Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs Saro Textiles Registered through Partner vs Regent Textile2017 CLC 429 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saindak Metals. Ltd. through Managing Director vs Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue and 3 others2017 PTD 2227 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-06-15
  income taxrectification of orderincome from businessincome from other sourcestax assessmentbrought forward losseslease agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This income tax reference concerns the classification of income derived by the petitioner, Saindak Metals Ltd., from a lease agreement with a third party. The petitioner classified its earnings as 'Income from Business' to claim brought-forward losses, whereas the Income Tax Commissioner, via a rectification notice under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, reclassified it as 'Income from Other Sources,' thereby denying the loss set-off. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner could rectify the assessment order under Section 221, or if the action required an amendment of assessment under Section 122, which is subject to a limitation period. The Court held that the petitioner’s income, derived solely from leasing assets without active participation in business operations, did not constitute 'Business Income.' The Court further held that the Commissioner’s action was a valid rectification of an error apparent on the face of the record under Section 221, rather than an amendment of assessment under Section 122. The key principle laid down is that rectification under Section 221 is permissible to correct errors in an order where the classification of income was fundamentally misstated, and such rectification is not constrained by the time limits applicable to assessment amendments.

  Questions settled

  • Does income derived from leasing out a business facility without active participation in business operations qualify as 'Income from Business'?
  • Is the rectification of a tax order under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 subject to the same time limitations as an amendment of assessment under Section 122?
  • What is the distinction between the power to amend an assessment under Section 122 and the power to rectify an order under Section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Messrs Resilience Expert (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner-Inland Revenue, Range-B, WHT, Rto, Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 1080 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-07-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Raas System Enterprises through Authorized Representative vs Government of Sindh, Secretary Local Government Karachi and 7 others2017 MLD 1485 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-14Read full judgment →
• Messrs Raab Packages (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner Inland2017 PTD (Trib.) 725 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-04-12
  blacklisting ordersales taxinput tax adjustmentsuspension of registrationtax fraudappellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This sales tax appeal was filed by the taxpayer against a blacklisting order passed by the Commissioner Inland Revenue under section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, relating to transactions with suppliers whose registrations were subsequently suspended or blacklisted. The core legal question was whether a registered person can be penalized and subjected to an indefinite blacklisting order based on the subsequent suspension or blacklisting of suppliers for past transactions where tax had been paid. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that a blacklisting order is a stop-gap arrangement and cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely without proper culminating proceedings under section 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Tribunal laid down the principle that a blacklisting order adversely affecting a taxpayer's business cannot persist indefinitely, and where subsequent statutory proceedings are not properly initiated or concluded, the blacklisting order stands annulled.

  Questions settled

  • Can a blacklisting order passed against a taxpayer be allowed to continue for an indefinite period without concluding proceedings under section 11 of the Sales Tax Act 1990?
  • Whether subsequent blacklisting of a supplier can be used to deprive a registered person of input tax credit on transactions conducted prior to such suspension?
  • What is the effect of failing to culminate subsequent proceedings under section 11 of the Sales Tax Act 1990 following a blacklisting order?
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• Messrs Premier Coating Resin (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector of Custom2017 PTD 1018 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-18
  Customs Reference ApplicationQuestion of LawFact-finding authorityExport-oriented unitLicense cancellationCustoms Act 1969Advisory jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Special Customs Reference Application was filed against an order of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the cancellation of the applicant's private warehouse license and the subsequent recovery of customs duties and taxes due to the applicant's failure to export goods as required. The core legal question was whether the applicant's grievances regarding the factual findings of the Tribunal—specifically concerning the existence of machinery and compliance with licensing conditions—constituted questions of law reviewable by the High Court under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that the findings of the lower forums were purely factual, based on evidence on record, and did not involve any misreading of law or legal error. The Court affirmed that its jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, is advisory and strictly limited to deciding questions of law; it cannot re-evaluate findings of fact determined by the Tribunal, which serves as the final fact-finding authority.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 196 of the Customs Act, 1969, to re-evaluate factual findings made by the Customs Appellate Tribunal?
  • Are disputes regarding the existence of machinery and compliance with licensing conditions considered questions of law or questions of fact?
  • Can a reference application be maintained in the High Court if it fails to identify a specific legal error or misreading of law in the Tribunal's order?
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• Messrs Power Construction Corporation of China Ltd. through Authorised Representative vs Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman WAPDA and 2 others2017 P.S.C. 187, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 83 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-25
  pre-qualificationpublic procurementWorld Bank Guidelinesjudicial reviewjudicial restraintpublic policyinternational fundingconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal arose from the disqualification of the Petitioner, a Chinese construction company, from the pre-qualification process for the Dasu Hydropower Project. The project was funded by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, under a Finance Agreement stipulating that procurement follow World Bank Guidelines. Although WAPDA initially included the Petitioner in the pre-qualified list, the IDA requested its deletion under Clause 2(a) of Appendix-I of the Guidelines, citing lack of standalone expertise. The Petitioner challenged WAPDA's decision to comply with the IDA's request, alleging violations of Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that under Rule 5 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, international commitments and financial institution agreements prevail over local rules in case of conflict. The Court further ruled that WAPDA's decision to follow IDA's request was a pragmatic commercial and policy decision aimed at securing project funding. Consequently, such matters fall within the domain of public policy, warranting judicial restraint and rendering the constitutional petition non-maintainable.

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• Messrs Pioneer Cables Limited, Karachi vs Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PTD 2485 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2017-10-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Peshawar Electric Supply Co., Peshawar vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Peshawar2017 PTD (Trib.) 1091 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-06-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation Limited vs Commissioner2017 PTD 1372 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-24
  withholding taxincome tax deductionfiscal interpretationbusiness expendituretax liabilitystatutory interpretationprincipal and agent
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV), challenged the disallowance of service fees paid to WAPDA/DISCOs for collecting television license fees. The tax authorities argued that PTV failed to deduct withholding tax under Sections 153 and 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, thereby violating Section 21(c) of the Ordinance. The core legal question was whether PTV was obligated to deduct tax despite not making an actual payment to WAPDA, as the latter retained its fee from the collected funds. The Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement to "deduct" tax under Section 153(1)(b) necessitates an actual payment, which did not occur here. Furthermore, no principal-agent relationship existed to trigger Section 233. The Court established that "deduct" and "collect" are distinct fiscal concepts and that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly in favor of the taxpayer. Additionally, the Court ruled that the amendment to Section 21(c) allows for the deduction of expenditure if the recipient has discharged its tax liability, thereby preventing double taxation. Consequently, PTV was entitled to claim the service fee as an allowable business expenditure.

