Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232,813 judgments in total.

• Mst. Shahbana Begum and 2 others vs Naeem-Ud-Din2015 PLJ Peshawar 18 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-08-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahana Bibi vs Nadeem Shah and other2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shahana Bibi vs Nadeem Shah and 3 others2015 MLD 1623 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-03-25Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shagufta Parveen vs Qaiser Ijaz and 2 others2015 YLR 2550 · Lahore High Court · 2013-10-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shagufta Parveen & 7 others vs Executive District Officer (Revenue) & 42015 LHC 3089 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shagufta Abdullah vs Commissioner Inland Revenue and 3 others2015 PTD 1855 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shafia Bibi vs State Life Insurance Corporation and others2015 CLD 1184 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shabiran Pathan vs The StateSindh High Court · -
  narcotics possessionsentence reductioncriminal appealfirst offenderproportionality in sentencingcharas recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant, Mst. Shabiran Pathan, who was found guilty of possessing 8 kilograms of charas under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment with a fine. The core legal question was whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive given the appellant's age, status as a first offender, and the period of incarceration already served. The Sindh High Court, noting the appellant's advanced age (60-65 years) and the fact that she had already served nearly six years in custody, accepted the appellant's request not to press the appeal against conviction while seeking a reduction in sentence. Relying on the principle of proportionality and precedent regarding drug-related offenses, the Court dismissed the appeal against conviction but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone and significantly reduced the fine amount. The judgment affirms that courts may exercise discretion to reduce sentences for elderly first-time offenders when the ends of justice are satisfied by the time already served.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence to the period already undergone for a narcotics conviction?
  • Does the advanced age of a convict justify a reduction in the sentence imposed for drug possession?
  • Is a sentence of imprisonment for a narcotics offense subject to reduction if the convict is a first-time offender?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shabana Begum and 2 others vs Naeem-U-Din2015 PLJ Peshawar 18, 2015 MLD 708 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-08-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sehti and another vs Mst. Farzana and others2015 P.S.C. 872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2013-12-26
  constitutional petitionremandimplementation of orderagricultural propertysupreme court of pakistanleave refused
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging an order passed by the High Court of Sindh in Constitutional Petition No. D-1820 of 2011, which had set aside an impugned order, remanded the matter to the concerned EDO for implementation of an earlier order regarding the compensation of legal heirs, and issued detailed directions concerning agricultural property shares. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the subsequent compliance order passed by the Additional Commissioner-I was in conformity with the spirit of the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that since the impugned order had already been implemented by the concerned authority, any further grievance of the parties should be agitated before the appropriate forum. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the remedy when a party is aggrieved by an implementation order passed pursuant to a High Court's remand directions?
  • Can a constitutional petition be entertained against a compliance order when the original judgment has already been executed?
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• Mst. Sarwat Bano through Attorney vs Province of Sindh through Member Board of Revenue Hyderabad and 5 others2015 PLJ Karachi 171 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarwari Bibi vs State and anotherPLJ 2015 Cr.C. (Lahore) 180 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-25
  post-arrest bailabductionmurdercriminal liabilityinvestigationbail bonds
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by Mst. Sarwari Bibi, who was implicated in a criminal case registered under Sections 302, 364-A, and 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether, given the evidence on record, the petitioner was entitled to the concession of bail. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner instigated her son to abduct two minors, one of whom was subsequently murdered. Upon reviewing the record, the Court observed that the only evidence against the petitioner was a prior scuffle with the complainant's sister and a resulting threat. Crucially, the recovered minor did not implicate the petitioner in her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the petitioner's liability remained a matter for trial and that her continued incarceration was unnecessary for investigation. Consequently, the Court admitted the petitioner to bail, establishing the principle that bail may be granted when the prosecution's case against an accused rests on tenuous grounds without direct evidence of participation in the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail when the prosecution evidence fails to directly implicate them in the alleged crime?
  • Does the absence of a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 implicating the accused justify the grant of bail?
  • Can bail be granted when the accused's continued incarceration is not required for further investigation?
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• Mst. Sarwar Bano through Attorney vs Province of Sindh through Member Board of Revenue, Hyderabad and 5 others2015 PLD Sindh 445 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-02
  civil revisionappellate courtpoints for determinationprocedural irregularityremandCode of Civil Procedurejudicial reasoning
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision application challenged an appellate court judgment that dismissed an appeal against a trial court decision concerning the ownership and possession of agricultural land. The core legal question was whether the appellate court violated the mandatory procedural requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by failing to frame specific points for determination and failing to provide independent reasoning regarding the evidence presented. The High Court held that the appellate court's judgment was legally unsustainable because it lacked the requisite points for determination and failed to independently evaluate the evidence, merely affirming the trial court's decision without judicial application of mind. The Court emphasized that an appeal is a continuation of the lis, and the appellate court is duty-bound to frame points for determination and provide reasoned findings. Consequently, the High Court accepted the revision, set aside the impugned appellate judgment, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision in accordance with the law, ensuring the appellate court fulfills its statutory obligations.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for an appellate court to frame points for determination under Order XLI, Rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does an appellate court's failure to independently discuss evidence and frame points for determination render its judgment unsustainable?
  • Does an appellate court satisfy the requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by merely affirming the trial court's judgment without providing its own reasoning?
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• Mst. Sana Naseem vs Zahoor Ahmed Awan & anotherSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sana Jamil vs Govt. of the Punjab etc.2015 LHC 7457 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-11Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samreen Bibi vs Judge Family Court, etc2015 PLJ Lahore 745 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samreen Bibi vs Judge Family Court etc.2015 LHC 1639 · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samreen Bibi vs Judge Family Court and others2015 LHC 1639, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1009, 2015 PLJ Lahore 745, PLD 2015 Lahore · Lahore High Court · 2015-03-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samina Naz and 2 otherss vs Baby Dua Saeed alias Hiba through her2015 CLC 260 · Sindh High Court · 2013-09-16
  succession certificateinheritanceMuslim law of inheritanceTarkadeceased salarymiscellaneous appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous appeal challenges the orders passed by the Additional District Judge regarding a succession application concerning the assets and salary of a deceased police constable. The core legal question revolves around whether the mother and other legal heirs are entitled to a share in the deceased's salary and assets as part of his Tarka according to Islamic jurisprudence. The court held that all legal heirs, including the mother and minor children, are entitled to their respective shares in the deceased's salary and assets in accordance with Sharia and their sect. The key principle laid down is that Islamic law of inheritance governs the distribution of a deceased employee's legacy, including salaries and benefits, superseding administrative rules or notifications, and that parents qualify as legal heirs and family members entitled to a share of the Tarka.

