Pakistan Case LawLatest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,594 judgments in total.
- Mst. Mahtab Tayab vs State and 2 othersPLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 492 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition arises from an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan, confirming the pre-arrest bail of respondents in a case registered under Sections 380, 457, and 506-B of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerns whether pre-arrest bail confirmed by the lower court warrants cancellation due to misuse of concession or other compelling grounds, particularly amidst a background of commercial disputes between partners of an educational institution, delayed FIR registration, and subsequent repetitive and unprosecuted petitions filed by the complainant. The Lahore High Court held that no justification exists to recall the bail-granting order, noting that the complainant failed to demonstrate any misuse of bail concession and was instead using the litigation process to harass the respondents through repeated, abandoned petitions. The court established that repeated filing of bail cancellation petitions without diligent prosecution, coupled with an absence of proof regarding the misuse of bail, does not justify interference with a well-reasoned pre-arrest bail confirmation order.
Questions settled- Whether pre-arrest bail can be cancelled when the complainant fails to establish any misuse of the concession of bail?
- Does the filing of repetitive and non-prosecuted petitions for bail cancellation constitute an abuse of the process of law?
- Whether unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and subsequent execution of an affidavit exonerating the accused are relevant factors in confirming pre-arrest bail?
- Mst. Maham Shabbir vs Salman Haider & Another2016 NLR Civil 421 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-10-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Khushboo vs Station House Officer and 7 others2016 YLR 1364 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. Khursheed Begum vs Mst. Shabnam Niaz2016 YLR 1155 · Shariat Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-12-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. Khandana Bibi and 2 others vs Khaista Rehman and 9 others2016 CLC 731 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition arises from a judgment of the Additional District Judge partially accepting an appeal against a trial court decree in a suit for declaration, possession, and perpetual injunction based on inheritance. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs established a joint share in the inherited property and entitlement to inheritance despite a prior lifetime partition by the common predecessor and long-standing alienations. The Peshawar High Court held that the evidence demonstrated a valid lifetime partition by the common predecessor, subsequent long-term exclusive possession, and alienation of property without objection, rendering the plaintiffs' suit time-barred and barred by their own acquiescence and non-joinder of necessary parties. The court laid down the principles that claims of inheritance are subject to the law of limitation and that acquiescence, long-standing peaceful possession following a lifetime partition, and failure to challenge alienation defeat belated claims to inherited property.
Questions settled- Whether a suit for declaration and possession based on inheritance is barred by limitation when brought decades after a lifetime partition?
- Does long-standing exclusive possession and alienation of property by co-sharers without objection constitute acquiescence against a belated inheritance claim?
- Is a suit for a share in Shamilat land maintainable without impleading all owners in possession as parties?
- Mst. Kattu and others vs Eesa2016 MLD 39 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-07Read full judgment →
- Mst. Karim Jan vs Muhammad Iqbal2016 CLC 1819 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-05-04Read full judgment →
- Mst. Kaneez Akhtar, Retired Divisional Directress Schools (Female), Muzaffarabad vs Azad Jammu & Kashmir Government through its Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 5 others2016 P.S.C. 840 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. Kaneez Akhtar vs Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 5 others2016 P.S.C. 840, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 376 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner filed a review petition against the dismissal of her appeal as having become infructuous following her retirement. She sought to challenge adverse remarks made by the Service Tribunal regarding her grade status (B-18 versus B-19), despite having previously sought to withdraw her appeal against her transfer order. The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir addressed the maintainability of the review petition under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, noting procedural defects regarding its filing without the requisite advocate's certificate. Nevertheless, invoking its powers to do complete justice under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the Court quashed the adverse observations made by the Service Tribunal regarding the petitioner's grade, ultimately dismissing the review petition.
Questions settled- Whether a review petition filed directly by a party without the mandatory certificate of the advocate who appeared at the original hearing is maintainable under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978?
- Can the Supreme Court expunge or quash adverse remarks made by a Service Tribunal regarding a civil servant's grade while exercising powers to do complete justice?
- What is the procedural requirement for filing a review petition under Order XLVI of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978?
- Mst. Kainat and 2 others vs The State2016 YLR 974 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-01-07Read full judgment →
- Mst. Javeria vs State2016 PHC 34 · Peshawar High Court · 2016-02-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. Jamila Bano through L.Rs,---Applicant vs Mst. Shahana Begum alias2016 YLR 2659 · Sindh High Court · 2016-05-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. Jaiwanti Bai vs Messrs Amir Corporation Ltd. and 2 others2016 MLD 1298 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. Irshad Begum alias Shadan and others vs The State2016 P Cr. L J 407 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-31Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentences awarded by the Special Judge, Control of Narcotic Substances, for alleged drug trafficking. The core legal questions concern the sustainability of convictions based on foreign reports without proper evidentiary proof, the failure to adhere to statutory mutual legal assistance procedures, and procedural irregularities during trial, specifically the failure to confront the accused with incriminating evidence during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden of proof. It found that the trial court relied on inadmissible foreign documents, failed to follow the mandatory legal mechanism for international cooperation under the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance 1997, and incorrectly applied the law retrospectively. Furthermore, the failure to confront the accused with material evidence rendered the trial fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, establishing that criminal liability cannot be based on presumptions, and that strict compliance with procedural and evidentiary rules is mandatory for a valid conviction.
Questions settled- Can a criminal conviction be sustained based on foreign reports that have not been proven in accordance with the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?
- Does the failure to confront an accused with incriminating material during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate the conviction?
- Is it permissible to apply the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 to an offence committed before its enactment?
- Must the prosecution strictly comply with the statutory mechanism for international mutual legal assistance when relying on evidence gathered in a foreign jurisdiction?
- Mst. Iqbal Begum, etc. vs Syed Muhammad Sadiq, etc.2016 C.L.R. 1131 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment setting aside the trial court's dismissal of a suit for cancellation of an exchange deed and remanding the matter back to the trial court for a fresh decision. The core legal questions involve the necessity of affixing court-fee on a memorandum of appeal and the propriety of an appellate court remanding a case when sufficient evidence is already available on record. The Lahore High Court held that the appellate court erred in remanding the case for rewriting a judgment instead of deciding the matter itself on merits based on the available evidence, and noted that court-fee must be affixed on the memorandum of appeal. The High Court laid down the principle that when sufficient oral and documentary evidence is available on record, the first appellate court should decide the appeal on merits rather than resorting to an unnecessary remand, avoiding procedural irregularities and the extension of litigation.
Questions settled- Whether an appellate court is justified in remanding a case to the trial court when sufficient oral and documentary evidence is already available on record to decide the matter?
- Does a memorandum of appeal require the affixation of court-fee when court-fee was already affixed on the plaint during the trial?
- Whether the first appellate court is bound to decide questions of fact and law independently instead of choosing to remand the case for rewriting a judgment?
- Mst. Humera Jabeen and 2 other vs Muhammad Arshad and others2016 YLR 300 · Sindh High Court · 2014-03-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Humaira Aslam vs Abdul Rahim Rafi2016 PLD Sindh 598 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-22Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hina Rukhsana vs The Provincial Police Officer/Inspector2016 P Cr. L J 150 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 sought to declare the action of the SHO of Police Station Akora Khattak in discharging and placing a murder accused, a police DSP, in column No. 2 of the challan under section 169, Cr.P.C. as illegal and mala fide. The core legal question was whether the police officer acted lawfully in discharging the accused during investigation based on deficient evidence and a plea of alibi. The Peshawar High Court held that the Investigating Officer is empowered under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to release an accused and place his name in column No. 2 of the challan when evidence is deficient or a plea of alibi is established, subject to the final determination and agreement of the trial court. The key principle laid down is that the police are not under a statutory obligation to straightaway arrest an accused in heinous offences if the accused joins and cooperates with the investigation, provided proper procedural requirements like executing a bail bond are fulfilled.
