Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman and 31995 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  service lawmove-overconfidential reportsadverse remarksFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had directed the petitioners to retroactively alter the respondent's move-over date from Scale 19 to Scale 20, granting him all consequential benefits. The core legal question presented to the Supreme Court is whether the Tribunal erred in its direction, given that the respondent's service record did not meet the requisite 'good' grading standard required by the relevant instructions for such a move-over. The petitioners argued that the respondent's confidential reports for the preceding five years were insufficient to qualify for the promotion. Furthermore, the petitioners contended that the failure to communicate adverse remarks in the respondent's confidential reports in a timely manner does not automatically elevate an 'average' service record to a 'good' one. Finding that the contentions raised regarding the interpretation of service rules and the evaluation of the respondent's record required deeper judicial examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to timely communicate adverse remarks in a service record automatically upgrade an 'average' performance rating to 'good'?
  • What are the criteria for qualifying for a move-over from Scale 19 to Scale 20 under WAPDA service instructions?
  • Can the Federal Service Tribunal direct a retroactive move-over if the service record does not meet the prescribed standards?
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• Water and Power Development Authority and 2 others vs Abdul Khaliq1995 PLC (C.S.) 650 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-03
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delayex-parte orderadjournmentdismissal from serviceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the respondent's service appeal against dismissal from service for unauthorized absence was partly allowed by converting the penalty to stoppage of two increments and ordering reinstatement. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the Tribunal proceeded with the matter and decided it in the absence of the petitioners' counsel whose adjournment application was rejected, and that the Tribunal failed to address the crucial objection regarding the service appeal being barred by limitation by 106 days. The Supreme Court held that the question of limitation cannot be waived and must be determined by the court first. Consequently, the Court granted leave, converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh determination on the question of limitation and the merits after providing a hearing to both parties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of limitation can be waived in judicial or tribunal proceedings?
  • Is it mandatory for a court or tribunal to determine the question of limitation first?
  • What is the legal effect of a tribunal deciding a service appeal without addressing a raised objection of limitation?
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• Waris Khan vs The Inspectorgeneral of Police, N.W.F.P., Peshawar and another1995 SCMR 1027 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-21
  service appealcompulsory retirementpolice officermisreading of evidenceexcessive penaltyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Inspector of Police, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal. The petitioner was proceeded departmentally for making a false statement before a Speedy Trial Court, which defamed a Senior Police Officer, and was subsequently found guilty of negligence and inefficiency, resulting in his compulsory retirement from service by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. His departmental appeal before the Inspector-General of Police was also dismissed, leading to the unsuccessful service appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the evidence had been misread and that the penalty imposed was excessive. The core legal question concerned the re-appraisal of evidence and the proportionality and justifiability of the penalty of compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence on record and to consider whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner was justifiable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal misread the evidence on record regarding the charges against the petitioner?
  • Is the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon a police officer excessive and unjustifiable in the circumstances of the case?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to re-appraise evidence in service matters?
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• Waris Khan vs The Inspector-General of Police, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar1995 PLC (C.S.) 857 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-21
  service appealcompulsory retirementpolice officermisreading of evidenceleave to appealquantum of punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Inspector of Police, sought leave to appeal against the order of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal dismissing his service appeal against his compulsory retirement from service. The petitioner was proceeded departmentally for making a false statement before a Speedy Trial Court, thereby defaming a Senior Police Officer, and was found guilty of negligence and inefficiency. Following the dismissal of his departmental appeal by the Inspector-General of Police and subsequent dismissal of his service appeal by the Tribunal, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court, contending that evidence had been misread and that the penalty imposed was excessive. The core legal question concerned the re-appraisal of evidence and the proportionality of the penalty of compulsory retirement in the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence on record and to consider whether the penalty imposed was justifiable in law, laying down the principle regarding the review of departmental penalties and factual findings by service tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the service tribunal misread the evidence on record while upholding the penalty of compulsory retirement?
  • Is the penalty of compulsory retirement disproportionate or excessive for making a false statement before a court resulting in defamation of a senior officer?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to re-appraise evidence in service matters?
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• WAPDA through its Chairman and anothers vs Muhammad Nawaz Khan1995 SCMR 1216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-13
  service mattercorrection of date of birthcivil court decreeservice tribunalleave to appealdelayed claim
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 14-12-1994, which accepted the respondent employee's appeal and directed the correction of his date of birth in his service record based on a civil court decree. The core legal question is whether a civil servant is entitled to seek a change in his date of birth near the end of his service based on a civil court decree obtained without the employer being a party, and whether unexplained delay and silence throughout most of his service disentitle him to such relief. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contention regarding the employee's long silence over thirty years and the binding nature of a decree to which the department was not a party requires detailed consideration, especially in light of established precedent holding that delayed claims for correction of date of birth do not merit a favourable decision.

  Questions settled

  • Is an employer department bound by a civil court decree declaring an employee's date of birth when the department was not a party to the suit?
  • Does a civil servant's silence and failure to object to his recorded date of birth for the major portion of his service disentitle him to seek its correction near retirement?
  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can validly order the correction of a civil servant's date of birth on the basis of a belated declaratory decree?
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• Wali and 10 others vs Akbar and 5 others1995 SCMR 284 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-12
  suit for declarationlimitationArticle 120 Limitation Actco-sharerpossessionconsolidation of holdingsmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which accepted the respondents' regular second appeal, restoring the trial court's decree in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The respondents instituted the suit claiming ownership and possession of the suit land. The core legal questions involved whether the declaratory suit filed in 1977 regarding a 1922 mutation was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, and whether the right to sue accrued from the date of the mutation or when the respondents' rights were actually interfered with during consolidation proceedings. The Supreme Court held that Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to such declaratory suits, and the starting point of limitation is when the right to sue accrues or when the plaintiff's title is actually challenged or interfered with. The Court laid down the principle that for a plaintiff in physical possession as a co-sharer, the right to bring a declaratory suit is a continuing right, and every denial or invasion of right furnishes a fresh cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act apply to a suit for declaration with a prayer for consequential relief?
  • When does the right to sue accrue in a declaratory suit concerning property where the plaintiff remains in physical possession as a co-sharer?
  • Is a plaintiff in possession as a co-sharer bound to sue on every denial of their right, or does every invasion furnish a fresh cause of action?
  • Does a suit for declaration of title to property constitute a subsisting and continuing right as long as the right to the property subsists?
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• Walayat Ali Mir vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation1995 SCMR 650 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-08
  service lawadministrative discretionpromotionjudicial reviewservice regulationsarbitrary exercise of powerdisqualification for employment
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the Federal Service Tribunal's dismissal of his appeal regarding the refusal of his promotion within the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC). The core legal questions concerned whether an appointment prohibited by service regulations could be sustained and whether the competent authority’s discretion to reject Promotion Board recommendations is absolute. The Supreme Court held that the induction of the respondent, who had been dismissed from prior service, violated Regulation 10(8) of the PIAC Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985, which strictly bars the employment of individuals dismissed from any employer. Furthermore, the Court ruled that while the competent authority possesses discretion, it is not unfettered; it must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and in good faith. The arbitrary rejection of the Promotion Board’s recommendations, without valid reasons, to accommodate an illegally appointed candidate was deemed unlawful. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, directing that the appellant be granted all benefits accruing from the promotion he was denied in 1987, as the administrative actions were found to be arbitrary and lacking bona fides.

  Questions settled

  • Can a competent authority arbitrarily reject the recommendations of a Promotion Board without providing valid reasons?
  • Does the bar on employing a person dismissed from any other employer apply even if there is intervening employment?
  • Is the discretion of an administrative authority in service matters absolute or subject to judicial review?
  • Can an appointment made in violation of service regulations be treated as valid?
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• Walayat Ali Mir vs Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (Piac)1995 PLC (C.S.) 836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-08
  service tribunalpromotiondiscretion of competent authoritystatutory regulationsdisqualification from employmentdismissed employeemala fidesarbitrary exercise of power
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal, brought with leave of the Court, challenges the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's service appeal against the refusal of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) to promote him to Pay Group IX. The core legal questions involved whether an appointment prohibited by law could be made in a properly constituted service, and whether the competent authority could arbitrarily reject the recommendations of a promotion board without providing valid reasons. The Supreme Court held that the induction and absorption of respondent No. 2 violated Regulation 10(8) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985, as he had been dismissed from previous service by court-martial, creating a strict statutory bar against his employment. The Court further held that while the competent authority possesses discretion to accept or reject promotion board recommendations, such discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or without giving valid reasons on record, especially when tainted by mala fides aimed at accommodating an ineligible person. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted all consequential retirement benefits accruing from the promotion he was unlawfully denied.

  Questions settled

  • Whether in a graded, properly constituted service, an appointment prohibited by law could be made?
  • Does Regulation 10(8) of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985 bar the employment of a person previously dismissed from service by any employer?
  • Whether the competent authority has unfettered discretion to reject the recommendations of a Promotion Board without recording reasons?
  • Can an executive authority exercise statutory discretion arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to the object of the governing rules and regulations?
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• Waheed alias Gogi vs The State1995 SCMR 1495 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  Zina-bil-Jabrattempted rapeconcurrent findingsleave to appealcredibility of witnessesminor victim testimonyHudood laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, Waheed alias Gogi, for the attempted commission of Zina-bil-Jabr with a five-year-old minor. The trial court convicted the petitioner under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, sentencing him to three years of rigorous imprisonment and fifteen stripes. The Federal Shariat Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's appeal, maintaining the conviction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt, based on the testimony of the minor victim and supporting witnesses, warranted interference under the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the evidence or the impugned judgment, noting that the prosecution witnesses were credible and the delay in the First Information Report was adequately explained. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence. The judgment reaffirms the principle that where concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are supported by reliable evidence, the Supreme Court will not interfere with such findings in its appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts when the evidence is credible?
  • Is the testimony of a minor victim sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted Zina-bil-Jabr when supported by other witnesses?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal where the evidence has been consistently believed by two lower courts?
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• Ussama Tariq vs The Administrator (Residual Properties)/Additional1995 SCMR 1519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26
  settlement lawspast and closed transactionresiduary propertyallotment finalityvoid ab initioadministrative authority
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the ownership of a property designated as a 'Kothee'. The petitioner's predecessor was allotted the land in 1953, with the allotment confirmed in 1959. Despite a 1961 report questioning the nature of the property, the Additional Settlement Commissioner determined it was subservient to agricultural purposes, a finding affirmed by Martial Law Authorities and never challenged. Decades later, following an ejectment petition against a tenant, the Deputy Administrator declared the original allotment void ab initio, treating the property as residuary property and transferring it to the tenant. The core legal question is whether an order passed under repealed settlement laws, which had attained finality and constituted a past and closed transaction, could be reopened by the Deputy Administrator. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, questioning the authority of the Deputy Administrator to sit in judgment over the decisions of competent settlement authorities and to reopen matters that had long since attained finality.

  Questions settled

  • Can an order passed under repealed settlement laws that has attained finality be reopened by a Deputy Administrator?
  • Does a Deputy Administrator have the authority to sit in judgment over decisions made by competent Settlement Authorities?
  • Can a property allotment that has become a past and closed transaction be declared void ab initio decades later?
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• University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others vs Akbar Ali1995 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  university regulationsmissing examination paperaverage marksleave to appealstudent rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondent was held entitled to the benefit of average marks under Proviso-I to Regulation 6 of the University Regulations due to a missing examination paper. The respondent appeared in the B.A. 2nd Annual Examination, but his result for English Paper A was delayed and subsequently declared missing. The University argued that the respondent should re-appear in the paper, whereas the respondent insisted on average marks. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the University could not shift responsibility for the lost record to the candidate. The Supreme Court examined the eventualities under Regulation 6 concerning lost examination papers and found that it was established that the respondent had handed over the paper to the Superintendent, making the proviso applicable. Finding no infirmity in the High Court judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that candidates are not to be penalized for misplaced answer books after proper submission.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a candidate is entitled to average marks under University Regulation 6 when an answer book is lost after being received?
  • Can a university shift the responsibility of a lost examination paper onto a candidate who duly appeared and submitted the paper?
  • Under what circumstances does the proviso regarding the grant of average marks for lost answer books apply to university examinations?
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• United Distributors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs The Government of Pakistan through Member, Judicial, Central Board of Revenue, Karachi and 3 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-10
  customs valuationimport trade pricecustoms dutystatutory notificationassessment of goodsconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the valuation of imported goods by Customs authorities. The petitioner challenged the assessment of imported refrigerators, arguing that the Customs authorities failed to follow the mandatory legal procedure for fixing Import Trade Prices (I.T.P.). Specifically, the petitioner contended that after the withdrawal of a formal I.T.P. notification, the authorities relied on a mere internal memorandum or 'advice' to fix values, rather than issuing a valid notification as required by law. The core legal question is whether Customs authorities can lawfully assess goods based on an internal advisory memorandum without issuing a formal notification under the relevant statutory provisions, or whether they must instead resort to the valuation procedures prescribed under the Customs Act. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, recognizing the substantial legal question regarding the validity of the valuation method employed by the Customs authorities in the absence of a properly notified I.T.P., thereby necessitating a deeper examination of the procedural requirements for customs valuation.

