Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,813 judgments in total.

• Muhammad Afzal Khan and anothers vs National Bank of PakistanK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 27, 2015 CLD 464 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-22
  auction saleexecution proceedingsreserve pricematerial irregularityvoid ab initiobanking courtauction proclamation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Banking Court dismissing an objection petition against an auction sale of property conducted during execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether the auction proceedings, which failed to fix a reserve price and omitted the place of sale in the proclamation, alongside the purchaser's failure to deposit 25% of the purchase money, rendered the sale void. The Court held that the auction was vitiated by material irregularities. It affirmed that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 66, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 are mandatory, requiring the court to fix a reserve price to protect the judgment-debtor's interests. Furthermore, the failure to specify the place of sale in the proclamation and the purchaser's failure to deposit 25% of the purchase money immediately, as required by Order XXI, Rule 84, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, constitute fatal irregularities. Consequently, the Court set aside the auction sale and all consequential orders, establishing that sales conducted in violation of mandatory procedural law are void ab initio.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to fix a reserve price in an auction proclamation constitute a material irregularity vitiating the sale?
  • Is the omission of the place of sale in an auction proclamation a material irregularity?
  • What is the legal consequence of an auction purchaser's failure to deposit 25% of the purchase money immediately under Order XXI, Rule 84, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Are the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to execution proceedings before a Banking Court?
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• Muhammad Afzal etc vs Fida Hussain etc.2015 LHC 5898 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Deura vs Orix Leasing Pakistan, etc.2015 P.C.T.L.R. 234 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-14
  ex parte decreeservice of summonsFinancial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001Banking Courtrecovery of financelimitationdue process
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of an application under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, which sought to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Banking Court. The core legal question was whether service of summons through any one of the modes prescribed under Section 9(5) of the Ordinance constitutes valid service, and whether the appellant established sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application. The Court held that the appeal lacked merit, affirming that Section 9(5) mandates simultaneous issuance of summons through multiple modes, but service effected through any one of these modes is legally sufficient. The Court emphasized that the special procedure under the Ordinance prevails over general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the burden of proof lies on the defendant to demonstrate non-service or sufficient cause for delay, which the appellant failed to discharge. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the ex parte decree and rejecting the appellant's claims of ineffective service.

  Questions settled

  • Does service of summons through any one of the modes prescribed in Section 9(5) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 constitute valid service?
  • Does the special procedure for service of summons under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 prevail over the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie to establish non-service of summons in an application filed under Section 12 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?
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• Muhammad Afzal Deura vs Orix Leasing Pakistan and others2015 CLD 439 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-14Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Butt alias Aphi vs The State and others2015 SCMR 1696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-27
  post-arrest bailstatutory groundtrial delayabsconding co-accusedjoint trialseparation of trialright to bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for post-arrest bail on statutory grounds arose from a murder case registered under Sections 302, 148, 149, and 109 of the PPC. The petitioner had been incarcerated since November 2012 without the trial reaching completion. The High Court had previously denied bail, attributing the trial delay to the absconsion of co-accused who were allegedly related to the petitioner. The Supreme Court examined whether the delay caused by absconding co-accused could be used to deny a petitioner statutory bail when the trial is conducted jointly. The Court held that the mere absconsion of co-accused is not a valid ground to deprive an accused of their right to statutory bail, especially when the prosecution or the court failed to separate the petitioner's trial. The Court emphasized that an accused cannot be detained indefinitely due to the conduct of others in a joint trial. Consequently, the petition was converted into an appeal, the High Court's order was set aside, and the petitioner was granted bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absconsion of co-accused can be used as a ground to deny an accused post-arrest bail on statutory grounds?
  • Can an accused be kept behind bars for an indefinite period during a joint trial if the delay is caused by other co-accused?
  • Is the court required to separate the trial of an accused if the conduct of co-accused is causing a delay that impacts statutory bail rights?
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• Muhammad Afzal and others vs The State and others2015 YLR 2665 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-04
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailcriminal appeallife imprisonmentbail pending appealremanded trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for the suspension of sentence filed by Muhammad Hayat and Bashir Ahmad, who were convicted under Sections 302(b)/34 and 337-F(i) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirwala. The petitioners were sentenced to life imprisonment and other penalties following a remanded trial. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to the suspension of their sentences and release on bail pending the final adjudication of their criminal appeal. The Court observed that the petitioners had already served approximately 12 years of their sentence and noted that their co-accused, who faced a death sentence, had been convicted separately. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to demonstrate any prior criminal involvement of the petitioners. Consequently, the Court held that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose. The Court granted the petition, suspending the sentences and ordering the release of the petitioners on bail, subject to the furnishing of bail bonds, emphasizing the lack of likelihood of an early conclusion to the main appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the long duration of time already served in custody constitute a valid ground for the suspension of sentence pending appeal?
  • Can a sentence be suspended if the prosecution fails to show any prior criminal involvement of the accused?
  • Is the lack of likelihood of an early conclusion of the main appeal a relevant factor for granting bail to a convict?
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• Muhammad Afzal and 2 others vs The State2015 YLR 1699 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-06
  circumstantial evidencejudicial confessionretracted confessionbenefit of the doubtmurder referenceanti-terrorismdeath sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the Anti-Terrorism Court convicting and sentencing the appellants under sections 302, 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Sections 6/7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 for the gruesome murder of five family members inside a house. The core legal questions involved the reliability of circumstantial evidence, the voluntariness and admissibility of retracted judicial confessions procured after alleged torture, and whether the prosecution successfully established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case suffered from major discrepancies, including an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, contradictory medical evidence, unverified recoveries, and doubtful judicial confessions. Setting aside the convictions and death sentences, the Court laid down the principle that conviction on circumstantial evidence requires an unbroken, credible chain of corroborative links, and that a single reasonable circumstance creating doubt in a prudent mind entitles the accused to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence in the absence of an interlinking chain of credible and cogent corroborative evidence?
  • Whether a retracted judicial confession allegedly procured through torture can form the basis of a capital conviction without strong independent corroboration?
  • Does the prosecution bear the sole burden of standing on its own legs regardless of weaknesses or defects in the defence plea?
  • What is the legal effect of a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the guilt of the accused?
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• Muhammad Aftab Sultan vs Government of Pakistan and 7 othersPTCL 2015 CL.672 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-06-10Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adnan vs State, etc.PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 330 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-09
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryabductionrapedelay in FIRDNA teststatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in case FIR No. 406 dated 28.07.2014, initially registered under Section 496-A, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and later amended to include Sections 365-B and 376(1), Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the alleged abduction and rape of the complainant's wife along with her suckling baby. The core legal question was whether the petitioner made out a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Lahore High Court held that due to an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, non-recovery of alleged stolen articles, exoneration of co-accused family members during investigation, non-conduct of a DNA test due to non-cooperation of the complainant and abductee, and the unlikelihood of the conclusion of trial in the near future, the case fell within the scope of further inquiry. The Court accepted the bail application, laying down the principle that tentative assessment of circumstances indicating delayed reporting, questionable allegations, and prolonged incarceration without commencement of trial warrants the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether delayed reporting of an incident in the FIR constitutes a ground for post-arrest bail?
  • Does the exoneration of co-accused during police investigation make the case against the remaining accused one of further inquiry?
  • Whether the non-conduct of a DNA test due to non-cooperation of the complainant entitles an accused to bail under Section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Adnan Moin vs Federation of Pakistan, Etc.2015-IHC-144 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-12-07
  disciplinary proceedingsnatural justicesummary procedureregular inquiryconstitutional petitionmisconductservice lawdiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns constitutional petitions challenging the dismissal of employees from the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC) following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal question was whether the authorized officer lawfully exercised discretion by dispensing with a regular inquiry under Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973, opting instead for summary proceedings under Rule 5. The Court held that the dismissal orders were unsustainable, as the allegations involved serious, disputed questions of fact that necessitated a regular inquiry to satisfy the requirements of natural justice. The Court emphasized that the authorized officer’s discretion to bypass a regular inquiry is not absolute and must be exercised reasonably and in good faith. By failing to hold a regular inquiry, the petitioners were denied the right to cross-examine witnesses and properly defend themselves, causing significant prejudice. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal orders, reinstated the petitioners with back benefits, and clarified that while authorities may initiate fresh proceedings, they must strictly adhere to the established legal procedure and principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • When is a regular inquiry mandatory under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973?
  • Can an authorized officer dispense with a regular inquiry when charges involve disputed questions of fact?
  • Does the exercise of discretion under Rule 5 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973 require the application of an independent mind?
  • Is a proceeding based solely on questionnaires sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a regular inquiry under Rule 6 of the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules 1973?
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• Muhammad Adnan alias Dana vs The State, etc2015 SCMR 1570, 2015 P.S.C. Cr1. 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-19
  surrender to order of imprisonmentmaintainabilitySupreme Court Rulessuspension of sentencenarcoticsabsconding convict
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court via a criminal petition filed by Muhammad Adnan alias Dana, who was convicted under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment along with a fine. The petitioner had slipped away when the trial court announced the judgment, leading to perpetual non-bailable warrants, and subsequently challenged the dismissal of his sentence suspension application by the High Court. The core legal question addressed is whether a criminal petition seeking leave to appeal against an order of imprisonment can be entertained by the Supreme Court when the petitioner has failed to surrender to the said order of imprisonment, in terms of Order XXIII, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Supreme Court held that surrender to an order of imprisonment is a mandatory condition precedent for the entertainment of a criminal petition under the first proviso to Rule 8 of Order XXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, and that surrendering before a higher court without actually being imprisoned in compliance with the judicial order does not fulfill this requirement. The petition was accordingly dismissed as non-entertainable.