  Questions settled

  • Are parents entitled to a share in the salary and assets left by a deceased government employee as part of the Tarka?
  • Does the Islamic law of inheritance supersede administrative rules or notifications regarding the distribution of a deceased's legacy?
  • Can a court modify a previous order upon an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to include the distribution of a deceased's salary?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Samina Khattak, etc vs SHO, Police Station Kohsar, etc2019 P Cr. L J 909, 2019 P Cr. L J 909, 2015-IHC-135 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-02-27
  quashment of FIRcustody of minorsnatural guardianhabeas corpusfamily disputeright to fair trialGuardian and Wards Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for the quashment of an FIR registered against a mother for the alleged kidnapping of her minor daughters, alongside a habeas corpus petition filed by the father seeking custody. The core legal questions were whether a criminal case under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be maintained against a natural guardian (mother) for retaining custody of minors, and whether habeas corpus proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are the appropriate forum for resolving custody disputes between parents. The Court held that a criminal case cannot be registered against a natural guardian for retaining custody of their own children, as such disputes fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of a Guardian Court. The Court quashed the FIR, noting that the police and criminal courts are not the proper forums for family disputes. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, affirming that such jurisdiction is reserved for exceptional cases of real urgency and cannot substitute for the Guardian and Wards Act 1890. The judgment establishes that unwarranted references to courts in an FIR are illegal as they may prejudice the right to a fair trial.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal case for kidnapping be registered against a natural guardian for retaining custody of their minor children?
  • Is the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 an appropriate substitute for the Guardian and Wards Act 1890 in custody disputes?
  • Does an unwarranted reference to a court in an FIR violate the right to a fair trial?
  • Under what circumstances can a High Court exercise its powers to quash an FIR?
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• Mst. Samina Bibi and 9 others vs Muhammad Ramzan and 3 others2015 YLR 539 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-11-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Salma vs The State2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-02-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sajida Bibi vs Mukhtar Ahmed & 2 others2015 PLJ FSC 1 · Federal Shariat Court · 2014-05-02
  rapeZina-bil-jabrappeal against acquittaldelay in FIRmedical contradictionbenefit of the doubtcredibility of witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the acquittal of the respondents by the trial court under Section 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question involves determining whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge of rape beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the delayed FIR, medical contradictions, doubtful ocular testimony, and failure to produce material evidence. The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal, holding that unexplained delays in lodging the FIR, material discrepancies between the ocular account and medical evidence regarding the time of the incident, absence of injuries on the victim, non-production of crucial witnesses including the complainant's father, and failure to recover incriminating evidence cast grave doubts on the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to establish its case through consistent and corroborative evidence, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused, and a suggestion put during cross-examination cannot substitute for independent proof of guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay of several days in lodging an FIR for rape cast serious doubt on the prosecution case?
  • Can a suggestion put to a witness during cross-examination be construed as an admission of guilt without independent corroborative evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of a prosecutrix when contradicted by medical evidence and doubtful ocular accounts?
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• Mst. Saira Bibi etc vs Nawab Ali etc2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saira Bibi and 2 others vs Nawab Ali and 2 others2015 CLC 1228 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saima Tabassum vs Syed Sher Shah and 3 others2015 PLJ Peshawar 124 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-21Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saima Gul and 3 others vs Haider Zaman and 2 others2015 PLD Peshawar 14 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-11-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sahib Khatoon vs The stateSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia and another vs Station House Officer, P.S. Shahwali, District2015 PLJ Lahore 1036 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Akhtar vs State Life Insurance Corporation through Chairman and 2 others2015 CLD 679 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-22Read full judgment →
• Mukhtiar Iqbal Ahmed vs NotSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailmurderocular and medical evidenceforensic reportreasonable groundsfurther inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by two accused persons charged with murder and other offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the applicants were entitled to bail given the allegations of their specific roles in the murder, the recovery of crime weapons with positive forensic reports, and the defense's arguments regarding contradictions between ocular and medical evidence and delays in investigation. The court dismissed the bail application, holding that the prosecution had established reasonable grounds to believe the applicants were connected to the offense. The court reasoned that the specific allegations, the positive forensic report linking the recovered weapons to the crime, and the lack of a plausible motive for false implication by the complainant outweighed the defense's contentions at the bail stage. The key principle laid down is that at the bail stage, the court should not engage in a deep appreciation of evidence or explore hypothetical scenarios; rather, it must determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the offense, leaving the resolution of evidentiary contradictions for the trial.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the recovery of crime weapons or their submission for forensic analysis automatically entitle an accused to bail?
  • Is a deep appreciation of evidence permissible at the post-arrest bail stage?
  • Does the presence of firearm injuries on the back of a deceased person, when the ocular account alleges a face-to-face encounter, necessarily create a contradiction requiring the grant of bail?
  • Can a bail application be dismissed when the prosecution provides a positive forensic report linking recovered weapons to the crime?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Bibi and 2 others vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 256 · Lahore High Court · 2013-12-31
  post-arrest bailfemale accusedransomjurisdictioncriminal procedurebail as of right
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by three female petitioners accused in F.I.R. No. 273, registered under sections 395, 365, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners contended they were falsely implicated, played no specific role, and were entitled to bail under the first proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, given their gender and the completion of the investigation. The State opposed the bail, arguing that the allegations of ransom-seeking invoked section 365-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts in favor of Anti-Terrorism Courts. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite the State's assertion of jurisdiction issues. The Court held that since the Investigating Officer confirmed no evidence of ransom-seeking existed and the prosecuting agency concluded no case under section 365-A was made out, the petitioners were entitled to bail. The Court affirmed that female accused are entitled to bail as a matter of right under the second proviso to section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, absent compelling contrary evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Are female accused entitled to bail as a matter of right under the second proviso to section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the mere allegation of ransom-seeking automatically oust the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts if the investigating agency finds no evidence to support such a charge?
  • Is a bail application maintainable when the investigating officer confirms that the specific offence alleged by the prosecution is not supported by the evidence collected?
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• Mst. Sadiqa Begum and others vs The Province of Punjab and others2015 YLR 1456 · Lahore High Court · 2014-02-07
  civil revisioninheritance mutationex parte decreeconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictiondeclaration suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts which decreed the respondents' declaratory suit regarding immovable property. The core legal question centered on the validity of a mutation sanctioned on the basis of an ex parte decree that was subsequently set aside, and whether the legal heirs of a deceased widow were entitled to inherit her share from the original owner's estate. The Lahore High Court held that when an ex parte decree—serving as the foundation for a disputed mutation—is set aside and the underlying suit is subsequently dismissed for non-prosecution, the superstructure of the disputed mutation collapses along with it. The court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts, based on proper appreciation of evidence, cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 unless there is a jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a mutation sanctioned on the basis of an ex parte decree survives when the said ex parte decree is subsequently set aside and the suit is dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the courts below in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity?
  • Is a widow entitled to inherit from the estate of her deceased husband if allegations of divorce are not established through a sustained legal challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sadia Bibi vs The State and another2015 P Cr. L J 150 · Lahore High Court · 2013-07-30
  suspension of sentencenarcotics controlbail pending appealrecovery of contrabandcriminal appealpossession of charas
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition was filed under Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking the suspension of a sentence and grant of bail pending the disposal of a criminal appeal. The petitioner, convicted under Section 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of four kilograms of charas, challenged her conviction on grounds of mala fide, lack of evidence, and contradictions in the prosecution's case, specifically regarding the identity of the recovered contraband. The Court examined the record, noting that the petitioner was apprehended red-handed, the recovery was proven, and the chemical examiner's report was positive. The Court held that the grounds raised required deeper appreciation of evidence, which is inappropriate at the stage of suspension of sentence. Relying on the principle established by the Supreme Court in The State through Deputy Director, Anti-Narcotics Force, Karachi v. Mobin Khan (2000 SCMR 299), the Court affirmed that the third proviso to Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, cannot be invoked for narcotics cases involving quantities exceeding one kilogram. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked in narcotics cases where the quantity exceeds one kilogram?
  • Is the suspension of a sentence appropriate when the grounds for appeal require a deeper appreciation of evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a narcotic substance exceeding one kilogram preclude the grant of bail pending appeal under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sabira 131B1, Etc s vs Hikmat Khan, Etc.s2015 NLR Civil 365 · Lahore High Court · 2014-06-20Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saadia vs Mst. Gul Bibi2015 SCP 34, 2016 P.S.C. 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-12-15
  Hiba-namaGift deedDelivery of possessionMisreading of evidenceBurden of proofUnregistered documentDeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of a house, where the respondent claimed title through two unregistered gift deeds (Hiba-namas) allegedly executed by the original owner in favor of her brother, who subsequently gifted it to the respondent. The appellant, the niece and legal heir of the original owner, challenged the validity of these deeds. The core legal questions involved the admissibility of unregistered gift deeds, the burden of proof regarding the execution of such deeds, and the necessity of proving the essential ingredients of a valid gift. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts committed patent misreading and non-reading of evidence. The Court ruled that the respondent failed to prove the execution of the gift deeds, as the original documents were not produced, and the attesting witnesses' testimony was insufficient. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a valid gift under Islamic law requires the fulfillment of three essential conditions: offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, none of which were established. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the suit was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of original gift deeds in court render them inadmissible as evidence?
  • What are the three essential conditions required to establish a valid gift (Hiba) under law?
  • Can concurrent findings of lower courts be set aside if they are based on a misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is the mere execution of a gift deed sufficient to prove a valid transfer of property without proof of delivery of possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saadia Abdul Shakoor vs Miss. Nadia Choudhry2015 MLD 951 · Sindh High Court · 2014-12-05Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ruqqia Bibi vs Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court and 2 others2015 P Cr. L J 456 · Lahore High Court · 2013-09-09
  anti-terrorism courtjurisdictionacid throwingcorrosive substancescheduled offenceconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 challenged an order of the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Sargodha, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the transfer of a case involving an acid-throwing incident from the Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court of competent jurisdiction. The core legal question was whether an offence involving hurt caused by a corrosive substance arising out of a private family dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court. The Lahore High Court held that by virtue of statutory amendments and notifications under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, specifically incorporating offences relating to corrosive substances into the Third Schedule, such scheduled offences are exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Courts regardless of whether the underlying motive stems from a personal family dispute. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence involving hurt caused by a corrosive substance is exclusively triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court?
  • Does a personal or family dispute exempt an accused from being tried under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for a scheduled offence?
  • What is the effect of a notification issued under section 34 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 regarding the Third Schedule?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana vs Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary and 3 others2015 PLC (C.S.) 560 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-10-09
  appointmentmerit-based selectionadministrative negligencelocus standiwrit petitionrecruitment criteria
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought the annulment of an order withdrawing her appointment as a P.E.T. teacher, arguing that her initial appointment was lawful. The core legal question was whether the authorities acted unlawfully in withdrawing the petitioner's appointment to accommodate candidates who possessed higher merit scores and had been inadvertently overlooked. The court held that the petitioner's appointment was based on an error, as she was lower in merit compared to the substituted candidates. The court emphasized that the selection process must strictly adhere to merit and the specific choices/priorities exercised by candidates regarding their posting locations. The court found that the petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the appointments of more meritorious candidates, particularly as she had also violated the terms of her appointment by joining before the stipulated date. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The court further directed the Department of Education to investigate the negligence of the officials responsible for the initial erroneous appointment, noting that such administrative failures cause unnecessary litigation and undermine the integrity of the recruitment system.

