Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Khadim Hussain vs Govt. of Balochistan, Education Department2017 PLJ Quetta 76 · Balochistan High Court
  contract employeeregularization of servicesvested rightservice matteradministrative inquirysalary arrears
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Principal of the Balochistan Residential College, Turbat, filed a constitutional petition seeking regularization of his services, posting to a suitable position, and payment of salary arrears from January 2009. The petitioner was initially appointed on a two-year contract. Although the Board of Governors had approved his regularization subject to legal formalities, the department declined to issue the notification due to serious allegations of misconduct, financial mismanagement, and administrative failure discovered during an inquiry. The core legal question was whether a contract employee possesses a vested right to claim extension or regularization of service. The Court held that the petitioner, as a contract employee, had no vested right to demand regularization or extension of his contract, especially when the appointment process did not comply with prescribed procedures. Relying on established precedents, the Court affirmed that contract appointments terminate upon the expiry of the contract period and do not confer rights to permanent absorption. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, though the Court noted the petitioner could still claim outstanding salary for the period worked upon submission of proper bills.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contract employee have a vested right to claim extension or regularization of their services?
  • Does the mere continuation of a temporary employee in service for two years or more ipso facto convert the appointment into a permanent one?
  • Can an appointment made without following the prescribed procedure, such as advertisement of the post, confer a legal right to hold the post or claim benefits?
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• Kh. Zia Ahmed vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau through Chairman_Chief Prosecutor2017 PLD Supreme Court (AJ&K) 11 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-03-05
  Ehtesab Bureau jurisdictionallotment of evacuee propertymultiple allotmentsacquittal under section 265-K Cr.P.C.temporal jurisdictioncorruption and corrupt practicespublic office holder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Court arose from concurrent judgments of the High Court and Ehtesab Court dismissing the appellant's applications under section 265-K, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for acquittal in corruption references filed by the Ehtesab Bureau. The appellant, a public servant, was accused of misusing his authority to procure multiple allotments of evacuee property by falsely claiming to be a 1947 refugee. The core legal question was whether the Ehtesab Bureau had jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the matter under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001, or whether the exclusive jurisdiction lay under special laws like the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, holding that allotments procured prior to January 1, 1985, fell outside the temporal scope of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001 pursuant to section 2(3) thereof and were subject to special laws, but upheld the jurisdiction of the Ehtesab Bureau regarding subsequent allotments obtained after that date where no lawful entitlement existed, as section 265-K acquittal was premature before recording evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Ehtesab Bureau has jurisdiction to prosecute offences relating to evacuee property allotments under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001?
  • Does the Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001 apply to offences committed before 1st January 1985?
  • When can an accused be acquitted under section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in corruption references?
  • Whether special laws like the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956 oust the jurisdiction of the Ehtesab Bureau in cases where a person lacks basic entitlement to an allotment?
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• Kekawas and 28 others vs Provincial Government through Chief2017 MLD 1261 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-10-19Read full judgment →
• Kausar Shabir vs S.H.O chamkani etc2017 PHC 1090 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-08-30Read full judgment →
• Kausar Bibi vs Ghulam Shabbir2017 LHC 3440 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-19Read full judgment →
• (1) Kashif Nawaz etc (2) Dr. Shahid Irshad Rao vs The State & another2017 LHC 3614 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-03
  criminal appealanti-terrorismtest identification paradejoint identification paradebenefit of the doubtballistic reportextortionacquittalcircumstantial evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and connected constitutional petition challenge the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting the appellants for offences including attempt to commit murder, extortion, mischief, and under the Anti-Terrorism Act, alongside a petition for enhancement of sentences. The core legal questions involve the reliability of a joint test identification parade, the admissibility and evidentiary value of delayed forensic and ballistic reports, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in a dark-night occurrence involving unknown accused. The Lahore High Court held that a joint test identification parade of multiple accused persons in one go is legally worthless, that unexplained delays in dispatching crime empties for forensic analysis render weapons recovery inconsequential, and that material suppressions and doubts in the prosecution's narrative warrant acquittal. The court laid down the principle that a conviction cannot be sustained on circumstantial evidence riddled with procedural flaws, suspicious arrests, and tampered or delayed forensic links, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is a joint test identification parade of multiple accused persons in one go legally reliable?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending crime empties to the forensic laboratory render the recovery of the weapon of offence inconsequential?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence when the prosecution suppresses material facts regarding the initial arrest of the accused?
  • Whether the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused when the occurrence takes place on a dark night without any source of light identified in the site plan?
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• (1) Kashif Khan (2) Arshad Khan (3) The State vs (1) The State & another (2)2017 LHC 3473 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-14
  capital punishmentmurder referencebenefit of doubtacquittalocular accountcorroborationdelay in FIRpostmortem
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge convicting the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and sentencing him to death along with other connected penalties for a double murder, while acquitting the co-accused. The core legal questions involve the credibility of the ocular account, the necessity of independent corroboration when co-accused identically placed are acquitted, and the effect of unexplained delays in reporting and postmortem examinations. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution's case suffered from major improbabilities, inconsistencies, a suspicious delay in reporting and conducting autopsies, and an implausible narrative regarding the presence of witnesses and the motive. The court established the ratio that where the ocular account has been disbelieved regarding acquitted co-accused, it cannot safely be used to maintain a conviction against the remaining accused without strong, independent corroboration. Consequently, the court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant, set aside the conviction and death sentence, and dismissed the complainant's appeal against acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ocular account disbelieved with respect to acquitted co-accused be relied upon to convict the remaining accused without independent corroboration?
  • Whether unexplained delay in reporting the crime and conducting autopsies casts serious doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction for capital murder sustainable when the prosecution fails to establish a plausible motive and the narrative of the incident is improbable?
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• Kashif Imran vs Altaf Hussain etc2017 LHC 1880 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-10Read full judgment →
• Kashif Ali vs The Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No, II, Lahore and others2017 P.S.C. (Crl.) 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Anti-Terrorism Act 1997Section 23 ATAtransfer of casedefinition of designpersonal enmityelection candidate murderjurisdiction of ATCsupplementary statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against the Lahore High Court judgment dated 16.08.2010, which had allowed Respondent No. 2's writ petition and set aside the Anti-Terrorism Court's order rejecting an application under Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 to transfer the case to an ordinary criminal court. The case involved the targeted, indiscriminate firing and murder of a provincial assembly candidate and his companion on the eve of general elections. The core legal question was whether an offence motivated by personal rivalry falls under the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court when executed in a manner that creates terror and insecurity. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that substituted terms like 'design' in Section 6 exclude motive and intent; if an act is planned to create fear or insecurity, or if creating fear is an inevitable consequence in a public setting—such as targeting an election candidate on election eve—it constitutes terrorism regardless of underlying personal enmity. Additionally, a supplementary statement recorded long after the FIR cannot oust ATC jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presence of personal enmity exclude an offence from the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court under Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • How does the statutory term 'design' in Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 affect the relevance of motive or intent when determining ATC jurisdiction?
  • Can a supplementary statement recorded long after the registration of an FIR be used to alter the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court?
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• Kasb Securities Limited vs Head of Department SMD (MSRD) Securities2017 CLD 925 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-02-25Read full judgment →
• Karpagam Faculty of Medical Sciences and Research vs Union of India and Ors2017 SCInd 1327 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-09-14Read full judgment →
• Karim Sayani vs Almina Pardhan2017 SHC 317 · Sindh High Court · 2017-08-07Read full judgment →
• Karim Nawaz vs Additional District Judge, Khushab and 4 others2017 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-09-02
  arbitration awardrule of the courtfraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findings of factburden of proofpresumption of regularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the appellant's application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which sought to set aside a 1979 judgment and decree making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The core legal question was whether the impugned judgment and decree were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation, specifically concerning whether the appellant's late father had actually appeared in court and conceded to the award. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving fraud, as official records, testimonies of the counsel and stamp vendor, and the father's thumb impression established his appearance and consent during his lifetime, while the appellant's evidence was merely hearsay. The Court reaffirmed that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence will not be disturbed in the absence of misreading or non-reading of evidence, and that judicial proceedings carry a presumption of regularity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. can be interfered with when no misreading or non-reading of evidence is shown?
  • Does a party alleging fraud in obtaining a judgment and decree discharge the onus of proof through hearsay evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of judicial proceedings and recorded statements when challenged on the ground of impersonation years after the death of the maker?
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• Karim Khan vs The State and 2 others2017 MLD 1326 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-02-13
  criminal appealmurder trialjudgment contentsmandatory provisionstransposed statementremand of caseevaluation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bannu, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether a trial court's judgment that fails to formulate points for determination, evaluate material evidence such as a transposed statement of a deceased eye-witness under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and assign reasons in accordance with Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is sustainable. The Peshawar High Court held that the provisions of Section 367 are mandatory, and non-compliance constitutes an incurable illegality rather than a mere irregularity under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court laid down the principle that a judgment lacking proper evaluation of evidence and points for determination is defective and voidable, setting aside the conviction and remanding the case back to the trial court for a fresh decision after proper re-examination of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether compliance with the provisions of Section 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the contents of a judgment is mandatory?
  • Does the failure of a trial court to formulate points for determination and evaluate material evidence amount to an incurable illegality under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a judgment that completely overlooks the statement of a sole eye-witness be sustained in appeal?
  • What is the legal effect of failing to put a transposed statement recorded under Section 512 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to the accused during his examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Karim Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 3 others2017 PTD 1085 · Sindh High Court · 2016-04-28Read full judgment →
• Kareem Nawaz Khan vs The State through PGP & Another2017 NLR Criminal 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-06-01
  anti-terrorismcompromiseqatl-i-amddeath sentenceconstitutional petitionleave to appealnon-compoundable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, which sought to modify an Anti-Terrorism Court order and secure acquittal following a compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioner had been convicted under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sections 7(a) and 21L of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, with convictions having attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, a compromise was effected under section 338-E of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, leading the Trial Court to acquit him of the compoundable murder charges while maintaining his conviction and sentence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The core legal question was whether a compromise in an offence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 dilutes or affects a conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997. The Supreme Court held that offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 are independent and non-compoundable, and a subsequent compromise regarding compoundable offences does not impact convictions under anti-terrorism laws. The Supreme Court laid down that a conviction under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 remains intact despite a compromise in underlying compoundable offences due to statutory bars.

