Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Bashir Ahmad vs Syed Ali Abbas1995 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  specific performanceagreement to sellleave to appealmisreading of evidenceearnest money
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's suit for specific performance of a contract. The petitioner filed the suit on 26-5-1985, seeking specific performance based on an agreement to sell, which was contested by the respondent and eventually dismissed by the trial court on 15-10-1989. An ensuing appeal to the High Court was likewise dismissed on 25-4-1993. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the execution of the agreement to sell and the payment of earnest money suffered from non-reading and misreading of evidence. Upon hearing counsel, the Supreme Court held that the contentions required consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts' findings on specific issues suffered from misreading of evidence or ignored material pieces of evidence on record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below on the execution of an agreement to sell suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted when the lower courts have allegedly ignored material pieces of evidence on record?
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• Muhammad Azam Mirza vs Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation1995 SCMR 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-18
  service appeallimitation perioddepartmental representationmaintainabilityFederal Service Tribunaltime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's service appeal before the Tribunal was maintainable, given that the underlying departmental representation was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Tribunal had held that because the departmental appeal was time-barred, it did not constitute an appeal in the eye of the law, rendering the subsequent appeal before the Tribunal incompetent. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's reasoning, noting that the grievance arose from a recruitment method notified on 24-11-1992, while the departmental representation was only filed on 29-3-1993, clearly exceeding the thirty-day limitation period. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that a departmental appeal filed after the period of limitation is legally ineffective, thereby precluding the maintainability of an appeal before the Service Tribunal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, finding no infirmity in the Tribunal's decision regarding the incompetence of the appeal due to limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Is a service appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal maintainable if the underlying departmental representation was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
  • Does a departmental appeal filed after the statutory period of limitation constitute an appeal in the eye of the law?
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• Muhammad Asif Khan vs Director (Establishment), S & Ga, Lahore and another1995 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12
  service appeallimitationtime-barredreversion from probationretirementadverse remarksleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal. The core legal questions involve the competency of a single appeal challenging three distinct types of orders—reversion from probation, adverse remarks in an ACR, and retirement—and whether the appeal was barred by time. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred and, furthermore, that the reversion order was unexceptionable since the petitioner was serving on probation. The Court laid down the principle that multiple distinct service orders cannot be challenged in a single time-barred appeal, and that a case failing to disclose a substantial question of law of public importance does not warrant leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single service appeal is competent against multiple distinct orders such as reversion, adverse remarks, and retirement?
  • Is an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation maintainable before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the reversion of an employee working on probation to their substantive post warrant interference when found unexceptionable?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance for the grant of leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Yusufi vs Muhammad Akbar Jahangir and another1995 SCMR 20 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  adverse remarksnatural justicecondemned unheardjudicial conductAnnual Confidential Reportdue processleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that directed adverse remarks regarding inefficiency and shirking of duty to be recorded in the petitioner's Annual Confidential Report (A.C.R.). The petitioner, a Magistrate, contended that the High Court's order was passed without providing him an opportunity of being heard, thereby violating the principle of natural justice. The petitioner had been presiding over a case where an application under Section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was pending. The High Court, while directing the disposal of said application, simultaneously issued the impugned remarks against the petitioner's conduct. The Supreme Court, noting the delay in filing the petition, condoned the delay upon finding sufficient cause. Addressing the core legal question of whether adverse remarks can be recorded against a judicial officer without affording them an opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contention that the petitioner was condemned unheard. The judgment underscores the requirement of due process before imposing disciplinary or adverse administrative consequences on judicial officers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court record adverse remarks in a Magistrate's Annual Confidential Report without providing the Magistrate an opportunity to be heard?
  • Does the principle of natural justice apply when a court issues administrative censure against a judicial officer?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 449 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-26
  speedy trialspecial court jurisdictiontransfer of criminal casestatutory interpretationsaving clausemurder convictionpublic interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a death sentence confirmed by the High Court, primarily questioning the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Speedy Trials and the legality of the case transfer. The appellant contended that the Special Judge was not qualified under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987, and that transferring a case already at the argument stage defeated the Act's purpose. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was valid under the saving provisions of Section 15(3) of the Act, which preserved appointments made under the repealed Ordinance. Regarding the transfer, the Court clarified that while the government has the power to transfer cases in the public interest, such orders must explicitly reflect consideration of the statutory guidelines defining an "offence" (gruesome, sensational, etc.). Although the transfer order in this instance lacked such explicit reasoning, the Court upheld the conviction on merits, finding the evidence reliable and the defence plea of a stray bullet inconsistent with the physical evidence at the crime scene. The judgment emphasizes that jurisdiction transfer powers must be exercised with caution and within statutory parameters.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Special Judge appointed under the repealed Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987 continue to preside over cases under the subsequent Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987?
  • Does the power to transfer a case to a Special Court for Speedy Trials require the transfer order to explicitly demonstrate that the offence meets the statutory guidelines of being gruesome or sensational?
  • Is a transfer order valid if it fails to explicitly record the reasons regarding the public interest and the nature of the offence as defined by the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Butt vs The State1995 SCMR 48 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-28
  post-arrest bailforged currency notescounterfeit currencyemigration offencerecovery from possessionbailable offence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ashraf Butt against the dismissal of his post-arrest bail application by the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was implicated in a case registered under sections 489-A, 489-B, 489-C, and 489-D of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 18 of the Emigration Ordinance 1979, following the alleged recovery of forged national and foreign currency notes and other documents. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the allegations and the lack of prima facie evidence connecting him to the actual forgery or emigration offences. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the petitioner made out a case for bail, noting that the State could not controvert that mere possession of the forged currency notes constituted a bailable offence or that evidence existed regarding the emigration-related allegations. The Court laid down the principle that an accused is entitled to bail when the primary offences alleged regarding possession are bailable and prosecution fails to substantiate active involvement in non-bailable elements at the pre-trial stage.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mere possession of forged or counterfeit currency notes considered a bailable offence under the law?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to bail when prosecution fails to establish active participation in forgery or emigration-related offences?
