Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.

• Mudasir Illahi vs Farooque Ahmed Khan and 2 others2016 CLC 1871 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-09
  personal bona fide needrented premisesevictionlandlord and tenantconstitutional petitionSection 18 noticeproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged an appellate court judgment allowing the eviction of the petitioner from the demised premises on the grounds of the respondents' personal bona fide need. The core legal questions concerned whether the failure to serve a written notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, vitiated the eviction proceedings, and whether the landlord's requirement for the premises was established in good faith. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant's conduct—specifically acknowledging the respondents as landlords by tendering and depositing rent—rendered the requirement for a formal Section 18 notice infructuous, particularly as the ground of default was withdrawn. The Court affirmed that a landlord possesses the right to select which of their properties to utilize for personal business, and a tenant cannot dictate the suitability of other premises. The principle laid down is that a landlord’s consistent testimony on oath regarding personal bona fide need, if not shaken during cross-examination, is sufficient to establish the requirement, and the landlord is not obligated to disclose the nature of their intended business.

  Questions settled

  • Does the tenant's acknowledgment of a new landlord render the requirement of a written notice under Section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, unnecessary?
  • Can a tenant dictate which specific premises a landlord should use to satisfy their personal bona fide requirement?
  • Is a landlord's consistent testimony on oath sufficient to establish personal bona fide need in the absence of contradictory evidence?
  • Does the failure to disclose the nature of the intended business or the insufficiency of current rented premises defeat a landlord's claim for personal bona fide use?
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• Mubishar Pesh Iman vs Federation of Pakistan and 2 others2016 PTD 518 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-19
  civil suitcustoms seizureouster of jurisdictiongood faithmala fide actiondamages for mental torturebetel nutsCustoms Act 1969
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a civil suit for declaration, permanent injunction, possession, and damages filed by the plaintiff seeking the return of legally purchased betel nuts seized by customs authorities during a raid on a third party's premises. The core legal question involves whether the customs officials' seizure of goods belonging to a third-party investor without establishing a nexus to smuggling was protected under Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969, and whether the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted thereby. The court held that the protection of Section 217 is conditional upon actions taken in good faith, and since the seizure was patently illegal, arbitrary, and mala fide, it fell outside the four corners of the statute, thereby vesting the court with jurisdiction. The court laid down the key principle that statutory bars ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts must be construed strictly, and actions taken without good faith or in violation of natural justice enjoy no immunity from judicial scrutiny.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the protection of Section 217 of the Customs Act, 1969 applies to actions taken mala fide or without good faith by public servants?
  • Does a civil court retain jurisdiction to entertain a suit against an illegal seizure of goods by customs officials when such action falls outside the four corners of the statute?
  • What is the principle for assessing general damages for mental torture, anguish, and defamation caused by an unlawful official act?
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• Mubashir Hussain vs The State and another2016 LHC 2413 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-15
  post-arrest bailfurther inquirydelay in FIRconflicting statementssui jurislove marriagecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking post-arrest bail in a case involving allegations of rape, extortion, and enticement for illicit intercourse. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the case, specifically the delay in FIR registration and conflicting statements by the alleged victim. The Court observed that the FIR was registered with a delay of over one month, suggesting deliberation. Furthermore, the alleged victim had previously stated in a private complaint that she married the petitioner of her own free will, only later resiling from this position after returning to her parents. The Court held that the petitioner's case fell within the scope of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Emphasizing that the petitioner was a first-time offender and the investigation was complete, the Court granted bail, establishing the principle that unexplained delays in FIR registration and contradictory statements by the complainant party can constitute grounds for further inquiry in bail matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in the registration of an FIR constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Can a case be considered one of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged victim has provided contradictory statements regarding the nature of their relationship with the accused?
  • Is the completion of an investigation and the fact that an accused is a first-time offender a relevant factor in granting post-arrest bail?
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• Mubarak Textile Mills Pvt. Ltd vs Director (Enforcement) Head of Department, SECP andothers2016 CLD 2293, 2016 P.C.T.L.R. 873 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-27
  inspection of books of accountsCompanies OrdinanceSECPadministrative orderbar of appealshow-cause noticeautomatic stay
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Section 34 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 challenges an inspection order passed under Section 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 against the appellant-company, as well as the subsequent appellate order dismissing the company's challenge. The core legal questions involved the maintainability of an appeal against an administrative inspection order under the SECP Act and whether a show-cause notice is mandatory prior to directing an inspection under Section 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The Islamabad High Court held that an order directing inspection under Section 231 is administrative in nature, does not require a prior show-cause notice, and is not appealable before the Appellate Bench of the SECP pursuant to the bar contained in Section 33 of the SECP Act. The court established that the SECP possesses regulatory powers to inspect company records based on adverse financial reports and that the mere filing of an appeal does not operate as an automatic stay without an express injunctive order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order passed under Section 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the inspection of a company's books of accounts is administrative in nature?
  • Is the issuance of a prior show-cause notice mandatory before the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan passes an order under Section 231 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984?
  • Does an appeal lie under Section 33 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 against an administrative direction given by the SECP?
  • Does the mere filing or pendency of an appeal operate as an automatic stay against the execution of the impugned order?
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• Mubarak Textile Mills (Pvt) Ltd vs Director (Enforcement), Head of Department Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and others2016 CLD 2293 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-07-27Read full judgment →
• Mubarak Jamia Masjid-Wa Jamia Abu Bakar Tarteelur Quran (Trust)2016 CLC 464 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-19
  civil appealtrust propertynecessary partylimitationremand of caseexecution proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil suit instituted by Respondent No.1 regarding occupation of land for a madarasa, which resulted in a decree in favor of Respondent No.1. During execution proceedings, the appellant Trust filed an appeal claiming that the mosque and madarasa are managed by the Trust and that the disputed land is trust property. The core legal question was whether the Trust was a necessary party to the suit and whether the matter ought to be remanded for proper adjudication regarding the existence of the Trust. The court held that the Trial Court ought to have joined the Trust as a necessary party and that no limitation runs against a trust. Consequently, the court set aside the decree and remanded the case to the Trial Court with directions to frame specific issues and conclude the proceedings expeditiously. The key principle laid down is that a trust claiming an interest in disputed property must be joined as a necessary party, and limitation does not run against a trust.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trust claiming an interest in disputed property is a necessary party to a civil suit?
  • Does limitation run against a trust?
  • Can an appellate court set aside a decree and remand the case for framing of issues when a necessary party was omitted?
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• Mubarak Ali vs Muhammad Aslam Khan and 2 otherss2016 MLD 1796 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-20Read full judgment →
• Mst.Rukhsana Bibi, etc. vs Government of Pakistan, etc.2016 LHC 2281 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-17Read full judgment →
• Mst.Jehan Ara vs Gomal University2016-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-01-21Read full judgment →
• Mst.Hijab Fatima vs Kohat Cement2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-11-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Bibi and anothers vs Riaz Ahmad and otherss2016 MLD 1761 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Ashraf vs D.C.O. and others2016 PLC (C.S.) 67 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-25
  service lawnatural justicevested rightsappointment withdrawalconstitutional petitiondue processshow cause notice
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges the withdrawal of an appointment letter for the post of Senior Elementary School Educator (Arabic Teacher) in BPS-14. The petitioner, having been selected on merit and having served for approximately three months, had her appointment withdrawn by the respondents without notice or inquiry, allegedly due to a departmental error in merit calculation. The core legal question was whether the respondents could unilaterally withdraw an appointment letter after a vested right had accrued to the petitioner, without adhering to the principles of natural justice or the contractual terms regarding notice. The Court held that the withdrawal was illegal, as it violated the principles of natural justice and the specific terms of the appointment letter requiring notice or salary in lieu thereof. The Court emphasized that a vested right cannot be taken away without due process, particularly when the error in merit calculation was attributable to the department, not the petitioner. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner and pay her salary for the period served.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appointment order be withdrawn without a show cause notice or inquiry when a vested right has accrued to the appointee?
  • Is an employee entitled to salary for the period served if their appointment is subsequently withdrawn by the department?
  • Does a department have the authority to terminate an appointment due to its own administrative error in merit calculation without following due process?
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• Mst. Zar Taja vs Manager Muslim Commercial Bank (M.C.B.) and 3 others2016 MLD 749 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahoor Mai vs Allah Bakhsh and another2016 PLJ Lahore 265 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Yasmeen Sheikh vs Ayaz Pathan and others2016 P Cr. L J 613, 2016 PLJ Karachi 33 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-08
  custodial deathpolice tortureregistration of FIRmagisterial inquirypostmortem reportmedical negligence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition seeking directions for the registration of an FIR regarding the custodial death of her 15/16-year-old son, who was allegedly tortured and poisoned by police officers and private respondents. The deceased had been arrested without injuries but subsequently died at a hospital with visible surface wounds, yet the postmortem report's final opinion was withheld pending a chemical analysis. The High Court observed that the police failed to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and neglected to initiate a mandatory inquiry under Section 176 of the Code. The Court held that when a person dies in police custody, an inquiry by the nearest empowered Magistrate under Section 176 is mandatory. The Court allowed the petition, directing the SHO to record the petitioner's statement and register an FIR if a cognizable offence was disclosed, and ordered the Director General of Health Services Sindh to probe the medical officer's negligence regarding the postmortem report.