  Questions settled

  • Does compounding an offence under section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 dilute or affect a conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997?
  • Can a sentence awarded under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 be set aside as a result of a subsequent compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased?
  • Are offences under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 independent and non-compoundable?
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• Kareem Bukhsh alias Suleman vs The State2017 YLR 1779 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-24Read full judgment →
• Kareem Bakhsh vs Aslam Khan2018 CLC 1737, 2018 PLJ Lahore 1, 2017 LHC 3053 · Lahore High Court · 2017-08-01Read full judgment →
• Karamat Ullah Khan Chaudhry vs The Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2017 LHC 4440 · Lahore High Court · 2017-07-05
  territorial jurisdictionconstitutional petitioncivil servantforeign postingtrade officersjudicial reviewforum non conveniens
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner, a civil servant working as Commissioner of Inland Revenue, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the recommendations of the Ministry of Commerce to re-advertise the post of Consul General of Pakistan (BS-20) instead of recommending him after he cleared the written test. The core legal question addressed by the court was whether the Lahore High Court possessed the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition and issue directions against federal authorities located in Islamabad regarding a selection process conducted entirely within Islamabad. The court held that it lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the dominant nexus, cause of action, addresses of the respondents, and all proceedings relating to the vacancy were situated within the Islamabad Capital Territory. The court laid down the principle that a provincial high court can only exercise constitutional jurisdiction and issue writs if the cause of action arises, the respondent authority is located, or the impugned action affects a person within its territorial jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Lahore High Court possess territorial jurisdiction to issue writs against federal authorities located in Islamabad when the entire cause of action arises outside its territorial limits?
  • What constitutes the dominant jurisdiction principle in determining the territorial competence of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Can a provincial High Court interfere with administrative actions and policy decisions of federal ministries whose offices and processes are situated exclusively in the Islamabad Capital Territory?
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• Karachi Property Investment Company (Private) Ltd. through Authorised Officer vs Government of Sindh through Secretary and 3 others2017 PLD Sindh 690 · Sindh High Court · 2017-07-28Read full judgment →
• Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Administrator vs Islamuddin and another2017 YLR 804 · Sindh High Court · 2016-12-02Read full judgment →
• Karachi Electric Supply Corporation vs Muhammad Shahnawaz and others2017 PLD Sindh 23 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-20
  amendment of plaintcause of actionmaster and servantdamagesservice terminationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a set of High Court Appeals arising from a common order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court, whereby applications filed by the respondent-employees under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking amendments to their plaints to include an alternative relief of damages were allowed. The core legal question revolves around whether an amendment to a plaint introducing a claim for damages in a service termination matter can be permitted at a belated stage, particularly when it alters the complexion of the suit and introduces a new cause of action. The Sindh High Court held that the learned Single Judge erred in law and fact by allowing the amendments, setting aside the impugned order, and dismissing the amendment applications. The court laid down the principle that while amendments can generally be permitted at any stage, they cannot be allowed if they change the fundamental nature or complexion of the suit, introduce a new cause of action inconsistent with the original pleadings, cause serious prejudice to the opposing party, or are sought after inordinate delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can an amendment of a plaint be allowed if it changes the fundamental nature and complexion of the suit?
  • Whether an application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be permitted after a prolonged delay to introduce a new cause of action?
  • Is a plaintiff entitled to substitute or add an alternative claim for damages in a suit originally instituted for declaration and injunction regarding employment termination?
  • What are the core judicial principles governing the exercise of discretionary powers for amending pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Karachi Development Authority through Director General, Civil Centre, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi vs Mst. Hawa Bai and 6 others2017 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-22
  commercialization feechange of land usemaster planningbinding precedentleave-refusing orderremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by the Karachi Development Authority challenges judgments of the High Court regarding commercialization of properties. Leave was granted to consider whether a notification dated 20.7.1998 was issued by the Provincial Government and duly gazetted. During the proceedings, the appellant conceded that the area where the properties are situated had been commercialized, but contended that property owners cannot use them as commercial properties without paying the requisite commercialization fee or charges. The core legal question addressed is whether property owners in a commercialized area are exempt from paying commercialization charges and whether previous leave-refusing orders constitute binding precedent. The Supreme Court held that while respondents can seek commercialization of their properties, they must pay the applicable commercialization fee or charges, the rates of which must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the Court clarified that a leave-refusing order does not constitute enunciated law with binding precedent. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the matters remanded to the High Court for determination of the commercialization fee rates.

  Questions settled

  • Are owners of previously residential properties entitled to use them as commercial properties without paying commercialization fees once an area is commercialized?
  • Does a leave-refusing order passed by the Supreme Court constitute a binding precedent?
  • How should the rate of commercialization fee or charges be determined for properties situated in a commercialized area?
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• Kanachur Islamic Education Trust (R) vs Union of India and Another2017 SCInd 1300 · Supreme Court of India · 2017-08-30Read full judgment →
• Kamran Mukhtyar Qureshi vs The State and another2017 PHC 610 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Kamran Martin vs Mst. Siera Bibi and 4 others2017 PLC (C.S.) 597 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-16
  locus standiaggrieved personconstitutional petitionfactual controversypublic service commissionrecruitmentminority quota
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal called in question a judgment of the learned Single Judge whereby a constitutional petition filed by Respondent No. 1 against the recommendation of the Appellant for the post of Sub-Inspector under the minority quota was allowed. The core legal questions involved whether a candidate who failed the interview and was ousted from the recruitment process possessed the requisite locus standi as an aggrieved person to challenge another candidate's recommendation under Article 199 of the Constitution, and whether constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked to resolve disputed factual controversies requiring the recording of evidence. The Lahore High Court held that Respondent No. 1, having failed the interview, had no personal, individual, or justiciable right affected by the recommendations and thus lacked locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The Court further held that the writ petition improperly delved into factual controversies involving medical examinations and inquiries that could not be adjudicated without recording evidence. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the constitutional petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does a candidate who fails an interview and is ousted from the recruitment process possess locus standi to challenge the appointment recommendations of another candidate under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can disputed questions of fact requiring the recording of evidence be resolved by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • When can a person be considered an aggrieved person for the purpose of maintaining a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Kamran Khan & another vs The State & another2017 LHC 3489 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-08
  post-arrest bailprohibitory clauseillegal armsrecovery of weaponstentative assessmentdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail by the petitioners who were apprehended by a police contingent following a tip-off with a massive cache of arms and ammunition in their vehicle at Faisalabad Road, Chiniot. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the recovery and the applicability of the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, notwithstanding arguments regarding a valid license held by a third party. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioners are not entitled to bail, dismissing the petition. The court reasoned that given the unprecedented volume and lethal nature of the recovered weaponry, coupled with the absence of tangible material to substantiate the third-party license claim at the tentative assessment stage, the discretionary relief of bail must be withheld. The key principle laid down is that offences punishable with imprisonment of ten years or above do not fall outside the prohibitory clause merely on the ground that a lower minimum sentence is provided, and courts retain the discretion to decline bail based on the gravity and specific facts of the accusation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused found in possession of a massive cache of illegal arms is entitled to post-arrest bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898?
  • Does an offence punishable with imprisonment of ten years or above fall out of the ambit of the prohibitory clause on the basis of a lower minimum sentence mandated by statute?
  • Can a claim of transporting weapons under a third-party license be accepted at the tentative assessment stage without tangible material supporting it?
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• Kamran Ali Khan vs Vaneeza Umeran and 9 others2017 PLD Sindh 105 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-19
  Islamic LawHibaconditional giftgift of corpusplaint rejectionspecific relieflimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration, injunction, and recovery of money, alleging that a 30-million-rupee gift made to the first defendant was subject to a condition that the funds be used exclusively for charitable purposes. The core legal question was whether a gift of the corpus of property under Islamic Law could be made subject to a condition restricting the donee's absolute ownership, and whether such a condition was enforceable. The Court held that under Islamic Law, a gift of the corpus, once possession is delivered, constitutes an absolute transfer of ownership. Any condition attached to such a gift that derogates from the donee's absolute dominion or power of alienation is repugnant and void, rendering the condition ineffective while the gift itself remains valid. Consequently, the Court found the plaintiff had no legal right to the gifted funds, rendering the suit barred under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and the law of limitation. Accordingly, the Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a condition attached to a gift of the corpus of property under Islamic Law is valid and enforceable?
  • Does a donor retain any legal interest in a gifted property once possession has been delivered to the donee?
  • Is a suit for declaration and injunction maintainable when the underlying gift transaction is found to be absolute and unconditional under Islamic Law?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the suit is barred by the Specific Relief Act 1877?
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• Kamran Ahmad vs Chief Executive GEPCO. and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 900 · Lahore High Court · 2017-02-10
  constitutional petitionmaintainabilitynon-statutory rulesterms and conditions of servicepremature petitionwrit of prohibitionpromotionpublic utility company
  Summary & questions settled

