Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Lal Shireen vs Mastana Khan through L.Rs. and 3 others2017 MLD 1290 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-11-20Read full judgment →
• Lal Bux vs The State2017 MLD 1164 · Sindh High Court · 2016-06-30
  post-arrest bailborderline casecharas recoverycontrol of narcotic substancesfurther inquirytentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant Lal Bux seeking release in Crime No. 61 of 2016 registered at Police Station A-Section Nawabshah for an offence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the dismissal of his earlier bail plea by the Special Judge, Narcotic, Shaheed Benazirabad. The core legal question involved whether the recovery of 1300 grams of charas constitutes a borderline case between clauses (b) and (c) of Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, making it a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Sindh High Court held that since the recovered narcotic substance falls within the borderline limit of 900 to 1500 grams, the case falls within the ambit of further inquiry, entitling the accused to bail. The court laid down the principle that in narcotics cases where recovery is on the borderline between clauses (b) and (c) of Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the benefit of doubt at the bail stage must be extended to the accused, making further inquiry into the guilt a ground for releasing the accused on post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of 1300 grams of charas qualifies as a borderline case between clauses (b) and (c) of Section 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Does a narcotics recovery that falls between 900 to 1500 grams attract the provisions of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the case against him is considered a borderline case under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
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• Lahore High Court, Lahore vs Commissioner Inland Versus: MuhammadPTCL 2017 CL. 373 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-13Read full judgment →
• Lahore Electric Supply Company Ltd. vs Commissioner Inland Revenue, Regional Tax Officer, Lahore and others2017 PTD 2488 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-25Read full judgment →
• Lahore Electric Supply Company Limited through Chief Executive and 32017 PLJ Lahore 827 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Lahore Electric Power Supply Company Limited (LESCO) vs National Electric2017 [M] C.L.R. 1552 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Lafarge Pakistan Cement Ltd. through Attorney vs Messrs Decent Coal2017 PLD Balochistan 11 · Balochistan High Court · 2016-05-31Read full judgment →
• Laalu vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 84 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-16
  Qatal-i-Amdcommon intentioninjured eye-witnessdelayed FIRmitigating circumstancevicarious liabilitydeath sentence conversioncompensation default
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a conviction for the murder of two individuals and murderous assault on two others. The appellant challenged the trial court's judgment, primarily arguing that the FIR was delayed, the identification of the accused was unreliable due to darkness, and the prosecution failed to prove motive. The Lahore High Court examined the ocular account provided by two injured eye-witnesses, whose presence at the scene was corroborated by medical evidence. The Court held that while the FIR was delayed, such delay is not per se fatal to the prosecution's case when the ocular evidence is consistent, reliable, and corroborated by the injuries sustained by the witnesses. The Court affirmed the conviction based on the direct involvement of the appellant and the principle of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. However, finding that the prosecution failed to establish a specific motive against the appellant, the Court converted the death sentence to life imprisonment, maintaining the conviction while modifying the default sentence for non-payment of compensation to align with statutory limits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Can a death sentence be converted to life imprisonment if the prosecution fails to prove motive?
  • Is an injured eye-witness's testimony sufficient to establish the presence and role of an accused?
  • What is the maximum imprisonment term for default in payment of compensation under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust THR.2017 SCInd 1276 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-09-22Read full judgment →
• Kiran Ayub Tanoli, Advocate vs Registrar Peshawar High Court2017 PLC (C.S.) 1283 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-08
  judicial appointmentpracticing advocateeligibility criteriawrit petitionKhyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Service Rulesadministrative discretionWakalatnama
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the eligibility criteria for the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge, specifically the requirement of submitting five Wakalatnamas per year for the last five years, as advertised by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioner contended that this condition was ultra vires to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP) Judicial Service Rules, 2001, and violated her fundamental rights, despite her standing as a practicing advocate. The core legal question was whether the High Court could impose such specific criteria to define a practicing advocate for judicial recruitment. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court possesses the authority to enhance recruitment standards to ensure the selection of competent judges. It observed that the condition was a consensus-based measure supported by the Bar to weed out non-practicing lawyers and improve judicial performance. The Court established that the term practicing advocate necessitates active, habitual engagement in legal practice, and that administrative bodies may prescribe reasonable qualifications to maintain efficiency in service, provided they do not contravene statutory law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court impose additional eligibility criteria for judicial appointments beyond those specified in the service rules?
  • Does the requirement of submitting Wakalatnamas to prove legal practice violate the fundamental rights of a candidate?
  • What constitutes a practicing advocate for the purpose of appointment as an Additional District and Sessions Judge?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to enhance recruitment standards to maintain efficiency in judicial service?
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• Kifayat Ullah vs Ibrahim, etc.2017 PHC 829 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-18Read full judgment →
• Kifayat Ullah vs Gul alias Gulli, etc2017 PHC 832 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-18Read full judgment →
• Kifayat and others vs Sami Ullah and another2017 PHC 779 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-07-21
  Section 265-K Cr.P.C.compromiseQisas and Diyatresiling from compromisequashment of proceedingsmurder casecompoundable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a revision petition under Section 439 read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the trial court's dismissal of their application under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. for acquittal in a murder case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. A genuine compromise had been executed at the bail stage where legal heirs of the deceased waived their rights of Qisas and Diyat, resulting in the grant of bail to the petitioners and acquittal of co-accused brothers. However, the trial court refused to acquit the petitioners under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. due to the legal heirs subsequently resiling from the compromise. The High Court accepted the petition and quashed the proceedings, holding that where a genuine compromise in compoundable offences has been acted upon and validly established on record, the complainant party cannot be permitted to resile from it, and such compromise ensures to the benefit of the accused for full acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a complainant party or legal heirs of a deceased resile from a compromise in a criminal case after it has already been acted upon?
  • Does a compromise regarding compoundable offences effected and verified at the bail stage entitle the accused to subsequent acquittal at the trial stage under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the basis of an established compromise that the complainant party later attempts to abandon?
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• Khyzar Iqbal vs Deputy Collector (GR-VI), Customs House, Karachi2017 PTD 458 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-29Read full judgment →
• Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs Saqlain and 2 othersPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 411, 2017 P Cr. L J 724 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-30
  appeal against acquittalbenefit of doubtattempt to murderappellate jurisdictionreappraisal of evidencepresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  The State preferred an appeal under section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court in a case relating to sections 324 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question revolved around whether the trial court's judgment of acquittal was perverse or suffered from any legal infirmity warranting interference by the appellate court. The Peshawar High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, noting missing corroborative evidence such as empties, blood, and bullet marks, alongside a prior pending criminal complaint between the parties indicating a possible false implication. The Court reaffirmed the principle that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and that an appellate court will not interfere with a finding of acquittal unless the conclusion reached by the trial court is arbitrary, artificial, or shocking. Consequently, the appeal against acquittal was dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • When will an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Does a single reasonable doubt entitle an accused to an acquittal?
  • What are the limitations on the power of an appellate court to convert an acquittal into a conviction?
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• Khyal Mir vs The State2017 PHC 1115 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-10Read full judgment →
• Khushdil vs The State2017 YLR 835 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-16
  appellate jurisdictionHudood lawsFederal Shariat CourtTazirforum of appealcriminal procedureOffences Against Property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court versus the Federal Shariat Court in criminal cases where the initial charge was framed under Hudood laws, but the conviction was ultimately recorded under the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellants were initially charged under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, but were subsequently convicted and sentenced by the trial court under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court possessed the jurisdiction to hear the appeal given that the conviction was under Tazir (Pakistan Penal Code) rather than the Hudood Ordinance. The Peshawar High Court held that the determining factor for the forum of appeal is the nature of the charge framed, not the section under which the sentence is eventually passed. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled that since the appellants were charged under Hudood laws, the appeal lies exclusively with the Federal Shariat Court. Consequently, the Court declared the appeals incompetent and ordered their transfer to the Federal Shariat Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does the forum of appeal depend on the section under which the conviction is recorded or the section under which the charge was originally framed?
  • Where does the appellate jurisdiction lie when an accused is charged under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 but convicted under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is an appeal filed before the High Court competent when the accused was originally charged under Hudood laws?
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• Khushdil vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 323 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-16
  appellate jurisdictionHudood lawsforum of appealcriminal appealcharge vs sentenceTazirOffences Against Property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two jail criminal appeals filed against a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Charsadda, which convicted the appellants under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Although the appellants were ultimately sentenced under the Pakistan Penal Code, they had been originally charged under Section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court possessed the appellate jurisdiction in a case where the charge was under Hudood laws but the conviction was under the Pakistan Penal Code. The Peshawar High Court held that the appeals were not competent before it and ordered their transfer to the Federal Shariat Court. The court established the principle that the forum of appeal is determined by the nature of the charge framed against the accused, rather than the specific provision under which the sentence is ultimately passed. Consequently, if an accused is charged under Hudood laws, the appellate jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Federal Shariat Court, regardless of whether the conviction is based on Tazir.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court or the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the accused was charged under Hudood laws but convicted under the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Is the forum of appeal determined by the charge framed against the accused or by the provision under which the sentence is passed?
  • Does a conviction under Tazir override the requirement to appeal to the Federal Shariat Court when the initial charge was under Hudood laws?
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• Khushdil Khan Malik vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi Cantt.2017 P.S.C. 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Defence Housing Authorityallotment of plotattached departmentprinciples of natural justiceshow-cause noticevested rightSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the legality of the cancellation of a residential plot allotted to the appellant by the Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad. The core legal question is whether the appellant, serving in the Directorate of Education of the Garrison, is an employee of an attached department of the Ministry of Defence and thus eligible for plot allotment under the housing scheme, and whether the unilateral cancellation of the plot without a show-cause notice was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the appellant belongs to an attached department of the Ministry of Defence, is paid from Defence Estimates, and acquired a vested right upon succeeding in the balloting and depositing the initial installment. The Court ruled that the cancellation of the plot without affording an opportunity of hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the cancellation order was set aside, and the Court directed the restoration or alternate allotment of the plot.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the Directorate of Education of the Garrison is an employee of an attached department of the Ministry of Defence?
  • Whether unilateral cancellation of a plot allotted through balloting without a show-cause notice violates the principles of natural justice?
  • Does a successful ballot and deposit of initial installment create a vested right in favor of the allottee?
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• Khushdil Khan Malik vs Secretary, Ministry of Defence Rawalpindi2017 P.S.C. 617, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 173 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-05-29
  Defence Housing AuthorityCategory-J eligibilitycivilian employees paid from defence estimatesnatural justiceshow cause noticeattached departmentRules of Business 1973
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the cancellation of a residential plot allotted to the appellant under 'Category-J' of the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a civilian employee of the Federal Government Educational Institutions (Cantonments/Garrisons) Directorate—an attached department of the Ministry of Defence—qualified as a 'civilian officer paid out of Defence Estimates' under the DHA eligibility criteria. A split verdict was rendered. The majority held that the appellant belonged to the Defence Services education cadre, was paid through internal arrangements of Defence Estimates, and that the unilateral cancellation of his plot without a show-cause notice violated natural justice. Conversely, the minority view concluded that the employee's department was funded through civil estimates and administered via the Accountant General of Pakistan Revenues, rendering him ineligible under Category-J. The appeal was allowed in accordance with the majority opinion, setting aside the cancellation and restoring the allotment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether civilian employees of the Federal Government Educational Institutions Directorate are paid out of Defence Estimates for the purpose of DHA plot allotment?
  • Does the unilateral cancellation of a plot allotted through balloting, without issuing a show-cause notice, violate the principles of natural justice?
  • Whether an attached department of the Ministry of Defence falls within the definition of a defence-paid organization?
  • Can administrative instructions override the statutory or structural classification of government budgetary estimates?