  Questions settled

  • Can Customs authorities fix the value of imported goods based on an internal advisory memorandum rather than a formal notification?
  • Is a notification required under Section 25-B of the Customs Act 1969 for the valid fixation of Import Trade Prices?
  • Must Customs authorities resort to the valuation procedures under Section 25 of the Customs Act 1969 in the absence of a validly issued Import Trade Price notification?
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• United Distributors (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Munir & Company1995 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-09
  bank guaranteetemporary injunctionencashment of bank guaranteecivil suitdamagesinterim relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a trial court's decision to restrain the encashment of bank guarantees provided by the respondent to the petitioner. The petitioner, a supplier of pesticides, held bank guarantees furnished by the respondent. The respondent subsequently sued the petitioner for damages, alleging the supply of substandard goods, and obtained an injunction preventing the encashment of these guarantees. The core legal question was whether the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee should be restrained pending the outcome of a suit for damages. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the injunctions barring the encashment were improper. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower courts' orders. It established the principle that while a beneficiary may encash a bank guarantee, they must provide security for an equivalent amount to ensure the due performance of any potential decree that might be passed in favor of the respondent, thereby balancing the rights of the beneficiary with the potential claims of the opposing party.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court restrain the encashment of a bank guarantee pending the outcome of a suit for damages?
  • Is a beneficiary entitled to encash a bank guarantee while providing security for the potential decree amount?
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• United Bank Limited vs Munir Ahmad Naseer and 2 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-26
  workman statusindustrial relationslabour court jurisdictionmanagerial capacitydismissal from servicespecial leave to appealspeaking order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by United Bank Limited against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the bank's writ petition in limine. The respondent, a Grade-II Officer, had been dismissed from service for misappropriation and successfully challenged his dismissal before the Punjab Labour Court, which set aside the dismissal order. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently upheld the reinstatement but granted 50% back benefits. The core legal question is whether a Grade-II Bank Officer, who performs managerial and supervisory duties, qualifies as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, thereby possessing the standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court failed to provide a speaking order on this jurisdictional issue despite it being raised. The Court held that the question of jurisdiction regarding the status of such officers requires in-depth examination, and consequently suspended the operation of the High Court's judgment pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Grade-II Bank Officer performing managerial and supervisory duties qualify as a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Is a High Court required to provide a speaking order when dismissing a writ petition that raises a substantial question of jurisdiction?
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• Umar Hayat vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-11
  appreciation of evidencerule of prudenceindependent corroborationfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusinterested witnessesforensic science laboratory reportbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from a murder conviction and death sentence passed on the appellant, Umar Hayat, for allegedly shooting and causing the death of the deceased in furtherance of common intention with two co-accused. The trial court acquitted one co-accused, while the High Court acquitted the second co-accused upon finding that medical evidence indicated the fatal injuries could have resulted from a single shot and that eye-witnesses were unreliable as to the acquitted co-accused. The Supreme Court considered whether the appellant's conviction could stand based on the ocular testimony of interested witnesses whose statements had been disbelieved regarding two co-accused. Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that where eye-witnesses are disbelieved regarding co-accused, the rule of prudence requires independent material corroboration before relying on their testimony against the remaining accused. As the Forensic Science Laboratory report confirmed the recovered weapon did not match the crime empties, independent corroboration was absent. The appeal was accepted and the appellant acquitted.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be safely sustained on the testimony of eye-witnesses who have been disbelieved regarding co-accused without independent corroboration?
  • Does a negative Forensic Science Laboratory report regarding a recovered weapon destroy its value as corroborative evidence in a murder trial?
  • Whether the rule of prudence requires independent corroboration when eye-witnesses exaggerate the number of accused in a criminal case?
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• Umar Draz vs The State1995 SCMR 1094 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-06
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencecriminal evidenceappellate reviewcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the findings of the lower courts in a criminal case. The core legal question presented for consideration is whether the lower courts correctly applied the established principles governing the appraisal of evidence in criminal proceedings, as previously laid down by the Supreme Court. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the correctness of the lower courts' evidentiary assessment. The judgment serves as a procedural step in the appellate process, focusing on the necessity of ensuring that criminal convictions are based on a proper and legally sound evaluation of the evidence on record, in accordance with the standards set by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Did the lower courts correctly follow the principles governing the appraisal of evidence in criminal cases?
  • Is the appraisal of evidence by lower courts subject to review by the Supreme Court upon the grant of leave to appeal?
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• Umar Din and anothers vs Mst. Sharifan and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 686 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-19
  Colonization of Government Lands ActSuccession to tenancyMuslim Personal LawCustomary lawBurden of proofAgricultural landInheritance mutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the succession of tenancy rights under the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, specifically regarding a non-original tenant in Bahawalpur. The core legal questions were whether Section 20 or Section 21(b) of the Act governed succession for a non-original tenant, and what law regulated succession in Bahawalpur at the relevant time. The Supreme Court held that Section 20 applies exclusively to original tenants, while Section 21(b) governs succession for non-original tenants, requiring the tenancy to be treated as agricultural land acquired by the original tenant. Consequently, succession is determined by the personal law of the parties unless a specific custom is proven. The Court affirmed that under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872, the burden of proving a custom excluding daughters from inheritance lies on the party asserting it. Since the appellants failed to establish such a custom, the Court ruled that Muslim Personal Law applies, upholding the mutation in favor of the daughter and brothers. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 20 of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912 apply to the succession of tenancy rights of a non-original tenant?
  • How is succession to tenancy rights determined under Section 21(b) of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912?
  • Upon whom does the burden of proof lie when asserting a custom contrary to personal law under Section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872?
  • In the absence of proof of a specific custom, which law governs the succession of agricultural land in Bahawalpur for Muslim parties?
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• TM Muhammad vs Muhammad Qadeer Chaudhry and 2 others1995 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  specific performanceagreement to sellpremature suitconcurrent findings of factleave to appealcontractual obligations
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot of land. The petitioner, the allottee of the plot, entered into an agreement with the respondent, who paid the full consideration. The trial court dismissed the suit, deeming it premature as the petitioner had not yet acquired ownership of the plot, despite finding that the full sale consideration had been paid. The first appellate court reversed this finding and decreed the suit. In the subsequent Regular Second Appeal, the High Court maintained the decree, incorporating an offer by the respondent to pay an additional sum to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the suit for specific performance was premature and whether the respondent's alleged initiation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner justified refusing specific performance. The Supreme Court held that the suit was not premature and that the initiation of criminal proceedings, even if frivolous, did not constitute valid grounds to refuse specific performance. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of fact regarding the payment of consideration and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for specific performance be dismissed as premature solely because the seller has not yet acquired formal ownership of the property?
  • Does the initiation of criminal proceedings by a purchaser against a seller constitute a valid ground for refusing a decree of specific performance?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the payment of sale consideration be re-agitated in a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
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• The Vice-President (Administration), National Bank of Pakistan and 21995 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-19
  departmental enquiryex parte proceedingsshow-cause noticeenquiry reportservice matterleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal concerning a service and employment dispute involving a departmental enquiry against an employee. The core legal question examined by the court is whether, when an employee is proceeded ex parte in a departmental enquiry, it remains necessary to serve upon them the Enquiry Report and the second show-cause notice, and whether the subsequent order of dismissal passed against the respondent is defective on that account. The court granted leave to appeal to thoroughly examine these questions regarding natural justice and procedural requirements in departmental proceedings. The principle laid down relates to the procedural safeguards and requirements of natural justice regarding the provision of enquiry reports and show-cause notices to employees, even when proceeded against ex parte in departmental enquiries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is necessary to serve the Enquiry Report and the second show-cause notice on an employee who has been proceeded ex parte in a departmental enquiry?
  • Can an order of dismissal passed against an employee be declared defective if the Enquiry Report and second show-cause notice are not served upon him?
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• The State vs Muhammad Sharif and 3 others Muhammad Yasin1995 SCMR 635 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-23
  appeal against acquittalappraisement of evidencemiscarriage of justicecorroborative evidencepresumption of innocencedelayed post-mortem examinationbenefit of doubt
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comprised two criminal appeals filed by the State against judgments of the High Court and trial Court acquitting several respondents charged with murder and related offences under Sections 302, 148, 149, 109, and 120-B of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal issue before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the findings of acquittal recorded by the courts below suffered from gross misreading or non-reading of evidence so as to justify appellate interference. Dismissing both State appeals, the Supreme Court held that no interference with an acquittal is warranted unless the lower court's findings are artificial, perverse, or cause a grave miscarriage of justice. The Court emphasized that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence. The Court further laid down that prompt lodging of an F.I.R. and medical evidence showing the nature and number of injuries cannot independently corroborate unconvincing ocular testimony to convict co-accused against whom no crime weapons were recovered, and that an unexplained delay in performing a post-mortem examination creates a presumption of benefit in favour of the accused.

  Questions settled

  • What is the standard of review applied by the Supreme Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 Cr.P.C.?
  • Does an unexplained delay in conducting a post-mortem examination give rise to a presumption in favour of the accused?
  • Can prompt lodging of an F.I.R. or medical evidence independently corroborate unconvincing ocular testimony against co-accused from whom no weapons were recovered?
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• The State vs Bakhtiar Ahmed and another1995 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-13
  coram non judiceautomatic weaponsemi-automatic weaponassault rifleMauser pistolSpecial Court jurisdictionejusdem generisillicit arms
  Summary & questions settled

  These criminal appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan were directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the convictions of the respondents under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, holding that their trial before the Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 was coram non judice. The core legal question was whether locally manufactured .32 bore and .30 bore pistols described as 'Mausers' qualified as automatic or semi-automatic weapons 'such as Klashnikov, a G-III rifle or any other type of assault rifle' under Section 13-A and the Schedule to the Act of 1975, so as to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Special Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's findings, holding that 'Mauser' is merely a manufacturer's name and the locally produced pistols did not fall within the scheduled category of assault rifles or similar weapons envisioned under the Act. Consequently, the trial before the Special Court was without jurisdiction, and both appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ordinary or locally manufactured pistols described as 'Mausers' fall within the definition of automatic or semi-automatic assault weapons under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975?
  • Does a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 have jurisdiction to try an offence involving an ordinary pistol not of the class of a Kalashnikov, G-3, or assault rifle?
  • Does a trial conducted by a Special Court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction render the proceedings coram non judice?
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• The State vs Bakhtiar Ahmad1995 SCMR 1285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-13
  Special Court jurisdictionSuppression of Terrorist Activitiesejusdem generisautomatic weaponscoram non judicefirearm classificationstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals filed by the State against a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside convictions under the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, ruling that the trial before a Special Court was coram non judice. The core legal question was whether locally produced pistols, described as Mauser pistols, constitute automatic or semi-automatic weapons akin to Kalashnikovs or G-3 rifles, thereby falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's finding that the recovered pistols did not fall within the scope of the Act. The Court applied the principle of ejusdem generis, holding that the statutory list of weapons is not exhaustive but illustrative of a specific class of terror-inducing assault weapons. Consequently, ordinary pistols, regardless of their firing mechanism, do not automatically trigger the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts unless they share the characteristics of the assault rifles specified in the statute.

  Questions settled

  • Do locally produced pistols classified as Mauser fall within the definition of automatic or semi-automatic weapons under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975?
  • Does the principle of ejusdem generis apply to the interpretation of weapon categories listed in the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975?
  • Are trials held before a Special Court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction considered coram non judice?
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• The State and another- vs Darius B. Kandawala1995 SCMR 1102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-21
  bailquashment of proceedingsleave to appealinherent powerscriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against an interim order passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court of Sindh, whereby bail was granted to the respondent in connection with criminal proceedings arising out of F.I.R. No. 199 of 1994 registered under the Customs Act, 1969 and Act II of 1947, while admitting a quashment petition to hearing. The core legal question raised was whether a High Court can grant bail under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 without a formal bail application, and in the presence of specific provisions under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regulating bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the contentions raised by the State required detailed consideration and accordingly granted leave to appeal to examine the legality of granting bail in such circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in the presence of specific provisions under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a High Court grant bail without a formal bail application being moved by the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• The Secretary, Government of the Punjab, through, Secretary HealthK.L.R. 1997 Labour & Service 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  termination of servicemisconductprobationerregular inquirycivil servantservice tribunalstigma
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by the Government of the Punjab challenges the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal setting aside the termination of the respondent's services as a Stenographer and ordering his reinstatement with back benefits. The respondent's services had been terminated purportedly under Section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, following allegations of misconduct and unsatisfactory performance during probation. The core legal question was whether the services of a temporary employee or probationer could be terminated on grounds of misconduct without conducting a regular departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while a temporary employee's services can be terminated simpliciter in accordance with their terms of employment or for unsatisfactory work without an inquiry, any termination founded upon allegations of misconduct amounts to dismissal or removal, which casts a stigma and necessitates a fair opportunity of defense through a regular inquiry under the applicable disciplinary rules. The key principle laid down is that the distinction between a simple termination of a temporary employee and termination for misconduct dictates the mandatory requirement of a regular inquiry where misconduct is the foundational basis.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the services of a temporary employee or probationer can be terminated on the ground of misconduct without holding a regular departmental inquiry?
  • Does the termination of a probationer's service for unsatisfactory work amount to dismissal or removal from service?
  • What is the distinction between a simpliciter termination of a temporary employee and termination based on allegations of misconduct?
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• The Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Irrigation and Power1995 SCMR 563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-06
  work-charge employeespay scale fixationservice matterconstitutional jurisdictionacquiescenceIndustrial Relations Ordinancetransfer of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the pay scale entitlement of former WAPDA employees transferred to the Irrigation Department. The respondents, initially employed as Tubewell Operators by WAPDA in National Pay Scale No. 4, were transferred to the Irrigation Department in 1978. Upon transfer, to avoid termination, they opted to accept National Pay Scale No. 2, consistent with the Irrigation Department's existing cadre. Subsequently, they challenged this pay fixation under Section 25-A(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Labour Court initially ruled in their favor, but the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal reversed this, citing the employees' voluntary undertaking and the delay in filing the grievance. The High Court later set aside the Tribunal's order, directing the payment of the higher scale. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether work-charge employees, having opted for a lower pay scale upon transfer and acquiesced to that arrangement for years, remain entitled to their previous higher pay scale, and whether the High Court properly exercised jurisdiction despite the constitutional bar under Article 212(2).