  The Petitioner filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court assailing an Office Order regarding a meeting of the Selection Board for promotion/induction within the Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO). The core legal questions involved whether GEPCO's service rules are statutory in nature, allowing terms and conditions to be enforced via constitutional jurisdiction, and whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a mere notice or pre-mature administrative action where no adverse final order has been passed. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that since GEPCO's promotion rules are non-statutory, they cannot be enforced through a constitutional petition. Furthermore, the Court held that the petition was premature as no adverse final order or denial of promotion had been passed against the Petitioner, but rather only an intimation of a meeting and requests for documents. The key principle laid down is that terms and conditions of service governed by non-statutory rules are not enforceable through a constitutional petition, and writ petitions filed against premature administrative steps like notices or meetings without a final adverse order are not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether GEPCO is a body corporate performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State and amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Are the terms and conditions of service governed by non-statutory rules enforceable through a constitutional petition?
  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable against a notice, intimation of a meeting, or inquiry before any final adverse order has been passed by the competent authority?
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• Kamal Hussain vs Muhammad Shabir & others2017 SCR 236 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2017-01-10Read full judgment →
• Kalsoom Aftab vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Elementary & Secondary Education Department and others2017 PLJ Peshawar 310 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• Kaleemullah vs The State etc2017 PHC 726 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-09Read full judgment →
• Kaleem Ullah vs The State and others2017 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-02-01
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirycriminal petitionexoneration during investigationbail adjudicationtrial delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Kaleem Ullah, in a case involving offences under sections 324, 427, 109, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the investigation and his specific role in the alleged offence. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that while ten individuals were originally implicated in the FIR, seven were exonerated during the investigation. Furthermore, no specific injury was attributed to the petitioner, and the investigation had concluded with the submission of a challan. The Court held that the petitioner's culpability required further probe, rendering his case one of 'further inquiry' under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the Court granted bail, emphasizing that continued incarceration served no beneficial purpose when the trial had not yet commenced with the recording of prosecution witnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exoneration of a majority of co-accused during investigation constitute grounds for further inquiry regarding the culpability of the remaining accused?
  • Is a petitioner entitled to post-arrest bail when no specific injury is attributed to them and the investigation is finalized?
  • Does the absence of prosecution witnesses having recorded their statements at the trial stage support the grant of bail?
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• Kaleem Ullah alias Bhola and another vs The State and others2017 P Cr. L J 586 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-11
  circumstantial evidencelast-seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionbenefit of doubtmurdercriminal appealinterested witnessforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 302(b), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for murder, resulting in a life imprisonment sentence. The prosecution's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically last-seen evidence, an alleged extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a weapon. The core legal question is whether the prosecution established the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt given the inconsistencies in the evidence. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case, noting that the FIR was delayed, the last-seen evidence was contradictory and hearsay, the extra-judicial confession was manufactured by interested witnesses, and the weapon recovery lacked forensic linkage to the crime scene. The Court emphasized that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be unbroken and solid; any single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and the complainant's revision petition for sentence enhancement was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is last-seen evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction without strong independent corroboration?
  • Does a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case entitle an accused to acquittal?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when the prosecution witnesses provide contradictory accounts regarding the time of death and the reporting of the crime?
  • Is an extra-judicial confession made to interested witnesses, who failed to act upon it, reliable evidence for conviction?
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• K.K. Oil and Giiee Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. vs F.B.R. etc.2017 PLJ Islamabad 196 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Justice Retired Abdul Rashid Sulehria vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir2017 CLC 926 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
• Junaid Arshad vs The State & another2017 LHC 3933 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-05
  pre-arrest bailcybercrimefake facebook profilemaliceequality before lawforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Lahore High Court through a pre-arrest bail petition filed by Syed Junaid Arshad, a senior police officer apprehending arrest in a case registered under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 for allegedly creating a fake Facebook profile of his estranged wife, uploading explicit images, and causing them to go viral. The core legal question revolves around whether pre-arrest bail can be granted to an accused of high official status in the absence of any mala fide or abuse of process of law. The court dismissed the petition and recalled the ad-interim pre-arrest bail, holding that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be claimed as a matter of privilege or routine substitute for post-arrest bail based merely on the high social or official status of the accused. The key principle laid down is that the law treats all citizens equally regardless of status, and pre-arrest bail requires concrete establishment of mala fide, which was absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Is pre-arrest bail a privilege or prerogative of high officials and persons enjoying worldly status?
  • Can anticipatory bail be claimed as a routine substitute for post-arrest bail in every criminal case?
  • What are the essential considerations for granting pre-arrest bail under Pakistani law?
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• Juma Saeed and 2 others vs Mohammad Abdali2017 YLR 281 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-05-29Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan vs Ameer Sultan, etc2017 KLR Revenue Cases 8 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan vs Ameer Sultan etc2017 LHC 150 · Lahore High Court · 2017-01-11Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan through L.Rs vs Tahir Ali and others2017 CLC 564 · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-03Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan and 2 others vs Messrs Habib Bank Limited through President2017 PLC 158 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-14
  retrenchmentcompensationjudgment in personamjudgment in remconstitutional petitionlabour lawsettlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the denial of additional compensation to retrenched bank employees who sought parity with other employees previously granted relief by the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether a Supreme Court order, which awarded additional compensation to a specific group of retrenched employees based on a settlement, constituted a judgment in rem, thereby entitling the petitioners to the same relief. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Supreme Court order was a judgment in personam rather than in rem. The court established the principle that a judgment in personam is binding only upon the parties to the litigation or their privies, whereas a judgment in rem determines the status of a subject matter against the world. Because the Supreme Court order arose from a specific settlement between the bank and a defined group of 2343 employees, it did not create a universal right for all retrenched staff. Consequently, the petitioners, having already accepted their initial compensation, could not claim additional benefits based on a settlement to which they were not parties.