  Questions settled

  • Does the requirement to 'deduct' tax under Section 153(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 apply where no actual payment is made by the withholding agent?
  • Is a service fee retained by a collection entity from collected funds considered a payment subject to withholding tax obligations under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Does the phrase 'paid or' in Section 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 allow a taxpayer to claim an expenditure deduction if the recipient has discharged their tax liability on that income?
  • Does a contract for the provision of services for a fee inherently create a principal-agent relationship for the purposes of Section 233 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
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• Messrs Pakistan Petroleum Limited vs Arif Aziz and 2 others2017 PLC 122 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-26
  constitutional petitionworkman reinstatementback benefitsmisconductburden of proofhandwriting expertsecondary evidenceconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition arises from a labour dispute where the petitioner-company challenged the judgment of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal upholding the reinstatement of respondent-worker with full back benefits. The core legal question involved whether the concurrent factual findings of the labour tribunals regarding the alleged misconduct of theft and forgery could be sustained in the absence of original incriminating documents. The court held that the petitioner failed to discharge the heavy burden of proof required to establish charges of a criminal nature in a disciplinary inquiry, particularly where original cheques were never produced and expert opinion was based solely on inadmissible photocopies. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary dismissals based on allegations of fraud and forgery must be substantiated by primary and legally admissible evidence, and a constitutional court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by labour courts unless a patent illegality or misreading of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employer can establish a charge of forgery and theft in a disciplinary inquiry without producing the original disputed documents?
  • Can a handwriting expert's opinion based solely on photocopies of cheques constitute sufficient proof of misconduct?
  • Does a constitutional court possess the jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings of fact rendered by labour courts in the absence of any material irregularity?
  • Whether the failure to produce primary evidence shifts the burden of proof regarding lost documents onto the employer in service tribunals?
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• Messrs Pakistan Motor Car Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs Commissioner of Income Tax2017 PTD 1266 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-07
  income taxWAPDA bondsexemption from taxinterest on securitiesreference applicationSecond ScheduleGovernment securities
  Summary & questions settled

  This reference application arises from a combined order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal concerning assessment years 1996-1997 to 1999-2000, addressing whether the Tax Department was justified in refusing tax exemption on returns from bonds granted exemption via SROs despite the absence of a specific exemption clause in the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Relying on a precedent of a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court in Habib Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Court noted that interest on Government securities or WAPDA bonds issued with tax exemption conditions qualifies for exemption under section 17(2)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, irrespective of their omission from the Second Schedule. The Court held that the ratio of the precedent applies equally to the third issue of WAPDA bonds. Consequently, the reference application was allowed, and the proposed question was answered in the negative in favor of the applicant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether interest on Government securities and WAPDA bonds issued with an exemption condition is exempt from tax under section 17(2)(a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, regardless of whether such exemption is incorporated in the Second Schedule?
  • Does the principal statute prevail over the Second Schedule in the event of a conflict under the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
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• Messrs Pak Gen Power Ltd. through Senior Manager Finance vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and 4 others2017 PTD 495 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Oil and Gas Development Company Limited vs Messrs Excel2017 CLD 1274 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-30
  irrevocable letter of creditautonomy principleinterim injunctionarbitration proceedingsfraudulent conductcivil revisionbanking law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged an order dismissing an application under Section 41(b) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which sought an interim injunction to restrain the encashment of an irrevocable Letter of Credit. The petitioner alleged that the respondent committed fraud and breached the underlying supply contract. The core legal question was whether a court should restrain the encashment of an irrevocable Letter of Credit based on allegations of contractual breach and fraud during pending arbitration. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the autonomy of an irrevocable Letter of Credit is a fundamental principle of international commerce, separating the bank's payment obligation from the underlying contract. The court affirmed that judicial interference is restricted to exceptional cases involving egregious fraud that vitiates the entire transaction. Furthermore, the court emphasized that bald allegations of fraud, lacking specific particulars as required by Order VI, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are insufficient to justify injunctive relief. Consequently, the bank's obligation to pay remains independent of disputes between the buyer and seller.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain the encashment of an irrevocable letter of credit based on a mere allegation of fraud?
  • Does the autonomy principle of an irrevocable letter of credit insulate the issuing bank from disputes arising from the underlying contract?
  • What is the standard of pleading required when alleging fraud to obtain an interim injunction?
  • Is an issuing bank responsible for the quality of goods or contractual breaches in an underlying transaction when dealing with an irrevocable letter of credit?
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• Messrs Nuzzer Pharmacutical and Nutritions vs Deputy Collector of Customs and another2017 PTD (Trib.) 221 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-06-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nib Bank Limited through Authorized Officer_General Attorney vs Mian Wisal Bacha and 2 others2017 P Cr. L J 316 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-07-18
  custody of vehiclelease defaultpolice seizurefinancial institutionmisuse of criminal machinerycivil disputerecovery of finance
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition, filed under Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenged an order regarding the custody of a vehicle seized by police following a default in a lease agreement between a financial institution and a customer. The core legal question was whether police possess the authority to seize property under Sections 523 and 550, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to resolve civil disputes arising from financial lease defaults. The Court held that the police acted illegally and without jurisdiction by seizing the vehicle, as these provisions are strictly limited to property suspected to be stolen or involved in the commission of an offence, not for enforcing civil contracts or recovering finance facilities. The Court emphasized that financial institutions must pursue recovery through the specialized Banking Court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, rather than misusing criminal machinery to pressure debtors. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower court's order, declared the police seizure unlawful, and directed the return of the vehicle to the respondent, while affirming the petitioner's right to pursue appropriate legal remedies in a competent forum.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police seize a vehicle under Sections 523 and 550 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to resolve a civil dispute regarding a lease default?
  • Is a financial institution entitled to use criminal proceedings to recover a leased vehicle from a defaulting customer?
  • Does the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 provide the exclusive forum for financial institutions to recover finance facilities?
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• Messrs National Transmission and Despatch Company Ltd vs Pub2017 SCMR 1506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-12-19
  Octroi taxfiscal exemptionstatutory interpretationlocal government lawWAPDAcontractor liabilitypolicy decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated High Court judgment regarding the recovery of outstanding Octroi tax dues by a contractor against the National Transmission and Despatch Company (NTDC). The core legal questions were whether NTDC was exempt from Octroi tax based on an Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee policy decision, and whether an Octroi contractor could be sued for the recovery of such taxes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the lower courts' findings. The Court held that policy decisions by the Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee are merely recommendatory and cannot override statutory law. Furthermore, the Court established that fiscal exemptions must be strictly construed and require formal government notification under the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979. Additionally, the Court clarified that under the Sindh Municipal Committee (Octroi) Rules, 1964, Octroi contractors possess specific statutory authority to collect and refund taxes, rendering them proper parties for litigation, thereby excluding the application of general agency principles under the Contract Act, 1872. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any valid exemption or legal error in the lower courts' judgments.

