003 allows an inspector to store seized fertilizer in the place of seizure, it does not grant the authority to seal the premises indefinitely, especially when the owner is not involved in the offense. Consequently, the Court directed the respondent to remove the seized fertilizer within thirty days and restore possession of the premises to the petitioner, emphasizing that property rights cannot be infringed upon without explicit statutory authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Fertilizer Control Act 1999 or its Rules authorize the indefinite sealing of premises used by a third party to store seized fertilizer?
  • Can a court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order the de-sealing of property owned by a non-accused person?
  • Under Rule 24(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Fertilizer Control Rules 2003, is an inspector required to remove seized fertilizer from a third party's premises if the premises owner is not involved in the offense?
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• Ahmad Saeed vs Abdul Rashid and others2018 PHC 1490 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-22Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Raza and others vs Executive Director (NBFCD) Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and 7 others2018 CLD 734 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-02Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Hassan Warriach vs District Coordination Officer, Sargodha, etc2018 KLR Civil Cases 199 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• Ahmad Danyal vs Islamia College, Peshawar through Registrar and others2018 PLJ Peshawar 26 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Ahlian-E-Murtaza Abad through Representatives vs Ahlian-E-Nasir2018 MLD 700 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-09-07Read full judgment →
• Ahad Khan Cheema vs National Accountability Bureau and others2018 PCr.LJ 1057 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-27Read full judgment →
• Ahad Khan Cheema vs NAB etc2018 PCRLJ 1057, 2018 LHC 471 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-27
  constitutional petitionNAB arrestjudicial remandcorruption inquirymala fideaccountability courtAshiana Iqbal Housing Project
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the legality of the petitioner's arrest by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) regarding alleged corruption in the Ashiana Iqbal Housing Project. The petitioner contended that his arrest was a retaliatory act following his request for information, asserting that the proceedings were mala fide. The core legal question was whether the arrest was illegal, unlawful, or void, and whether the petitioner was entitled to release. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the arrest was lawful. The Court observed that the petitioner was currently in custody under valid remand orders issued by the Accountability Court, which remained unchallenged in the present proceedings. The Court found no merit in the allegations of mala fide, noting that state institutions do not function based on personal whims. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that where prima facie reasonable grounds exist to believe an accused is involved in an offence, custody is neither illegal nor improper. The Court also emphasized the necessity for responsible media reporting to avoid parallel media trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained to challenge an arrest when the accused is held under a valid, unchallenged remand order from an Accountability Court?
  • Does the mere allegation that a state institution acted out of personal vendetta or mala fide suffice to invalidate an arrest made under statutory authority?
  • Are the requirements of Section 24(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999 satisfied when the grounds for arrest are conveyed to the accused?
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• Agro Trade Private Limited and another vs Karachi Port Trust through Chairman and 2 others2018 CLC 1140 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-24Read full judgment →
• Agro Pack. vs Federation of Pakistan.PTCL 2018 CL. 317 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-23Read full judgment →
• Agro Pack vs Federation of PakistanPTCL 2018 CL. 317, 2018 PTD 1729 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-23Read full judgment →
• Agha Shoaib Abbas & 10 others vs Province of Sindh & others2018 SHC 1025 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-11Read full judgment →
• Agha Imtiaz, Ali Khan Babar and 2 others vs The Federation of Pakistan2018 CLC 1376 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-31
  nominee directorsinterim injunctionCompanies Ordinance 1984irreparable losspublic sector companyremoval of directorspleasure of the authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiffs, former nominee directors of a public sector company, sought an interim injunction to suspend a government notification removing them from the Board of Directors. The core legal question was whether nominee directors appointed under Section 183 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 possess a vested right to hold office for a fixed term, thereby precluding their removal. The Court dismissed the application, holding that nominee directors do not enjoy the protections afforded to elected directors under Section 178 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Specifically, the Court ruled that because Sections 180 and 181 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 are inapplicable to nominee directors, they serve at the pleasure of the nominating authority, which retains the inherent power to remove them. Furthermore, the Court determined that the plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages rendered any potential loss reparable, failing the test for irreparable loss required for injunctive relief. Finally, the Court noted the plaintiffs’ failure to approach the court with clean hands, as they misrepresented their status as elected directors in their pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Do nominee directors appointed under Section 183 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 have a vested right to hold office for a specific term?
  • Are the provisions of Sections 180 and 181 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 applicable to directors nominated under Section 183?
  • Does a claim for monetary damages in a suit preclude the grant of an interim injunction on the ground of irreparable loss?
  • Does the nominating authority have the inherent power to remove a nominee director?
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• Agha Imtiaz Ali Khan Babar and 2 others vs Federation of Pakistan2018 CLC 1376, 2018 CLD 80 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-31Read full judgment →
• Afzal Khan and 2 others vs The State2018 YLR 1676 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-12
  interested witnessocular accountcorroborative evidenceabscondencereasonable doubtcriminal appealQatl-e-Amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a trial court judgment convicting three appellants for murder under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of a sole eyewitness—the deceased's father—and whether the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Peshawar High Court held that while the complainant was an interested witness, his testimony was credible and corroborated by medical evidence and the site plan. However, the Court found that the specific weapons attributed to one appellant (Zeeshan) did not match the fatal injuries, creating reasonable doubt; consequently, he was acquitted. Conversely, the Court upheld the convictions of the other two appellants and, finding the trial court erred in its acquittal on the charge of attempted murder, convicted them under Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court affirmed that while abscondence alone is insufficient for conviction, it serves as corroborative evidence, and that the testimony of an interested witness is admissible when supported by strong, independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be based on the sole testimony of an interested witness?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused person constitute sufficient evidence for conviction?
  • Is the testimony of an interested witness admissible if corroborated by independent evidence?
  • Should an accused be acquitted if the medical evidence contradicts the weapon attributed to them?