  Questions settled

  • Is a judgment based on a settlement between parties considered a judgment in rem or in personam?
  • Does a Supreme Court order granting compensation to a specific group of employees create a universal entitlement for all similarly situated employees?
  • Can retrenched employees claim additional compensation based on a settlement agreement to which they were not parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Juma Khan & others vs M/s. Habib Bank Limited through President and2017 PLC 158, 2017 PLJ Quetta 54 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-03-14
  retrenchmentadditional compensationjudgment in remjudgment in personamconstitutional petitionbank employees
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by retrenched bank employees seeking an additional compensation of Rs. 350,000/- each, relying on an order passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in an H.R. Case based on a settlement. The core legal question was whether a judgment or order passed by the Supreme Court on the basis of a private settlement between parties constitutes a judgment in rem applicable to all retrenched employees or a judgment in personam restricted to the parties to that proceeding. The Balochistan High Court held that the Supreme Court order relied upon was passed on the basis of a specific settlement between the bank and the employees in that case, rendering it a judgment in personam rather than a judgment in rem, and thus it could not be automatically claimed by petitioners who had already accepted their compensation and withdrawn their prior grievance applications. The key principle laid down is that orders or judgments rendered by courts on the basis of compromises or settlements between specific litigants operate in personam and do not create universal rights in rem for persons who were not parties to those proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed by the Supreme Court on the basis of a settlement between parties constitutes a judgment in rem or in personam?
  • Are retrenched bank employees who accepted compensation entitled to claim additional ex-gratia payments granted under a separate settlement order to which they were not parties?
  • What is the distinction between a judgment in rem and a judgment in personam under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Judicial-II) Hi-Tech Impex Karachi and 5 others vs The Deputy Collector2017 PTD (Trib.) 1608 · Customs, Excise And Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-17
  post-clearance auditcustoms reassessmentshow-cause noticepast and closed transactioncoram non judicejurisdictioncustoms duty recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns seven appeals filed against orders of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) maintaining reassessment orders passed by the Deputy Collector of Customs. The core legal question was whether customs authorities could unilaterally reassess goods and demand additional duties and taxes after the goods had been cleared for home consumption, without issuing a show-cause notice or possessing the requisite jurisdiction. The Tribunal held that once goods are cleared and a clearance order is passed, the transaction becomes "past and closed" and cannot be reopened without fulfilling statutory requirements, specifically regarding misdeclaration under Section 80(2) of the Customs Act, 1969. The Tribunal further held that the Deputy Collector usurped the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Post Clearance Audit and failed to adhere to mandatory show-cause notice requirements under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969. Consequently, the reassessment orders were declared coram non judice, illegal, and void. The key principle laid down is that customs authorities cannot bypass statutory procedures for post-clearance audit or demand recovery without a valid show-cause notice, as such actions constitute an unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can customs authorities unilaterally reassess goods after they have been cleared for home consumption?
  • Is the issuance of a show-cause notice a mandatory prerequisite for the recovery of short-paid duties under Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Does a customs officer have the jurisdiction to perform post-clearance audit functions assigned to the Directorate of Post Clearance Audit?
  • Can an assessment order be reopened after the goods have been removed from the port area and the transaction has attained finality?
  Read full judgment →
• Judicial Activism Panel vs The Govt. of the Pakistan, etc2017 LHC 1853 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-28Read full judgment →
• Judicial Activism Panel vs Government of the Pakistan and others2017 LHC 1853, 2017 PLD Lahore 588 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-28
  public interest litigationPILdominus litiswithdrawal of petitionemployment quotadisabled personsconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a public interest petition filed under constitutional jurisdiction seeking the enforcement of the employment quota for disabled persons in public and private organizations. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether a petitioner in a public interest litigation possesses the absolute right to withdraw the petition at their sweet will. The Lahore High Court, presided over by Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C.J., held that a public interest litigation cannot be withdrawn unilaterally by the petitioner, as the petitioner is not the dominus litis in such proceedings. The court reasoned that permitting unrestricted withdrawal would render public interest proceedings vulnerable to abuse and prejudice the public weal. Consequently, the request for withdrawal based on the counsel's personal protest was declined, the counsel's power of attorney was ordered to be returned, and the case was directed to proceed independently under the title 'EMPLOYMENT QUOTA OF DISABLED PERSONS CASE'.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner in a public interest litigation withdraw the petition at their sweet will?
  • Is a petitioner in public interest litigation considered the dominus litis?
  • What considerations guide a court in deciding whether to permit the withdrawal of a public interest petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Jubilee Life Insurance Co Ltd vs United Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. through Managing Director and others2017 PLJ Karachi 46 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-22
  trademark infringementservice markpermanent injunctionClass 36likelihood of confusionTakafulintellectual propertygoodwill
  Summary & questions settled

  This suit concerns a claim for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff, an insurance company, against the defendant for the alleged infringement of its registered service mark "Amaan Plan." The core legal question was whether the defendant’s use of the same mark for Takaful services constituted trademark infringement, despite the defendant’s contention that Takaful and conventional insurance are distinct services. The court held that the defendant’s use of the mark, which falls under the same international classification (Class 36) as the plaintiff’s registered mark, created a likelihood of confusion and deception among the public. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan authorized the infringement of a proprietary trademark. Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement, noting the defendant failed to justify the adoption of the plaintiff’s established mark. The court granted the injunction, emphasizing that the unauthorized use of a phonetically and visually similar mark in the same service class constitutes infringement under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001.