  Questions settled

  • Can a policy decision of the Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee override statutory law regarding tax exemptions?
  • Are Octroi contractors personally liable for the refund of taxes collected erroneously under the Sindh Municipal Committee (Octroi) Rules 1964?
  • Does the general law of agency under the Contract Act 1872 apply to the relationship between a Municipal Council and an Octroi contractor?
  • Is WAPDA exempt from paying Octroi tax on its equipment and materials based on Inter-Provincial Coordination Committee policy decisions?
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• Messrs National Highway Authority through Duly Authorised Director2017 PLD Lahore 390 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-24
  writ jurisdictionmining rightsownership of mineralsmaintainabilityalternate remedylocus standiland acquisition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged a tender notice for public auction and a subsequent lease order issued by the Mines and Minerals Department, Government of Punjab, regarding land allegedly acquired by the National Highway Authority (NHA) for the Islamabad-Peshawar Motorway (M-1). The core legal questions concerned whether the NHA could challenge the provincial government's authority to lease mineral rights on acquired land, whether factual disputes regarding land ownership are triable in writ jurisdiction, and the availability of alternate statutory remedies. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable due to the existence of disputed factual questions regarding land ownership and the failure of the petitioner to exhaust the statutory appellate remedy provided under the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Section 49 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, all minerals beneath the surface of land, regardless of surface ownership, vest in the provincial government. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the NHA lacked locus standi to challenge the government's mining concessions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained when there is a disputed question of fact regarding land ownership?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition where an alternate statutory remedy is available but not exhausted?
  • Do minerals beneath the surface of land vest in the provincial government even if the surface land has been acquired by a public authority?
  • Does the National Highway Authority have the locus standi to challenge a mining lease granted by the provincial government on land acquired for a motorway project?
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• Messrs Naeem Zafar Industries and others vs Bank of Punjab2017 CLD 397 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-13
  financial estoppelleave to defendbanking suitstatement of accountsapprobation and reprobationblank documentsrecovery of finances
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two consolidated regular first appeals arising from a Banking Court judgment regarding the recovery of finance facilities. The core legal questions were whether the defendants were entitled to leave to defend the suit, whether they could challenge the bank's statement of accounts despite having received them regularly without objection, and whether the signing of blank documents invalidated the underlying finance agreements. The Court held that the defendants were financially estopped from challenging the statement of accounts, as they had failed to raise objections at the appropriate time, and that the execution of documents could not be denied merely by alleging they were blank. Furthermore, the Court found that the Banking Court erred in reducing the bank's claim without providing cogent reasons. The key principles laid down are that a customer who receives and retains bank statements without objection is estopped from later challenging their accuracy, and that the doctrine of approbation and reprobation prevents parties from challenging the validity of documents they have acted upon. Consequently, the defendants' appeal was dismissed, and the bank's appeal was allowed, modifying the decree to the full claimed amount.

  Questions settled

  • Can a customer challenge the accuracy of bank statements in a recovery suit if they received them regularly without raising prior objections?
  • Does the signing of blank documents by a borrower invalidate the underlying finance agreement if the signatures are not denied?
  • Is a party precluded from challenging the validity of proceedings or documents they have previously acted upon under the doctrine of approbation and reprobation?
  • Can a Banking Court reduce a bank's claimed recovery amount without providing cogent reasons in its judgment?
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• Messrs N.H. Packages, Mansoorabad, Faisalabad vs Cir (Appeals), Faisalabad and others2017 PTD (Trib.) 211 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-09-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muslim Traders vs Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PTD 1205 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Multan Electric Power Co. Limited (MEPCO) through Chief(2017) 116 TAX 130 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Messrs Mia Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Pakistan PWD and others2017 PLD Islamabad 29, 2017 PLJ Islamabad 65 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-09-30
  writ petitionpublic procurementPPRA Rulesselective biddingre-tenderingprequalificationopen competitive biddingpublic advertisement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 was filed to challenge the decision of the Pakistan Public Works Department (Pak PWD) to award a re-procurement contract for HVAC equipment through selective bidding among previously prequalified bidders without issuing a fresh public tender advertisement. The core legal questions before the court were whether a procuring agency can bypass fresh public advertisement after terminating a contract, whether the petition was barred due to alleged disputed facts, and whether pending arbitration proceedings precluded constitutional jurisdiction. The Islamabad High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable because the petitioner sought to enforce statutory procurement norms rather than contractual rights, and the respondents failed to establish any genuine factual controversy requiring evidence. On the merits, the court held that open competitive bidding through public advertisement under the PPRA Rules, 2004 is mandatory, and the absence of an express prohibition in the rules against selective bidding does not validate non-transparent re-tendering without public notice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a procuring agency can award a re-procurement contract through selective bidding among previously prequalified bidders without issuing a fresh public advertisement under the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Rules, 2004?
  • Does a general assertion of disputed facts by a respondent automatically bar the High Court from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a party challenge an illegal public procurement re-tendering process via a constitutional petition while contractual termination disputes are pending under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940?
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• Messrs Meezan Bank Limited through Attorney vs A. H. International2017 CLD 29 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mashallah Paper Board Mills, Faisalabad vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 880 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-02-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mandokhail Brothers Commercial Trading and Government2017 CLC 221 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-11-07
  public procurementlowest biddervested righttender cancellationre-tenderingconcluded contractconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a participant in a government tender for construction work at Zhob Airport, challenged the cancellation of their bid and the subsequent re-tendering process. Despite being the lowest bidder, the petitioner's bid was rejected due to identified ambiguities and discrepancies in the tender documents. The core legal question was whether the petitioner acquired a vested right to the contract merely by being the lowest bidder, such that the cancellation of the tender without a concluded contract violated their rights. The Court held that the mere submission and acceptance of a lowest bid does not constitute a concluded contract, nor does it create a vested right in the bidder. Consequently, the authorities retain the discretion to cancel or reject tenders for sufficient and cogent reasons, provided the process is not arbitrary or mala fide. The principle laid down is that until a bid is formally confirmed and a contract is finalized, no enforceable contractual right exists, and administrative decisions to re-tender based on objective scrutiny of bid ambiguities are permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Does the submission of the lowest bid in a public tender create a vested right to the award of the contract?
  • Can a government authority cancel a tender process after opening bids but before a formal contract is finalized?
  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable to challenge the cancellation of a tender where no concluded contract exists?
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• Messrs Makma Steel Craft (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Allied Bank Limited2017 PLJ Lahore 677, 2017 CLD 302 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-09
  banking suitpledged goodsmisappropriationfinancial institutionsrecovery of financesburden of proofconsumption certificatedelivery order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves consolidated suits between Messrs Makma Steel Craft (Pvt.) Ltd. and Allied Bank Limited. The primary legal questions concerned whether the plaintiffs' suit was maintainable under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, whether the plaintiffs had discharged their liability regarding finance facilities, and whether the pledged goods had been misappropriated. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to substantiate their claims regarding the payment of customs duties and the repayment of finance facilities. Conversely, the Court found that the defendant-Bank successfully established that the plaintiffs had misappropriated the pledged goods, as evidenced by consumption certificates and the absence of bank-issued delivery orders. Consequently, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit and decreed the Bank's suit for recovery of Rs. 68,104,675/-. The judgment affirms that banking suits are essentially suits on accounts, requiring parties to provide specific documentary evidence rather than mere denials. Furthermore, it establishes that the unauthorized consumption of pledged goods, absent bank authorization, constitutes misappropriation, shifting liability to the borrower.