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• Khushdil and another vs The State2017 YLR 2218, 2017 PLJ FSC 144 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-04-27
  retracted confessionjudicial confessioncircumstantial evidencemurder during dacoityrobbed vehicle recoveryjail criminal appealvoluntariness of confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 396-PPC and sentencing them to life imprisonment for murder during a dacoity. The core legal question was whether the appellants' retracted judicial confessions, coupled with circumstantial evidence such as the recovery of the robbed vehicle and the deceased's National Identity Card, were sufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of direct ocular testimony. The Federal Shariat Court held that a retracted judicial confession, if found to be true, voluntary, and corroborated by attending circumstances and medical evidence, can validly form the basis of a conviction. The court laid down the principle that a short delay in recording a judicial confession does not render it involuntary, and mutual corroboration among multiple confessions along with recovery of incriminating articles completes the chain of circumstantial evidence required to establish guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis for a conviction if it is found to be true and voluntary?
  • Does a delay of a few days in recording a judicial confession automatically render it involuntary?
  • Whether the recovery of a robbed vehicle and the victim's identity card on the pointation of the accused can corroborate a judicial confession?
  • What is the effect of the death of an appellant during the pendency of a criminal appeal?
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• Khurshid Khan vs Mst. Asia & others2017 PHC 1237 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-08Read full judgment →
• Khurshid Begum vs Sabir Hussain2017 CLC 788 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2013-03-28Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Begum widow of Abdul Jabbar vs N/A2017 CLC 687 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-06Read full judgment →
• Khursheed Ahmad---Appellant vs The State and another---Respondents2017 P Cr. L J 1664 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-01
  rapecriminal appealconvictioncorroborative evidencemedical evidenceocular testimonyfamily honour
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan, for the offense of rape committed by the appellant against his real daughter. The core legal question concerns whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge of rape beyond reasonable doubt, given the appellant's defense of innocence and allegations of witness tutoring. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case was proved diligently and scrupulously. The court found that the victim's testimony was consistent, credible, and corroborated by the testimony of her mother, who witnessed the incident, as well as by medical evidence and the Chemical Examiner's report confirming the presence of semen. The court rejected the appellant's contentions of witness bias and tutoring, noting that the defense failed to create any dent in the prosecution's case during cross-examination. The principle laid down emphasizes that in cases involving heinous crimes against family members, the court must rigorously evaluate ocular and medical accounts, and where such evidence is consistent and corroborated, the conviction must be upheld to maintain societal peace and family dignity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a victim in a rape case can be accepted when corroborated by medical evidence and the testimony of a family member?
  • Does the failure of the defense to create contradictions during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses support the reliability of the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction for rape sustainable based on the consistent ocular account of the victim and supporting medical reports despite the accused's denial?
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• Khurram Shehzad vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and others2017 MLD 580 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Khurram Ghulam Rasool vs Shazia Khurram and others2017 PLD Lahore 689, 2017 LHC 1486 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-24
  family courtrestraining orderproperty alienationinterim maintenanceattachment before judgmentconstitutional petitionwest pakistan family courts act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an order passed by the Family Court, Lahore, whereby an application under Section 21-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 was accepted and the Petitioner was restrained from alienating his property. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Section 21-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 can be invoked on the first day of hearing based on mere apprehensions and without recording cogent evidence, and whether such a restraining order can be passed prior to or independent of an interim maintenance order or final decree. The Lahore High Court held that the Family Court acted prematurely and without lawful authority by issuing a restraining order amounting to attachment before judgment on the first date of hearing without establishing any concrete intention of the defendant to defeat the execution of a decree. The Court laid down that powers under Section 21-A are preservative and not punitive, requiring strong evidence of intent to alienate assets to frustrate a decree, and cannot be invoked lightly on vague apprehensions in a mere suit for maintenance where the defendant is regularly paying maintenance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Section 21-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 can be invoked on the first date of hearing without cogent evidence?
  • Can a Family Court pass an order restraining a party from alienating their property based merely on apprehensions that they might sell it?
  • What are the mandatory ingredients and criteria required to be fulfilled before passing an interim restraining order under Section 21-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Whether the principles of attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to proceedings under Section 21-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
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• Khuja vs Times Newspapers Limited and others2017 SCMR 1605 · Supreme Court of United Kingdom
  open justicereporting restrictionscontempt of courtright to private and family lifefreedom of expressionpre-emptive injunctionchild sexual exploitationpresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom arose from an application by an individual referred to as PNM (later named as Tariq Khuja) for an injunction to restrain media organisations, including The Times and the Oxford Mail, from publishing information identifying him as a person who had been arrested, bailed, and subsequently released without charge in connection with a high-profile criminal investigation into child sexual exploitation. The core legal question was whether the publication of matters exposed during a public criminal trial, which implicated a non-party in serious allegations without leading to formal charges, justified a pre-emptive injunction to protect private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, balancing it against the freedom of expression and the principle of open justice under Article 10. The Supreme Court majority held that the appeal should be dismissed and the injunction refused, ruling that fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings held in public is an essential extension of open justice, and that the incidental impact on a non-party's reputation and private life does not outweigh the strong public interest in reporting court proceedings. The key principle laid down is that restrictions on reporting matters disclosed in public trials are exceptional, and the public interest in open justice and media reporting generally permits the naming of individuals involved, as the collateral reputational damage does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy over public court proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an injunction can be granted to restrain the media from reporting matters disclosed during public criminal proceedings to protect the Article 8 rights of an uncharged third party?
  • Does the principle of open justice and freedom of the press outweigh the collateral reputational damage suffered by a non-party whose alleged involvement in a crime is mentioned in a public trial?
  • Whether the public interest in reporting judicial proceedings extends to the publication of the identity of individuals who are mere suspects and have never been formally charged?
  • What is the proper scope of reporting restriction orders under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 regarding fair and accurate reports of legal proceedings held in public?
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• Khudai Noor vs District Judge, Pishin and 2 others2017 YLR 2349 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-05-11
  Family CourtMaintenance allowanceDowerDowry articlesConstitutional petitionPleadingsIddat
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the Family Court and the District Judge, Pishin, which decreed a suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance, dower, and dowry articles in favor of the respondent. The petitioner contended that the suit was procedurally flawed due to the absence of the plaintiff's thumb impression on the plaint and that the parties had previously settled matters through arbitration. The High Court examined whether procedural irregularities in pleadings invalidated the suit and whether the wife was entitled to maintenance and dower despite the husband's claims. The Court held that omissions in signing or verifying pleadings constitute mere irregularities curable at any stage and do not warrant dismissal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that maintenance is a fundamental right of a wife during the subsistence of marriage and the Iddat period, regardless of the divorce method or Rukhsati status. Finding no illegality in the lower courts' reliance on the defendant's own admissions during cross-examination regarding the dower and dowry, the High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the concurrent findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to sign or affix a thumb impression on a plaint render a family suit liable for dismissal?
  • Is a wife entitled to maintenance during the subsistence of marriage and the Iddat period regardless of whether Rukhsati has taken place?
  • Can a husband avoid liability for maintenance by claiming the wife sought divorce on the basis of Khula?
  • Are admissions made by a defendant during cross-examination sufficient to establish claims for dower and dowry in the absence of documentary evidence?
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• Khudai Dad and 2 others vs Rahimuddin and 6 others2017 MLD 1143 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-03
  Illegal Dispossession Actcivil disputeco-sharersabuse of processproperty grabberscriminal acquittal appealland mafia
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Killa Abdullah, which dismissed a complaint filed under sections 3 and 4 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The appellants sought action against the respondents regarding a property dispute involving co-sharers of inherited land. The core legal question was whether the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, could be invoked to resolve a bona fide civil dispute between co-owners where civil litigation concerning the same property was already pending. The Court held that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, is a special legislation designed specifically to curb the activities of property grabbers and land mafias, not to settle civil disputes between co-sharers. The Court affirmed that attempting to convert a civil dispute into a criminal case through this Act constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the High Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that the civil court remains the competent forum for resolving such disputes between co-owners after the recording of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 apply to disputes between co-owners or co-sharers of immovable property?
  • Can a bona fide civil dispute regarding property title or possession be converted into a criminal case under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Is the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 applicable to cases where civil litigation regarding the same property is already pending?
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• Khuda-E-Noor vs The State2017 NLR Criminal 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-11-11
  honour killingterrorismAnti-Terrorism Court jurisdictionmens reastatutory interpretationcriminal trialtransfer of case
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the transfer of his criminal case, involving the murder of his sister, from a Sessions Court to an Anti-Terrorism Court. The trial court, relying on a previous High Court precedent, deemed the alleged 'honour killing' to be 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether all cases of honour killing automatically fall within the definition of 'terrorism' under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, thereby requiring trial by an Anti-Terrorism Court. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in their interpretation. It clarified that an action specified in Section 6(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, does not constitute 'terrorism' unless accompanied by the specific 'design' or 'purpose' defined in Section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Act. The Court ruled that private disputes or honour killings lacking such statutory design do not attract the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court. Consequently, the Court set aside the transfer orders, affirming that the case must be tried by a court of ordinary jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does every instance of honour killing automatically constitute 'terrorism' under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997?
  • Is the presence of a 'design' or 'purpose' as defined in Section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, a mandatory requirement for an act to be classified as terrorism?
  • Can a private offence committed without the specific designs mentioned in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
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• Khuda-E-Dad alias Pehlwan vs The State2017 SCMR 701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-03
  murderbenefit of reasonable doubtreappraisal of evidenceeye-witness testimonymotivecriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court upholding the appellant's conviction and death sentence under section 302(b), P.P.C., alongside convictions under sections 324 and 337-F(i), P.P.C., for murder and causing injuries. Upon granting leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence, the appellant's counsel did not contest the convictions under sections 324 and 337-F(i) as the sentences had already been served, confining the challenge solely to the murder conviction. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the murder charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish any motive, the eye-witnesses did not witness the actual shooting as they arrived after hearing gunshots, and the forensic evidence regarding the recovered firearm was legally inconsequential due to delayed dispatch of crime empties. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt regarding the murder. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed, the conviction and death sentence under section 302(b), P.P.C. were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of that charge, while the appeal regarding the other sections was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution can sustain a murder conviction under section 302(b), P.P.C., in the absence of proof of motive and direct eye-witness account of the shooting?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a firearm recovery when crime empties are sent to the forensic laboratory after the recovery of the weapon?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a capital sentence when eye-witnesses arrive at the scene only after hearing reports of firing?
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• Khuda Bakhsh vs The State2017 YLR 1804 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-22
  murdercapital punishmentdiminished responsibilitymitigating circumstanceseyewitness testimonymedical corroborationmotivecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from a judgment of the Sessions Judge, Bhakkar, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased and sentencing him to death, based on an eyewitness account and medical evidence. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt and whether the death sentence was warranted given the mitigating circumstances surrounding the domestic dispute and motive. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution successfully established the appellant's guilt through reliable eyewitness testimony and medical corroboration. However, taking into consideration that the murder stemmed from extreme emotional disturbance caused by the dissolution of the appellant's marriage with the deceased's niece, the Court applied the principle of diminished responsibility as a mitigating factor. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the criminal appeal while modifying the sentence from death to imprisonment for life, and answered the murder reference in the negative. The key principle laid down is that while ocular and medical evidence can safely sustain a conviction for murder, profound emotional distress and psychological disturbance arising from family breakdown can serve as a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment under the doctrine of diminished responsibility.