  • Does the non-association of persons from the locality during a recovery pursuant to section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 affect the grant of bail?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs The State1995 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-13
  double jeopardyautrefois convictautrefois acquitsimultaneous trialsconstitutional guaranteecriminal appealocular testimonymurder conviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellants for murder, primarily raising the legal question of whether a dual trial—where the appellant was convicted in one proceeding and acquitted in another for the same incident—violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Article 13(a) of the Constitution and Section 403(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court held that the constitutional guarantee under Article 13(a) is confined to protection against double punishment, while Section 403(1) of the Cr.P.C. provides broader protection against subsequent trials following a final adjudication of conviction or acquittal. The Court determined that since the conviction was rendered prior to the acquittal, the conviction holds the field and is not invalidated by the subsequent acquittal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that simultaneous prosecutions are not barred, provided the accused is not punished twice for the same offence. The Court upheld the convictions, finding the ocular testimony credible despite the appellants' arguments regarding the complainant's survival.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 13(a) of the Constitution prohibit a second trial if the first trial resulted in an acquittal?
  • Does the rule against double jeopardy prohibit simultaneous prosecutions for the same offence?
  • When an accused is convicted in one trial and acquitted in another for the same offence, which judgment prevails?
  • Is a conviction rendered prior to an acquittal in a separate trial for the same offence valid under Section 403(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others vs Zahoor' Muhammad Sarohi1995 PLD Supreme Court 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-09
  pre-emptiondoctrine of sinkerindivisible transactionvendeeright of pre-emptionpleadingssale price
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the vendee-defendants challenged the application of the doctrine of sinker. The land in question was sold to three vendees, with one vendee possessing an equal right of pre-emption to the plaintiff. The trial court applied the doctrine of sinker, holding that because the purchase price was paid in a lump sum rather than specified per vendee, the transaction was indivisible, thereby allowing the plaintiff to succeed. The core legal questions were whether the doctrine of sinker applies when shares are specified but the price is not, and whether the doctrine must be explicitly pleaded in the plaint. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sinker applies to indivisible transactions where the purchase price is not allocated per vendee, regardless of specified shares. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that a plaintiff is not required to plead the doctrine of sinker in the plaint, as doing so would unfairly require the anticipation of a defense. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of sinker apply when the sale shares are specified but the purchase price is paid in a lump sum?
  • Is a plaintiff required to explicitly plead the doctrine of sinker in the plaint to rely upon it?
  • What constitutes an indivisible transaction in the context of the law of pre-emption?
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• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1995 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-09
  criminal appealocular testimonyidentification paradeindependent witnesscorroborationmurder convictionFIR discrepancies
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which modified a death sentence to life imprisonment for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while maintaining a conviction for theft under section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing that the FIR contained incorrect names and that the identification parade was flawed due to police interference. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony, specifically that of an independent witness, was sufficient to sustain the conviction despite these challenges. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of the independent witness remained credible and was corroborated by the recovery of the motorcycle used in the crime. The Court established that where an independent witness is present and their testimony is consistent and corroborated by physical evidence, such evidence is sufficient to uphold a conviction, even if other witnesses are contested or the FIR initially contained discrepancies regarding the identities of the perpetrators.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of an independent witness when other witnesses are alleged to be compromised?
  • Does the recovery of a vehicle used in the commission of an offense provide sufficient corroboration to support an identification of the accused?
  • Is a conviction valid when the FIR names different individuals, but witnesses identify the accused as having used aliases during the crime?
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• Muhammad Ashiq vs Secretary, Interior, Narcotics, Islamabad and 41995 PLC (C.S.) 620 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31
  service tribunaldismissal from servicedepartmental inquiryleave to appealgovernment servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging the order of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 17-2-1993, whereby the petitioner, a former Field Investigating Officer with the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, had his dismissal from service upheld. The petitioner was proceeded against under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on charges including unauthorized possession of narcotics and unaccounted cash. The core legal question concerns whether the Service Tribunal was justified in holding the charges proved against the petitioner in light of the star prosecution witness's statement indicating that the items might have been kept with official knowledge and consent, and whether the denial of the full inquiry report and witness statements by the Tribunal vitiates the proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these questions of public importance, holding that prima facie the evidence required deeper examination regarding the establishment of the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal was justified in holding the charges proved against the accused in view of the statement of the star prosecution witness?
  • Is an employee entitled to the full text of the inquiry report and witness statements before the Service Tribunal?
  • Whether the charges of misconduct stood proved beyond reasonable doubt under the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs The State1995 SCMR 1321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-27
  criminal appealmurderocular testimonycorroborationweapon recoverybenefit of doubtforensic evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution case was founded on ocular testimony and circumstantial evidence, specifically the recovery of a weapon. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the reliability of the eyewitness identification when the witnesses initially failed to recognize the rider of the motorcycle. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence regarding the recovery of the crime empty and the weapon, noting serious discrepancies between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the official forensic reports regarding the dates parcels were dispatched and received. The Court held that when the recovery of the incriminating weapon becomes doubtful and the ocular testimony is not fully corroborated, the conviction cannot be sustained. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, establishing that doubtful recoveries cannot serve as safe corroboration to maintain a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a weapon recovery when the forensic dispatch dates contradict the prosecution timeline?
  • Whether doubtful recovery of a crime empty and weapon can furnish safe corroboration for ocular testimony?