  Questions settled

  • Does the unauthorized consumption of pledged goods by a borrower without a bank's delivery order constitute misappropriation?
  • In a banking suit, is a mere denial of liability sufficient to rebut the bank's statement of accounts?
  • What is the standard of proof required to establish misappropriation of pledged goods in a civil banking suit?
  • Are suits pertaining to matters covered by a previous consent decree barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Messrs Magna Textile Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad vs C.I.R. (Zone-I), R.T.O., Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 1010 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-01-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Magna Processing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Appellate Tribunal2017 PTD 2247 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Lucky Paragon Ready Mix Ltd., Karachi vs C.I.R., (Appeals-IV), Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 156 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-04-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Leo Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 LHC 2716, 2017 PLD Lahore 709 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-18
  freedom of speech and expressionPEMRApublic interestbroadcast licenseprinciple of reciprocityconstitutional petitionfundamental rightsregulatory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a satellite TV licensee, challenged a PEMRA circular that unilaterally banned Indian content, arguing it violated their license terms and fundamental rights. The core legal questions were whether PEMRA’s reliance on the "principle of reciprocity"—in response to a private Indian channel’s actions—constituted a valid "public interest" justification under the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002, and whether this ban infringed upon the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court held that the impugned circular was unconstitutional and illegal. It ruled that "public interest" must be substantive, tangible, and proximate, rather than a reactive or "tit-for-tat" policy. The Court established that the principle of reciprocity is not a valid legal ground for restricting fundamental rights. Furthermore, it emphasized that freedom of speech includes the right to broadcast diverse cultural content, and any restriction must be strictly justified by constitutional parameters rather than extra-legal considerations. The petition was allowed, and the circular was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Does the 'principle of reciprocity' constitute a valid ground for restricting fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can PEMRA unilaterally alter the terms of a broadcast license without serving a show cause notice as required by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2002?
  • Does the broadcast of foreign content by a satellite TV channel fall under the protection of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What constitutes 'public interest' sufficient to justify reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression?
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• Messrs Labels Franchise through Mrs. Amna Badar Afzal and 2 others vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman and 2 others2017 CLC 150 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-08-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Labbaik (Pvt) Ltd. through Authorised Officer---Appellant vs2017 PLD Sindh 661 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kingsway Capital LLP and anothers vs Murree Brewery Co. Ltd.2017 CLD 587 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-28
  Extraordinary General Meetingnotice of meetingmaterial factscapitalisation of reservesbonus sharescorporate representativeproxyarticles of association
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition under sections 160A and 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 challenged the validity of an Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM) held by Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. on September 29, 2016, along with its notice and resolutions enhancing authorized share capital for issuing bonus shares. The core legal questions involved whether the notice violated mandatory disclosure requirements under section 160(1)(b), whether capitalization of reserves and bonus share issuance require a special resolution under the Articles of Association and section 28, and whether the company's chairman wrongly rejected the petitioners' corporate representative. The Lahore High Court held that the EOGM and its notice were vitiated due to non-compliance with section 160(1)(b) for failing to annex a statement of material facts, and that capitalization of reserves and altering articles require strict adherence to the company's articles and statutory provisions rather than unilateral board action. The Court laid down that statutory requirements for notices and special business are mandatory to protect shareholder rights, and that capitalisation of reserves is distinct from interim dividends and must be authorized by members in a general meeting.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notice of an extraordinary general meeting is rendered a nullity if it fails to annex a statement setting out all material facts concerning special business under section 160(1)(b) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does the capitalization of reserves and issuance of bonus shares fall within the exclusive domain of shareholders in a general meeting or the Board of Directors?
  • Whether the appointment of a corporate representative under section 162 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 is governed by the restrictions applicable to proxies under section 161?
  • Whether an increase in the authorized share capital of a company requires an alteration of its articles of association subject to the three-fourths majority requirement under section 28 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
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• Messrs King Enterprises, Karachi vs The Collector of Customs2017 PTD (Trib.) 2490 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-11-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kasb Bank Limited through Muhammad Ali, Head of Financial2017 PTD 1122 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Messrs Kamal Ltd. through Director vs Federation of Pakistan through Chairman and 2 others2017 PTD 243 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-23
  constitutional petitionrecovery proceedingsstay of recoveryAppellate Tribunal Inland RevenueIncome Tax Ordinancecoercive measures
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court by the petitioner challenging the initiation of recovery proceedings by the tax authorities during the pendency of its appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, after the expiry of the statutory stay period of 180 days under section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question was whether recovery can be enforced when an appeal before an independent forum remains undecided through no fault of the taxpayer. The Court disposed of the petition by directing the Tribunal to decide the pending appeal expeditiously within one month and ordered that no coercive measures for the recovery of the disputed amount shall be taken against the petitioner until the appeal is decided. The key principle laid down is that recovery of a disputed tax amount should not be enforced unless the matter is decided by at least one independent forum outside the revenue hierarchy, protecting taxpayers from coercive recovery due to institutional delays.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Appellate Tribunal extend a stay of recovery beyond 180 days under section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Whether recovery proceedings can be initiated against a taxpayer while their appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal due to institutional delay?
  • Does a taxpayer have the right to protection from coercive recovery until their tax matter is decided by an independent forum outside the revenue hierarchy?
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• Messrs Kamal Limited, Khurrianwala, Faisalabad vs C.I.R.(a), Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 113 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-04-04
  sales tax refundinput tax creditretrospective applicationblacklisted suppliertax jurisdictionpost-refund auditbona fide purchasertax fraud
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the recovery of sales tax refunds by the department from a registered textile manufacturer, Messrs Kamal Limited, based on the subsequent blacklisting of its supplier. The core legal questions involve the retrospective application of Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the jurisdiction of the ACIR (Post Refund Audit) to initiate recovery proceedings, and the entitlement of a buyer to input tax credit when the supplier is later blacklisted. The Tribunal held that Section 11(3) cannot apply retrospectively to defaults occurring before its 2012 enactment, as the law governing at the time of the transaction applies. Furthermore, the Tribunal ruled that the ACIR (Post Refund Audit) lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Rule 36 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006, without proper referral. The holding establishes that a buyer’s right to input tax credit remains protected if the supplier was operative at the time of transaction and payments were made via banking channels. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the recovery orders, emphasizing that procedural lapses by the department cannot penalize a bona fide taxpayer.