  Questions settled

  • Can a candidate with lower merit challenge the appointment of a more meritorious candidate?
  • Does an appointment order issued due to administrative error or oversight confer a vested right upon the appointee?
  • Is an appointment order valid if it ignores the merit-based preferences and choices submitted by candidates?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rukhsana Bibi vs The StateK.L.R. 2015 Criminal Cases 59 · Lahore High Court · 2014-10-30
  narcotic substancesmorphinechemical analysissample collectionsentencing modificationcriminal appealnarcotic recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Mst. Rukhsana Bibi, was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, for the possession of 485 tablets of morphine and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the contents of all recovered tablets because samples were only taken from ten tablets, and that the total weight of the narcotics was never established. The Lahore High Court held that because each tablet is an independent unit, the prosecution could only prove the presence of morphine for the ten tablets actually tested. Consequently, the Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 9(b), which requires proof of the total quantity. Applying the principle that samples must be taken from each individual unit to establish the nature of the entire bulk, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 9(b), substituted it with a conviction under Section 9(a), and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant, considering her age and health.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 be sustained if chemical analysis was only performed on a fraction of the recovered tablets?
  • Is it legally permissible to infer that an entire batch of tablets contains a narcotic substance based on the analysis of only a few samples?
  • Does the failure to weigh the total quantity of recovered narcotics preclude a conviction under Section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rubina Kousar Mughal vs District Police Officer, Sukkur & othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rooh Afza and others vs Ayub and others2015 YLR 2199 · Peshawar High Court · 2015-04-10
  inheritance disputerevenue recordpresumption of truthburden of proofpedigree tablecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a dispute over inheritance and the accuracy of revenue records. The petitioners (plaintiffs) claimed entitlement to property as the widow and daughter of the deceased, alleging that the existing pedigree table was incorrect and that they were entitled to a share of the legacy. The respondents contested this, asserting the plaintiffs had no nexus with the property and that the revenue records were accurate. The trial court initially decreed in favor of the plaintiffs, but the appellate court set aside this judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence insufficient. The core legal question was whether the plaintiffs had discharged the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of truth attached to long-standing revenue records. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce cogent evidence to substantiate their claims or rebut the official revenue records. The court affirmed that entries in settlement records carry a presumption of truth under the law, which cannot be overturned by weak, uncorroborated oral testimony, particularly after an unexplained delay of forty years.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presumption of truth attached to entries in the first settlement record under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967 prevail over oral testimony?
  • Can a pedigree table prepared by plaintiffs be accepted as evidence without corroboration from independent witnesses or official records?
  • Is a delay of forty years in challenging revenue entries a significant factor in determining the validity of a claim to inheritance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Siddique vs District Co-Ordination Officer and others2015 PLC (C.S.) 279 · Lahore High Court · 2014-08-11
  recruitment policymerit listjudicial review of policyestoppel by conductacademic qualificationconstitutional jurisdictionElementary School Educator
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner challenged the merit list for the appointment of an Elementary School Educator, contending that her M.A. (Education) degree was incorrectly treated as a professional qualification rather than an academic degree, which resulted in fewer marks being awarded. The core legal question was whether the court could interfere with the recruitment policy's allocation of marks for specific degrees and whether the petitioner, having participated in the recruitment process, was estopped from challenging the policy after being declared unsuccessful. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the allocation of marks was a policy decision that could not be judicially reviewed absent proof of mala fide, conflict with law, or violation of fundamental rights. The Court affirmed that it lacks the jurisdiction to act as a policy maker. Furthermore, the Court held that a candidate who participates in a recruitment process under an unchallenged policy is estopped by conduct from challenging that policy after failing to secure the position. The petition was dismissed, and the appointment of the respondent was upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court interfere with a recruitment policy's allocation of marks for specific degrees in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a candidate who participates in a recruitment process under an unchallenged policy estopped from challenging that policy after being declared unsuccessful?
  • Under what circumstances can a government recruitment policy be judicially reviewed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Sattar vs Government of Punjab, Etc.2015 LHC 5967 · Lahore High Court · 2015-09-02Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Parveen vs Regional Director Anti-Corruption2015 P Cr. L J 1207 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-02
  Anti-Corruption Establishmentsuccessive inquiriesharassmentconstitutional petitionadministrative powerwrit jurisdictionwitch-hunting
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by a Lady Health Worker seeking protection against harassment by the Anti-Corruption Establishment. The petitioner had been subjected to three successive inquiries regarding allegations of fraudulent employment documents, all of which resulted in her exoneration. The core legal question was whether the Anti-Corruption Establishment possesses unbridled, open-ended authority to conduct repeated inquiries against an individual despite multiple findings of innocence. The Lahore High Court held that the competent authority does not have unlimited or untrammeled power to initiate successive investigations amounting to "witch-hunting." The court emphasized that administrative powers under the Punjab Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985, must be exercised reasonably and not as a tool for harassment or personal vendettas. Consequently, the court restrained the Regional Director from further harassing the petitioner, establishing the principle that the judiciary must intervene to prevent the abuse of special laws and protect citizens from the tyranny of endless administrative investigations when allegations have been repeatedly proven baseless.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Anti-Corruption Establishment possess unbridled authority to conduct successive inquiries against an individual after they have been exonerated?
  • Can the High Court exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to restrain administrative authorities from engaging in the harassment of citizens through repeated investigations?
  • Are the powers granted under the Punjab Anti-Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985, absolute and exempt from judicial review regarding the frequency of inquiries?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riffat Munir vs Naveed Zafar, etc2015 LHC 5309 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-25
  cancellation of bailpre-arrest bailmisuse of bailconsignment to recordcriminal procedureprohibitory clause
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions sought the cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to the respondents in a case involving offences under sections 379 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the previously granted bail should be recalled due to alleged misuse of the concession and the merits of the case. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that no grounds existed for the cancellation of bail. The Court reaffirmed the established legal principle that considerations for the grant of bail are distinct from those for its cancellation. Once bail is granted by a competent court, it cannot be recalled without strong and exceptional grounds, such as proof of misuse of the concession. The Court observed that the petitioner’s allegations of misuse were unsubstantiated, as the cross-version FIR was found false by the police and the Judicial Magistrate. Furthermore, the petitioner’s failure to prosecute resulted in the trial being consigned to the record room under section 249-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, rendering the request for cancellation unjustified.