  Questions settled

  • Can work-charge employees claim a higher pay scale after voluntarily opting for a lower scale upon their transfer and absorption into a new department?
  • Does the bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 preclude the High Court from exercising jurisdiction in service matters involving pay fixation?
  • Does long-term acquiescence to a specific pay scale by an employee preclude a subsequent legal challenge to that pay fixation?
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• The Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Education and anothers1995 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-28
  service lawregularization of servicesad hoc appointmentcivil servantleave to appealN.-W.F.P. Ad hoc Civil Servants Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of N.-W.F.P. against a judgment of the Service Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., which had granted the respondent's claim for regularization of service from 19 March 1987. The respondent, initially appointed as a Junior Trade Instructor (Mechanical) on a stopgap basis, sought regularization under Section 3 of The N.-W.F.P. Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularisation of Services) Act, 1987. The core legal question is whether the respondent, who held a post in BPS-14, was entitled to the benefits of the 1987 Act, specifically regarding the date of regularization. The petitioner contended that the Act's provisions, particularly when read with Rule 3(a) and the relevant Schedule, restrict the applicability of the regularization process to posts filled upon the recommendation of the Public Service Commission, which generally pertains to BPS-16 and above. The Supreme Court found that the Advocate-General’s argument regarding the interpretation of 'post' and the scope of the Act raised substantial questions of law requiring further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine the correct application of the statutory regularization criteria.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 3 of The N.-W.F.P. Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularisation of Services) Act, 1987 apply to civil servants holding posts below BPS-16?
  • What is the definition of a 'post' under Section 2(1)(d) of The N.-W.F.P. Ad hoc Civil Servants (Regularisation of Services) Act, 1987?
  • Are posts in BPS-14 subject to the regularization requirements mandated for posts filled by the recommendation of the Public Service Commission?
  Read full judgment →
• The Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab, Lahore and 3 others vs Raja Mumtaz Ahmed, Superintendent of Police,Cia Staff, Rawalpindi1995 PLC (C.S.) 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18
  out of turn promotionservice tribunalcivil servantdistinguished performanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, which allowed the respondent police officer's appeal and granted him out-of-turn promotion to the rank of Superintendent of Police with effect from a back date. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent was entitled to an out-of-turn promotion based on his distinguished performance in busting a foreign exchange racket, notwithstanding subsequent government policy decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed no infirmity in granting the promotion, noting that section 8-A of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 explicitly provides for out-of-turn promotions for outstanding performance, thereby overriding contrary departmental instructions. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is entitled to out-of-turn promotion for outstanding performance under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974?
  • Do statutory provisions regarding out-of-turn promotion override contrary government policy decisions?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a Service Tribunal judgment granting promotion when supported by statutory authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Tehmina Mufti vs University of Sindh, Jamshoro and another1995 SCMR 65 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-21
  personal hearingreview petitionnatural justiceuniversity employeetermination of servicestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition against the termination of her services as a University Lecturer due to unauthorized absence. The core legal question is whether a statutory right of review, when silent on the matter, implicitly carries a right of personal hearing akin to an appeal. The Supreme Court held that where a statute provides a remedy of review which is the sole recourse against an adverse order of the Syndicate, such review is to be equated with an appeal, and thus the principle that a right of hearing is silently implied applies. The Court laid down the principle that when a statute provides a right of appeal or a substantive review remedy against a penal or adverse administrative order, the affected person must be afforded an opportunity of being heard personally, even if the statutory provision is silent on personal hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a right of review provided under a statute includes an implied right to be personally heard even if the statutory provision is silent on the matter?
  • Does an ostensible Ordinance issued under a university statute possess statutory force if not promulgated in accordance with constitutional provisions?
  • Whether an order passed in review by a university syndicate without affording a personal hearing to the aggrieved employee is sustainable in law?
  Read full judgment →
• Tayyab vs The State1995 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-17
  kidnapping for ransomidentification paradecriminal appealbenefit of doubtdelay in identification parademuffled facesre-appraisal of evidenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh upholding the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under Section 365-A read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping for ransom. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained in the absence of a description or identification marks in the initial police statements, and given material contradictions regarding whether the abductors had muffled faces, alongside an inordinate delay in holding the identification parade. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt due to a two-month unexplained delay in holding the identification parade, contradictory testimonies of abductees regarding muffled faces, and unreliable dock identification. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the lower courts' judgments were set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted. The key principle laid down is that an unexplained, inordinate delay in conducting an identification parade, coupled with material contradictions among eyewitnesses concerning facial concealment, severely undermines the evidentiary value of identification and renders a conviction unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for kidnapping for ransom be maintained when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in holding an identification parade?
  • Does a material contradiction between eyewitnesses regarding whether the abductors had muffled faces render the identification doubtful?
  • Is dock identification without prior reliable identification proceedings sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Tariq Bashir and 5 others vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 34 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-31
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationdacoityCriminal Procedure CodeHudood Ordinancebenefit of doubtfurther inquirypersonal bondtentative assessmentreasonable grounds
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the cancellation of post-arrest bail by a single judge of the High Court, which had previously been granted by another judge of the same High Court in a dacoity case registered under Section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal question revolved around the grounds required for cancelling bail once granted, especially when two judges arrive at contradictory conclusions on the existence of reasonable grounds for belief in the accused's guilt. The Supreme Court held that considerations for granting and cancelling bail are distinct, requiring strong and exceptional grounds for cancellation. It emphasized that where reasonable doubt arises regarding an accused's participation or guilt, or where contradictory judicial opinions exist, the benefit of doubt should extend to the accused even at the bail stage, making it a case for further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. The Court allowed the appeal, restoring the bail.

  Questions settled

  • What are the considerations for cancellation of bail once granted by a competent court?
  • Can bail be cancelled without strong and exceptional grounds?
  • Does the benefit of reasonable doubt apply at the bail stage?
  • What is the effect of contradictory judicial opinions on the existence of reasonable grounds for an accused's guilt at the bail stage?
  • Should accused persons in bailable, petty, or less than ten-year imprisonment offences be unnecessarily detained in jail?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain vs The State1995 SCMR 1538 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-24
  circumstantial evidencemurdersodomyleave to appealappreciation of evidencechild witnessdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and death sentence under section 302/377 P.P.C. for the murder and sodomy of a minor student. The prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence, including the testimony of the complainant and a child witness who went to the petitioner's house searching for the victim, knocked on the door, and saw the petitioner emerge in a perplexed state with blood-stained clothes before fleeing. Upon entering, they found the victim strangled and bound, which medical evidence confirmed. The core legal question involved the proper appreciation and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct eyewitnesses to the crime itself. The Supreme Court held that the unbroken chain of proved circumstances—including the petitioner's presence, his immediate flight, the recovery of the body from the premises, and corroborating medical evidence—irresistibly pointed to the guilt of the accused and excluded any other reasonable hypothesis. The Court laid down that where circumstances are undesigned, proved beyond doubt, and form an unshakeable chain incompatible with innocence, they furnish a safer basis for conviction than direct evidence.

  Questions settled

  • What are the established principles for evaluating and appreciating circumstantial evidence in criminal cases?
  • Can a conviction for murder and sodomy be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence and medical corroboration in the absence of direct eyewitnesses to the crime?
  • What evidentiary value is attached to the immediate flight and perplexed conduct of an accused discovered at the scene of a crime?
  • How should the testimony of a child witness be evaluated when corroborated by surrounding circumstances and medical evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Talib Hussain and others vs The State1995 SCMR 1776 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-06
  triple murderdeath sentenceinterested witnessmotive in murderballistic evidencenight occurrencecapital punishmentcompensation to legal heirs
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment arose from cross criminal appeals regarding a triple murder committed during Sehri time in Ramazan. Three convicts appealed their convictions and the confirmation of death sentences (and life imprisonment for one convict), arguing that the eyewitnesses were interested relatives, the night was dark, and the alleged motive was too weak to warrant capital punishment. Simultaneously, the complainant appealed against sentence reduction and the omission of compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals. It held that the ocular testimony was credible and corroborated by ballistic evidence matching crime empties with recovered firearms. The Court clarified that there is no legal requirement to allege or prove motive to award the normal penalty of death when guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Premeditated trespass into a victim's dwelling precludes presumptions of sudden provocation. Furthermore, while fine under PPC cannot strictly equate to statutory compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C., the Court declined rectification as the entire fine was already directed to the heirs.

  Questions settled

  • Is the prosecution legally required to allege and prove a motive in order to justify the award of a death sentence for murder?
  • Does a weak or unalleged motive serve as a mitigating circumstance to reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment in cases of premeditated attack?
  • Can the omission of the investigating officer to recover a light source from the crime scene be fatal to the prosecution's case when natural illumination circumstances exist?
  • Can a fine imposed upon conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code be legally equated with statutory compensation awarded under Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Tahir Hussain Malik vs Mst. Najma Rafi1995 SCMR 1407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-15
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentregistered sale deedunregistered agreement to sellsuccessor-in-interestres judicata
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an ejectment application filed under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, by the respondent against the petitioner's father, alleging default in rent payment and personal bona fide need. The petitioner contested the application, denying the landlord-tenant relationship and asserting ownership based on an unregistered agreement to sell. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, a decision upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could deny the landlord-tenant relationship despite a registered sale deed in favor of the respondent and a prior judicial finding confirming the relationship. The Supreme Court held that the registered sale deed took precedence over the petitioner's unregistered agreement to sell. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the respondent, as the successor-in-interest, was entitled to rent following the issuance of a notice under section 18 of the Ordinance. The Court concluded that the petitioner's failure to pay rent rendered him liable for eviction, finding no misreading of evidence by the High Court. Leave to appeal was refused, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a registered sale deed take precedence over a prior unregistered agreement to sell in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute?
  • Is a tenant liable for eviction for failing to pay rent to a successor-in-interest landlord after receiving notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a tenant deny the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship when that relationship has been established by a prior judicial order?
  Read full judgment →
• Yaqub Shah vs The State1995 SCMR 1293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-12
  criminal appealmurdercommon objectinterested witnessesocular accountrecovery of weaponbenefit of doubtacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal and maintaining his conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case involved a double murder arising from a previous enmity and blood feud, supported by ocular testimony and recovery of weapon matching a crime empty. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's co-accused, who faced the same allegations and evidence, had already been acquitted by this Court in a connected appeal. Examining the record, the Court found that the eyewitnesses were closely related and interested, their presence at the spot was doubtful, and the recovery evidence was unreliable due to delayed transmission of crime empties and weapons to the forensic laboratory. Holding that the appellant's case was indistinguishable from that of his acquitted co-accused, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered the appellant's immediate release.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellant is entitled to acquittal when his case is indistinguishable from that of co-accused who have already been acquitted on the same evidence?
  • Whether the testimony of closely related eyewitnesses can be relied upon when their presence at the crime scene is doubtful and they fail to give a reasonable explanation for their presence?
  • Whether a Fire-Arm Expert's report connecting a weapon with a crime empty loses its evidentiary value due to delayed transmission of the items to the forensic laboratory and missing malkhana deposit dates?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Miskieen Shah vs Sajjid Hussain and 2 others1995 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-13
  cancellation of bailZinaDarul-Amanprotective custodysurety bondsinterim reportHudood laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court order dismissing an application for the cancellation of bail in a case involving charges under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The core legal concern was the propriety of releasing a female accused on bail when the surety bonds were furnished by the very person with whom she was alleged to have committed Zina, potentially allowing them to cohabit during the pendency of the proceedings. The Supreme Court examined whether such an arrangement, if the defense plea of valid Nikah failed, would create an untenable legal and social situation. To ensure the safety of the accused and to prevent the court from facilitating a situation that might be criticized if a conviction followed, the Supreme Court, with the consent of both parties, modified the impugned order. The Court directed that the accused be lodged in Darul-Aman, Abbottabad, rather than being released into the custody of the co-accused, and ordered the completion of the investigation and submission of an interim report under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 within one month.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court order an accused to be lodged in Darul-Aman as a condition of bail to ensure safety and prevent potential abuse of the bail process?
  • Is it appropriate for a court to allow an accused person in a Zina case to be released on bail furnished by the co-accused with whom they are alleged to have committed the offense?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to direct the completion of an investigation and the submission of an interim report within a specified timeframe?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Mehboob Shah vs The State1995 SCMR 1097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  post-arrest bailmurder casecancellation of bailspecific role in FIRleave to appealcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Syed Mehboob Shah, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed his application for post-arrest bail in a criminal case involving charges of murder and firing. The petitioner was accused of firing at the complainant and others, resulting in a fatality. The petitioner argued that he had been found innocent during investigations by three different agencies and that a co-accused had been granted bail. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner was specifically named in the F.I.R. with a distinct role, unlike the co-accused whose cases were not identical. The Court noted that the alleged offence was punishable by death or life imprisonment. Emphasizing that the High Court had already directed the trial court to conclude proceedings within a specific timeframe and granted the petitioner liberty to renew his bail application if the trial remained pending, the Supreme Court held that no grounds existed to interfere with the High Court's order. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the release of a co-accused on bail automatically entitle another accused to bail when their roles are not identical?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be granted when the High Court has already directed the trial court to conclude the trial within a fixed period?
  • Is bail appropriate for an accused specifically named in the F.I.R. for an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Imran Raza Zaidi vs Government of Punjab and 2 others1995 SCMR 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-23
  miscellaneous applicationstay orderinfructuousservice tribunalexpedited hearingappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This miscellaneous application before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose in the context of a pending appeal where the petitioner sought a stay order, which had previously been refused upon the grant of leave. During the proceedings, counsel for both parties reached a consensus that the retention of the original record by the Supreme Court was unnecessary, as the paper books were prepared and relevant documents could be incorporated. Consequently, the Court directed that the record be transmitted back to the Service Tribunal. Furthermore, the parties requested an out-of-turn hearing for the main appeal. Given that the primary relief sought in the application—the stay—was no longer relevant or required in light of the parties' agreement to expedite the hearing of the main appeal, the Court dismissed the application as having become infructuous.