  Questions settled

  • Whether relationship of an eyewitness with the deceased is sufficient to discard testimony if it is otherwise trustworthy and corroborated?
  • Can a conviction for murder be recorded solely on the basis of ocular testimony when corroborated by medical evidence?
  • Whether emotional disturbance and psychological pressure arising from the breakdown of a family bond can be invoked as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to imprisonment for life under the doctrine of diminished responsibility?
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• Khizer Mehmood vs The State2017 YLR 1944 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-02
  circumstantial evidencebenefit of doubtmurder referencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessioncriminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal appeal filed by Khizer Mehmood against his conviction and death sentence for murder, alongside a complainant's appeal against the acquittal of co-accused persons, and a murder reference for sentence confirmation. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, given the absence of direct eyewitnesses. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, as the circumstantial evidence—comprising last-seen testimony, extra-judicial confession, and alleged motive—was inconsistent, unreliable, and failed to form a continuous, unbroken chain connecting the accused to the crime. The court emphasized that when circumstantial evidence is the sole basis for conviction, every link must be firmly established; missing links necessitate an acquittal. Furthermore, the court reiterated that the benefit of any reasonable doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right, not grace. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, dismissed the appeal against the co-accused, and answered the murder reference in the negative.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is incomplete?
  • Is the benefit of doubt a matter of right or a concession for an accused person?
  • Does medical evidence alone suffice to identify an accused in a criminal case?
  • What is the legal effect of withholding material and independent witnesses by the prosecution?
  Read full judgment →
• Khizar Yaseen etc. vs Mst. Khadija Bibi etc2017 LHC 221 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-23Read full judgment →
• Khizar Yaseen and others vs Mst. Khadija Bibi and others2017 LHC 221, 2017 CLC 1773 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-23Read full judgment →
• Khizar Badshah vs Mst. Tayyaba Fatima and 3 others2017 YLR 2466 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Khayal Din vs The State and another2017 LHC 3545 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-26
  post-arrest bailineffective firingvicarious liabilityfurther inquirycommon intentionstatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a petition filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein the petitioner sought post-arrest bail in respect of FIR No. 152/14 registered under Sections 302 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 at Police Station Kalabagh, District Mianwali. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner, who was attributed only ineffective firing and whose weapon recovery conflicted with ballistic evidence, is entitled to post-arrest bail pending trial. The court held that the case falls within the purview of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, noting the absence of specific fatal injury attribution, lack of crime empties matching the recovered weapon, and the prolonged incarceration without trial progress. The petition was accordingly allowed and post-arrest bail granted, laying down that mere heinousness of an offence does not disentitle an accused to bail when the case otherwise falls for further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when only the role of ineffective firing is attributed to the accused?
  • Does the mere heinousness of an offence serve as sufficient ground to refuse bail to an otherwise entitled accused?
  • Whether a case falls under further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when no crime empties are recovered to match the weapon allegedly seized from the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Khayaban-E-Iqbal (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Representative vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 4 others2017 PTD 2191 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-28Read full judgment →
• Khayaban-e-Iqbal (Pvt.) Limited vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 SHC 123 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-28Read full judgment →
• Khawer Hanif vs Imran Hanif and others2017 CLD 1788 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-06Read full judgment →
• Khawas Khan vs The State and others2017 MLD 739 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-01Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Wajid Ali vs District Coordination Officer and another2017 PLC (C.S.) 749 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-07
  civil servantservice tribunaljurisdictionsuspensionterms and conditions of servicemaintainabilityalternate efficacious remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service dispute where the Petitioner, a civil servant, challenged his suspension order and related administrative actions through a constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition challenging the terms and conditions of a civil servant's service, specifically regarding suspension, in light of constitutional bars. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. It reasoned that the Petitioner is a civil servant and that Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, provides exclusive jurisdiction to Service Tribunals regarding matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of service. The Court further noted that suspension is a temporary measure and not a punishment, and that the Petitioner had an alternate efficacious remedy available through departmental appellate authorities and the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court affirmed that its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is barred when such alternate remedies exist and when the matter falls within the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain a petition challenging the suspension of a civil servant?
  • Is a suspension order considered a punishment under the terms and conditions of service for a civil servant?
  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained under Article 199 of the Constitution when an alternate efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Khawaja Tariq Iqbal, Assistant Engineer, Public Health Engineering2017 SC AJK 95 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khawaja Rahim Ullah and others vs Bank of Punjab2017 CLD 873 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-12Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Akhlaq and 2 others vs Mst. Naseeba Jan w/o2017 SC AJK 363 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khawaja Muhammad Akhlaq and 2 others vs Mst. Naseeba Jan and 62017 P.S.C. 1520 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khaqan Ahmed s/o Muhammad Hafeez Khan, Form Attendant Fish2017 SC AJK 104 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Khan Wazir vs The StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 332 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-10-07
  post-arrest bailnarcotics recoverydelayed FSL transmissionControl of Narcotic Substances Actcriminal jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Khan Wazir, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 3.6 kilograms of charas pukhta from a vehicle driven by him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the circumstances of the recovery and the delay in sending samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). The Peshawar High Court held that the fourteen-day delay in transmitting the samples to the FSL raised a question to be determined at trial after recording evidence, and noted that the petitioner was not a previous convict or a hardened criminal. Consequently, the court allowed the bail petition, admitting the petitioner to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing reliable sureties. The key principle laid down is that unexplained or notable delays in sending narcotics samples to the FSL, coupled with the absence of previous convictions, can constitute sufficient grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, making the accused eligible for bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in sending recovered narcotics samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory provide sufficient grounds for grant of post-arrest bail?
  • Whether an accused found in possession of contraband can be admitted to bail when he has no previous criminal record?
  • Can further inquiry into the circumstances of sample transmission bring a case within the scope of prohibitory clause of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan vs Zahoor Ahmed, Etc2017 NLR Criminal 21 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  illegal dispossessionland grabbersqabza mafiastatutory interpretationpreamblecriminal liabilityspecial law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a larger bench reference to resolve a conflict regarding the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, specifically whether prosecution under Section 3 is restricted exclusively to individuals who possess the credentials and antecedents of professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia, or whether it extends to anyone who commits the defined offence. The core legal question addresses whether a complainant must establish past criminal antecedents of the accused as a condition precedent to maintain a complaint. The Supreme Court held that the statute applies universally to 'anyone' or 'whoever' commits illegal dispossession without lawful authority, and no precondition requires proving that an accused belongs to a land grabber class. The Court ruled that restricting the statute based on the preamble or legislative history was erroneous, thereby affirming the broader interpretation in earlier judgments and declaring restrictive precedents to be bad law. The appeals were allowed and cases remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prosecution under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is restricted only to those who possess the credentials and antecedents of professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia?
  • Does Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 impose a precondition that a complainant must establish the past criminal history of the accused before a complaint can be entertained?
  • Can the preamble of a statute be used to curtail or enlarge the clear and unambiguous meaning of its substantive provisions?
  • Does the term 'whoever' or 'anyone' in Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 bring any person who commits illegal dispossession within the ambit of prosecution without distinction?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Toti and others vs Government of NWFP through Secretary Finance2017 PLC (C.S) 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-16
  ministerial staff of judiciaryseparation of powersservice tribunal jurisdictioncivil servantsdiscriminationfinancial benefitsequal treatmentSupreme Court original jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition questions the legality of the Peshawar High Court judgment setting aside a Civil Court decree in a matter concerning the extension of financial and service benefits (selection grades and advance increments) to ministerial staff (Readers, Moharars, Examiners) of the District Judiciary, and directing them to approach the Provincial Service Tribunal. The core legal questions involve whether the ministerial staff of the subordinate judiciary fall within the definition of civil servants amenable to the Provincial Service Tribunal, and whether denying them financial benefits granted to similar grades constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court held that the judiciary stands separated from the executive under Article 175(3) of the Constitution and landmark jurisprudence, meaning the staff of the district judiciary are not civil servants under the control of the provincial service tribunal. Furthermore, the court held that denying financial benefits to the petitioners while granting them to others in identical grades violates the guarantee of equal treatment. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, declaring the impugned actions discriminatory and ordering the refund of all deductions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the ministerial and paralegal staff of the District Judiciary are civil servants amenable to the jurisdiction of the Provincial Service Tribunal?
  • Does the denial of financial benefits and selection grades to judicial staff while granting the same to comparable grades in the executive violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • What is the effect of the constitutional separation of the judiciary from the executive on the administrative and disciplinary control over subordinate court establishments?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Munir vs The State2017 PHC 1122 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-23Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad through L.Rs and others vs Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others2017 SCMR 1476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-15
  InheritanceMuslim Personal LawPre-deceased son's childrenLimited estateShari shareSuccessionLimitationCo-sharerOccupancy tenantsConstitutional suspension
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned a suit for declaration filed by the daughter of a pre-deceased son, seeking her shari share in her grandfather's legacy. The core legal questions revolved around whether the widows of the pre-deceased son inherited as full owners or limited estate holders, the entitlement of the pre-deceased son's daughter and widows to inherit, and the applicability and construction of the Punjab Tenancy Act, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, particularly regarding the retrospective effect of Section 4 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. It held that the widows were limited estate holders, and upon termination of their limited estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, became applicable, entitling the pre-deceased son's heirs to their shari shares. The Court also reiterated that no limitation runs against a co-sharer, and the operation of a Federal Shariat Court verdict against Section 4 MFLO is suspended under Article 203D of the Constitution.

  Read full judgment →
• Khan Javed Khan vs The State and 5 others2017 YLR 461 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Khan Gul vs Govt of KPK2017 PLJ Peshawar 358, 2017 PHC 635 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-21Read full judgment →
• Khan Gul vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Secretary Local2017 PLJ Peshawar 358 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khan Asghar and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary,Defence, Islamabad and 8 otherss2017 PLJ Peshawar 65, P LD 2017 Peshawar 31 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khan Asghar and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary2017 PLJ Peshawar 65 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Khan Alam vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 281 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-10-07
  post-arrest bailnarcotics controlcharas recoveryfurther inquirypolice tortureFSL report
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of 3 kilograms of charas from a vehicle driven by him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, considering the medico-legal report showing injuries, the absence of the Forensic Science Laboratory report, and the failure of the prosecution to record the statement of the vital witness on whose identification the contraband was allegedly recovered. The Peshawar High Court accepted the bail petition and held that these factors created a serious dent in the prosecution story, bringing the case within the scope of further inquiry. The key principle laid down is that unexplained injuries on the accused coupled with procedural lapses in the prosecution case, such as missing forensic reports and unrecorded witness statements on recovery points, constitute grounds for grant of post-arrest bail in narcotics cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether unexplained injuries on the person of an accused at the time of arrest constitute grounds for post-arrest bail?
  • Does the absence of a Forensic Science Laboratory report at the bail stage make out a case for further inquiry?
  • Whether failure to record the statement of a material witness on whose identification contraband is recovered creates a dent in the prosecution case?
  Read full judgment →
• Khamiso vs The State2017 PLJ FSC 158, 2017 PLD Federal Shariat Court 98 · Federal Service Tribunal · 2017-06-09
  criminal appealrobberywrongful confinementbenefit of doubtFIR delaycorroborationacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the judgment of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Sanghar, which convicted the appellant, Khamiso, for robbery and wrongful confinement. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the significant delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of recovery of stolen property, and inconsistencies in witness testimony. The Federal Shariat Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The court held that if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding an accused's guilt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right, not grace. The court emphasized that the prosecution failed to corroborate the complainant's testimony, particularly where the eye-witness failed to identify the appellant and the complainant's testimony regarding the stolen items contradicted the FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR undermine the prosecution's case?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of the doubt if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt regarding their guilt?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution fails to provide corroboratory evidence connecting the accused to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Khamiso vs State2017 PLJ FSC 158 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-06-07
  criminal appealrobberyacquittaldelayed FIRHudood Ordinanceconviction set aside
  Summary & questions settled