  Questions settled

  • Are the considerations for the grant of bail identical to those for the cancellation of bail?
  • Can bail be cancelled in the absence of strong and exceptional grounds demonstrating misuse of the concession?
  • What is the effect on a bail cancellation petition when the trial court has consigned the case to the record room under section 249-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Riaz Bibi. vs Addl: Sessions Judge/JOP2015 LHC 6084 · Lahore High Court · 2015-08-31Read full judgment →
• Mst. Resham Bibi and others vs Ali Muhammad and others2015 PLJ SC 1009, 2015 SCMR 1398 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2014-10-17
  additional evidenceOrder XLI Rule 27 CPCcivil revisionremandrevenue recordofficial recordduties of revisional court
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a suit filed by the respondents to challenge revenue record entries allocating a half-share in suit land to Hashim Din (predecessor of the petitioners) instead of a one-third share. The trial court decreed the suit, and after rounds of appeal and remand, the appellate court dismissed the petitioners' appeal. The petitioners filed a civil revision before the High Court along with an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to produce an official order of the Deputy Commissioner (Claims) dated 17-2-1959. The High Court decided the civil revision without adverting to or deciding the pending application for additional evidence. The Supreme Court held that while additional evidence is generally not encouraged at the revisional stage, where official record directly impacts the merits of the case, it ought to be examined to reach a just decision. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the matter for decision afresh along with the pending application.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court decide a civil revision on merits without disposing of a pending application for additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether official revenue records having a direct bearing on the merits of a case may be considered as additional evidence at the revisional stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Resham Bibi (deceased) through L.Rs, and others vs Muhammad2015 MLD 1655 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-03
  past and closed transactioncustomary lawgiftabatement of proceedingsMuslim Personal Lawinheritancecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision challenged an appellate court judgment regarding the inheritance of land originally gifted by the deceased in 1928. The core legal question was whether a decree passed under customary law, which allocated shares of the gifted property, abated following the promulgation of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, and its 1983 amendment, or whether it remained valid as a past and closed transaction. The Court held that the transaction was saved. It observed that the gift and subsequent compromise decree, finalized in 1958, resulted in the delivery of possession to the beneficiaries long before the relevant legislation. Consequently, the Court ruled that the transaction was a past and closed matter, falling under the proviso to Section 2-A of the Act, which protects transactions where possession has already been delivered. The revision was dismissed, affirming that such settled property rights are not subject to abatement under the 1962 Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decree passed under customary law regarding property alienation abate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, if possession has already been delivered?
  • What constitutes a past and closed transaction under the proviso to Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
  • Are property rights established by a compromise decree finalized prior to the 1962 Act subject to abatement under the Punjab Amendment Ordinance, 1983?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehana Hafeez vs Muhammad Ali alias EhsanSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razya Ghulam and anothers vs The General Public2015 PLD Balochistan 127 · Balochistan High Court · 2015-04-16
  succession certificatefurnishing of securityspeaking ordernon-speaking orderjudicial discretioncivil revisionwidow compensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges an order passed by the District Judge dismissing an application for production of official surety in connection with a succession certificate. The core legal question concerns whether a trial court is bound to demand security under Section 375 of the Succession Act 1925 in all cases, and the validity of a perfunctory, non-speaking judicial order. The Balochistan High Court held that the trial court's order of 'Not Allowed' was a perfunctory, non-speaking order manifesting a lack of judicial application of mind. The Court held that under Section 375 of the Succession Act 1925, demanding security is mandatory only in cases falling under subsections (3) or (4) of Section 373, whereas in other cases—such as where all legal heirs consent and there is no adverse claimant—dispensing with security is a matter of judicial discretion. The Court set aside the impugned order, ruling that the widow, as the sole legal heir, should not be burdened with excessive security demands, and directed that the succession certificate be issued upon furnishing a personal surety bond of a government official.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial court can dispose of a judicial matter through a perfunctory, non-speaking order without considering the contentions of the parties?
  • Is it mandatory for a court to demand security for the grant of a succession certificate in all circumstances under Section 375 of the Succession Act 1925?
  • When does a court have the discretion to dispense with the furnishing of security for a succession certificate?
  • Whether a court should insist on furnishing security when all legal heirs are before the court and have consented to the grant of a succession certificate to the petitioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia vs Iind Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and 3 others2015 YLR 816 · Sindh High Court · 2014-05-07
  registration of FIRJustice of Peacecognizable offenceextra-judicial killingdue processpolice encounterlast seen evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal miscellaneous application challenges an order passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, which dismissed the applicant's application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking registration of an FIR regarding the kidnapping and subsequent extra-judicial killing of her son. The core legal question was whether the Sessions Judge properly evaluated the application for disclosing a cognizable offence or erred by relying solely on a police encounter report. The Sindh High Court held that the Sessions Judge misdirected himself by calling for a police report and dismissing the complaint based on allegations of the deceased's criminal record, while ignoring the specific allegations of a cognizable offence and eyewitness accounts of 'last seen'. The Court established that under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace must examine whether a cognizable offence is disclosed in the complaint rather than conducting a mini-trial or relying on police reports of encounters, and that involvement in other crimes does not deprive a citizen of due process or bar the registration of an FIR.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is required to call for a police report before deciding an application under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the alleged involvement of a deceased person in other criminal cases justify refusing the registration of an FIR regarding their unnatural death?
  • What is the scope of inquiry by a Sessions Judge while dealing with an application for the registration of a criminal case under sections 22-A and 22-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum vs Mst. Shahnaz Begum2015 LHC 3128 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-15
  civil revisioninheritanceparentage disputebirth certificatedocumentary evidenceconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts which decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiff, Mst. Shahnaz Begum, for inheritance and dismissed the suit of the petitioners. The core legal question was whether the respondent-plaintiff was the legitimate daughter of the deceased land-owner, Fateh Muhammad, and thus entitled to a share in his inheritance, or the daughter of another individual following an alleged divorce and remarriage of her mother. The Lahore High Court held that documentary evidence, including official birth register entries, identity documents, and nikahnamas—supported by the testimony of the defendants' own witness—overwhelmingly established that the respondent was born to the deceased during the subsistence of the marriage. The Court laid down the principle that documentary evidence takes precedence over verbal assertions, and concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence are immune from interference in revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the absence of any gross illegality, irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether documentary evidence takes precedence over verbal assertions in determining parentage and inheritance rights?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction without showing gross illegality, irregularity, misreading, or non-reading of evidence?