  • How does a discrepancy between witness statements and forensic science laboratory reports affect the credibility of circumstantial evidence?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs Aijaz alias Jajji and another1995 SCMR 1289 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-12
  culpable homicidemurdergrave and sudden provocationaltercation over loanalteration of convictioncriminal appealPakistan Penal Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which altered the respondent's conviction under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code to section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code, reducing his sentence from life imprisonment to five years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether a minor altercation arising from the lawful demand of a small loan by the deceased constitutes grave and sudden provocation sufficient to bring the case within Exception 4 to section 300, Pakistan Penal Code, reducing murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court held that demanding the repayment of a loan is a lawful act that cannot furnish self-assumed or grave and sudden provocation to justify reducing the offense, especially where the accused was armed with a dagger and inflicted a fatal blow to a vital part of the body. The Supreme Court restored the trial court's judgment convicting the respondent under section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, laying down the principle that a verbal altercation over a debt does not mitigate murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether demand of a loan and a subsequent verbal altercation can constitute grave and sudden provocation to attract Exception 4 to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does an altercation arising from the lawful demand of a creditor reduce the offense of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder?
  • Whether the High Court was legally correct in converting the conviction under section 302 to section 304, Part II, of the Pakistan Penal Code based on the precedent cited?
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• Muhammad Arshad vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-03
  visual identificationmurderbenefit of doubtcorroborationchance witnesscriminal appealappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the appellant's conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Jamal Din. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained based on disputed visual identification by alleged eyewitnesses during a dark night, corroborated by a delayed recovery of a weapon and an alleged motive linked to the appellant's father. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution's evidence—specifically regarding the presence of adequate lighting, the credibility of the chance and related witnesses, prompt reporting, and the delayed weapon recovery—was fraught with reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that visual identification in criminal trials is suspect evidence requiring strict corroboration, particularly where opportunities for observation are fleeting and conditions of visibility are dubious.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be safely sustained on the sole basis of disputed visual identification made during a dark night without reliable corroboration?
  • Does the delayed recovery of a blood-stained weapon after a significant lapse of time serve as reliable corroborative evidence against an accused?
  • Can the testimony of chance witnesses and interested witnesses be relied upon without independent and trustworthy corroboration in a capital charge?
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• Muhammad Arshad and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  leave to appealZina-bil-Jabarcorroborationsolitary statementcontradictionsfalse implicationbail confirmation
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Shariat Court which upheld their conviction under Article 10(3) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, while reducing their sentence. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners committed Zina-bil-Jabar with the complainant. The defence contended false implication due to severe party faction and enmity in the village, supported by admissions of village factionalism, bad reputation of the prosecutrix, and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecutrix regarding the sequence of events and presence of eyewitnesses. The core legal question was whether the uncorroborated solitary statement of the prosecutrix could form a sound basis for conviction under the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted to consider this question, and confirmed the interim bail allowed to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated solitary statement of a prosecutrix can form a sound basis for conviction in a charge of Zina-bil-Jabar?
  • Does material contradiction in the testimony of the prosecutrix regarding the sequence of events warrant interference in conviction?
  • Whether enmity and party factionalism in the village provide grounds for doubting the prosecution version in a Zina case?
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• Muhammad Arshad alias Achhi vs The State1995 SCMR 1639 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  Zina-bil-Jabrcriminal trespassocular evidenceconsenting partyaccomplice testimonycriminal appealacquittalHudood Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction of the appellant for Zina-bil-Jabr and criminal trespass. The core legal question concerns the reliability of the complainant’s testimony, whom the Federal Shariat Court had deemed a consenting party, and the credibility of the sole eyewitness. The Supreme Court held that the complainant, having been labeled a consenting party, effectively became an accomplice, rendering her testimony unreliable without independent corroboration. Furthermore, the Court found the eyewitness’s account contradictory and inconsistent with the physical circumstances, classifying her evidence as wholly unreliable. Consequently, the Court set aside the convictions and acquitted the appellant. A key principle laid down is that ocular evidence must be categorized as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or partly reliable; conviction cannot rest on wholly unreliable testimony. Additionally, the Court cautioned that a finding of consent against a complainant is a serious matter with grave legal and social consequences and should not be recorded summarily without a proper trial, as it may stigmatize the individual and potentially lead to prosecution for perjury.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based on the testimony of a witness who has been judicially declared a consenting party to the act of Zina?
  • What are the three categories of ocular evidence, and how does each affect the possibility of a conviction?
  • Is it legally permissible for a court to record a positive finding of consent against a complainant in a Zina case without a proper trial?
  • Does the absence of enmity or interest in a witness automatically stamp their statement with truth?
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• Muhammad Anwar vs Province of N.W.F.P. and 3 others1995 SCMR 77 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-20
  service tribunalpensionary benefitsad hoc appointmenthigher postgovernment notificationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding pensionary benefits. The petitioner, initially appointed in the Health Department in 1948 and subsequently promoted, had served as Assistant Accounts Officer in BPS-17 on a posting made by the Government of N.-W.F.P. Health and Social Department from December 1983 until May 1984, before applying for leave preparatory to retirement and ultimately retiring as an Almoner in BPS-9. The Federal Service Tribunal held that his appointment to BPS-17 was neither approved by the competent authority nor in conformity with the rules, thus denying him pensionary benefits of that higher post. The core legal questions concern whether the Service Tribunal was justified in holding that the petitioner's initial appointment was not in accordance with the rules despite performing duties pursuant to a government order, and whether he could be deprived of pensionary benefits of that post. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider these questions of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal was justified in holding that the petitioner's initial appointment in BPS-17 was not in accordance with the rules although he held the post and performed such duties in compliance of the order of appointment?