  Read full judgment →
• Afzal Khaliq vs National Accountability Bureau through its Chairman2018 PHC 1825 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-11-15Read full judgment →
• Aftab Muhammad Khan vs Federation of Pakistan & others2019 PLC (C.S.) 1483, 2018 SHC 605 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-09
  service mattertransfer and postingjurisdiction of High Courtcivil servantterms and conditions of serviceService TribunalArticle 212
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a BPS-19 civil servant, challenged a notification transferring him from his position as Registrar of Trade Marks and appointing a BPS-18 officer in his place, alleging the transfer was illegal, discriminatory, and violated established tenure rules and Supreme Court precedents regarding 'Own Pay & Scale' (OPS) postings. During the proceedings, the respondents issued a new notification posting the BPS-18 officer to a position commensurate with his grade, effectively rendering the petitioner's primary grievance moot. The core legal question was whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute concerning the transfer and posting of a civil servant. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable, ruling that matters concerning the terms and conditions of service, including transfer and posting, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, read with the Sindh Service Tribunals Act 1973, bars the jurisdiction of the High Court in service-related matters, even where allegations of mala fide or lack of jurisdiction are raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding the transfer and posting of a civil servant?
  • Do matters relating to the transfer and posting of a civil servant fall within the definition of 'terms and conditions of service' under the Sindh Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in service matters even if the impugned order is alleged to be mala fide or without jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Aftab Ahmad vs Member (Judicial-I) Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore2018 YLR 776 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-30Read full judgment →
• Afsar Khan vs The State and another2018 YLR 1293 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-18
  murdersolitary eyewitnessbenefit of doubtwithholding best evidenceabscondencemedical evidence contradictioncriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kohat, convicting the appellant under sections 302-C/34, 324/34, and 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentencing him to imprisonment and compensation. A connected criminal revision petition was filed for enhancement of the sentence. The core legal question revolved around the reliability of the solitary eyewitness testimony, the consequences of withholding best evidence such as the injured eyewitness and the vehicle driver, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case due to major contradictions in the sole eyewitness testimony, non-production of vital injured witnesses, lack of blood recovery from the scene, and unproven motive and abscondence. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the revision petition as infructuous, reiterating the principle that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal conviction be safely based on the solitary testimony of an interested and partisan witness when it contains material contradictions and improvements?
  • What is the legal effect on the prosecution's case when the best evidence, such as an injured eyewitness and the vehicle driver, is withheld from the court?
  • Is mere abscondence of an accused sufficient to establish guilt in the absence of unimpeachable independent ocular evidence?
  • Does the failure to recover blood-stained earth from the alleged place of occurrence create a serious doubt regarding the manner and site of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Afreen Khan vs Faramoz Khan2018 PLJ Tr.C. (KPK B.C.) 226, 2018 YLR 1409, 2018 PHC 1570 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-03-17Read full judgment →
• Advocate General Sindh vs Islamic Education Trust and others2019 CLC 781, 2018 SHC 855 · Sindh High Court · 2018-08-07Read full judgment →
• Adnan vs The State and others2018 MLD 43 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-16
  identification parademurder convictionbenefit of doubtinquest reportocular evidencecriminal appealdeath sentencerole attribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the identification parade, the evidentiary value of the inquest report, and the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, particularly given the appellant was not named in the FIR. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that an identification parade is of no evidentiary value if the accused is not identified in relation to their specific role in the crime. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the inquest report is a vital document for preventing the fabrication of evidence; the failure to name the appellant therein, despite the complainant's claim of prior knowledge, rendered the prosecution's case doubtful. Additionally, the Court noted that abscondance alone cannot sustain a conviction and serves only as weak corroboration. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, extended the benefit of doubt to the appellant, and answered the murder reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade hold evidentiary value if the accused is not identified in relation to their specific role in the crime?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of abscondance?
  • Is an inquest report a mandatory document for verifying the presence of accused persons at the crime scene?
  • Does the failure to name an accused in the inquest report, when the complainant claims prior knowledge, create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Adnan Rasheed vs Gul Nawaz and 4 others2018 YLR 340 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-09-25
  acquittal appealcircumstantial evidenceretracted confessionjudicial confessionhandcuffspointation memoforensic science laboratorysupplementary statementOffences against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Torghar, acquitting four respondents charged under Section 17(4) of the Offences against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 in connection with an alleged dacoity and murder. The Federal Shariat Court examined whether the trial court's acquittal resulted from misreading or non-reading of evidence. The Court found that the prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including supplementary statements, retracted judicial confessions, pointation memos, recovered weapons, and forensic reports. It held that supplementary statements carry minimal evidentiary value similar to statements under Section 161 of CrPC. The judicial confessions were unreliable as the respondents remained handcuffed during recording, procedural safeguards were omitted from official certificates, and the confessions contradicted each other. Furthermore, pointations without recoveries were inadmissible, and delay in sending crime empties and weapons together compromised forensic evidence. The Court affirmed that an order of acquittal cannot be lightly interfered with unless shown to be perverse, artificial, or legally impossible. Consequently, the acquittal was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What parameters govern an appellate court's interference with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Whether a retracted judicial confession recorded while an accused remains handcuffed is admissible and reliable?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a supplementary statement recorded during police investigation?
  • Does a pointation memo of the place of occurrence without any corresponding recovery constitute admissible evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Adnan Prince vs The State etc.2018 P.S.C. (Crl.) 28 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-01
  post-arrest bailstatutory delayspeedy trialfair trialdelay in conclusion of trialblasphemy laws
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his bail petition by the Lahore High Court, despite a statutory delay of over three years in the conclusion of his trial under Sections 295-A, B, and C of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court examined whether the statutory delay, largely caused by the prosecution or the court, entitled the accused to bail, notwithstanding earlier precedents holding that adjournments sought by the accused disentitle them. The Court held that in light of the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, inordinate and un-condonable delay in the conclusion of a trial entitles the accused to the concession of post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as prolonged incarceration cannot be compensated upon eventual acquittal. The Court laid down that speedy trial is a fundamental right of every accused, and delays attributable to the prosecution or investigative agencies cannot be used to deny statutory bail rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person is entitled to bail on the ground of statutory delay in the conclusion of the trial when the delay is primarily caused by the prosecution or the court?
  • Does the right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 affect the application of earlier precedents regarding bail refusal due to adjournments sought by the accused?