  • Does a birth certificate and official union council record carry evidentiary weight in establishing the date of birth and parentage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashidan Bibi, etc vs Aman Ullah Bangsh, etc2015 LHC 6550 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-14Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Khatoon and others vs District Education Officer (Male), Peshawar and others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-05-06
  family pensionqualifying servicecondonation of deficiencyCivil Service Regulationswrit jurisdictionArticle 212pensionary benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, legal heirs of a deceased theology teacher, challenged the denial of family pension benefits by the education department. The core legal question was whether the deceased had completed the requisite ten years of service for pension eligibility and whether the department could unilaterally reclassify his leave as extraordinary leave without pay to disqualify him. The Court held that the deceased had served for over nine years and six months, which, under paragraph 423 of the Civil Service Regulations, is automatically condonable. The Court found the department's reclassification of the deceased's leave as "extraordinary leave without pay" to be unsupported by evidence and contrary to the official service record. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to grant the family pension. The judgment establishes that pension is a vested right earned through past service rather than a bounty, that service deficiencies up to six months are automatically condonable, and that the constitutional bar under Article 212 regarding service matters does not apply to heirs of a deceased employee who are not themselves civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan apply to the legal heirs of a deceased civil servant seeking pensionary benefits?
  • Is a deficiency of up to six months in the qualifying service of a civil servant automatically condonable under the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Can a department unilaterally reclassify sanctioned leave on full or half pay as extraordinary leave without pay to deny pensionary benefits?
  • Is pension considered a vested right or a bounty for a civil servant?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Begum and others vs The State2015 MLD 703 · Board of Revenue · 2014-10-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashida Begum and others vs Muhammad Din, etc2015 PLJ Lahore 1217 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rani Fareeda vs Tahir SajeemK.L.R. 2015 Civil Cases 5 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ramzano (deceased) through LRs vs Khushi Muhammad etc.2015 LHC 8568 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-21
  inheritance mutationdeclaratory suitconsent decreelocus standilimitationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Lodhran, which set aside the trial court's judgment decreeing the plaintiff's suit regarding an inheritance mutation. The core legal question concerns whether a plaintiff who was not a party to a previous consent decree is barred from filing a regular declaratory suit and whether an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is the exclusive remedy in such circumstances, along with issues of limitation. The Lahore High Court held that a previous consent decree to which the plaintiff was not a party is not binding upon her and does not bar a separate declaratory suit to establish her title and challenge the decree, as section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is not mandatory when establishing independent locus standi. Furthermore, limitation does not pose a hurdle when the defendants have admitted the inheritance rights in prior related litigation. The revision petition was allowed, setting aside the appellate judgment and restoring the trial court's decree.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who was not a party to a previous consent decree is bound to challenge it through an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a plaintiff file a declaratory suit to establish title and challenge a prior decree without first filing an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether a decree passed in proceedings to which the plaintiff was not a party is binding upon the plaintiff under Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Does the defense of limitation bar a suit where the defendants have admitted the inheritance rights of the plaintiff's predecessor in prior litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ramzano (deceased) through LRs vs Khushi Muhammad and others2015 LHC 8568, 2015 PLJ Lahore 1082 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-22
  civil revisioninheritance mutationconsent decreelocus standideclaratory suitSection 12(2) CPCres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment which set aside a trial court decree in favor of the plaintiff-petitioner regarding an inheritance mutation. The core legal question was whether a prior consent decree, to which the plaintiff was not a party, precluded her from filing a separate declaratory suit to challenge the mutation, or if she was mandatorily required to proceed via an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court held that a consent decree does not bind a non-party, and such a person is not required to challenge it through Section 12(2) proceedings. The Court further ruled that a party may challenge a prior decree in a fresh suit for declaration of title if they establish their own locus standi and interest in the property. The principle laid down is that Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is intended to curtail litigation, not to bar a person from asserting their independent rights in a suit for declaration, especially when they were not a party to the prior proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is a person who was not a party to a prior consent decree bound to challenge it through an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a party challenge a prior decree in a fresh suit for declaration of title if they were not a party to the previous proceedings?
  • Does a consent decree bind a person who was not a party to the proceedings in which it was passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rakayya Perveen vs Province of Punjab, etc.2015 PLJ Lahore 521 · Lahore High Court · 2015-01-30Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raj Bibi and others vs Mukhtar Shah and others2015 C.L.R. 111 · Lahore High Court · 2014-09-09
  gift mutationhibbaparda nasheen ladylimitation periodburden of proofcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition arose from a suit challenging a mutation of gift executed by a deceased parda nasheen lady in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions involved the validity of the gift, the presence of fraud or forgery, and the limitation period for challenging the mutation. The Lahore High Court held that the gift was validly created with proper offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession, and that the minor discrepancies in the testimony of the respondents' witnesses were inconsequential. The court further held that the protection afforded to a parda nasheen lady cannot be invoked by third-party heirs when the donor herself did not challenge the transaction during her lifetime despite having knowledge of it. The petition was dismissed and the appellate court's judgment upholding the gift was affirmed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a gift mutation is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can legal heirs invoke the doctrine protecting parda nasheen ladies to challenge a gift when the donor herself did not challenge it during her lifetime?
  • Does an official act performed in the normal course of revenue proceedings carry a presumption of truth under the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raj Bibi and anothers vs Province of Punjab through Collector, Multan and 24 others2015 YLR 1500 · Lahore High Court · 2013-07-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia Khatoon vs Abbas Ali & anotherSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rabia Bibi vs Muhammad Arshad2015 LHC 5946 · Lahore High Court · 2015-06-12Read full judgment →
• Mst. Pathani vs (1) Habib Bank Ltd. (2) Raja Tariq Minhas (auctionSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Pashmeena through Legal Heirs and 3 others vs DILNAWAZand 5 others2015 YLR 1905 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-09-30
  Civil RevisionConcurrent findingsMutationLand Revenue ActGiftFraud and misrepresentationDelivery of possessionPower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged concurrent judgments from the trial and appellate courts, which dismissed the petitioner's suit regarding property ownership. The dispute arose from competing claims: the petitioner relied on a consent decree, while the respondents relied on Mutation No. 9125. Both lower courts found that the transactions were fraudulent, collusive, and lacked valid delivery of possession. The core legal questions concerned the validity of the mutation process and the requirements for a valid gift. The High Court upheld the concurrent findings, emphasizing that under Section 42 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, mutations must be attested within the estate where the property is situated. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that a beneficiary cannot witness their own benefit and that a gift is invalid without clear proof of the delivery of possession. The Court held that revisional jurisdiction is limited and cannot disturb concurrent findings of fact unless they are patently illegal or based on misreading of evidence. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as meritless, affirming that neither party established a valid claim to the property.