  The criminal appeal assailed the judgment of the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge Sanghar, whereby the appellant Khamiso was convicted and sentenced under Section 392 and Section 342 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case arose from an FIR lodged regarding an alleged robbery of a Datsun vehicle and other articles, where the appellant and others were implicated following a delayed report and subsequent identification during a private search. The Federal Shariat Court heard the appeal and, vide its short order, allowed the appeal, set aside the trial court's judgment along with the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant of the charges, directing his immediate release if not required in any other case. The judgment evaluates the prosecution's evidence regarding the delayed FIR and identification, resulting in the acquittal of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish identity and timely reporting?
  • Can an amended charge be framed during the trial under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an FIR lodged with a considerable delay after the alleged occurrence of robbery?
  Read full judgment →
• Khaliq Nawaz & 3 others vs Aj&K Govt. & 2 others2017 SCR 1504 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-02-06
  adverse possessionex-parte decreenecessary partiesvoid decreelimitation periodpecuniary jurisdictionstate land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court, which had set aside an ex-parte decree originally granted in a suit for declaration and adverse possession over state land. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, and whether the trial court's original decree was void due to the absence of necessary parties and improper service. The Supreme Court held that the direct appeal was incompetent because the subject matter did not meet the pecuniary threshold required by the Constitution. Furthermore, on the merits, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that the original decree was a nullity because the suit for adverse possession against state land was filed without impleading necessary government departments. The Court established that a decree passed in the absence of necessary parties is void, and where a judgment is void ab initio, the strict application of limitation periods may be relaxed, particularly when the date of knowledge is established and unrebutted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir competent if the subject matter of the dispute does not meet the prescribed pecuniary threshold?
  • Can a decree for adverse possession against state land be sustained if the relevant government departments are not impleaded as necessary parties?
  • Does the principle of limitation apply to an application for setting aside a decree that is void ab initio?
  Read full judgment →
• Khaliq Dad and another vs The State and another2017 YLR 1756 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-19Read full judgment →
• Khalil vs Sharafuddin Musleh Shami through Legal heirs and 3 others2017 YLR 1046 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-24Read full judgment →
• Khalil Khan vs The State and another2017 YLR 2472 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-01Read full judgment →
• Khalil Aziz vs Collector Land Acquisition & 3 others2017 SCR 929 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-05-27Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 455 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-17
  suspension of sentencestatutory grounddelayed appeallife imprisonmentpost-conviction bail
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Khalil Ahmed, sought the suspension of his sentence of life imprisonment under the statutory ground provided in Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, following his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence due to the delay in the disposal of his criminal appeal, exceeding two years without the appeal being fixed for hearing, pursuant to the statutory provisions. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner fulfilled the requirements under proviso (1-A)(c) to Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as more than two years had lapsed since the filing of the appeal and no material was brought on record to show that he was a desperate or hardened criminal. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the sentence was suspended during the pendency of the appeal subject to furnishing bail bonds. The key principle laid down is that a convict becomes entitled to statutory suspension of sentence under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the statutory delay threshold is met and they are not classified as a desperate or hardened criminal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a convict is entitled to suspension of sentence on statutory grounds when the appeal has not been fixed for hearing within the statutory period?
  • Does the delay in hearing an appeal against conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 warrant the suspension of sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What constitutes a disqualification for the grant of statutory suspension of sentence under proviso (1-A)(c) to Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalil Ahmed Soomro and others---Petitioners vs The State---2017 PLD Supreme Court 730 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-28
  pre-arrest bailmala fideprohibitory clauseshort orderjudicial reasoningmedico-legal reportliberty of citizen
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order recalling interim pre-arrest bail for the petitioners in a case involving various hurt provisions under the Pakistan Penal Code. The Supreme Court expressed strong displeasure regarding the High Court's failure to provide detailed reasons for its short order, emphasizing that judicial delay in such matters adversely affects the institution's decorum. On the merits, the Court observed that the alleged offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C. The Court held that where an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail, denying pre-arrest bail becomes a matter of technicality that risks unnecessary humiliation. Regarding mala fide, the Court ruled that solid evidence is often unavailable at the pre-arrest stage and may be inferred from circumstances such as over-broad accusations or exaggerated injuries. Furthermore, the Court censured Medico-legal Officers for assuming the role of prosecutors by citing specific penal sections, clarifying that their role is limited to describing the nature of injuries. Consequently, the Court granted leave and allowed pre-arrest bail.

  Read full judgment →
• Khalida Shaheen, Associate Professor Government Girls Degree College, Choki, Mirpur. vs Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 2 others2017 SC AJK 329 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
  service lawlimitation periodretrospective promotiondepartmental appealcivil servantadministrative discretionservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service matter where the appellant challenged the dismissal of her appeal by the Service Tribunal on the grounds of limitation. The appellant sought retrospective promotion, arguing that her delay in approaching the Service Tribunal was due to pending departmental review petitions. The core legal question was whether a civil servant is required to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal within the statutory limitation period, irrespective of whether a departmental appeal or representation is pending. The Supreme Court upheld the Service Tribunal's decision, affirming that a civil servant must file an appeal within the prescribed period from the date of the impugned order's communication, regardless of pending departmental remedies. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to ensure the prompt finalization of service disputes to avoid administrative complications. Nevertheless, the Court observed that while the appeal was time-barred, the government retains the discretion to exercise its powers under the relevant civil service legislation to address potential discrimination, thereby balancing strict procedural compliance with the principles of equitable administrative justice.

  Questions settled

  • Must a civil servant file an appeal with the Service Tribunal within the prescribed limitation period even if a departmental appeal or review is pending?
  • Does the pendency of a departmental representation extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  • Can the government exercise its powers under the Civil Servants Act to redress grievances even if a judicial appeal is found to be time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid vs The State etc.2017 PHC 702 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-11Read full judgment →
• Khalid vs Mst. Akbar Jan and another2017 MLD 599 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-01Read full judgment →
• Khalid Pervez Bhatti vs Mst. Madiha Rafiq2017 PLJ Islamabad 97 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-11-01Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood, Iraq/Specal Assistant to Commissioner, Inland2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 147 · Federal Service Tribunal
  service appealdisciplinary proceedingsacquittaldouble jeopardymajor penaltycivil servantillegal tax refunds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a departmental order imposing a major penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale upon the appellant under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, regarding alleged illegal tax refunds. The core legal question was whether departmental disciplinary proceedings can be sustained against a civil servant when they have already been acquitted by a competent court of law on the same charges. The Federal Service Tribunal held that the impugned penalty order and the subsequent appellate order were unjustified and set them aside. The Tribunal reasoned that once a competent court of law has acquitted a civil servant of criminal charges, departmental proceedings based on the same allegations become void and irrelevant. Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized that a subordinate cannot be punished for the faults of others, especially when the actual culprits were identified by the court and the appellant had limited service experience at the time of the incident. Consequently, the appellant was restored to his original status with all consequential benefits.

