Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Messrs B.P. Pakistan Exploration and Production Inc vs The Cir, Zone-2017 PTD (Trib.) 1725 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-12-09Read full judgment →
• Messrs Azad Kashmir Logging and Saw Mills Corporation (Aklasc), Muzaffarabad vs Commissioner Income Tax, Inland Revenue, Muzaffarabad2017 PTD 1058 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-05Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ayub Textile Industries through Proprietor vs Commissioner2017 PTD 352 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-29Read full judgment →
• Messrs Arbab Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Managing Partner2017 CLD 1657 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-21
  banking courtex parte decreerecovery suitleave to defendmaintainability of appealfinancial institutions recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This first appeal challenged an order passed by the Banking Court, which refused to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree previously issued against the appellant in a recovery suit filed by a respondent bank. The appellant argued that the Banking Court had prioritized technicalities over fair adjudication and failed to properly appreciate the record. The core legal question was whether an application to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree, passed on merits by a Banking Court, is maintainable under the relevant financial recovery laws. Upon review, the Court observed that the Banking Court had indeed passed the decree on merits after examining the record and the appellant's application for leave to defend, even while proceeding ex parte. The Court held that a judgment and decree passed on merits cannot be set aside under the provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The established principle is that the appropriate remedy in such circumstances is to file an appeal against the judgment and decree itself, rather than seeking to set aside the ex parte order.

  Questions settled

  • Is an application to set aside an ex parte judgment and decree passed on merits by a Banking Court maintainable under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party aggrieved by an ex parte judgment and decree passed on merits by a Banking Court?
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• Messrs Angora Textiles Ltd. and others vs Nib Bank Limited and others2017 CLD 867 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-08Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amin Spinning Mills Ltd., Industrial Area Mirpur Azad KashmirPTCL 2017 CL. 227, 2017 PTD 201 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
• Messrs Allah Wala Auto Engineering vs Deputy Collector of Customs2017 PTD (Trib.) 2201 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2017-06-01Read full judgment →
• Messrs Alfalah Medicos through Sole Proprietor and anothers vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Primary and Secondary Healthcare and 4 others2017 PLD Lahore 124 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-06Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Hussain Trades Contractor vs Government of Sindh2017 PTD 1156 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-04Read full judgment →
• Messrs Al-Haj Enterprises (Pvt.). Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Model2017 PTD 2016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  customs rulesbonded carrierPOL productsshort supplyevaporationpost export auditcustoms reference application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the transport of POL products by a bonded carrier to ISAF in Afghanistan under the Customs Rules, 2001. During a post-export audit, shortages exceeding the permissible one percent limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 were discovered, leading to show-cause notices, adjudication by the Collector of Customs, an appeal before the Customs Appellate Tribunal, and a Customs Reference Application in the Islamabad High Court, all of which went against the petitioner. The core legal question was whether a bonded carrier can be held liable for short supplies exceeding one percent under Rule 564(4) when the shortage is attributed to factors like evaporation rather than pilferage or broken seals. The Supreme Court held that since the consequences for short supply beyond one percent are explicitly provided in Rule 564(4) and were fully attracted, no legal error was committed by the lower forums. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave refused. The key principle laid down is that strict liability applies under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 for cargo shortages exceeding the prescribed one percent limit during transit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bonded carrier can be held liable under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 for cargo shortages exceeding one percent caused by evaporation?
  • Does Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 require proof of pilferage or broken seals before imposing liability on a carrier for short supplies?
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• Messrs Al-Haj Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd vs Collector of Customs, ModelK.L.R. 2017 S.C. 539, 2017 PLJ SC 596, 2017 PTD 2016, 2017 SCP 930, 2017 SCMR · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-22
  bonded carrierPOL productsshort supplycustoms dutyevaporation lossstrict liabilityCustoms Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a customs dispute where the petitioner, a bonded carrier, was held liable for duties, taxes, and penalties due to short-delivered petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products exported to Afghanistan. The shortages exceeded the one percent permissible variation limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001. The petitioner contended that the shortages were due to natural evaporation in hot weather rather than pilferage, arguing that Rule 564(4) should be interpreted to allow carriers to justify shortages if they occurred without fault. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that because the consequences for short supply beyond the one percent threshold are explicitly provided for under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001, the provisions were fully attracted. The Court affirmed that in the absence of any legal error by the lower forums, the strict liability imposed by the rules must be upheld, and no further adjudication into the physical causes of the shortage was required once the statutory limit was breached.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a bonded carrier can escape liability for short-delivered cargo exceeding the one percent limit under Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 by pleading natural evaporation?
  • Does Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules, 2001 require the customs authorities to prove pilferage or broken seals before imposing liability for shortages exceeding the statutory limit?
  • Is a bonded carrier strictly liable for duties and taxes on short-delivered goods once the variation in quantity exceeds the permissible limit under the Customs Rules, 2001?
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• Messrs Al-Fazal International vs Deputy Collector of Customs and 22017 PTD (Trib.) 569 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-07-13Read full judgment →
• Messrs Air Ciro through Senior Partner vs Civil Aviation Authority2017 CLC 126 · Lahore High Court · 2016-07-01
  writ petitiontender processtechnical bidfinancial bidmandatory conditionsCivil Aviation Authoritypublic procurement
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged a letter issued by the Civil Aviation Authority regarding the opening of financial bids for a concession license at Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore. The core legal question concerned whether the authority could relax mandatory tender conditions for a non-responsive technical bid and fail to adhere to procedural timelines. The Lahore High Court held that the submission of a signed Technical Offer Form was a mandatory essential term of the tender document which could not be relaxed or cured irregularly, and that premature opening of financial bids violated the tender conditions. The Court laid down the principle that authorities must strictly enforce essential tender conditions uniformly without discrimination, and where mandatory requirements are breached, procedural fairness and transparency must prevail, warranting a fresh financial bidding process between qualified competitors.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to submit a mandatory Technical Offer Form constitutes a curable irregularity in a public tender?
  • Can a procuring agency relax essential terms of a tender document without explicit reservation of such power?
  • Whether the premature opening of financial bids in violation of prescribed tender timelines renders the bidding process unlawful?
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• Messrs A.H. Syed and Company (Pvt.) Ltd., Jhang vs C.I.R., R.T.O., Faisalabad2017 PTD (Trib.) 2234 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2017-02-13
  minimum taxdistributorcommission agentturnoverdeemed assessmentincome taxaudited accounts
  Summary & questions settled