  Questions settled

  • Is a police officer legally bound to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the information discloses a cognizable offence, even if the accused is a police officer?
  • Is a magisterial inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory in every case of death in police custody?
  • Does the lack of a request from police or medical officers restrict a Magistrate from initiating an inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Yasmeen Shaikh vs Ayaz Pathan and others2016 P Cr. L J 613 · Sindh High Court · 2015-10-08
  custodial deathFIR registrationjudicial inquirypolice tortureSection 176 Cr.P.C.medical negligencefundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought directions against police harassment and the registration of an FIR regarding the custodial death of her son, Mushtaque Ahmed Shaikh, who allegedly died following torture while in police custody at P.S. City, Jacobabad. The core legal question concerned the mandatory obligations of police and medical officers when a death occurs in custody, specifically regarding the registration of an FIR and the initiation of a judicial inquiry into the cause of death. The Court held that the SHO is legally bound to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 upon receiving information of a cognizable offence, regardless of the accused's status. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a judicial inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is mandatory in cases of custodial death. The Court directed the registration of the FIR and ordered the Director General of Health Services to investigate the medical officer's negligence regarding the postmortem report, establishing that police and medical officers must ensure transparency and accountability in custodial death cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandatory when information discloses a cognizable offence?
  • Does Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate a judicial inquiry into the cause of death for persons dying in police custody?
  • Can a Magistrate initiate an inquiry under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 even if no request is made by the police or medical authorities?
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• Mst. Yasmeen Riaz through Special Attorney vs Riaz AHMADand 7 others2016 YLR 321 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-25
  specific performancecompromise of suitrejection of plaintpossession in specific performancecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land, which was subsequently compromised by the parties during proceedings. Despite the respondents conceding the claim and submitting a voluntary compromise, the trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground that possession was not prayed for as a consequential relief. The lower appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal. Upon a civil revision, the Lahore High Court held that the lower courts committed an illegality in rejecting the plaint. The Court ruled that where parties reach a lawful compromise, the court must record it and pass a decree accordingly under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, the Court established that a prayer for possession is not strictly necessary in a suit for specific performance as delivery of possession is incidental to the main relief.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. in a suit for specific performance for failure to pray for the recovery of possession?
  • Is a court bound to pass a decree in accordance with a lawful compromise reached between the parties during the pendency of a suit?
  • Does the relief of delivery of possession in a suit for specific performance spring out of the contract for sale as an incidental relief?
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• Mst. Yasmeen Bibi vs Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan and others2016 SCP 51, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-28
  Family Court jurisdictiondowermaintenanceterritorial jurisdictiondowry articlesWest Pakistan Family Courts Actmatrimonial disputesremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a matrimonial dispute where the petitioner sought recovery of maintenance, dower (including 200 Kanals of land), and dowry articles. The District Appeal Court and the High Court had partially set aside the Trial Court's decree, holding that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction over the landed property situated in a different district. The core legal question was whether the Family Court, where the wife resides, has exclusive jurisdiction over all matrimonial disputes listed in the Schedule, regardless of the location of the property or traditional territorial limitations under the CPC. The Supreme Court held that the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, is a special law intended for the expeditious disposal of family affairs. By virtue of Section 17, the application of the Civil Procedure Code (except Sections 10 and 11) is expressly excluded. The Court ruled that the Family Court where the wife resides possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matrimonial matters, including personal property and dower, to prevent the mischief of multi-jurisdictional litigation. The case was remanded to the High Court for a decision on merits.

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• Mst. Yasmeen Bibi vs Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan & others2016 SCP 51 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-04-28
  Family Court jurisdictionmatrimonial disputesdower recoveryterritorial jurisdictionNikah Namadowry articlesmaintenance allowanceexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the scope of the Family Court's jurisdiction over matrimonial disputes, specifically regarding dower, maintenance, and dowry articles. The petitioner challenged the High Court's decision, which limited the Family Court's authority to adjudicate certain claims. The Supreme Court examined the legislative intent behind the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964, noting that it was enacted to provide an expeditious, specialized forum for family matters, thereby excluding the cumbersome procedures of civil courts. The Court held that the Family Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matrimonial disputes, including the transfer of property stipulated in a Nikah Nama. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Family Court where the wife resides maintains territorial jurisdiction, and that the procedural constraints of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are largely inapplicable to Family Court proceedings. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgments that restricted the Family Court's jurisdiction, emphasizing that the legislative scheme aims to protect the rights of wives and prevent unnecessary litigation delays. The appeals were allowed, and the matters were remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Family Court have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all matrimonial disputes, including the recovery of dower and dowry articles?
  • Does the Family Court where the wife resides have exclusive territorial jurisdiction over matrimonial disputes?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to proceedings before a Family Court?
  • Can a Family Court decree the transfer of landed property stipulated in a Nikah Nama as part of the dower?
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• Mst. Waziran Mat and another vs Allah Wasaya and others2016 LHC 1753, 2016 PLJ Lahore 969 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-30
  civil revisionadditional evidenceevidence in rebuttalappellate courtfundamental rule of justicerevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the order of the Additional District Judge refusing the petitioners an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal against additional evidence brought on record during the pendency of an appeal. The core legal question is whether the opposite party has a right to lead rebuttal evidence when additional evidence is allowed and produced in appellate proceedings. The Lahore High Court held that it is a fundamental rule of justice that whenever additional evidence is led, the opposite party must be permitted to rebut it to prevent grave injustice. The court set aside the impugned order and allowed the petitioners to produce evidence in rebuttal, laying down the principle that the right to adduce rebutting evidence naturally follows the introduction of additional evidence in appellate forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the opposite party has an imperative right to lead evidence in rebuttal when additional evidence is produced in appeal?
  • Does the refusal to provide an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal against additional evidence lead to grave injustice?
  • Is it incumbent upon the appellate court to allow an opportunity of rebuttal subsequent to taking additional evidence on record?
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• Mst. Waziran Mai and another vs Allah Wasaya and others2016 LHC 1753 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Waziran and another vs Province of Sindh through Home Secretary, Government of Sindh and 10 others2016 MLD 1180 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Uzma Iqbal and another vs District Education Officer, Elementary2016 PLC (C.S.) 218 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-06-19
  constitutional petitionwrit petitionservice matterrecruitmentmerit listvested righteducational qualification
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court seeking directions for their appointment to the post of Physical Education Teacher (PET) after being placed at the top of the merit list, following which their names were arbitrarily ousted on the ground that they held a Senior Diploma in Health and Physical Education instead of the prescribed Junior Diploma. The core legal question was whether candidates holding a higher or equivalent qualification who successfully participated in the entire recruitment process and secured top merit positions could be ousted on technical grounds without cogent reasons. The court held that once the petitioners participated in the recruitment process and attained top merit, a vested right accrued to them, especially since previous judgments of the court had allowed Senior Diploma holders to compete and be appointed. The Peshawar High Court allowed the petition and directed the respondents to appoint the petitioners as PET.