  • Can post-arrest bail be refused on hyper-technical grounds when a clear case of inordinate delay in trial has been made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Adnan Hussain and another vs The State2018 YLR 1412 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2017-09-27Read full judgment →
• Adnan Anwar & another vs Muhammad Sharaiz Hussain & another2019 [M] C.L.R. 275, 2019 PLD Lahore 68, 2018 LHC 1824 · Lahore High Court · 2018-09-04Read full judgment →
• Adil Hussain Abid, Advocate Jang vs Syed Moghees Asghar Shah, Advocate Fateh Jang and others2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Pb.B.C.) 52 · Punjab Bar Council · 2017-07-13Read full judgment →
• Adil Aziz Qazi, Chairman Union Council-II, Mughal, Islamabad vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary2018 MLD 1453 · Islamabad High Court · 2018-05-10Read full judgment →
• Adeel Shaban Hirani vs The State2018 YLR 1865 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-20
  post-arrest baildishonoured chequehabitual offenderfraudabscondencecriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application was filed by the accused, Adeel Shaban Hirani, seeking post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, following the dismissal of his application by the trial court. The accused was charged under Sections 489-F, 420, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for issuing dishonoured cheques in connection with an investment agreement. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the allegations of habitual fraud and the issuance of cheques from a closed account. The court observed that the accused did not deny issuing the cheques or the underlying agreement. Furthermore, the record indicated the accused had absconded for a significant period following the FIR and was allegedly involved in similar fraudulent activities against multiple parties, as evidenced by external documentation. The court held that the accused was not entitled to bail, concluding that the circumstances demonstrated a pattern of deceitful conduct. The principle laid down is that where an accused is shown to be a habitual offender in issuing dishonoured cheques and has evaded arrest, the discretion to grant bail should not be exercised in their favour.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when they have issued cheques from a closed account and have a history of similar fraudulent conduct?
  • Does the act of absconding after the registration of an FIR impact the court's discretion in granting bail?
  • Can the court consider evidence of an accused's habitual criminal conduct when deciding a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Adeel Masih @ Diwana vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 38 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  post-arrest bailnarcoticscharascriminal procedurebail bondsinvestigation completion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Adeel Masih alias Diwana, who was apprehended by a police party led by Shoukat Ali, S.I., while allegedly in possession of 1297 grams of Charas. The core legal question before the Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of post-arrest bail given the circumstances of the recovery and his period of incarceration. Upon review of the record, the Court noted that the investigation into the case had been completed, rendering the petitioner no longer required for investigative purposes. Furthermore, the Court considered the petitioner's prior record, noting he was a probationer in a single case involving illicit liquor consumption, and acknowledged his continuous detention since August 31, 2016. Consequently, the Court allowed the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 200,000 with one surety to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The judgment reinforces the principle that bail is generally appropriate once the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further custodial interrogation.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail once the investigation is complete and the accused is no longer required for further investigation?
  • Does a prior probationary record in a minor offense necessarily preclude the grant of bail in a narcotics case?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional, Cir, (Legal) Zone-II, Rto, Hyderabad vs Messrs Walls2018 PTD (Trib.) 803 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-12-22Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I vs M/s. Eden Builders Limited2018 P.C.T.L.R. 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  limitation periodretrospective effectvested rightsamended assessmenttax returnprocedural lawincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced via the Finance Act, 2009, which altered the commencement point for the limitation period of amending assessment orders, possesses retrospective effect. The core legal question was whether limitation laws are purely procedural and thus capable of retrospective application so as to extend the time available to the tax department, or if they create substantive and vested rights for taxpayers that cannot be disturbed once time has begun to run. The Court held that while limitation is often viewed as procedural, it also creates vested and substantive rights, and once a limitation period begins to run under a specific statutory provision, it cannot be interrupted or retrospectively altered to the detriment of accrued rights unless the legislature explicitly provides for it. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and petitions, ruling that taxpayers who filed their returns prior to the 2009 amendment are governed by the unamended Section 122(2).

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 brought about through the Finance Act, 2009 has retrospective effect?
  • Do laws of limitation create substantive and vested rights that prevent the alteration of limitation periods once time has begun to run?
  • Can the commencement date of a limitation period be shifted retrospectively to extend the time for amending an income tax assessment order?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I vs M/s. Edein Builders Limited2018 P.S.C. 831 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  limitation periodretrospective operationvested rightsamended assessmentincome taxprocedural lawtaxing statute
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addresses whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced via the Finance Act, 2009—which altered the commencement date for the limitation period to amend an assessment order—operates retrospectively or prospectively. The appellant tax department argued that limitation laws are purely procedural and therefore apply retrospectively, whereas the respondents contended that the unamended limitation period created vested rights that could not be disturbed once time had begun to run. The Court held that while limitation laws are often viewed as procedural, they create vested and substantive rights by regulating remedies, and once time begins to run under a specific statutory provision, it cannot be interrupted or retrospectively altered to the detriment of vested rights unless the legislature provides explicit provisions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals and petitions, ruling that tax returns filed before the 2009 amendment are governed by the unamended Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The key principle laid down is that limitation provisions in taxing statutes that affect the commencement or computation of time to the prejudice of acquired finality cannot be applied retrospectively so as to divest vested rights.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 brought about through the Finance Act, 2009 has retrospective effect?
  • Do limitation laws create vested and substantive rights, or are they purely procedural in nature?
  • Can the commencement date of a limitation period once it has begun to run be altered to affect accrued rights without express legislative provision?
  • Does an amendment changing the start of the limitation period apply to tax returns filed prior to the enactment of the Finance Act, 2009?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I and Others vs M/s Eden Builders Limited and Others2018 PCTLR 442, 2018 PLJ SC 532, 2018 PTD 1474, 2018 SCMR 991, 2018 SCP 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  retrospective operationlimitation periodamended assessment ordervested rightsincome tax ordinanceprocedural lawcommencement of limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This statutory tax appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether an amendment made to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO 2001) via the Finance Act, 2009 applied retrospectively to taxpayers who had filed returns prior to its enactment. The revenue department argued that limitation laws are procedural and therefore operate retrospectively, extending the limitation period for amending assessment orders. The taxpayers contended that time had already begun to run under the pre-amendment provision, creating a vested substantive right that could not be disrupted by shifting the commencement date of limitation without express statutory retrospective intent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and petitions, holding that limitation laws create vested rights and are not strictly procedural. Once limitation begins to run from a specified date, it cannot be interrupted or altered to the taxpayer's prejudice unless expressly provided by the legislature. The amendment, changing the commencement date rather than extending an unexpired terminal period, operates prospectively and does not apply to returns filed before its enactment.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment altering the commencement date of limitation in a tax statute operate retrospectively to affect returns filed prior to its enactment?