  Questions settled

  • Can departmental disciplinary proceedings be sustained against a civil servant after they have been acquitted by a competent court of law on the same charges?
  • Does the acquittal of a civil servant in criminal proceedings render simultaneous departmental proceedings on the same allegations void?
  • Can a civil servant be held liable for the faults of others in the context of departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs The State2017 SCMR 201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-11-14
  death sentencemitigating circumstancesQisasTa'zirmurderbrutalitysentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged his convictions and death sentence under Sections 302(b), 324, and various sub-sections of Section 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.) for murdering his wife and brother-in-law, and injuring three others. Leave to appeal was granted to determine if Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the P.P.C. applied to the case, and whether mitigating circumstances existed to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the P.P.C. are applicable exclusively to cases of Qisas and have no relevance to cases of Ta'zir. On the question of mitigation, the Court observed that the appellant acted with extreme brutality, using a pistol and a screw-driver to gouge out the eyes of some victims. Consequently, the Court found no mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction in sentence, maintaining the convictions and death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Sections 306, 307, and 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code apply to cases of Ta'zir?
  • Can a death sentence be reduced to life imprisonment on the ground of mitigation if the offender acted with extreme brutality and mercilessness?
  • Are the statutory provisions governing Qisas relevant to a trial and conviction under Ta'zir?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs Shabir Ahmed and another-2017 MLD 1497 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-30Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood vs Mst. Naseem Akhtar and 9 others2017 MLD 338 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-05
  civil revisiondeclaration suitmutation of inheritancefraud and misrepresentationburden of proofpresumption of truthofficial recordpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of a judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Wazirabad, which reversed the trial court's dismissal of a declaration suit and decreed the plaintiffs' claim regarding inheritance and sale mutations. The core legal questions involve the burden of proof in allegations of fraud regarding mutations, the necessity of pleading particulars of fraud under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the necessity of impleading revenue officials as parties when fraud is alleged against them, the presumption of truth attached to official records under Articles 91 and 92 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and the maintainability of a bare suit for declaration without seeking possession under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiffs failed to discharge the initial onus of proving fraud or misrepresentation, that non-pleading of specific particulars of fraud is fatal, that revenue officials must be impleaded if fraud is alleged against them, and that a bare suit for declaration without seeking possession is defective. The civil revision was allowed, setting aside the appellate court judgment and restoring the trial court's dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to specifically plead particulars of fraud under Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when challenging a mutation?
  • Does failure to implead revenue officials as defendants constitute a fatal defect when fraud is alleged against them in the attestation of a mutation?
  • What is the evidentiary value and presumption of truth attached to official mutation records under Articles 91 and 92 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Is a bare suit for declaration maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 when the plaintiffs are neither recorded owners nor in possession of the suit land?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and others vs M/s Multi Plus Corporation Private Limited2017 SHC 326 · Sindh High Court · 2017-10-05Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and another vs The State through Advocate-General, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzaffarabad and another2017 P Cr. L J 1383 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-04-22
  post-arrest bailmurderlalkarafacilitationfurther inquiryinjured eye-witnessescriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal revision petition arising from concurrent lower court orders refusing bail to the petitioners in a case involving murder and related offences. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners, who were attributed with raising a lalkara, catching hold of the deceased, and facilitating the principal offender, are entitled to post-arrest bail. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dismissed the petition, holding that at the bail stage only a cursory view of the evidence is to be taken, and since the petitioners were nominated in a promptly lodged FIR, supported by multiple injured eye-witnesses, and played an active participatory role in the pre-planned attack rather than a mere proverbial lalkara, they are prima facie connected with the crime and not entitled to bail. The key principle laid down is that while mere proverbial lalkara without other overt acts may warrant further inquiry, a lalkara coupled with active facilitation—such as catching hold of the deceased—deprives the victim of self-defense and justifies the refusal of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person attributed with a lalkara and catching hold of the deceased is entitled to post-arrest bail?
  • How should the evidentiary value of a lalkara be assessed at the bail stage in a criminal case?
  • Does the statement of injured eye-witnesses carry sufficient weight to decline bail to an accused implicated in a murder case?
  • Can bail be refused when the accused is prima facie connected with the crime through a promptly lodged FIR and corroborative medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and 4 others vs Messrs Multi Plus Corporation2017 CLD 1737 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-21Read full judgment →
• Khalid Mehmood and 3 others vs Safdar Iqbal and another2017 P Cr. L J 1104 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-24
  quashment of criminal proceedingsjactitation of marriagebinding effect of family court judgmentforged nikahnamapower of trial court to acquitabuse of process of court
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenged orders of the lower courts dismissing the petitioners' application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and a subsequent revision petition in a case involving alleged forgery and cheating regarding a marriage. The core legal question was whether a family court's final judgment and decree declaring a marriage valid and granting jactitation of marriage has a binding effect on a concurrent criminal trial concerning allegations of a forged nikahnama. The Lahore High Court held that the decision of the family court on the issue of nikah has a binding effect on the criminal trial, and since the family court had conclusively decreed the marriage in favour of the parties, the criminal prosecution was groundless and an abuse of process. The court laid down the principle that a family court's determination of a matrimonial status is binding on criminal proceedings, and where such determination nullifies the basis of the criminal charge, proceedings may be quashed and the accused acquitted under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does a family court's decision regarding the validity of a marriage have a binding effect on a concurrent criminal trial?
  • Can an application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be filed at any stage of the trial?
  • Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed when the foundational dispute regarding matrimonial status has been resolved by a competent family court?
  • Can a criminal lis be agitated or defended through a special attorney?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal, Malik Muhammad Sabir, Awais Malik and others, Muhammad Haseeb vs Mushtaq Sukhera, Ig Police and other, Mushtaq Sukhera, Ig Police, Muhammad Amin Vans and others2017 SCMR 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionservice mattersconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalseniorityres judicatalimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of the Supreme Court's earlier judgment in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed (2017 SCMR 206), which declared 'out of turn promotions' in the police force unconstitutional. Following this, the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Punjab, reviewed individual cases and issued orders withdrawing such promotions. Certain police officers, supported by the Home Department, challenged these withdrawals, contending that their promotions were protected by judicial orders and paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The core legal question was whether promotions previously granted via High Court or Tribunal orders remained protected despite the Supreme Court's mandate. The Court held that the IGP’s actions were correct and in accordance with the law. It clarified that High Court orders granting such promotions were issued without jurisdiction, as service matters fall exclusively under the purview of Service Tribunals per Article 212 of the Constitution. Furthermore, previous Supreme Court dismissals based on limitation did not constitute decisions on merits or res judicata. The Court directed the immediate de-notification of the affected officers.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to issue writs regarding out of turn promotions in service matters?
  • Do previous Supreme Court dismissals of petitions on the ground of limitation constitute a decision on merits or res judicata?
  • Are out of turn promotions granted by judicial fora protected if the Inspector General of Police has reviewed and withdrawn them in accordance with Supreme Court directives?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal, Malik Muhammad Sabir, Awais Malik and others2017 PLC (C.S) 1242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionservice mattersjurisdiction of High CourtArticle 212police serviceres judicatalimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the implementation of the Supreme Court's judgment in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed, which declared out-of-turn promotions in the police service unconstitutional. The core legal question was whether police officers who previously obtained court orders for out-of-turn promotions were protected from the withdrawal of such benefits under the Shahid Pervaiz ruling. The Court held that the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, correctly reviewed individual cases and that the officers were not entitled to protection. The Court clarified that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain service-related petitions, as Article 212 mandates exclusive jurisdiction for Service Tribunals. Furthermore, the Court ruled that previous dismissals of petitions on limitation grounds did not constitute decisions on merits or create res judicata. The principle laid down is that administrative actions withdrawing unconstitutional benefits, based on a proper review process, are valid, and that judicial fora cannot bypass the constitutional bar on service matters by issuing writs for out-of-turn promotions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a petition on the ground of limitation constitute a decision on merits or create res judicata?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to entertain petitions regarding out-of-turn promotions in service matters?