  Questions settled

  • Is surrender to an order of imprisonment a condition precedent for the entertainment of a criminal petition under Order XXIII Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • Does surrendering before a higher court without being imprisoned in compliance with a judicial order satisfy the requirement of surrender under the first proviso to Rule 8 of Order XXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • Can a criminal petition seeking stay of execution of an order of imprisonment be entertained when perpetual non-bailable warrants are outstanding against the petitioner?
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• Muhammad Adnan alias Dana vs The State and others2015 SCMR 1570 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-08-19
  entertainability of petitionsurrender to order of imprisonmentsuspension of sentenceperpetual non-bailable warrantsoffice objectionSupreme Court Rules 1980
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a criminal petition filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a convict seeking suspension of sentence during the pendency of his appeal before the High Court. The petitioner had slipped away upon the announcement of his conviction and sentence by the trial court under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, leading to the issuance of perpetual non-bailable warrants. The office of the Supreme Court raised an objection regarding the entertainability of the petition. The core legal question was whether a criminal petition involving an order of imprisonment can be entertained without the petitioner first surrendering to the order of imprisonment as required by Order XXIII, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. The Supreme Court sustained the office objection and dismissed the petition, laying down that under the first proviso to Order XXIII Rule 8, actual surrender to an outstanding order of imprisonment is a mandatory condition precedent for the petition to be entertainable by the office.

  Questions settled

  • Is surrender to an outstanding order of imprisonment a mandatory prerequisite for the entertainment of a criminal petition in the Supreme Court under Order XXIII Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
  • Does surrendering before a higher court without being actually taken into custody satisfy the requirement of surrender to an order of imprisonment under the Supreme Court Rules, 1980?
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• Muhammad Adnan alias Abu Hamza son of Siddique Ahmed alias Sadiq, vs StateSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailterrorismexplosives recoverytentative assessmentprohibitory clausebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a bail after arrest application filed by the accused, Muhammad Adnan alias Abu Hamza, who was charged under the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, and the Explosives Act, following the recovery of a 30-bore pistol, ammunition, and two hand grenades. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to post-arrest bail given the nature of the allegations and the recovery of explosive materials. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that the alleged offenses, which included acts of terrorism creating fear and insecurity, fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court emphasized that at the bail stage, only a tentative assessment of the evidence is permissible, and an elaborate sifting of evidence is not required. Finding reasonable grounds to connect the accused to the commission of the offense and noting the absence of alleged enmity against the police, the Court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to the concession of bail and directed the trial court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of explosives and arms in a terrorism-related case disentitles an accused from the concession of bail?
  • Does the court perform an elaborate sifting of evidence or a tentative assessment when deciding a bail application?
  • Does an offense falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically preclude the grant of bail?
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• Muhammad Adnan alias Abu Hamza son of Siddique Ahmed alias SadiqSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailexplosives actterrorismtentative assessmentprohibitory clauserecovery of explosives
  Summary & questions settled

  The applicant, Muhammad Adnan alias Abu Hamza, sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under the Explosives Act, 1908, and the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, following his apprehension with hand grenades and ammunition. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to the concession of bail given the nature of the allegations involving terrorism and the recovery of explosive materials. The Sindh High Court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, reasoning that the offence constituted an act of terrorism, which creates fear and insecurity in society. The court emphasized that the recovery of two hand grenades from the applicant's possession, without any alleged enmity against the police, provided reasonable grounds to connect him to the commission of the offence. Furthermore, the court noted that the offence fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed, with the trial court directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, while clarifying that these observations were merely tentative.

  Questions settled

  • Does the possession of explosive materials in a terrorism-related case disentitle an accused to the concession of bail?
  • Is an elaborate sifting of evidence required at the stage of deciding a bail application?
  • Does the recovery of incriminating material from an accused without alleged police enmity constitute reasonable grounds to deny bail?
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• Muhammad Adeel. vs Gov't. of Punjab, Etc.2015 LHC 4650 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adeel vs Government of Punjab through Secretary Home2015 LHC 4650, 2015 YLR 2422 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-25Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Adeel The State vs The State Muhammad Adeel2015 LHC 7756 · Lahore High Court · 2015-12-04
  Section 302(b)death sentencemurder referenceeyewitness testimonychance witnessesCCTV footagecorroborative evidenceplea of accusedburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses a criminal appeal filed by the appellant challenging his conviction under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the death sentence imposed by the trial court, alongside a murder reference for confirmation of the capital penalty. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot the deceased at a grocery store late at night over an illicit liaison. The High Court evaluated the reliability of the eyewitness testimonies, noting that two eyewitnesses from a distant district were omitted from the initial complaint, their presence was highly improbable, and none of the witnesses or the appellant appeared on recovered CCTV footage. The Court held that when the substantive direct evidence fails to inspire confidence, corroborative evidence such as weapon recovery cannot sustain a conviction. Furthermore, the prosecution must independently establish its case beyond reasonable doubt; a plea raised by an accused cannot be used to his detriment or selectively parsed where general exceptions under Chapter IV of the Pakistan Penal Code do not apply. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and the death sentence not confirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Can corroborative evidence sustain a criminal conviction if the substantive ocular evidence fails to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Whether the omission of material eyewitnesses from the initial complaint creates doubt regarding their presence at the crime scene?
  • Can an accused person's defence plea be considered to their detriment when the prosecution has failed to establish its case independently?
  • Is a court permitted to selectively accept portions of an accused's plea to aid the prosecution while rejecting favorable portions, where the plea does not fall under the general exceptions of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Achar vs Shahmir and 19 others2015 YLR 2191 · Sindh High Court · 2013-02-18Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abu Bakar Mufti vs Mst. Shaheen Mufti and others2015 MLD 960 · Lahore High Court · 2013-05-22
  suit for partitionpreliminary decreeinheritance sharesIslamic law of inheritancecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court judgment and decree confirming a preliminary decree in a suit for partition of properties left by the late propositus, Mufti Zain-ul-Abedin. The core legal questions involved the failure of the trial court to initially determine the specific fractional shares of each legal heir in the preliminary decree, and whether a legal heir (Mst. Mahmooda Begum) could be disinherited from her father's estate on the ground that she had sold one of the estate properties under a power of attorney from her co-heirs. The Lahore High Court held that an heir cannot be disinherited from inheritance merely because she sold a property on behalf of co-heirs; at most, co-heirs may claim proceeds from the sale, but her right to inherit remains intact. The court laid down the principle that in a suit for partition, a preliminary decree must accurately compute and specify the fractional inheritance shares of all legal heirs in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence, and clarified the mathematical distribution of shares where multiple successions are involved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a legal heir can be disinherited from the estate of their parent merely because they sold one of the estate properties acting as an attorney for the co-heirs?
  • Is it mandatory for a trial court to ascertain and specify the fractional shares of each legal heir while passing a preliminary decree in a partition suit?
  • How are inheritance shares computed and combined when multiple successions of parents occur across different years?
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• Muhammad Abid vs Muhammad Bashir alias Bashir Ahmed and another2015 YLR 991 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-12-08Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs The State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 10, PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 795, 2015 P Cr. L J · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailnon-prohibitory clausecriminal breach of trustcivil transactionhabitual offenderpresumption of innocencefair trialprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a criminal petition seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, concerning an alleged breach of trust regarding a loan transaction. The core legal questions involved whether a loan transaction failing civil repayment constitutes a criminal offence under the non-prohibitory clause, and whether the mere registration of other cases or a previous conviction in an unrelated matter automatically disentitles an accused from bail. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction prima facie appeared to be of a civil nature, making it a case for further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that registration of multiple cases or a prior conviction does not negate the constitutional right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that bail in non-prohibitory offences should be granted as a rule unless exceptional circumstances exist, and courts must not allow prior convictions or pending cases to create bias or deny an accused the right to defence and due process guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does failure to repay a loan transaction constitute a criminal offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or is it a matter of a civil nature?
  • Does the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused suffice to treat them as a habitual offender for the refusal of bail?
  • Whether a previous conviction in an unrelated case automatically disentitles an accused from the concession of bail in a subsequent case falling within the non-prohibitory clause?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution apply when considering bail for an accused facing multiple criminal proceedings?
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• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 795 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustnon-prohibitory clausefurther inquiryhabitual offenderfair trialpresumption of innocenceprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a monetary loan dispute. The core legal questions concerned whether a loan transaction lacking 'entrustment' constitutes criminal breach of trust, whether bail should be granted in offences falling within the non-prohibitory clause, and the impact of other pending cases or a previous conviction on an accused's right to bail, fair trial, and the presumption of innocence. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction prima facie appeared to be of a civil nature, making it a case of further inquiry under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and that registration of multiple cases or a prior conviction does not automatically disentitle an accused to bail or negate the constitutional presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that each case must be assessed on its own merits, and refusing bail merely due to other pending cases or a conviction infringes upon the fundamental right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Does a loan transaction involving a failure to repay constitute criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860?
  • Whether the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused is sufficient to classify them as a habitual offender and deny post-arrest bail?
  • Does a previous conviction in one criminal case automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail in another pending case?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence affect the consideration of bail when an accused is facing multiple criminal prosecutions?
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• Muhammad Abid Farooq vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Islamabad) 10 · Islamabad High Court · 2014-09-09
  post-arrest bailcriminal breach of trustnon-prohibitory clausefurther inquiryhabitual offenderfair trialpresumption of innocenceprevious conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, arising from a financial dispute over an unpaid loan. The core legal questions concern whether a loan transaction lacking entrustment constitutes criminal breach of trust, and whether an accused's previous conviction or pending cases disentitle them to bail in a separate matter under the non-prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Islamabad High Court held that the transaction was prima facie of a civil nature, making the case one of further inquiry under Section 497, and that the mere registration of other cases or a conviction in an unrelated matter cannot be used to deny bail or infringe upon the constitutional right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. The court laid down the principle that each case must be adjudicated on its own merits, and treating a previous conviction as a universal bar to bail in other pending cases violates the right to due process and fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