  Questions settled

  • Can a miscellaneous application for a stay order be dismissed as infructuous when the parties agree to an expedited hearing of the main appeal?
  • Is it permissible for the Supreme Court to direct the transmission of the record to the Service Tribunal when paper books are ready?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and anothers vs Government of Pakistan1995 SCMR 809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-14
  service appealpromotionleave to appealFederal Service Tribunalnon-complianceremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had declined the petitioners' miscellaneous applications alleging non-compliance with a previous Tribunal order. The petitioners, having previously secured a remand order from the Tribunal for reconsideration of their promotion cases, alleged that the authorities failed to comply by citing a lack of vacancies as the reason for denying promotion. The petitioners contended that their juniors had been promoted, bypassing them without justification, and that the Tribunal's remand order required an examination of whether this bypassing was factually justified. They argued that the respondents' plea of 'no vacancy' effectively negated the Tribunal's earlier judgment and that the Tribunal failed to address this aspect in its subsequent order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the Tribunal failed to properly evaluate the petitioners' grievance regarding being bypassed for promotion and whether the respondents' reliance on the lack of vacancies was a valid compliance with the Tribunal's remand directions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of 'no vacancy' constitutes valid compliance with a Tribunal's order to reconsider promotion cases?
  • Does a Tribunal's failure to address the specific grievance of being bypassed for promotion in a remand proceeding warrant Supreme Court intervention?
  • Can authorities cite a lack of vacancies to deny promotion after a Tribunal has remanded the case for reconsideration of promotion eligibility?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and another vs Government of Pakistan1995 PLC (C.S.) 653 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-14
  service appealpromotionremandleave to appealbypassing seniorsservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed petitions for leave to appeal against the judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal which declined their miscellaneous petitions. The miscellaneous petitions were filed alleging non-compliance with the Tribunal's earlier judgment that had remanded their cases to the authority for reconsideration of promotion after their appeals were disposed of. The grievance was that their juniors had been promoted by bypassing them without justifiable reason, and the respondents had refused promotion on the ground of the absence of vacancies. The Supreme Court considered the arguments that the respondents' plea regarding the lack of vacancies negated the Tribunal's remand judgment and that the Tribunal failed to examine whether the petitioners were factually bypassed without justifiable reason. The Court held that these contentions raised substantial questions warranting examination and accordingly granted leave to appeal. The key principle established is that when a service appeal regarding supersession and promotion is remanded for reconsideration, the authorities cannot defeat the remand order on the mere plea of non-availability of vacancies without addressing the core grievance of unjustified bypassing.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an authority can refuse promotion after a remand order on the ground of non-availability of vacancies?
  • Does the failure of a service tribunal to consider whether an employee was bypassed without justifiable reason warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can the non-compliance of a tribunal's remand judgment be challenged through miscellaneous petitions?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Hassan Khan vs Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and 5 others1995 SCMR 23 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-06
  transfer of civil servantconstitutional jurisdictioncompetent authoritymala fidesleave to appealService Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner to challenge his transfer order from Bannu back to his original place of posting in Lahore. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court correctly declined to interfere with the transfer and cancellation orders passed by the competent authority in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent order cancelling the earlier transfer was passed by the competent authority without any lack of jurisdiction or established mala fides, and thus interference in constitutional jurisdiction was unwarranted. The Court concluded by refusing leave to appeal while observing that the petitioner may approach the Service Tribunal if available under the law. The key principle laid down is that transfer and posting orders passed by a competent authority without jurisdictional defect or proven mala fides are not amenable to interference under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order cancelling a civil servant's transfer can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction when passed by a competent authority?
  • Does a transfer order passed without lack of authority warrant interference under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a transfer cancellation order before the High Court on grounds of alleged mala fides without sufficient proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Fakhar Mahmood Gillani vs Abdul Ghafoor1995 SCMR 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-16
  Cantonments Rent Restriction Actdefault in payment of rentvalid tender of rentmoney ordereviction petitionburden of proofpresumption of official acts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment that dismissed an eviction petition filed by the landlord against the tenant for alleged default in rent payment. The core legal question was whether the remission of rent via money order constitutes a valid tender under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, and whether the tenant must prove the landlord's refusal to accept the payment. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the tenant was not a defaulter. The Court held that the explanation to Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, establishes that rent remitted by money order to the landlord’s correct address is deemed a valid tender. The Court clarified that the tenant’s responsibility is discharged upon the act of remitting the rent via money order; the tenant is not required to follow the postman or prove the landlord's refusal to accept the funds. Furthermore, official acts performed by postal authorities are entitled to a presumption of regularity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the remission of rent via money order to a landlord constitute a valid tender of rent under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963?
  • Is a tenant required to prove that a landlord refused to accept rent remitted via money order to establish a valid tender?
  • What is the extent of a tenant's responsibility when remitting rent through a money order?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Ahmed Ali Rizvi and anothers vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-03
  habeas corpusbail cancellationterritorial jurisdictionPrincipal SeatLahore High Court BenchesEmigration Ordinanceforged travel documents
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave challenged a High Court Single Judge's order recalling a previously granted bail to the appellants on the grounds that the relevant FIR (No. 46 of 1994) was registered in Rawalpindi and that the High Court Judge sitting at the Principal Seat in Lahore lacked territorial jurisdiction. The appellants were initially granted bail by a trial court in Lahore, but FIA authorities allegedly avoided releasing them and transferred them to Rawalpindi on an allegedly 'afterthought' second FIR. The High Court initially converted a habeas corpus petition into a bail petition and granted bail, but subsequently cancelled it on an application by the state. The Supreme Court held that administrative rules like the Lahore High Court (Establishment of Benches) Rules 1981 do not curtail or limit the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court Judge, who can exercise jurisdiction throughout the entire territorial limits of the High Court, including at the Principal Seat. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored/confirmed the appellants' bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does administrative division of High Court Benches curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court Judge sitting at the Principal Seat?
  • Can a High Court Judge sitting at the Principal Seat grant bail in a matter originating within the territorial area of another Bench of the same High Court?
  • Is a High Court justified in recalling bail on technical grounds of bench territoriality where the state's actions are found to be mala fide and intended to frustrate a court order?
  Read full judgment →
• Syed Afzal Ahmed Hydari and anothers vs Secretary, Defence1995 SCMR 1852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-04
  service lawseniority listdiscipline-wise seniorityrecruitment rulespromotioncivil servantintra vires
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed appeals challenging the validity of a discipline-wise seniority list and the underlying recruitment rules in the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). The core legal questions were whether the Government was competent to amend recruitment rules to introduce discipline-based seniority and whether such amendments violated Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, by allegedly harming the petitioners' promotion prospects. The Supreme Court held that the amendments were intra vires, noting that the Government possesses the authority to amend rules and that Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, does not mandate the maintenance of an overall seniority list to the exclusion of group-specific lists. The Court further held that the amendments were not mala fide and were intended to facilitate specialization. The principle laid down is that the Government has the power to amend service rules, and such amendments are valid provided they are not mala fide, even if they introduce discipline-wise seniority groupings.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 8 of the Civil Servants Act 1973 mandate the maintenance of an overall seniority list for all employees in a department?
  • Is the Government competent to amend recruitment rules to introduce discipline-based seniority groupings for civil servants?
  • Can service rules be challenged on the basis that they were changed to the detriment of an employee's promotion prospects if the change was not mala fide?
  Read full judgment →
• Sultan Ahmed vs Ghulam Raza and 2 others1995 SCMR 664 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-27
  criminal appealacquittalinterested witnessocular testimonymedical evidenceforensic evidencebenefit of doubtcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder and theft charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appraisal of evidence by rejecting the testimony of interested eye-witnesses and doubting the forensic recovery of crime weapons and empties. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal was based on a proper evaluation of the record. The Court affirmed that the testimony of interested and hostile witnesses requires strong, independent corroboration, which was absent here. Furthermore, the High Court correctly identified that the ocular version was contradicted by medical evidence regarding the range of fire and the number of shots. The Court also emphasized that the extended period crime empties remained in police custody before forensic examination rendered that evidence unreliable. Establishing the principle that an acquittal judgment should not be interfered with unless it is perverse or founded on artificial reasoning, the Court found no infirmity in the High Court’s decision to grant the respondents the benefit of doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of interested and hostile witnesses require strong independent corroboration to sustain a conviction?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment that is not perverse or based on artificial reasoning?
  • Does the extended retention of crime empties in police custody before forensic examination render such evidence unreliable?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when the ocular version of the incident is contradicted by medical evidence regarding the range of fire?
  Read full judgment →
• Suleman vs Nazar Muhammad1995 SCMR 565 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-13
  gift mutationdelivery of possessionconcurrent findingscivil suitfraudulent transferpermanent injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil suit challenging two gift mutations attested in 1969 and 1979, which the petitioner alleged were fraudulent and ineffective against his rights, while also seeking a permanent injunction against the respondent. The core legal question was whether the gift mutations were valid, specifically focusing on the delivery of possession to the donee. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court all concurrently found that the gifts were valid and that the respondent had been in possession of the land. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, noting that the petitioner's challenge arose only after the death of his daughter, who was married to the respondent. The Court held that once a gift is completed by the delivery of possession, it cannot be invalidated by subsequent disputes over the land's produce or allegations of forcible possession. The principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity and completion of a gift, supported by oral and documentary evidence, are not open to interference in the absence of misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a completed gift be challenged on the basis of subsequent disputes regarding the possession of the land's produce?
  • Does the delivery of possession validate a gift mutation even if the donor later alleges forcible possession by the donee?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the validity of a gift subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sufi Muhammad Anwar vs Mst. Badshah Begum and others1995 SCMR 1016 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  quashing of criminal proceedingslimitation and condonation of delaycivil suit and criminal caseex parte orderleave to appealright of hearing
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against the judgment of the High Court quashing a criminal case registered under sections 452, 506, 448, 511, 148, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, originating from F.I.R. No. 127 of 1986. The petition was barred by 423 days, and an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was filed for condonation of delay, supported by an affidavit stating that the petitioner was not served in the High Court proceedings. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court is whether a criminal case relating to the same subject-matter as a pending civil suit can be completely quashed on the basis of a civil stay order or if it can only be stayed. The Supreme Court condoned the delay upon verifying that the petitioner was not properly served in the High Court proceedings and granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal case relating to the same subject-matter as a pending civil suit can be quashed altogether or only stayed?
  • Can delay in filing a petition be condoned when the petitioner was not served in the prior proceedings?
  • Is a complainant entitled to a hearing before a criminal case arising from their F.I.R. is quashed?
  Read full judgment →
• Subedar Zar Muhammad vs Wali Muhammad1995 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-12
  leave to appealrevenue recordJamabandiKhasra numberappraisal of evidencecivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a civil revision in a property dispute concerning land allotment and revenue record entries. The core legal question involves the proper appraisal of evidence by the High Court regarding the existence and identity of a specific Khasra number in settlement and revenue records. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court properly appraised the evidence on record before passing the impugned judgment. The key principle laid down relates to the necessity of a correct and thorough appraisal of revenue records, Jamabandis, and oral testimony of revenue officials when determining discrepancies in property identification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has properly appraised the evidence on record before passing the impugned judgment regarding the existence of a disputed Khasra number?
  Read full judgment →
• State through AdvocateGeneral, Sindh, Karachi vs Farman Hussain and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-09
  kidnapping for ransomacquittal appealchild witnessidentification paradeevidentiary valuecorroborationmisreading of evidencecriminal jurisprudencebail cancellationdacoityconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard criminal appeals filed by the State against a High Court judgment that acquitted seven respondents previously convicted of kidnapping for ransom under Section 365-A/109, P.P.C. The core legal questions revolved around the evidentiary value of child witnesses, the necessity and proper conduct of identification tests, and the scope of interference with acquittal judgments. The Court, by majority, set aside the High Court's acquittal for three respondents (Shoukat Ali Mughal, Ghulam Abbas, and Ameer Bux Umrani), convicting them to 14 years' R.I. and a fine, while upholding the acquittal of the remaining four. The judgment affirmed that child witness testimony, if found true, natural, and unshaken, can be relied upon, especially when corroborated. It also clarified that identification tests are crucial for strangers but may be dispensed with if witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the accused. Interference with an acquittal judgment is warranted only in exceptional cases of gross misreading of evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice or an impossible conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained on the solitary evidence of a child witness if corroborated?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a child witness in a criminal trial?
  • Is an identification test a legal requirement in all cases, or can it be dispensed with if eye-witnesses can identify the accused before the trial Court?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment by a High Court?
  • Is it necessary for the prosecution to prove that ransom was actually demanded to establish an offence under Section 365-A, P.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• State Bank of Pakistan vs Ch. Muhamamd Akhtar and others1995 SCMR 41 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-03
  leave to appealwrongful dismissalreinstatementback benefitsconstitutional jurisdictiondepartmental inquirycompetent authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The State Bank of Pakistan filed a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that had set aside the dismissal of an employee, Ch. Muhammad Akhtar, and directed his reinstatement with full back benefits. The respondent had been dismissed following departmental proceedings for the misappropriation of funds. His initial grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and subsequent appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal were both dismissed. The High Court, exercising constitutional jurisdiction, intervened and ordered reinstatement. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred by substituting its own decision for that of the competent authority without properly considering the inquiry officer's report. Furthermore, the petitioner raised a legal question regarding whether the bank's employees are governed by the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations and Standing Orders or the Wage Commission Award. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court acted within its lawful authority in setting aside the departmental orders and directing reinstatement, effectively replacing the competent authority's decision with its own.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, can substitute its own decision for that of the competent authority regarding the dismissal of an employee?
  • Whether the employees of the State Bank of Pakistan are governed by the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations and Standing Orders or the Wage Commission Award?
  Read full judgment →
• Soneri Bank Limited through Mian Abdul Wajid, Evp And Muhammad Ashfaq Chishti, VP vs Raja Weaving Mills Limited And AnotherK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Banking Tribunalvires of statutepast and closed transactionswrit petitionnatural justicenotice
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court disposing of a writ petition following a Full Bench decision that declared certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 as ultra vires. The appellant bank had previously secured a money decree from the Banking Tribunal against the respondent. The respondent challenged the decree through a writ petition, which was disposed of by the High Court Division Bench relying on the Full Bench judgment without issuing notice to the appellant and without considering whether past and closed transactions were protected. The Supreme Court heard the appeal, noted that the respondent's counsel conceded that the decree fell within the protective scope of paragraph 12 of the Full Bench judgment as a past and closed transaction, and that the appellant had not been served with notice. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a judgment and decree passed by a Banking Tribunal prior to a declaration of unconstitutionality is protected as a past and closed transaction?
  • Can a High Court dispose of a constitutional petition affecting a decree-holder without serving notice on the appellant?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Hameed, Advocate vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law, Islamabad1995 SCMR 166 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-10
  fundamental rightsfreedom of religionEnforcement of Shariah Actconstitutional petitionsupreme court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a constitutional petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution by a practicing advocate challenging the validity of the Enforcement of Shariah Act (Act X of 1991) on the ground that it violates his fundamental right to profess, practise, and propagate his religion under Article 20 of the Constitution. The core legal question is whether Section 3 of the Enforcement of Shariah Act 1991 infringes upon the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 20 of the Constitution. The Court holds that the petition is misconceived, noting that the petitioner failed to point out any specific provision of the impugned Act that impedes his religious freedom, and that his grievance regarding interest-bearing loans from the House Building Finance Corporation does not stem from Section 3 of the Act. The petition is accordingly dismissed, laying down the principle that a legislative enactment cannot be struck down as violative of fundamental rights without demonstrating a direct and concrete infringement.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Enforcement of Shariah Act 1991 violate the fundamental right to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can a statute be declared void on the ground that it prevents a citizen from obtaining an interest-free loan from a financial corporation?
  Read full judgment →
• Sohail Ahmed vs The State1995 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-30
  leave to appealocular testimonycorroborationcriminal convictionappreciation of evidencemurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction for murder and attempted murder while acquitting his four co-accused. The petitioner was originally sentenced to death by the trial court for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, which the High Court subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the petitioner's conviction can be sustained based solely on ocular testimony when the same evidence was rejected by the lower courts regarding the co-accused, and when the prosecution's evidence regarding motive was disbelieved. The petitioner contends that the eye-witnesses were unreliable and that his conviction requires independent corroboration, which is absent from the record. Upon examination, the Supreme Court found that the contentions raised regarding the reliability of the ocular testimony and the lack of corroboration warranted further judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the conviction suffers from serious legal infirmity due to the partial rejection of the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on ocular testimony when that same testimony has been rejected by the courts regarding co-accused persons?
  • Does the rejection of prosecution evidence regarding motive and co-accused necessitate independent corroboration for the remaining accused's conviction?
  • Is leave to appeal warranted when the conviction is based on evidence found unreliable in other material aspects?
  Read full judgment →
• Sir E.H. Jaffar and Sons Ltd. vs Sultan Karam Ali and others1995 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-06
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentsublettinggrace periodrent restrictiontenancy agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a judgment of the High Court of Sindh setting aside an ejectment order granted by the Rent Controller against the respondents. The ejectment was sought on grounds of default in rent payment and subletting. The Rent Controller had found the respondents in default for failing to pay rent in advance as per the tenancy agreement. The High Court reversed this, holding that the parties had modified the mode of payment through a practice of billing, thereby entitling the tenants to a statutory grace period during which no default occurred. The Supreme Court agreed that no default in rent payment was committed due to the modified practice and applicability of the grace period. However, regarding the ground of subletting, the Supreme Court found that the original tenant had transferred his shares in the company and parted with possession of the premises to a third party without the landlord's written consent or knowledge. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on the ground of subletting, setting aside the High Court's judgment on that issue, and granted the respondents one year to vacate the premises.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord and tenant can modify the mode of rent payment agreed in a tenancy agreement through their subsequent course of conduct?
  • Is a tenant considered a defaulter in rent payment if a statutory grace period covers the delay resulting from a modified billing practice?
  • Does the transfer of shares in a company by a tenant constitute subletting or parting with possession of the rented premises without the landlord's consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution vs M/s. Pakistan Tobacco1995 SCMR 32 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-02
  audi alteram partemsocial securityadministrative suspensionstatutory notificationnatural justicevested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which had set aside the withdrawal of suspension orders concerning the application of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 to the respondent establishment. The core legal question was whether the respondent was entitled to a prior hearing under the principle of audi alteram partem before the government withdrew administrative suspension orders that had previously deferred the application of the Ordinance to their establishment. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Provincial Government was not legally required to provide a show-cause notice or a hearing to an establishment before issuing a notification under Section 1(3) of the Ordinance to extend its provisions. Consequently, the Court determined that the withdrawal of administrative suspension orders—which lacked a statutory basis—did not create a vested right or benefit necessitating the application of the audi alteram partem principle. The Court reaffirmed that administrative deferments do not confer procedural rights that override the government's authority to enforce statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Provincial Government required to provide a show-cause notice to an establishment before issuing a notification under Section 1(3) of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance 1965?
  • Does the withdrawal of an administrative suspension order, which was not based on any statutory provision, trigger the requirement of a prior hearing under the principle of audi alteram partem?
  • Can an establishment claim a vested right based on an administrative suspension order that lacks a basis in the governing statute?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar Hayat vs Muhammad Nawaz and 3 others1995 SCMR 616 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-24
  appeal against acquittalmurderabetmentreappraisal of evidencerecovery of crime emptiespresumption of innocence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the acquittal of the respondents on charges of murder and abetment. The core legal question involved the standard of review and the principles to be applied by an appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an acquittal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasons for acquittal recorded by the courts below—specifically regarding the absence of weapon corroboration and discrepancies in the testimony of abetment witnesses—were supported by the evidence on record and were neither perverse nor artificial. The key principles laid down reiterate that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal unless the conclusions of the lower court are such that no reasonable person could conceivably reach them, or unless the judgment is perverse and based on ridiculous reasoning, maintaining the double presumption of innocence.