Questions settled- Whether an Investigating Officer is empowered to release an accused and place his name in column No. 2 of the challan under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is the police under a statutory obligation to straightaway arrest an accused in heinous offences during investigation?
- What is the role and jurisdiction of the trial court when an accused is placed in column No. 2 of the challan by the police?
- Mst. Hina Liaquat vs Secretary Education, etc.2016 C.L.R 1673 · Lahore High Court · 2004-05-13Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hifsa Naseer vs Additional District Judge, Gujjar Khan and others2016 LHC 2446, 2016 KLR Civil Cases 351 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hifsa Naseer vs Additional District Judge, Gujar Khan and others2016 LHC 2446 · Lahore High Court · 2016-06-30Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hayatan Mai vs Mst. Aziz Mai alias Azizi through L.Rs.2016 YLR 539 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment that reversed the trial court's dismissal of a suit for declaration regarding the validity of a gift mutation. The core legal question concerns whether the defendant, as the beneficiary of the disputed gift, successfully discharged the burden of proof regarding the gift's validity, and whether the appellate court erred by failing to provide issue-wise findings. The Court held that the revision petition was meritless, affirming the appellate court's decision. It ruled that in cases of disputed gifts, the onus lies heavily on the beneficiary to prove the essential ingredients—offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession—through cogent, incontrovertible evidence. The Court found the defendant failed to prove these elements and contradicted her own pleadings. Furthermore, the Court clarified that appellate courts are not bound by the same requirement as trial courts to provide issue-wise findings, provided they comprehensively address the controversy. The principle established is that a beneficiary must strictly prove the validity of a gift, and a party cannot depart from their original pleadings to improve their case.
Questions settled- Upon whom does the burden of proof lie in a disputed gift transaction?
- Is an appellate court required to provide issue-wise findings in its judgment similar to a trial court?
- What are the essential ingredients that must be proven to establish the validity of a gift?
- Can a party be permitted to lead evidence on a material fact not pleaded in their written statement?
- Mst. Hassan Jan and 8 others vs Akhtar JANand 19 others2016 PLJ AJ&K 72, 2016 YLR 760 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-10-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hassan Jan and 8 others vs Akhtar Jan and 19 others2016 PLJ AJ&K 72 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2015-10-21Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hamida Bibi vs Additional District Judge-I, D.I.Khan2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-08-16Read full judgment →
- Mst. Hameedan Bibi and another vs Muhammad Sharif2016 LHC 894 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. Halim Bi vs Mohammad and 14 others2016 MLD 690 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-04-01Read full judgment →
- Mst. Gulzar Begum vs Mst. Bibi Zaitoon and 2 others2016 CLC 630 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-06-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Gulshan Bibi, etc. vs Muhammad Sadiq, etc_2016 P.S.C. 924 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether the Act is restricted to prosecuting only those individuals who possess the established credentials of a 'land grabber' or 'Qabza Mafia,' or if it applies to any person who commits the offence of illegal dispossession. The Court held that the Act is not restricted to a specific class of offenders. It determined that the legislature used broad terms like 'no one' and 'whoever' in Section 3, indicating an intent to cover any person who illegally dispossesses another, regardless of their past history or status as a professional land grabber. The Court clarified that the preamble cannot be used to restrict the clear and unambiguous substantive provisions of the statute. The key principle laid down is that in proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, the court need only determine whether the alleged offence occurred and whether the accused committed it without lawful authority; no prior history of land grabbing is required for prosecution.
Questions settled- Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 apply only to professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia?
- Can the preamble of an enactment be used to restrict the scope of its clear and unambiguous substantive provisions?
- Is it a prerequisite for prosecution under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 that the accused must have a prior record of land grabbing?
- What is the scope of the term 'whoever' as used in Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
- Mst. Gulshan Bibi etc (In CP 41_2008) (2) Federation of Pakistan thr_9fb198742016 SCP 19 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan resolves a conflict regarding the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether prosecution under Section 3 of the Act is restricted exclusively to individuals possessing the credentials and antecedents of professional land grabbers or Qabza Mafia, or if it extends to anyone who commits the prohibited act of illegal dispossession. The Court held that the Act applies to any person ("no one" or "whoever") who illegally dispossesses, grabs, controls, or occupies property without lawful authority, regardless of whether the accused has a prior history or record as a professional land grabber. The ratio established is that a trial under the Act must be strictly confined to the specific property and incident forming the subject matter of the complaint, and a complainant is not required as a precondition to prove that the accused belongs to a Qabza Group or land mafia. Consequently, the Court overruled previous judgments that had restricted the statute's scope to known property grabbers and reaffirmed earlier rulings that gave the statutory language its broad, literal meaning.
Questions settled- Whether the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is restricted only to those persons who hold the credentials and antecedents of a land grabber or Qabza Mafia?
- Must a complainant establish as a precondition that the accused belongs to a land mafia before a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is maintainable?
- Can the preamble of a statute be used to curtail or enlarge the clear and unambiguous meaning of its substantive provisions?
- Does Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 categorize any specific class of offenders who alone can be prosecuted for the offence?
- Mst. Gulshan Bibi and others vs Muhammad Sadiq and otherss2016 PLJ SC 776 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns the scope and applicability of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, specifically whether prosecution under the Act is restricted to individuals with established credentials as 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Mafia'. The Court addressed conflicting precedents, examining whether a complainant must prove the accused belongs to a professional land-grabbing group as a condition precedent for maintainability. The Court held that the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 does not categorize offenders or restrict its application to a specific class of 'land grabbers'. By interpreting the plain language of Section 3, which uses the terms 'no one' and 'whoever', the Court determined that the Act applies to any person who illegally dispossesses, grabs, controls, or occupies property without lawful authority. The Court established the principle that the preamble cannot be used to curtail the clear, unambiguous substantive provisions of an enactment. Consequently, the Court ruled that a complainant is not required to prove the accused's past history or status as a professional land grabber; the trial must focus solely on whether the specific offence of illegal dispossession occurred.
Questions settled- Does the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 require an accused to be a professional 'land grabber' or member of a 'Qabza Group' to be prosecuted?
- Can the preamble of a statute be used to restrict the scope of its clear and unambiguous substantive provisions?
- Is it necessary for a complainant to prove the past criminal history of an accused to maintain a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
- What is the scope of the term 'whoever' as used in Section 3 of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005?
- Mst. Gulshan Bibi and others vs Muhammad Sadiq and others2016 P.S.C. 924, 2016 PLD Supreme Court 769 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter was brought before a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to resolve a conflict in judicial interpretations regarding the scope of the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. The core legal question was whether the Act applies to any person who illegally dispossesses an owner or occupier, or if it is restricted to a specific class of offenders known as 'land grabbers' or 'Qabza Mafia'. The Court examined two sets of conflicting precedents: one advocating for broad application and another requiring the complainant to prove the accused's credentials as a professional property grabber. The Court held that Section 3 of the Act uses the terms 'no one' and 'whoever', indicating the widest possible application to all offenders without distinction. It further clarified that the preamble cannot be used to curtail the clear language of substantive provisions. The Court concluded that the Act aims to provide a speedy remedy against all illegal dispossessions, regardless of the accused's past record. Consequently, the restrictive interpretation was declared bad law, and the cases were remanded for fresh decisions on merit.