  • Can an employee be deprived of pensionary benefits of a higher post duly held under a government posting order?
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• Muhammad Anwar and anothers vs Muhammad Afzal and others1995 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  pre-emption suitleave to appealdismissal of suittarget dateprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a suit for pre-emption filed by the petitioners, which was dismissed by the trial court on 12-12-1984. Subsequent appeals filed by the petitioners before the District Judge and the High Court were also dismissed. The High Court's dismissal was predicated on the finding that no decree had been passed in favour of the appellants before the target date, and consequently, no such decree could be granted in light of established Supreme Court of Pakistan precedents. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the dismissal of their suit constituted a decree, thereby entitling them to relief. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, affirming that the legal position regarding pre-emption suits where no decree was passed before the relevant target date is well-settled. Relying on the principle established in Rozi Khan v. Karim Shah (1992 SCMR 445), the Court held that the petitioners could not be granted relief. The petition was accordingly dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a pre-emption suit constitute a decree for the purposes of relief?
  • Can a decree be passed in a pre-emption suit after the target date has passed?
  • Is a suit for pre-emption maintainable if no decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff before the target date?
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• Muhammad Amin alias Manna vs The State1995 P Cr. L J 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-07-14
  murdercapital punishmentoral dying declarationocular accountsole eye-witnesscriminal appealspeedy trials court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Special Court for Speedy Trials, Gujranwala, convicting the appellant under sections 302 and 452 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentencing him to death for murder. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of an ocular account furnished by a single witness, the reliability of an oral dying declaration, and the evidentiary value of weapon recoveries against the defense's plea of mistaken identity and false implication. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that the testimony of the natural and disinterested eye-witness, corroborated by consistent oral dying declarations and supporting recovery evidence, proved the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt. The Court laid down that minor discrepancies regarding ancillary details do not impair a credible dying declaration or a reliable ocular account, and that young age per se is no ground for withholding the normal penalty in a brutal murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Does minor discrepancy in recounting the reason for an attack vitiate an otherwise reliable oral dying declaration?
  • Whether young age per se constitutes a mitigating circumstance for withholding the death penalty in a murder case?
  • Can a defense plea of mistaken identity based on similarity of names be accepted in the face of positive identification by natural witnesses?
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• Muhammad Ali and 3 others vs The State and others1995 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  leave to appealappraisal of evidenceacquittalenhancement of sentencestatement of accusedmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves petitions seeking leave to appeal against conviction and sentence for murder and murderous assault, as well as a petition challenging the acquittal of co-accused and seeking enhancement of sentences. The core legal question concerns whether the conviction of the petitioners could be sustained solely on their statements under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after the High Court disbelieved the eye-witnesses and recoveries. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the contentions regarding conviction based on the accused's statements, and similarly granted leave on the question of enhancement of sentences. However, the Court declined to grant leave regarding the acquittal of the five co-accused, finding that the lower courts had properly appraised the evidence and drawn reasonable conclusions. The key principle laid down is that where eye-witnesses are disbelieved, the sustainability of a conviction primarily based on the accused's exculpatory or qualified statement requires careful appraisal by the appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Can an accused be convicted merely on their statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when eye-witnesses and recoveries have been disbelieved?
  • Whether leave to appeal against acquittal should be granted when the lower courts have reasonably appraised the evidence?
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• Muhammad Akram Zaidi vs The Water and Power Development1995 PLC (C.S.) 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  WAPDAmove-overservice benefitsqualifying servicepensiondeputationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Akram Zaidi, challenged a judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal which upheld the refusal by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to grant him a move-over from BPS-18 to BPS-19. The petitioner, originally appointed as a Social Welfare Officer in the Government of West Pakistan in 1967, was later absorbed into WAPDA in 1983. Upon reaching the maximum of BPS-18, he sought a move-over to BPS-19, which was denied on the grounds of insufficient length of service. The petitioner argued that his prior government service should be counted toward the length of service required for the move-over, noting that WAPDA had already conceded that this prior service counted toward pension and earned leave benefits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the petitioner's initial government service, which the respondent acknowledged for other service benefits, should legally be included in the calculation of qualifying service for the purpose of move-over to BPS-19, thereby addressing the consistency of service benefit application.

  Questions settled

  • Should prior government service be counted towards the length of service required for a move-over to a higher pay scale in WAPDA?
  • Does the recognition of prior service for pension and leave purposes mandate its inclusion for move-over eligibility?
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• Muhammad Akram and 4 others vs The State1995 SCMR 1359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26
  retracted confessionacquittalcriminal appealremand orderappellate interferencevoluntary confessionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges an order of the Federal Shariat Court, which had set aside an acquittal judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for rewriting. The appellants were originally tried for offences under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The trial court had acquitted the accused, primarily rejecting a retracted confession due to inconsistencies with the prosecution's case and evidence of potential coercion. The core legal question was whether the Federal Shariat Court was justified in interfering with the trial court's acquittal and remanding the case. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Shariat Court erred in its interference, as the trial court's reasoning for discarding the confession was sound and based on a proper assessment of evidence. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that an acquittal judgment should not be interfered with lightly, especially when the trial court's conclusions are reasonably possible and based on a proper evaluation of evidence, including the voluntary nature of confessions and the requirement for independent corroboration in criminal jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an acquittal judgment?
  • Is a retracted confession sufficient for conviction without independent corroborative evidence?
  • Does a trial court's failure to assess a confession's voluntariness justify a remand for rewriting the judgment?
  • What is the standard of proof required to set aside an acquittal in a criminal case?