  Questions settled

  • Must a mutation of land transfer be attested in the village where the property is situated?
  • Can a beneficiary of a gift act as an attesting witness to the mutation of that gift?
  • Is the delivery of possession a mandatory requirement to prove a valid gift under law?
  • What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction regarding concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Jamal Hassan vs Mushtaq-Ur-Rehman and 3 others2015 CLC 1124 · Sindh High Court · 2015-02-12
  Letter of AdministrationSuccession petitionOral giftBurden of proofInheritanceCaveatEstate distribution
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a succession petition for the grant of a Letter of Administration regarding the immovable property of the deceased, Mst. Fatima Begum, which was subsequently converted into a suit following a caveat filed by one of the legal heirs, Rizwan-ur-Rehman. The core legal question was whether the suit property formed part of the deceased's estate to be distributed among all legal heirs according to Islamic law, or if it had been orally gifted to the caveator during the deceased's lifetime. The Court held that the plaintiff successfully proved the estate's existence and the entitlement of the legal heirs. Conversely, the caveator failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the alleged oral gift, as he did not testify or produce evidence to substantiate the claim. Consequently, the Court dismissed the caveat and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment reinforces the principle that the burden of proof lies heavily on a party claiming an oral gift to provide positive and cogent evidence to displace the rights of legal heirs in an estate.

  Questions settled

  • Does the burden of proof lie on the caveator to establish an alleged oral gift of property when other legal heirs claim it as part of the deceased's estate?
  • Can a succession petition be converted into a suit upon the filing of a caveat?
  • Is a claim of oral gift valid if the claimant fails to testify or produce evidence to support the declaration of gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Parveen Bibi. vs The State etc.2015 LHC 7268 · Lahore High Court · 2015-11-16Read full judgment →
• (1) Mst. Parveen Akhtar (2) Noor Bacha (3) Sultan Zaib and another vs TheSindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Jan vs Asghar Khan & 05-others2015 LHC 6538 · Lahore High Court · 2015-10-15Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nusrat Bibi vs Nazir Akhtar2015 SCMR 808, 2015 NLR Civil 419, 2015 PLJ SC 575 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-03-02
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadattesting witnessessuperior right of pre-emptioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a civil revision filed by the appellant, which had upheld the appellate court's decree in a suit for possession through pre-emption. The core legal question was whether the failure to produce both attesting witnesses of the notice of Talb-i-Ishhad is fatal to a pre-emption suit under section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the statutory mandate requires the production of two truthful attesting witnesses to prove Talb-i-Ishhad, and the non-production of one attesting witness without plausible explanation leads to the failure of proof regarding Talb-i-Ishhad. The key principle laid down is that failure to examine the requisite attesting witnesses for Talb-i-Ishhad as contemplated under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 results in the dismissal of the pre-emption suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of one of the attesting witnesses of Talb-i-Ishhad is fatal to a suit for pre-emption?
  • How many truthful attesting witnesses are required to be produced to prove Talb-i-Ishhad under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noureen Nazim vs B.I.S.E. Rawalpindi etc.2015 LHC 819 · Lahore High Court · 2015-02-12
  Intermediate examinationacademic regulationseducational institutionexamination chanceswrit jurisdictionstudent disciplineBoard of Intermediate and Secondary Education
  Summary & questions settled

  This intra-court appeal challenges a single bench order dismissing a writ petition against the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Rawalpindi. The appellant, having exhausted four permissible chances to pass the Intermediate examination, sought a fifth special chance, which the Board refused. The core legal question was whether a student is entitled to an additional examination attempt beyond the prescribed limit and whether the Board is obligated to honor an examination form accepted due to administrative irregularity. The Court held that the appellant had exhausted all four permissible chances under the Board's regulations. It observed that the appellant had secured the examination form by concealing previous academic records and misrepresenting her status. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board's refusal to declare the result, noting that the appellant was bound by the institution's rules. The principle laid down is that students are strictly governed by the disciplinary and academic regulations of their educational institutions, and courts will not grant relief to candidates who have exhausted their statutory attempts or who have acted in bad faith to circumvent established examination rules.

  Questions settled

  • Is a student entitled to a special examination chance after exhausting all permissible attempts under the Board's regulations?
  • Are students bound by the rules and regulations prescribed by their educational institutions regarding examination attempts?
  • Does an administrative error in accepting an examination form create a vested right for a student to appear in an examination for which they are ineligible?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Noor UN Nisa and 18 others vs Collector Land Acquisition, Abbottabad and 3 others2015 NLR Revenue 33, 2015 YLR 2599 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-29Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nomail Zia-- vs Adnan Riaz2015 NLR Civil 435 · Islamabad High Court · 2013-09-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nighat Rizwan vs The Federation of Pakistan, etc2015 C.L.R. 142 · Lahore High Court · 2014-04-04Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nazir Bibi, etc vs Mst. Nazir Bibi,- etc2015 PLJ Lahore 1194 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-11
  civil revisionsale deedfraudulent documentfingerprint expertburden of proofdeclaration suitappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the appellate court's judgment which reversed the trial court's dismissal of a suit for declaration regarding the validity of a sale deed. The core issue was whether the disputed sale deed, executed in 1975, was a genuine transaction or a fraudulent document, given the plaintiffs' assertion that the vendor had died in 1972. The High Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the appellate court's finding that the sale deed was bogus. The court emphasized that when a registered document is challenged as fraudulent, the reliance on expert evidence, such as a fingerprint analysis comparing the disputed thumb impression with known samples, is conclusive. Furthermore, the court held that testimony from identification witnesses who admit they did not personally know the vendor is insufficient to establish the validity of a sale transaction, particularly when rebutted by credible evidence of the vendor's prior death. The appellate court’s appreciation of evidence was found to be free from legal error or misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Can a registered sale deed be declared void if the thumb impression of the vendor is proven to be forged by expert evidence?
  • Is the testimony of an identification witness sufficient to prove the execution of a sale deed if the witness admits they did not personally know the vendor?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to interfere in a factual finding of the appellate court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if no misreading of evidence is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Zahra vs Multan Development Authority, Multan and another2015 P.S.C. 1433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-07
  land acquisitioncompensationinterest on compensationstatutory dutycollectorpublic purposemandatory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over land acquisition compensation for the construction of the Multan Bye-Pass. The core legal questions were whether the Provincial Government was liable for compensation and whether the landowner was entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, given the Collector’s failure to tender or deposit the awarded amount. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government, as the beneficiary of the acquisition, is liable for compensation. Furthermore, the Court held that the landowner is entitled to interest under Section 34 because the Collector failed to comply with the mandatory duty under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to tender or deposit the compensation in the Referee Court. The Court established that the Collector's obligation to tender or deposit compensation is a mandatory statutory requirement, and failure to perform this duty triggers the penal consequence of interest. The mere release of funds to an executing agency does not absolve the Collector of this statutory obligation.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Provincial Government liable for compensation for land acquired for a public purpose where it is the beneficiary of the acquisition?
  • Does the failure of a Collector to tender or deposit compensation as required by Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, trigger the payment of interest under Section 34?
  • Does the release of funds to an executing agency absolve the Collector of the statutory duty to tender or deposit compensation to the landowner?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Zahra and others vs Multan Development Authority, Multan and others2015 PLJ SC 916, 2015 P.S.C. 1433, 2015 SCMR 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 2015-07-07
  land acquisitionpayment of compensationtender of compensationpayment of interestmandatory statutory dutyMultan Bye-Passprovincial liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal and related petitions arose from a long-standing land acquisition dispute concerning the acquisition of land for the construction of the Multan Bye-Pass. The core legal questions involved the liability of the Provincial Government to pay compensation as the ultimate beneficiary, and whether a landowner is entitled to statutory interest under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when the compensation amount is neither tendered nor deposited in court upon taking possession. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government, as the beneficiary of the public purpose project, is liable to pay the compensation, and that the Collector's compliance with section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to tender or deposit compensation is mandatory. The ratio decidendi established is that failure of the Collector to tender payment of the awarded compensation to the entitled person or to deposit the same in the Referee Court upon taking possession of the land automatically triggers the penal consequences of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, making the payment of interest mandatory.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Provincial Government liable to pay compensation as the ultimate beneficiary when land is acquired for a public purpose project?
  • Does failure by the Collector to tender compensation to the entitled person or deposit it in the Referee Court attract mandatory interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • What are the legal consequences under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 when the Collector fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 31?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Zahra and others vs Multan Development Authority2015 PLJ SC 916 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitionpayment of compensationinterest on compensationmandatory duty of collectorprovincial government liabilityreference court
  Summary & questions settled