  Questions settled

  • Does a financial dispute involving an unpaid loan constitute a criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, or a matter of a civil nature?
  • Whether the mere registration of multiple criminal cases against an accused is sufficient to classify them as a habitual offender for the denial of bail?
  • Does a conviction in an unrelated criminal case automatically disentitle an accused to the concession of bail in a subsequent case?
  • How does the constitutional right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, apply when considering previous convictions and pending cases during bail adjudication?
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• Muhammad Abid etc. vs State etc.2015 KLR Criminal Cases 332, PLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 545 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-05
  murder referencecircumstantial evidenceextra-judicial confessionlast-seen evidencebenefit of doubtcriminal appealacquittaljoint confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from criminal appeals and a murder reference directed against the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants under Sections 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question before the Lahore High Court was whether the prosecution had successfully proven its case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically an extra-judicial confession, last-seen evidence, and alleged recoveries. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances connecting the accused to the crime, noting that the joint extra-judicial confession was inadmissible and uncorroborated, the last-seen evidence lacked credibility, and the recoveries were unverified. The Court laid down the key principle that circumstantial evidence must form an unbroken chain of unimpeachable evidence to sustain a conviction, and any reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case must be resolved in favor of the accused as a matter of right. Consequently, the appeals were accepted, the convictions and sentences were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Is a joint extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence against multiple accused persons?
  • Can a conviction be sustained on circumstantial evidence when links in the chain of circumstances are missing?
  • Does the absence of previous enmity between prosecution witnesses and the accused automatically render the testimony of witnesses truthful?
  • What is the evidentiary value of medical evidence in connecting an accused person to the commission of a crime?
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• Muhammad Abdullah vs Additional Sessions Judge, etcK.L.R. 2015 Criminal Cases 87 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-27Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abbas vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 290 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-21
  post-arrest bailfurther inquiryvicarious liabilitysupplementary statementinvestigation reportaerial firing
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition seeks post-arrest bail for the petitioner, Muhammad Abbas, who is charged under Sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in connection with a murder case. The core legal question is whether the petitioner is entitled to bail given the conflicting evidence regarding his specific role in the alleged offence. The court observed that while the F.I.R. contained a joint allegation of indiscriminate firing, the complainant's supplementary statement clarified that the petitioner only engaged in aerial firing and did not cause any injury to the deceased. Furthermore, the investigating officer declared the petitioner innocent in the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Holding that the case falls within the scope of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the court granted bail. The key principle laid down is that where the investigation declares an accused innocent and the complainant's supplementary statement contradicts the initial F.I.R. regarding the specific role of the accused, the case warrants further inquiry, justifying the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does a finding of innocence by the investigating officer constitute grounds for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted when the complainant's supplementary statement contradicts the initial F.I.R. regarding the specific role of the accused?
  • Is the question of vicarious liability in a murder case a matter for the trial court to determine after recording evidence rather than at the bail stage?
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• Muhammad Abbas Ali vs M.D. WASA, Gujranwala2015 PLC 251 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2015-07-27
  review jurisdictionfunctus officiorectification of judgmentsubstantive right of reviewLabour Appellate Tribunaldismissal in limine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review application filed against an order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The applicant sought to challenge the previous order dated 20-11-2014, requesting the Tribunal to pass a new order rather than merely correcting clerical or arithmetical errors. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to review its own judgment or order in the absence of a specific statutory provision granting such power. The Tribunal held that the application was misconceived, as the applicant sought a re-adjudication of the matter rather than the rectification of an accidental slip or omission. The Tribunal emphasized that the right of review is a substantive right that must be expressly created by statute. Since the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 does not provide for the remedy of review, the Tribunal became functus officio upon signing and pronouncing the original judgment. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application in limine, establishing the principle that a court or tribunal cannot reopen a decided matter through review proceedings unless such power is explicitly conferred by the governing statute.

  Questions settled

  • Does a court or tribunal have the inherent power to review its own judgment in the absence of express statutory authority?
  • Is there a legal distinction between the power of rectification of clerical errors and the power of review?
  • At what point does a court or tribunal become functus officio regarding a decided matter?
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• Muhammad Abaidullahmuhammad Tayyab vs Ijaz Ahmeddawa Khan2015 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-04
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadattesting witnessesscribecivil reviewproof of execution
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal and review petition before a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan resolved a conflict of judicial views regarding the evidentiary requirements for proving Talb-i-Ishhad (demand of pre-emption) under provincial pre-emption laws. The core legal question was whether a pre-emptor must produce both attesting witnesses to establish the validity of Talb-i-Ishhad, and whether Articles 17 and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 apply to such transactions. The Supreme Court held that to prove a valid Talb-i-Ishhad, the pre-emptor must examine two truthful, independent attesting witnesses. The Court clarified that a scribe of a document cannot be treated as an attesting witness for this purpose. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 strictly requires the production of two attesting witnesses to prove the execution of a document. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as the appellant had examined only one attesting witness, and the review petition was dismissed except for the withdrawal of costs.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to examine two attesting witnesses to prove the validity of Talb-i-Ishhad under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991?
  • Can a scribe of a document be treated as an attesting witness to satisfy the statutory requirement of proving Talb-i-Ishhad?
  • Does Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 require the production of two attesting witnesses to prove the execution of a document in pre-emption cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abaidullah Muhammad Tayyab vs Ijaz Ahmed Dawa Khan2015 NLR Civil 242 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-12-04
  pre-emptiontalab-i-ishhadattesting witnessesscribeburden of proofcivil review petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before a larger bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to resolve conflicting precedents regarding whether producing both attesting witnesses is mandatory to prove the validity of Talabs under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, and the applicability of Articles 17 and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The core legal question examined was the evidentiary requirement for proving Talab-i-Ishhad and whether a scribe qualifies as an attesting witness. The court held that to prove a valid Talab-i-Ishhad under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, examining two truthful attesting witnesses independent of the person issuing the notice is mandatory, and a scribe cannot be construed as an attesting witness. Furthermore, the execution of a document must be proved by producing two attesting witnesses in accordance with Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The key principle laid down is that strict compliance with the statutory requirement of producing two independent attesting witnesses is essential for establishing a valid Talab-i-Ishhad in pre-emption cases, excluding the scribe from fulfilling this role.

  Questions settled

  • Is it necessary to produce two attesting witnesses to prove Talab-i-Ishhad under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • Can a scribe be construed as an attesting witness for proving Talab-i-Ishhad?
  • Does Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 require two attesting witnesses to prove the execution of a document in a pre-emption case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abaid Ullah vs Ateeq-Ur-Rehman and 8 others2015 CLD 307 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-05
  civil revisionsummary suitNegotiable Instruments Actdishonoured chequeliability of legal heirsmaintainability of suitCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges an order passed by the Additional District Judge setting aside an ex parte judgment and decree in a recovery suit. The petitioner had filed a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 against the legal heirs of a deceased person on the basis of a dishonoured cheque issued by the deceased before his death. The core legal question was whether a summary recovery suit under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 based on a cheque is maintainable against the legal heirs of a deceased maker who had not signed the instrument themselves. The Lahore High Court held that under sections 29 and 29-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, a person who has not signed a cheque as maker or drawer is not liable thereon, and a cheque ceases to have effect as a bill of exchange upon the death of its maker. Consequently, a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 cannot be maintained against legal heirs unless they have individually signed the instrument.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a summary suit under Order XXXVII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be filed against the legal heirs of a deceased person on the basis of a cheque issued by the deceased?
  • Does a cheque cease to have effect as a bill of exchange upon the death of its maker before encashment?
  • Are legal representatives liable on a negotiable instrument if they have not signed it as maker, drawer, indorser, or acceptor?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aamir vs Nazia Bibi and another2015 YLR 1667 · Lahore High Court · 2013-09-10Read full judgment →
• Muhamad Yasmin vs Mst. Naheed Bano and others2015 CLC 776 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-22
  rent evictionex parte ordercourt feead valorem court feeappellate jurisdictionexecution of decreePunjab Rented Premises Act 2009
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenges an ex parte eviction order passed by a Rent Tribunal and the subsequent dismissal of an appeal by the Additional District Judge due to the petitioner's failure to deposit the requisite court fee. The core legal question was whether an appeal against an eviction order under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, requires the payment of ad valorem court fee. The petitioner argued that the 2009 Act did not mandate such fees, unlike the repealed West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Court held that because the final order of a Rent Tribunal under the 2009 Act is executable as a decree of a civil court, the legal requirement for court fees remains applicable. Consequently, the appellate court correctly dismissed the appeal for non-payment. The Court affirmed that an appeal against an order having the force of a decree is governed by the Court Fees Act, 1870, necessitating ad valorem court fee based on the annual rental value of the property, regardless of the specific rent statute applied.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal against an eviction order under the Punjab Rented Premises Act 2009 require the payment of ad valorem court fee?
  • Is a final order passed by a Rent Tribunal under the Punjab Rented Premises Act 2009 executable as a decree of a civil court?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed for failure to affix the requisite court fee on the memorandum of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muddasir Shehzad and 230 others vs Managing Director, Utility Stores2015 PLC 326 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 2014-11-13
  Labour lawGrievance petitionRestoration of suitDismissal in defaultProcedural lawOrder XVII Rule 3 CPCLabour Appellate Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a grievance petition filed under Section 41 of the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act 2010, and the subsequent rejection of an application for restoration under Order IX, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court correctly applied Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to dismiss the petition, thereby barring restoration, or whether the dismissal should have been treated as a default under Order IX, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Tribunal held that the Labour Court erred in invoking Order XVII, Rule 3, as the essential conditions—specifically the grant of time to produce evidence, a subsequent default in that specific act, and the existence of material on record—were not satisfied. The Tribunal established that where these conditions are absent, a dismissal for non-appearance constitutes a default under Order IX, Rule 8, making an application for restoration under Order IX, Rule 9 maintainable. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside and the case remanded for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a court invoke Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to dismiss a suit?
  • Is a dismissal for non-appearance of a party and their counsel properly classified as a dismissal under Order XVII, Rule 3 or Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the failure to produce evidence on a single hearing, without a specific grant of time for that purpose, justify dismissal under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mudassir Iqbal vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 1053 · Sindh High Court · 2014-08-21
  narcotics bailprohibitory clauseinvestigating officerstatutory delayheroin recoveryControl of Narcotic Substances Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This bail application concerns an accused charged under sections 6 and 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 2160 grams of heroin. The core legal questions were whether the accused was entitled to bail due to procedural irregularities, specifically the complainant acting as the investigating officer and the absence of private witnesses, and whether the offence fell outside the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given the quantity of narcotics and trial delay. The court held that the bail application was devoid of merit and dismissed it. It established that a police officer may act as both complainant and investigating officer absent proof of prejudice. Furthermore, Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is excluded by Section 25 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. Crucially, offences under section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, punishable by death, fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and are subject to the bail bar under section 51(1) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997.