- Mst. Gulalai vs Major Fakhr-I-Jehan2016 NLR Civil 379 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-23Read full judgment →
- Mst. Gul Safia Bibi and another vs Al-Haj Muhammad Nazir and 2 others2016 CLC 10 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-06-24Read full judgment →
- Mst. Gul Haseena vs Provincial Government, G.B. through Chief2016 PLC (C.S.) 855 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-08-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition was filed by the mother of a deceased government servant seeking the payment of a departmental assistance package of Rs. 300,000 and the provision of a government job for the legal heirs of the deceased. The petitioner challenged an order dated 7th May 2014, alleging it was void and violated fundamental rights. Upon review, the Court found that the petitioner failed to provide any documentary evidence to substantiate the claim that the alleged assistance package was outstanding or that the petitioner was entitled to such funds. Furthermore, regarding the request for a government job, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to identify any specific legal heir eligible for appointment, nor was the petition filed on behalf of a candidate seeking such employment. Additionally, the petitioner could not cite any applicable law or policy in effect at the time of the employee's death in 2005 that mandated the appointment of legal heirs. Consequently, the Court held the petition to be baseless and dismissed it for lack of merit and supporting evidence.
Questions settled- Is a petitioner entitled to a departmental assistance package without providing documentary proof of the entitlement?
- Can a writ petition for government employment be maintained if the petitioner fails to identify an eligible candidate for the position?
- Does a court have the authority to grant relief in a service matter where no statutory basis or policy is cited to support the claim?
- Mst. Ghulam Aisha and others vs Kalimullah and others2016 CLC 118 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-17Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts whereby the respondents' suit for declaration, perpetual injunction, and possession regarding the inheritance of their grandfather was decreed. The core legal question was whether grandchildren through a predeceased son or daughter are entitled to inherit from their grandfather's legacy under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, given that the Federal Shariat Court declared the provision repugnant to Islam. The Peshawar High Court held that because the operation of the Federal Shariat Court's judgment stands suspended during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, section 4 remains fully operative. The court dismissed the revision petition, laying down the principle that until the Supreme Court finally disposes of the appeal, the inheritance rights of orphaned grandchildren under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, remain intact and enforceable.
Questions settled- Are grandchildren entitled to inherit from their grandfather's legacy under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, when their parent predeceased the grandfather?
- Does the declaration of repugnancy by the Federal Shariat Court against section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, immediately deprive orphaned grandchildren of their inheritance rights while an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court?
- Whether the suspension of a Federal Shariat Court judgment by the Supreme Court keeps section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, operative until the final disposal of the appeal?
- Mst. Ghania Hassan vs Shahid Hussain Shahid and another2016 LHC 592, 2016 PLJ Lahore 756, 2017 PLD Lahore 41 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from the dismissal of an objection petition filed by the appellant (wife) in execution proceedings initiated by a decree-holder against her husband (judgment-debtor). The core legal question was whether property claimed by the wife under a post-marriage agreement, characterized as 'additional dower,' could be protected from attachment in execution of a money decree against her husband. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish a valid claim over the attached property. The Court ruled that dower is a consideration fixed at the time of marriage, and there is no legal concept of 'additional dower' created years later. The Court affirmed that while property transferred in lieu of dower at the time of marriage is valid, any subsequent transfer of property between spouses constitutes a gift, not dower. Furthermore, an agreement that does not effectuate a final transfer of title does not create a lien sufficient to frustrate execution proceedings against the judgment-debtor. The judgment emphasizes that Nikahnama entries regarding dower are conclusive, whereas subsequent agreements require proof of a concluded contract to establish title.
Questions settled- Can property claimed under a post-marriage agreement be classified as dower to defeat execution proceedings?
- Does the concept of 'additional dower' exist in Muslim law for property transferred years after the marriage?
- Can an objection petition in execution proceedings be sustained based on an unconcluded agreement of transfer?
- Mst. Ghania Hassan vs Shahid Hussain Shahid & another2016 LHC 592 · Lahore High Court · 2016-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal arises from the dismissal of an objection petition filed by the appellant, wife of the judgment-debtor, against the attachment of property in execution of a money decree passed under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant claimed ownership of the attached properties based on entries in her Nikahnama and a subsequent agreement executed four years after her marriage, alleging the same constituted dower and additional dower. The core legal questions examined were whether property claimed under a subsequent agreement can be treated as additional dower and whether such an un-concluded agreement creates a valid lien to frustrate execution proceedings. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that dower is strictly the consideration fixed at the time of marriage, and any subsequent transfer or undertaking cannot be classified as dower but at best as a gift requiring separate legal establishment. The court established that property not forming part of the original Nikahnama and claimed through a pending suit for recovery cannot be used to obstruct the execution of a lawful decree.
Questions settled- Can a property claimed under a subsequent agreement executed years after marriage be legally treated as additional dower?
- Whether entries in a Nikahnama regarding dower property pass a valid title without requiring further registration?
- Does a pending suit for recovery of dower create a valid lien over property to obstruct the execution of a decree against the husband?
- Mst. Fozia Shabnam vs Additional Sessions Judge, Multan and 8 others2016 PLD Lahore 518 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, the sister of the deceased, sought the disinterment and exhumation of her brother's body, alleging he was murdered by poisoning and strangulation. The Judicial Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge dismissed her application, citing potential mala fides and family disputes. The Lahore High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the lower courts erred by focusing on collateral issues like inheritance and family disputes rather than the statutory requirements for exhumation. The Court held that the primary consideration under Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is whether the circumstances raise a reasonable suspicion that an offence was committed in relation to the death. The Court emphasized that the right to know the cause of death is paramount, and exhumation can be ordered even on the request of a stranger, let alone a close relative, to dispel suspicions of unnatural death. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' orders and directed the Judicial Magistrate to manage the disinterment to ascertain the cause of death.
Questions settled- Can a Judicial Magistrate consider collateral issues like inheritance disputes when deciding an application for the exhumation of a dead body?
- Is the registration of an F.I.R. a prerequisite or an impediment to holding an inquiry into the cause of death under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- What is the primary legal test for ordering the exhumation of a dead body under Sections 174 and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does the alleged mala fide intent of an applicant preclude the court from ordering an exhumation if there is a reasonable suspicion of an unnatural death?
- Mst. Feeroza vs Muhammad Anees and 2 others2016 YLR 1048 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by the trial court in a case registered under sections 506-B, 337-A(i), 354, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal was justified given the evidence presented and the alleged contradictions in the prosecution's case. The High Court dismissed the appeal at the Katcha Peshi stage, upholding the acquittal. The court held that in a criminal acquittal appeal, there exists a double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, and appellate interference is not justified unless there is a concrete flaw in the trial court's factual or legal reasoning. The court found that the prosecution failed to substantiate the ingredients of the charged offenses, noting the absence of medical evidence, unexplained delays, contradictions in witness testimony, and the existence of prior litigation between the parties, suggesting that a family dispute had been improperly converted into criminal proceedings. The judgment reinforces the principle that the appellate court will not disturb a well-reasoned acquittal without compelling grounds.