  • Can time that has already begun to run under a limitation provision be interrupted or extended without express statutory provision to the contrary?
  • Is the law of limitation purely procedural, or can it create vested substantive rights in favor of a party?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I and others vs Messrs Eden Builders Limited and others2018 SCMR 991 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  income tax assessmentlimitation periodretrospective operationvested rightstaxing statuteamendment of assessmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced by the Finance Act, 2009, which altered the commencement date for the limitation period regarding the amendment of assessment orders, applies retrospectively to tax returns filed before the amendment. The Supreme Court addressed whether limitation periods are purely procedural or if they create vested rights. The Court held that the amendment does not apply retrospectively to tax returns filed prior to its enactment. It reasoned that while limitation is often viewed as procedural, it can create substantive vested rights. Once the limitation period begins to run, it cannot be interrupted or extended without express legislative provision. Because the taxpayers had a vested right to finality of their assessment orders under the original law, the amendment, which shifted the commencement date of the limitation period, could not be applied to their cases. The Court emphasized that statutes should not be construed to have retrospective effect if they prejudicially affect vested rights or past transactions, particularly in taxing statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Does an amendment to a limitation period in a taxing statute apply retrospectively to tax returns filed before the amendment?
  • Can a change in the commencement date of a limitation period be applied to proceedings where the limitation period had already begun to run?
  • Does the law of limitation create vested rights for taxpayers regarding the finality of assessment orders?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Audit Range, Zone-I & others vs M/s. Eden Builders Limited & others2018 PLJ SC 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2018-04-04
  limitation periodretrospective effectvested rightstax assessmentprocedural lawincome tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, introduced via the Finance Act, 2009, operates retrospectively to alter the limitation period for amending tax assessments. The Supreme Court considered whether limitation laws are purely procedural and can disturb vested rights once time has begun to run. The Court held that while limitation is often procedural, it creates vested and substantive rights by establishing certainty in limitation periods, particularly in tax matters. Once time begins to run under a specific statutory provision, it cannot be retroactively altered or interrupted by changing the commencement date of limitation to the prejudice of vested rights unless the legislature expressly provides for it. The key principle laid down is that amendments affecting the commencement date of limitation and impairing vested rights in tax matters cannot be applied retrospectively.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the amendment to Section 122(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 brought about through the Finance Act, 2009 has retrospective effect?
  • Can a period of limitation once it begins to run be interrupted or extended without express legislative provision?
  • Does a law of limitation create vested rights that cannot be curtailed or extinguished retrospectively?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax vs Manola Metals2019 PCRLJ 529, 2018 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 78, 2018 PTD 1922 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  Sales Tax ActAdjudication powersHierarchy of officersStatutory interpretationTax assessmentRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that quashed an adjudication order issued by an Additional Collector of Central Excise and Sales Tax against the respondent-company. The core legal question was whether an Additional Collector possesses the competency to exercise adjudication powers typically assigned to subordinate officers under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The High Court had relied on Section 45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, finding the order without lawful authority, but failed to consider Section 31 of the same Act. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the High Court erred by interpreting the statutory provisions in isolation. The Court clarified that Section 31 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 explicitly empowers a Sales Tax officer to exercise all powers and discharge all duties conferred upon any officer subordinate to them. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision, emphasizing the necessity of a cumulative interpretation of the statutory framework, specifically Sections 31 and 45, to determine the scope of administrative authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 31 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 authorize a superior officer to exercise the powers and duties conferred upon their subordinates?
  • Is the adjudication power of a Sales Tax officer exclusive, or can it be exercised by a superior officer under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Must statutory provisions be interpreted cumulatively rather than in isolation?
  Read full judgment →
• Additional Chief Secretary (Development) and 2 others vs Messrs2018 MLD 1112 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-10-09
  consultancy agreementcontractual variationwritten contractrecovery suitlump sum paymentscope of servicesBalochistan High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a trial court judgment that decreed a suit for recovery of consultancy fees. The respondent, an architectural firm, sought additional payment for an eleven-month period beyond the original twenty-four-month contract duration, citing delays caused by the civil contractor. The core legal question was whether the consultant was entitled to additional remuneration for this extended period despite the absence of a written variation to the original agreement. The High Court held that the trial court’s judgment was perverse and based on a misappreciation of evidence. The Court found that the original contract explicitly mandated that any variation in the scope of services or cost estimates must be in writing, signed by authorized representatives. Since no such written agreement existed for the extension, the consultant was bound by the original lump-sum payment terms. The Court established the principle that where a contract stipulates a specific mechanism for variations, parties cannot claim additional compensation for extended services without strictly adhering to those written requirements, particularly when the extension resulted from third-party delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party claim additional remuneration for an extended service period when the original contract requires all variations to be in writing?
  • Is a consultant entitled to extra fees for delays caused by a third-party contractor when the consultancy agreement provides for a fixed lump-sum payment?
  • Does a trial court judgment that ignores explicit contractual terms regarding variations constitute a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Add Oil (Private) Limited and Another: In the matter of vs N/A2018 CLD 15 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-13Read full judgment →
• Adam Khan vs The State2018 MLD 1007 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-29
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirystrangulationcriminal conspiracycontradictory medical reporttentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by Adam Khan seeking release in crime number 95/2015 registered under sections 302, 34, and 338-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Ranipur. The core legal question concerns whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the applicant is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or if his case warrants further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry due to contradictions between the FIR and medical evidence regarding the cause of death and timing, lack of specific role assignment, the improbable nature of four men jointly strangulating one victim leaving only a single bruise, and the grant of bail to similarly-placed co-accused. The court laid down the principle that where prosecution allegations are prima facie doubtful and tentative assessment points towards further inquiry, the accused is entitled to post-arrest bail as a matter of right under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the prosecution story regarding joint assault by multiple accused requires further inquiry?