  The taxpayer, a private limited company and distributor of a manufacturer, filed income tax returns for the tax years 2014 and 2015, which were treated as deemed assessments under section 120(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The tax authorities amended the assessments under section 122(5A), treating the taxpayer's turnover as declared in sales tax returns and final accounts as taxable under section 113 for minimum tax, and made an addition under section 111(1)(b). The taxpayer appealed to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, contending it was a commission agent liable to pay minimum tax only on commission rather than gross turnover. The core legal question was whether a distributor declaring gross sales in its audited final accounts is liable to minimum tax on turnover under section 113 or on commission. The Tribunal held that since the taxpayer chose to recognize sales as revenue in its final accounts, those sales are liable to minimum tax under section 113. The appeal was dismissed on the main tax issue, while the addition under section 111(1)(b) was remanded for a fresh speaking order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a distributor recognizing sales as revenue in its final accounts is liable to minimum tax on turnover under section 113 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a taxpayer claim to be treated as a commission agent for tax purposes while declaring gross sales in its audited final accounts?
  • Whether the addition under section 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 requires a speaking order after providing an opportunity of being heard?
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• Messrs a & B Food Industries (Pvt.) Limited through Manager vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan and 3 others2017 PTD 1237 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-02
  sales tax auditCommissioner Inland Revenuestatutory interpretationtax assessmentFederal Board of Revenueaudit selectionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged show cause notices issued to the petitioner for a sales tax audit for the period of July 2012 to June 2013. The petitioner contended that following the insertion of Section 72B into the Sales Tax Act, 1990, the authority to select cases for audit rests exclusively with the Federal Board of Revenue, thereby precluding the Commissioner from initiating such audits under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner’s power to conduct an audit under Section 25 is independent of the FBR’s power to select cases under Section 72B. Relying on the precedent set in Matiari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, the Court held that the powers vested in the FBR under Section 72B are independent and do not create a bar on the Commissioner’s authority to conduct audits under Section 25. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitioner's challenge, affirming that the Commissioner retains the statutory authority to conduct audits, provided the conditions prescribed under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, are duly satisfied.

  Questions settled

  • Does the insertion of Section 72B in the Sales Tax Act, 1990, divest the Commissioner of the power to conduct audits under Section 25 of the same Act?
  • Is the power of the Federal Board of Revenue to select cases for audit under Section 72B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, exclusive of the Commissioner's power to conduct audits?
  • Can the Commissioner conduct an audit of a taxpayer's accounts independently of the audit selection powers vested in the Federal Board of Revenue?
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• Messers Friends & 4 others vs Barrister Syed Iftikhar Ali Gillani & 24 others2017 SCR 534 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-04-18
  writ jurisdictionpublic-private partnershipofficial gazettedoctrine of lachesultra viresstatutory interpretationbidding processtaxation powers
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that declared a government notification authorizing the installation of weighing apparatus and the imposition of taxes on vehicles at entry points in Azad Jammu and Kashmir to be without lawful authority. The core legal questions involved whether the government possessed the statutory power under the Local Government Act, 1990 to levy such taxes, whether the notification required official gazette publication, and whether the bidding process for the project was transparent. The Supreme Court held that the notification was void ab initio because the cited provisions of the Local Government Act, 1990 did not empower the government to impose such taxes, and the maintenance of highways fell under the jurisdiction of the Highways Authority. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the failure to publish the notification in the official gazette rendered it non-existent. The Court also found the bidding process lacked transparency. Key principles laid down include that the doctrine of laches is not a rigid statutory bar but depends on case circumstances, and that notifications creating legal obligations must be published in the official gazette to be enforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Local Government Act, 1990 empower the government to impose taxes and fines on heavy vehicles for highway maintenance?
  • Is a government notification creating legal rights and obligations valid if it is not published in the official gazette?
  • Can a writ petition be dismissed on the ground of laches without examining the specific circumstances and dictates of justice?
  • Does the existence of an alternate remedy automatically bar the invocation of the High Court's extraordinary writ jurisdiction?
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• Mess Faysal Bank Limited vs C.I.R. (Appeals-I), L.T.U., Karachi2017 PTD (Trib.) 867 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 2014-05-28Read full judgment →
• Meraj Din and anothers vs Muhammad Sharif and another2017 SCMR 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-05
  pre-emption suitlimitation periodregistration of sale deedphysical possessionconstructive noticeSection 47 Registration ActArticle 10 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the determination of the limitation period for filing a suit for pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. The core legal question was whether the one-year limitation period prescribed by Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commences from the date of execution of the sale deed or the date of its registration. The Court held that the limitation period commences from the date of registration of the sale deed. The Court reasoned that Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, provides for limitation based on physical possession or registration, both intended to provide notice to the pre-emptor. It clarified that Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which dictates that a document operates from the date of execution for parties to the transaction, does not apply to third-party pre-emptors. Consequently, the Court ruled that the date of registration is the starting point for calculating the limitation period in such suits, setting aside the High Court's contrary finding.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 1908, commence from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale deed?
  • Does Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, govern the starting point of limitation for a pre-emptor who is not a party to the sale transaction?
  • Is a mere recital of delivery of possession in a sale deed sufficient proof of possession to trigger the limitation period for a pre-emption suit?
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• Meraj Din and another vs Muhammad Sharif and another2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-05
  pre-emptionlimitation perioddate of registrationdate of executionRegistration ActLimitation Actphysical possessionPunjab Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed whether the limitation period for filing a pre-emption suit under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 commences from the date of execution or the date of registration of a sale deed when physical possession of the property has not been delivered earlier.

  The respondents bought property via a sale deed executed on May 8, 1975, and registered on May 26, 1975. The appellants filed a pre-emption suit on May 25, 1976. The High Court dismissed the suit as time-barred, applying Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 to hold that limitation ran from the date of execution.