  Questions settled

  • Does the use of a registered trademark for Takaful services constitute infringement when the mark is already registered for conventional insurance services in the same class?
  • Can a license granted by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan be used as a defense against a claim of trademark infringement?
  • What constitutes 'similar services' under the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 for the purpose of determining trademark infringement?
  Read full judgment →
• JS Bank Limited vs Commissioner Company Law Division, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and another2017 CLD 368 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2016-08-02Read full judgment →
• Jess Smith and Sons Cotton LLC vs D.S. Industries2017 LHC 4337 · Lahore High Court · 2017-12-12Read full judgment →
• Jehangir vs StatePLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 32 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-06-17
  post-arrest bailnarcoticsfurther inquiryevidentiary value of co-accused statementabscondencetentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail arises from a narcotics case involving the recovery of 10 kilograms of Charas from a vehicle occupied by a co-accused. The petitioner was not named in the initial FIR but was subsequently implicated solely based on the statement of the co-accused recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could be denied bail based on the statement of a co-accused and his alleged abscondence, despite the lack of direct recovery or evidence linking him to the contraband. The Court held that the petitioner's case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Relying on established precedents, the Court affirmed that a statement made by a co-accused before the police is insufficient evidence to deny bail. Furthermore, it held that mere abscondence does not preclude the grant of bail if the case otherwise merits it on the basis of further inquiry, and bail should not be withheld as a punitive measure.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be denied bail solely on the basis of a co-accused's statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere fact of abscondence automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail?
  • Is a statement made by an accused before the police admissible as evidence against a co-accused under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Jehangir Khan vs Muhammad Asif Awan and others2017 PLD Peshawar 111 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-15
  election petitionelection tribunalprocedural non-compliancediscretionary powerverification of pleadingslocal government electionstechnical grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged an order by the Election Tribunal which dismissed an election petition due to technical defects in the verification of annexures, citing non-compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Representation of the People Act 1976. The core legal question was whether the Election Tribunal was mandatorily required to dismiss the petition for such technical deficiencies under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013. The Court held that unlike the Representation of the People Act 1976, which mandates dismissal for non-compliance, Section 51 of the Election Rules, 2013 grants the Tribunal discretion regarding dismissal. The Court ruled that the Tribunal should exercise this discretion to advance justice by deciding cases on merits or allowing amendments under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, rather than resorting to summary dismissal on technical grounds. The principle laid down is that where a statute confers discretionary power on a tribunal to dismiss a petition for procedural non-compliance, that discretion must be exercised to facilitate a decision on the merits rather than defeating the cause through technicalities.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Election Tribunal have mandatory power to dismiss an election petition for defective verification under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013?
  • Is the dismissal of an election petition for procedural non-compliance mandatory or discretionary under Section 51 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013?
  • Can an Election Tribunal allow an amendment to an election petition regarding the verification of documents under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Jehan Sharif vs The State2017 PHC 1153 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-24
  post-arrest bailnarcotics traffickingheroin recoverybelly smugglingprohibitory clauseControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a bail petition filed by the accused Jehan Sharif seeking post-arrest release in case FIR No. 60 dated 2.8.2017 registered under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 at Police Station RD ANF, Peshawar, following the alleged recovery of 930 grams of heroin concealed in his belly. The core legal question before the Peshawar High Court was whether the accused was entitled to the concession of bail for an offense involving the trafficking of a substantial quantity of narcotics abroad, notwithstanding that the offense may not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court held that the accused was prima facie connected with the commission of the offense, particularly given the nature of international narcotics trafficking bringing disrepute to the country and a positive FSL report, and consequently dismissed the bail petition. The key principle laid down is that where an accused is prima facie connected with heinous drug trafficking offenses carrying stringent penalties, bail may be denied even if the specific statutory punishment does not strictly fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when charged under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 for smuggling heroin in his belly?
  • Can bail be denied in narcotics cases even if the alleged offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the legal effect of a positive FSL report and prima facie connection on a bail petition involving international drug trafficking?
  Read full judgment →
• Jeewan vs The State2017 YLR 1638 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-05
  surety bondsuperdariforfeiture of bondseized propertytheft of case propertyconcurrent findingscriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenges concurrent orders passed by the lower courts dismissing the applicant's revision and upholding the imposition of a fine for breach of a surety bond. The applicant stood surety for the superdari release of seized cattle (buffaloes), which were subsequently reported stolen. The core legal question concerns the liability of a surety upon failing to produce property entrusted on superdari and the validity of a false theft defense where the related criminal case resulted in acquittal. The Sindh High Court held that the surety is strictly bound by the terms of the bond and cannot evade liability through unsubstantiated claims of theft or appeals to humanitarian grounds. The court laid down the principle that failure to immediately report the loss of superdari property and produce the same upon court notices attracts penal consequences under the surety bond, and concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the breach of bond conditions will not be interfered with in the absence of valid legal grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a surety can be held liable for a fine upon failing to produce property released on superdari?
  • Does a subsequent FIR regarding the theft of superdari property absolve a surety from the obligation to produce the property before the court?
  • Whether execution of a surety bond on humanitarian grounds constitutes a valid defense against forfeiture or penalty for non-production?
  Read full judgment →
• Jawaria Maqsood vs Joint Admission Committee for Medical2017 YLR 1571 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2016-01-16Read full judgment →
• Jawad-ul-Haq vs The State2017 PHC 1137 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-11-07Read full judgment →
• Jawad Ali and others vs Superintendent Jail and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 587 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-19
  locus poenitentiaecancellation of appointmentconstitutional jurisdictioncivil servantsvested rightsmalice in lawappointment of jail warders
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Peshawar High Court disposes of three writ petitions filed by Jawad Ali and others challenging an order dated 16.2.2015, through which their appointments as Jail Warders (BPS-5) were cancelled on the mere desire of a so-called competent authority after they had already assumed office and performed duties for nearly twenty days. The core legal questions revolved around whether the government could rescind appointment orders that had already taken legal effect, creating vested rights, and whether the High Court's jurisdiction was barred under Article 212 or Article 199(3) of the Constitution. The Court held that once an appointment order has been acted upon and legal rights have accrued, the principle of locus poenitentiae prevents the government from arbitrarily withdrawing or rescinding it, especially when no illegality in the selection process is established. Furthermore, the bar under Article 199(3) does not oust the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction where an administrative action is coram non judice, without jurisdiction, or mala fide. The writ petitions were accordingly allowed and the cancellation order was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the government can rescind or withdraw an appointment order after it has taken legal effect and created vested rights in favor of an individual?
  • Does the bar contained in Article 199(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preclude the High Court from exercising judicial review over an appointment cancellation order that is mala fide or without jurisdiction?
  • Can a civil servant's appointment be lawfully cancelled without issuing a show-cause notice or affording an opportunity of hearing after they have assumed charge of their duties?
  • Are appointees to a public post to be penalized for administrative irregularities or policy shifts committed by the department itself during the recruitment process?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Zamir Ahmed/Secretary General Ogap vs Tahir Mahmood,2017 CLD 922 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-04-07Read full judgment →
• Javed vs The State2017 SCMR 531 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-31
  post-arrest bailControl of Narcotic Substances ActSection 9(c)constructive knowledgedisabled personrecovery of narcoticsco-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court, which had denied bail to the petitioner in a case registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether a passenger in a vehicle, who is disabled, can be refused bail when narcotics are recovered from secret cavities of the car owned and controlled by an absconding principal accused, without preliminary evidence of constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that on the available record, there was no clear evidence connecting the petitioner to constructive knowledge of the hidden contraband. Furthermore, the court noted that the petitioner was disabled due to polio, entitling him to concession on humanitarian grounds. The court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, set aside the High Court's order, and granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner. The decision establishes that mere presence in a vehicle does not automatically establish constructive possession of hidden narcotics for bail purposes without prima facie evidence of knowledge, especially where the accused is disabled.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted to a passenger where narcotics are recovered from secret cavities of a vehicle owned by an absconding principal accused?
  • Whether mere presence in a vehicle is sufficient to attribute constructive knowledge of hidden narcotics at the bail stage?
  • Can physical disability of an accused be considered as a ground for granting bail in a narcotics case under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Kiian alias Bacha and another vs State and another2017 PLJ SC 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-19
  identification parademurderrobberyforensic science laboratory reportbullet casing matchingchance witnesscriminal appealacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arose from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal questions concerned the evidentiary value of delayed and flawed identification parades, the reliability of in-court identifications of fleetingly-seen strangers, and the integrity of forensic ballistics reports where chain of custody and seal markings are doubtful. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted the appellants, holding that identification proceedings conducted over a year after the incident without proper matching of participants or addressing objections of prior showing to witnesses are unreliable, and that in-court identification of strangers who were only seen fleetingly is inconsequential. The Court laid down the principle that unexplained delays in transmitting forensic items to laboratories, coupled with failures to document seal types and marks, render ballistic matching unsafe for sustaining a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the basis of identification parades conducted more than a year after the incident without descriptions in the FIR?
  • Does the in-court identification of an accused by witnesses who only had a fleeting glimpse of a stranger suffice to maintain a conviction?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a forensic ballistics report when there is unexplained delay in transmitting the weapon and bullet casings to the laboratory and seals are undocumented?
  • Can reliance be placed on identification proceedings where the magistrates failed to address the suspects' objections that they had been shown to the witnesses prior to the parade?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Khan vs Pakistan through Secty. Interior2017 PLJ Peshawar 317, 2017 YLR 2109, 2017 PHC 553 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Javed Khan vs Pakistan through Secretary Interior and 6 others2017 YLR 2109 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Javed Khan vs Pakistan through Secretary Interior & 6 others2017 PLJ Peshawar 317 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-25Read full judgment →
• Javed Khan alias Bacha. (in Crl. A. 126/2010) Raees Khan. (in Crl. A.2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  criminal appealidentification paradechance witnessforensic science laboratorymurderrobberybenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals arise from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for murder and robbery. The core legal questions involved the reliability of identification parades conducted over a year after the incident without descriptions in the initial report, the evidentiary value of in-court identification of strangers who were only glimpsed fleetingly, and the integrity of forensic evidence regarding the matching of a bullet casing with a recovered weapon given unexplained delays and lack of sealing details. The Supreme Court held that the identification proceedings were deeply flawed, the chance witness's presence was unverified, and the forensic report could not be safely relied upon due to potential tampering and delays. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants of all charges, laying down that identification parades must be conducted promptly and meticulously, and that fleeting glimpses by strangers without prior physical descriptions in the FIR cannot sustain a capital conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the basis of an identification parade held more than a year after the incident when the accused's physical features were omitted from the initial police report?
  • Whether in-court identification of stranger accused persons by witnesses who only had a fleeting glimpse during the crime can substitute for a flawed identification parade?
  • Does an unexplained delay in sending a recovered weapon and bullet casing to the forensic laboratory, coupled with a failure to prove proper sealing, vitiate the reliability of the forensic report?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a chance witness whose presence at the crime scene remains unexplained and inconsistent with ordinary conduct?
  Read full judgment →
• (Crl. a 126/2010) Javed Khan alias Bacha(Crl. a 127/2010) Raees Khan vs2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  identification paradeforensic evidencechain of custodycriminal appealmurder convictionreasonable doubtchance witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns criminal appeals against convictions for murder and robbery. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently established the identity of the appellants and the integrity of the forensic evidence. The Supreme Court held that the convictions were unsafe and set them aside. The Court found the identification proceedings unreliable because they occurred over a year after the incident, the witnesses had not provided descriptions in the FIR or statements under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the Magistrates failed to address the appellants' objections that their identities had been revealed beforehand. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the forensic evidence was compromised due to unexplained delays in sending the bullet casing and pistol to the laboratory and the failure to document the specific seals used on the evidence parcels. The key principle laid down is that identification parades must be conducted promptly and fairly, and forensic evidence requires a strict, documented chain of custody to be admissible and reliable. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in conducting an identification parade render the identification evidence unreliable?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution fails to document the specific seals used on forensic evidence parcels?
  • Can an identification parade be considered valid if the Magistrate fails to address the accused's objection that their identity was previously revealed to witnesses?
  • Does the failure of a witness to provide a description of the assailant in the FIR or initial police statement undermine subsequent identification?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Khan alias Bacha and another vs The State and another2017 PLJ SC 260, 2017 P.S.C. (Crl) 97, 2017 SCMR 524 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-01-20
  MurderRobberyIdentification paradeForensic evidenceChain of custodyAcquittalAppealsChance witnessCriminal Procedure CodePakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerned appeals against convictions for murder and robbery, where the Lahore High Court had upheld the convictions for murder and substituted the charge under Section 392 PPC with Section 394 PPC read with Section 34 PPC. The core legal questions addressed the reliability of identification parades and forensic evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether identification proceedings were conducted carefully, noting significant delays, the absence of accused descriptions in the FIR or Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, and the Magistrates' failure to address the appellants' objections about being shown to witnesses prior to the parade. The Court also scrutinized the forensic report, highlighting unexplained delays in sending the pistol and bullet casing to the laboratory and the lack of details regarding seals, which raised concerns about tampering. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted the appellants, emphasizing that identification evidence must be meticulously conducted with proper safeguards and that doubts regarding the chain of custody for forensic evidence render it unsafe for conviction.