Questions settled- What is the standard for appellate interference in a criminal acquittal appeal?
- Does the existence of prior litigation between parties impact the credibility of criminal proceedings?
- Is the absence of medical evidence a valid ground for the trial court to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused in a criminal case?
- Mst. Farrukh Habib vs Saeed Ahmad Khan etc2016 LHC 1497 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-28Read full judgment →
- Mst. Farida Bano vs Hazrat Muhammad and 4 others2016 MLD 809 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-31Read full judgment →
- Mst. Farhat Begum through Legal Heir vs Judge Banking Court No.12016 CLD 1089 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-05Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This first appeal challenges an order of the Banking Court dismissing an objection petition filed under section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, in execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether an agreement to sell accompanied by a power of attorney and payment of a prior loan confers valid title superior to a registered mortgage deed in favor of a bank. The Lahore High Court held that an agreement to sell does not transfer title, which requires a registered sale deed under the Registration Act, 1908, and that a prior registered mortgage prevails over an agreement to sell, particularly where the objector had knowledge of the proceedings and was not a bona fide purchaser without notice. The key principles laid down are that title to immovable property only passes via a registered sale deed, an agreement to sell creates no ownership rights, and the doctrine of 'once a mortgage, always a mortgage' applies.
Questions settled- Does an agreement to sell confer or transfer any title to immovable property?
- Can an objection petition under section 19(7) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 succeed on the basis of an unregistered or agreement-based claim against a registered mortgage?
- Is a person who files a suit for specific performance after the passing of a banking court decree considered a bona fide purchaser without notice?
- Mst. Falak Naz vs Tariq Mehmood Khan, Lac2016 LHC 4081 · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This petition sought the initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondent for alleged non-compliance with a previous court order regarding the payment of compensation for acquired land. The petitioner contended that the respondent failed to pay a specific sum of Rs.33,58,460/-, which had been mentioned in the court's earlier order. The core legal question was whether the mention of a claimed amount in a court order, based on a petitioner's assertion, constitutes a binding judicial determination of that specific amount, thereby rendering non-payment a contempt of court. The court held that the amount mentioned in the previous order was merely a reflection of the petitioner's claim and not an adjudicated sum fixed by the court. The court clarified that it had not intended to direct payment of a specific disputed amount without proper adjudication. The key principle laid down is that a court's direction to pay compensation in accordance with statutory provisions does not convert a claimant's asserted figure into a binding judicial decree, and disputes regarding compensation amounts must be resolved through the statutory mechanism of the Referee Court.
Questions settled- Does the mention of a claimed amount in a court order constitute a binding judicial determination of that amount?
- Can a party initiate contempt proceedings for non-payment of a sum that was merely asserted by the claimant and not adjudicated by the court?
- What is the appropriate legal remedy for a landowner dissatisfied with the compensation amount determined in a land acquisition award?
- Mst. Fahmida vs Sajjad Ashraf and another2016 YLR 2119 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. Dr. Yousaf Fida and another vs Justice (Retd.)Muhammad Azam2016 PLD Peshawar 105 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-12Read full judgment →
- Mst. Dilshad Bibi and others vs Amir Nawaz and others2016 MLD 786 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-09-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Dilbar Jan (widow) and 6 others vs Government of Khyber2016 YLR 53 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-26Read full judgment →
- Mst. Bushra Bibi and others vs Hidayatullah and others2016 MLD 80 · Lahore High Court · 2013-01-18Read full judgment →
- Mst. Bukhti-Harem vs Sabir and 4 others2016 P Cr. L J 1408 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-13Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal arises from an acquittal judgment passed by the trial court in a murder case involving the death of a forest official during an anti-smuggling operation. The core legal question was whether the trial court's acquittal of the respondents was based on a misappreciation of evidence, specifically regarding the ocular testimony of eyewitnesses and medical evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that the trial court's acquittal of one respondent, Abdul Jabbar, was perverse and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as the prosecution's evidence—consisting of consistent eyewitness accounts and corroborating medical reports—was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed that while appellate courts generally respect acquittals, they must intervene when findings are based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence. Consequently, the Court set aside the acquittal of Abdul Jabbar, convicting him under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while dismissing appeals against other respondents due to lack of specific roles or abatement by death.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of acquittal?
- Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
- Is the testimony of government officials acting in their official capacity considered 'interested' evidence requiring independent corroboration?
- Can an appellate court convict an accused after setting aside an acquittal if the trial court's reasoning was found to be perverse?
- Mst. Bhagul and 8 others vs Abdullah and others2016 MLD 70 · Sindh High Court · 2014-11-10Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This second appeal arises from concurrent proceedings in a suit for declaration, specific performance of contract, and permanent injunction concerning agricultural land. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, whereas the first appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reversed the trial court's judgment. Upon review, the Sindh High Court observed that both lower courts committed fundamental procedural errors regarding the framing of issues and the proper allocation of the burden of proof, specifically misplacing the onus of Issue No. 1 onto the defendant instead of the plaintiff asserting the sale agreement, and the appellate court improperly altering the wording of the issue. The court held that framing issues is a vital procedural safeguard requiring correct placement of the burden of proof in accordance with statutory provisions, and appellate courts cannot arbitrarily alter trial court issues without following prescribed procedures. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgments of both courts below and remanded the matter to the trial court for proper re-framing of issues and a fresh decision on merits.
Questions settled- Where does the burden of proof lie regarding the execution of a sale agreement in a suit for specific performance?
- Does an appellate court have the legal right to alter or substitute words in issues framed by the trial court while discussing them?
- What is the proper legal course for an appellate court when issues require resettlement or framing during an appeal?
- Mst. Bashiran Bibi vs Adj, etc.2016 PLJ Lahore 365 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. Bashir Begum vs Member Judl., Board of Revenue etc2021 [M] C L R 704, 2021 KLR Revenue Cases 38, 2016 LHC 4098, 2021 YLR · Lahore High Court · 2016-10-04Read full judgment →
- Mst. Basharat Jehan vs Director General, Federal Government2016 NLR Service 1 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This service appeal challenges the removal of the appellant from her position as an Assistant Librarian (BPS-09) on the grounds of being over-age at the time of appointment. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been appointed following a competitive process where the advertisement specified an age limit she met, could be terminated due to the government's subsequent claim that the advertised age limit was a typographical error. The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not over-age and that the government could not benefit from its own administrative oversight or negligence. The Court affirmed that once an appointment is made after fulfilling all codal formalities, a vested right is created in favor of the employee. Invoking the doctrine of locus poenitentiae, the Court ruled that such an appointment cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn. Consequently, the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal was set aside, and the appellant was ordered reinstated with seniority from the original date of appointment, though back benefits were denied for the period she remained out of office.
Questions settled- Can a government department terminate an employee on the ground of being over-age when the employee met the age criteria specified in the official recruitment advertisement?
- Does the doctrine of locus poenitentiae prevent the withdrawal of an appointment letter once an employee has joined service after fulfilling all codal formalities?
- Can the government rely on its own administrative oversight or errors in an advertisement to justify the removal of a civil servant?