  Questions settled

  • Can candidates who successfully participate in a recruitment process and attain top positions on the merit list be ousted on the ground of possessing a different diploma?
  • Does a candidate acquire a vested right to appointment after successfully completing the entire recruitment process and securing the top merit position?
  • Whether holders of a Senior Diploma in Health and Physical Education are eligible to compete for posts requiring a Junior Diploma based on past judicial precedents?
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• Mst. Tanveer Bibi vs SHO Police Station Mandi Bahauddin and others2016 SCMR 1287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-26
  habeas corpusminor custodyguardianshipwelfare of minorstender agecriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 by the petitioner mother seeking the recovery and custody of her two minor children, aged six and four years, which was dismissed by the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned the rightful interim custody and welfare of the minor children whose father was residing abroad and whose mother alleged maltreatment and forceful separation from them by the paternal grandfather and uncle. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, holding that the mother is legally entitled to the custody of her minor children of tender age in the absence of their father, particularly when the children appeared happy and contented with her and it serves their welfare and best interest.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the mother is legally entitled to the custody of minor children of tender age in the absence of their father?
  • Can a petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be utilized for the recovery and custody of minor children?
  • What considerations govern the delivery of custody of minors in habeas corpus petitions?
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• Mst. Tajrian vs Zarshaid Khan and another2016 YLR 1883 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-10-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sumera Bano vs Additional District & Sessions Judge/Appellate2016 PLJ Lahore 509 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughran Bibi vs Muhammad Naveed and another2016 C.L.R. 146 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-10Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shumaila vs The State2016 YLR 1216 · Sindh High Court · 2016-01-02
  murderunnatural deathbenefit of doubtmedical evidencestrangulationcircumstantial evidenceappellant acquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court whereby the appellant, Mst. Shumaila, was convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the alleged murder of her husband, while two co-accused were acquitted. The core legal question was whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died of homicidal strangulation committed by the appellant, and whether a conviction could be sustained solely on probabilities and an alleged ligature mark in the absence of medical proof of strangulation and proven motive. The Sindh High Court held that the medical evidence, including the testimony of court witnesses and pathologists, conclusively established that the death was not caused by strangulation and that the postmortem report was substandard. Furthermore, the motive alleged by the prosecution stood disproved upon the acquittal of the co-accused, and the trial court misapplied various precedents regarding circumstantial evidence and motive. Consequently, the High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, extending the benefit of the doubt and acquitting the appellant.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained on the basis of presumptions and probabilities when medical evidence fails to establish strangulation as the cause of death?
  • Does the acquittal of co-accused persons on the same set of evidence and failure to prove the alleged motive weaken the prosecution case against the remaining accused?
  • Whether an unnatural death occurring inside a residence can be treated as murder in the absence of corroborative medical and circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the crime?
  • Is a trial court justified in shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to explain an unnatural death when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt?
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• Mst. Shehr Bano vs Abdullah through Legal Representatives2016 C.L.R. 128 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-03-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamshad Akhtar vs Muhammad Anwar2016 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 39, 2016 MLD 655 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar and 4 others vs Muhammad Ashraf and 8 others2016 PLJ AJ&K 78 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-08-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education and others2016 LHC 49, 2016 PLJ Lahore 623, 2016 MLD 1845 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shameem Akhtar vs Govt. of Punjab, etc.2016 LHC 49 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shameem Akhtar vs Government of Punjab, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 623 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahzeen vs Station House Officer and another2016 MLD 792 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahida Rani, since deceased through her Legal Heir Mst. Sidra Ijaz vs Muhammad Chuttal Khan2016 SHC 17 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahida Parveen vs Saiful Malook2016 MLD 1696 · Sindh High Court · 2015-08-17
  specific performancerecovery of possessionburden of proofconcurrent findingscivil revisionsale agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the applicant's suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed and the respondent's suit for possession, permanent injunction, recovery of utility charges, and mesne profits was decreed. The core legal question was whether the applicant had successfully proved the execution of the alleged sale agreement and the lawful payment of consideration to resist the owner's claim for possession. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant failed to discharge her heavy burden of proof under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, by relying solely on her own uncorroborated testimony without producing marginal witnesses or receipts, and failed to demonstrate any perversity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of jurisdictional error, thereby dismissing the revision applications.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the sole testimony of a party is sufficient to prove a disputed sale agreement without examining the marginal witnesses?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by two lower courts be set aside under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without showing perversity or misreading of evidence?
  • What is the burden of proof on a defendant who admits entry into a property through the admitted owner but claims subsequent purchase via an agreement of sale?
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• Mst. Shaharbano and anothers vs Chief Election Commissioner and 92016 YLR 2451 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shah Sanam vs State2016 PHC 13 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shagufta vs The Chairman Federal Public Service Commission, Islamabad, Etc2016 NLR Service 14 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-04-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shabana Kousar vs Director Public Instructions Schools2016 PLC (C.S.) 837 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-26
  writ of prohibitionfraud vitiates proceedingsrecall of judgmentforged appointment orderconstitutional petitionpublic employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a writ petition filed under Section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, seeking a writ of prohibition against the abrogation of the petitioner's appointment order as a Primary Teachress and challenging the private respondent's appointment as fraudulent. The core legal questions concern whether an appointment order and a prior court judgment obtained through fraud and forgery can be recalled, and the legality of the competing appointments. The High Court held that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings and that a court has the inherent power to recall any judgment or order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The Court laid down the principle that courts of law possess the authority to recall, even suo motu, judgments and orders secured by fraudulent means, declaring the private respondent's appointment and previous favorable judgment as nullities while ordering the post to be re-advertised on merit.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court of law recall an order or judgment obtained through fraud or misrepresentation?
  • Whether an appointment order found to be forged and fabricated can be treated as a nullity in the eye of law?
  • Does a court have the power to suo motu recall a judgment procured by practicing fraud upon it?
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• Mst. Sarkar Khano A. Molo vs Abdul Malik Rehmatullah Kasim Lakha2016 YLR 1506 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-28
  receivershipinterlocutory ordersprivate limited companycivil procedureproperty managementBOT basisends of justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns applications filed under Order XL, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking the appointment of a Receiver or the sealing of the "Prince Cinema," a property subject to ongoing litigation between parties claiming ownership of the underlying private limited company. The core legal question was whether a Receiver could be appointed or maintained when the subject property had become non-functional and damaged, rendering previous interim orders for account monitoring obsolete. The Court held that the appointment of a Receiver under Order XL, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was unsustainable as the property was inoperative and no party was in possession. However, invoking its discretionary powers under Section 94, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court directed the Official Assignee to invite bids to lease the property on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis to restore its functionality. The key principle laid down is that where specific procedural provisions for receivership fail due to changed circumstances, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 94, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to pass just and convenient interlocutory orders to prevent the defeat of justice and preserve the subject matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appoint a receiver under Order XL, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for a property that is non-functional and damaged?
  • Does the principle of res judicata bar a fresh application for a receiver when the status of the subject property has fundamentally changed?
  • Can a court invoke Section 94, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to pass interlocutory orders for property management when specific statutory provisions for receivership are inapplicable?
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• Mst. Sardaran (deceased) through L.Rs. vs District Judge, Mianwali and 2 others2016 MLD 801 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-19Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sana Jamil vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary and 52016 P Cr. L J 424 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-11
  preventive detentionpublic orderhabeas corpusdouble jeopardyfundamental rightsillegal constructionconstitutional petitionliberty
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the wife of a detenu challenging a detention order dated 24-07-2015 issued by the District Coordination Officer (DCO), Lahore, under Section 3(1) of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The detention was based on the detenu's involvement in six criminal cases related to illegal building constructions, which the authorities claimed posed a threat to public safety and order. The petitioner argued that the detention was punitive, based on sub-judice matters, and constituted double jeopardy. The court held that the mere pendency of criminal cases, especially where the detenu had been granted bail by competent courts, cannot justify preventive detention. The court emphasized that the right to liberty is an inalienable constitutional right and that detention without independent material or evidence of a threat to public peace is unlawful. Consequently, the court set aside the detention order as illegal and void, laying down the principle that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass judicial orders of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the availability of an alternate remedy of representation to the Provincial Government ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 in detention cases?
  • Can a detention order under Section 3 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance be justified solely on the basis of pending criminal FIRs?
  • Does the detention of a person on the same grounds for which they are already facing trial in criminal courts amount to double jeopardy?
  • Is the subjective satisfaction of a detaining authority valid if it is based entirely on police recommendations without independent material?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sana Asim Hafeez vs Administrator/Chairman, Arbitration and2016 MLD 1061 · Lahore High Court · 2014-01-21
  divorce certificateoverseas pakistanisjurisdictionmuslim family laws ordinanceconstitutional petitionalternative remedymala fides
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the legality of a Divorce Certificate issued by a Union Council in Lahore, declaring a divorce effective between overseas Pakistanis holding dual nationality and residing in the United Kingdom. The core legal questions concerned whether a local Union Council in Pakistan possesses jurisdiction to entertain divorce proceedings when both spouses reside abroad, and whether failure to serve notice through the Pakistan Mission in the U.K. pursuant to applicable statutory provisions vitiates the proceedings. The Lahore High Court held that since both spouses were permanent residents of the U.K., the husband was required to approach the Pakistani Mission in the U.K. under SRO No. 1086(K)/61 rather than initiating proceedings before a Union Council in Pakistan. The Court ruled that local authorities lacked jurisdiction, rendering the proceedings coram non judice and mala fide, thereby bypassing the bar of alternative statutory remedies. The petition was allowed with costs and the impugned Divorce Certificate was declared null and void.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Union Council in Pakistan have jurisdiction to initiate divorce proceedings and issue a divorce certificate when both spouses are permanent residents and nationals residing abroad?
  • Whether the failure to serve notice of divorce through the Pakistani Mission abroad violates the mandatory provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?
  • Does the availability of an alternative remedy of revision bar the invocation of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction when proceedings by a statutory functionary are tainted with mala fides and lack jurisdiction?
  • Are divorce proceedings initiated in Pakistan maintainable when the foreign court of the country of permanent residence has already assumed jurisdiction over the family dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Bibi vs Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffargarh and 42016 PLJ Lahore 806 · Lahore High Court · 2016-04-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina Begum vs Government of Punjab through Secretary2016 PLJ Lahore 82 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saima Tabbasam vs Syed Sher Shah and 3 others2016 MLD 1430 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sahibzadi Jahan Ara vs District and Sessions Judge (South), Karachi and 2 others2016 MLD 376 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-30
  criminal revisiontransfer of criminal caseadministrative transferbias of trial courttransparency in trial
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed a criminal revision application impugning the order of the Sessions Judge, Karachi South, which had declined her criminal transfer application. The dispute arose from a criminal case registered under Section 337-F(v), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an altercation between the tenants and the landlord. The applicant sought transfer of the trial from the judicial magistrate alleging a partial attitude, which the sessions court dismissed as premature. The High Court evaluated the material on record and noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate substantial legal grounds for bias against the trial court. However, considering the report of the magistrate and in the interest of ensuring transparency and maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice, the High Court directed the Sessions Judge to transfer the case to another competent court on administrative grounds. The principle laid down is that while transfer of a case ordinarily requires strong proof of bias, a court may direct a transfer on administrative grounds to uphold transparency and fairness in judicial proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal case can be transferred from one trial court to another on administrative grounds to ensure transparency?
  • Does loss of faith in the trial court by a party constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of a criminal case?
  • What is the scope of a Sessions Judge's power in deciding a criminal transfer application?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safina Bibi and others vs Sirajdeen and 3 others2016 PLJ Sh.C. (AJ&K) 30 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-06-30
  Ikhtatami reportcancellation of casecognizance of offencepolice reportcriminal revisiontrial court powerssuicide vs murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision petition challenged an order by the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Muzaffarabad, which disagreed with a police 'Ikhtatami' (cancellation) report and directed the investigating agency to proceed in accordance with law and submit a challan. The underlying case involved allegations of murder under Sections 302 and 34 of the Azad Penal Code, where the police report concluded the deceased committed suicide, while the complainant alleged the accused caused his death. The core legal question was whether a trial court is bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a case and whether it can direct the submission of a challan despite such a report. The Court held that a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not binding on the judiciary. A Magistrate or trial court may disagree with the police's findings and take cognizance of an offence under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to ensure justice, particularly where evidence is required to resolve conflicting versions of events. The revision petition was dismissed, affirming the trial court's authority to reject the cancellation report.