  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that under the second part of Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908, limitation runs strictly from the date of registration. Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 governs rights inter se between parties to a transaction and cannot operate to abridge or alter the statutory limitation period available to a prospective pre-emptor.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908 run from the date of execution or the date of registration of a sale deed?
  • Does Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908 apply to alter the starting point of limitation for a third-party pre-emptor under Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • When does Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 apply in preference to Article 10 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• MEPCO, etc. vs Advisory Board, Punjab, Lahore etc.2017 PLD Lahore 769, 2017 PLJ Lahore 364, 2017 LHC 445 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-31Read full judgment →
• Memoona Ilyas vs Addl. District Judge, etc.2017 CLC 1747, 2017 LHC 2257 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-02
  guardianshipinterim custodyvisitation rightsfamily courtsappealability of interim ordersconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an appellate judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which modified a Guardian Judge's order regarding interim custody and visitation rights of minor children. The petitioner contended that the appeal before the District Judge was incompetent under Section 14(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and that an order under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, was not appealable and amounted to an improper review of an earlier final order. The Lahore High Court held that disputes relating to guardianship are exclusively triable by Family Courts under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and that an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890, constitutes a 'decision given' rather than a barred 'interim order' under Section 14(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, thus rendering the appeal competent. The Court laid down the principle that Guardian Judges exercise parental jurisdiction unhindered by strict technicalities, allowing fresh applications on new grounds, and that Family Courts are quasi-judicial bodies empowered to formulate their own procedures ensuring fair hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed under Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 by a Family Court constitutes an appealable decision under Section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964?
  • Does Section 14(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 bar an appeal against an order granting interim custody or visitation of minors?
  • Can a Guardian Judge entertain a subsequent application for interim custody or visitation after a previous order has been passed?
  • What is the scope of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court over factual determinations made by appellate courts in family matters?
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• Member-VI Mumtaz Hussain, S.I., Distt. Police, Lahore vs Inspector2017 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 117 · Punjab Service Tribunal
  service appealPEEDA Actcompetent authorityappointing authorityjurisdictionpolice disciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This service appeal challenges the departmental orders imposing a penalty of a fine of Rs. 5,000/- upon the appellant, a Sub-Inspector, for alleged reluctance to register a case regarding a motorcycle theft. The core legal question is whether the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Operations, Lahore, was competent to award the punishment under the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, not being the appellant's appointing authority. The Punjab Service Tribunal held that under the relevant statutory framework and notifications, the Capital City Police Officer (CCPO), Lahore, being the appointing authority under Article 23 of the Police Order, 2002, was the competent authority to take disciplinary action, rendering the punishment awarded by the DIG without jurisdiction. The Tribunal laid down the principle that an order passed by an authority lacking statutory competency is void and without jurisdiction, though a remand at a belated stage may be declined if it serves no useful purpose.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the DIG of Police, Operations, Lahore is competent to award punishment under the PEEDA Act, 2006 to a Sub-Inspector when he is not the appointing authority?
  • Who constitutes the competent authority under Section 2(f)(ii) of the PEEDA Act, 2006 for employees of BS-01 to BS-18 in subordinate offices of the Government of Punjab?
  • Does the Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Lahore act as the appointing authority for junior police ranks under Article 23 of the Police Order, 2002?
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• Melmaruvathur Adhiparasakthi Institute of Medical Sciences and Research2017 SCInd 1313 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-09-08Read full judgment →
• Mehwish Khan vs Khyber Medical University etc2017 PHC 1287 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-14Read full judgment →
• Mehraz Khan vs The State etc2017 PHC 1118 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-10-16Read full judgment →
• Mehran Ginning Industries and 2 others vs Sajid Shafique and 12 others2017 [M] C.L.R. 1716 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Mehran Electronics Company through Partner vs National Bank of Pakistan2017 CLD 1642 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-28
  malicious prosecutiondamagespartnership firmmental tortureburden of proofbanking suitcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This High Court Appeal challenged a trial court judgment that dismissed a suit for damages filed by a partnership firm against a bank. The appellant sought damages, alleging mental and physical torture and business losses resulting from a previously dismissed recovery suit filed by the respondent bank. The core legal question was whether the dismissal of a recovery suit automatically entitles the defendant to damages for malicious prosecution and whether a partnership firm can claim damages for mental torture. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the mere dismissal of a prior suit does not constitute malicious prosecution. The court held that a plaintiff must establish six specific ingredients, including proof that the defendant acted with malice and without reasonable and probable cause, which the appellant failed to demonstrate. Additionally, the court ruled that a plaintiff must prove their case through cogent evidence rather than relying on the defendant's absence, and that a partnership firm, as a distinct legal entity, cannot maintain a claim for mental torture.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish a claim for malicious prosecution?
  • Can a partnership firm maintain a legal claim for damages based on mental torture?
  • Does the mere dismissal of a recovery suit filed by a bank entitle the defendant to damages for malicious prosecution?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to a decree for damages solely because the defendant failed to contest the suit?
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• Mehnaz Kousar vs Mst. Munir Begum & 2 others2017 SCR 116 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-10-26Read full judgment →
• Mehnaz Bibi vs Additional District Judge, etc.2017 KLR Civil Cases 132, 2017 LHC 1125 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-15Read full judgment →
• Mehmood-ul-Hasan alias Muna vs The State2017 SHC 324 · Sindh High Court · 2017-09-15
  criminal appealnarcoticsfugitive from lawsuspension of sentenceright of audiencedismissal for absconsion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question concerns the consequence of an appellant absconding and becoming a fugitive from justice after the suspension of their sentence during the pendency of an appeal. The Sindh High Court held that a fugitive from law loses their right of audience before the court and normal procedural rights. The court decided to dismiss the appeal on account of the appellant's conduct as a fugitive, with a clarification that the appellant may apply for the resurrection of the appeal if recaptured or if he surrenders to custody. The key principle laid down is that an absconding appellant forfeits the right of audience and active prosecution of their appeal until custody is regained.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellant who absconds after the suspension of their sentence lose their right of audience before the court?
  • What is the legal consequence of an appellant becoming a fugitive from law during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed solely on the ground that the appellant has absconded and become a fugitive from justice?
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• Mehmood Zaman vs The State Etc2017 PHC 1099 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-20Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Khan vs Sohail Khan and another2017 P Cr. L J 1305 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-29
  dishonour of chequecriminal liabilitydishonest intentionacquittalburden of proofSection 489-F
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the acquittal of the respondent by a Judicial Magistrate regarding an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning the dishonor of cheques. The core legal question was whether the respondent’s actions met the statutory requirements to constitute criminal liability for dishonestly issuing a cheque. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial court’s decision. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence, specifically the existence of a "dishonest intention" and that the cheques were issued for the repayment of a loan or the fulfillment of a lawful obligation. The Court emphasized that not every dishonored cheque constitutes a criminal offence. The key principle laid down is that for Section 489-F to be attracted, the prosecution must establish four foundational elements: the issuance of a cheque, the presence of dishonest intent, the purpose being the repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation, and the subsequent dishonor of the cheque upon presentation.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does every instance of a dishonored cheque constitute a criminal offence under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • On whom does the burden of proof lie to establish the bona fides of a cheque issuance under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Mehmood Anwar vs Abdul Hanan etc.2017 LHC 1985 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Anwan vs Abdul Hanan, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1221 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Alam vs Mushtaq Ahmed, etc2017 LHC 212 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mehboobullah vs The State2017 PHC 1051 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-09-29Read full judgment →
• Mehboob vs The State2017 MLD 596 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-28Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Alim vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 1164 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-27