  • Does a contradiction between the time of death in the FIR and the post-mortem report create grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the rule of consistency applies when co-accused with similar roles have already been granted bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Adalat Khan vs Chief Conservator of Forest, Northern Zone, Rawalpindi and others2019 KLR Labour & Service Cases 204, 2018 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 100 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  adverse remarksannual confidential reportconflict of interestdepartmental appealservice tribunalbias
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Forest Guard, challenged adverse remarks recorded in his Performance Evaluation Report and the subsequent rejection of his departmental representations by the authorities. The core legal question was whether an officer who recorded adverse remarks as a countersigning authority could competently decide the departmental appeal against those very remarks. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that an officer cannot act as a judge in their own cause and lacks the competency to hear an appeal against an ACR they themselves countersigned, rendering the appellate order biased and without lawful authority. The Tribunal laid down the principles that public functionaries must act reasonably, judiciously, and within the parameters of their lawful authority, and that an authority who evaluates an official cannot sit in judgment over its own evaluation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an officer who recorded adverse remarks as a countersigning authority competently decide the departmental appeal against those remarks?
  • Whether an executive authority can act as a judge in its own cause?
  • What is the proper course of action when an appeal is filed against adverse remarks countersigned by the appellate authority itself?
  Read full judgment →
• Achpal @ Ramswa roop & Another vs State of Rajasthan2018 SCInd 91 · Supreme Court of India · 2018-09-24
  default bailindefeasible rightSection 167(2) CrPCinvestigation periodcharge-sheetcriminal procedurestatutory bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the denial of default bail to the appellants, who were arrested for offences under the Indian Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether an accused is entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 when a charge-sheet filed within the statutory 90-day period is returned by the Magistrate for technical non-compliance with a prior High Court order, leaving no charge-sheet on record upon the expiry of the statutory period. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were entitled to default bail. The Court ruled that the statutory period for investigation under Section 167(2) cannot be extended by the High Court, as the Code does not empower any court to grant such extensions. Furthermore, because the charge-sheet was returned, no valid report was on record when the 90-day period expired, thereby triggering the accused's indefeasible right to bail. The Court affirmed that the legislative mandate of Section 167(2) is absolute, and the absence of a valid charge-sheet on record upon the expiry of the prescribed period necessitates the grant of default bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the return of a charge-sheet by a Magistrate due to technical non-compliance with a court order constitute a failure to file a charge-sheet within the meaning of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973?
  • Can a High Court order extending the time for investigation override the statutory time limits prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973?
  • Does an indefeasible right to default bail accrue to an accused if no valid charge-sheet is on record upon the expiry of the statutory period prescribed under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Achar vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Home Department, Sindh2018 YLR 1479 · Sindh High Court · 2018-01-17Read full judgment →
• Abuzer Ghaffari Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. through Honourary2018 MLD 1806 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Abuzer Ghaffari Cooperative Housing Society Ltd vs Federation of Pakistan2018 MLD 1806, 2018 SHC 438 · Sindh High Court · 2018-02-15Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar vs First Women Bank Ltd. and others2019 CLD 549, 2020 P C T L R 1088, 2018 SHC 1023 · Sindh High Court · 2018-10-05
  Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001Leave to defendEquitable mortgageBanking CourtSubstantial question of factContinuing securityForgery allegations
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Banking Court decree passed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which held the appellant liable for a debt secured by a mortgaged property. The appellant sought leave to defend, alleging that his signatures on certain finance documents were forged and that the mortgage was intended for a different entity. The core legal question was whether these allegations constituted a substantial question of fact requiring the recording of evidence. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant had admitted to executing the Registered Mortgage Deed and General Power of Attorney, which established the mortgage as a continuing security for the respondent's debt. The court ruled that where the primary mortgage is admitted, bald allegations of forgery regarding subsequent documents do not raise a substantial question of fact sufficient to grant leave to defend. The judgment affirms that liability remains enforceable when the foundational security documents are undisputed, rendering the disputed secondary documents immaterial to the determination of the appellant's liability under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does a bald allegation of forgery in banking documents automatically entitle a defendant to leave to defend a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can an equitable mortgage act as a continuing security for subsequent finance facilities provided to a borrower?
  • Is a defendant entitled to leave to defend if the core liability is established by admitted documents, regardless of disputes over secondary documents?
  Read full judgment →
• Abu Bakar Siddique and another vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Quetta) 116 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-06-30
  circumstantial evidenceres gesteaextra-judicial confessionsudden provocationmurdersentence enhancementlast seen together
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected revision petition arose from a judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) and Section 338 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of his wife and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involved whether a conviction for murder can be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of res gestea, and whether the sentence warranted enhancement to capital punishment. The Balochistan High Court held that the appellant's immediate disclosures to police and witnesses formed part of the same transaction under the doctrine of res gestea, and that the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence—including the appellant's presence under the same roof, unexplained injuries on his own person, shifting defenses, and medical evidence—sufficiently established his guilt. However, noting extenuating circumstances regarding sudden provocation arising from a domestic altercation, the court held that capital punishment was not warranted. The appeal against conviction and the revision petition for enhancement of sentence were both dismissed, upholding the life imprisonment sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be legally sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone?
  • Under what circumstances is a statement made by an accused immediately after an occurrence admissible as res-gestea evidence?
  • Does the failure of an accused husband to explain the unnatural death of his wife under the same roof serve as strong corroborative evidence against him?
  • Whether sudden provocation arising from a domestic altercation constitutes a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty?