  • Are out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to High Court or Service Tribunal orders protected from withdrawal if the underlying basis for those promotions was unconstitutional?
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• Khalid Mehmood Afzal , Malik Muhammad Sabir , Awais Malik and others_0254dd192017 P.S.C. 1169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  out of turn promotionpolice serviceseniorityservice tribunal jurisdictionconstitutional jurisdictionpast and closed transaction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter emanates from previous judgments of the Supreme Court declaring out-of-turn promotions unconstitutional and violative of Fundamental Rights, notably Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed. The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, reviewed individual police officers' out-of-turn promotion cases and issued speaking orders withdrawing them, while the Home Department and Advocate General Punjab contended that certain promotions were judicially protected under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The core legal question was whether out-of-turn promotions granted or facilitated by judicial fora or service tribunals remained protected under the exceptions carved out in the Shahid Pervaiz case, and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain such service matters under Article 199 of the Constitution in light of the constitutional bar of Article 212. The Supreme Court held that the IGP's review and individual speaking orders withdrawing the out-of-turn promotions were valid and in conformity with the law, clarifying that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain service matters relating to terms and conditions of service under Article 199. The key principle laid down is that out-of-turn promotions are subject to review, and service matters exclusively fall within the domain of departmental authorities and service tribunals under Article 212 of the Constitution, barring constitutional petitions before the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain petitions relating to out-of-turn promotions in view of the bar contained in Article 212?
  • Do out-of-turn promotions granted pursuant to orders of judicial fora or service tribunals stand protected under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz case after departmental review?
  • Does the dismissal of a time-barred civil petition by the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent on merits under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Whether the Inspector General of Police has the authority to review and withdraw out-of-turn promotions following the declarations made by the Supreme Court?
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• (1) Khalid Mehmood Afzal (2) Malik Muhammad Sabir (3) Awais Malik and2017 PLC (C.S) 1242, 2017 P.S.C. 1169, 2017 SCMR 868, 2017 SCP 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-03-29
  out of turn promotionpolice servicesenioritypast and closed transactionconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunalcontempt proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter emanates from earlier judgments of the Supreme Court declaring out of turn promotions unconstitutional, specifically the ruling in Shahid Pervaiz v. Ejaz Ahmed (2017 SCMR 206). The core legal question concerned whether certain police officers who had previously obtained out of turn promotions through orders of judicial fora or service tribunals were protected from the reversal of such promotions under paragraphs 111 and 143 of the Shahid Pervaiz judgment. The Supreme Court held that the view point of the Inspector General of Police, Punjab, was correct and that the out of turn promotions were not protected, as the review contemplated by the judgment had been lawfully conducted by the IG of Police after issuing notices and hearing the affected officers. The Court laid down that promotions granted by courts acting without jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in service matters barred by Article 212 do not constitute binding precedents or past and closed transactions when the underlying basis of discrimination has been removed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether out of turn promotions granted pursuant to judicial orders are protected under the principles laid down in the Shahid Pervaiz case?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to entertain petitions relating to terms and conditions of service in view of the bar contained in Article 212?
  • Whether the dismissal of a civil petition on the ground of limitation constitutes a decision on merits having binding force under Article 189 of the Constitution?
  • Can an out of turn promotion initially granted on the ground of discrimination remain intact after the promotions of the benchmark officials have been reversed?
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• Khalid Mehmood & others vs M/s. Multi Plus Corporation Private Limited &2017 SHC 296, 2017 CLD 1737 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-21Read full judgment →
• Khalid Khan vs The State and another2017 YLR 2530 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-01
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirysupplementary statementdelayed FIRcircumstantial evidencemurdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from a murder case registered under Section 302 and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, Khalid Khan, sought bail after being implicated in a supplementary statement three days after the FIR was lodged, despite the complainant and witnesses having prior knowledge of the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the delayed implication, the lack of an eye-witness account in the FIR, and the questionable evidentiary value of the supplementary statement and recovery. The Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from significant doubts, particularly due to the delayed naming of the accused and the lack of crime-empty recovery, rendering the case one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court granted bail, establishing the principle that a supplementary statement introducing new accused persons after a significant delay, coupled with improvements to the prosecution's story, creates sufficient doubt to warrant bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does the introduction of an accused in a supplementary statement after a significant delay constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be refused solely on the basis that the accused is charged with a heinous offence?
  • Does the failure to recover crime-empty from the scene of the crime weaken the prosecution's case regarding the recovery of a weapon from the accused?
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• Khalid Khan vs Fazal Riaz2017 PHC 1148 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-20Read full judgment →
• Khalid Hussain Magsi vs Mir Abdul Rahim Rind and othersK.L.R. 2017 SC 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-03
  election petitionverification on oathbiometric verificationNADRA reportriggingreturned candidatevoid election
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from an election dispute over the National Assembly seat NA-267 Kachi-cum-Jhal Magsi following the general elections held on 11.5.2013, where the appellant was declared the returned candidate. The respondent challenged the election before the Election Tribunal, alleging widespread rigging and the detention of polling agents. During the proceedings, biometric verification by NADRA cast doubt on 7555 votes across several polling stations. The Tribunal declared the election void as a whole, leading to the present appeal. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of the election petition regarding its verification on oath and whether widespread irregularities and dubious voting patterns warranted setting aside the election. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the election petition was duly verified and, upon analyzing the consolidated voting data and NADRA's report, concluded that the election was not conducted fairly. The appeal was dismissed, and the election was declared void under Section 70(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The key principle laid down is that anomalous voting patterns, exceptionally high turnouts in specific polling stations, and substantial biometric discrepancies established by NADRA can collectively prove pervasive illegal practices, justifying the invalidation of an entire election.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an election petition is maintainable when there is a discrepancy of one day between the printed date and the date of verification by the Oath Commissioner?
  • Does an election petition contain sufficient compliance with verification on oath if it bears the stamp 'sworn before me' and an accompanying affidavit?
  • Whether anomalous voting patterns and unusually high voter turnouts in specific polling stations can serve as proof of illegal practices during an election?
  • Can an election be declared void as a whole under Section 70(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, when the number of doubtful votes identified by NADRA exceeds the winning margin of the returned candidate?
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• Khalid Humayun vs The NAB through its D.G. Quetta and others2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  plea bargainNAB corruption casediscretionary powerbailstatutory interpretationpublic accountabilitymisuse of authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's bail application in a corruption case. The core legal questions concerned the nature of the Chairman NAB’s discretion under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 regarding plea bargains, and whether such discretion was exercised lawfully. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail petition, finding sufficient prima facie evidence of the petitioner's involvement in the defalcation of public funds. The Court held that the Chairman NAB’s discretion under Section 25(b) is structured, not absolute or arbitrary, and must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and justly, as mandated by Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Chairman is required to independently consider the facts and circumstances of each case rather than merely endorsing the recommendations of subordinates. The Court emphasized that corruption is a crime against humanity, and NAB’s statutory powers must be utilized to eradicate corruption, not to facilitate plea bargains that effectively condone criminal conduct. The judgment underscores that statutory functionaries must act strictly in accordance with the law to maintain institutional credibility.