  criminal appealreferee judgebenefit of doubtocular evidenceinterested witnessesdelayed FIRacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal was referred to a referee judge under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 following a split verdict between the members of a Division Bench. The appellant had been convicted by the trial court for the murder of two individuals and attempted murder, receiving death sentences and other penalties. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution had established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt given significant evidentiary contradictions. Upon independent scrutiny, the Court found the prosecution's case riddled with fatal flaws, including doubts regarding the timing of the First Information Report, the actual place of occurrence, the source of light for identification, and the motive. Furthermore, the Court noted the unexplained delay in recording witness statements and the unreliability of the interested witnesses. Applying the principle that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt entitles an accused to acquittal, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case. Consequently, the conviction and sentences were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The judgment reaffirms that a referee judge must independently assess evidence to reach a binding decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a referee judge under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have the authority to form an independent opinion on evidence rather than merely agreeing with one of the dissenting judges?
  • Is the delay in recording the statements of prosecution witnesses by the police fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of the accused's absconsion when the ocular evidence is found to be unreliable?
  • Does a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt as a matter of right?
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• Mehboob Ali vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 1366 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-15
  re-investigationdefence witnesssummoning of witnesscriminal revisioncapital punishmentjudicial notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application impugns the order of the trial court whereby the applicant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking to examine the second investigating officer as a defence witness and to produce a re-investigation report, was dismissed. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in refusing to summon a material witness whose evidence and re-investigation report were part of the record and essential for the just decision of a case involving capital punishment. The Sindh High Court held that the powers of the court under Section 540, Cr.P.C. are of the widest amplitude and are obligatory to exercise when the evidence is essential for a just decision, irrespective of delay or technicalities. The court set aside the impugned order and allowed the application, directing the trial court to examine the investigating officer as a defence witness, laying down the principle that courts must exercise plenary powers under Section 540 judiciously to prevent miscarriage of justice and ensure that an accused is not deprived of the opportunity to prove innocence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in dismissing an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to examine an investigating officer who conducted a re-investigation favorable to the accused?
  • What is the scope and amplitude of the powers conferred upon a court under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for summoning a witness essential for the just decision of a case?
  • Does delay in filing an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justify its dismissal when the evidence sought to be produced is essential for the just determination of the controversy?
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• Mehboob Ali alias Maqbali and another vs Arbab Athar Khan and 32017 CLC 874 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-12-19Read full judgment →
• Mehar Pervaiz Akhtar vs Director General Excise and Taxation, Lahore2017 PTD 1962 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-24
  property taxdue processassessment proceedingsfundamental rightstax exemptionaudi alteram partemstatutory compliancecoercive recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged sealing notices and tax demands issued under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, arguing that the property was exempt as it was owned by the Federal Government and that the assessment process violated due process. The core legal question was whether tax authorities could impose tax liabilities and initiate coercive recovery measures without associating the taxpayer in the assessment proceedings or communicating the assessment orders. The Court held that the impugned notices and assessment were null and void, as the authorities failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedure of calling for returns, providing an opportunity for hearing, and communicating assessment orders. The Court emphasized that the imposition of tax, which restricts the fundamental right to property under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution, requires strict compliance with the law. It established that due process, including the principle of audi alteram partem, is an inviolable right under Article 10A, and that assessment orders must be formally communicated to taxpayers to enable their statutory right of appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate a taxpayer in assessment proceedings render a tax demand illegal?
  • Is the communication of an assessment order to the taxpayer a mandatory requirement for the exercise of the right of appeal?
  • Can tax authorities initiate coercive recovery measures without following the mandatory procedures prescribed under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958?
  • Does the imposition of tax without providing an opportunity to claim exemption violate the principle of due process?
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• Mehar Pervaiz Akhtar vs Director General Excise and Taxation Lahore etc2017 PLD Lahore 790, 2017 PTD 1962, 2017 LHC 2568 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-24
  property taxdue processaudi alteram partemassessment proceedingstax exemptionvaluation listmandatory procedureconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged notices for sealing his shops due to non-payment of property tax under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. The core legal question was whether the tax assessment and subsequent demand notices were lawful despite the authorities' failure to associate the petitioner in the assessment proceedings, call for returns, or communicate the assessment orders. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned notices, valuation list, and assessment were null and void for failing to follow mandatory statutory procedures. The Court emphasized that tax imposition involves the deprivation of property, necessitating strict compliance with the law. It established that due process, protected under Articles 4, 10A, 23, and 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, requires that taxpayers be associated in assessment proceedings and served with assessment orders to exercise their right to appeal. The judgment mandates that authorities must communicate reasons for rejecting objections and serve Form P.T.1 to taxpayers, ensuring the right to defend against tax levies and upholding the principle of audi alteram partem.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate a taxpayer in assessment proceedings violate the right to due process under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the rules framed under fiscal enactments considered mandatory and binding on state authorities?
  • Is the communication of an assessment order to the taxpayer a necessary requisite of due process to enable the right of appeal?
  • Can tax authorities impose a tax demand without following the statutory procedure for calling returns and providing an opportunity of being heard?
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• Meena Gul alias Yasmin and others vs The State and others2017 P Cr. L J 1563 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-17
  murderdeath sentenceself-defensedying declarationadversarial systemstatement of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a death sentence for the murder of a grocery shop owner. The prosecution's case rested on a detailed but hearsay complaint by the deceased's father and the ocular account of a single witness who claimed to have heard the dying declaration of the deceased implicating the appellant and two acquitted co-accused. The appellant pleaded self-defense, asserting she killed the deceased to protect her modesty when he entered her home armed. The High Court analyzed the evidence and found the solitary eye-witness's testimony highly improbable, contradictory, and already disbelieved regarding the acquitted co-accused. The Court held that in an adversarial system, the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot rely on the accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to fill gaps, as such statements must be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Consequently, the conviction was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Can the prosecution rely on the admission of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to sustain a conviction if it fails to independently prove its case?
  • Whether the statement of an accused recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on ocular evidence that has been disbelieved and rejected regarding identically placed co-accused without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Medical Council of India vs G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust & Ors.2017 SCInd 1354 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-11-23Read full judgment →
• MCB-Arif Habib Savings and Investments Limited vs Commissioner2017 CLD 1329 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2017-02-03Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Ltd. vs Messrs Genertech Pakistan Ltd. and others2017 CLD 570 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-22Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited through duly constituted Attorney vs Sajida Nqai Riaz2017 CLD 285 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-10Read full judgment →
• MCB Bank Limited through duly constituted Attorney vs Sajida Naqi Riaz2017 CLC 418 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-10
  rejection of plaintBanking Mohtasibspecial forumcivil court jurisdictionnegotiable instrumentsbanking negligencecause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff, MCB Bank Limited, filed a suit challenging the orders of the Banking Mohtasib and the State Bank of Pakistan regarding the disbursement of funds related to specific pay orders. Defendants filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint on the grounds that the matter had already been adjudicated by a special forum and was barred by law. The core legal question was whether a bank could re-agitate a matter before a civil court after it had been decided by the Banking Mohtasib. The court held that the special law provides a remedy to the complainant to approach the civil court if a complaint is rejected, but does not grant the same right to the bank to challenge the Mohtasib's decision. Consequently, the court ruled that the plaint against the defendants involved in the special forum proceedings was not maintainable, ordering their deletion from the suit, while permitting the bank to pursue recovery claims against the actual account holders. The principle established is that matters decided by a special forum cannot be re-agitated in civil courts absent specific exceptions like jurisdictional defects or properly pleaded mala fides.