  The present matter arises from multiple civil appeals and petitions concerning land acquisition proceedings initiated for the construction of the Multan Bye-Pass. The core legal questions involve determining the liability for the payment of compensation and whether a landowner is entitled to statutory interest under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when the compensation is neither tendered to the entitled person nor deposited in court upon taking possession. The Supreme Court held that the Provincial Government, being the primary beneficiary of the land acquisition project, is liable for the payment of compensation, and that the statutory requirement under Sections 31 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to tender or deposit compensation is mandatory. The ratio decidendi is that failure of the Collector to tender compensation to the landowner or deposit it in the reference court strictly attracts the penal consequence of mandatory interest payment under Section 34 of the Act. The key legal principle laid down is that the release of funds to an executing agency does not absolve the authorities from the mandatory statutory duty of tendering or depositing compensation, and default thereof entitles the landowner to claim interest from the time of taking possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Provincial Government is liable to pay compensation for land acquired for a public project executed through a development authority?
  • Is the requirement of the Collector to tender compensation or deposit it in court under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mandatory?
  • Does the release of funds by the government to an executing agency discharge the statutory obligation of tendering or depositing compensation?
  • When does a landowner become legally entitled to statutory interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Bibi vs Shamas UN Nisa2015 YLR 1400 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-09-20
  agreement to sellspecific performanceearnest moneyforfeiture clausebreach of contractvacant possessioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for the recovery of money arising from a failed agreement to sell land. The core legal question is whether a vendor is entitled to cancel an agreement and forfeit earnest money due to the vendee's failure to pay the balance consideration within the stipulated time, when the vendor themselves failed to deliver the full extent of the land agreed upon. The Court held that the vendor could not rely on the penal forfeiture clause because they were unable to provide vacant possession of the entire suit land, as evidenced by subsequent demarcation proceedings revealing encroachments and diluvian. The Court affirmed that a contract must be interpreted in light of its purpose, and a vendor cannot enforce strict compliance with payment terms while failing to fulfill their own obligation to deliver the subject matter of the contract. Consequently, the Court ordered the return of the proven earnest money paid by the vendee, while dismissing the claim for the unproven cash portion of the alleged consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendor rely on a forfeiture clause in an agreement to sell when they are unable to deliver the full extent of the land agreed upon?
  • Does the failure of a vendor to deliver the entire subject matter of a contract justify a vendee's withholding of the remaining sale consideration?
  • Is a party entitled to the recovery of alleged cash payments in a contract dispute where no receipt or reliable evidence of such payment is produced?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs Justice of Peace/Learned Additional Sessions2015 P Cr. L J 1644 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-07-01
  First Information Reportcognizable offenceJustice of the Peacemandatory registrationpolice inquirycriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition challenging an order passed by an Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, who dismissed a request for the registration of an FIR on the ground that a parallel inquiry was pending before the Capital Development Authority. The core legal question is whether an officer in charge of a police station or a Justice of the Peace has the authority to conduct an inquiry into the veracity of information regarding a cognizable offense before complying with the mandatory duty to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the duty to register an FIR upon receiving information of a cognizable offense is mandatory and cannot be delayed or refused pending an inquiry. The Court affirmed that neither the police nor the Justice of the Peace has the authority to adjudicate the truth or falsity of such information at the registration stage. The key principle laid down is that the scope of a Justice of the Peace under Section 22-A(6) is limited to determining if the information discloses a cognizable offense; if it does, the registration of an FIR must be directed without further inquiry.