  Questions settled

  • Can a police officer act as both the complainant and the investigating officer in a narcotics case?
  • Does the requirement for private witnesses under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to cases under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  • Do offences under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does delay in trial attributable to the accused entitle them to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mudassar Zafar and others vs The State through D.G. NAB2015 YLR 868 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-09-11Read full judgment →
• Mudassar Hanif vs The State2015 LHC 3693 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-01
  criminal appealself-defenseright of private defensejuvenile offenderappreciation of evidenceSection 342 statementacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a juvenile, challenged his conviction and sentence for the murder of the deceased under Section 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot the deceased after signaling him to stop. During the trial, the appellant admitted to the shooting but asserted a plea of self-defense, claiming the deceased attempted to sodomize him. The trial court disbelieved the prosecution's version of events but partially accepted the appellant's statement, convicting him on the basis that he exceeded his right of self-defense by firing multiple shots. Upon appeal, the Lahore High Court found the prosecution's evidence unreliable, noting the failure to examine a key eyewitness and the absence of a credible motive. The Court held that once the prosecution's case is disbelieved, the accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 must be accepted or rejected as a whole, rather than parsed for convenience. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellant, ruling that his actions were justified under the circumstances of self-defense.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court partially accept and partially reject an accused's statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after disbelieving the prosecution's case?
  • Is the testimony of a single witness sufficient for conviction when other key eyewitnesses are withheld by the prosecution?
  • Does the repetition of fire shots by an accused necessarily constitute an excess of the right of self-defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Mudassar Ghafoor vs The State etc.2015 LHC 3925 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-11
  pre-arrest bailfugitive from lawabuse of process of lawbank fraudATM card fraudcriminal breach of trustforgery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought pre-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and Sections 36 and 37 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002. The core legal question concerned whether an accused who has remained a fugitive from law for a prolonged period without justification is entitled to the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail. The Lahore High Court held that an unexplained and unjustified period of remaining a fugitive from law disentitles the accused to pre-arrest bail and amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner who remains fugitive from law for an extended period without a plausible explanation cannot be granted pre-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained period of being a fugitive from law disentitle an accused to pre-arrest bail?
  • Whether an accused who remains away from the process of law for a long period can be granted the extraordinary concession of pre-arrest bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mudassar Ahmed Khan vs The State2015 YLR 360 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-19Read full judgment →
• Mubashir Pesh Imam vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary and 22015 MLD 1197 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-19Read full judgment →
• Mubasher and another vs The State2015 PLD Lahore 426 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-14
  criminal appealmurdercapital punishmentcommutation of sentencebenefit of doubtocular evidenceSection 342 CrPCcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the convictions and sentences of two appellants for murder and murderous assault. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of the ocular account, the validity of the common intention charge, and the appropriateness of the capital sentence. The Lahore High Court acquitted the co-accused, Sarfraz, noting that no specific overt act was attributed to him and that the recovery of the motorcycle was not put to him during his Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 examination, rendering it inadmissible. Regarding the main appellant, Mubasher, the Court found the ocular account of the injured witness reliable, despite excluding the complainant's testimony due to material improvements. The Court held that while a conviction can rest on a single reliable witness, the prosecution failed to prove the motive or provide corroborative recovery evidence. Consequently, the Court upheld Mubasher’s conviction but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment, citing the failure to prove motive and the acquittal of the co-accused as extenuating circumstances. The judgment reaffirms that accused persons are entitled to the benefit of doubt regarding the quantum of sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be maintained against an accused if the evidence used for conviction was not put to them during their examination under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the improvement of a witness's statement to strengthen the prosecution's case render their testimony unreliable?
  • Is an accused entitled to the benefit of doubt regarding the quantum of sentence even if the conviction is upheld?
  • Can a murder conviction be based on the testimony of a single witness?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubara and 4 others vs Mst. Khanu through L.Rs, and others2015 CLC 1661 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-07Read full judgment →
• Mst.Zareedah Begum & 2 others vs Abdul Rasheed & Shehzad YousifSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst.Shamim Akhtar vs Additional District Judge,etc.2015 LHC 792 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mst.Nusrat Perveen vs Home Department, etc.2015 LHC 5888 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-01Read full judgment →
• Mst.Najma Bibi. vs Malik Muhammad Aslam2015 LHC 1652 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-07Read full judgment →
• Mst.Kounjan Shar vs NotSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst.Jameela and others vs Muhammad Iqbal & othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst.Fatima Bai & others vs The Karachi Building Control Authority &Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst.Doda Begum vs Israr Hussain Zaidi & othersSindh High Court · -
  consent orderreview applicationlimitation periodcondonation of delaycivil procedurescope of review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a civil suit for declaration, cancellation of documents, possession, permanent injunction, and mesne profits concerning a residential property. During the proceedings, the parties recorded a consent order before the court whereby the property was to be sold through the Nazir and the proceeds distributed. Subsequently, the legal heirs of the deceased defendant filed an application under Section 114 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking a review of the consent order, alongside applications invoking the Limitation Act 1908. The core legal question centered on whether a consent order or decree can be reviewed or set aside on the ground that a party misunderstood the agreement or wishes to resile from it, and whether a review petition is maintainable without showing an error apparent on the face of the record or complying with limitation periods. The court held that a consent order cannot be reviewed simply because a party subsequently changes their counsel or attempts to resile from an informed agreement to minimize their financial liability, reiterating that the scope of review is strictly confined to errors apparent on the face of the record and cannot be used as an appeal in disguise. The key principle laid down is that litigants cannot be permitted to grant consent in court and subsequently engage new counsel to file merit-based review petitions to frustrate judicial orders passed with consent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a consent order or decree can be reviewed under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 on the ground that a party misunderstood the compromise or wishes to resile from it?
  • Is it mandatory for an applicant seeking a review under Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to explain the delay of each day when the petition is barred by time under Article 162 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 be invoked to condone the delay in filing a review application before a court that undisputedly possesses original civil jurisdiction?
  • Does the scope of a review petition permit a rehearing of a matter on merits or the introduction of a different conclusion akin to an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Bibi vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 165 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-09
  bail cancellationpost-arrest bailsupplementary statementdelayed FIRcriminal proceduremisuse of bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition was filed under Section 497(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to Respondent No. 2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kasur, in a case involving offences under Sections 376, 379, 392, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the bail granted to the respondent should be cancelled due to his subsequent implication in the case. The Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it. The Court observed that the respondent was not named in the FIR, and his inclusion via a delayed supplementary statement suggested potential deliberation. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the grounds for granting bail and cancelling bail are distinct. Cancellation requires strong, exceptional, and cogent evidence of misuse of bail, such as tampering with evidence or repeating the offence, which was absent in this case. Consequently, the Court affirmed that in the absence of such compelling circumstances, the concession of bail should not be recalled once granted.