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• Muhammad Akbar vs The State1995 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-15
  murderocular accountrelated witnessesweapon recoverypointation of accuseddeath sentenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, upholding the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Muhammad Akbar, for the murder of Mst. Tajal under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved whether the ocular testimony inspired confidence despite being related witnesses, whether the recovery of the weapon was vitiated due to non-compliance with section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the firearm recovery on the accused's pointation fell under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. The Supreme Court held that related eye-witnesses whose presence is natural and whose testimony is corroborated by medical evidence, prompt FIR, and independent corroboration are reliable. The Court further held that section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not apply to recoveries made pursuant to an accused's disclosure or pointation under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-association of respectable inhabitants of the locality render a weapon recovery illegal when it is made on the pointation of the accused?
  • Whether Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies to a recovery made in consequence of information or pointation provided by an accused person?
  • Can related eye-witness testimony be relied upon to sustain a conviction for murder without independent corroboration?
  • Is a statement made by a witness to a third party immediately after an occurrence relevant under Article 19 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984?
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• Muhammad Ajmal vs Zahid Shakoor and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-10
  culpable homicidesudden fightheat of passionpremeditationcriminal appealself-defenceintention to kill
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, following an incident where the respondent killed the deceased during a sudden altercation over land usage. The core legal question was whether the respondent's act constituted murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the same Code. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to convict the respondent under Section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, dismissing the appellant's plea for a murder conviction. The Court held that the incident occurred during a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation, and the respondent did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel manner. The key principle laid down is that where a killing occurs in a sudden fight without premeditation, and the offender does not act in a cruel or unusual manner or take undue advantage, the act falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, thereby reducing the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

  Questions settled

  • Does a killing committed during a sudden fight without premeditation constitute murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • What are the essential requirements for an act to fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a conviction be sustained under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if the accused lacked the intention to kill and acted without premeditation in a sudden quarrel?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abbas and others vs Sagheer Ahmed and others1995 PLD Supreme Court 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-14
  revision against acquittalretrialreappraisal of evidencemurderbenefit of doubtscope of revisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which reversed an acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge, Gujrat, and remanded the case for retrial on a murder charge under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerned the scope and propriety of the High Court's revisional power in interfering with an order of acquittal by re-appreciating evidence, and whether remanding a case for retrial based on strong observations by the appellate court prejudices the trial judge. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court has unfettered revisional powers to interfere with a perverse or legally flawed acquittal, it must not load the dice against the accused by making binding observations on the evidence. However, the petition was dismissed, with the clarification that the trial court on remand remains completely free to independently evaluate the evidence and express its own conclusions without being influenced by prior appellate observations. The key principle established is that an order of retrial upon revision against acquittal must leave the trial court unfettered to independently adjudicate the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court re-appraise evidence in a revision petition against an order of acquittal?
  • Whether an order of retrial by the High Court improperly prejudices the trial judge when strong views on evidence are expressed?
  • Are the powers of the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to interfere with an acquittal unfettered?
  • Must a trial court strictly follow the observations made by a revisional court when a case is remanded for retrial?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhamma.D Riaz vs The State1995 SCMR 912 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  leave to appealhostile witnessdelayed FIRcommutation of sentencemurder convictionevidentiary reliabilitypardon
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Riaz, challenging the judgment of the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was originally convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Allah Rakha and sentenced to death. The High Court dismissed his appeal but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment while granting the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner now seeks leave to appeal, contending that the two eyewitnesses mentioned in the First Information Report were declared hostile after testifying that they did not witness the occurrence. Furthermore, the petitioner argues that the presence of the complainant, the sister of the deceased, was unnatural due to her residence in a different village, and highlights an inordinate 12-hour delay in lodging the First Information Report without explanation. Additionally, the petitioner notes that the complainant has submitted an application stating she has pardoned the accused. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider these submissions regarding the evidentiary reliability and the legal implications of the pardon.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of eyewitnesses who have been declared hostile provide a sufficient basis for a murder conviction?
  • Can a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained when the First Information Report is lodged with an unexplained 12-hour delay?
  • What is the legal effect of a pardon submitted by the complainant in a murder case on the appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhamamd Javed and anothers vs The State1995 SCMR 1178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-13
  post-arrest bailcriminal procedureF.I.R. contradictionfurther inquirymurderSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the Peshawar High Court's order declining post-arrest bail to the petitioners, Muhammad Javed and Shamrez, in a murder case registered under F.I.R. No. 397/94. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the material contradictions between the initial First Information Report and the complainant's subsequent statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where entirely different persons were initially implicated due to an enmity. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the major discrepancy in the complainant's stance, the lack of immediate eye-witnesses to the crime, and the delayed examination of circumstantial witnesses brought the petitioners' case within the scope of further inquiry under subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail to the appellants, laying down that material contradictions in ocular accounts and unexplained delays in recording witness statements create reasonable grounds for further inquiry warranting the grant of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Whether post-arrest bail can be granted when there are material contradictions between the initial F.I.R. and a subsequent statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the unexplained delay in examining prosecution witnesses entitle an accused person to bail on the ground of further inquiry?
  • Whether shifting stances by a complainant regarding the identity of the accused creates a case of further inquiry under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubarik Ali vs Fazal Muhammad and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-04
  fraudsection 12(2) CPCfinal judgmentwithdrawal of leave to appealjurisdictionpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  These two civil appeals addressed whether an order by the Supreme Court dismissing petitions for special leave to appeal as withdrawn constitutes a final judgment, decree, or order under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby transferring the jurisdiction to entertain an application alleging fraud from the High Court to the Supreme Court. The appellant had filed applications under section 12(2) before the Lahore High Court to recall its previous appellate decisions on the grounds of fraudulent manipulation of a power of attorney, but the High Court returned the applications, holding that the Supreme Court had last dealt with the matter when leave petitions were filed and withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that orders merely permitting the withdrawal of leave petitions do not amount to final judgments, decrees, or orders within the meaning of section 12(2) C.P.C., as they neither decided issues on merits nor closed the litigation with finality. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and directed the High Court to entertain and decide the appellant's applications in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Does an order of the Supreme Court dismissing a petition for leave to appeal as withdrawn amount to a final judgment, decree, or order under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure?