  Questions settled

  • Is a trial court bound by a police report recommending the cancellation of a criminal case?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance of an offence despite a police report recommending the discharge of the accused?
  • Under what circumstances may a court reject a police report seeking the cancellation of a case?
  • Does a trial court have the authority to direct the investigating agency to submit a challan after disagreeing with a cancellation report?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Shafi vs General Anti-Corruption Establishment & 3 others2016 LHC 886 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Shafi vs Director General, Anti-Corruption Establishment and 3others2016 LHC 886, K.L.R. 2016 Civil Cases 193 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safeena Shaheen vs Muhammad Akhtar2019 KLR Revenue Case 36, 2021 YLR 1776, 2016 LHC 4072 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safa Arshad vs The learned Additional Sessions Judge (East), Islamabad, etc2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-10-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Begum vs Azeem-Ud-Din, Etc.2016 PLJ Karachi 193, 2016 NLR Civil 268 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saadia vs Mst. Gul Bibi2016 P.S.C. 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-15
  gift deedhibaconcurrent findingsmisreading of evidencedelivery of possessiondeclaration suitunregistered document
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from concurrent findings of three lower courts which had decreed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the respondent against the appellant regarding a residential house. The respondent claimed ownership based on two unregistered gift deeds executed in 1986 and 1995. The core legal question centered on whether the respondent successfully proved the execution, validity, and genuineness of the un-registered gift deeds and fulfilled the mandatory prerequisites of a valid gift under the law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the concurrent findings, holding that the lower courts suffered from patent misreading and non-reading of evidence. The Court laid down that the execution of a gift must be independently proven by fulfilling the essential conditions of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, and that unverified, unregistered, and withheld documents coupled with the failure to examine proper attesting witnesses cannot establish valid title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts can be set aside by the Supreme Court on grounds of misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Can an unregistered gift deed establish valid title without independent proof of offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession?
  • Does the failure to produce original documents along with the plaint pursuant to procedural rules vitiate the claim of the plaintiff?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. S. Yasmin vs Pakistan Railways, etc2016 LHC 2160 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-22
  disciplinary proceedingsabatement of proceedingsservice benefitsposthumous penaltydeceased employeeconstitutional petitionmaster and servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed before the Lahore High Court to challenge an order depriving the petitioner of the service benefits of her deceased husband, who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings under the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. The core legal question was whether departmental disciplinary proceedings abate upon the death of an employee prior to the culmination of such proceedings, or whether a penalty can be imposed posthumously. Holding that disciplinary proceedings are personal to the contract of service and automatically abate upon the death or superannuation of the employee, the court ruled that no penalty can be validly imposed on a deceased person. The Lahore High Court set aside the impugned departmental order as coram non judice and without jurisdiction, directing the respondent authorities to release all service benefits to the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant abate upon their death, rendering any subsequent imposition of a penalty legally void.