  Questions settled

  • Can a bank re-agitate a matter in a civil court after it has been adjudicated by the Banking Mohtasib?
  • Does the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962 grant a bank the right to challenge the orders of the Banking Mohtasib in a civil court?
  • Are allegations of mala fides sufficient to maintain a civil suit against a special forum's decision without specific pleadings?
  • Can a defendant be deleted from a suit under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the plaint discloses no cause of action against them?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar vs The State2017 PHC 1247 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-06Read full judgment →
• Mazhar vs SHO, etc.2017 LHC 3172 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-15
  habeas corpusillegal detentionpolice torturedue processdaily diaryunauthorized custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a habeas corpus petition seeking the recovery of three detenues found in illegal police confinement. The core legal question concerns the legality of the detention of individuals kept at a police station without recording their arrest in the online daily diary and without lawful justification. The Court held that the detention was entirely illegal, arbitrary, and violative of the due process of law, ordering the immediate release of the detenues upon furnishing personal bonds. The key principle laid down is that police officials are not above the law, and maintaining undisclosed or unauthorized detentions alongside subjecting citizens to torture constitutes a grave abuse of authority, mandating departmental inquiry and strict disciplinary action against delinquent officials by the competent authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order the immediate release of detenues found in unlawful police custody without a recorded arrest?
  • Whether the police can detain individuals based on unverified suspicion without incorporating their arrest in the online daily diary?
  • What is the remedy when police officials subject detainees to illegal confinement and torture?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Nawaz vs The State etc.2017 LHC 2336 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-23
  murderocular evidencerelated witnessesinterested witnessesmitigating circumstancecriminal appealappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the murder of his wife, Mst. Shabana Aslam, under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions concerned the credibility of prosecution eye-witnesses who were closely related to both the deceased and the appellant, and the impact of a failed recovery of the murder weapon on the conviction. The Court held that the conviction was sound, affirming that mere relationship does not render witnesses "interested" or unreliable, particularly when the witnesses are related to both parties and lack enmity. The Court emphasized that the ocular account was natural and consistent, corroborated by medical evidence. While the prosecution failed to prove the recovery of the weapon, the Court ruled this did not invalidate the conviction but served as a mitigating circumstance regarding the quantum of sentence, justifying the imposition of life imprisonment rather than a capital sentence. The principle laid down is that related witnesses are credible absent evidence of enmity, and failed recoveries do not automatically undermine otherwise trustworthy ocular testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Does the close relationship between prosecution witnesses and the deceased automatically render such witnesses 'interested' and unreliable?
  • Can a conviction be maintained when the recovery of the alleged weapon of offence is not proved by the prosecution?
  • Does the failure to prove the recovery of a weapon of offence constitute a mitigating circumstance for the quantum of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Nawaz vs State etc.PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 917 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-23
  jail appealmurderocular accountinterested witnessmitigating circumstanceweapon recoverymotivecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail appeal challenges the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Lodhran, convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of his pregnant wife. The core legal questions involved the credibility of closely related eye-witnesses, the establishment of motive regarding a property dispute, and the evidentiary value of a disputed weapon recovery. The Lahore High Court held that close relationship does not disqualify a witness unless animosity is proved, that natural ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence is sufficient for conviction, and that a defective recovery of the crime weapon can serve as a mitigating circumstance against the death penalty. The court laid down the principle that mere relationship to the deceased does not render a witness interested or unreliable, especially when the accused is also related, and that a flawed weapon recovery alone cannot discard otherwise trustworthy ocular testimony but may warrant the lesser punishment of life imprisonment rather than death.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eye-witness can be discarded solely on the ground of a close relationship with the deceased?
  • Does a contradiction in the recovery of the crime weapon vitiate an otherwise reliable ocular account in a murder trial?
  • Can a defective or unproved recovery of a weapon of offense serve as a mitigating circumstance to withhold the death sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal vs State and anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 787 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14
  post-arrest baildishonour of chequeprohibitory clausedelay in FIRpenal provisionrecovery of amount
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner in a case registered under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail given the circumstances of the case. The Court observed that there was an unexplained delay of over three months in the registration of the FIR, suggesting deliberation. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner was a previous non-convict and the alleged offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is a penal provision and not a mechanism for debt recovery, for which civil remedies under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 exist. Emphasizing that further incarceration served no purpose as investigation was complete, the Court granted bail, establishing that mere registration of other cases without conviction is insufficient to deny bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the registration of other criminal cases without conviction constitute sufficient grounds to refuse bail?
  • Is Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 intended to function as a mechanism for the recovery of money?
  • Does an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR impact the entitlement to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal Poultry Farm vs Environmental Tribunal, Lahore and others2017 CLD 1054 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-02Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Iqbal and another vs The State and others2017 SCMR 2036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-31
  leave to appealmurderself-defencehouse trespassbenefit of doubtacquittalillicit relationschance witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, alongside a connected petition by the complainant challenging an acquittal and seeking sentence enhancement. The case arose from an incident where the deceased truck driver was killed during a late-night altercation after entering a house where he allegedly maintained illicit relations with a female occupant. The trial court convicted the main petitioner under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and co-accused under section 302(c), which the High Court modified by reducing the petitioner's sentence and acquitting the others. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, noting unexplained late-night presence, lack of credible eye-witnesses, and circumstances indicating house trespass for illicit purposes, thereby attracting the right of private defence under sections 97 and 100 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts ignored the vital right of self-defence and the circumstances of trespass. Consequently, the Court granted the appeal, extended the benefit of the doubt, acquitted the petitioner, and dismissed the complainant's connected petition as infructuous, while issuing directives regarding medico-legal examinations in cases involving illicit relations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence of property and person extends to causing death of a trespasser who enters a house for illicit purposes?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses be accepted without cogent reasons explaining their presence at the crime spot?
  • Does nighttime entry into another's house under suspicious circumstances substantiate a plea of self-defence?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in interfering with a conviction when material aspects concerning the right of private defence are ignored by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Hussain vs The State and others2017 SCMR 1936 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-08-23
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailforfeiture of bail bondabscondenceEmigration Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose out of a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court recalling pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner in a case registered under Sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in recalling pre-arrest bail on the ground of the petitioner's alleged abscondence when the trial court forfeited his bail bond upon a single non-appearance. The Supreme Court observed that the trial court reached its conclusion regarding the petitioner's abscondence without following the required legal procedure, noting the absence of any execution report concerning previously issued arrest warrants. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's cancellation order was legally unsustainable. Converting the petition into an appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, restored the pre-arrest bail, and directed the trial court to conclude the trial expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Can pre-arrest bail be recalled on grounds of abscondence without proper procedure and execution reports for arrest warrants?
  • Is a single non-appearance sufficient for a trial court to hold an accused as an absconder for the purpose of cancelling bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali Nomani and another vs Karachi Electric Supply2017 MLD 1544 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-13Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Ali Magsi vs Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 62017 PLD Sindh 483 · Sindh High Court · 2017-02-16Read full judgment →
• Mazhar Abbas alias Baddi vs The State2017 SCMR 1884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-05-15
  murderqatl-i-amdsingle blowmotivemitigating circumstancequantum of sentencelife imprisonmentSection 382-B CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) PPC for the murder of Muhammad Waseem, as upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions pertained to the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction and whether the failure to prove an alleged motive constitutes a mitigating circumstance warranting a reduction in sentence. Upon reappraisal of the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully proved the appellant's guilt through reliable ocular account, medical evidence, and a positive recovery of the weapon of offense. However, the Court determined that the sentence of death was not warranted because the appellant inflicted only a single dagger blow without repetition, and the prosecution failed to prove the alleged motive. The Court laid down the established principle that where prosecution alleges a motive but fails to prove it at trial, such failure can be considered as a mitigating factor in deciding the quantum of sentence. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, converting the death sentence to life imprisonment while granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is the failure of the prosecution to prove an alleged motive a valid mitigating circumstance for reducing a sentence from death to life imprisonment?
  • Can a single weapon blow without repetition be taken into consideration as a ground to convert a death sentence into life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Maya Devi and another vs State of Haryana2017 PSC (Cr1.) 273 · Supreme Court of India · 2015-12-07
  dowry deathcruelty to married womansuicidepresumption of guiltSection 304B IPCmental depressionsoon before death
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the High Court's judgment affirming the appellants' conviction for offences under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code 1860, following the suicide of the deceased within seven years of marriage. The core legal questions concerned whether the prosecution established the ingredients of 'dowry death,' specifically whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment 'soon before her death' in connection with dowry demands, and whether the statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 was rebutted. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prosecution successfully established the essential ingredients of dowry death. The Court affirmed that the expression 'soon before her death' requires a proximate and live link between the cruelty and the death, which was satisfied here. The Court emphasized that Section 304B IPC does not distinguish between homicidal, suicidal, or accidental deaths, and that the mandatory presumption under Section 113B shifts the burden to the accused to prove innocence, which the appellants failed to do.