  • Which court has jurisdiction under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to entertain an application challenging a judgment on the ground of fraud when a leave to appeal petition against that judgment was withdrawn?
  • Do orders permitting the withdrawal of petitions for special leave to appeal constitute a final disposal of a case for the purposes of attracting the bar or jurisdiction under section 12(2) C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Muamber vs Assistant Political Agent and 3 others1995 SCMR 622 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-01
  criminal trialtribunal procedurePATA Regulationright of cross-examinationillegal convictionremand for trialmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a trial conducted by a Tribunal under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Regulation. The core legal question was whether the appellant had been convicted in a lawful manner, specifically concerning the procedure followed by the Tribunal where members relied on police statements recorded outside the trial and secret inquiries without affording an opportunity of cross-examination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that relying on unexamined statements and secret inquiries violates the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 9 of the PATA Regulation, rendering the trial and conviction illegal. The Court laid down the principle that a Tribunal must record evidence directly and permit cross-examination, and noted that the PATA Regulation had previously been declared violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the case remanded to the Sessions Judge for a fresh trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Tribunal under the PATA Regulation can base its findings of guilt on police statements not recorded before it?
  • Is an accused entitled to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are considered by the Tribunal?
  • Does a Tribunal have the authority under the PATA Regulation to conduct secret inquiries from external sources?
  • What is the effect of procedural illegality by a Tribunal on a subsequent conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi and 8 others vs Abdul Malik and 12 others1995 SCMR 1061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  civil revisionlimitation periodretrospective applicationprocedural lawleave to appealvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a Civil Revision Application filed by the petitioners in September 1990. The core legal question presented for determination is whether the High Court erred in dismissing the petitioners' Civil Revision Application on the ground that it was filed beyond the 90-day limitation period prescribed by the second proviso to subsection (1) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The central issue is whether this limitation period, introduced by Act No. VI of 1992, which was promulgated on 30-5-1992, could be applied retrospectively to a revision application that had already been filed in September 1990, well before the enactment of the amending legislation. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the High Court's application of this statutory amendment to pending proceedings, thereby addressing the principle of non-retroactivity of procedural amendments affecting vested rights of litigation, specifically regarding the temporal application of statutory limitation periods introduced after the initiation of legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory amendment introducing a limitation period be applied retrospectively to a civil revision application filed prior to the enactment of said amendment?
  • Does the second proviso to subsection (1) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, as introduced by Act No. VI of 1992, apply to revision applications pending at the time of its promulgation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi and 2 others vs Muhammad Yousaf and 4 others1995 SCMR 868 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-06
  Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application Actlimited estatecustomary lawmaintenance-holderinheritancelocus standiagricultural land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which accepted the respondents' second appeal, set aside the judgment of the Additional District Judge, and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiffs. The core legal question revolved around whether the plaintiff, a paternal uncle of the last male owner, had the locus standi to challenge a sale of land made by a female holder who had initially acquired it under custom, in light of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 and Section 2-A added by Ordinance XIII of 1983. The Supreme Court held that under Section 2-A of the Shariat Act, a male heir who inherited agricultural land under custom before the specified date is deemed an absolute owner under Shariat law, meaning the estate devolves according to Muslim Law. Consequently, the last male owner's mother and sisters received their respective shares, leaving the residue to the paternal uncle, giving him the requisite locus standi. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a person who acquired agricultural land under custom as a male heir before the enforcement of the Shariat Act is deemed an absolute owner under Section 2-A of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
  • Does a paternal uncle have the locus standi to challenge an alienation made by a female limited owner when the estate is governed by Muslim Personal Law under the Shariat Act?
  • How does the addition of Section 2-A to the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 affect properties previously held under customary law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Waten Khela vs The State1995 SCMR 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-17
  criminal appealZina-bil-RazaZina-bil-Jabrexculpatory statementconvictionacquittalHudood Ordinancesappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the conviction and sentencing of the appellant Mst. Waten Khela under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for committing Zina with consent, which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction could be sustained in the absence of direct evidence and where the appellant's confessional statement was exculpatory rather than incriminating. The Supreme Court held that suspicion cannot take the place of proof, and an exculpatory statement made by an accused person alleging Zina-bil-Jabr cannot be used to convict them of Zina-bil-Raza. Consequently, the Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. The key principle laid down is that an accused person's exculpatory statement denying consensual relations and alleging coercion cannot form the legal basis for sustaining a conviction for consensual sexual offense under the Hudood laws.

  Questions settled

  • Can suspicion take the place of proof in criminal cases?
  • Whether an exculpatory confessional statement alleging Zina-bil-Jabr can be used to convict an accused of Zina-bil-Raza?
  • Does the absence of direct evidence of illicit intercourse warrant the setting aside of a conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tabassam Begum vs Muhammad Arshad alias Boob and others1995 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-16
  leave to appealacquittalmurdereye-witness testimonyappraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court whereby the respondents were acquitted of the charge of murdering Sardar Khan, after the trial court had initially convicted them under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's rejection of the eye-witness testimony and subsequent acquittal was based on proper judicial reasoning or surmises and presumptions. The Supreme Court held that the case required a thorough appraisal of the evidence for the proper and safe administration of justice, finding that the High Court's disbelieving of the eye-witnesses—including a son-in-law with no apparent enmity—warranted a re-examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and issued non-bailable warrants for the arrest of the respondents, establishing the principle that ocular accounts from related witnesses cannot be discarded on generalized presumptions without cogent reasons.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can discard the testimony of related eye-witnesses based on surmises and presumptions?