  Questions settled

  • Does an officer in charge of a police station have the authority to conduct an inquiry into the truth or falsity of information before registering an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the scope of the jurisdiction of an Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace under Section 22-A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when considering a petition for the registration of an FIR?
  • Can the registration of an FIR be refused or delayed on the ground that a separate inquiry is being conducted by another authority?
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• Mst. Nasreen Akhtar vs Justice of Peace/Learned Additional Sessions2015-IHC-159 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-06-08Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nasim Akhtar vs Pervez Akhtar and 12 others2015 YLR 2524 · Lahore High Court · 2014-11-27Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through its2015 PLJ Islamabad 135 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through Its2015 NLR Civil 572 · Islamabad High CourtRead full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem Fatima vs Capital Development Authority through Chairman and 4 others2015 PLJ Islamabad 135, 2015 YLR 1348 · Islamabad High Court · 2015-03-11
  pendente lite purchaserlis pendensimpleadment of partiesnecessary and proper partycivil revisiontransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  In this civil revision petition before the Islamabad High Court, the petitioner challenged an order passed by the Civil Court, Islamabad, which allowed an application under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and impleaded respondent No. 5 as a defendant in a pending property suit. The core legal question concerned whether a person who purchases property during the pendency of litigation regarding that property is a necessary or proper party to be impleaded in the suit. The court dismissed the civil revision, holding that while a purchase during pending proceedings is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, the preponderance of judicial precedent from the apex court establishes that a subsequent purchaser can be considered a proper party and that trial courts possess wide, discretionary powers under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to add parties to avoid future complications. The key principle laid down is that a trial court exercises valid judicial discretion when impleading a pendente lite purchaser as a party to the proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent purchaser of property who acquires interest during the pendency of a suit is a necessary or proper party under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 bar the impleadment of a pendente lite purchaser as a party to ongoing proceedings?
  • What is the extent of judicial discretion vested in a trial court under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 regarding the addition of parties?
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• Mst. Naseem Bibi vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan2015 CLD 1155 · Lahore High Court · 2014-12-17Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem and anothers vs Ali Akbar and another2015 PLD Balochistan 30 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseem and another vs Ali Akbar and another2015 PLD Balochistan 30, 2015 PLJ Quetta 23 · Balochistan High Court · 2014-07-24Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naseeb Rana vs Mst. Hazrat Hilal and others2015 PLD Peshawar 111 · Peshawar High Court · 2014-05-13
  dowergiftinheritance mutationcivil revisionadditional evidenceMuslim Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts dismissing the petitioner's suit regarding ownership of property given in lieu of dower and the cancellation of an inheritance mutation. The core legal question concerned whether a transfer of property by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower constitutes a valid gift under Muslim Law requiring no registration or strict documentary formalities, and whether the lower appellate court erred in dismissing the suit and an application for additional evidence. The Peshawar High Court held that the transaction between spouses constituted a valid gift of land in lieu of dower, which requires no specific form or registration and can be oral or evidenced by intent. The Court established that an indoor transfer of property between husband and wife as dower is valid without formal registration, and collateral heirs cannot challenge it when the husband's intent is proven. The petition was allowed, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the suit was decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a transfer of property by a husband to his wife in lieu of dower require formal registration or a specific documentary form under Muslim Law?
  • Can collateral heirs challenge a property transfer made by a deceased husband to his wife in lieu of dower when the husband's intent is proven?
  • Whether an appellate court's failure to separately reason the dismissal of an application for additional evidence vitiates its judgment?
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• Mst. Najma Bibi and others vs Hakim Khan and others2015-PHC · Peshawar High Court · 2015-01-18
  Civil RevisionLocus StandiMuhammadan LawGift DeedCo-sharersProperty CancellationRevocation of Gift
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenged the concurrent judgments of the lower courts dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for the cancellation of sale and gift deeds regarding ancestral property. The core legal questions concerned the plaintiffs' locus standi to challenge property transfers by co-sharers during the lifetime of the husband/father, the necessity of registering a gift deed under Muhammadan Law, and the validity of revoking a gift made to a relative within prohibited degrees. The Court held that the plaintiffs, not being direct co-sharers in the legacy while the husband/father was alive, lacked the standing to challenge the alienations. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that under Muhammadan Law, a gift deed does not require registration, and a gift cannot be revoked when the donee is related to the donor within prohibited degrees. The Court concluded that the lower courts committed no legal error, upholding the dismissal of the suit. The principle laid down is that third parties cannot challenge property transfers by co-sharers, and gifts under Muhammadan Law are governed by personal law, exempting them from registration requirements and specific revocation rules.

  Questions settled

  • Does a wife and children have locus standi to challenge the alienation of ancestral property by co-sharers during the lifetime of the husband/father?
  • Is the registration of a gift deed essential for the validity of a gift under Muhammadan Law?
  • Can a donor revoke a gift of immovable property if the donee is related to the donor within prohibited degrees?
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• Mst. Najma & another vs DPO Badin and othersSindh High Court · -Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nagma Sultana through Attorney vs Muhammad Jameel and 2 others2015 PLJ Karachi 360 · Sindh High Court · 2015-01-23Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nabeela Shaheen and otherss vs Zia Wazeer Bhatti and others2015 PLD Lahore 88 · Lahore High Court · 2013-09-09
  constitutional petitionmaintenance allowanceenhancement of maintenancedowerNikahnamapresumption of truthinterpolation in Nikahnamafamily suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was filed by the wife and minor child seeking modification of the judgments and decrees of the Family Court and the Additional District Judge regarding maintenance allowance, enhancement, deferred dower, and a house. The High Court reviewed the evidence and held that Nikahnama is a public document registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, carrying a presumption of truth. The Court observed that any allegation of forgery or interpolation in the Nikahnama must be proved through strong evidence or challenged before the competent authority. Finding that the respondent failed to rebut the entries, the High Court held the petitioner entitled to the deferred dower of Rs. 200,000, 10 tolas gold, and the value of a house. Following Supreme Court precedent, as the house description was missing, the Court directed the Revenue Authorities to determine the value of any house owned by the respondent at the time of marriage to be paid as dower. Additionally, considering the minor's educational and medical needs as well as the respondent's status, the Court enhanced the minor's monthly maintenance from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 10,000 with 10% annual increase.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Nikahnama registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 attached with a presumption of truth?
  • How can a party challenge alleged interpolations or forged entries made in a Nikahnama?
  • Does the lack of specific property description in a Nikahnama defeat a wife's claim to a house promised as dower?
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• Mst. Musarat Bibi through Attorney vs Razzak Masih through SHO and 22015 YLR 2465 · Sindh High Court · 2015-04-28Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Majeed & Others vs Muhammad Inayat2015 LHC 2724 · Lahore High Court · 2015-05-21
  specific performanceagreement to sellcivil revisionpartial performancecontractual uncertaintyburden of proofcontract formation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil revision petition challenges the concurrent judgments of the lower courts, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The core legal questions concern whether the courts below erred in granting partial specific performance without adhering to the statutory requirements of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, and whether the agreement was void for uncertainty under Section 21(c) of the same Act. The High Court held that the lower courts acted in palpable error by decreeing partial performance without satisfying the conditions stipulated in Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Furthermore, the court determined that the agreement lacked essential particulars regarding the subject matter, rendering it unenforceable for uncertainty under Section 21(c). Additionally, the absence of the vendee's signature on the agreement raised significant doubts regarding the formation of a valid contract under the Contract Act, 1872. Consequently, the court set aside the lower courts' decrees, emphasizing that specific performance cannot be granted where the contract terms are uncertain or where statutory prerequisites for partial performance are not met.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court decree the specific performance of a part of a contract without satisfying the statutory requirements set forth in Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Does an agreement to sell that lacks specific property details, such as killa numbers, violate the requirement of reasonable certainty under Section 21(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877?
  • Is an agreement to sell legally enforceable if it lacks the signature of the vendee?
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• Mst. Mumtaz Bibi vs Muhammad Sain2015 MLD 1210 · Peshawar High Court · 2013-11-01Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mukhtaran Bibi, etc. vs Sarfraz Khan, etc.2015 LHC 5495 · Lahore High Court · 2015-04-13Read full judgment →
• Mst. Moona W/o Shakeel Asim vs StateSindh High Court · -
  post-arrest bailabductionfurther inquiryprinciple of consistencycriminal procedureFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the applicant, Mst. Moona, who was charged under Section 365-B and Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for her alleged involvement in the abduction and sale of the complainant's wife. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail given the circumstances of the case, including the delay in lodging the FIR, the lack of specific evidence regarding the alleged sale, and the principle of consistency regarding co-accused. The Court held that the applicant was entitled to bail, noting that the prosecution failed to provide specific details regarding the time, place, or manner of the alleged sale. Furthermore, the Court observed that the delay in lodging the FIR remained unexplained and that the applicant's case was identical to that of a co-accused who had already been granted bail. The Court established the principle that where ingredients of an offence are not prima facie attracted and there is no reasonable ground to believe the accused committed the offence, the case falls under the scope of further inquiry, warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the lack of specific details regarding the time, place, and manner of an alleged offence justify bail on the grounds of further inquiry?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused when a co-accused in an identical position has already been released on bail?
  • Does an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR constitute a valid ground for the grant of post-arrest bail?
  • When does a case qualify for further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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