  Questions settled

  • Whether disciplinary proceedings initiated against a civil servant stand abated upon their death prior to the finalization of the proceedings?
  • Can a departmental penalty of dismissal be imposed on an employee posthumously?
  • Are the legal heirs of a deceased employee entitled to service benefits if the employee died before a valid penalty was finalized and communicated?
  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable for the payment of pensionary and service benefits to the legal heirs of a deceased employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Tabbasum Shaikh vs Kazim Imam Jan and others2016 SHC 18 · Sindh High Court · 2016-11-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Bibi and otherss vs Government of Pakistan and otherss2016 LHC 2281, 2016 PLD Lahore 857 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-18
  citizenshipgender discriminationfundamental rightsforeign spouseequal protection of lawconstitutional petitionPakistan Citizenship Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by a Pakistani woman and her Indian national husband, seeking directions to prevent discrimination, grant citizenship to the husband, and restrain his extradition. The core legal question concerned whether denying Pakistani citizenship to an alien male married to a Pakistani woman, while granting the converse right to an alien female married to a Pakistani man under Section 10(2) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, violates the fundamental right to equality under Article 25 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court held that the alien husband could not directly invoke constitutional jurisdiction due to his status, but allowed the petition with respect to the Pakistani wife. The Court ruled that denying citizenship to a foreign national husband of a Pakistani woman is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violates Article 25 of the Constitution and international human rights commitments. The key principle laid down is that gender-based discrimination in citizenship laws regarding foreign spouses is unconstitutional and lacks rational classification.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 10(2) of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 by discriminating against Pakistani women married to alien males?
  • Can an alien male, prior to acquiring citizenship, invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge visa and deportation measures?
  • What are the parameters for a valid classification under the equal protection clause of Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Roshan Bano and 5 others vs Pakistan Defence Officers Housing2016 PLD Sindh 445 · Sindh High Court · 2015-05-18
  interim injunctionprima facie casebalance of convenienceamenity plotnuisanceeasement rightspetrol pumptown planning
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil miscellaneous applications filed by the plaintiffs under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 and Order XL, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking an interim injunction against the construction of a petrol pump on a subject plot and the appointment of a receiver. The core legal questions involved whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case regarding the alleged conversion of an amenity plot/green belt, the existence of actionable nuisance, and the violation of easement rights under Section 15 of the Easements Act, 1882. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case showing that the plot was reserved as an amenity or green belt, that claims of nuisance and easement rights required recording evidence, and that the balance of convenience and irreparable loss lay in favour of the defendant licensee who had made heavy investments under valid approvals. Consequently, the interim injunction application was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that temporary injunctions will not be granted on the basis of hypothetical apprehensions of nuisance or unproven easement claims where the defendant holds a validly approved license and has acted upon it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an interim injunction can be granted against the construction of a petrol pump on a plot claimed to be a green belt without producing an approved master plan establishing its amenity status?
  • Does the determination of nuisance and violation of easement rights require trial and evidence rather than being decided at the interlocutory stage?
  • Where a licensee has made heavy investments under valid permits and approvals, does the balance of convenience lie in favor of granting an interim injunction against construction?
  • Can a plaintiff claim a right of easement by prescription under Section 15 of the Easements Act, 1882 without fulfilling the statutory requirement of twenty years of uninterrupted enjoyment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Roshan Ara Begum and 8 others vs Muhammad Banaras and another2016 YLR 1300 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-12
  revision petitionco-sharersuit for declaration and possessionconcurrent findingsownershipsale deed
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners instituted a civil suit for declaration and possession asserting ownership of a disputed shop constructed by their predecessor-in-interest, alleging that respondent No. 1, a tenant, unlawfully purchased the property through a secret sale deed executed by respondent No. 2. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the lower appellate court affirmed the decision, leading to the filing of the instant revision petition before the Lahore High Court. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioners established their exclusive ownership and whether a suit for declaration and possession is maintainable by a co-sharer against another co-sharer. The High Court held that the petitioners failed to prove their exclusive ownership and gift, whereas respondent No. 1 established ownership through a registered sale deed, becoming a co-sharer in the joint property. The Court laid down that a co-sharer cannot maintain a suit for declaration and possession against another co-sharer, as the appropriate remedy is a suit for partition, and concurrent findings of fact by lower courts will not be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction without proof of material misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer maintain a suit for declaration and possession against another co-sharer in respect of joint property?
  • What is the status and possession of a purchaser who buys a share out of joint property?
  • Under what circumstances will the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Does the purchase of a share in joint property terminate the previous tenancy status of the purchaser?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Sultana and others vs Nadir Hayat and others2016 YLR 110 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-12
  oral salerevenue mutationburden of proofpleadings and proofrevisional jurisdictionmisreading of evidencegeneral power of attorneydeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts, which decreed the plaintiff's suit for a declaration regarding ownership of agricultural land based on an oral sale and a subsequent revenue mutation. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff successfully proved the underlying oral sale transaction, the valid attestation of the mutation, and the authority of the general attorney, despite material contradictions in pleadings and evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the plaintiff miserably failed to establish the foundational oral sale, the payment of consideration, or the valid attestation of the mutation, noting that a mutation per se is not a document of title and that the plaintiff's evidence severely departed from his pleadings. The Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts as perverse and suffering from misreading and non-reading of evidence, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The key principles laid down are that a party cannot prove a case beyond its pleadings, a mutation does not convey title independent of the underlying transaction, and the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if there is misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party be permitted to prove a case or facts beyond the scope of its pleadings?
  • Does a revenue mutation per se serve as a document of title or merely indicate a previous oral transaction?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the mere admission of a signature or thumb impression on an instrument amount to proof of its execution without proving its contents under Article 78 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Sattar vs Government of Punjab, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 13 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Munir vs Naveed Zafar and another2016 P Cr. L J 464 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-25
  bail cancellationpre-arrest bailmisuse of bailconsigned to recordSection 561-A CrPCcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two petitions filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the recall and cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent-accused in a case involving offences under Sections 379 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant argued that the offences were attracted, material connected the respondents, and the respondents had misused the bail by committing a subsequent offence recorded in a cross-version. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the considerations for the grant of bail and those for its cancellation are entirely distinct. The court noted that the alleged cross-version was investigated and found false by the police, which was concurred with by the Judicial Magistrate, thus failing to establish misuse of bail. Furthermore, because the complainant repeatedly failed to appear before the trial court, the trial had been consigned to the record under Section 249-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The court reaffirmed that bail granted by a competent court on valid reasons cannot be cancelled absent strong and exceptional grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Are the considerations for granting bail distinct from the grounds required to cancel bail once granted?
  • Can bail be cancelled on allegations of misuse where a subsequent cross-version FIR was found false by the police and endorsed by a magistrate?
  • Should a petition for cancellation of bail be entertained when the underlying trial has been consigned to record due to the complainant's non-appearance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehana Anjum vs Additional Sessions Judge and 6 others2016 PLD Lahore 570 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-06
  electronically generated evidenceprimary evidenceautomated information systemdefence witnessadmissibility of documentsproof of contentsQanun-e-Shahadat
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous petition challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhang, whereby an objection raised by the petitioner-complainant during the examination of a defence witness (Statistical Assistant, NADRA) was overruled and the witness was directed to complete his statement. The petitioner had filed a private complaint for murder against private respondents, who produced electronic records from an E-Toll Plaza as part of their defence. The petitioner objected that the witness, not being the scribe or record-keeper of the document, could not depose to its contents. The Lahore High Court held that printouts or outputs from an automated information system constitute primary evidence under Article 73 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, and do not require manual signatures. The court ruled that producing a document in evidence is distinct from proving its contents, and the defence witness was legally competent to depose about the electronically generated record, subject to cross-examination and final determination of admissibility by the trial court. The petition was accordingly dismissed as meritless.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a printout or output of an automated information system qualifies as primary evidence under Article 73 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
  • Can a defence witness who is not the scribe or direct author of an electronically generated document depose regarding its contents?
  • Does the mere production and tendering of a document in evidence dispense with the requirement of proving its contents?
  • Are electronically generated documents required to be manually signed to be admissible in evidence under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Bibi vs The State and another2016 P Cr. L J 1519 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-11
  pre-arrest bailmurdersuckling babydelay in recording statementextra judicial confessionwelfare of minor
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed by Mst. Razia Bibi seeking pre-arrest bail in a case registered under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 relating to the murder of her niece. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to pre-arrest bail considering the delayed recording of witness statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the weak nature of the alleged extra-judicial confession, and the fact that she was nursing an eight-month-old suckling baby. The Lahore High Court held that the one-month delay in recording the statements of prosecution witnesses reduced their evidentiary value to nil, that extra-judicial confessions are a weak type of evidence, and that the welfare of an infant child is incompatible with jail life. The court confirmed the pre-arrest bail, laying down that the welfare and protection of a suckling child's rights override maternal detention pending trial in appropriate circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay of one month in recording the statement of a prosecution witness under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 reduce its evidentiary value?
  • Whether the presence of a suckling infant constitutes a valid ground for confirming pre-arrest bail of a female accused in a capital charge?
  • What is the evidentiary status of an extra-judicial confession at the pre-arrest bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum vs Adam KHANand another2016 YLR 172 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-11
  pre-emptiontalb-i-ishhadtalb-i-muwathibattalb-i-khusumatattesting witnesscivil revisionKPK Pre-emption Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises from a pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents regarding the sale of property through a mutation. The core legal questions involve whether a notice of talb-i-ishhad is legally valid when not signed by one of its marginal witnesses, and whether a suit for pre-emption (talb-i-khusumat) can be validly instituted by a person who did not perform the prior demands of talb-i-muwathibat and talb-i-ishhad personally or as a duly authorized agent/attorney at the relevant time. The Peshawar High Court held that an attesting witness must see the execution and sign the instrument as a witness, and that the notice of talb-i-ishhad was not properly proved. Furthermore, the court held that talb-i-khusumat must be made by the pre-emptor or a properly authorized agent who satisfies the requirements of the prior demands. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding the appellate court's judgment setting aside the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of a marginal witness to sign the notice of talb-i-ishhad renders the notice invalid under the KPK Pre-emption Act, 1987?
  • What constitutes a valid attesting witness for the purpose of a notice of talb-i-ishhad under pre-emption law?
  • Can a pre-emption suit (talb-i-khusumat) be validly filed by a person who did not perform the prior demands of talb-i-muwathibat and talb-i-ishhad?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashidan Bibi through Legal Heirs and others vs Aman Ullah Khan2016 PLD Lahore 602 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Kiiatoon and 2 others vs District Education Officer2016 PLC (C.S.) 308 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-06
  family pensionqualifying servicecondonation of deficiencycivil servantwrit jurisdictionpensionary benefitsservice recordArticle 212 bar
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition was filed by the legal heirs of a deceased civil servant seeking family pension, which had been denied on the ground that the deceased’s qualifying service was less than the mandatory ten years. The core legal question was whether the deceased’s service period, which exceeded nine years and six months, qualified for pensionary benefits through the automatic condonation of the deficiency, and whether the department could arbitrarily reclassify sanctioned leave as extraordinary leave without pay to disqualify the claim. The Court held that the service record confirmed the deceased served for over nine years and six months. Under Paragraph 423 of the Civil Service Regulation, a deficiency not exceeding six months in qualifying service is automatically condoned. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the department’s unilateral reclassification of leave was unsupported by evidence. The Court affirmed that pension is a vested right, not a bounty, and held that the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 does not apply to the legal heirs of a civil servant, as they do not meet the statutory definition of a civil servant.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 apply to the legal heirs of a deceased civil servant seeking pensionary benefits?
  • Is a deficiency of less than six months in the qualifying service of a civil servant automatically condoned under the Civil Service Regulation?
  • Can a government department arbitrarily reclassify sanctioned leave with pay as extraordinary leave without pay to disqualify a claim for pension?
  • Is pension a bounty or a vested right acquired in consideration of past service?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rani Fareeda vs Tahir Saleem2016 MLD 1771 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-30
  review petitionerror apparent on the face of the recordadditional evidencecivil revisionscope of reviewbenamidar
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed under Section 114 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking review of an earlier order passed by the High Court in a civil revision. The underlying dispute relates to a suit for declaration filed by the respondent claiming ownership of the property, which was decreed by the trial court. During the pendency of the first appeal, the petitioner's application for production of additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was dismissed, and the subsequent civil revision against that dismissal was also dismissed by the High Court. In the present review petition, the petitioner argued that the previous order failed to discuss certain cited case law. The core legal question was whether a review petition can be entertained merely on the ground that a previous order did not discuss cited case law or to re-open the merits of a case. The court held that review jurisdiction is extremely limited and cannot be invoked as a substitute for an appeal or to re-hear a case in the absence of an error apparent on the face of the record. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.