- Mst. Basan Bi and 2 others vs Additional District Judge-v, East2016 PLJ Islamabad 353, 2016 CLC 1111 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-24Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged an order of the Additional District Judge, which set aside a trial court's decision to restore a suit previously dismissed under Order IX, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The petitioners had failed to deposit the process fee for summoning newly impleaded defendants, leading to the dismissal of the suit against those parties in 2011. The petitioners sought restoration four years later, claiming ignorance of the dismissal order. The core legal question was whether the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in restoring the suit despite the significant delay and lack of sufficient cause. The High Court held that the trial court's initial dismissal was lawful and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate 'sufficient cause' for the four-year delay in seeking restoration. The court emphasized that while law favors adjudication on merits over technicalities, it does not condone gross negligence or indolence. Consequently, the High Court upheld the appellate order, ruling that the application for restoration was time-barred under Article 163, Limitation Act, 1908, and lacked merit.
Questions settled- Is the dismissal of a suit under Order IX, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, mandatory or discretionary?
- What is the limitation period for filing an application to set aside a dismissal order passed under Order IX, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Can a party claim ignorance of a court order when the order was passed in the presence of their counsel or recorded in the case file?
- Does the failure to pay process fees constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of a suit after a significant delay?
- Mst. Ayyan Ali vs The State and another2016 P Cr. L J 654 · Lahore High Court · 2015-07-14Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 2(s), 156(1)(8), 70, 157, 178 of the Customs Act, 1969, read with section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and section 3(1) of I.T.C, 1950, after her previous bail applications were dismissed by the lower forums. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's apprehension at the airport counter before making a baggage declaration constituted an attempt to smuggle foreign currency, warranting continued detention. The Lahore High Court held that since the stage of making a declaration had not arrived and her custody was no longer required for investigation, a case for further probe was made out. Furthermore, considering her status as a female with no previous criminal record and that the offense was technical in nature, the court allowed the petition and admitted the petitioner to post-arrest bail pursuant to the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
Questions settled- Does the apprehension of a passenger before reaching the customs counter for baggage declaration constitute an attempt to smuggle foreign currency?
- Whether the offense of taking foreign currency out of Pakistan beyond the prescribed limit is considered technical rather than immoral or anti-social for the purpose of bail?
- Does a female accused with no previous criminal record qualify for leniency under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Mst. Ayesha Malik vs S.H.O. Police Station City Jampur District2016 YLR 2106 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
- Mst. Asghari Bibi vs Ex-Officio Justice of Peace/Additional Sessions2016 PLJ Lahore 711 · Lahore High Court · 2016-03-17Read full judgment →
- Mst. Amena Gulnaz alias Aimena vs State2016 LHC 493, PLJ 2016 Cr.C. (Lahore) 801 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of the deceased. The trial court had acquitted the co-accused but convicted the appellant based solely on her statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where she admitted to killing the deceased after he allegedly committed rape against her. The core legal question was whether an accused can be convicted on their Section 342 statement alone when the prosecution’s evidence has been rejected in its entirety. The High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the ocular evidence was unreliable and the forensic evidence was compromised by procedural delays. Relying on established precedent, the Court ruled that if the prosecution fails to prove its case, the accused must be acquitted, regardless of any admission made in their statement. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a statement under Section 342 must be accepted or rejected in its entirety, and cannot be used selectively to convict when the primary prosecution case is discarded. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant acquitted.
Questions settled- Can an accused be convicted solely on their statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the prosecution's evidence is rejected in its entirety?
- Must a statement of an accused recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
- Does the failure of the prosecution to prove its case necessitate the acquittal of an accused even if they have admitted to the act in their Section 342 statement?
- Mst. Amena alias Gulnaz Aimena vs The State2016 LHC 493 · Lahore High Court · 2016-01-26Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, Mst. Amena Gulnaz alias Aimena, challenged her conviction under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Abu Bakar, for which she was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. The trial court had acquitted her co-accused but convicted the appellant based on her own statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein she admitted to shooting the deceased after he allegedly raped her at gunpoint. The core legal question was whether an accused can be convicted solely on their own statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when the prosecution's evidence has been rejected in its entirety. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, noting that the ocular account was unreliable, the motive was unproven, and the forensic evidence was compromised by delayed submission. Relying on established Supreme Court precedents, the Court ruled that if the prosecution fails to prove its case, the accused must be acquitted, even if they admitted the act in their statement. The conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.
Questions settled- Can an accused be convicted solely on their statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the prosecution's evidence is rejected in its entirety?
- Does the statement of an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 have to be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
- What is the legal effect of sending crime empties to a forensic laboratory after the arrest of the accused or with significant delay?
- Is medical evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction if the ocular account is found unreliable?
- Mst. Akhtar Fatima through Legal Heirs and others vs Bakhat Rafee Shah2016 CLC 887 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-09Read full judgment →
- Mst. Akhtar Bibi vs Abdul Rasheed2016 YLR 2195 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-01Read full judgment →
- Mst, Saeeda Begum vs Azeemuddin and others2016 PLJ Karachi 193 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-30Read full judgment →
- Mst, Amina Khan vs The State and 5 others2016 MLD 1937 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-28Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This criminal revision application was filed against the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge dismissing an application seeking the issuance of summons for the Incharge of Edhi Sardkhana along with relevant records. The core legal question was whether additional evidence, specifically summoning a witness not named in the calendar of witnesses, can be allowed at a belated stage under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the just decision of the case. The court held that the provisions of Section 540 empower the court to summon any witness or document at any stage if it is essential for the just elucidation and fair conclusion of the matter, and delay in moving the application is not relevant if the evidence is essential. The key principle laid down is that a trial court cannot summarily dismiss an application under Section 540 Cr.P.C. solely on the ground that the witness is not in the challan or that it is a belated stage, provided the evidence is necessary for discovering the truth.
Questions settled- Whether an application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be dismissed solely on the ground that it was filed at a belated stage?
- Can a trial court summon a witness not mentioned in the calendar of witnesses for the just decision of the case?
- Does Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower the court to summon any person as a witness at any stage of the proceedings?
- Mst Akhtari Begum vs Syed Akhlaq Haider2016 SHC · Sindh High Court · 2016-10-03Read full judgment →
- Ms. Tariq, Flat # 144/3, Mohalla Ameena Manzi!, Bantoa Town, F.B. Area,Review Later · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Ms. Talat Ejaz vs City District Government through City Nazim and another2016 YLR 829 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-23Read full judgment →
- MS. Shamuna Badshah Qaisarani--Appellant vs Khuwaja Muhammad2016 NLR Civil 583 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an Election Tribunal's decision declaring the appellant's election to the Punjab Assembly void. The appellant's election was challenged via an election petition alleging corrupt practices. During proceedings, the Tribunal exercised powers under Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, finding that the appellant failed to disclose significant assets belonging to herself and her spouse in her nomination papers. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 76A, arguing it conflicted with Article 225 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which mandates that elections can only be questioned via election petitions. The Supreme Court held that Section 76A is not unconstitutional, as Article 225 allows Parliament to determine the manner in which elections are challenged, and the Representation of the People Act, 1976, is the valid legislative instrument for such procedures. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal possesses the authority to declare an election void upon discovering non-disclosure of assets, regardless of whether the initial allegations of corrupt practices were proven. The appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Is Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, unconstitutional for being contrary to Article 225 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Does an Election Tribunal have the power to declare an election void based on the non-disclosure of assets discovered during the pendency of an election petition?
- Can an election be challenged on grounds other than corrupt and illegal practices if the Election Tribunal invokes its powers under Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976?