  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs The Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Etc2019 PLC (C.S.) 395, 2017 LHC 3966 · Lahore High Court · 2017-10-17
  constitutional petitionmaster and servantnon-statutory rulesservice regulationsmaintainabilitystatutory bodydepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by an employee of the Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Rawalpindi, challenging departmental inquiry proceedings and the withholding of his promotion. The core legal question was whether the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, could be invoked by an employee of a statutory body whose service regulations are non-statutory, and whether such employment is governed by the principle of master and servant. The Court held that the petition was not maintainable. Relying on established precedents, the Court determined that because the Board's service regulations had not received the requisite approval from the Controlling Authority, they remained non-statutory in nature. Consequently, the relationship between the Board and its employees is governed by the principle of master and servant, precluding the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction for service-related grievances. The Court affirmed that where regulations are merely internal instructions rather than statutory rules, the appropriate remedy does not lie in a constitutional petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is a constitutional petition maintainable for an employee of a Board whose service regulations are non-statutory?
  • Does the principle of master and servant apply to employees of the Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education?
  • Are service regulations effective without the approval of the Controlling Authority under the Punjab Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education Act, 1976?
  • What is the test for determining whether rules or regulations governing a statutory body are statutory or non-statutory?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs National Bank of Pakistan through Manager and others2017 CLD 833 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-21
  auction saleexecution petitionmaterial irregularitybanking courtprocedural defectactus curiae neminem gravabitexecution first appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This Execution First Appeal challenges a Banking Court's order confirming an auction sale of mortgaged property. The appellant alleged material irregularities in the auction proceedings, including failure to specify the auction venue, non-compliance with mandatory notice periods under Order XXI, Rule 68, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and fictitious conduct by the court auctioneer. The core legal questions were whether the auction violated mandatory procedural requirements and whether the appellant's objection petition was rightly dismissed for failing to deposit 20% of the sale price under Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that the auction proceedings were sham and violated mandatory provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, causing substantial injury to the appellant. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the appellant could not be penalized for failing to deposit the full 20% when the court itself had only ordered a 5% deposit, invoking the principle 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the auction sale was set aside due to procedural illegalities and lack of transparency.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of an executing court to specify the venue of an auction render the subsequent auction proceedings invalid?
  • Can an objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 90, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be dismissed for non-deposit of the required percentage of the sale price if the court failed to order such deposit?
  • Does the principle 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' protect a litigant from the consequences of a court's failure to order the correct deposit amount for an objection petition?
  • Is the requirement under Order XXI, Rule 68, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the 15-day notice period for the sale of immovable property mandatory?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs Imtiaz Ahmad & anotherPLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 926 · Lahore High Court · 2017-06-13
  pre-arrest bailcancellation of bailhomicidemala fideabuse of processabscondence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition challenges an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, which granted pre-arrest bail to the respondent in a 2008 homicide case. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to pre-arrest bail despite being nominated in the FIR for an effective fire shot, corroborated by eye-witnesses and medical evidence, and having absconded for nine years. The Lahore High Court held that the impugned order was factually incorrect and legally unsustainable, as it erroneously claimed no incriminating material existed. The Court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy, a diversion from the usual course of law, and should only be granted when the accused demonstrates that the intended arrest is actuated by mala fide or abuse of process. Finding no such elements and noting the respondent's long absence from the law, the Court cancelled the bail. The judgment reaffirms that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted in routine criminal cases without establishing clear mala fides, regardless of the submission of a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pre-arrest bail can be granted in a criminal case where the accused is nominated in the FIR and supported by eye-witness testimony and medical evidence?
  • Is the concession of pre-arrest bail available to an accused in the absence of proof that the intended arrest is actuated by mala fide or abuse of process?
  • Does the submission of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically entitle an accused to the confirmation of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs Director, Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR, Karachi and another2017 PTD (Trib.) 2357 · Customs Appellate Tribunal · 2016-09-03Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal vs Asj, etc.2017 LHC 2732 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-07Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and another vs The State and another2017 MLD 1440 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-10
  capital punishmentocular accountreasonable doubtbenefit of the doubtcriminal appealappreciation of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the convictions and sentences imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Rajanpur, for murder and attempted murder under sections 302(b) and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had proven its case beyond reasonable doubt, specifically regarding the presence and credibility of eye-witnesses. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the appellants' guilt. The court found the ocular account unreliable, noting that the prosecution's own witness, PW-11, contradicted the presence of the eye-witnesses at the scene. Furthermore, investigation reports indicated the appellants were incapacitated by intoxication during the incident, and the police had previously declared them innocent. The court emphasized that in capital cases, evidence requires rigorous scrutiny, and where eye-witness testimony is doubtful, medical evidence cannot corroborate the prosecution's version. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing the principle that a single instance of reasonable doubt is sufficient to warrant an acquittal, with the benefit of such doubt accruing to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of a prosecution witness that contradicts the presence of other eye-witnesses at the scene of the crime undermine the entire prosecution case?
  • Can medical evidence corroborate a prosecution case where the ocular account itself is found to be doubtful and unreliable?
  • Is a single instance of reasonable doubt sufficient to warrant the acquittal of an accused in a capital case?
  Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and another vs Pakistan Mobile Communications Ltd. and 32017 PTD 1257 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-01-17Read full judgment →
• Javed Iqbal and another vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Planning and Development Division and others2017 IHC 196 · Islamabad High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Khurram Shahzad vs The State2017 MLD 69 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-06
  criminal appealmurdersudden provocationpremeditated murderdeath penaltysentence reductionQatl-i-amd
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Khurram Shahzad, for the murder of Sajid Mehmood. The prosecution alleged a premeditated conspiracy involving deceitful inducement. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. Upon review, the Lahore High Court rejected the prosecution's theory of a planned conspiracy, finding it improbable given the circumstances. Instead, the Court determined that the incident arose from a sudden, unanticipated confrontation when the deceased was discovered at the appellant's house at an odd hour. The Court held that the assault was not premeditated nor motivated by honour, but rather occurred in the wake of a sudden situation. Consequently, the Court converted the conviction from Section 302(b) to Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, reducing the sentence to fifteen years rigorous imprisonment. The judgment affirms that cases involving sudden provocation, previously covered by exceptions to the former Section 300, are appropriately dealt with under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Does a murder committed during a sudden, unanticipated confrontation fall under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be converted to Section 302(c) if the prosecution fails to prove premeditation?
  • Are cases previously covered by the exceptions to the former Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 now appropriately dealt with under Section 302(c)?
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• Khurram Shahbaz vs The State2017 MLD 2017 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-19
  common intentionvicarious liabilityidentification paradebenefit of doubtcriminal appealAnti-Terrorism Actmere presence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences awarded by an Anti-Terrorism Court for offences including murder and terrorism. The appellant was convicted for his alleged presence alongside the main accused, who fired the fatal shot at a police constable. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s mere presence at the scene, without evidence of an overt act or prior concert, was sufficient to establish vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the identification parade unreliable due to the exposure of the appellant to witnesses prior to the parade. Furthermore, the Court ruled that mere presence at the scene of a crime, absent evidence of a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds, does not attract the provisions of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, establishing that vicarious liability requires proof of common intention, and any doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime sufficient to establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the failure to conduct a valid identification parade entitle an accused to the benefit of doubt?
  • Is proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior concert necessary to invoke vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Javed Hassan vs Mst. Farkhnda Yasmin, etc.2017 LHC 2776 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-23Read full judgment →
• Javed Hameed, etc. vs Aman-Ullah and othersK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 357 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• Javed Hameed etc. vs Aman-Ullah and 12 othersK.L.R. 2017 Civil Cases 357, 2017 LHC 2067 · Lahore High Court · 2017-05-03Read full judgment →
• (1) Javed (2) The State vs (1) The State (2) The StateK.L.R. 2017 Criminal Cases 167, 2017 LHC 1812 · Lahore High Court · 2017-04-18
  death sentencecircumstantial evidencelast seen evidenceextra-judicial confessionFSL reportbenefit of doubtmurder reference
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arose from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including 'last seen' evidence, an extra-judicial confession, and the recovery of a pistol and cash. The Lahore High Court observed that the 'last seen' evidence lacked proximity of time and distance, and the witnesses' statements were recorded with an unexplained delay of 19 days. The extra-judicial confession was deemed weak and uncorroborated due to the non-production of a key witness. Furthermore, the recovery of the weapon was rendered legally insignificant because both the pistol and the crime empty were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory on the same day. Applying the principle that a chain of circumstantial evidence must be unbroken to sustain a conviction, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was accepted, the conviction was set aside, and the death sentence was not confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the evidentiary value of 'last seen' evidence when the proximity of time and distance between the last sighting and the death is not established?
  • Does an unexplained delay in recording a witness's statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect their credibility?
  • Can a forensic report matching a recovered weapon with a crime empty be relied upon if both articles are sent to the laboratory together after the arrest of the accused?
  • What is the legal consequence under Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 when the prosecution fails to produce a material witness?
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• Javaid vs The State2017 PLJ FSC 137 · Federal Shariat Court · 2017-04-24
  retracted confessioncircumstantial evidencedacoity with murdervoluntary confessionrecovery of stolen propertymedical corroborationjail appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail criminal appeal was filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section 396 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentence of life imprisonment, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-II Charsadda. The case originated from the recovery of an unidentified body, later identified as a taxi driver who was murdered and whose vehicle was stolen. Although there was no direct ocular evidence, the prosecution relied on the appellant's judicial confession, the recovery of the stolen vehicle on the pointation of a co-accused, the recovery of the deceased's national identity card, and corroborating medical evidence. The appellant contended that the conviction could not be based on a retracted confession without independent corroboration. The Federal Shariat Court held that a judicial confession, even if retracted, can form the sole basis of conviction if found to be true and voluntary. The Court further ruled that a brief delay in recording a confession does not automatically render it involuntary, and since the circumstantial evidence completed the chain of events, the conviction was maintained and the appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a retracted judicial confession form the sole basis of a conviction under Pakistani law?
  • Does a delay of two days in recording a judicial confession automatically render it involuntary?
  • Can circumstantial evidence, such as the recovery of stolen property and medical reports, sufficiently corroborate a retracted confession to sustain a conviction?
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• Jansher and another vs M.t. Zarmina and 11 others2017 PLJ Peshawar 157 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-13Read full judgment →
• Jan Noor vs Hidayat shah2017 PHC 642 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-06-19Read full judgment →
• Jan Nabi, Executive Engineer vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 339 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-11-16
  criminal proceduredischarge of accusedpolice challanrevisional jurisdictionquashment of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Jan Nabi and others against an order of the Sessions Judge Diamer, which recalled and reversed earlier orders of the Judicial Magistrate Diamer discharging petitioners Nos. 1 to 11 from a criminal case registered via FIR No. 70/2014 at Police Station Chilas. The core legal question concerned the legality of the Sessions Judge's order reversing the discharge of petitioners who were not even challaned by the police upon completion of the investigation. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that since the police challan did not charge petitioners Nos. 1 to 11, the impugned order of the Sessions Judge could not operate against them, while petitioner No. 12 was left free to seek alternative relief. The petition was consequently allowed to the extent of petitioners Nos. 1 to 11 and dismissed regarding petitioner No. 12.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Sessions Judge reverse the discharge order of a Judicial Magistrate against persons not challaned by the police?
  • Does an order of discharge passed by a Judicial Magistrate attain finality if left unchallenged by the prosecution?
  • What is the legal effect of an impugned revisional order on accused persons whose names do not appear in column No. 3 or 4 of the police challan?
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• Jan Muhammad vs The Member (Colony), etc2017 P.S.C. 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food Schemeproprietary rightstemporary leasealternate land allotmentBoard of Revenueremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from a dispute over the allotment of alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' of 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner met the conditions specified in government notifications of 1970 and 1971 to qualify for the grant of proprietary rights or alternate land after the expiration of his original temporary lease in 1962, or whether the land had lawfully reverted to the State and the subsequent allotment was vitiated by fraud. The Supreme Court held that alternate land was strictly contingent upon specific conditions—namely, that the original lessee fulfilled lease terms but was dispossessed due to municipal proximity or the implementation of a permanent government scheme. Because the lower forums and the High Court failed to properly examine the applicability of these notifications to the respective claims of the petitioner and respondent No. 3, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Board of Revenue for a fresh decision in accordance with the governing notifications.