  Questions settled

  • Does the expression 'soon before her death' in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 require a specific time interval to be defined?
  • Does Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code 1860 apply to suicidal deaths, or is it limited to homicidal deaths?
  • What is the nature of the burden of proof placed on the accused under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 once the prosecution establishes the ingredients of dowry death?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulana Aman Ullah Haqani and another vs Government of Khyber2017 PHC 1144 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-12-07Read full judgment →
• Matracon Pakistan (Pvt) Limited through Muhammad Abdul Qadr, CEO_Man_6001c9482017 SC AJK 126 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• Matiullah vs Mst. Saddiqa2017 PLJ Peshawar 296 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-03-16Read full judgment →
• Mati-Ur-Rehman vs Muhammad Haroon2017 MLD 27 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-04Read full judgment →
• Masood ur Rehman vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.2017 PHC 374 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-04Read full judgment →
• Masood Anwar vs The State and another2017 P Cr. L J 1466 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-05
  quashment of FIRdouble jeopardyprevious acquittal or convictionNAB referencecheatinginherent powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the quashment of an FIR registered against him under sections 419 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, on the grounds that he was already facing prosecution for a reference before an Accountability Court regarding the same matter. The core legal question was whether simultaneous prosecution of an accused in an Accountability Court based on a NAB reference and under an FIR for cheating and impersonation violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioner could not invoke the protection against double jeopardy or autrefois acquit / autrefois convict as there was no prior conviction or acquittal, and the offences and complainants were distinct. The court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that the constitutional guarantee under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply only where an accused has already undergone a final adjudication resulting in conviction or acquittal for the same offence, and do not bar separate prosecutions for distinct and independent offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does prosecution under a NAB reference bar the registration of an FIR for separate offences of cheating and impersonation?
  • When does the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 become applicable?
  • Does Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prohibit a second trial where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal resulting from a final adjudication?
  • Can a criminal petition for quashment under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be maintained without establishing an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ali Khan vs Zahid Ali Khan through L.Rs, and another2017 MLD 892 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-14Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed Orakzai vs Parveen Shoukat and another2017 PLD Islamabad 194 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-04-06
  appeal against acquittalprivate complaintlocus standiaggrieved personcheatingdeceased complainantcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate, Islamabad, which acquitted respondent No. 1 of the charge under Section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a complaint case. The core legal question before the High Court was whether an appeal against an acquittal in a private complaint can be maintained by a legal heir (son) of the deceased original complainant under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that an appeal against acquittal in a complaint case must be instituted by the complainant herself under Section 417(2), and that a legal heir who is not the direct complainant cannot maintain such an appeal under the general provisions of Section 417(2-A) or as an 'aggrieved person' without statutory backing. The key principle laid down is that special provisions governing appeals against acquittal in private complaints override general provisions, and legal heirs of a deceased complainant lack locus standi to file such appeals unless specifically authorized by law.

  Questions settled

  • Can a legal heir of a deceased complainant maintain an appeal against an order of acquittal under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does a special provision governing appeals against acquittal in private complaints prevail over general provisions of appeal?
  • Who is competent to file an appeal against an acquittal recorded in a case instituted upon a private complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed and another vs State through Director-General, NAB2017 P Cr. L J 770 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-19
  pre-arrest bailembezzlementtransfer of caseaccountability courtcriminal breach of trustjudicial discretionstatutory bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for confirmation of ad interim pre-arrest bail filed by two bank employees accused of embezzlement alongside other co-accused in a case originally registered under the Offenses in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance 1984 and subsequently transferred to an Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, who had previously been granted bail on merits—upheld by the Supreme Court—were entitled to confirmation of pre-arrest bail following the transfer of the case to the Accountability Court, despite the prosecution's opposition. The Court held that while fresh bail applications are required upon case transfer, weightage must be given to prior bail orders granted on merits when no new incriminating evidence has been added. The Court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, emphasizing that no recoveries were made from the petitioners, they had already served significant time in custody, and the potential for a protracted trial starting from scratch warranted the exercise of judicial discretion. The Court also cautioned against the transfer of cases nearing completion without compelling justification.