  Questions settled

  • Are the grounds for the grant of bail and the cancellation of bail the same?
  • What specific circumstances are required to justify the cancellation of bail once it has been granted?
  • Does the failure to name an accused in the initial FIR, followed by a delayed supplementary statement, constitute a ground for cancelling bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Begum vs Nazar Hussain, etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 1295 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zohra Falak vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Home and Tribal Affair and 13 others2015 CLC 616 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-02-11
  property demarcationwrit jurisdictionimplementation of judgmentpublic functionariesDir State propertyconstitutional duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition concerns the implementation of a prior court order regarding the demarcation and separation of private properties belonging to the descendants of the former Ruler of Dir State from State-owned properties. The petitioner, a descendant of the former Nawab, sought the execution of a 2010 High Court judgment that directed revenue authorities to identify and demarcate these properties based on 1972 government notifications. The core legal question was whether the public functionaries were obligated to implement the court's previous directions regarding property demarcation. The Court held that the respondents failed to perform their statutory and constitutional duties by delaying the implementation of the prior order. Relying on the principle that public functionaries must act in accordance with the law and provide timely, reasoned decisions, the Court directed the authorities to finalize the demarcation proceedings within two months. It emphasized that state functionaries are bound to respect and implement the mandates of superior courts to ensure justice and the rule of law, as enshrined in the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Is it the duty of public functionaries to implement court orders regarding property demarcation within a reasonable time?
  • Does the failure of public functionaries to decide applications in accordance with law violate the constitutional mandate?
  • Are public functionaries required to provide reasons for their decisions under the General Clauses Act 1897?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Yousafi & Others vs Mst. Zahida Bibi & Others2015 LHC 2220 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-06
  civil revisionsecondary evidencedivorce deedclosing of evidenceremand of caseinheritance disputeappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges an appellate judgment and decree whereby the lower appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the respondents' declaratory suit and remanded the matter. The core legal questions involved the propriety of closing the respondents' evidence after repeated adjournments and the legality of permitting secondary evidence regarding a divorce deed without satisfying statutory prerequisites. The Lahore High Court held that the trial court committed no material irregularity in closing the right of evidence when the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence despite numerous opportunities, and that the lower appellate court erred fundamentally in ignoring the mandatory conditions for admitting secondary evidence under the relevant law. The key principles laid down are that parties cannot claim innumerable adjournments as a matter of right for producing evidence, and secondary evidence of documents cannot be permitted casually without strictly fulfilling the conditions stipulated in Articles 73 to 76 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court is justified in closing the right of evidence after repeated adjournments granted to a party?
  • Can secondary evidence of a document be allowed without fulfilling the statutory conditions prescribed under Article 76 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Whether a lower appellate court can set aside a trial court judgment solely on an ancillary issue without addressing the primary ground regarding the failure to produce evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Bibi vs Muhammad Ashraf and others2015 PLD Lahore 253 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zareena Ashraf vs D.C.O., etcK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 113 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-26Read full judgment →
• Mst. Waziran Mai through L.Rs, and others vs Rab Nawaz through L.Rs, and 2 others2015 MLD 365 · Lahore High Court · 2012-11-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Wandul Mai vs District Police Officer, Muzaffargarh, etcK.L.R. 2015 Criminal Cases 46 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Wahdul Mai vs District Police Officer, Muzaffargarh and 3 others2015 PLJ Lahore 203 · Lahore High Court · 2014-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Wafa Andaleeb vs Imran Bhatti and 6 others2015 P Cr. L J 875 · Sindh High Court · 2014-09-24
  habeas corpusminor custodycriminal revisionsummary jurisdictionSection 491 Cr.P.C.Guardians and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal revision application challenged an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which granted the applicant custody of her minor daughter but imposed conditions, including a personal recognizance bond and restrictions on leaving the city without court permission. The core legal question was whether a court exercising summary jurisdiction under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is empowered to attach conditions to an order for the recovery of a minor. The High Court held that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction by imposing these restrictions. The court clarified that proceedings under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, are summary in nature, intended solely to provide immediate relief regarding illegal detention. The court emphasized that a judge exercising this criminal jurisdiction cannot assume the powers of a Guardian Judge or impose conditions on custody, as final adjudication regarding the minor's welfare and custody must be determined by the competent court under the relevant guardianship laws. Consequently, the High Court modified the impugned order by setting aside the conditions imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court impose conditions, such as personal bonds or travel restrictions, when passing an order under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is a court exercising jurisdiction under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, competent to assume the powers of a Guardian Judge?
  • What is the scope of the court's power in summary proceedings under section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Urooj Begum vs Shabbir Ahmed Chaudhry and 4 others2015 YLR 1602 · Sindh High Court · 2015-03-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tara Begum vs Government of Sindh through Home Secretary and 22015 PLC (C.S.) 1285 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-17
  service tribunaldepartmental proceedingscriminal acquittaldouble jeopardyconstitutional petitiondismissal from servicelaches
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, widow of a deceased Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Police Department, filed a constitutional petition seeking symbolic restoration of her late husband in service, along with salary and other benefits, following his acquittal in criminal proceedings after being dismissed from service through departmental action. The core legal questions involved whether acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically vitiates a departmental dismissal on the same facts, and whether such a belated petition by the widow is maintainable where the deceased failed to challenge his dismissal before the Service Tribunal during his lifetime. The Sindh High Court held that where departmental and criminal proceedings are initiated on the same grounds of misconduct, acquittal in the criminal case does not automatically discharge the employee or invalidate the departmental proceedings. The Court further held that the petition was barred by laches and not maintainable as the deceased had failed to challenge his dismissal before the Service Tribunal, allowing the order to attain finality. The key principle laid down is that departmental proceedings and criminal trials operate in distinct spheres when based on misconduct, and the outcome of a criminal trial has no bearing on departmental action unless the disciplinary measure was based solely on the criminal conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does acquittal in criminal proceedings automatically invalidate a departmental dismissal based on the same misconduct?
  • Whether departmental proceedings are dependent on the outcome of a criminal trial arising from the same facts?
  • Is a constitutional petition filed by the widow of a deceased civil servant maintainable where the deceased failed to challenge his dismissal before the Service Tribunal during his lifetime?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tamam Bibi vs Mir Ahmed son of Dawood GulSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sumera Bibi and anothers vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 440 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-13
  post-arrest bailnarcotic recoveryprocedural irregularityhumanitarian groundssuckling infantschemical examiner reportsearch and seizure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for post-arrest bail filed by two female accused, Mst. Sumera and Mst. Rabia, who were charged under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, following the alleged recovery of narcotics from their personal possession. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the procedural irregularities in the investigation and the humanitarian considerations regarding the accused's minor children. The Peshawar High Court held that the petitioners were entitled to bail. The court reasoned that the prosecution's case suffered from significant evidentiary gaps, including the failure to associate a lady constable during the initial search, the absence of independent witnesses to the recovery, and the failure to place the chemical examiner's report on the judicial file in a timely manner. Furthermore, the court emphasized the humanitarian necessity of releasing a mother incarcerated with her suckling infants. The key principle laid down is that procedural lapses in narcotic recovery, combined with humanitarian grounds involving the welfare of minor children, constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of post-arrest bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to associate a lady constable during the search of female suspects in a narcotics case create doubt in the prosecution's case?
  • Can the presence of suckling infants in custody with an accused mother be considered a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Does the failure to place the chemical examiner's report on the judicial file constitute a ground for bail in narcotics cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sumera Bano vs A.D.& S.J./Appellate Authority etc.2015 LHC 7412 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sultana Begum, etc vs Member Board of Revenue, etc2015 LHC 3408 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs Qaiser Pervez, etc.2015 PSC Crl. 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-17
  murderchance witnessbenefit of doubtcorroboratory evidencecriminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidencepolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder. The core legal question was whether the conviction could be sustained given the nature of the ocular account, the acquittal of co-accused, and the reliability of the investigation. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. The Court held that where eye-witnesses are 'chance witnesses' and their testimony lacks independent corroboration, it cannot sustain a conviction. It established that when the case against the convict is indistinguishable from that of acquitted co-accused, and the evidence is indivisible, the convict is entitled to the same benefit of doubt. The Court further emphasized that eye-witnesses cannot corroborate their own testimony through recovery memos, as corroboration must come from an independent source. Additionally, the Court ruled that unexplained delays in FIR registration and interpolations in police documents, such as the daily diary, fundamentally undermine the prosecution's case and render the evidence unreliable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular account is provided by chance witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Is a convict entitled to the benefit of doubt when the evidence against them is indistinguishable from that of an acquitted co-accused?
  • Can eye-witnesses corroborate their own testimony through recovery memos?
  • Does the interpolation of police documents and unexplained delay in FIR registration vitiate the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs Qaiser Pervez etc.2015 PLJ SC 774 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-17
  chance witnessbenefit of doubtocular testimonycorroboratory evidencecriminal appealacquittalappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for murder, following the High Court's reduction of his death sentence to life imprisonment. The core legal questions concern the reliability of ocular testimony from alleged chance witnesses, the validity of recoveries made in suspicious circumstances, and whether the appellant is entitled to the same benefit of doubt as his acquitted co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the eye-witnesses to be chance witnesses whose presence was not established, noted an unexplained delay in the FIR, and identified interpolations in police records that rendered the ballistic evidence and recoveries unreliable. Furthermore, the court applied the principle that where the evidence against a convict is indivisible from that of acquitted co-accused, and no strong independent corroboration exists, the convict is entitled to the same benefit of doubt. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction, acquitted the appellant, and dismissed the related appeal for enhancement of compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained when the ocular testimony is provided by chance witnesses whose presence at the crime scene is not established by independent evidence?
  • Does the principle of indivisibility of evidence require that a convict be acquitted if co-accused with identical roles have been acquitted and no independent corroboration exists?
  • What is the legal effect of unexplained interpolations and overwriting in police records on the credibility of the prosecution's case?
  • Can the testimony of eye-witnesses be corroborated by recovery evidence that was attested by the same eye-witnesses?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs Qaiser Pervez and others2015 PLJ SC 774, 2015 PSC Crl. 476, 2015 SCMR 1142 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-04-17
  MurderCriminal AppealAcquittalConvictionOcular AccountChance WitnessDelayed FIRCorroboratory EvidenceBenefit of DoubtPolice Documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved criminal appeals against a murder conviction and sentence, and against the acquittal of co-accused. The core legal questions revolved around the reliability of ocular testimony from chance witnesses, the impact of an unexplained delay in lodging the First Information Report (FIR), the evidentiary value of motive, and the admissibility of recoveries. The Supreme Court allowed the appellant's appeal, setting aside his conviction and sentences, and acquitted him of all charges. The Court held that the testimony of chance witnesses is generally unreliable without strong justification for their presence. An unexplained delay in lodging the FIR casts serious doubt on the prosecution's case. Corroboratory evidence must come from an independent source, not from eye-witnesses corroborating themselves. Furthermore, when a convict's case is indistinguishable from that of acquitted co-accused, and the evidence is indivisible, conviction without strong independent corroboration is unjustified. Overwriting or interpolation in police documents, particularly in murder cases, can render the entire prosecution case doubtful.