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• Absar Ahmed Siddiqui through legal heirs vs M/s. Union Bank Limited and 42020 YLR 871, 2018 SHC 933 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-06Read full judgment →
• Abrar Ali Khichi vs Chairman Sindh Public Service Commission through Secretary and 2 others2018 PLC (C.S.) 52 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-31
  public service commissionrecruitment processwritten competitive examinationtransparency in public appointmentseligibility criteriaconstitutional petitionservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the recruitment process initiated by the Sindh Public Service Commission for the post of Additional Prosecutor General (BPS-19). The petitioner, an experienced government prosecutor, contested his exclusion and the Commission's decision to bypass a written competitive examination in favor of direct interviews. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner met the eligibility criteria and whether the Commission could legally dispense with a written test. The Court held that the Commission is legally mandated to conduct a written competitive examination before proceeding to interviews. It reasoned that the definition of 'test' under the Sindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1990, and the principles of transparency, require that written examinations be prioritized. The Court clarified that while the Commission has discretion, it cannot exclude the primary requirement of a written test. Consequently, the Court directed the Commission to hold a written competitive examination for the advertised posts, ensuring transparency, and declared the petitioner eligible for consideration in the recruitment process.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Sindh Public Service Commission conduct recruitment for BPS-19 posts without a written competitive examination?
  • Does the definition of 'test' under the Sindh Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1990, allow the Commission to prioritize interviews over written examinations?
  • Is a written competitive examination a mandatory requirement for transparency in public sector recruitment?
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• Abid Wali Khoso and others vs National Accountability Bureau (NAB)2018 P Cr. L J 1607 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-15
  NAB referencepost-arrest bailpre-arrest bailembezzlementfurther inquiryquashment of proceedingsmisuse of authoritytrial delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions for the quashment of proceedings and the grant of pre-arrest and post-arrest bail arising from a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) reference alleging embezzlement of government funds through fictitious vouchers and bogus works in Town Committee Manjhand. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to bail given the evidentiary material and the pace of the trial. The Court held that while the request for quashment of the reference was unsustainable, the petitioners were entitled to bail. The ratio establishes that where a case rests on documentary evidence already in the possession of the prosecution, and there is no risk of tampering, the continued incarceration of the accused is unjustified. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that inordinate, unexplained delays in trial proceedings and the failure to examine key stakeholders necessitate the grant of bail under the principle of 'further inquiry.' The Court underscored that bail is not a punishment, and the prosecution must establish reasonable grounds for detention, which were lacking in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of documentary evidence by the prosecution, with no risk of tampering, justify the grant of bail in NAB cases?
  • Can bail be granted on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in the conclusion of a trial?
  • Is the failure to examine all interlinked stakeholders in a corruption case a valid ground for the court to determine that the case requires 'further inquiry'?
  • Does the mere allegation of embezzlement of a large sum of money constitute a sufficient ground to refuse bail when the trial is not likely to conclude in the near future?
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• Abid Nawaz, etc vs State, etcPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 287 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-13
  post-arrest bailfirearm injuriesprohibitory clauseanti-terrorismtentative assessmentcriminal conspiracybail dismissal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two consolidated post-arrest bail petitions arising from FIR No. 250 dated 02.9.2017 registered under Sections 324, 436, 148, 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 at Police Station Seetpur, District Muzaffargarh. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail given the specific allegations of firearm injuries, recovery of weapons, and corroborating medical and circumstantial evidence. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners were nominated in a promptly lodged FIR with specific roles, supported by medical evidence, witness statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and recoveries of crime empties and weapons. The court laid down the principle that accused persons are not entitled to discretionary post-arrest bail when prima facie evidence connects them to an offense falling within the prohibitory clause and deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Are accused persons entitled to post-arrest bail when nominated in a promptly lodged FIR with specific roles of causing firearm injuries supported by medical evidence?
  • Does the recovery of crime weapons and a burnt tractor-trolley from the place of occurrence bar the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • When can a court decline to hold that a case falls within the ambit of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether deeper appreciation of evidence is permissible at the stage of deciding a post-arrest bail petition?
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• Abid Husssa in Shah etc vs Aurangzeb etc2018 LHC 380 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-10
  gift mutationcivil revisionburden of proofdelivery of possessionconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictiondeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which dismissed the petitioners' suit for declaration regarding the validity of a gift mutation. The core legal question was whether the disputed gift mutation, executed by the deceased predecessor of the parties, was validly established under the law. The High Court held that the gift was invalid, noting that the beneficiaries failed to prove the three essential ingredients of a gift: offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession. The court emphasized that the attestation of a mutation is merely a subsequent administrative step and does not substitute for the proof of the underlying transaction. Furthermore, the court identified material contradictions in the testimony of the defendants' witnesses regarding the mutation process and noted the absence of evidence supporting the alleged family settlement. Consequently, the court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that they suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence, and decreed the suit in favor of the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the attestation of a gift mutation by a revenue officer constitute sufficient proof of a valid gift?
  • What are the three essential ingredients required to establish a valid gift under law?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the validity of a gift when it is challenged?
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• Abid Hussain vs StatePLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 481 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-04
  anti-terrorisminsertion of chargecriminal revisionterrorism definitionlaw enforcement agenciesjurisdictionpolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this criminal revision petition, the petitioner assailed the legality of an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing an application for the insertion of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in a case registered under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the acts alleged—specifically the targeted killing of a police constable and attacking an official vehicle by armed individuals to take revenge for a previous police encounter and create terror—fall within the definition of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Lahore High Court held that the acts squarely fall within the ambit of terrorism under Sections 6(1) and 6(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and that the trial court erred in failing to recognize this. The Court set aside the impugned order, allowed the petition, and directed the trial court to transmit the case file to the concerned Anti-Terrorism Court, establishing the principle that attacks on law enforcement officials intended to create panic and prevent them from discharging their duties constitute terrorism triable exclusively by an Anti-Terrorism Court.

  Questions settled

  • Do acts of armed resistance and murder directed against law enforcement officials fall within the definition of terrorism under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a trial court refuse to transmit a case to the Anti-Terrorism Court when the facts disclose an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 merely because the challan was initially submitted in an ordinary court?