  Questions settled

  • Should weightage be given to previous bail orders granted on merits when a case is transferred from a Special Court to an Accountability Court?
  • Does the transfer of a criminal case to an Accountability Court necessitate fresh bail applications by the accused?
  • Can an accused be granted pre-arrest bail in a corruption case where no recovery has been made and the accused has already served significant time in custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Mashooq Ali vs State & anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 352 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-01Read full judgment →
• Mashooq Ali vs Shah Zaman, etc.2017 PLJ Peshawar 290 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-29
  gift mutationburden of prooffraudlimitation periodIslamic lawunsound mindrevenue recordrevision petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's suit seeking a declaration that certain gift mutations of land, executed in 1972 and 1981, were fraudulent and ineffective against his rights. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the gifts, the burden of proof regarding allegations of fraud and the donor's mental capacity, and the limitation period for challenging such mutations. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving fraud or the donor's alleged unsound mind through credible evidence. The Court affirmed that under Islamic Law, a Muslim donor may gift property to non-heirs. Furthermore, the Court held that the suit was time-barred, as the challenge was brought decades after the mutations were entered in the revenue record, exceeding the six-year limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court emphasized that the party alleging fraud bears the initial burden of proof, which the petitioner failed to satisfy.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the party alleging fraud in a property transaction?
  • Is a gift of immovable property by a Muslim donor to a non-heir valid under Islamic Law?
  • What is the limitation period for challenging a mutation entry in the revenue record?
  • Is oral assertion of a donor's unsound mind sufficient to invalidate a gift without medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mashooq Ali vs Shah Zaman and others2017 PLJ Peshawar 290, 2017 YLR 957 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-29
  gift mutationburden of prooffraudlimitation actunsound mindIslamic lawrevision petitiondeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which dismissed the petitioner's suit for declaration regarding the invalidity of certain gift mutations executed in 1972 and 1981. The core legal questions concerned whether the gift mutations were fraudulent, whether the donor was of unsound mind, and whether the suit was time-barred. The Peshawar High Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the alleged fraud or the donor's mental incapacity. The court emphasized that mere oral assertions without medical evidence are insufficient to establish unsoundness of mind. Furthermore, the court affirmed that under Islamic law, a Muslim donor may gift property in preference to legal heirs. Finally, the court held that the suit was barred by limitation, as the challenge was brought decades after the mutations were entered, exceeding the six-year period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the revision petition was dismissed for lack of merit, as no misreading or non-reading of evidence was established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the party alleging fraud in a gift mutation?
  • Is a Muslim donor prohibited from gifting immovable property in preference to legal heirs?
  • What is the limitation period for challenging a mutation in the revenue record?
  • Is oral testimony sufficient to prove the unsoundness of mind of a donor without supporting medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mariam Bibi and 7 others vs Hakam Ali and others2017 PLJ SC (AJ&K) 142 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-14Read full judgment →
• Mariam Bibi & 7 others vs Hakam Ali, & 6 others2017 SCR 944 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-06-10Read full judgment →
• Maria Sanam vs The State and another2017 MLD 1373 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilityextrajudicial confessionwomen in custodybail after arrest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the petitioner, Maria Sanam, who was accused in an FIR involving charges under sections 302, 376, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the evidence and her status as a woman. The court observed that the occurrence was unseen, the Chemical Examiner's report prima facie falsified the allegation of administering sleeping pills, and the co-accused had already been granted bail based on a compromise. The court held that the petitioner's case fell under the category of further inquiry and that, as a woman, she was entitled to the benefit of the first proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the court noted the delay in trial and the fact that the petitioner was not required for further investigation. Consequently, the court granted bail, establishing that where evidence is tentative and the accused is a woman, bail should be granted pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a female accused is entitled to the benefit of the first proviso to section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in a non-bailable offence?
  • Does the existence of a Chemical Examiner's report contradicting the prosecution's story constitute grounds for further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an extrajudicial confession made in police custody be considered sufficient material to deny bail to an accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Mari Petroleum Company Limited vs Director (Mssid), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan2017 CLD 740 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-05-14Read full judgment →
• Marahaba Pakistan International Bashir Designs Furniture and another vs Habib Bank Limited and another2017 CLD 995, 2017 P.T.C.L.R. 267, 2017 PLJ Lahore 600, 2017 LHC 813 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-08Read full judgment →
• Marahaba Pakistan International and others vs Habib Bank Limited and another2017 CLD 995 · Lahore High Court · 2017-03-08Read full judgment →
• Marahaba Pakistan International and another vs Habib Bank Limited and another2017 P.T.C.L.R. 267 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Maqsood Kausar vs Revenue Department through Collector and 912017 YLR 1492 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Hussain vs Habib Bank Limited and others2017 CLD 507 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-05
  banking courtobjection petitionauction of propertydecretal amountrecovery of financesfinancial institutions
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges an order passed by the Banking Court, Gujranwala, which dismissed the appellant's objection petition filed under Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The core legal questions were whether the Banking Court erred in its handling of an objection regarding the venue of an auction and whether it was legally permissible to mandate the deposit of one-third of the decretal amount as a condition for entertaining an objection petition. The Lahore High Court held that the Banking Court misconstrued the law by dismissing the objection petition in a casual manner without properly addressing the substantial objection concerning the auction venue. Furthermore, the High Court held that there is no legal requirement under the Ordinance for a judgment debtor to deposit one-third of the decretal amount to maintain an objection petition. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, and the Banking Court was directed to decide the objection petition afresh in accordance with the law within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal requirement for a judgment debtor to deposit one-third of the decretal amount to maintain an objection petition under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can a Banking Court dismiss an objection petition regarding the auction of property without addressing the substance of the objection?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Elahi, CEO/Director/Company Secretary and 4 others vs2017 CLD 767 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-05-19Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Elahi, CEO/Director/Company Secretary and 4 others vs2017 CLD 1019 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-02-19Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad vs The State and others2017 SCMR 397 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-06-23
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealmurderpost-mortem opinionacquittal of co-accusedappraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition arising from the refusal of the High Court to suspend the petitioner's sentence pending appeal. The petitioner was convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of the complainant's father by allegedly giving kick blows, while his co-accused were acquitted by the trial court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a prima facie case for the suspension of his sentence during the pendency of his appeal. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the lack of a final medical opinion regarding the cause of death by the doctor, the acquittal of co-accused attributed with specific roles, and the complainant's testimony stating the petitioner was not the culprit made out a case for suspension of sentence. The key principle laid down is that where material contradictions exist in the prosecution evidence, including an inconclusive medical report and a resiling complainant, along with the non-availability of early disposal of the appeal, the sentence of a convicted person may be suspended pending appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a prima facie case for suspension of sentence is made out when the medical officer gives no final opinion on the cause of death?
  • Can the sentence of a convict be suspended pending appeal when co-accused assigned similar or major roles have been acquitted?
  • What is the effect of the complainant making statements in court exonerating the accused on the question of suspension of sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory vs Environmental Protection Ltd. Agency, etc2017 LHC 4343 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-21Read full judgment →
• Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited through Group Director Finance vs Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Islamabad through Director General and 3 others2017 P Cr. L J 1540 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-10
  territorial jurisdictionwrit petitionFIA inquirycommercial disputecriminal matters
  Summary & questions settled