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• Mst. Sidra Kausar vs SHO Shera Kot etc.2015 LHC 1979 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-22
  habeas corpuscustody of minorshizanatdetentionguardian judgecriminal procedurewelfare of minors
  Summary & questions settled

  Through this petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, the petitioner, who is the real mother, sought the custody of her two minor sons from their paternal uncle. The petitioner had been arrested as an abettor in the murder of her husband, during which period the minors remained with the respondent uncle. An Additional Sessions Judge previously granted custody of a younger child to the petitioner but dismissed the petition regarding the two older minors, aged 8 and 6 years, as they were unwilling to accompany her, directing her to the Guardian Judge. The core legal question was whether habeas corpus under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is an appropriate remedy for custody of minors who are not being forcibly detained and have expressed unwillingness to live with the mother. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that since the minors were not forcibly removed or detained, and given their age and expressed preference, no urgency warranted interference under Section 491 Cr.P.C., leaving the petitioner to seek remedy before the Guardian Judge.

  Questions settled

  • Whether habeas corpus under Section 491 Cr.P.C. is maintainable for the custody of minors who are not being forcibly detained?
  • Does a mother accused of the murder of her husband have an absolute right to custody of her minor children through a summary writ jurisdiction?
  • Can the expressed unwillingness of minors of understanding age to go with a parent influence a court's decision in a habeas corpus petition for custody?
  • Is the Guardian Court the appropriate forum for resolving custody disputes where no illegal or forcible detention is established?
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• Mst. Shumaila Bibi vs Zahir Khan and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 44, 2015 PLD Peshawar 182 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-18Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shugafta vs Chairman Federal Public Service Commission, Islamabad and 2 others2015 PLC (C.S.) 819 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-04-03
  FPSCeligibility criteriavested rightwritten testeducational qualificationsservice matterconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition challenged the rejection of the petitioner's candidature by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) for the posts of Assistant Head Mistress and Vice Principal. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner possessed the requisite qualifications for the posts and whether her participation in the written test conferred a vested right to proceed to the interview stage. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to meet the mandatory qualification criteria, specifically the requirement of a B.Ed. degree in addition to a Master's degree. The Court further held that, pursuant to the FPSC’s General Instructions, appearing in a written examination does not create a vested right to participate in the interview if a candidate is subsequently found ineligible upon detailed scrutiny. The judgment affirms the principle that it is the government's prerogative to prescribe qualifications for public posts, and eligibility must be strictly determined in accordance with the advertisement. Consequently, the Court ruled that a non-qualified candidate cannot be appointed, and the FPSC’s rejection was lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Does appearing in a written test conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission confer a vested right to proceed to the interview stage?
  • Can a candidate challenge the rejection of their candidature on the ground that they possess an equivalent degree not explicitly listed in the recruitment criteria?
  • Is the Federal Public Service Commission authorized to cancel a candidate's candidature after the written test if they are found ineligible upon detailed scrutiny?
  • Does a general letter from the Higher Education Commission regarding degree equivalence automatically satisfy specific recruitment qualification requirements?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shopari Bibi vs The State2015 P Cr. L J 1584 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-03-05
  appeal against acquittalbenefit of doubtsolitary eye-witnessinterested witnessabscondencemedical evidence contradictiondouble presumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondent-accused by the trial court under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in a murder case. The core legal question was whether the prosecution had successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through ocular, medical, and circumstantial evidence, and whether the trial court's judgment of acquittal warranted interference. The Peshawar High Court held that the testimony of the solitary eye-witness, who was the mother of the deceased, was riddled with major contradictions, improvements, and material discrepancies, and that identification in the dark without a light source was implausible. The court further held that the medical evidence contradicted the time of occurrence alleged in the FIR, and that mere abscondence cannot take the place of substantive proof when the primary ocular account is disbelieved. Emphasizing the double presumption of innocence attached to an acquittal, the court laid down that a judgment of acquittal will not be interfered with unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or perverse. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of a solitary, related eye-witness requires strict corroboration when it contains material contradictions and improvements?
  • Can the abscondence of an accused alone form the basis of a conviction when the substantive ocular evidence has been disbelieved?
  • What is the standard of interference by an appellate court against a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does a discrepancy between the time of occurrence stated in the FIR and the medical evidence create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case?
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• Mst. Sher Bano vs Nazir Ahmed and others2015 P.S.C. 933 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2011-12-01
  civil revisionstatus quodispossessionpossession restorationtrial court proceedingsexpeditious disposal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had allowed a civil revision application on the basis that a status quo order had not been extended, leading to the dispossession of the appellant. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's decision to allow the revision and effectively sanction the dispossession of the appellant despite the ongoing litigation. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court noted that the appellant had been dispossessed during the pendency of the matter. Consequently, the parties reached a consensus to resolve the dispute by directing the Trial Court to conclude the proceedings within a specified timeframe. The Court held that the Trial Court must decide the suit within three months. Furthermore, the Court laid down the principle that if the suit is ultimately decreed in favour of the appellant, the respondent is obligated to restore possession immediately, failing which the Trial Court is empowered to pass necessary orders to enforce such delivery of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Trial Court be directed to conclude proceedings within a specific timeframe to resolve a dispute over possession?
  • Is a respondent obligated to restore possession if a suit is decreed in favour of the appellant after an alleged illegal dispossession?
  • Does the failure to extend a status quo order justify the dispossession of a party during pending litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shehr Bano vs Abdullah through L.Rs,2015 MLD 1484 · Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court · 2015-03-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shehnaz Khadim Hussain, Falak Sher, In person. vs The State,Sindh High Court · -
  murderocular accountchance witnessconfessional statementbenefit of the doubtappellate reviewcriminal revisionretracted confession
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and revision arise from a judgment of the Sessions Court convicting the appellants for murder and abetment under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved the credibility of chance witnesses, the evidentiary value of a retracted and delayed confessional statement, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the ocular account through natural and confidence-inspiring evidence, that the alleged eyewitnesses were chance witnesses who failed to explain their presence, and that the recovery of the weapon and the confessional statement suffered from serious legal and factual infirmities. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellants, laying down the principle that when there are two reasonable views or possibilities, the one favoring the accused must be adopted, and if the prosecution fails to establish its case, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses who fail to offer a plausible explanation for their presence at the crime scene can form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • Can a retracted and delayed confessional statement be relied upon when it contradicts the medical evidence and the prosecution's narrative?
  • Is an accused entitled to acquittal as of right when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt?
  • How should a court evaluate competing versions presented by the prosecution and the defence in a criminal trial?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sheerina vs StatePLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Peshawar) 617 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-07-06
  post-arrest bailnarcotic substancesprohibitory clausepossession of narcoticsheinous offencesbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving the recovery of five kilograms of charas, registered under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The core legal question was whether the accused, found in possession of a significant quantity of narcotics, was entitled to the concession of bail despite the offence falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the accused was not entitled to bail. Relying on recent Supreme Court guidance, the Court determined that offences under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 are heinous in nature and offences against society at large. The Court emphasized that bail should not be granted merely based on the quantity of the narcotic substance, as the trial court retains discretion regarding sentencing, and deeper appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the bail stage. The key principle laid down is that the nature of narcotic offences necessitates caution in granting bail, and the quantity of contraband is not a sufficient ground to bypass the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused charged with an offence under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 entitled to bail merely on the basis of the quantity of the recovered narcotic substance?
  • Are offences punishable under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997 considered heinous offences against society at large for the purpose of bail?
  • Does the trial court have the discretion to award punishment regardless of the quantity of narcotics recovered, thereby impacting the bail consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shazia vs Sohail Nazir Khan2015 PLJ Lahore 79 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shazia Naheed vs Public at Large, etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 266 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-27
  Court of Protectionguardianshipmentally disordered personsurety bondjudicial discretionmanagement of propertyMental Health Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged an order by the Court of Protection, which had declined to accept a surety bond provided by the appellant for the guardianship and management of her mentally disordered daughter's property. The appellant, previously appointed as guardian, was directed to furnish a surety bond of Rs. 27,500,000/-. The Court of Protection rejected the proffered surety because the proposed guarantor's property was located in Dera Ghazi Khan, whereas the ward's assets and the appellant's residence were in Lahore, rendering the surety unsuitable for safeguarding the ward's interests. The High Court examined the scope of the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001, noting that the Court of Protection is mandated to protect the rights of mentally disordered persons. The High Court held that the phrase 'satisfaction of the Court' grants the Court of Protection discretion to determine the adequacy and suitability of a surety. Finding no jurisdictional error or legal infirmity in the lower court's exercise of discretion to reject an unsuitable surety, the High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, affirming the necessity of local, reliable security to protect the ward's estate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Court of Protection have the discretion to reject a surety bond based on the location of the guarantor's property?
  • What is the scope of the Court of Protection's authority under the Mental Health Ordinance 2001 regarding the management of a mentally disordered person's property?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with the Court of Protection's decision regarding the adequacy of a surety bond if no jurisdictional error is shown?
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• Muhammad Abrar vs The StateSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailunlicensed weaponprohibitory clauseballistic reportbail as punishmentcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Muhammad Abrar, who was charged under Section 23-(i)(a) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, following the alleged recovery of an unlicensed 30-bore pistol. The accused sought bail after his initial application was rejected by the trial court, arguing that the case was false, the weapon was not sent for ballistic analysis, and he was already granted bail in a separate case. The State opposed the application, citing the recovery of the weapon and the fact that the offense falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The Court held that since the investigation was complete, the accused was no longer required for further inquiry, and there was no risk of evidence tampering, bail should be granted. The Court emphasized that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment and that unjustified incarceration cannot be remedied by future acquittal, ultimately granting the application subject to the furnishing of surety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure to send a recovered weapon to a ballistic expert for analysis constitutes a ground for granting bail?
  • Does the fact that an offense falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 automatically preclude the grant of bail?
  • Is bail to be withheld as a form of punishment for an accused person?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shazia Naheed vs Public at Large and others2015 PLJ Lahore 266, 2015 PLD Lahore 268 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shazia Kousar vs Nisar Ahmed2015 P.S.C. 986, 2015 YLR 917 · Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 2014-04-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar, etc vs Anwar Ali and others2015 C.L.R. 74 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Saifur Rehman alias Saifa and 2 others2015 PLJ FSC 62, 2015 MLD 155 · Federal Shariat Court · 2014-10-10
  HaraabahAppellate jurisdictionFederal Shariat CourtHudood lawsCriminal appealAcquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed by the complainant against the acquittal of respondents by the trial court in a case involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code and the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The matter was transferred to the Federal Shariat Court by the Peshawar High Court on the premise that the inclusion of a charge under section 17(4) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (relating to Haraabah) vested appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Shariat Court. Upon review, the Court examined the F.I.R. and evidence, noting that the prosecution failed to allege any intent to rob or extort property, which is a fundamental element of Haraabah as defined under section 15 of the Ordinance. The Court held that the charge of Haraabah was void and illegal, as the incident constituted a simple case of murder and attempted murder. Consequently, the Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and directed that the record be returned to the High Court for adjudication on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Shariat Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the charge of Haraabah is erroneously applied to a simple murder case?
  • What are the essential elements required to constitute the offence of Haraabah under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does an appellate court have the authority to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the law regarding the nature of the charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Pirzada Khalil Ur Rehman and 2 others2015 YLR 2176 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-11
  civil revisionoral giftrevocation of giftprohibited degreelimitation perioddeclaration suitIslamic law
  Summary & questions settled