  Questions settled

  • What are the well-settled principles to be kept in view while dealing with an appeal against acquittal?
  • Does the recovery of all crime empties from the weapon of only one co-accused exclude the participation of another accused alleged to have fired shots?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with a well-reasoned judgment of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sikandar A. Karim vs The State1995 SCMR 387 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-11
  post-arrest bailunder-invoicingsmugglingcustoms duty evasionprohibitory clauseburden of proofjudicial proprietyrule of consistency
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from two criminal petitions for leave to appeal filed by the Managing Director of an automobile company, challenging the High Court of Sindh's refusal to grant bail in a case registered under Section 156(1), (8), and (14) of the Customs Act, 1969, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The prosecution alleged under-invoicing of imported auto parts and smuggling of parts inside imported taxis. The Supreme Court converted the petitions into appeals and granted bail. The Court held that under-invoicing under Section 156(1)(14) carries a maximum punishment of three years and does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Cr.P.C., making bail the rule and refusal the exception. Regarding the smuggling charge under Section 156(1)(8), the Court ruled that under Section 156(2) of the Customs Act, the accused is entitled to tentatively show at the bail stage that the seized goods were lawfully imported. The Court also emphasized that judicial propriety requires judges to express dissent with courtesy and restraint.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offence under Section 156(1)(14) of the Customs Act, 1969, which carries a maximum punishment of three years, falls within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Whether an accused charged with smuggling under Section 156(1)(8) of the Customs Act, 1969, is entitled to produce and have the court tentatively examine import documents at the bail stage to discharge the burden under Section 156(2) of the Act?
  • Can a private person who is not a public servant be substantively convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947?
  • What are the standards of judicial propriety and courtesy required under the Code of Conduct when a High Court judge expresses dissent or disagreement with a brother judge of the same court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sherin and 4 others vs Fazal Muhammad and 4 others1995 SCMR 584 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-03-29
  condonation of delaysufficient causepecuniary jurisdictionreturn of appealmistaken advice of counselact of courtSection 5 Limitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the appellants' first appeal as barred by time. The appellants originally instituted the appeal before the District Judge within the statutory limitation period on the mistaken advice of their counsel, who overlooked the pecuniary jurisdiction as determined by the trial court's order on court-fee deficiency. The District Court entertained and retained the appeal for over ten months before returning the memorandum of appeal for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The High Court refused to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court considered the standard of care required of litigants and the duties of court functionaries. The Supreme Court held that while filing an appeal in a wrong forum due to legal counsel's advice does not automatically excuse delay, the act and delay of the court itself in failing to return the appeal with reasonable dispatch prejudiced the appellants. Applying the maxim that an act of court shall prejudice no man, the Supreme Court held that the court's delay constituted 'sufficient cause' under Section 5. The appeal was allowed, delay condoned, and the matter remanded to the High Court for fresh decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure empower an appellate court to apply Order VII Rule 10 to return a memorandum of appeal for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction?
  • Can the delay in returning a memorandum of appeal by a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction constitute 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is it the duty of court officials upon receiving a memorandum of appeal to decide jurisdictional issues regarding pecuniary limitation?
  • Does the mistaken advice of counsel automatically furnish sufficient cause for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheraz Asghar d vs The State1995 SCMR 1365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-03
  murder convictionocular evidencefalsus in uno falsus in omnibusFIR delaymedical evidencemotiveinvestigation irregularities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction and life sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence in the presence of alleged delays in FIR registration, discrepancies between medical and ocular evidence regarding the weapon used, the impact of an unproven motive, and the effect of the acquittal of a co-accused on the petitioner's conviction. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that minor discrepancies in describing weapons (pistol vs. carbine) in rural contexts do not invalidate reliable eyewitness testimony. The Court affirmed that the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' is not recognized in Pakistan, allowing courts to sift grain from chaff. Furthermore, it ruled that the absence of a proven motive does not destroy otherwise credible evidence, and procedural irregularities in investigation do not vitiate a trial unless they cause a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus' apply to criminal trials in Pakistan?
  • Does the failure to prove a motive for murder invalidate otherwise credible ocular evidence?
  • Can procedural irregularities during a police investigation vitiate a conviction if no miscarriage of justice occurs?
  • Does a minor discrepancy in the description of a weapon between the FIR and medical evidence inherently discredit eyewitness testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Zaman vs Muhammad Irshad and another1995 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-15
  leave to appealmitigating circumstancesdeath sentencelife imprisonmentquantum of sentencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 8-11-1993, whereby the High Court maintained the conviction of respondent No. 1 under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but altered the sentence of death to life imprisonment with the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns whether the circumstances considered by the High Court—namely, that the murder stemmed from a blood feud involving family honour and that the convict did not repeat the fire or attack the complainant—constituted valid mitigating circumstances to warrant the reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the aforementioned circumstances legally amounted to mitigating circumstances justifying the commutation of the death penalty. The key principle laid down is that the adequacy of mitigating circumstances for reducing a sentence of death to life imprisonment requires detailed examination by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the involvement of family honour and a blood feud can constitute mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Does the failure to repeat a firearm injury amount to a mitigating circumstance in a murder case?
  • Whether the alteration of a death sentence to life imprisonment by the High Court is sustainable in law under the given circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad vs Abdul Aziz1995 SCMR 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12
  specific performancepre-emption suitconcurrent findingsleave to appealcontractual agreementagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent judgments of the trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court, which decreed a suit for specific performance of an agreement. The respondent had filed a suit alleging that he and his two brothers, including the petitioner, had jointly acquired agricultural land through a pre-emption suit. The respondent claimed that an agreement existed whereby the petitioner and the other brother agreed to transfer their shares of the acquired land to the respondent, excluding 2-1/2 acres, in consideration for the respondent bearing all litigation expenses. The petitioner denied the existence of the agreement. The core legal question was whether the lower courts erred in finding the agreement proved. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding the existence and terms of the agreement were final and free from defect. Furthermore, the Court refused to entertain a new factual contention raised for the first time at the leave stage regarding partial satisfaction of the agreement. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual contention for the first time during a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court?
  • Are concurrent findings of fact by lower courts subject to interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of legal defects?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and others vs The State1995 SCMR 846 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-03
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencechance witnessesrelation witnessescriminal conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the conviction of the petitioners, Sher Muhammad and others, as reported in 1995 SCMR 846 before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerns the proper appraisal of evidence, specifically whether the testimony of three relation-cum-chance witnesses, who allegedly witnessed the occurrence at dead of night in the moonlight, can form a safe basis for conviction in accordance with the established principles laid down by the Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the courts below correctly followed these evidentiary principles. The key principle laid down relates to the rigorous scrutiny required for appraising the testimony of relation and chance witnesses in criminal cases involving night-time occurrences.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of relation-cum-chance witnesses form a safe basis for conviction for an occurrence at dead of night in the moonlight?
  • Were the principles governing the appraisal of evidence correctly followed by the courts below?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Muhammad and 2 others vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-25
  criminal appealappraisal of evidencechance witnessesocular evidencemedical evidencecross-examinationcontradiction of witnessesFIR delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 and Section 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder and causing hurt. The core legal questions concerned the proper appraisal of evidence, specifically whether the testimony of related and alleged "chance witnesses" regarding a nighttime occurrence could safely form the basis for conviction, and the scope of contradicting witnesses under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Article 140 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the convictions were sound. The Court affirmed that medical evidence corroborated the ocular account, and the delay in lodging the FIR was adequately explained. Crucially, the Court ruled that facts elicited by the defense during cross-examination cannot be equated with previous statements for the purpose of contradiction. Furthermore, the Court disapproved of the practice of using prolonged cross-examination to manipulate witness error, emphasizing that minor contradictions do not undermine the material evidence of credible eyewitnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Can facts elicited during cross-examination be equated with previous statements for the purpose of contradicting a witness?
  • Does a delay in lodging an FIR automatically invalidate the prosecution's case?
  • Is the medical evidence sufficient to corroborate the ocular account of an incident?
  • Does the practice of prolonged cross-examination to induce error in a witness invalidate the testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Azam Khan vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Health, Peshawar1995 SCMR 1706 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-18
  service lawpromotion withdrawalservice tribunal jurisdictionfitness for promotioncivil servantjudicial reviewreversion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a service appeal by the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which had refused to exercise jurisdiction regarding the withdrawal of the appellant's promotion. The appellant, a Hostel Superintendent, was promoted to Assistant Provost but subsequently reverted when the government withdrew the promotion order. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal in limine, citing Section 4(b)(i) of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunals Act, 1974, which bars appeals regarding the 'fitness or otherwise' of a person to be promoted. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted this provision as a bar to reviewing the legality of the withdrawal of a promotion order. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation. The Court clarified that determining the 'fitness' of a civil servant for promotion is distinct from determining the legality of an order reverting a civil servant from a superior to an inferior post. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the case to the Tribunal for adjudication on merits, establishing that the bar on fitness-related appeals does not preclude judicial review of the validity of promotion withdrawal orders.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar in Section 4(b)(i) of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunals Act, 1974 regarding 'fitness' for promotion preclude a Service Tribunal from reviewing the legality of an order withdrawing a promotion?
  • Is the question of a civil servant's fitness for promotion synonymous with the question of whether a civil servant has been rightly reverted from a superior to an inferior post?
  Read full judgment →
• Sher Ahmed and others vs The State1995 SCMR 144 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-16
  criminal breachforgerycheatingpost-arrest bailprohibitory clausestatutory delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing their application for pre-trial bail in a case registered under sections 420, 34, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, concerning allegations of fraudulent transfer of land via a forged power of attorney. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail when the offences charged did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and trial proceedings had been stayed for an indefinite period. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed bail, holding that accused persons cannot be detained in judicial lock-up without trial for an indefinite period when the case falls outside the prohibitory clause of section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that prolonged incarceration without trial, coupled with the non-applicability of the prohibitory clause, warrants the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to bail when the alleged offense does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can accused persons be detained in a judicial lock-up without trial for an indefinite period?
  • Does a stay of trial proceedings by the High Court justify granting bail to incarcerated petitioners?
  Read full judgment →
• Sheikh Muhammad Asghar vs The Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and 51995 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  service appealleave to appealcompromisewithdrawal of petitionestoppeltermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed his service appeal in limine. The petitioner, initially appointed as a Cashier and later as a Revenue Officer on probation, had his services dispensed with. He previously challenged his termination through a constitutional petition, which resulted in a compromise wherein he withdrew the petition and accepted re-appointment as a Cashier. Subsequently, he re-agitated the matter regarding his earlier termination before the Tribunal. The core legal question was whether an employee, having compromised a previous challenge and accepted a lower post under an arrangement, could subsequently turn around and challenge the termination order again. The Supreme Court held that having acted upon the settlement arrangement, the petitioner was estopped from challenging the termination order. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that a party who compromises a legal proceeding and acts upon the settlement cannot subsequently reagitate the settled grievance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee challenge a termination order after compromising a previous constitutional petition and accepting a lower post under that arrangement?