  Questions settled

  • Who is eligible for the grant of alternate state land under the Grow More Food Scheme notifications of 1970 and 1971?
  • What are the precise conditions under which an allottee under a temporary lease is entitled to proprietary rights or alternate land?
  • Does a temporary lease that expires by efflux of time and reverts to the State entitle the lessee to claim alternate land?
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• Jan Muhammad vs The Member (Colony) and others2017 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food Schemestate land allotmentproprietary rightsalternate land grantlease terminationBoard of Revenueadministrative law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' initiated by the Board of Revenue in 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose original lease expired in 1962, qualified for the grant of alternate land under the notifications issued in 1970 and 1971. The Board of Revenue had cancelled the petitioner's allotment, alleging fraud and misrepresentation, a decision upheld by the High Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly examine whether the parties satisfied the strict criteria established by the 1970 and 1971 notifications, which specifically limited alternate land grants to lessees dispossessed for permanent schemes or whose land fell within restricted zones, such as near municipalities or railway stations. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Board of Revenue to determine, based on the evidence, whether either party met these specific eligibility requirements or if the land had correctly reverted to the State.

  Questions settled

  • Under what specific conditions were allottees under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' entitled to the grant of alternate state land?
  • Does the expiration of a temporary lease under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' automatically entitle a former lessee to the grant of alternate land?
  • Can an allotment of state land be cancelled on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation without a proper determination of the lessee's eligibility under the relevant notifications?
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• Jan Muhammad vs National Bank of Pakistan and others2017 PLC (C.S.) 727 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-06
  Intra-Court Appealservice lawsalary discriminationpromotion before retirementNational Bank of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant filed an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) against the dismissal of his writ petition, seeking a revision of his salary and pensionary benefits upon retirement as a Senior Executive Vice President (SEVP) from the National Bank of Pakistan. He claimed discrimination, arguing that he was given a 10% salary increase while another officer, who retired on the same date, received a significantly higher increase. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to parity in pay and benefits with other officers who had served as SEVPs for a longer duration. The Lahore High Court held that the appellant was promoted as SEVP as a special concession merely one day before his retirement without having served in that rank, whereas the comparators had served as SEVPs for years and enjoyed regular increments. The court ruled that no case of discrimination was made out and dismissed the appeal, establishing that an employee promoted as a special concession immediately prior to retirement cannot claim salary parity with regular long-serving incumbents of the same post.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee promoted to a higher post immediately before retirement is entitled to claim salary parity with regular officers who served in that post for years?
  • Does promotion as a special concession one day prior to retirement entitle an employee to annual increments and pay scales of active incumbents?
  • Can a claim of discrimination be sustained when the persons compared are not similarly situated in terms of tenure and date of promotion?
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• Jan Muhammad vs Member (Colony) etc.2017 P.S.C. 245, 2017 SCMR 93, 2017 PLJ SC 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-10-20
  Grow More Food SchemeState land allotmentAlternate landProprietary rightsRevenue lawAdministrative notificationRemand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the entitlement to alternate state land under the 'Grow More Food Scheme' initiated by the Board of Revenue in 1956. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, whose original lease expired in 1962, satisfied the eligibility criteria for the grant of alternate land as stipulated in the government notifications dated 01.06.1970 and 26.04.1971. These notifications restricted the grant of alternate land to lessees who had fulfilled lease conditions but were dispossessed due to land proximity to municipalities, towns, or railway stations, or because their land was utilized for permanent government schemes. The Supreme Court held that the lower forums failed to properly examine whether the petitioner or the contesting respondent met these specific criteria. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Board of Revenue for a fresh determination of eligibility in strict accordance with the conditions prescribed in the 1970 and 1971 notifications. The principle established is that entitlement to alternate land is strictly contingent upon satisfying the specific conditions set forth in the governing administrative notifications.