  Questions settled

  • Can review jurisdiction be invoked merely on the ground that the court did not discuss case law cited during the hearing?
  • Whether failure to consider a ground or case law constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review?
  • Is a review petition maintainable as an appeal to re-open and re-hear the merits of a settled case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ramzano vs Khushi Muhammad and others-2016 YLR 2627 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rahamat Bibi and another vs Station House Officer, Karan Sharif2016 PLD Sindh 268 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia Gulzar and others vs Additional District Judge and others2016 MLD 693 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-03Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia Bibi vs Abdul Qadir and others2016 CLC 1460 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-14
  custody of minorwelfare of the minorHizanatsecond marriage of mothermaintenance allowancevisitation rightsGuardian JudgeGuardians and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenged the concurrent orders of the Guardian Judge and the Appellate Court, which had allowed the father's (respondent No. 1) application under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for custody of the minor son. The courts below had disturbed the mother's custody primarily because she had remarried and the minor had crossed seven years of age, thereby terminating her right of Hizanat under personal law. The High Court allowed the petition, setting aside the impugned orders and dismissing the custody application. The Court held that the welfare of the minor is the paramount and supreme consideration in determining custody, overriding strict rules of personal law. Second marriage or crossing the age of seven does not automatically disentitle a mother from retaining custody. It was established that the father sought custody merely to evade paying maintenance, whereas the mother had cared for the minor since birth and had subsequently divorced her second husband. The father was granted conditional visitation rights subject to clearing all maintenance dues.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mother's second marriage automatically disentitle her from retaining the custody of her minor child?
  • Whether the preferential custody rights of a father under Muhammadan Law are subservient to the paramount consideration of the welfare of the minor?
  • Can a father's application for custody be dismissed if it is filed primarily to evade execution of a maintenance decree?
  • Can a court make a father's visitation rights contingent upon the clearance and regular payment of the minor's maintenance allowance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Qaif Ul Wara Sajjad through Attorney vs Habib Bank Limited and 22016 CLD 1828 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-19
  execution proceedingsbanking courtunregistered sale agreementregistered sale deedcollusionsummary dismissalfinancial institutions recoveryproperty attachment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order passed by the Banking Court dismissing an objection application filed under Section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The appellant, claiming to be a legal heir of her late father, sought to stop the execution of a decree against her mother, alleging that the mortgaged property was fraudulently transferred to the mother despite an earlier unregistered sale agreement in favor of the father. The core legal question was whether an unregistered sale agreement could defeat a registered sale deed and whether the executing court was obligated to hold a full inquiry into such objections. The Court held that the unregistered agreement conferred no title, whereas the registered sale deed possessed legal sanctity. Furthermore, the Court found the appellant’s claim collusive and meritless. The holding established that an executing court is not bound to conduct a full trial or frame issues when objections are clearly meritless or collusive, and that parties seeking equitable relief must approach the court with clean hands.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unregistered sale agreement confer legal title or interest in property superior to a registered sale deed?
  • Is an executing court obligated to hold a full inquiry and frame issues for every objection filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
  • Can an objection application in execution proceedings be dismissed summarily if the court finds the objector and judgment debtor are acting in collusion?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Akhtar vs Subash Chandar, etc.2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · 2016-05-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Perveen vs Home Department, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 5, 2016 KLR Criminal Cases 38 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Perveen vs Home Department and others2016 PLD Lahore 153 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-01
  death sentenceblack warrantwrit jurisdictionexecution of sentencedisabilityPakistan Prison Rulesmercy petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought to set aside a black warrant issued for the execution of her son, a death row convict, primarily arguing that his permanent paralysis rendered his execution illegal under the Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978, and violative of fundamental rights under the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court examined whether writ jurisdiction was the appropriate forum to challenge the execution of a death sentence after all legal remedies, including mercy petitions, had been exhausted. The Court held that writ jurisdiction is not the proper forum to suspend or set aside a death sentence execution, as the authority to issue and carry out warrants lies with the Sessions Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Furthermore, the Court clarified that there is no legal bar against executing a disabled prisoner, as the Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978, grant discretion to the Superintendent regarding the execution process. The petition was dismissed, affirming that once legal remedies are exhausted, there is no justification to suspend an execution.