  • Whether an employee who has acted upon a settlement arrangement can subsequently reagitate the legality of their termination?
  Read full judgment →
• Shakil-Ur-Rehman Hamidi vs Government of Sindh and others1995 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-30
  service appealseniority listpromotionsupersessiongovernment undertakingservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a judgment of the Sindh Service Tribunal, Karachi, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal challenging the seniority list pertaining to Head Masters, Sub-Divisional Education Officers, and Deputy Education Officers (B-17). The core legal question concerned the alleged illegal supersession of the appellant by a junior officer in promotion from BS-17 to BS-18. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the Government of Sindh submitted a formal undertaking stating that if the appellant's allegation of supersession by a junior officer from the Provincialized Cadre in 1984 is correct, the appellant will be granted promotion from the date his junior was promoted. The appellant accepted this undertaking. Consequently, the Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in terms of the official undertaking given by the Provincial Government, with no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal regarding a service seniority list can be disposed of on the basis of an official undertaking given by the Provincial Government?
  • Does promotion of a junior officer entitle a senior civil servant to pro-rata promotion from the date of the junior's promotion when the government undertakes to rectify the supersession?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Mansoor Bodla vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and another1995 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-21
  service lawshort-term vacancytermination of serviceintervening periodFederal Service Tribunalleave to appealcivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the regularization of service benefits for a former Statistical Officer. The petitioner, initially appointed to a short-term vacancy, challenged the termination of his services and the subsequent treatment of his intervening period of service by the departmental authority. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having been appointed against a specific short-term vacancy, possessed a legal entitlement to have the entire intervening period of his unemployment treated as duty with full pay, despite the Tribunal's previous compassionate accommodation. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having been appointed against a temporary vacancy, had no valid legal claim to continued employment or specific treatment of the intervening period beyond what the department had already granted. The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that appointments against short-term vacancies do not confer a right to permanent absorption or automatic salary entitlements for periods where no service was rendered, particularly when the department has already acted to accommodate the individual on compassionate grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appointment against a short-term vacancy confer a legal right to be accommodated against other available posts upon the expiry of that vacancy?
  • Can a civil servant claim salary for an intervening period of unemployment following the termination of a short-term contract?
  • Is a departmental authority obligated to treat an intervening period of service as 'on duty' for a temporary employee whose contract has expired?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid Iqbal vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and another1995 SCMR 660 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-01
  deputationpermanent absorptioninterim reliefstatus quocivil servantSenate SecretariatCentral Board of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a permanent employee of the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) sent on deputation, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court vacating an interim status quo order in his writ petition. The petitioner challenged his repatriation to his parent department, contending he had been permanently absorbed into the Senate Secretariat with the concurrence of the CBR. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had made out a prima facie case regarding his permanent absorption to justify the continuation of interim relief, considering the jurisdictional bar regarding civil servants. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the documents on record—showing no-objection letters from the CBR and requests to remove the petitioner's name from the CBR's officer strength—established a prima facie case that the absorption was done with competent consent. Furthermore, Senate employees do not fall within the category of civil servants under Article 87(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the vacation of an interim status quo order by a High Court was justified when documents prima facie established the permanent absorption of a deputationist?
  • Do employees of the Senate Secretariat fall within the category of civil servants under the Constitution?
  • Whether an interim injunction should be restored when a prima facie case and official regularity are demonstrated on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Shahid and 2 others vs The State and another1995 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  leave to appealacquittalretrialrevisionreappraisal of evidencecriminal administration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court's Judge in Chambers, which had set aside their acquittal by the trial court and remanded the case for retrial under section 302/34 P.P.C. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's acquittal judgment in revision without establishing misreading of evidence or perversity. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to reappraise the evidence for the safe administration of criminal justice, ordering that proceedings before the trial court remain stayed pending the disposal of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal may be granted to examine whether an appellate or revisional court properly exercised its jurisdiction in setting aside an acquittal without identifying material perversity or complete misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can a revisional court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Whether failure of the trial court to give independent reasons for disbelieving ocular evidence justifies setting aside an acquittal.
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal for the reappraisal of evidence in criminal matters where acquittal is reversed?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Zaman vs Mst. Mussarat Begum1995 SCMR 488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  concurrent findingssale-deed cancellationfraudulent transferthumb-impressionfinger print expertmisreading of evidencecivil petition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition against the concurrent judgments of three lower forums decreeing the respondent's suit for cancellation of a registered sale-deed and for possession of a disputed house. The core legal question concerns whether the lower courts misread the evidence, particularly regarding the expert findings on the disputed thumb-impressions and the execution of the sale-deed. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the sale-deed and the lack of proper identification and execution were based on a proper assessment of the evidence, with expert testimony indicating tampering and failure to verify thumb-impressions. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent factual findings supported by evidence will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by three lower forums regarding the cancellation of a fraudulent sale-deed warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Can a registered sale-deed be set aside when expert evidence establishes that the thumb-impressions of the executant were either tampered with or not proved?
  • What is the effect on a party's case when a key marginal witness to a disputed sale-deed is not produced for further examination after allegations of impersonation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shah Zaman and anothers vs Federal Government and another1995 SCMR 464 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-23
  transfer of criminal caseSpecial Court for Speedy Trialswrit jurisdictionmaintainability of writ petitionconstitutional barFederal Government powers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court order that dismissed their writ petition challenging the Federal Government's decision to transfer their double murder case from the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Haripur, to a Special Court for Speedy Trials. The core legal questions were whether the Federal Government possessed the authority to transfer a pending criminal case to a Special Court, and whether the High Court correctly held that the writ petition was not maintainable given the constitutional bar on jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Federal Government is fully empowered under the Special Court for Speedy Trials Act 1992 to transfer cases involving gruesome, brutal, or sensational offenses to a Special Court. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the constitutional provision barring jurisdiction in relation to proceedings before such tribunals is broad enough to preclude interference with the transfer of criminal cases. The judgment establishes that accused persons must raise their objections regarding the trial proceedings directly before the Special Court itself rather than through writ petitions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Government have the authority to transfer a criminal case from an ordinary court to a Special Court for Speedy Trials?
  • Does the constitutional bar on jurisdiction in Article 212-B(8) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 include the transfer of criminal cases to Special Courts?
  • Can an accused challenge the transfer of their case to a Special Court through a writ petition in the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafiqur Rahman vs Haji Agha Hassan1995 SCMR 313 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-07
  ejectmentrented premiseshotel definitionrestaurant vs hotelpleadingsappellate jurisdictionSindh Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a landlord's petition for ejectment against a tenant regarding commercial premises. The core legal question was whether the premises, operated as a restaurant or cafe, constituted a 'hotel' and were thereby excluded from the ambit of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, and whether the High Court could entertain this plea when it was neither pleaded nor argued before the Rent Controller. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the appeal on this ground. The Court clarified that a 'hotel' necessarily implies an establishment providing residential accommodation to travelers, whereas a restaurant or cafe merely provides refreshments. Consequently, the premises were not excluded from the Ordinance. The Court further emphasized that appellate courts should not decide cases on points not raised in the pleadings or before the trial forum. The judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a decision on the merits of the original ejectment grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does a restaurant or cafe constitute a 'hotel' under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can an appellate court allow an appeal based on a legal plea that was neither raised in the pleadings nor argued before the Rent Controller?
  • What is the essential distinction between a 'hotel' and a 'restaurant' in the context of rent control legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Shafique Ahmad vs Muhammad Ramzan and another1995 SCMR 855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  criminal appealleave to appealacquittalappreciation of evidenceunexplained injuriesmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby respondent Muhammad Ramzan was acquitted of charges under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of a four-year-old child. The core legal question concerns the propriety of interfering with an acquittal judgment, particularly regarding the evaluation of ocular testimony, unexplained injuries on the accused, and competing versions of the incident. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court provided sound, cogent, and supportable reasons for acquittal, notably because the eye-witnesses suppressed injuries sustained by the respondent and lacked corroboration. The key principle laid down is that an appellate court will not interfere with an acquittal by a competent court unless there are very strong, exceptional, and compelling grounds showing the judgment to be perverse or unreasonable.

  Questions settled

  • What grounds are required for an appellate court to interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the suppression of injuries on the accused by eye-witnesses affect the credibility of the prosecution case?
  • Whether leave to appeal against acquittal should be granted when the High Court has given sound and cogent reasons for acquitting the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Shabbir Ahmad vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 343 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-02
  murderself-defenceSection 342 Cr.P.C.appreciation of evidenceocular evidencecriminal appealexculpatory statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment maintaining the appellant's conviction and sentence for murder. The prosecution alleged the appellant shot and killed the deceased during a dispute over a watercourse. The appellant admitted the occurrence but pleaded self-defence, claiming an exchange of fire occurred where the deceased was accidentally hit. The core legal question was whether the appellant's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. should be accepted in its entirety, specifically regarding his plea of self-defence, and whether the prosecution's ocular account was reliable. The Supreme Court held that while an accused's statement should generally be read as a whole, the court is not bound to accept exculpatory parts if the prosecution provides clear, cogent, and reliable evidence. The Court found the defence plea to be a fabrication, noting the lack of injuries on the appellant and his failure to report the incident. The conviction was upheld, establishing that where prosecution evidence is robust, the court may reject an accused's self-serving exculpatory version while relying on the inculpatory facts.

  Questions settled

  • Must an accused's statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C. be accepted or rejected in its entirety?
  • Can a court reject the exculpatory portion of an accused's statement if the prosecution evidence is reliable?
  • Does the mere existence of a defence version require the court to accept it over the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Sh. Muhammad Aslam and others vs Shaukat Ali alias Shoka and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  QisasDiyatTa'zirCompounding of offenceLegal heirsWaiver of QisasCriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal petition for leave to appeal arising from a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, convicted of murder, sought to compound the offence based on a compromise reached with some, but not all, of the deceased's legal heirs. Specifically, the mother of the deceased refused to waive her right of Qisas, while the widow and minor children agreed to the compromise. The core legal question is whether, in a case where punishment is awarded by way of Ta'zir, the principle of Section 309 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860—which allows for the waiver of Qisas by some heirs while entitling others to Diyat—is applicable. Furthermore, the Court identified a broader issue regarding whether an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be compounded under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if not all legal heirs consent to the compromise. Due to the general importance of these questions, the Court issued notices to the Attorney-General and Advocates-General and appointed amicus curiae to assist in the final determination.