  • Is the omission of Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 by the investigating officer a curable defect?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain Shah, etc. vs Aurangzeb, etc.2018 [M] C.L.R. 1302 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-15Read full judgment →
• Abid Ali vs Ibrar Muhammad and 2 others2018 PLD Peshawar 147 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-04-17Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rehman vs The State and another2018 YLR 1629 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-11
  confessional statementpolice custodyco-accused confessionbenefit of doubtFSL reportretracted confessionunwitnessed occurrencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two criminal appeals filed by convicts Abdur Rehman and Raqibullah against their convictions under Sections 302(b) and 382 PPC, alongside a criminal revision for sentence enhancement filed by the victim's widow. The core legal questions pertain to the voluntariness and evidentiary value of an uncorroborated, delayed confessional statement recorded after prolonged police custody, and whether an exculpatory co-accused confession can form the basis of a conviction under Article 43 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. The High Court observed that the confession was involuntary as the Judicial Magistrate granted only 5 to 10 minutes thinking time instead of the prescribed 30 minutes under the High Court Rules, and police custody was unexplained. Furthermore, the co-accused's statement shifted the main blame to the co-appellant without self-incrimination, rendering it inadmissible as substantive evidence. The forensic evidence was also compromised due to unexplained delays in sending crime empties. Consequently, the High Court accepted both appeals, set aside the convictions, and dismissed the revision petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does a short thinking period of 5 to 10 minutes granted by a Judicial Magistrate render a judicial confession involuntary?
  • Can a confession of a co-accused that shifts the main blame onto another accused be used as substantive evidence for conviction under Article 43 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an FSL report when there is an unexplained delay in sending physical evidence to the laboratory?
  • Does prolonged and unexplained police custody prior to recording a confession diminish its voluntariness and evidentiary value?
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• Abdur Rehman Kalyar vs District Coordination Officer, Chiniot and 32018 PLJ Lahore 121 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-04Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahim alias Rahima and others vs State2004 PLJ SC 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2003-03-04
  MurderOcular testimonyCorroborationDying declarationCourt witnessAcquittalBenefit of doubtCommon intentionDeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a criminal appeal and revision petitions arising from a murder conviction under Section 302/34 PPC. The core legal questions revolved around the reliability of ocular testimony from related/friendly witnesses, the need for corroboration, the evidentiary value of an oral dying declaration, and the impact of a co-accused's acquittal on the principal accused. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and death sentence of Abdur Rahim alias Rahima for the murder of Zafar Iqbal, dismissing his petition for leave to appeal. The Court also dismissed the complainant's petition seeking conviction of co-accused Shiraz Hussain and enhancement of compensation. The Court held that ocular testimony, even from related or friendly witnesses, can be accepted without corroboration if no personal enmity with the accused is established. An oral dying declaration, though generally considered weak, can be relied upon if corroborated by independent circumstances, especially when brought on record by a court witness summoned at the instance of the accused. Mere lalkara by an unarmed co-accused, if not commanding, may warrant the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular testimony from related or friendly witnesses be accepted without corroboration if no enmity with the accused is proven?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an oral dying declaration, and when can it be relied upon?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused, based on benefit of doubt for lack of overt act, automatically entitle the principal accused to acquittal?
  • What is the legal implication of a 'lalkara' by an unarmed co-accused in a murder case?
  • Can the statement of a court witness, summoned at the instance of the accused, corroborate prosecution evidence?
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• Abdur Rahim A. Jafry vs Karachi Port Trust through Chairman and 22018 YLR 768 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-14Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rab alias Ali Akber and others vs The State and others2018 P Cr. L J 1313 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-31
  anti-terrorism jurisdictionterrorismpersonal enmitybhattaextortionpublic panictarget killingcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenged an order by the Anti-Terrorism Court declining an application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, regarding the transfer of a murder case to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether the alleged murder, stemming from a blood feud and extortion dispute, constituted "terrorism" under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, or if it was merely a personal vendetta. The court held that the case fell within the Anti-Terrorism Court's jurisdiction. It affirmed that the existence of personal enmity does not automatically exclude an offence from the scope of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The ratio established that courts must assess the "motivation, object, design, or purpose" behind the act, alongside the manner of commission—specifically, whether the accused chased the victims across cities and executed the crime in a public place to create fear, insecurity, or panic. The court concluded that the gruesome, planned nature of the execution, intended to send a message, brought the offence within the mischief of the Act, regardless of the underlying personal dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of personal enmity or a blood feud automatically exclude an offence from the scope of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • What criteria should a court use to determine if an offence falls within the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Is the 'design' and 'manner' of committing a crime relevant in determining whether an act constitutes terrorism?
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• Abdullah vs Board of Revenue, Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and 15 others2018 YLR 1276 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2018-01-18Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Mushtaq vs Province of Sindh and Ors2018 SHC 614 · Sindh High Court · 2018-04-13Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Khan vs Province of Sindh and others2018 SHC 572 · Sindh High Court · 2018-03-20Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Baloch, J vs Raheem Khan and 12 others2018 YLR 1611 · Balochistan High Court · 2018-03-27Read full judgment →
• Abdullah and 6 others vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Elementary & Secondary Education Department through Secretary Educations, Peshawar and 5 others2018 PLJ Peshawar 43 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Abdullah and 3 others vs The State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 228, 2018 P Cr. L J 763 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-24
  pre-arrest bailcross-versionbenefit of doubttentative assessmentfalse implicationproperty disputeFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for pre-arrest bail arose from an FIR involving multiple offences, including murder and hurt, following a property dispute. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the circumstances of the case, including a three-day delay in FIR registration, the assignment of roles, and the existence of a cross-version. The Court held that the petitioners were entitled to confirmation of their pre-arrest bail. The ratio of the decision rests on the tentative assessment that the FIR appeared to be the result of deliberation and consultation due to the unexplained delay. Furthermore, the Court noted that the specific roles attributed to the petitioners involved bailable offences or lacked specificity, and that the suppression of injuries sustained by the petitioners' side created a case of two versions. The key principle laid down is that where there is a cross-version of events and the possibility of false implication due to a property dispute, the benefit of doubt at the bail stage should be extended to the accused, particularly when they have joined the investigation and are previous non-convicts.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be granted when there is an unexplained delay in the registration of the FIR?
  • Does the existence of a cross-version regarding who was the aggressor entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt at the bail stage?
  • Is pre-arrest bail appropriate when the investigation is complete and the accused has already joined the investigation?