- Ms. Shamuna Badshah Qaisarani vs Khuwaja Muhammad Dawood and others2016 PLJ SC 719, 2016 SCP 178, 2016 SCMR 1420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-05-09Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an Election Tribunal order declaring the election of the appellant (returned candidate for constituency PP-240 D.G. Khan-I) void under Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The respondent had filed an election petition alleging corrupt practices and subsequently moved an application under Section 76A bringing on record the non-disclosure of certain properties owned by the appellant and her spouse in her nomination papers. The appellant contended that Section 76A was ultra vires Article 225 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 76A is entirely consistent with Article 225, which empowers Parliament to determine the manner of challenging elections. The Court ruled that Section 76A confers jurisdiction upon the Election Tribunal to declare an election void if material from any source establishes that the returned candidate submitted a false or incorrect statement of assets and liabilities. The failure to disclose revenue-recorded properties justified declaring the election void.
Questions settled- Is Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 contrary to or ultra vires Article 225 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- Can an Election Tribunal declare an election void under Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 based on information regarding non-disclosure of assets received from any source during an election petition?
- Does the failure of a candidate to disclose properties standing in their name or their spouse's name in revenue records on nomination papers justify declaring the election void?
- MS. Shamuna Badshah Qaisar.Ani vs Khuwaja Muhamm.Ad Dawood2016 PLJ SC 719 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenged a decision by an Election Tribunal declaring the appellant's election to the Punjab Assembly void. The core legal question was whether Section 76-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, which empowers an Election Tribunal to declare an election void for non-disclosure of assets, is unconstitutional as being contrary to Article 225 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The appellant argued that Article 225 restricts election challenges solely to election petitions based on corrupt practices. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 76-A is a valid legislative provision enacted by Parliament, which defines the manner in which elections may be challenged, consistent with the mandate of Article 225. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal possesses the authority to declare an election void upon receiving information regarding the non-disclosure of assets by a candidate or their spouse, regardless of whether corrupt practices were established. The judgment reinforces that statutory mechanisms for election scrutiny provided by Parliament are constitutional and operate within the framework of the Election Tribunal's jurisdiction.
Questions settled- Is Section 76-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, unconstitutional for being contrary to Article 225 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Does an Election Tribunal have the power to declare an election void based on the non-disclosure of assets by a candidate or their spouse?
- Can an Election Tribunal entertain an application regarding non-disclosure of assets during the pendency of an election petition?
- Ms. Shabnam Irshad Ahmed and others vs Muhammad Muneer Malik and others2016 PLJ SC 793, 2016 SCMR 2017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2016-07-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These petitions for leave to appeal arose from the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which set aside the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Director due to a lack of the requisite 12 years of experience in the field of production as mandated by the relevant statutes and advertisement. The core legal question was whether the petitioner satisfied the eligibility criteria for the post of Deputy Director Production and whether the High Court could interfere with the selection board's decision. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioner's experience in the field of Design could not be treated as production experience, her certification failed to establish the mandatory 12-year experience, and the High Court rightly intervened as the selection board's conclusion was based on a flawed assessment and wrong reckoning. The court affirmed that while a constitutional court cannot substitute its own view for that of a selection board, it can turn down conclusions based on erroneous evaluations. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether experience in the field of design can be treated as equivalent to experience in the field of production for the post of Deputy Director?
- Can a constitutional court interfere with the decision of a selection board regarding candidate evaluation?
- Whether a candidate lacking the mandatory 12 years of relevant experience prescribed by the statute is eligible for appointment?
- Ms. Shabnam Irshad Ahmad and others vs Muhammad Muneer Malik and otherss2016 PLJ SC 793 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Islamabad High Court, which set aside the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Director at a university. The core legal question was whether the petitioner met the mandatory statutory eligibility criteria for the post, specifically regarding the required twelve years of experience in the field of production, and whether the High Court could interfere with the Selection Board's decision. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's experience in the field of 'Design' was distinct from 'Production' and did not satisfy the statutory requirement of twelve years of experience in production. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling that while a court generally should not substitute its view for that of a Selection Board, it is empowered to intervene when a selection is based on erroneous factual premises or incorrect arithmetical calculations regarding eligibility. The principle laid down is that judicial review is permissible when a selection body deviates from clear statutory criteria to favor an unqualified candidate based on subjective or obscure assessments.
Questions settled- Can a High Court interfere with the decision of a Selection Board regarding the appointment of a candidate?
- Does experience in the field of 'Design' satisfy a statutory requirement for twelve years of experience in 'Production'?
- Is a court empowered to set aside a selection board's decision if it is based on incorrect factual or arithmetical calculations regarding eligibility?
- Ms. Shabina Riaz Khan vs Federation of Pakistan and others2016 CLC 458 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This constitutional petition challenged an order passed by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) directing a complaint to be filed against the petitioner before the Sessions Judge for allegedly posing as a graduate on the basis of a fake degree. The core legal question was whether the ECP acted within its jurisdiction and in accordance with Supreme Court mandates when it issued the impugned order of prosecution without conducting a proper investigation or collecting tangible evidence. The Lahore High Court held that the ECP exceeded its mandate by assuming the role of an adjudicating authority to record definitive findings of fact rather than conducting the required investigation to unearth triable evidence of corrupt practices. The Court ruled that the ECP's function under the Supreme Court's directives was to investigate and gather positive evidence before filing a complaint, rather than prematurely judging the defense or prejudicing a fair trial. Consequently, the impugned order was declared a nullity in the eye of law. The key principle laid down is that the ECP must strictly confine its actions to conducting genuine investigations and collecting tangible evidence before initiating criminal complaints for corrupt practices regarding forged educational qualifications, without usurping the trial court's adjudicatory domain.
Questions settled- Does the Election Commission of Pakistan have the jurisdiction to act as an adjudicating authority to record definitive findings of fact regarding a fake degree before filing a complaint?
- What is the proper scope of an inquiry or investigation mandated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning parliamentarians accused of using forged educational qualifications?
- Who is competent to lodge a complaint for corrupt practices under the Representation of the People Act 1976?
- Can an order of the Election Commission of Pakistan be declared a nullity if it is passed in excess of the mandate given by the Supreme Court?
- Ms. Raheesa Zeb vs KMU & others2016 PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2016-09-06Read full judgment →
- Ms. Namoos Zaheer vs Azfar Hussain and another2016 CLC 1425, 2016 C.L.R. 646 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-02-03Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
These appeals challenge orders passed by the Civil Court, Islamabad, returning plaints for lack of territorial jurisdiction in suits for damages and declaration/injunction. The appellant sought to litigate matters concerning a property in London and a debt adjudicated by a London court, despite the respondents residing in Karachi and the appellant having previously participated in the London proceedings. The High Court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the Civil Court correctly returned the plaints. The Court held that under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, no cause of action arose in Islamabad. Furthermore, by actively participating in the London proceedings through a defense and counter-claim, the appellant voluntarily submitted to that foreign jurisdiction. The Court clarified that Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not permit a preemptive suit to declare a foreign judgment void; such challenges must be raised when the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced in Pakistan. The principle of judicial comity requires respect for foreign judgments rendered by competent courts.
Questions settled- Does a party who contests a suit on merits in a foreign court without objecting to jurisdiction voluntarily submit to that court's jurisdiction?
- Can a suit be maintained in Pakistan to declare a foreign judgment illegal on the grounds of fraud before the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced?
- Does the mere residence of a plaintiff in a specific jurisdiction create a cause of action for a suit regarding a foreign property and a foreign debt?