  Questions settled

  • What are the specific eligibility criteria for the grant of alternate state land under the Grow More Food Scheme notifications of 1970 and 1971?
  • Does a lessee whose lease expired and reverted to the State automatically qualify for the grant of alternate land under the Grow More Food Scheme?
  • Is a revenue authority required to specifically examine compliance with notification conditions before cancelling an allotment of alternate land?
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• Jan Muhammad etc. vs Mst. Samna Bibi etc.2017 PLJ SC 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale-deednew plea at appellate stagepure question of lawcolonization areacomplete justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from pre-emption suits filed against the sale of land executed in 1966. The core legal questions involved whether the period of limitation for pre-emption commences from the date of execution or registration of the sale-deed, and whether an appellant can raise a completely new legal plea requiring factual inquiry before the Supreme Court without leave. The Supreme Court held that limitation begins from the date of the registration of the sale-deed, reaffirming established precedent. Furthermore, the Court held that while it possesses the discretion under Order XIX Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 to allow new pure questions of law to be raised for the first time to do complete justice, a plea requiring foundational factual determination and evidence cannot be raised at the appellate stage without prior pleading and leave. Consequently, the appeals and the review petition were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit starts from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale-deed?
  • Can an appellant raise a new point for the first time before the Supreme Court without obtaining prior leave of the Court?
  • Is a plea regarding the applicability of pre-emption bars in colony areas considered a pure question of law when it requires a foundational factual inquiry?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court permit a party to agitate a point not mentioned in the leave granting order?
  Read full judgment →
• (1) Jan Muhammad etc (2) Mst. Jiwani etc. (3) Malang Khan (decd)2017 SCP · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale deednew pleaSupreme Court Rules 1980factual foundationappellate discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals arose from pre-emption suits where the appellants challenged the respondents' superior right of pre-emption and the limitation period for filing the suits. The core legal questions were whether the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of execution or registration of the sale deed, and whether the appellants could introduce a new plea regarding the non-pre-emptibility of land under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court held that the limitation period for pre-emption suits runs from the date of registration of the sale deed. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the appellants' attempt to raise a new plea, ruling that while the Supreme Court has the discretion to allow new points of law, it will not permit arguments that require a factual foundation not established in the lower courts. The Court emphasized that a party cannot raise a new plea for the first time at the final appellate stage as a matter of right, particularly when it necessitates factual inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commence from the date of execution or the date of registration of the sale deed?
  • Can an appellant raise a new plea for the first time before the Supreme Court if that plea requires a factual determination not previously addressed?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the discretion to allow the raising of a new point of law not specified in the petition of appeal?
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• Jan Muhammad and others vs Mst. Sakina Bibi and others2017 PLJ SC 337, 2017 PLD Supreme Court 158 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2017-02-14
  pre-emptionlimitation periodregistration of sale deednew plea at appellate stagepure question of lawcolonization areaSupreme Court powers
  Summary & questions settled

  These appeals, stemming from pre-emption suits filed in 1968 regarding a sale deed executed in 1966 and registered in 1968, address whether limitation starts from the date of execution or registration of a sale deed, and whether a new point not raised below can be urged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the starting point of limitation for a pre-emption suit is the date of registration of the sale deed, not its execution. Furthermore, the Court held that a new plea requiring factual foundation and adjudication cannot be raised for the first time at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court as a pure question of law without prior pleadings and evidence. The key principle established is that while the Supreme Court has the discretion to allow pure questions of law to be raised for the first time in exceptional circumstances to do complete justice, points requiring factual inquiry and foundation in the record cannot be entertained for the first time.

  Questions settled

  • Does the period of limitation for filing a pre-emption suit commence from the date of execution of the sale deed or from the date of its registration?
  • Can an appellant raise a new legal plea for the first time before the Supreme Court without having pleaded it in the lower courts?
  • Does a plea regarding the applicability of a notification exempting colony areas from pre-emption constitute a pure question of law that can be raised without factual foundation?
  • Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court permit a party to rely on grounds not specified in the memo of appeal?
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• Jan Baz & 10 others vs Shah Nawaz & 02 others2017 PHC 398 · Peshawar High Court · 2017-04-05Read full judgment →
• Jan Ali vs The State2017 YLR 303 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2016-04-29Read full judgment →
• Jamil Ahmed vs Nazir Ahmed through Legal heirs and others2017 YLR 829 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-23Read full judgment →
• Jamia Khair Ul Madaris, Aurangzeb Road, Multan vs Manzar and 52017 PLD Lahore 219 · Lahore High Court · 2016-08-09Read full judgment →
• Jalil-ur-Rehman & others vs Province of Sindh & others2017 SHC 119 · Sindh High Court · 2017-01-26Read full judgment →
• Jalil Ahmad Khan vs The State & 8 others.2017 LHC 3478 · Lahore High Court · 2017-11-01Read full judgment →
• Jaleel Ahmed vs Election Commission of Pakistan through Chief Election2017 YLR 557 · Sindh High Court · 2016-08-24
  election petitionverification of pleadingsmandatory provisionselection appealsummary dismissalservice of processlocal government election
  Summary & questions settled

  This election appeal challenged an order by the Election Tribunal dismissing the appellant's election petition and recounting application. The core legal question concerned whether the appellant's failure to sign the election petition, verify it in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and serve copies to all respondents as mandated by the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015, rendered the petition incompetent. The High Court held that the provisions of the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015, regarding the signing, verification, and service of election petitions are mandatory. The Court found that the appellant failed to comply with these requirements and that such deficiencies could not be cured after the expiration of the limitation period for filing the election petition. Consequently, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the petition. The key principle laid down is that strict compliance with procedural requirements for election petitions is essential, and failure to adhere to mandatory signing, verification, and service provisions necessitates the summary dismissal of the petition by the Election Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the requirement to verify an election petition under the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015, mandatory?
  • Can a defect in the signing and verification of an election petition be cured after the limitation period for filing the petition has expired?
  • Does the failure to serve a copy of the election petition on all respondents as required by the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015, render the petition liable for dismissal?
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• Jaleel Ahmed Pitafi and others vs The State2017 P Cr. L J 742 · Sindh High Court · 2016-09-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirybenefit of doubtanti-terrorismunlicensed armsprolonged detentionpolice encounter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the grant of post-arrest bail to several applicants charged with offences under sections 324, 353, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, and separate offences under section 23(1)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act 2013. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the prosecution's allegations of an armed encounter with police, despite the absence of injuries to any party, the lack of forensic evidence linking recovered weapons to the crime scene, and the prolonged pre-trial detention of the accused. The Court held that the case required further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, as the prosecution's version was rendered doubtful by the lack of physical evidence and the absence of injuries. The key principle laid down is that where reasonable doubt exists regarding the truth of the prosecution's case or the participation of the accused, and where trial has not commenced despite significant detention, the benefit of doubt should be extended to the accused at the bail stage.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of injuries to a police party during an alleged armed encounter entitle an accused to post-arrest bail?
  • Is an accused entitled to bail when the prosecution fails to link recovered weapons to the crime scene through forensic evidence?
  • Should a court consider the maximum sentence provided by a statute or the likely sentence when deciding a bail application?
  • Does prolonged pre-trial detention without the commencement of trial justify the grant of bail?
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• Jalal Khan vs Abdul Rauf and 4 others2017 MLD 1808 · Balochistan High Court · 2017-01-10
  criminal acquittal appealdelayed ocular evidencebenefit of doubtplanted witnessesappreciation of evidencemurder trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal acquittal appeal challenged the trial court's judgment acquitting the respondents of murder charges. The core legal question concerned the reliability of ocular evidence introduced after an unexplained eleven-month delay following the initial registration of the FIR against unknown persons. The High Court held that the trial court correctly disbelieved the testimony of the alleged eye-witnesses, as their failure to report the incident or assist the victim, despite being close relatives, was contrary to human nature and indicated they were planted witnesses. The court emphasized that in the absence of strong, independent, and unimpeachable corroboration, such delayed testimony cannot sustain a conviction. The key principle laid down is that a significant, unexplained delay in recording the statements of eye-witnesses is fatal to the prosecution's case, rendering such evidence incredible. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and where the evidence is insufficient or unreliable, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of eye-witnesses reliable when they come forward after an unexplained delay of eleven months?
  • Does the failure of alleged eye-witnesses to report a crime or assist the victim immediately render their subsequent testimony incredible?
  • Is the prosecution required to provide independent corroboration for delayed witness statements in a murder case?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be extended to the accused when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
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• Jalal Hayyat Khan vs Punjab Public Service Commission, etc2017 [M] C.L.R. 1608 · Lahore High Court · 2017-09-20Read full judgment →