  Questions settled

  • Is writ jurisdiction the appropriate forum to suspend or set aside the execution of a death sentence?
  • Does the law of Pakistan prohibit the execution of a death row prisoner who is physically disabled or paralyzed?
  • What is the role of the Sessions Court in carrying out a death sentence after confirmation by the High Court?
  • Can the legal heirs of a deceased person pardon a convict at the last moment before execution?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Jan vs Asghar Khan and 5 others2016 MLD 1956 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Bibi vs The State and another2016 P Cr. LJ 732 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-29
  juvenile offenderdetermination of ageNADRA birth certificateForm-Bossification testcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, whereby respondent No.2 was declared a juvenile offender facing trial under sections 364-A and 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court was bound to hold a formal inquiry and order an ossification test despite the availability of official documentary evidence like a NADRA birth certificate and Form-B regarding the accused's age. The Lahore High Court held that an inquiry is not mandatory where authentic official documents issued prior to the crime establish minority, and an ossification test is unnecessary when reliable documentary evidence exists. The petition was dismissed, upholding the trial court's order declaring the respondent a juvenile offender under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a court to hold a formal inquiry for age determination under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance 2000 when authentic official birth documents are available?
  • When is an ossification test necessary for determining the age of an accused claiming to be a juvenile?
  • Does a NADRA-issued birth certificate and Form-B carry a presumption of truth regarding the age of an accused?
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• Mst. Nusrat Bibi vs Nazir Akhtar2016 P.S.C. 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-02
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadattesting witnessesburden of proofright of pre-emptioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for possession through pre-emption, where the respondent claimed a superior right of pre-emption over the appellant regarding a property sale. The core legal question was whether the respondent had satisfied the mandatory requirement of proving 'Talb-i-Ishhad' under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, specifically regarding the production of two truthful attesting witnesses. The Trial Court had dismissed the suit, but the Appellate Court and the High Court subsequently decreed it in favor of the respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to produce the required two truthful attesting witnesses to prove the 'Talb-i-Ishhad' as mandated by Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. One witness did not support the case, and the other was not produced without explanation. The Court reaffirmed that non-production of the requisite witnesses is fatal to a pre-emption claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appellate judgments, and restored the Trial Court's dismissal of the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Is the production of two truthful attesting witnesses mandatory to prove Talb-i-Ishhad under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • What is the legal consequence of failing to produce the required attesting witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad in a pre-emption suit?
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• Mst. Nosheen Fatima vs Provincial Government G.B. through Chief2016 PLC (C.S.) 1087 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-08-12
  service matterpublic appointmentmerit listdiscriminationconstitutional petitionteacher appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a constitutional petition aggrieved by an office order through which the official respondents appointed respondent No. 5 as a teacher, despite the petitioner securing a higher merit position (16th) compared to respondent No. 5 (17th) in the recruitment test. The core legal question concerned whether the authorities could bypass a more meritorious candidate in favor of a lower-ranked candidate and subsequently regularize her appointment. The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court held that the appointment of respondent No. 5 in disregard of the merit list constituted a clear violation of merit and amounted to discrimination against the petitioner. The court accepted the petition, directed the official respondents to pass a similar appointment order in favor of the petitioner, declared the petitioner senior to respondent No. 5, and ordered an inquiry to recover any financial loss caused to the state treasury by the illegal regularization. The key principle laid down is that public authorities are strictly bound to respect merit lists in public appointments and cannot arbitrarily favor lower-ranked candidates.

  Questions settled

  • Whether public authorities can appoint a candidate who secured a lower position on the merit list while bypassing a more meritorious candidate?
  • Does the regularization of a lower-ranked candidate in violation of a merit list constitute discrimination against higher-ranked candidates?
  • Can the court direct the appointment of a petitioner who was wrongfully superseded in a public recruitment process?
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• Mst. Nosheen Bibi vs Ziaullah & 2 otherss2016 PLJ Peshawar 260 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-04-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor Bibi and another vs Ghulam Qamar and another2016 P.S.C. 1010, 2016 SCP 42, 2016 SCMR 1195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-03-17
  Shia law of inheritancechildless widowimmovable propertyinheritance mutationcivil revisionagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had set aside concurrent findings of the two courts below and decreed the respondents' suit for a declaration and change of mutation regarding agricultural land. The core legal question was whether a widow who is a mother with surviving children from her deceased husband is disqualified from inheriting immovable property under the Shia law of inheritance, specifically being equated with a 'childless widow'. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the concurrent findings of the courts below. The ratio laid down is that under Shia personal law, a widow who has surviving children from the deceased husband is not a 'childless widow' and is therefore fully entitled to her legal share in both the movable and immovable property (including agricultural land) of the deceased. The key principle established is that the legal disability excluding a widow from inheriting immovable property under Shia jurisprudence strictly applies only to a childless widow.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a widow having surviving children from her deceased husband is entitled to a share in immovable property under the Shia law of inheritance?
  • Does the disqualification of a widow from inheriting land under Shia jurisprudence apply to a widow who is not childless?
  • What constitutes a 'childless widow' for the purpose of succession under the Shia Fiqah?
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• Mst. Nighat Rizwan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry2016 CLC 1719 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nawab Bibi and others vs Ch. Allah Ditta and 13 others2016 LHC 1621 · Lahore High Court · 2016-05-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naveeda Kausar and others vs Mauzzam Khan and others2016 CLC 180 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-05
  oral divorceTalaqFamily Court jurisdictionNikahnamaactionable claimMuslim Family Laws Ordinancedissolution of marriage
  Summary & questions settled

  This writ petition challenged the judgments and decrees of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge regarding a wife's suit for maintenance, dowry articles, and a specific monetary claim arising from a Nikahnama clause. The core legal questions were whether an oral divorce (Talaq) is valid and effective without formal notice to the Union Council, and whether a Family Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for a specific sum of money stipulated in a Nikahnama upon divorce. The Court held that an oral divorce is valid and becomes effective upon pronouncement, regardless of the absence of notice to the Union Council. However, regarding the monetary claim, the Court held that a claim for a specific amount payable upon divorce under a Nikahnama does not constitute 'personal property and belonging of the wife' under the Family Courts Act, 1964, and thus falls outside the Family Court's jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that while the divorce was effective, the wife must seek the monetary claim in a court of competent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Is an oral divorce valid and effective even if notice is not provided to the Union Council under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  • Does a claim for a specific sum of money payable upon divorce under a Nikahnama fall within the jurisdiction of a Family Court?
  • Can a Family Court adjudicate a claim for money that does not constitute the personal property or belongings of the wife?
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• Mst. Nasreen Zahra Government of the Punjab Throughsecretary2016 NLR Revenue 66 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitioncompensationstatutory interestcollector's dutymandatory paymentcompulsory acquisitionaward
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the acquisition of land for the Multan Bye-Pass project, which involved protracted litigation regarding compensation and interest payments. The central legal question was whether the landowner, Mst. Nasreen Zahra, was entitled to statutory interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, given that the compensation awarded by the Collector was neither tendered to her nor deposited in the Referee Court. The Supreme Court held that the Collector’s failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894—which requires the Collector to tender compensation or deposit it in court upon making an award—triggered the penal consequences of Section 34. The Court rejected the argument that the release of funds to the executing agency absolved the government of this liability. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the landowner is entitled to interest at the statutory rate from the time possession was taken until the compensation is paid or deposited. The principle laid down is that the payment of interest under Section 34 is mandatory when the Collector fails to tender or deposit compensation as prescribed by law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a Land Acquisition Collector to tender or deposit compensation as required by Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 entitle the landowner to interest under Section 34?
  • Is the release of funds by the government to an executing agency sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of tendering compensation to the landowner?
  • Can the government be held liable for compensation and interest in land acquisition proceedings where it was the primary beneficiary of the acquisition?
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• Mst. Naseem Aziz vs The State and 7 others2016 P Cr. L J 786 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-24
  Illegal Dispossession Actforcible dispossessionrevisional jurisdictioncivil nature of disputeprima facie caseproperty rightstenancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This revision application challenges an order by the Additional Sessions Judge dismissing a complaint filed under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The applicant alleged that her in-laws forcibly dispossessed her from a flat following her husband's death. The core legal question was whether the applicant established a prima facie case of illegal dispossession warranting criminal proceedings under the Act. The High Court upheld the trial court's dismissal, holding that the applicant failed to demonstrate the essential ingredients required to invoke the Act. The Court emphasized that for an offence under Section 3(1) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, a complainant must prove they are the lawful owner or occupier, that the accused entered the property without lawful authority, and that the entry was intended to dispossess the complainant. Since these elements were absent and the dispute appeared to be of a civil nature regarding property rights, the Court ruled that the criminal complaint was not maintainable, directing the applicant to seek appropriate relief before a civil court.