  This consolidated civil revision arises from a property dispute between a father and daughter regarding a residential plot in Islamabad, involving the transfer of half the property in 1991 and an oral gift of the remaining portion in 1998, which the donor later attempted to revoke. The core legal questions pertain to the revocability of an oral gift under Islamic law between relatives within the prohibited degree, the limitation period for a suit for declaration, and the effect of withdrawal of previous suits. The Islamabad High Court held that a gift made to a relation within the prohibited degree for love and affection is irrevocable once possession is transferred and accepted, and its contents cannot be contradicted by oral testimony. Furthermore, the suit was barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1908. The High Court set aside the lower appellate court's judgment regarding the gifted portion, upholding the transfer of the first half and dismissing the plaintiff's suit in its entirety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an oral gift made to a relation within the prohibited degree of consanguinity is revocable under Islamic law?
  • What is the limitation period for filing a suit for declaration concerning immovable property?
  • Can the contents of a written document or acknowledgment of gift be contradicted or negated through oral testimony?
  • What is the legal effect of withdrawing a previous suit without permission to re-file on a subsequent suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and another2015 LHC 792, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1022, 2015 PLD Lahore 500 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-23
  DNA profile testlegitimacy of childpaternity disputeQanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984family suitmaintenance allowanceconsent for DNA testconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed by the petitioner-wife challenging an order of the Additional District Judge directing the parties to undergo a DNA profile test of her minor son to determine parentage in a suit for maintenance and dowry articles. Respondent No. 2 had denied paternity after years of acknowledging the child in public records and NADRA documents. The core legal question was whether a court can order a DNA profile test to determine paternity in family disputes without the consent of the parties or the child, and whether such tests can be ordered as a matter of routine overriding the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The Lahore High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned order. The Court held that DNA tests cannot be ordered routinely upon a father's denial of paternity, especially after significant delay, nor can a DNA test be conducted without explicit consent. The Court reaffirmed that children born during a valid marriage carry a statutory presumption of legitimacy under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court order a DNA profile test to determine paternity without the consent of the person concerned or the mother?
  • Can a DNA profile test be ordered as a routine matter where a child is born during the continuance of a valid marriage under Article 128 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Is a considerable delay by a father in denying the paternity of a child a relevant factor when considering a request for a DNA test?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Additional District Judge, etc2015 PLJ Lahore 1022 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar and anothers vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary,Ministry of Law and 2 others2015 PLD Lahore 129 · Lahore High Court · 2014-03-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shakila Bibi vs SHO Police Station Chobara, District Layyah and another2015 P Cr. L J 880 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-24
  habeas corpuscustody of minorsillegal custodywelfare of minorsabandonmentseparation of siblings
  Summary & questions settled