  Questions settled

  • Is the discretion vested in the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, absolute and unfettered?
  • Does Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 apply to the exercise of discretionary powers by the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau?
  • Is the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau required to independently consider the facts and circumstances of a case before accepting a plea bargain?
  • Can the Supreme Court of Pakistan exercise its powers under Article 187(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to issue directions regarding the exercise of statutory functions by the National Accountability Bureau?
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• Khalid Humayun vs The NAB through D.G. Quetta and others2017 PLD Supreme Court 194, 2017 PLJ SC 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  post-arrest bailNational Accountability Bureauplea bargaindiscretion of Chairman NABSection 24A General Clauses ActArticle 187(1) Constitutioncomplete justicemisappropriation of public funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan refusing bail to the petitioner in a corruption inquiry conducted by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The petitioner, acting as Advisor on Finance, was implicated alongside the Secretary Finance regarding massive defalcation of municipal development funds. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the merits, finding sufficient prima facie evidence implicating the petitioner and holding that medical grounds were insufficient to warrant release. Additionally, exercising its constitutional powers under Article 187(1) to ensure complete justice, the Court reviewed the Chairman NAB's acceptance of a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the NAB Ordinance, 1999. The Court held that the Chairman's discretion under Section 25(b) is not absolute, arbitrary, or unfettered, but structured and bound by Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Chairman must independently evaluate the facts and give reasons rather than mechanically endorsing subordinate recommendations or accepting seized assets as voluntary offers.

  Questions settled

  • Is the discretion of the Chairman NAB to accept a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the NAB Ordinance absolute and unfettered?
  • Does the seizure of assets during a raid constitute a voluntary offer to return ill-gotten gains for the purposes of a plea bargain?
  • Are statutory functionaries like the Chairman NAB required under Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to give reasoned decisions when exercising executive power?
  • Can bail be granted on medical grounds if medical reports do not establish that continued incarceration poses a danger to the accused's life or health?
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• Khalid Humayun vs NAB through its D.G. Quetta and others2017 PLJ SC 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  post-arrest bailplea bargainNational Accountability Bureaumisappropriation of public fundsexercise of discretionmedical grounds baildelay in filing reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition for post-arrest bail in a corruption inquiry conducted by the National Accountability Bureau. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the prolonged detention without a reference, whether bail was warranted on medical grounds, and the legality of the Chairman NAB's acceptance of a plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly declined bail on merits and medical grounds, finding no immediate risk to life, and further ruled that the Chairman NAB failed to exercise his statutory discretion reasonably, fairly, and independently when accepting the co-accused's plea bargain regarding seized public funds. The key principles laid down are that the Chairman NAB's discretion under Section 25(b) is structured and must be exercised reasonably, fairly, and with due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case in accordance with Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course when serious prima facie allegations exist.