  Questions settled

  • What are the essential ingredients required to establish an offence under Section 3(1) of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
  • Can a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 be maintained where the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature regarding property title?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere in a trial court's dismissal of a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 if the essential elements of the offence are not prima facie established?
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• Mst. Naseem Akhtar vs State & another2016 PCRLJ 1867, 2017 YLR 1571, PLJ 2017 Cr.C. (Lahore) 71 · Lahore High Court · 2016-09-06
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabductionprostitutiondelay in FIRbail for women
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Mst. Naseem Akhtar, sought post-arrest bail in connection with FIR No. 297/2015, registered at Police Station Budhla Cantt, Multan, for offences under Sections 376, 371-A, 371-B, and 496-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner and a co-accused abducted the complainant's daughter for the purpose of prostitution and misappropriated cash and gold ornaments. The Court observed that the FIR was lodged with an unexplained delay of three months. Furthermore, the medical examination of the alleged victim showed no signs of violence. The Court noted that the petitioner is the ex-wife of the complainant and the mother of the alleged victim. Crucially, the Court found that co-accused persons had already been granted bail based on the statements of the complainant and the victim, which exonerated them. Given the petitioner's status as a woman and the fact that her case was on a better footing than the co-accused who were released, the Court held that the petitioner's guilt required further inquiry. Consequently, the bail petition was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained three-month delay in lodging an FIR constitute grounds for further inquiry in a bail application?
  • Is a female accused entitled to bail when her case stands on a better footing than co-accused who have already been granted bail?
  • Does the absence of violence marks on the alleged victim's body support a plea for further inquiry in an abduction case?
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• Mst. Najum-Ul-Nisa Zahra through Attorney vs Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah2016 MLD 1606 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-07Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naila Kausar and anothers vs Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh and otherss2016 SCMR 1781 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-04
  power of attorneygift mutationfiduciary dutydeclaration suitprincipal and agentkith and kinrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over a gift mutation executed by an attorney in favor of his own daughter, using a power of attorney granted by the original owner, Mst. Fatima Jan. The legal heirs of the deceased owner challenged the gift through a suit for declaration and possession. The core legal question was whether an attorney can transfer the principal's property to himself or his kith and kin via gift without specific authorization. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that an attorney is prohibited from utilizing delegated powers to transfer property to themselves or their close relatives unless special and specific consent is granted by the principal. The Court held that the intention to gift must be explicitly proved and cannot be inferred from a general power of attorney. Finding no evidence of specific written permission or a relationship justifying such a gift to a stranger, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the attorney failed to discharge the heavy onus of proving the principal's consent.

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• Mst. Naheed vs Ameer Bakhsh and 5 otherss2016 YLR 975 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-01
  direct complaintpreliminary inquirycriminal revisionprima facie casedismissal of complaintwitness contradictioncognizance of offence
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant filed a criminal revision application challenging the dismissal of her direct complaint by the III-Additional Sessions Judge, Khairpur. The complaint alleged that the respondents, along with unknown police officials, trespassed into her home, robbed her, and attempted to force a marriage. The trial court had referred the matter for a preliminary inquiry under Section 202, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, during which the complainant's witnesses provided contradictory statements that failed to substantiate the allegations. The High Court examined the record and found that the witnesses' testimonies were inconsistent and failed to establish a prima facie case. The Court held that the purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to determine the veracity of allegations without the participation of the accused, and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint under Section 203, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, due to insufficient grounds. The Court affirmed that the trial court is not required to issue notices to the accused during the preliminary inquiry stage, and the dismissal order was maintained as it suffered from no legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for a trial court to issue notice to the accused during the preliminary inquiry stage of a direct complaint?
  • Can a trial court dismiss a direct complaint if the preliminary inquiry reveals material contradictions in the statements of the complainant's witnesses?
  • What is the primary purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Mst. Nagina Gul Ali vs Tariq and otherss2016 MLD 1619 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-08-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naghma Sultana through Attorney vs Muhammad Jameel and 22016 CLC 392 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-23
  ex parte judgmentsubstitute servicecivil proceduredue serviceappellate jurisdictionsetting aside decreeright of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Miscellaneous Application filed under Order XLI, Rule 21 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking to set aside an ex parte judgment passed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether an ex parte judgment could be set aside based on a claim of non-service, despite evidence of substitute service and the applicant's knowledge of the proceedings. The Court dismissed the application, holding that the applicant failed to establish a lack of service. The Court laid down the principle that 'duly served' implies providing sufficient information of the proceedings to the defendant, rather than requiring personal receipt. Substitute service under Order V, Rule 20 is as effectual as personal service. Furthermore, the Court held that in appellate proceedings, the requirement is the Court's satisfaction regarding the party's knowledge of the pending lis, rather than a formal 'ex parte' order. Finally, the Court clarified that Order XLI, Rule 21 does not apply to revisional or constitutional jurisdictions, as those are governed by different legal standards.

  Questions settled

  • Does the provision for setting aside an ex parte decree under Order XLI, Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to revisional or constitutional matters?
  • Is personal service of summons mandatory, or does substitute service under Order V, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 constitute valid service?
  • Does the law require a formal 'ex parte' order to be passed in appellate proceedings before a court can proceed to hear an appeal in the absence of a party?
  • Can an ex parte judgment be set aside if the court is satisfied that the defendant had knowledge of the pending proceedings despite a claim of non-service?
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• Mst. Nafeesa Manzoor vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir University through Vice-Chancellor, Muzaffarabad and 7 others2016 MLD 1999 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nabeela Kausar vs S.H.O. Police Station Chowk Azam, District, Layyah and 3 others2016 PLJ Lahore 718 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Musarat Bib! and 2 others vs The State and another2016 P Cr. L J 121 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-10
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of the doubtinterested witnesschance witnessmedical evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Section 302(b)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the Qatl-i-Amd of the deceased and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal questions involve the credibility of interested and chance witnesses, the reliability of dishonest improvements in witness testimony, the evidentiary value of uncorroborated joint attributions of fatal blows, and the application of the benefit of the doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a shadow of doubt, as the eye-witnesses were established to be chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene was doubtful, their testimonies suffered from deliberate improvements, and the medical evidence and recoveries did not corroborate the charges against the appellants. Consequently, the court laid down that uncorroborated testimony of interested and unreliable witnesses cannot form the basis of a conviction, accepting the appeal and acquitting the appellants by extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an eye-witness who is a chance witness and fails to establish his natural presence at the crime scene can be relied upon for sustaining a conviction?
  • Does a material and dishonest improvement made by a witness in subsequent testimony destroy the credibility of such witness?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained on a joint attribution of a single fatal injury to multiple accused without corroborative evidence?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to an acquittal when the prosecution evidence is riddled with material contradictions, delay in lodging the FIR, and uncorroborated interested testimony?
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• Mst. Manzoor Elahi vs Sessions Judge and 4 others2016 P Cr. L J 211 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-12
  exhumationpostmortem examinationinquestdiscretionary powercriminal investigationcause of death
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the dismissal of an application for the exhumation and second postmortem examination of a deceased woman, Mst. Sumaira Bibi. The petitioner, the mother-in-law of the deceased, alleged that the deceased committed suicide due to family pressure and that the initial postmortem report was fabricated to include blunt weapon injuries. The core legal question was whether the Magistrate and the revisional court erred in refusing to order a second postmortem under sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the power to order a second postmortem is discretionary and requires compelling new circumstances, which were absent here. The Court found the initial postmortem report credible and dismissed the theory of suicide as unsupported by the record. The key principle laid down is that the power to order exhumation and re-postmortem examination under sections 174 and 176, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is an extraordinary measure that cannot be exercised based on mere whims or unsubstantiated allegations when the cause of death is already unequivocally established.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Magistrate order a second postmortem examination of a dead body under sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the power to order exhumation and re-postmortem examination discretionary or mandatory upon the request of a party?
  • Does a discrepancy between the injury statement prepared by the police and the medical officer's report automatically necessitate a second postmortem examination?
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• Mst. Mamuna Amin vs Government of Punjab etc2016 LHC 4216 · Lahore High Court · 2016-12-07Read full judgment →