- Is a court required to return a plaint under Order VII Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if it lacks territorial jurisdiction?
- Ms. Namoos vs Mr. Azfar Hussain & another2016 IHC · Islamabad High Court · -Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This judgment disposes of two connected First Appeals from Order challenging the return of plaints by the Civil Judge, Islamabad, for want of territorial jurisdiction in a suit for damages and a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The appellant had rented a flat in London owned by the respondents, who later obtained an ex-parte or contested money judgment against her in the County Court at London. The core legal questions involved whether the Civil Court at Islamabad possessed territorial jurisdiction over the suits and whether a suit for declaration and anti-suit injunction against a foreign judgment is maintainable. The court held that neither do the respondents reside in Islamabad nor did the cause of action accrue there under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as the underlying tenancy and property disputes occurred in London and the appellant had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court. Furthermore, Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not empower a civil court to entertain a suit declaring a foreign judgment illegal on grounds of fraud. The appeals were accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a civil court in Pakistan has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages and declaration when the defendants reside outside its limits and the cause of action arose abroad?
- Does voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court preclude a party from later questioning its competency and seeking a declaration against its judgment in Pakistan?
- Can a civil court in Pakistan entertain a suit seeking to declare a foreign judgment illegal or null and void on the ground of fraud?
- Does Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, confer independent jurisdiction on Pakistani courts to invalidate foreign judgments through a separate suit?
- Ms. Kalpna Dew, Advocate vs National High Way Authority through Chairman, Islamabad and 4 others2016 PLJ Karachi 38 · Sindh High Court · 2015-09-17Read full judgment →
- Ms. Humaira Najmi Mujahid and anothers vs Defence Housing2016 MLD 1774 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-28Read full judgment →
- Mrs.Shama Bashir khan, Mr. Shahnawaz Khan, Ms. Hina Khan, Mr. SherazAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Suriya Iqbal Chishti and 3 others vs Mrs. Rubina Majidulla and 22016 CLC 1233 · Sindh High Court · 2016-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This is a civil matter arising from an application for the rejection of a plaint in a suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, mandatory injunction, and damages regarding a residential property. The core legal questions involved whether a suit for the revocation of a gift filed by the original donor abates or becomes barred upon the death of the donor under Islamic Law and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether a gift made to a person within prohibitory degrees can be revoked without a court decree. The Sindh High Court held that a suit competently filed by a living donor for the revocation of a gift does not abate upon the donor's death, and that legal heirs can continue the proceedings as the right to sue survives. The Court further held that a court decree is the proper remedy for revoking a gift even among prohibited degrees, and disputed factual assertions regarding fraud, misrepresentation, and mental capacity require evidence rather than summary rejection under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The application for rejection of the plaint was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Does a suit for the revocation of a gift filed by a donor abate upon the death of the donor during the pendency of the proceedings?
- Can legal heirs continue a suit for the cancellation of a gift filed by the original donor who subsequently died?
- Does a gift made in favor of a person within prohibitory degrees require a decree of the court for its revocation?
- Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when allegations of fraud and lack of mental capacity require evidence?
- Mrs. Shama Bashir Khan and 4 others vs Securities and Exchange2016 CLD 2118 · Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · 2015-02-19Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) refusing to appoint inspectors to investigate the affairs of a private company. The Appellants, holding over 44% of the company's shares, sought an investigation under Section 263 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, citing mismanagement, illegal share transfers, and failure to hold general meetings. The SECP had declined the request, arguing that the primary grievance regarding share transfers fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts and that insufficient evidence was provided. The Appellate Bench held that while share transfer disputes may be subject to court jurisdiction, this does not preclude the Commission from exercising its statutory power to investigate other serious allegations of corporate mismanagement and non-compliance. The Bench emphasized that the Commission has a duty to independently verify claims rather than accepting the company's assertions at face value. Consequently, the Commission's refusal was set aside, and it was directed to initiate an investigation into the company's affairs as mandated by the Ordinance.
Questions settled- Does the existence of a court dispute regarding share transfers preclude the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan from investigating other allegations of corporate mismanagement?
- Is the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan required to independently verify allegations of corporate non-compliance rather than relying solely on the company's assertions?
- Does the pendency of proceedings before a Companies Registration Office prevent the Commission from exercising its power to order an investigation under Section 263 of the Companies Ordinance 1984?
- Mrs. Saira Hameed, Chairperson Mr. Mian Asad Hameed, Chief ExecutiveAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Sahida Bibi and 7 otherss vs Province of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh Land Utilization and 6 others2016 YLR 2425 · Sindh High Court · 2016-03-07Read full judgment →
- Mst. Ghulam Fatima vs Muhammad Khan (Deceased) represented2016 C.L.R. 77 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Mrs. Riffat Sattar vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary and 6 others2016 PLJ Lahore 13, 2016 PLC (C.S.) 472 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-02Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The petitioner, a retired Assistant Professor of Economics from the University of Education, Multan Campus, filed a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court aggrieved by the failure of the respondent authorities to finalize her pension case despite the lapse of nearly one year since her superannuation. The core legal question was whether the arbitrary delay in processing and finalizing the pension of a retired civil servant without any fault on her part violates her vested rights and judicial mandates. The Court held that pension is a vested right and a legitimate expectation acquired in consideration of past services, and unjustified delays by public functionaries amount to criminal negligence and dereliction of duty. The Court allowed the petition, directing the Government of Punjab to pay costs of Rs. 100,000 to the petitioner, with liberty to recover the same from the University of Education. The key principle laid down is that pension cases must be finalized within the strict timelines prescribed by law, and unwarranted delays by government departments violate fundamental rights to human dignity and life.
Questions settled- Whether pension is a vested right and a legitimate expectation of a retiring civil servant?
- Can a government department arbitrarily delay the finalization of a retired civil servant's pension case without lawful justification?
- Does the unnecessary delay in payment of pension and retirement benefits violate Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
- What are the legal consequences for public functionaries who fail to process pension cases within the prescribed timelines?
- Mrs. Rehana Anwar through Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and 2 others2016 CLD 832 · Sindh High Court · 2015-07-13Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Perin J. Dinshaw vs Mubarak Ali and another2016 YLR 251 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-11Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Lahore, which reversed the trial court’s dismissal of a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the alleged agreement, the admissibility of evidence recorded in excess of a remand order, and the procedural propriety of compelling a party's personal appearance based on mere suspicion. The High Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to sell, noting that the produced receipt lacked essential details and the draft sale deed appeared to be fabricated evidence. The court further held that evidence recorded beyond the scope of a remand order is inadmissible and that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to prove the agreement, not on the defendant to disprove it. Additionally, the court ruled that a party cannot be compelled to appear in person without solid material evidence. Consequently, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the appellate judgment, and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the suit.
Questions settled- Can a court compel a party to appear in person based solely on the opposing party's suspicion?
- Is evidence recorded in excess of the scope of a remand order admissible?
- Does the burden of proof lie on the defendant to disprove an agreement to sell, or on the plaintiff to prove its existence?
- Is the opinion of a handwriting expert conclusive proof of the authenticity of a document?