  Questions settled

  • Can Section 11(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 be applied retrospectively to recovery cases arising before its enactment?
  • Does the ACIR (Post Refund Audit) have the jurisdiction to initiate show-cause proceedings under Rule 36 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 without a referral from the Refund Division?
  • Is a registered buyer entitled to input tax credit if the supplier is subsequently blacklisted, provided the supplier was operative at the time of transaction and payments were made via banking channels?
  • Is physical transfer of goods a mandatory condition for claiming input tax credit under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs K.B. Enterprises, Faisalabad vs Cir (Appeals), Rto., Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 324 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-01-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs JFK International through Proprietor vs Commissioner Inland2017 PTD 941 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Irfan Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive vs Standard Chartered Bank through. Chief Executive Officer and another-s2017 CLD 223, 2017 MLD 312 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-24
  rejection of plaintrendition of accountscontractual relationshipres judicatabanking disputepreliminary issue
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil matter involves an application filed by the defendant bank under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the rejection of a plaint in a suit primarily seeking rendition of accounts arising from a contractual banking relationship. The core legal question addressed is whether a suit for rendition of accounts is maintainable between parties bound by a contractual relationship where no statutory or fiduciary duty to render accounts exists, and whether such a suit becomes barred by res judicata upon the decreeing of a cross-suit between the same parties. The Lahore High Court held that a suit for rendition of accounts is an exceptional remedy not maintainable under a purely contractual relationship where the plaintiff can otherwise ascertain amounts or file a money recovery suit, and that the suit was barred by res judicata following a judgment and decree rendered in a connected cross-suit. The key principle laid down is that a right to seek rendition of accounts must stem from a statute or a fiduciary relationship, rather than a mere contractual one, and cannot be invoked simply because a party lacks exact knowledge of due amounts.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for rendition of accounts maintainable between parties in a contractual relationship?
  • Can a suit for rendition of accounts be maintained merely because the plaintiff does not know the exact amount due?
  • Whether a subsequent judgment and decree in a cross-suit renders a pending suit barred by res judicata?
  • Does Order XX Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 create a substantive right to seek rendition of accounts?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iqra International, Peshawar vs Collector of Customs, MCC, Peshawar and 3 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 1744 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-03-07
  customs appealmis-declarationPCT classificationWeBOC systemvaluation rulingpost-clearance auditburden of proofexamination report
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by Messrs Iqra International against an Order-in-Original passed by the Collector of Customs, which ordered the deposit of short-paid duty and taxes and imposed a personal penalty for alleged mis-declaration and misclassification of imported lead acid batteries based on post-clearance audit and WeBOC images. The core legal question was whether customs authorities could establish a charge of mis-declaration and invoke penal provisions under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969, solely on the basis of digital images from the WeBOC system without corroborative documentary evidence, and notwithstanding a clean physical examination report at the time of clearance. The Tribunal held that a photographic image in the WeBOC system, absent specific legal sanctity and corroboration, cannot serve as conclusive evidence of mis-declaration to override verified import documents and the statutory examination report. The Tribunal laid down that allegations under Section 32 require definite and positive material satisfying the standard of 'material particular', and that post-clearance audit cannot arbitrarily disregard the physical examination and assessment conducted by competent customs staff at the time of clearance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether digital images available in the WeBOC system can constitute conclusive evidence of mis-declaration under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does a physical examination report prepared at the time of clearance override findings made during a subsequent post-clearance audit?
  • Whether the show-cause notice requirements under Section 180 of the Customs Act, 1969 are violated if the specific grounds and basis of allegations are not disclosed to the importer?
  • Can subsections relating to deliberate mis-declaration and inadvertent error under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 be simultaneously invoked against an importer?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iqbal and Sons through Authorized Representative vs FederationPTCL 2017 CL. 627, 2017 PTD 590 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-27
  Sales Tax Act 1990Section 38 inspectionstatutory interpretationconstitutional petitiontax auditreasonable causeindependent provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged notices issued under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, by the tax authorities. The petitioners contended that Section 38 cannot be invoked independently and is contingent upon the procedural formalities of Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, arguing that an audit under Section 25 is a prerequisite for such notices. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that Section 38 is an independent, self-executing provision that does not require prior completion of Section 25 proceedings. The Court emphasized that interpreting Section 38 as subordinate to Section 25 would render the former redundant, violating the canon of statutory construction that every legislative provision must be given effect. The Court clarified that while Section 38 is independent, it is not absolute; it requires the tax department to have reasonable cause, recorded in writing, and proper authorization from the Board or Commissioner. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 38 is strictly limited to the inspection of records and premises and does not empower officers to conduct search and seizure operations.