  Questions settled

  • Whether plea bargain under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 can be entered into when money and assets are seized by NAB as opposed to ill-gotten assets or gains voluntarily offered to be returned by the accused?
  • Whether the Chairman NAB must take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case while making a decision under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999?
  • Does indefinite incarceration without the filing of a reference entitle an accused to post-arrest bail in corruption cases?
  • Whether the discretionary powers vested in the Chairman NAB under Section 25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are subject to Section 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897?
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• (1) Khalid Farooq & another (2) The State & another vs (1) The State (2)2017 LHC 2167 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-26
  benefit of doubtmurderocular evidencecriminal appealdeath sentenceappreciation of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellants for the murder of two brothers, Hamid Mehmood and Basit Ali. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, along with several co-accused, attacked the deceased following a trivial dispute over payment for soft drinks. The trial court convicted the appellants while acquitting four co-accused. On appeal, the Court examined the reliability of the ocular evidence and the integrity of the investigation. The Court found that the prosecution's narrative, including the motive and the use of non-conventional weapons, was inconsistent and lacked credibility. Furthermore, the Court noted that the acquittal of co-accused, who were implicated alongside the appellants, undermined the prosecution's case, necessitating independent corroboration which was absent. The Court held that when the prosecution's case is riddled with doubts and the participation of some accused is found suspicious, it is unsafe to maintain convictions based on a 'guess game'. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the appellants, set aside their convictions, and acquitted them, emphasizing that it is better to err in acquittal than in conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the acquittal of co-accused in a criminal case necessitate independent corroboration for the remaining accused?
  • Is it safe to maintain a conviction where the prosecution's narrative regarding the motive and weapons used is inconsistent with the evidence?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be extended when the prosecution's case relies on a 'guess game' regarding the participation of the accused?
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• Khalid Aziz vs PTV2017 PLD Peshawar 115, 2017 PHC 547 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05Read full judgment →
• Khalid Aziz vs Pakistan Television through Managing Director and 52017 PLD Peshawar 115 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-05
  defamationlibeldamagestelevision broadcastmaliceburden of prooffair commentdefamation ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This Regular First Appeal under section 15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 was filed against the trial court's judgment dismissing the appellant's suit for recovery of damages for defamation. The appellant, a senior civil servant, alleged that an Urdu drama serial titled 'Saza Aur Jaza', telecasted by Pakistan Television, depicted a corrupt and cruel bureaucrat named 'Shakeel' whose life sketch, family furniture business, and pending accountability references closely mirrored the appellant's persona, thereby lowering his reputation and causing severe mental agony. The core legal question was whether the telecast constituted actionable defamation under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, and whether the defense of depicting fictitious social evils in good faith could exonerate the respondents. The Peshawar High Court examined the evidence and held that the broadcast contained defamatory, exaggerated imputations directly pointing to the appellant without establishing justification or truth. The court emphasized that under the Defamation Ordinance, falsehood is presumed unless truth or privilege is proven, and a lack of personal acquaintance does not absolve the publisher of liability for defamatory broadcasts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaintiff must prove express malice when the published material is defamatory on its face and not established to be true?
  • Does the depiction of a fictional character in a television play afford immunity from a defamation suit if the surrounding circumstances point to a living individual?
  • What are the essential ingredients to constitute actionable defamation under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002?
  • Can a publisher escape liability for defamation by pleading that a broadcast was made in good faith as fair criticism of social evils without proving the truth of the underlying imputations?
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• Khalid Aziz etc. vs Province of Punjab etc.2017 LHC 1959 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-10
  civil revisiondeclaratory suitappellate judgmentspeaking judgmentremandpoints for determination
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate judgment and decree whereby a declaratory suit originally decreed in favor of the petitioners was dismissed. The core legal question concerns whether the lower appellate court judgment complied with the mandatory requirements of law regarding a reasoned appellate decision. The court held that an appellate judgment must state the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision, and failure to discuss oral evidence or record independent reasons renders the judgment unsustainable. The ratio is that an appellate court judgment lacking points for determination, discussion of evidence, and adequate reasoning violates the procedural requirements of law and warrants a remand. The key principle laid down is that an appellate judgment must be a self-explanatory, speaking judgment complying with procedural mandates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court judgment is legally sustainable if it fails to frame or address points for determination?
  • Is an appellate court required to discuss oral and documentary evidence when reversing the trial court's findings?
  • What are the essential requirements of a valid appellate judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Khalid Aziz and another vs Government of Punjab through Chief2017 PLC (C.S.) 1090 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-11
  disciplinary proceedingsremoval from servicebogus transfer ordersservice tribunalcriminal proceedingssupreme court
  Summary & questions settled

  The instant petitions arise out of a consolidated judgment passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, upholding the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the petitioners after joint disciplinary proceedings conducted under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006. The core legal question involved whether the penalty of removal from service could be sustained when proper disciplinary proceedings, codal formalities, and substantial evidence regarding the preparation of bogus transfer orders in exchange for bribe money were established, and whether criminal proceedings by Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) authorities override independent departmental proceedings. The Supreme Court held that proper disciplinary proceedings were duly conducted, that criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously and independently without one overriding the other, and that no substantial question of law of public importance arose to warrant interference. The Court laid down the principle that the conclusion arrived at in criminal proceedings by ACE authorities does not override independent departmental disciplinary proceedings, and refused leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings by anti-corruption authorities override independent departmental disciplinary proceedings?
  • Whether joint disciplinary proceedings under the PEEDA Act, 2006 can result in the major penalty of removal from service upon proof of corruption?
  • Does an acquittal or exoneration in criminal proceedings automatically vitiate a penalty imposed through departmental disciplinary proceedings?
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• Khalid Ahmed and 2 others vs Enviromental Protection Agency, Punjab2017 CLD 328 · Environmental Tribunal · 2016-07-19
  environmental approvalinitial environmental examinationenvironmental impact assessmentlimitation periodprovincial legislative competenceenvironmental lawdelegated legislation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an Environmental Approval granted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Punjab, for the construction of a multi-story hotel. The core legal questions were whether the appeal was time-barred and whether the EPA could lawfully rely on the Federal 'PEPA Review of IEE and EIA Regulations 2000' following the enactment of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act 2012. The Tribunal held that the appeal was maintainable, as the appellants, not being parties to the original proceedings, were not communicated the order, and the limitation period commenced from the date of knowledge. Crucially, the Tribunal set aside the approval, ruling that the EPA, Punjab, failed to frame necessary regulations under Section 33(2)(f) of the Punjab Environmental Protection Act 2012. The Tribunal established that Federal regulations cannot be applied by a Provincial Agency after the enactment of provincial legislation without proper adoption or modification, and that the failure to frame mandatory provincial regulations renders the Agency's actions, such as granting environmental approvals, legally unsustainable and without jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for an appeal against an environmental approval commence from the date of the order or the date of knowledge for a non-party?
  • Can a Provincial Environmental Protection Agency rely on Federal regulations after the enactment of a specific provincial environmental statute?
  • Is an environmental approval granted by a Provincial Agency valid in the absence of regulations framed under the provincial environmental legislation?
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• Khalid & another vs The StatePHC 2017 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-02-27
  post-arrest bailattempted murderindiscriminate firingexaggerated chargetentative assessmentFSL report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a post-arrest bail petition filed by the accused petitioners, Khalid and Zeeshan, in a case registered under Sections 324, 452, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners along with co-accused unlawfully entered a residence and fired indiscriminately, injuring the female complainant, allegedly due to a blood feud. The primary legal issue before the Peshawar High Court was whether the accused petitioners were entitled to post-arrest bail based on a tentative assessment of the material on record. The court observed that despite five accused being charged with indiscriminate firing, only four empties from a single 30-bore weapon were recovered, the complainant received a single non-fatal injury, and her husband standing nearby remained unhurt despite being the natural target in a blood feud. The court held that the possibility of an exaggerated charge could not be ruled out. Consequently, the bail petition was allowed, granting the petitioners bail subject to furnishing bail bonds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when the physical evidence contradicts the allegation of indiscriminate firing by multiple accused?
  • Does the uninjured presence of a male target during an alleged attack motivated by a blood feud justify granting bail on the ground of an exaggerated charge?
  • Can bail be allowed based on a tentative assessment when only a single firearm injury is sustained despite charges against five accused?
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• Khaista Gul vs state2017 PHC 638 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Khadim Hussain vs State, etc2017 PLJ Lahore 675 · Lahore High Court · 2016-11-16Read full judgment →