  • Does a case involving the reversal of a murder conviction warrant the grant of leave to appeal for reappraisal of evidence?
  • Can non-bailable warrants of arrest be issued upon the grant of leave to appeal in a criminal matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Chief Administrator, Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others1995 SCMR 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  limitationwaqf propertyspecial leave to appealtime-barredallotmentadministrative control
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed an appeal against an order of the District Judge, Lahore. The petitioner, claiming to be an allottee of a property on Hall Road, Lahore, challenged a 1968 notification by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf declaring the property as waqf. The petitioner initially filed an application under the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance in 1969 seeking a declaration that the property was not waqf, which was dismissed in 1970 on the grounds of limitation. Subsequent attempts to seek relief via a review application in 1982 and an appeal to the High Court in 1984 were also dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner's claims were maintainable given the significant delays. The Court held that the petitioner failed to adhere to the law of limitation at every stage of the proceedings. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that the matter was time-barred and not a fit case for judicial interference. The judgment reinforces the strict application of limitation periods in legal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a legal challenge against a notification declaring a property as waqf be entertained if it is filed beyond the statutory period of limitation?
  • Does the failure to comply with the law of limitation at the trial stage preclude the maintainability of subsequent appeals and review applications?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sarwar Jan vs Ayub and another1995 SCMR 1679 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-14
  sentence enhancementrevisional jurisdictioninherent powers of High Courtabuse of processmagistrate powerscompensation to victimcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court setting aside an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Haripur, which had enhanced the sentences of the respondents for offences under sections 325 and 342, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following a conviction by a Judicial Magistrate. The core legal questions concerned whether an Additional Sessions Judge acting in revision can enhance a sentence beyond the limits competent to a Magistrate First Class, and whether the High Court can interfere with such an order under section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court held that an Additional Sessions Judge exercising revisional powers cannot inflict a greater punishment than a Magistrate First Class could have imposed, making the enhancement ab initio illegal. The Supreme Court further held that the High Court is fully justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to prevent an abuse of the process of the court and correct patent illegalities where no other adequate remedy exists. The appeal was disposed of by maintaining the trial court's original sentence while additionally awarding compensation to the victim under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Additional Sessions Judge exercising revisional powers under section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can enhance a sentence beyond the limits that could have been inflicted by a Magistrate of the First Class?
  • Can the High Court invoke its inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to set aside an illegal order passed by a Sessions Judge under section 439-A?
  • What are the jurisdictional requirements for the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the bar under section 439-A(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 restrict the High Court from utilizing its inherent powers under section 561-A to prevent an abuse of the process of the court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Safia Aziz vs Mst. Dil Ara Malik and 28 others1995 SCMR 1023 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-29
  service appealseniority listamendment of appealcause of actioncurtailment of litigationdepartmental representationservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a majority judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which allowed an application for amendment of a memo of appeal. The underlying dispute concerned a seniority list. Following a previous remand by the Supreme Court to the Tribunal for a fresh decision, a final seniority list was issued. The respondent sought to amend her pending appeal to challenge this new list. The petitioner objected, arguing that a fresh cause of action had accrued, necessitating a new departmental representation and a fresh service appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the final seniority list merely affirmed the earlier list already under litigation. Emphasizing the need to curtail protracted litigation, which had persisted for fourteen years, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to allow the amendment. The Court held that where a subsequent administrative action merely affirms a position already under judicial consideration, an amendment to the existing appeal is permissible to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. Finding no substantial question of law of public importance, the Court refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a service appeal be amended to challenge a final seniority list that merely affirms an earlier list already under judicial challenge?
  • Is a fresh departmental representation required when a subsequent administrative order merely affirms a position already subject to pending litigation?
  • Does the refusal of leave to appeal under Article 212 of the Constitution require the presence of a substantial question of law of public importance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehana Begum vs Mst. Shagufta1995 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-06-14
  ejectmentdefault in rentelectricity chargescondonation of delaylimitation during summer vacationsmisreading of evidenceSindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave was filed by the widow of a deceased tenant challenging concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court of Sindh ordering her ejectment on the ground of default in the payment of electricity charges. Preliminary questions of limitation and condonation of delay arose because the petition was barred by 27 days, with the limitation period having expired during the Supreme Court's summer vacations. On the merits, the core issue was whether the tenant committed a wilful default under rent laws regarding unpaid electricity charges. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in light of conflicting judicial views on Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 during court vacations and the appellant's circumstances. On merits, the Court found that the landlord's attorney admitted in cross-examination that electricity bills were paid directly to the utility provider (KESC) and never demanded by the landlord, and the tenant cleared dues upon receipt of bills. Holding that the lower courts misread the evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ejectment orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the period during which the Supreme Court is closed for summer vacations is excluded for computing limitation under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1908 when the Court registry remains open to receive petitions?