  Through the instant constitutional petition, the petitioner company assailed an inquiry notice and order issued by the Deputy Director, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Commercial Banking Circle, Peshawar, following a complaint regarding business transactions and advance payments for the supply of cement. The core legal question before the Islamabad High Court was whether it could assume territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an inquiry pending and being conducted within the territorial jurisdiction of Peshawar merely because the complaint was initially addressed to the Director General FIA at Islamabad. The Court held that while the Islamabad High Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over the Director General FIA, the proper forum to challenge an ongoing inquiry is determined by the place of occurrence, the territory where evidence is collected, and where the inquiry or investigation is actively carried out. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, ruling that the petitioner must approach the competent court located within the territorial limits of Peshawar.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Islamabad High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition against an FIA inquiry being conducted outside Islamabad?
  • How is the territorial jurisdiction of a court in criminal matters and writ petitions determined?
  • Can a petitioner choose a writ jurisdiction based on convenience or the location of the headquarters under principles analogous to section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Feroz Khan and another2017 YLR 327 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-04-29Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain Jamali vs National Accountability Bureau2017 PLD Balochistan 57 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-04-03
  double jeopardyautrefois acquitautrefois convictconstitutional protectionquashing of proceedingscriminal trialfinal adjudication
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to quash proceedings pending against him before both the Anti-Corruption Court and the Accountability Court in Balochistan, arguing that simultaneous trials for identical facts constituted double jeopardy in violation of Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The core legal question was whether the constitutional protection against double jeopardy and the statutory bar under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply when two separate, ongoing criminal proceedings exist, neither of which has concluded in a final conviction or acquittal. The Court held that the constitutional guarantee under Article 13 and the principle of 'autrefois acquit' or 'autrefois convict' under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 require a final adjudication—either an acquittal or a conviction—by a court of competent jurisdiction to be triggered. Since neither trial had concluded, the protection against double jeopardy was not yet applicable. The petition was dismissed, establishing that the mere pendency of two separate proceedings for the same offence does not constitute double jeopardy until one has reached a final judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of two separate criminal proceedings for the same offence constitute double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Is a final judgment of conviction or acquittal a prerequisite for invoking the protection against double jeopardy under Article 13 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar a second trial for the same offence while the first trial is still ongoing?
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• Manzoor Ahmed @ Mavia @ Usama @ Habibullah vs The State2017 SHC 370 · Sindh High Court · 2017-11-21Read full judgment →
• Manzar Masood vs Bank Islami Pakistan Limited through President2017 CLD 1497 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-03
  banking negligenceloss of title documentstortious liabilitycivil court jurisdictiondamages for mental agonycustodian of documentsproperty devaluation
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff filed a suit for compensation and damages against the defendant bank, alleging that the bank lost the original title documents of his property, which had been mortgaged as security for an Ijara Finance Facility. Although the loan was fully repaid, the bank failed to return the original documents, providing only certified true copies instead. The plaintiff claimed this loss caused significant mental agony and a 50% depreciation in the property's market value. The defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Banking Court. The Court held that since the financial relationship had concluded upon the repayment of the loan, the dispute regarding the bank's negligence as a custodian of documents constituted a tortious claim triable by a civil court, not a banking court. The Court ruled that the bank, as a custodian, breached its duty of care, causing the plaintiff mental distress and potential devaluation. Consequently, the Court decreed the suit, awarding Rs. 7 million in damages, establishing that banks bear a high responsibility for the safekeeping of mortgaged documents.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Banking Court have jurisdiction over a claim for damages arising from a bank's loss of property documents after the underlying finance facility has been fully repaid?
  • Is a bank liable for damages when it loses original title documents of a customer's property held in its custody?
  • Can a court award damages for mental agony and potential property devaluation in the absence of an actual sale of the property?
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• Manthar vs Province of Sindh through Secretary Home Department and 8 others2017 YLR 240 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-11Read full judgment →
• Mansur-ul-Haque vs Government of Pakistan and another2017 PLC (C.S) 1255, 2017 PLD Sindh 614, 2017 SHC 62 · Sindh High Court · 2017-03-17
  plea bargainpensionary benefitsmoral turpitudedeeming convictionlachesarmed forces serviceconstitutional petitioncorruption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Chief of Naval Staff, filed a constitutional petition seeking the restoration of pensionary benefits and privileges suspended by the government following his retirement. The petitioner had previously entered into a plea bargain under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999, regarding corruption charges, resulting in a deeming conviction. Consequently, the government removed his name from the retired list of the Pakistan Navy and suspended his benefits. The core legal question was whether the suspension of these benefits was lawful and whether the petitioner was entitled to their restoration. The Court held that the plea bargain constituted an admission of guilt and a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, justifying the government's action under the Pakistan Navy Rules, 1961. The Court determined that the removal from the retired list rendered the petitioner ineligible for pensionary benefits. Furthermore, the petition was dismissed on the grounds of laches, having been filed nine years after the cause of action, and due to the bar under Article 199(3) of the Constitution concerning matters arising from service in the Armed Forces.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plea bargain under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 constitute a conviction for the purpose of withholding pensionary benefits?
  • Can a retired officer of the Armed Forces challenge the suspension of pensionary benefits in a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Does the removal of a name from the retired list of the Pakistan Navy for misconduct justify the permanent suspension of pensionary benefits?
  • Does an offence involving corruption and corrupt practices fall within the definition of moral turpitude?
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• Mansoor Ali vs The learned Additional District Judge (West), Islamabad2017 IHC 133 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Mansoor Ali vs Additional District Judge (West), Islamabad and other2017 MLD 1432 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-02Read full judgment →
• Manohar Lal Sharma vs Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Ors.2017 SCInd 1357 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-11-28
  public interest litigationartistic licencefreedom of speech and expressionfilm certificationscurrilous pleadingsstatutory authorityabuse of process
  Summary & questions settled

  This Public Interest Litigation filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India sought to restrain the exhibition of the film 'Padmavati' and to direct the Central Bureau of Investigation to register an FIR against the filmmakers for various offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. The core legal questions were whether the Court should interfere in the certification process of a film pending before the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) and whether the Court should direct the registration of an FIR based on the petitioner's allegations. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that it cannot pre-judge the certification process while it is pending before the statutory authority. Furthermore, the Court held that the prayer for an FIR was misconceived and that the petition contained scurrilous and vexatious pleadings, which were struck off the record. The judgment reaffirms that artistic licence is protected under the freedom of speech and expression, and that public interest litigation should not be abused to sensationalize matters or bypass statutory processes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct the registration of an FIR while a film's certification is pending before the Central Board of Film Certification?
  • Does the Court have the power to strike off scurrilous and vexatious pleadings from a writ petition?
  • Should public officials comment on matters pending before a statutory authority like the Central Board of Film Certification?
  • Is artistic licence a protected aspect of the freedom of speech and expression?
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• Manohar Lal Sharma vs Sanjay Leela Bhansali & Ors2017 SCInd 1235 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-11-28
  public interest litigationfilm certificationartistic licensefreedom of speech and expressionrule of lawscurrilous pleadingsCBFCjudicial restraint
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition, filed as a public interest litigation, sought to restrain the exhibition of the film "Padmavati" pending certification by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) and requested a writ of mandamus directing the Central Bureau of Investigation to register an FIR against the filmmakers for various alleged offences. The core legal question was whether the Court should intervene in the certification process of a film while it remains pending before the statutory authority and whether the allegations warranted criminal investigation. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that judicial interference while the CBFC is actively considering certification would amount to pre-judging the matter. The Court further ruled that the prayer for an FIR was legally misconceived and lacked foundation. Additionally, the Court struck off scurrilous pleadings from the record, emphasizing that public officials must refrain from commenting on matters sub judice before statutory bodies to uphold the rule of law. The judgment reaffirmed that artistic license is protected, though subject to reasonable restrictions, and cautioned against the abuse of public interest litigation for publicity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct the registration of an FIR while a matter is pending before a statutory authority for certification?
  • Is it permissible for public officials to comment on the certification process of a film while the application is pending before the Central Board of Film Certification?
  • Does the Court have the authority to interfere with the film certification process before the Central Board of Film Certification has reached a decision?
  • What is the legal standing of artistic license in the context of freedom of speech and expression?
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• Manager (Op) MEPCO Circle Dera Ghazi Khan and another vs Sheikh2017 PLJ Lahore 991 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-11Read full judgment →
• Malir Development Authority vs Province of Sindh and another2017 SHC 200 · Sindh High Court · 2017-04-21Read full judgment →
• Malik Zaheer Arshad vs Federation of Pakistan and others2017 LHC 3035 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-29Read full judgment →
• Malik Zafar-Ul-Islam and 3 others vs Abdul Azeem Latif and 2 others2017 YLR 1509 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-16Read full judgment →