  Questions settled

  • Can notices under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, be issued independently of the audit proceedings mandated by Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • Does the power of inspection under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, authorize tax officers to conduct search and seizure operations?
  • Is the provision of Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, subject to the procedural formalities of Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  • What are the prerequisites for a valid inspection under Section 38 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs International Petrochemicals (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Deputy Collector2017 PTD 370 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-13
  customs valuationdeclared valuetransaction valuesequential methodsimported goodsreference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This Reference Application arises from a customs dispute concerning the valuation of imported goods. The applicant imported goods whose declared value was subsequently rejected by the customs authorities and provisionally assessed, ultimately leading to a final assessment under section 25(8) of the Customs Act, 1969, after various departmental proceedings and appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. The core legal question was whether the customs authorities could lawfully reject the declared transaction value of imported goods solely on the ground that the goods were being imported into Pakistan for the first time and, consequently, comparative data for identical or similar goods was unavailable. The Sindh High Court held that the declared value cannot be rejected merely because goods are imported for the first time and comparative data is lacking, as section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, mandates a sequential application of valuation methods and requires legally valid reasons for rejecting the declared value. The court established the principle that absence of data for identical or similar goods for first-time imports does not furnish a legal warrant to discard the transaction value under section 25.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the declared value of imported goods can be rejected solely on the ground that the goods are being imported for the first time and comparative data for identical or similar goods is unavailable?
  • Do the valuation methods under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969, require sequential application by customs authorities?
  • What constitutes a legally valid reason for rejecting the price paid or payable as the declared value under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Indus Motor Company Limited: In the matter of vs Not2017 CLD 354 · Competition Commission of Pakistan · 2013-11-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Image Garments (Pvt.) Ltd., Satiana Road, Faisalabad vs Commissioner Inland Revenue (Zone-I), R.T.O., Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 611 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-01-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ijaz Nizam vs Nib Bank and others2017 CLD 361 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-08
  banking courtrecovery suitleave to defendclosing right of evidenceremand of casefinancial institutions recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the judgment and decree passed by the Banking Court in a recovery suit filed by the respondent bank under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal question concerns whether the Banking Court was justified in closing the appellants' right to produce evidence and prematurely decreeing the suit without affording sufficient opportunities, particularly in a case remanded for framing issues and recording evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the Banking Court committed a material irregularity and acted in undue haste by closing the appellants' right to lead evidence without granting adequate opportunities, thereby condemning them unheard and violating the mandatory procedures under section 10(11) of the 2001 Ordinance and Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The court set aside the impugned judgment and decree and remanded the matter back to the Banking Court with directions to provide the appellants an opportunity to produce their evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Banking Court is justified in closing a defendant's right to produce evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 without granting adequate opportunities?
  • Can a Banking Court decree a suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 without recording the evidence of all parties after leave to defend has been granted?
  • What are the procedural requirements under section 10(11) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 once leave to defend is granted?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Iffco Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd vs Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others2017 PLC 143 · Sindh High Court · 2017-05-16
  labour courtwrongful dismissaldomestic inquiryconcurrent findingsreinstatementconstitutional petitionindustrial relations
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the Sindh Labour Court and the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, which reinstated a workman dismissed by the petitioner company. The core legal question was whether the lower forums erred in their factual findings regarding the alleged misconduct of the respondent and whether the Labour Court possessed the authority to re-examine evidence from the domestic inquiry. The High Court held that the Labour Court is empowered to examine all facts and material to determine if a punishment is just and sustainable, rather than merely reviewing the procedural legality of the inquiry. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums, noting that the respondent's alleged misconduct was not proven and that the inquiry officer failed to consider the respondent's defense. The key principle laid down is that the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by labour forums unless such findings are shown to be based on no evidence or are the result of extraneous considerations, as the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of the evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Labour Court have the authority to examine the material and facts of a case to determine if a punishment awarded to a workman is sustainable?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a constitutional petition?
  • Is the Labour Court restricted to reviewing only the procedural legality of a domestic inquiry, or can it substitute its findings for those of the inquiry officer?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs I.T. Impex vs Deputy Director and 2 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 2265 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-05-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs I.S.M. Hospital through authorized person vs Province of Sindh2017 CLC 1023 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-02Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hero Tea and Food Company, Rampura Gate, Peshawar vs Collector Customs (Appeals), Peshawar and 2 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 141 · Customs Appellate TribunalRead full judgment →
• Messrs Hanif Metal Store through Proprietor and others vs Bank of Punjab through Manager and others2017 CLD 447 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hafiz Steel Furnace and 4 others vs Directorate of Intelligence2017 PTD 761 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-24Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited vs Messrs Subhan Knitwear2017 CLD 298 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi vs I.A.C. Range-III, Company-2017 PTD (Trib.) 2316 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2016-11-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Messrs State Life Insurance2017 YLR 478 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Muslim Traders vs Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad2017 PTD 1144 · Federal Tax Ombudsman · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue2017 PTD (Trib.) 2169 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-05-27
  tax recovery stayappellate tribunal inland revenuecoercive measurestax refund adjustmentspeaking orderundue hardshipjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)'s refusal to grant a stay of tax recovery pending the adjudication of the main appeal. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal has the authority to grant a stay of recovery when the tax demand has not yet been upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals), and whether the adjustment of determined refunds against disputed tax demands constitutes a coercive recovery measure. The Tribunal held that while its power to grant a stay under Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is contingent upon the tax being upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal retains inherent powers to review the Commissioner's refusal of a stay. The Tribunal determined that the Commissioner's order was non-speaking and arbitrary. It established that withholding legitimate tax refunds to satisfy disputed demands constitutes a coercive measure. Consequently, the Tribunal vacated the Commissioner's refusal order, directed the taxpayer to file a fresh stay application, and ordered the Commissioner to decide both the stay and the main appeal within specified timelines, emphasizing that Tribunal orders are binding on subordinate authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue have the authority to grant a stay of tax recovery if the tax demand has not yet been upheld by the Commissioner (Appeals)?
  • Does the adjustment of a determined tax refund against a disputed tax demand constitute a coercive measure of recovery?
  • Is a refusal of a stay application by the Commissioner (Appeals) appealable before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue?
  • Are the orders of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue binding on subordinate tax authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gul Construction through Authorized Attorney vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 3 others-Defendants2017 YLR 501 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gridit, Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. through authorized Manager and another vs Sirajulhaq and 7 others2017 MLD 841 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Green Group of Hotels through Attorney vs Municipal2017 MLD 257 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-01
  temporary injunctionspecific performanceexpired leasecivil revisionmaintainability of suithistorical site preservationOrder VII Rule 11
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged concurrent judgments from the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's application for a temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance. The petitioner sought to extend a lease agreement for a marriage hall situated at a historical site, alleging fraud in the lease documentation. The core legal question was whether a court can grant a temporary injunction to extend a lease agreement that has already expired, and whether a suit for specific performance is maintainable in such circumstances. The High Court held that the lease had expired by efflux of time, and since no contract existed between the parties, the court could not compel the respondents to renew or extend the lease. Consequently, the court held that no prima facie case existed for an injunction. The court further affirmed the principle that a temporary injunction cannot be granted where a perpetual injunction is not permissible, and that a suit for specific performance of an expired contract is not maintainable. The petition and the underlying suit were dismissed under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a temporary injunction to extend a lease agreement that has already expired?
  • Is a suit for specific performance maintainable when the underlying contract has expired by efflux of time?
  • Can a court force private parties to renew or extend a contract against their will?
  • Does a court have the power to reject a suit under Order VII, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, if it finds the suit is not maintainable?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Good Luck Cosmetics, Karachi vs Deputy Collector of Customs and 2 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 914 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-08-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghee Corporation Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore vs Dcit, Officer, Lahore2017 PTD 1824 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-02