- Mrs. Nusrat Kausar Gillani vs Aftab Ahmed Khan and another2016 YLR 1690 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-08Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Nighat Sultana vs District Co-Ordination Officer Lahore and others2016 PLD Lahore 607 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-11Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Nazia Sohail vs Mst. Iqbal Begum and another2016 PLJ Islamabad 239, 2016 MLD 1403 · Islamabad High Court · 2016-03-25Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Naela Turab Ali vs Mian Nusrat-ud-Din (Member, Lahore StockSecurities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Naela Turab Ali House No#4, Street No #15, Cavalry Ground, Laho_d17125c7Appellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Naela Turab Ali House No#4, Street No #15, Cavalry Ground, Laho_462efe1eAppellate Bench of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan · -Read full judgment →
- MRS. NADRA Hyder Abbass, Ex-Nso, National Savings, Hyderabad vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others2016 PLJ Tr.C. (Services) 23 · Federal Service TribunalRead full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
The appellant, a National Savings Officer, challenged an office order imposing the major penalty of removal from service following allegations of failing to detect a massive financial fraud, defalcation, and forgery during an audit of the Sambara Tower Branch of National Savings. The core legal question was whether the appellant's failure to detect the fraud amounted to active complicity warranting dismissal, or merely negligence and inefficiency, and whether the penalty imposed was discriminatory compared to co-accused officials. The Federal Service Tribunal held that while no complicity or direct involvement in the fraud was established against the appellant, her failure to conduct the audit in accordance with prescribed manuals and instructions established inefficiency and negligence amounting to misconduct. However, the Tribunal found the penalty of removal from service to be disproportionate and discriminatory given that other co-accused officers found negligent in the same scam received lesser penalties. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the removal order, substituted it with a lesser penalty of reduction of two stages in time scale for two years, and ordered the appellant's reinstatement.
Questions settled- Does failure to detect financial fraud during an audit amount to active complicity in the fraud or mere negligence under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973?
- Whether the penalty of removal from service is disproportionate for an official guilty only of inefficiency and negligence in conducting an audit?
- Can a disciplinary authority impose a severe penalty of removal on one official while co-accused officials guilty of similar negligence are given lesser penalties?
- Mrs. Mucca Bejon Kandawalla through L.Rs, and 7 others vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Works, Islamabad and 3 others2016 CLC 1408 · Sindh High Court · 2015-12-04Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This special High Court appeal challenged an arbitral award dated 14.03.2013 regarding compensation for properties requisitioned in 1947 and acquired in 1955 in Karachi. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants established their locus standi and legal heirship to the original property owners, and whether the claim was barred by limitation. The Sindh High Court held that the appellants failed to produce succession certificates, trust deeds, or satisfactory evidence to prove their status as legal heirs or successors-in-interest, and that the arbitral award was based on a flawed premise shifting the burden of proof onto the Federal Government. The Court further held that the claims were hopelessly time-barred under the relevant statutory provisions and limitation laws. The appeal was consequently dismissed, and the impugned award was set aside. The key principles laid down are that the burden of proving legal heirship and entitlement to compensation rests squarely upon the claimant under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and that mere possession of power of attorney instruments or official correspondence does not establish legal standing or dispense with the requirement of formal succession documentation.
Questions settled- Whether the burden of proving legal heirship and entitlement to compensation lies upon the claimants asserting such rights?
- Does the mere possession of powers of attorney or correspondence establish a claimant's status as a legal heir or successor-in-interest?
- Can an arbitral award granting compensation be sustained when the claimants fail to establish their locus standi and title to the subject properties?
- Whether a claim for compensation regarding requisitioned and acquired land is barred by limitation if not pursued within the statutory timeframe?
- Mrs. Irshad Qaiser, Jqaiser Jamal Khan vs Haji Abid Afridi and 10 others2016 CLC 377 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-16Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Humaira Khurram Khan vs Secretary Ministry of Interior and 32016 P Cr. L J 1226 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-30Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This writ petition challenged the inclusion of the petitioner's name in the Exit Control List (ECL) by the Federal Government, following allegations of embezzlement of public funds. The petitioner, a public servant facing criminal charges, sought removal from the ECL to attend her daughter's wedding in Canada. The core legal question was whether the government's action in placing the petitioner on the ECL was arbitrary or in violation of fundamental rights, and whether the petitioner demonstrated sufficient grounds for relief. The Court held that the Federal Government acted within its statutory authority under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, which does not mandate a prior hearing or disclosure of grounds. The Court found that the petitioner failed to prove the urgency of the travel or obtain necessary departmental leave. The ratio established is that where significant public interest is involved, such as the investigation of large-scale embezzlement, the government's power to restrict travel via the ECL is valid, especially when the petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy of review which was not exhausted.
Questions settled- Does the Federal Government have the authority to place a person on the Exit Control List without providing a prior opportunity of hearing?
- Is a writ petition maintainable against an order placing a name on the Exit Control List if the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedy of review?
- Can the court interfere with an order placing a person on the Exit Control List when the person is under investigation for the embezzlement of public funds?
- Mrs. Ghazala Arif vs Muhammad Aftab2016 CLC 120 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-27Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter involves a suit for specific performance of an alleged oral contract of sale concerning a commercial property currently being used as a school, where the plaintiff claimed possession in part performance. The core legal question was whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for the grant of interim relief and protection of possession without depositing the balance sale consideration or providing security for the use of the property, whilst rent proceedings by the actual owner against a prior tenant remained pending. The Sindh High Court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case due to the lack of a written agreement, doubtful receipts, and suspicious signatures, and consequently ordered the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration along with monthly payments as equitable security to retain possession pending the suit, failing which the premises would be sealed. The key principle laid down is that a plaintiff claiming possession under an oral agreement of sale without paying the substantial balance consideration cannot enjoy the property to the detriment of the true owner without providing equitable security, and that civil suits for specific performance do not override or defeat independent ejectment proceedings under rent laws.
Questions settled- Can a plaintiff claim part performance of an oral agreement of sale to retain possession of a property without depositing the balance consideration?
- Whether an interlocutory court can direct a plaintiff in a specific performance suit to deposit monthly payments as security for enjoying possession of the property?
- Are ejectment proceedings before a Rent Controller independent of a civil suit for specific performance of a contract of sale?
- What are the consequences under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if a plaintiff fails to deposit the required security and balance consideration during a specific performance suit?
- Mrs. Farida Sultan through Attorney vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum Islamabad and others2016 MLD 992 · Sindh High Court · 2015-11-26Read full judgment →
- Mrs. Farhana vs Messrs Sindh Small Industries Corporation through Managing Director and 2 others2016 PLC 42 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-09-29Read full judgment →
Summary & questions settled
This matter concerns an appeal against an order of the Sindh Labour Court, which dismissed the appellant's grievance application for reinstatement as time-barred. The appellant, a junior clerk, had her services terminated in 2003 and filed a grievance application in 2013, nearly ten years later, without seeking condonation of delay. The appellant argued that she should be granted the same relief as a colleague, Mst. Salma, who was reinstated by the Labour Court in a separate proceeding. The core legal question was whether the judgment in Mst. Salma's case constituted a binding precedent or a judgment in rem that entitled the appellant to similar relief. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the Labour Court's previous judgment was not a judgment in rem, did not establish a binding precedent under the Constitution, and involved distinct factual circumstances, as Mst. Salma held a different rank and seniority. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal as meritless, affirming that the appellant's claim was time-barred and lacked independent legal merit.
Questions settled- Is a judgment of a Labour Court considered a judgment in rem?
- Does a Labour Court judgment create a binding precedent under Article 189 or Article 201 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Can an employee claim the benefit of a reinstatement order granted to another employee if the factual circumstances and seniority are different?