  Questions settled

  • Can the principle of Section 309 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 apply to cases where punishment is awarded by way of Ta'zir?
  • Can an offence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be compounded under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if not all legal heirs of the victim agree to the compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary, Finance Division Government of Pakistan and 2 others vs Ejaz Hussain Malik1995 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  move-overcivil servantservice tribunaljusticiabilityselection gradeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the decision of a Selection Board denying the respondent, a permanent BPS-18 employee, a move-over to BPS-19. The respondent had sought a move-over effective from December 1, 1992, but the Selection Board rejected his request, citing specific shortcomings, including the fact that he had been granted Selection Grade BPS-18 only on June 1, 1992, and had not completed the requisite one-year tenure at the maximum of his pay scale. The Tribunal subsequently declared the Selection Committee's recommendations discriminatory and unlawful. The petitioners, representing the Government, challenged this, arguing that move-over is a concession, not a vested right, and thus not justiciable before the Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the interpretation of the phrase 'subject to the condition that they fulfil other conditions according to the existing policy' contained in the Finance Division's Office Memorandum dated May 17, 1992, to determine the scope of eligibility for move-over concessions for federal civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of move-over to a civil servant a justiciable matter before the Federal Service Tribunal?
  • Does the denial of a move-over concession constitute a violation of the terms and conditions of service?
  • What is the legal significance of the condition requiring fulfillment of existing policy criteria for the grant of move-over?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Irrigation and Power1995 PLC 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-06
  leave to appealpay scalework charge employeesdepartmental transferconstitutional jurisdictionservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 20th October 1993, which allowed a writ petition filed by work-charged tubewell operators previously employed by WAPDA and subsequently transferred to the Irrigation Department. The core legal questions involve whether work-charged employees are entitled to retain their higher previous pay scale upon transfer despite opting for a lower scale and acquiescing for years, and whether the High Court could exercise constitutional jurisdiction in light of the bar under Article 212(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider these questions regarding pay fixation upon departmental transfer and the jurisdictional bar of the service tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether work-charged employees could be held entitled to the same pay on their transfer and absorption in the same cadre of the Irrigation Department in NPS-2 after they had opted for it and acquiesced for years?
  • As to whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction in the manner irrespective of the bar of Article 212(2) of the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Finance Department, Lahore1995 PLC (C.S.) 108 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service lawreversionnatural justicediscriminationcivil servantdepartmental promotionS.A.S. examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Service Tribunal judgment that set aside the reversion of the respondent from the post of Accountant to Assistant Accountant. The respondent, initially promoted as an Accountant in 1980, was reverted in 1986 on the grounds of being non-qualified for failing to pass the S.A.S. Departmental examination. The core legal questions were whether the respondent's promotion was regular or merely officiating, whether his reversion without notice violated natural justice, and whether he was subjected to discriminatory treatment compared to other similarly situated employees who were granted exemptions. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the respondent had been promoted against a permanent vacancy and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the promotion was conditional. Crucially, the Court held that the respondent was subjected to discrimination, as other employees in similar circumstances were exempted from the examination requirement and retained their positions. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the arbitrary reversion of a civil servant without notice, particularly when discriminatory, violates fundamental principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be reverted from a promoted post without a show-cause notice?
  • Does the arbitrary exemption of some employees from a mandatory departmental examination while enforcing it against others constitute discrimination?
  • Is a promotion made against a permanent vacancy considered regular even if the order uses the term 'officiating'?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Excise and Taxation1995 PLC (C.S.) 492 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20
  service tribunaldismissal from serviceliencompetent authoritycivil servantdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which set aside the respondent's dismissal from service and ordered a fresh inquiry. The respondent, initially a confirmed Lecturer in the Education Department, was later appointed as an Excise and Taxation Officer in a temporary capacity while retaining his lien in the Education Department. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings for misconduct were initiated against him, culminating in his dismissal by the Secretary of the Excise and Taxation Department. The Punjab Service Tribunal allowed his appeal, holding that because his lien in the parent Education Department was never terminated, the competent authority to dismiss him was the Secretary, Education, and not the Secretary, Excise and Taxation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed this view, holding that the authority competent to dismiss a civil servant who retains a lien in a parent department remains the authority of that parent department. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, and the key principle established is that departmental dismissal of a civil servant holding an active lien must be executed by the competent authority of the department where the lien is retained.

  Questions settled

  • Which authority is competent to dismiss a civil servant who retains a lien in his parent department?
  • Whether the termination of a civil servant's lien is a prerequisite for a new employing department to exercise dismissal powers?
  • Does the failure to terminate a lien in the parent department affect the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority in the new department?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Education Department, Lahore and 2 others vs Abbas Anwar Qureshi1995 SCMR 2 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-27
  disciplinary proceedingsmisconductinsubordinationservice tribunalcharge-sheetpetitioner for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Education Department against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had set aside the penalty of censure imposed upon the respondent, a Lecturer, for alleged insubordination and misconduct. The core legal question involved the validity of disciplinary proceedings initiated through a vague charge-sheet and statement of allegations lacking specific instances, coupled with the failure of the Authorized Officer to examine the complainant Principal or seek comments on the respondent's explanation. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed no error in accepting the respondent's appeal, as the charge-sheet was entirely vague and the finding of insubordination could not be supported in the absence of proper inquiry and examination of evidence. The Court laid down the principle that disciplinary proceedings and penalties imposed on the basis of vague charges without affording a proper opportunity of refutation and inquiry are unsustainable in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a charge-sheet and statement of allegations lacking specific instances of misconduct are legally sustainable?
  • Can a finding of insubordination be upheld when the Authorized Officer fails to examine the complainant or seek comments on the accused's explanation?
  • Did the Punjab Service Tribunal err in setting aside a penalty imposed through defective disciplinary proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Secretary to Government of Punjab, Housingphysical &K.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-05
  constitutional petitionallotment of plotvested rightpolicy changelawyers quotaleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from the concurrent findings of the Lahore High Court and its Appellate Bench regarding the allotment of a residential plot to the respondent under a lawyers' quota in the Area Development Scheme No. II, Tehsil Samundri. The respondent was allotted a plot by the District Housing Committee, which was later found to be reserved for government servants. Before an alternate plot could be issued, the government changed its policy and abolished all quotas, leading the department to withhold further allotment. The respondent successfully challenged this refusal through a constitutional petition and subsequent Intra-Court Appeal. The core legal question addressed is whether a subsequent change in government policy can divest a right already accrued to an applicant upon the acceptance of their allotment application and determination of eligibility. The Supreme Court held that once a plot is allotted following the determination of eligibility, a vested right is created which cannot be taken away by a subsequent retrospective policy change, particularly when the government continued making allotments despite the new policy. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent change in government policy can take away a right to the allotment of a plot that had already vested in an applicant upon the acceptance of their application?
  • Whether the recommendation and allotment of a plot by a District Housing Committee creates a binding obligation on the government?
  • Can a government department refuse to honor an allotment on the basis of a policy abolition when it continues to make allotments under the guise of that same policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Muhammad vs Muhammad Israr and 3 others1995 SCMR 1356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-25
  locus standisentence reductionjudicial application of mindOffence of Zinaremandappellate dutycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which had reduced the sentences of three respondents convicted under Section 12 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The trial court had initially sentenced the respondents to 12 years' rigorous imprisonment, whipping, and a fine. Upon appeal, the Federal Shariat Court, based solely on the consent of the parties' counsel, reduced the imprisonment to the period already undergone (approximately 56 days) and reduced the number of stripes. The Supreme Court examined whether the complainant had locus standi to appeal and whether the sentence reduction was proper. The Court held that the Federal Shariat Court failed to apply its judicial mind to the evidence and circumstances, relying improperly on the consent of counsel rather than an independent assessment of the record. The Supreme Court clarified that the ratio in PLD 1983 SC 233 does not restrict a complainant's locus standi to appeal against Federal Shariat Court judgments. Consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the ratio in PLD 1983 SC 233 restrict a complainant's locus standi to file an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court before the Supreme Court?
  • Is an appellate court permitted to reduce a sentence based solely on the consent of the parties' counsel without independently assessing the evidence and circumstances of the case?
  • What is the obligation of an appellate court when reviewing a conviction and sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Shaukat Ali vs The State1995 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-15
  circumstantial evidencemurderconvictionrecovery of weaponabscondencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant, Shaukat Ali, for the murder of Abdul Zahir under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was upheld by the Balochistan High Court. The core legal question was whether it is safe to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence where the occurrence was unwitnessed at night. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's employment and residence with the deceased, his sudden disappearance from the crime scene, his subsequent arrest in another province, and the recovery of a blood-stained murder weapon at his pointing constitute an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing exclusively to his guilt. The court affirmed that circumstantial evidence, when corroborated by recoveries and conduct, is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction even in the absence of direct eyewitnesses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence in the absence of eyewitnesses?
  • Does the sudden disappearance of an accused from the scene of the crime constitute incriminating circumstantial evidence?
  • Whether the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused provides sufficient corroboration to support a murder charge?
  Read full judgment →
• Sandoz Limited and anothers vs Federation of Pakistan and others1995 SCMR 1431 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-07
  time of the essencebreach of contractliquidated damagesagencyrepudiationforeign currency claimContract Act 1872remote damages
  Summary & questions settled

  These direct appeals under Article 185 of the Constitution arise from a contractual dispute regarding the import and formulation of chemical pesticides. The core legal questions were whether the contract was bilateral or tripartite, whether the specified completion date was of the essence under Section 55 of the Contract Act, 1872, and the entitlement of the parties to damages under Sections 73 and 74. The Supreme Court held that the contract was bilateral between the Federation and the foreign supplier, with the local distributor acting as an agent. The Court further held that time was not of the essence of the contract, as the agreement contained provisions for liquidated damages and extensions of time, which militated against such an inference. The word 'positively' alongside the delivery date was insufficient to make time of the essence. Consequently, the Federation's unilateral refusal to accept late delivery constituted an invalid repudiation. The Court laid down that while time is generally of the essence in commercial contracts, this presumption is rebutted by clauses providing for penalties or extensions, and remote damages cannot be recovered under Section 73.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of the word 'positively' alongside a delivery date in a commercial contract automatically make time of the essence under Section 55 of the Contract Act, 1872?
  • How does the presence of a liquidated damages or penalty clause for delayed performance affect the determination of whether time is of the essence in a contract?
  • Can a party recover damages under Section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 for expenses or freight differences that are deemed too remote and indirect to have naturally arisen from the breach?
  • What is the relevant date of exchange rate conversion for a decree involving a foreign currency claim under Pakistani law?
  Read full judgment →
• Sanaullah Khan Gandapur vs Advocategeneral, N.W.F.P. and others1995 SCMR 79 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-21
  leave to appealnomination papersbar council electionelection disputeconstitutional petitionmaintainabilityelection tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition, which had challenged the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondents Nos. 3, 4, and 5 for the election of a Member of the Provincial Bar Council. The petitioner contended that the respondents' nomination papers were filed in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge and only received by the Returning Officer after the prescribed deadline, rendering them invalid. The High Court had dismissed the petition as non-maintainable, ruling that election disputes must be referred to the Election Tribunal under Rules 61, 63, and 64 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976, drawing analogies from Article 225 of the Constitution and Section 52 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether a constitutional petition is maintainable when no specific statutory appeal mechanism against the acceptance of nomination papers is provided under the Bar Councils Act or its rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition is maintainable to challenge the acceptance of nomination papers in a Bar Council election where no specific statutory appeal mechanism is provided under the relevant Bar Council rules?
  • Can provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1976 be relied upon to determine the dispute resolution forum for Bar Council elections?
  • Does the receipt of nomination papers by a court other than the office of the Returning Officer within the deadline constitute valid filing if they reach the Returning Officer after the deadline?
  Read full judgment →
• Saleem Ullah vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 3 others1995 SCMR 1865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-23
  service senioritypolice service of pakistansupersession and defermentfederal service tribunalvested rightgradation listcivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing the petitioner's appeals regarding seniority in the Police Service of Pakistan. The core legal questions involve whether a seniority list creates a vested right, whether the competent authority has the power to convert an officer's supersession into deferment, and whether the petitioner is entitled to seniority over the contesting private respondents who were originally senior in the lower rank. The Supreme Court held that a seniority list by itself confers no vested right unless backed by an order competently passed, that the competent authority is duly authorized under the rules to convert supersession into deferment, and that the respondents properly regained their seniority upon clearance and promotion. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision and refused leave to appeal. The key principles laid down are that seniority lists do not confer vested rights in themselves, that supersessions can be converted to deferments by competent authorities under applicable administrative rules, and that initial seniority in lower grades carries forward when subsequent deferments are regularized.