  minimum taxadditional taxtax referenceRepealed Income Tax Ordinance 1979default surchargeturnover tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference application before the Lahore High Court arose from an order of the Appellate Tribunal regarding the charging of additional tax under the Repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the levy of minimum tax under Section 80-D of the Repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 precludes the charging of additional tax under Section 88 of the same Ordinance for failure to pay tax along with the return. The Court held that charging a minimum tax under Section 80-D does not exempt a taxpayer from additional tax for non-payment or default, noting that interpreting the statute otherwise would lead to absurd results allowing taxpayers to benefit from their own omission to pay tax. The Court established that Section 80-D was intended to ensure a minimum tax floor where liability drops due to allowances, and does not override default provisions for unpaid taxes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the levy of minimum tax under Section 80-D of the Repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 bars the charging of additional tax under Section 88 for failure to pay tax?
  • Does the term tax payable or paid under Section 80-D of the Repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 exclude the application of penalty or additional tax for defaults in payment?
  • Can a taxpayer benefit from their own omission to pay tax along with the return when assessed under Section 80-D of the Repealed Income Tax Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ghee Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Commissioner2017 PTD 1153 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt) Ltd. through Authorised Person vs Federation2017 PLD Sindh 157 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-07
  drug pricing mechanismmaximum retail pricepharmaceutical regulationconstitutional petitionmonopolypublic healthgeneric drugsadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges Notification SRO No. 101(I)/2016, which fixed the Maximum Retail Price (MRP) for the generic drug Sofosbuvir. The petitioner contends that the government’s pricing mechanism violated the established Drugs Pricing Mechanism (DPM), which mandates that generic substitutes be priced at 30% less than the originator brand’s MRP. The petitioner alleges that the authorities arbitrarily fixed the generic price at Rs. 5,868, significantly lower than the policy-mandated rate, while simultaneously allowing a specific company to charge exorbitant prices for the originator brand, thereby creating a monopoly and exploiting patients suffering from Hepatitis-C. The core legal question concerns whether the government’s deviation from its own pricing policy and the alleged discriminatory treatment of market participants constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power under the Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012, and the Drugs Act, 1976. The court’s holding emphasizes that regulatory bodies must adhere strictly to established pricing policies to prevent monopolistic practices and ensure the availability of affordable life-saving medication, underscoring the state's obligation to protect public health over private commercial interests.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Drugs Pricing Committee have the authority to deviate from the established Drugs Pricing Mechanism when fixing the Maximum Retail Price for generic drugs?
  • Can the Federal Government delegate its power to fix drug prices under the Drugs Act, 1976 to the Drugs Pricing Committee?
  • Does the Drugs Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 override the provisions of the Drugs Act, 1976 regarding the regulation of therapeutic goods?
  • Is the fixation of Maximum Retail Price by the government subject to judicial review if it is alleged to be arbitrary and discriminatory?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gerry's International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Manager vs Messrs2017 CLC 291 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Gas and Oil Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited through Manager and another2017 PTD (Trib.) 945 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-05-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Garden Autos through Managing Partner vs Lady Sughra Begum2017 YLR 297 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Galaxy Engineering, Lahore vs Deputy Collector of Customs, R&D, MCC of Appraisement-East, Customs House, Karachi and 2 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 2069 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-01-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Frontier Corporation, Peshawar vs Collector of MCC, Peshawar and 3 others2017 PTD (Trib.) 1993 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-05-02
  customs classificationpost-clearance auditmisdeclarationWeBOCclosed transactionburden of proofPCT heading
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a consolidated Order-in-Original issued by the Collector of Customs (Adjudication), Peshawar, which alleged that the appellant misclassified imported lead-acid batteries under PCT heading 8506.8000 instead of 8507.2090, resulting in short-paid duties and taxes. The Customs department relied on post-clearance audit findings and WeBOC images to support the reclassification. The Tribunal held that the department failed to substantiate the misclassification, as no chemical examination or expert report was produced to verify the battery composition. The Tribunal emphasized that WeBOC images, without corroborating evidence, do not constitute conclusive proof of misdeclaration under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the audit process flawed, noting that the physical examination report at the time of clearance found no discrepancies, and the department failed to provide cogent evidence to rebut the initial assessment. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, ruling that the department could not reopen a closed transaction based on mere estimates or conjectures without definitive material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities reopen a closed assessment and reclassify goods based solely on WeBOC images without physical chemical analysis?
  • Does the absence of a chemical examination report invalidate a customs department's claim of misclassification for imported batteries?
  • Is a post-clearance audit valid when it contradicts the initial physical examination report conducted at the time of import clearance?
  • Can the Customs department invoke Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 based on mere estimates or conjectures regarding the value or classification of goods?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Forvil Cosmetics Mingora Swat vs Commissioner Inland2017 PTD (Trib.) 1030 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-09-17Read full judgment →
• Messrs Flying Cement Company Ltd. vs Appellate Tribunal InlandPTCL 2017 CL. 146, 2017 PTD 627 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-07
  Sales Tax Act 1990Value of supplyDebit and credit noteMachinery provisionTax referenceStatutory interpretationAppellate Tribunal Inland Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This tax reference arose from an order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which disallowed the applicant’s adjustment of commission payments through debit/credit notes in sales tax returns. The core legal question was whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the applicant’s case did not fall within the scope of Section 2(46)(b) and Section 9 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Lahore High Court held that the Appellate Tribunal erred by narrowly interpreting Section 9. The Court clarified that Section 9, which permits adjustments for changes in the value or nature of supply after the issuance of a tax invoice, is a machinery provision. Consequently, it must be construed liberally to ensure the tax regime remains workable, rather than being restricted to specific, pre-defined events. The Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal to determine whether the specific commission payments were permissible under the law, as the Tribunal had failed to address this underlying factual aspect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 9 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 allows for adjustments of output tax after the issuance of a tax invoice for reasons other than the specific events of cancellation of supply or return of goods?
  • Should machinery provisions in a fiscal statute be construed strictly or liberally?
  • Does the definition of 'value of supply' under Section 2(46)(b) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 preclude adjustments for commission payments made subsequent to the issuance of a tax invoice?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Fateh Textile Mills vs Collector Model Customs Collectorate, Hyderabad2017 PTD (Trib) 744, PTCL 2017 CL. 113 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-04-30Read full judgment →
• Messrs Faisal Motors vs Model Collector of Customs (East) and others2017 CLD 270, 2017 PTD 355, 2017 CLC 78 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-16Read full judgment →
• Messrs Export International through Proprietor vs Collector of Customs2017 PTD 1201 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-07Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eden Developers (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of the Punjab2017 PLD Lahore 442 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-12Read full judgment →
• Messrs Eagle Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Manager (Admin) vs Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, Revenue Division Islamabad and 3 others2017 PTD 361 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Doctor Agro Chemical and others vs Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Live Stock and others2017 CLC 689 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dewan Petroleum (Pvt.) Limited vs Executive Director, SECP and another2017 CLD 1237 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dewan Automotive Engineering Limited Formerly Delta2017 CLD 342 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-10Read full judgment →
• Messrs Dehli Cooperating Housing Society through Chairman vs Province of Sindh through Secretary, Cooperation, Karachi and 5 others2017 MLD 695 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-27Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cresox (Pvt.) Ltd. vs C.I.R., Zone-IV, Ltu, Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 1416 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2013-10-31Read full judgment →
• Messrs Colony Sugar Mills Ltd. through Deputy Manager vs Province of Punjab and 5 others2017 PTD 406 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-15
  constitutional petitionprovincial excise dutyPunjab Excise Act 1914manufacture of spiritethanolinter-provincial tradelegislative competencedouble taxation
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the constitutional validity of Section 31 read with Sections 3(6) and 3(14) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, along with Notification dated 03.07.2012 imposing excise duty on the manufacture of spirit at Rs. 2 per liter, and a subsequent show-cause notice. The core legal questions were whether ethanol or spirit constitutes an excisable alcoholic liquor within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature under Article 142, and whether the levy infringed inter-provincial trade under Article 151 or fundamental rights under Articles 18 and 25. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that spirit falls under the definition of liquor and excisable article under the Act of 1914. The court ruled that under Article 142, alcoholic liquor is excluded from Entry No. 44 of the Federal Legislative List and falls within provincial domain. Furthermore, imposing duty on local manufacturing does not restrict free trade under Article 151, nor can an incorporated body invoke Article 25.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ethanol or spirit falls within the definition of alcoholic liquor and excisable article under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914?
  • Whether the Provincial Legislature has exclusive legislative competence under Article 142 of the Constitution to impose excise duty on the manufacture of spirit?
  • Whether the levy of excise duty on the manufacturing of spirit within a province violates the freedom of inter-provincial trade under Article 151 of the Constitution?
  • Can an incorporated company claim protection under Article 25 of the Constitution as a citizen to challenge the constitutionality of a fiscal statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs China Machinery Engineering Corporation (Cmec) through Projec_6eeff1b32017 P.S.C. 1248, 2017 CLC 1519 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-06-04