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• Abdullah and 3 others vs State and anotherPLJ 2018 Cr.C. (Lahore) 228 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-24
  pre-arrest bailcross-versiondelay in FIRbailable offencesvicarious liabilitybenefit of doubtproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this petition under Section 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in respect of offences under Sections 302, 324, 337A(i), 337A(ii), 337F(i), 337L(2), 447/511, 337H(2), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved was whether the petitioners were entitled to pre-arrest bail given the delay in the FIR, assignment of bailable offences or general roles, suppression of injuries on the accused side, and the existence of a cross-version arising from a property dispute. The Lahore High Court held that the case had become one of two conflicting versions, creating reasonable grounds for further inquiry into the petitioners' complicity and potential false implication by spreading the net wide. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down that the benefit of doubt arising from an unexplained delay, a cross-version of injuries sustained by the accused party, and tentative assessment of roles may justify the confirmation of pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted when an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR reflects due deliberation and consultation?
  • Does the emergence of a cross-version regarding injuries sustained by the accused party make a criminal case one of further inquiry at the bail stage?
  • Whether pre-arrest bail is warranted when the roles attributed to the petitioners attract bailable offences or general allegations of aerial firing without causing fatal injuries?
  • Can the possibility of false implication by spreading the net wide be considered for confirming pre-arrest bail in cases involving a previous civil property dispute?
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• Abdul Wahid vs State etc.PLJ 2018 Cr.C. 628 · Lahore High Court · 2018-03-13
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyco-accusedbail paritycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from FIR No. 305/2017, registered at Police Station Sahoka, District Vehari, under Sections 498-A, 376, 380, 381-A, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was accused of administering intoxicants, abduction, and theft of property including a motorcycle, gold ornaments, and cash. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the principle of consistency, given that a co-accused facing identical allegations and roles had already been granted bail by the court. The Court observed that the prosecution failed to distinguish the petitioner's case from that of the co-accused who had been granted bail. Consequently, the Court held that the principle of consistency applied, entitling the petitioner to the same relief. The petition was allowed, and the petitioner was admitted to post-arrest bail subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, establishing that where roles are identical, a co-accused is entitled to the same treatment as one already granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petitioner entitled to bail on the principle of consistency if a co-accused with the same allegations has already been granted bail?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to distinguish the role of a petitioner from a co-accused justify the grant of bail?
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• Abdul Waheed Khan vs Chairman, National Accountability Bureau2018 PLD Peshawar 59 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-22Read full judgment →
• Abdul Wadood vs Additional Secretary FATA etc2019 PLC (C.S.) 488, 2018 PHC 1302, 2018 PLJ Peshawar 162 · Peshawar High Court · 2018-01-11
  repatriationcivil servantsterms and conditions of serviceconstitutional jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionservice tribunaltransfer and posting
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a set of consolidated constitutional petitions filed by government servants challenging their repatriation orders from FATA to the Health Department of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The core legal question was whether the High Court has constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 to entertain petitions concerning the terms and conditions of civil servants, specifically regarding transfer and repatriation, in light of the ouster of jurisdiction under Article 212. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the petitions as non-maintainable, holding that matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants, including transfers and repatriations, fall exclusively within the domain of the Service Tribunal. The court established that even if an impugned order is alleged to be mala fide, coram non judice, or in violation of rules, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is explicitly barred by Article 212 of the Constitution, and aggrieved civil servants must seek their remedy before the appropriate Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain constitutional petitions filed by civil servants regarding their transfer or repatriation?
  • Whether the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution applies when an official order is alleged to be mala fide or coram non judice?
  • Do matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants exclusively fall within the domain of the Service Tribunal?
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• Abdul Tauheed Khan vs The Federation of Pakistan & another2018 SHC 925 · Sindh High Court · 2018-09-10Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor vs The State2018 SHC 732 · Sindh High Court · 2018-05-17
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryrapejactitation of marriagemarital disputecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Abdul Shakoor, who is accused of rape under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the conflicting claims regarding the marital status of the alleged victim, Sania, and the existence of pending civil litigation concerning the validity of their alleged marriage. The Court observed that the victim had filed a suit for jactitation of marriage, and the applicant presented documentation supporting a prior marriage, creating a dispute over the marital relationship that required judicial determination by a Family Court. The Court held that because the allegation of rape was inextricably linked to the unresolved question of the parties' marital status, the case fell within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the applicant was admitted to post-arrest bail. The key principle laid down is that where a criminal allegation hinges on a disputed marital status currently under adjudication in civil proceedings, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pending suit for jactitation of marriage regarding the alleged victim constitute grounds for further inquiry in a rape case?
  • Can a case be brought within the purview of Section 497(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the criminal allegation depends on the adjudication of a civil claim?
  • Is the existence of conflicting documentation regarding a marital relationship sufficient to grant post-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of rape?
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• Abdul Shakoor vs Member (Judicial-v), Board of Revenue etc2018 LHC 1128 · Lahore High Court · 2018-01-10Read full judgment →
• Abdul Shakoor Sheikh vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Aviation, Civil Aviation, Islamabad and 6 others2019 PLC (C.S.) 25, 2019 PLJ Lahore 99, 2018 PLJ Lahore 948 · Lahore High Court
  regularization of servicescontract employeesproject employeeswork-charge employeescivil aviation authoritynon-statutory rulesconstitutional petitionmaintainability
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of a batch of constitutional petitions filed by contract and work-charge employees of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) seeking regularization of their services. The core legal questions involved whether project-based contract and work-charge employees of a statutory body with non-statutory service regulations are entitled to regularization, and whether constitutional petitions are maintainable for enforcing non-statutory service terms. The Lahore High Court held that the service regulations of the CAA are non-statutory and cannot be enforced through constitutional petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court further ruled that project employees and work-charge personnel recruited for specific developmental projects have no legal right to claim regularization or employment beyond the completion of their respective projects. The key principles laid down are that employees governed by non-statutory service rules cannot invoke writ jurisdiction for service grievances, and project-based contractual or work-charge appointments expire automatically upon project completion without conferring any right to regularization.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees governed by non-statutory service rules of a statutory corporation can invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for the enforcement of terms and conditions of service?
  • Do project-based contract employees have a legal right to claim regularization of their services upon the completion of the project?
  • Whether work-charge employees acquire the status of regular employees merely on the basis of length of service?
  • Can a High Court renegotiate, alter, or amend the terms and conditions of regularization offered to contractual employees?
  Read full judgment →