  Questions settled

  • Does a seniority list by itself confer any vested right to an employee?
  • Is the competent authority authorized under the ESTACODE to convert an officer's supersession into deferment?
  • Whether an employee can claim seniority over colleagues who were senior in the lower rank and whose subsequent regularization rectifies their position?
  Read full judgment →
• Salar Jang Khan and 4 others vs Khaleeo Ahmad Ansari and another1995 SCMR 726 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-20
  execution proceedingscivil revisionpossessionjudgment-debtorobjection petitionleave to appealproperty dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order dismissing a civil revision regarding execution proceedings. The core legal question was whether the execution court erred in summarily dismissing the petitioners' objections—filed under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908—concerning their alleged physical possession of the disputed property and their non-joinder in the original suit, without conducting a detailed inquiry. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the execution court had acted correctly by reviewing the relevant documents and hearing the parties before rejecting the objections. The Court found that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest derived rights solely from the judgment-debtor, whose title was limited, and that the petitioners, as relatives residing in the property, were aware of the ongoing litigation. The key principle established is that an execution court is not required to hold an exhaustive inquiry when the record, including documentary evidence, sufficiently demonstrates that the objector's claims are derivative of the judgment-debtor's limited rights and that the objector had prior knowledge of the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an execution court summarily dismiss objections regarding possession if the record demonstrates the objector's rights are derivative of the judgment-debtor?
  • Is an execution court required to hold a full inquiry into objections filed under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the documentary evidence contradicts the objector's claims?
  • Does the failure to join a party in a suit invalidate a decree if that party's interest is derived from the judgment-debtor and they had knowledge of the litigation?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Ali Baig And Other vs Muhammad Asghar Chaudhry, S.O. Etc.KLR 1997 PSC 656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1997-06-20
  Office Management Groupacting charge appointmentregularizationseniority disputepromotion quotaretrospective effectcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the regularization of Section Officers in the Office Management Group (OMG) who were initially appointed on an acting charge basis due to administrative shortages. The core legal question was whether the government could retrospectively regularize these promotees effective from 31.12.1989, thereby affecting the seniority of direct recruits. The Federal Service Tribunal had partially allowed the appeals of direct recruits, holding that while regularization was permissible, it could not be given retrospective effect without proof of available vacancies in the promotion quota on the specified date. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision, affirming that the government failed to transparently demonstrate the existence of sufficient vacancies within the 1/3rd promotion quota on the retrospective date. The Court held that adherence to prescribed recruitment quotas is mandatory, and administrative regularizations cannot arbitrarily infringe upon the seniority rights of direct recruits. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, maintaining that retrospective regularization without clear vacancy justification is legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can the government regularize civil servants on an acting charge basis with retrospective effect without proof of available vacancies?
  • Does the regularization of promotees against the promotion quota require strict adherence to the prescribed recruitment ratio?
  • Can direct recruits challenge the regularization of promotees if such regularization adversely affects their seniority?
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• Salahoon vs Abdullah and another1995 SCMR 996 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-14
  leave to appealsentence reductionpremeditated murdersentencing discretioncriminal appealappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal matter where the respondent was convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Kalsoom Bibi. While the trial court sentenced the respondent to death, the High Court maintained the conviction but commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The High Court reasoned that the attack was unpremeditated, suggesting the weapon used was picked up at the scene and the incident occurred due to a sudden provocation following a marriage refusal. The petitioner challenges this reduction, arguing that the High Court's finding that the origin of the attack was shrouded in mystery is not supported by the record and that the attack was, in fact, premeditated. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction in reducing the sentence based on the factual findings presented. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's interference with the trial court's sentencing discretion when the underlying factual premises regarding premeditation are contested.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction in reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment based on the finding that the attack was unpremeditated?
  • Can an appellate court reduce a sentence based on factual findings regarding the nature of the attack that are not supported by the trial record?
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• Sajjad Bashir vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-17
  cancellation of bailrecall of bail orderenhancement of sentencecriminal revisioncriminal appealnotice to show causeprinciples of natural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an order of the Lahore High Court that recalled the appellant's post-conviction bail without notice. The appellant had been convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to life imprisonment. While his criminal appeal against conviction was pending and admitted for regular hearing, bail had been granted to him due to prolonged detention. The complainant subsequently filed a criminal revision petition seeking enhancement of the sentence, which was ordered to be heard alongside the appeal. However, the revision petition was later taken up in isolation, and the High Court recalled the bail order without issuing notice or hearing the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in recalling the bail granted in the appeal while hearing the revision in isolation and without serving a show-cause notice on the appellant. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's cancellation order, and restored the appellant's bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can recall a bail order granted in a criminal appeal while hearing a revision petition for enhancement of sentence in isolation of the appeal?
  • Whether an order granting bail can be recalled or cancelled without issuing a show-cause notice and providing an opportunity of hearing to the accused?
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• Saira Hashim vs Mian Shamsul Haq and 11 others1995 SCMR 1081 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  petition for leave to appeallimitationbarred by timeconnected petitionsupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal which is stated to be barred by 213 days. The core legal question concerns whether leave to appeal should be granted despite a significant delay in filing when leave has already been granted in a connected petition arising from the same impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court. The court held that leave is to be granted in the present case while explicitly leaving the question of limitation open for consideration and final decision at the hearing of the appeal. The key principle laid down is that where leave has already been granted in a connected petition challenging the same judgment, leave may also be granted in a time-barred petition with the limitation issue deferred to the final hearing stage.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal can be granted in a time-barred petition when leave has already been granted in a connected petition?
  • Can the question of limitation be left open for consideration at the final hearing of an appeal?
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• Said Amir vs Manzqor Ellahi and 3 others1995 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  GiftFraudImpersonationConcurrent findingsRevisional jurisdictionSham transactionBurden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his revision petition, thereby affirming concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding a disputed gift of land. The respondents challenged the validity of a mutation of gift, alleging that the donor, Mst. Bhag Bhari, was suffering from a terminal illness and hospitalized at the time of the alleged transaction, and that the mutation was procured through fraud, forgery, and impersonation. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court and the High Court, found the transaction to be a sham, noting the lack of evidence regarding the donor's presence before the revenue authorities and the absence of independent advice for the illiterate donor. The Supreme Court addressed whether the High Court erred in its revisional jurisdiction. The Court held that where lower courts have recorded concurrent findings of fact based on evidence, and no misreading or non-reading of evidence is demonstrated, the High Court correctly declined to interfere. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, as the findings of fraud and impersonation remained undisturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere in revisional jurisdiction when there are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts?
  • Does the burden of proof lie on the beneficiary of a gift made by an illiterate woman to establish that the transaction was genuine and that independent advice was available?
  • Is a gift transaction valid if it is proven to be a sham procured through impersonation?
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• Safiullah Siddiqui vs Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited1995 SCMR 497 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-08
  ex parte decreeservice of noticeleave to appealprocedural irregularitytransfer of suitcounsel representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which set aside an ex parte decree passed against the respondent, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. The petitioner had filed a suit for recovery of dues, which was subsequently transferred to another court. While the trial court served notice on the respondent directly, it failed to serve the respondent's counsel. The trial court proceeded ex parte, decreeing the suit in favor of the petitioner. The High Court, however, set aside this decree, reasoning that service of notice should have been effected upon the counsel under Order III, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and suggesting that the failure to do so was an attempt to keep the respondent uninformed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the petitioner's contentions regarding the validity of the service and the interpretation of the High Court's findings constitute substantial questions of law requiring further consideration. The Court stayed the trial court proceedings pending the final disposal of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is service of notice on a party valid when the party is represented by counsel but the counsel was not served?
  • Does the failure to serve notice on a party's counsel constitute sufficient grounds to set aside an ex parte decree?
  • Can a court proceed ex parte if notice was served on the party directly but not on their counsel?
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• Safdar Ali Randhawa vs Secretary, Agriculture Department, Lahore1995 PLC (C.S.) 100 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-23
  service appeallimitation periodcompulsory retirementdepartmental appealretrospective effectPunjab Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal as withdrawn. The petitioner, a civil servant, had been retired after completing 25 years of service under Section 12(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. Following the dismissal of his initial departmental appeal, the petitioner filed a second, unauthorized appeal to the Secretary of the Agriculture Department, subsequently approaching the Service Tribunal only after that second appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner's appeal before the Tribunal was maintainable. The Court held that the petitioner's appeal was time-barred because the filing of a second, unauthorized departmental appeal did not justify the delay in approaching the Service Tribunal. The Court further noted that even if the withdrawal of the appeal before the Tribunal were contested, the delay in filing the initial appeal to the Tribunal rendered the matter non-maintainable. Additionally, the Court clarified that decisions rendered under Shariat jurisdiction regarding retirement provisions do not have retrospective effect. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the filing of an unauthorized second departmental appeal extend the limitation period for approaching the Service Tribunal?
  • Do judgments rendered under Shariat jurisdiction declaring retirement provisions un-Islamic have retrospective effect?
  • Is a service appeal maintainable before the Tribunal if the petitioner fails to approach the Tribunal within the statutory period after the first departmental appeal?
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• Safdar Ali Malik vs The Estate Officer, Estate Office, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 4 others1995 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-26
  civil servantallotment of government accommodationterms and conditions of serviceService Tribunal jurisdictionwrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the cancellation of his government accommodation allotment. The petitioner, a civil servant, had his allotment of a government quarter cancelled and re-allotted to another party. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the matter concerned the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, thereby falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged this finding, relying on precedent to argue that the allotment of government housing does not constitute a term or condition of service. The Supreme Court found that the contention raised by the petitioner regarding the nature of government accommodation allotments in relation to service matters required further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether such disputes are excluded from the jurisdiction of Service Tribunals and remain amenable to writ jurisdiction under the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the allotment of government accommodation to a civil servant constitute a term and condition of service?
  • Is a dispute regarding the cancellation of government housing allotment within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal?
  • Can a civil servant challenge the cancellation of government accommodation through a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution?
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• Saeed Ahmed vs The State1995 SCMR 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-18
  post-arrest baildocumentary evidenceprohibitory clausemisappropriation of fundsmala fidecriminal breach of trust
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a bail application by the High Court. The petitioner, a retired police department cashier, was accused of misappropriating funds by failing to remit deductions to the District Police Welfare Punjab, leading to an F.I.R. under sections 406, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with section 409 subsequently added. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the evidence and the alleged mala fide addition of a non-bailable offence. The Supreme Court observed that the case rested entirely on documentary evidence already in the prosecution's possession, rendering the risk of tampering negligible. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the potential merit in the petitioner's argument regarding the strategic addition of section 409 to invoke the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the court granted bail, holding that where evidence is documentary and secured, and the addition of a non-bailable offence appears questionable, bail should be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of purely documentary evidence in the possession of the prosecution justify the grant of bail?
  • Can the addition of a non-bailable offence to an F.I.R. be scrutinized for mala fide intent during bail proceedings?
  • Is bail appropriate when there is no reasonable apprehension of tampering with evidence?
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• S.M. Yousuf and anothers vs Settlement Commissioner (Sindh) and others1995 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-15
  transfer of propertysettlement authoritieslocus standiauction-purchaserremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a dispute regarding the transfer of a urban plot under settlement laws, where the appellants claimed entitlement based on possession and permanent construction, while the contesting respondents claimed rights as auction-purchasers. The core legal question concerned the locus standi of the auction-purchaser's successors to challenge the subsequent transfer of the property to the appellants, and whether earlier judgments of the superior courts had already foreclosed the matter. The Supreme Court observed that the contentions raised by the appellants had not been duly considered by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Consequently, with the consent of both parties, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remanded the case back to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction-purchaser whose auction was set aside has the locus standi to challenge the subsequent transfer of property by the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Does a remand order by the Supreme Court confine the lower forums to determine entitlement strictly in terms of the specified instructions and notifications?
  • Whether the High Court can alter rights accrued to a party under an earlier final judgment of the superior court?
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• S H Er Zada vs Zowar Din and others1995 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-09-07
  pre-emptionnon-compliancedeposit of pre-emption moneysuit for possessionwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Peshawar High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition against the dismissal of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner had filed a suit for possession by pre-emption, and the trial court ordered the deposit of pre-emption money. Following the vendee's written statement disclosing a higher sale consideration, the trial court ordered the petitioner to deposit additional funds. The petitioner failed to comply fully with the court's order regarding the deposit of cash and security, resulting in the dismissal of the suit by the trial court. This dismissal was upheld through various appellate and revisional forums and eventually by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's failure to comply with the trial court's order for the deposit of the pre-emption amount justified the dismissal of the suit. The Court affirmed that the forums below correctly exercised their jurisdiction in dismissing the suit for non-compliance, and found no merit in the contention that the High Court erred in its reasoning regarding the absence of 'Talabs'.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a pre-emptor to comply with a court order regarding the deposit of pre-emption money justify the dismissal of the suit?
  • Can a court dismiss a pre-emption suit for non-compliance with an order to deposit additional security after the sale consideration is disclosed in the written statement?
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• Roshan and anothers vs The State and another1995 SCMR 418 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16
  restoration of petitionnon-prosecutiondelayconstitutional petitionsummary military courtminority plea
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Sindh, which dismissed an application for restoration and re-hearing of a constitutional petition as non-maintainable due to a delay of five years after the main petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question involved the sufficiency of the explanation for the five-year delay in seeking restoration and whether a belated plea regarding minority at the time of the trial could be raised. The Supreme Court held that the explanation provided for the delay was vague, contradictory, and factually incorrect, and that the plea of minority under the Sindh Children Act could not be permitted to be raised for the first time at such a belated stage when it was not specifically urged in the memorandum of the constitutional petition before the High Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as having no merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for restoration of a constitutional petition dismissed for non-prosecution can be maintained after an unexplained delay of five years?
  • Can a plea of minority under the Sindh Children Act be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not specifically urged in the constitutional petition before the High Court?
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• Rizwan Anwar vs The State1995 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  leave to appealmurderattempt to murderabsconsionappreciation of evidenceacquittal of co-accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 13-2-1993, whereby the petitioner's conviction under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was maintained, but the sentence of death was reduced to life imprisonment. The core legal question concerns the sustainability of the conviction based on direct eyewitness testimony, motive, and absconsion, notwithstanding the acquittal of a co-accused. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the guilt of the petitioner based on credible eyewitness accounts and proved absconsion warranted no interference. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, reinforcing the principle that differing judicial outcomes between co-accused are legally sound where distinct roles, specific overt acts, and evidence of absconsion are established against the convicted party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conviction can be sustained on the same set of evidence upon which a co-accused was acquitted when a specific overt role is attributed to the convicted person?
  • Does the failure to produce warrant documents on file vitiate the proof of absconsion when police testimony confirms proceedings under sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court regarding eyewitness testimony be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
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