  power of attorneyauthentication of documentsQanun-e-Shahadat Ordercompetency of writ petitionincome tax assessmentforeign corporationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment regarding income tax assessments for M/s China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC). The core legal question was whether the writ petition and subsequent appeals were competently filed, given that the power of attorney authorizing the legal proceedings was executed in a foreign country (China) without proper authentication. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held that the power of attorney was invalid because it failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and sections 32 and 33 of the Registration Act, 1908. The Court emphasized that authentication is not mere attestation; it requires the authenticating authority to verify both the identity of the executant and the fact of execution. Consequently, the Court ruled that the proceedings were initiated without lawful authority and were a nullity. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Court declined to address the merits of the tax dispute, adhering to the principle that judgments should not be rendered for academic discussion when the initial filing is incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Is a power of attorney executed in a foreign country valid if it is not authenticated by the authorities prescribed under Article 95 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Does the authentication of a power of attorney require the authenticating authority to verify both the identity of the executant and the fact of execution?
  • Can a court proceed to decide the merits of a case if the initial writ petition was filed incompetently due to an invalid power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chiltan Ghee Mills, Quetta and others vs Deputy Collector of Sales Tax (Refund), Customs House, Quetta and another2017 PTD 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-03
  sales tax refundinput tax adjustmentexempt suppliestaxable suppliesstatutory interpretationtax exemption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a manufacturer of ghee and tin containers, sought a refund of sales tax paid on the purchase of tin plates used to manufacture tin containers, arguing that because its finished supplies were exempt from sales tax under S.R.O. 580(1)/91, the input tax paid on raw materials should be refundable. The Sales Tax Department, the Appellate Tribunal, and the High Court rejected this claim. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether input tax paid on raw materials used in the production of exempt supplies is refundable. The Court held that under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the facility to deduct or claim a refund of input tax is strictly reserved for 'taxable supplies'. The Court affirmed that Section 8(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 explicitly prohibits the claim of input tax paid on goods used in the manufacture of exempt supplies. Consequently, the Court ruled that an exemption from sales tax on finished goods does not entitle a manufacturer to a refund of input tax paid on raw materials, dismissing the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a registered person entitled to claim a refund of input sales tax paid on raw materials used in the manufacture of goods that are exempt from sales tax?
  • Does the exemption of finished goods from sales tax liability automatically entitle a manufacturer to a refund of input tax paid on raw materials?
  • Can input tax be deducted or refunded for goods that do not fall within the definition of taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chief Sarhad Cargo Service through Proprietor and others vs Judge Banking Court No. II, Lahore and others2017 CLD 1269 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-18Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chemtire Traders vs Customs Appellate Tribunal and 3 others2017 PTD 1131 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Chaudhry Sugar Mills Ltd vs Province of Punjab and others2017 LHC 3082, 2017 PLD Lahore 848 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Charmang Corporation and 9 others vs Additional Collector2017 PTD (Trib.) 680 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2015-11-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Central Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi vs C.I.R., Zone-III, Ltu, Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 2013 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-11-24
  rectification applicationIncome Tax Ordinanceremand of casemistake apparent from recordappellate tribunalspeedy justice
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant miscellaneous application was filed by the taxpayer under section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, seeking rectification of an appellate order passed by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue on the ground that the Tribunal allegedly omitted findings on certain specific grounds relating to tax year 2007. The core legal question was whether any mistake apparent from the record existed in the Tribunal's previous remand order warranting rectification under the law. The Tribunal held that since the original order had remanded the entire case back to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) on all issues and grounds, no mistake apparent from the record existed. Consequently, the rectification application was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a general remand order passed by an appellate tribunal encompasses all pending grounds of appeal, rendering separate specific findings on each individual ground unnecessary, while emphasizing the imperative need for speedy disposal of tax cases in line with judicial policy.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a rectification application under section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is maintainable when an appellate tribunal remands a case back on all issues?
  • Does a general remand order by the Tribunal cover all grounds raised in the memo of appeal?
  • What constitutes a mistake apparent from the record in tax adjudication proceedings?
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• Messrs Catalyst Communication (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Messrs National2017 CLC 466 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-11Read full judgment →
• Messrs Cargill Holdings vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Cabinet Division and others2017 MLD 372 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-06-15Read full judgment →
• Messrs Butyal Enterprises vs Collector Customs Appraisement2017 PTD 1146 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-28Read full judgment →
• Messrs Brightlink Mobile Phone and Accessories through Proprietor vs Muhammad Qamar Ghani and 2 others2017 PLD Sindh 409 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-25Read full judgment →
• Messrs Boc Pakistan Ltd vs The Commissioner Inland Revenue, (L.D)2017 PT D (Trib.) 1865 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-03-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bhanero Energy Ltd. and others vs Sui Southern Gas Co. Limited2017 PLD Sindh 520 · Sindh High Court · 2015-06-30
  Independent Power ProjectsCaptive PowerGas Supply AgreementTariff ClassificationEstoppelRegulatory ComplianceGeneration License
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter involves multiple suits filed by power generation companies against a gas supply company seeking a declaration that they be classified as 'Independent Power Projects' (IPPs) rather than 'Captive Power' (CP) units to benefit from specific tariff rates and gas supply terms. The core legal question is whether the plaintiffs, who generate electricity primarily for sister concerns or specific industrial consumers, meet the regulatory criteria to be classified as IPPs. The Court dismissed the suits, holding that the plaintiffs do not qualify as IPPs. It reasoned that IPP status requires specific prerequisites, including government guarantees, long-term power purchase agreements, and integration with the national grid, which the plaintiffs lacked. Furthermore, the Court applied the principle of estoppel, noting that the plaintiffs had operated under industrial or captive power classifications for years without objection. They could not now unilaterally claim IPP status to secure favorable tariff rates and uninterrupted gas supply, as their business model did not align with the policy objectives of IPPs, which are designed to cater to the national grid.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere possession of a generation license under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, automatically qualify an entity as an Independent Power Project (IPP)?
  • Can an entity claim the status of an Independent Power Project (IPP) without fulfilling the prerequisites of government guarantees and project agreements?
  • Does the principle of estoppel prevent a company from claiming a different regulatory status after operating under a specific classification for years?
  • Is an entity that generates electricity for self-consumption or sister concerns legally distinct from an Independent Power Project (IPP) under the prevailing energy policies?
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• Messrs Bela Lubricants (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Collector, Collectorate of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise2017 PTD (Trib.) 2210 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2015-03-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Basf Chemical and Polymers Pakistan Ltd. vs Taxation Officer, Acit, Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 1785 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2013-11-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bara Ghee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others vs The Assistant2017 PLD Supreme Court 738 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-04-06
  customs dutiesrecovery of government dueslimitation periodalternate remedywrit jurisdictionmanufacturing in bondinterim orders
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions challenging the resumption of recovery proceedings for customs duties and government dues arising from the export of ghee and oil to Afghanistan under interim court orders that were later vacated. The core legal questions concern whether the recovery of such dues is barred by limitation periods under sections 32 or 211 of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when an alternate statutory remedy is available under the Customs Act, 1969 and the Customs Rules, 2001. The Supreme Court held that the recovery of government dues under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 following the vacation of stay orders is not subject to the limitation periods prescribed for short-levies or untrue statements under section 32, and that writ petitions are incompetent where a complete statutory hierarchy leading to the High Court's referral jurisdiction is available. The court affirmed that resumption of recovery proceedings stayed by judicial orders does not attract limitation, dismissing the petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of government dues after the vacation of a judicial stay order is barred by the limitation periods prescribed under section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 lie against an order passed under Rule 142 of the Customs Rules, 2001 when an alternate statutory hierarchy of appeals and revisions is available under the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Whether recovery proceedings initiated under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 for dues payable on goods exported during the subsistence of an interim court order are subject to the limitation rules governing short-levies or erroneous refunds?
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• Messrs Baloch Distillery and Sugar Mills through Chief Executive vs Secretary Industries and Commerce Department, Government of Sindh and another2017 PLD Sindh 313 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-04
  executive discretionno objection certificatediscriminatory policyarbitrary exercise of powersugar mill establishmentjudicial review of policyadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the refusal of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to establish a sugar mill in District Ghotki, which the government denied citing a 'negative list' policy and concerns regarding crop patterns and district saturation. The core legal question was whether this refusal constituted an arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of executive discretion. The court observed that while the petitioner’s application was pending, the authorities had granted NOCs to five other sugar mills in the same district, thereby contradicting the government's stated justification for the refusal. The court held that the rejection was without substance and discriminatory. While acknowledging that policy matters generally fall within the executive domain, the court emphasized that discretionary powers cannot be exercised at the whims of an authority. The judgment established that executive discretion must be exercised fairly, evenly, and justly. Finding the refusal to be an arbitrary exercise of power, the court set aside the impugned order and directed the authorities to issue the NOC to the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executive authority refuse an NOC based on a policy that it has simultaneously ignored for other applicants?
  • Is the exercise of executive discretion in granting or refusing an NOC subject to judicial review?
  • Does the granting of multiple NOCs to other parties while denying one to a petitioner on the same grounds constitute discriminatory treatment?
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