  Mst. Shakila Bibi filed a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the recovery of her three minor children from the alleged illegal custody of their father, Muhammad Shakeel. The petitioner alleged the minors were forcibly taken away, but during the proceedings, it was revealed that she had left her matrimonial home nearly a year prior, contracted a second marriage, and abandoned the children. The minor children appeared well cared for, expressed attachment to their father, and showed aversion towards the petitioner. The Lahore High Court examined whether the custody of the minors, or alternatively the youngest child, could be handed over to the petitioner. The court held that the habeas corpus petition was baseless as the minors were not in illegal custody, and denied the custody of the children to the petitioner. The key principles laid down include that welfare of the minors is paramount in custody matters, a parent who abandons children and contracts a second marriage loses immediate equitable claim in summary habeas proceedings, separation of siblings is undesirable, and maintenance and stability strongly favor retaining custody with the natural father where minors are well-adjusted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a habeas corpus petition under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is maintainable for the recovery of minors when they are in the custody of their natural father?
  • Can a mother who has abandoned her minor children and contracted a second marriage claim their custody through summary proceedings?
  • Is it desirable to separate minor siblings by handing over the custody of one child to a parent while leaving the others with the father?
  • Does the welfare of minors require them to remain in the custody of a father where they are well-adjusted and attached, as opposed to a mother with no independent source of income who abandoned them?
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• Mst. Shahnaz vs The State2015 YLR 771 · Sindh High Court · 2014-03-21
  murderchance witnessesretracted confessionbenefit of the doubtocular evidenceappellate reviewcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and revision arises from a judgment of the Sessions Court convicting the appellants for murder and abetment. The core legal questions involved the credibility of chance witnesses, the reliability of a retracted confessional statement, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Sindh High Court held that the ocular account furnished by interested and chance witnesses was unnatural, inconsistent, and not confidence-inspiring, that medical and recovery evidence were merely corroborative and insufficient on their own, and that the delayed retracted confession did not align with the medical evidence. Consequently, the court set aside the convictions and sentences, acquitted the appellants on the ground of benefit of doubt, and dismissed the revision for enhancement of sentence. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to establish a natural and confidence-inspiring direct ocular account, and where two reasonable hypotheses exist regarding the origin of the crime, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused as a matter of right.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of chance witnesses who fail to offer a plausible explanation for their presence at the crime scene can form the basis of a murder conviction?
  • Can a retracted confessional statement sustain a conviction when it is materially inconsistent with the medical evidence and recorded after an unexplained delay?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the prosecution's ocular account is unnatural, contradictory, and fails to inspire confidence?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to an acquittal and the benefit of doubt when the defence version is plausible and supported by surrounding circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz Kousar vs Additional Sessions Judge and another2015 MLD 648 · Sindh High Court · 2014-07-17
  quashing of orderregistration of FIRcognizable offenceEx-officio Justice of Peacecivil disputematrimonial disputepolice obligation
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenged an order of the Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-officio Justice of Peace dismissing an application for the registration of an FIR regarding an alleged cognizable offence involving house trespass and firing. The core legal question was whether an Ex-officio Justice of Peace can refuse to direct the registration of an FIR on the ground that a civil or matrimonial dispute exists between the parties. The Sindh High Court held that the Ex-officio Justice of Peace is only required to examine whether the information discloses a cognizable offence, without delving into the veracity of the information or refusing relief merely due to a civil/matrimonial dispute. The court set aside the impugned order and directed the SHO to record the statement if a cognizable offence is made out, reinforcing the principle that the police are bound to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-officio Justice of Peace can refuse to direct the registration of an FIR on the ground that a civil or matrimonial dispute exists between the parties?
  • What is the scope of inquiry for an Ex-officio Justice of Peace while dealing with an application under Section 22-A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the Officer Incharge of a Police Station under a statutory obligation to record an FIR when information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence?
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• Mst. Shahnaz Kausar vs S.H.O., Police Station Civil Line, DistrictPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 57 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-19
  habeas corpusillegal detentionfree willNikahcustodysui juris
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a habeas corpus petition filed before the Lahore High Court concerning the alleged illegal detention of Mst. Abeera Bashir. Initially, the police sub-inspector claimed inability to trace the detenue, but following strict judicial directions and the personal appearance of the District Police Officer (DPO) Muzaffargarh and the SHO, the detenue was produced before the court. The core legal question revolved around the whereabouts and voluntary will of the alleged detenue regarding her custody and marriage. The court examined the statement of the detenue, who confirmed that she had contracted a valid Nikah of her own free will and consent with her husband, Syed Shahenshah Bukhari, and expressed a clear desire to reside with him rather than the petitioner. Holding that an adult sui juris person is entitled to reside of her own free will, the court dismissed the habeas corpus petition. The key principle laid down is that the wishes of a sui juris adult regarding their residence and marriage must be respected in habeas corpus proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a habeas corpus petition be maintained when the alleged detenue expresses a free will to reside with her husband?
  • What is the procedure when police officials fail to produce a detenue and provide doubtful explanations?
  • Is an adult free to contract marriage and decide her place of residence of her own free will?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz Elahi, etc. vs I.G. Police Punjab, Lahore etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 16 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz Elahi and otherss vs I.G. Police, Punjab and others2015 PLJ Lahore 16, 2015 PLD Lahore 213 · Lahore High Court · 2014-07-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahnaz alias Jahan Ara vs Syed Ahtisham Ali Shah and 5 others2015 CLC 672 · Sindh High Court · 2014-10-31
  administration suitrejection of plaintterritorial jurisdictionres judicatalimitationinheritanceCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the rejection of a plaint in an administration suit. The defendants contended that the suit was barred by res judicata under Order IX, Rule 9, as a previous suit on the same cause of action had been dismissed. They further argued that the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1908, and that the court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the subject properties were located outside its jurisdiction. The Court held that the dismissal of the previous suit occurred when neither party was present, falling under Order IX, Rule 3, which permits the filing of a fresh suit under Order IX, Rule 4. Regarding limitation, the Court affirmed that the right to seek administration of a deceased's estate does not extinguish by the passage of time. Finally, the Court ruled that it possesses the jurisdiction to administer an estate even where some properties are situated beyond its territorial limits. Consequently, the application for rejection of the plaint was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a suit where neither party is present constitute a bar to a fresh suit under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the right to file a suit for the administration of a deceased's estate subject to the law of limitation?
  • Does a court have the jurisdiction to administer an estate if some of the properties are located outside its territorial jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahista Bibi vs The Superintendent Central Jail, etc.2015 NLR Criminal 294, 2015 PLD Supreme Court 15, 2015 PLJ SC 379, 2015 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-19
  concurrent sentencescriminal sentencingCode of Criminal Procedurecommutation of sentencejudicial discretionpunitive law interpretationhuman rights in prison
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal concerns the sentencing of the appellants, who were convicted in multiple cases involving explosives and murder. Following the commutation of their death sentences to life imprisonment, the appellants sought relief to have their various sentences of imprisonment run concurrently rather than consecutively, as the cumulative term would extend well beyond a natural human lifespan. The core legal question was whether the Court could exercise its discretion under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct concurrent sentencing to mitigate extreme hardship. The Supreme Court held that the sentences shall run concurrently. The Court established that punitive laws must be interpreted in favor of the liberty of the subject, and where two interpretations exist, the one favorable to the accused must be preferred. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that it possesses wide, unfettered discretion under Section 397, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct concurrent sentencing, particularly when consecutive sentencing would render the benefit of government commutation nugatory and result in inhumane, excessive incarceration, thereby defeating the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Court have the discretion to direct that sentences of imprisonment awarded in different trials run concurrently?
  • Should punitive laws be interpreted in favor of the liberty of the accused when multiple interpretations are possible?
  • Can the Court direct concurrent sentencing to prevent the benefit of a commuted sentence from being rendered nugatory?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahista Bibi and Another vs The Supdt. Central Jail, Mach, Etc.s2015 NLR Criminal 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-19
  concurrent sentencescommutation of death sentencelife imprisonmenthardship casessentencing discretionbeneficial interpretationCode of Criminal Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a petition seeking the relief of concurrent sentences under section 35 read with section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where the appellant had been convicted in multiple cases involving the Explosive Substances Act 1908 and the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, receiving multiple sentences of death and long-term rigorous imprisonment which, when calculated consecutively, far exceeded a normal human lifespan, notwithstanding the commutation of death sentences to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the court could direct multiple sentences of imprisonment awarded in different trials to run concurrently under sections 35 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent severe hardship and nullify the effect of life-exceeding cumulative imprisonments. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that in cases of extreme hardship, courts possess wide and unfettered discretion under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to direct that sentences of imprisonment run concurrently. The key principle laid down is that punitive laws must be interpreted beneficially to favor the liberty of an individual, and technicalities should not bar the delivery of substantial justice in cases involving disproportionate cumulative sentences.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the court can direct multiple sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should punitive and penal laws be interpreted in favor of the liberty of an accused person in cases of severe hardship?
  • Does a previous dismissal of a review petition operate as an absolute bar to granting substantial justice in exceptional hardship cases?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahista Bibi and another vs Superintendent, Central Jail, Mach2015 PLD Supreme Court 15 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-09-19
  concurrent sentencesconsecutive sentencescommutation of death sentencelife imprisonmenthardship caseinterpretation of penal statutesremissionsCode of Criminal Procedure 1898
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the question of whether multiple sentences of imprisonment awarded in different trials can be ordered to run concurrently under sections 35 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent extreme hardship where consecutive sentences exceed human life expectancy. The appellant had been convicted in multiple cases involving explosive substances and murder, receiving multiple death sentences and long terms of rigorous imprisonment. Although the death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by the Government, the cumulative unexpired terms exceeded two centuries. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that courts have wide, unfettered discretion under section 397 Cr.P.C. to direct sentences to run concurrently in hardship cases, and that penal provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of the liberty of the subject. The Court directed that all sentences awarded to the appellants shall run concurrently, granting them the benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. and all applicable remissions.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct multiple sentences of imprisonment awarded in different trials to run concurrently under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Should penal provisions curtailing personal liberty be strictly construed in favor of the accused when multiple interpretations are possible?
  • Does the dismissal of a previous review petition regarding the commutation of a sentence operate as an absolute bar to granting relief under section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in cases of extreme hardship?
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• Mst. Shahista Bibi and another vs Superintendent Central Jail, Mach2015 PLJ SC 379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  concurrent sentencesconsecutive sentencescommutation of sentencecriminal procedurejudicial discretionsubstantial justicepunitive law interpretationhardship
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, convicted in multiple criminal cases and sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment), sought relief to have their sentences run concurrently rather than consecutively, as the cumulative duration of their imprisonment exceeded human life expectancy. The core legal question was whether the Court could exercise its discretion under Sections 35 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to order concurrent sentencing in cases of extreme hardship. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, directing that all sentences awarded to the appellants run concurrently, alongside the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and all applicable remissions. The Court held that in interpreting punitive laws, the judiciary must prioritize the liberty of the individual and adopt interpretations that minimize hardship. It emphasized that where statutory provisions confer wide discretion, courts must exercise it to prevent detestable hardship and ensure that the benefits of executive clemency are not rendered illusory. Ultimately, the Court ruled that technicalities must not obstruct substantial justice, particularly when consecutive sentencing would result in imprisonment exceeding a natural human lifespan.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court direct that sentences of imprisonment awarded at different trials run concurrently under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the principle of strict interpretation of punitive laws require courts to prefer an interpretation favoring the liberty of the accused?
  • Can technicalities regarding previous review petitions bar the court from granting relief in cases of extreme hardship involving excessive imprisonment?
  • Are courts empowered to order concurrent sentencing to prevent the defeat of executive clemency benefits?
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• Mst. Shahi Lal and 5 others vs Khurshid Ali Khan and 13 others2015 YLR 2443 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-11-07
  inheritancecustomary lawRiwajlimitationMuslim Personal LawEx-State of Swatcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arises out of concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts, which had decreed the respondent's suit for declaration and possession regarding the legacy of his maternal grandfather. The core legal question was whether inheritance succession governed by customary law ('Riwaj') in the former State of Swat could be reopened decades later under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962, and whether a suit filed after more than fifty years was barred by limitation and protected by saving clauses in applicable tribal area regulations. The Peshawar High Court allowed the revision petition, setting aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissing the suit. The court held that where a property owner died during the regime of the Ex-State of Swat when customary law excluded daughters from inheritance, and the mother of the plaintiff never challenged the mutation during her lifetime, subsequent claims brought decades later are barred by limitation and protected by the saving of past operations under the relevant legal framework.

  Questions settled

  • Whether succession governed by customary law in the former State of Swat can be reopened under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1962?
  • Is a suit for inheritance barred by limitation when the predecessor-in-interest failed to challenge the adverse mutation during her lifetime?
  • Do saving clauses in regional regulations protect the previous operation of customary law and past property devolutions?
  • Whether legal heirs can independently challenge a mutation years later when their deceased ancestor acquiesced to the settlement entries during their lifetime?
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• Mst. Shaheen Saghri vs Judge Family Court, Khanewal and another2015 PLJ Lahore 1051 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-09Read full judgment →