  • Whether non-payment of electricity bills directly to a utility provider constitutes actionable default of rent warranting ejectment under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 where the landlord never demanded such charges and dues were subsequently cleared upon receiving duplicate bills?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding default in payment of utility charges be set aside in appeal when they are based on a misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raheela Durrani vs The State1995 SCMR 1184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18
  bail cancellationmurdercircumstantial evidencelast seen evidencediscretionary orderssupreme court of pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court of Sindh cancelling the post-arrest bail granted to the petitioner, Mst. Raheela Durrani, who was implicated in the murder of a Pakistan Air Force officer under F.I.R. No. 108/94 at Police Station Tipu Sultan, Karachi. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in cancelling the bail based on available circumstantial and last-seen evidence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's order cancelling bail was sound, as the petitioner and co-accused were apprehended red-handed while disposing of the deceased's dead body, and corroborative last-seen evidence placed the deceased at the petitioner's house around the time of the crime. The Court laid down the principle that at the bail stage, a deep appraisal of evidence is to be avoided, and the presence of strong circumstantial evidence, such as being caught disposing of a corpus delicti, justifies the cancellation of bail in heinous offences regardless of the accused being a woman, provided no exceptional statutory grounds are met.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail once granted can be cancelled by the High Court when strong circumstantial evidence connects the accused to the crime?
  • Is it proper for a court to deeply appraise evidence and resolve factual conflicts at the bail stage?
  • Does the mere fact that an accused is a woman serve as a sole ground for the grant or sustenance of bail in a murder case?
  • Whether the recovery of an accused person along with a dead body constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant the denial or cancellation of bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Niaz Parveen vs Mst. Rukhsana Shaheen and 3 others1995 SCMR 1844 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-19
  leave to appealservice tribunaltransfer orderlimitationcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, which accepted the respondent's appeal and restored her transfer order. The core legal question concerned whether the Service Tribunal erred in law by condoning the delay in filing the departmental appeal without a formal application under the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the Service Tribunal's decision to uphold the transfer and deprecate frequent and arbitrary transfer orders of public servants within a short span was justified. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused and dismissed, reinforcing the principle that frequent and arbitrary transfers of government employees adversely affect administrative efficiency.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can condone the delay in filing an appeal without a formal application under section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does frequent and arbitrary transfer of public servants within a short period warrant judicial interference?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the judgment of the Service Tribunal restoring a transfer order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Naveed Arshad vs The State1995 SCMR 1165 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-15
  leave to appealinterim bailprima facie evidencecriminal lawbail in non-bailable offences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the lower courts in a criminal case. The petitioner, an ailing and aged lady, sought relief on the grounds that the evidence gathered by the investigating agency failed to establish a prima facie connection between her and the alleged offences. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of these contentions, specifically focusing on whether the material on record sufficiently links the petitioner to the crime, given her age and health condition. Pending the final adjudication of the appeal, the Court ordered that the interim bail previously granted to the petitioner shall continue. The judgment serves as a procedural step in the bail process, affirming the court's role in scrutinizing the sufficiency of evidence at the pre-trial stage for vulnerable categories of accused persons.

  Questions settled

  • Does the material collected by the investigating agency prima facie link the accused to the commission of the offence?
  • Should interim bail be continued pending the final adjudication of a leave to appeal petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nargis Khatoon vs Director General, Pakistan Broadcasting1995 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-08
  disciplinary proceedingsremoval from serviceservice of charge sheetnatural justiceleave to appealuncooperative employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the termination of the petitioner's employment from the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation following disciplinary proceedings. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was denied due process, specifically regarding notice and the opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner persistently avoided service, refused to participate in the inquiry, and maintained an uncooperative attitude despite multiple concerted efforts by the employer to associate her with the proceedings. Consequently, the plea regarding lack of personal hearing and due process was untenable. The petition was dismissed as lacking merits, reinforcing the principle that a delinquent employee who deliberately avoids disciplinary proceedings cannot subsequently claim a violation of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee who deliberately avoids service of a charge-sheet can claim violation of natural justice?
  • Does refusal to participate in disciplinary proceedings invalidate the inquiry report?
  • When can an employer proceed ex parte against an employee in disciplinary matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Nadira Shahzad vs Mubashir Ahmad and others1995 SCMR 1419 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-26
  condonation of delaysufficient causelimitation periodfamily court appealreasonable diligenceconstitutional jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had remanded a family appeal, which was originally dismissed by the appellate court as time-barred. The core legal question was whether the requirement to show "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay under Rule 22 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, differs from the standard applied under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically regarding the necessity of explaining each day of delay. The Supreme Court held that no legal distinction exists between the two provisions; both require the appellant to demonstrate "sufficient cause" and exercise reasonable diligence throughout the delay period. The Court found that the respondent failed to provide material particulars for the delay or demonstrate reasonable diligence. Consequently, the High Court’s interference under its constitutional jurisdiction was deemed unjustified, as the appellate court’s initial dismissal was legally sound. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the appellate court's dismissal, and affirmed the original decree, establishing that the judicial interpretation of "sufficient cause" remains consistent across these statutes.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal distinction between the standard of 'sufficient cause' under Rule 22 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
  • Does an appellant seeking condonation of delay under Rule 22 of the Family Courts Rules, 1965, have an obligation to explain the delay for each day?
  • Can the failure of an advocate to inform a client about a court judgment constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning a significant delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is the High Court justified in exercising constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with an appellate court's dismissal of a time-barred appeal where no jurisdictional error exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mumtaz Parveen and 4 others vs Settlement Commissioner, Bahawalpur and 10 other1995 SCMR 969 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-31
  land allotmentMukhabari applicationleave to appealsettlement of claimscancellation of allotmentdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the cancellation of land allotment originally granted to the petitioners' predecessor, Muhammad Iqbal, in 1959. The core legal question is whether the allotment was validly cancelled based on allegations of duplicate claim forms, and whether the respondents, who initiated the proceedings via a Mukhabari application, possessed a preferential right to the land. The Supreme Court observed that the land had been settled in favor of the predecessor-in-interest in 1959, at which time no competing claims from the respondents were pending in the area. Furthermore, the Court noted the contention that the allotment was not obtained against duplicate claim forms, rendering the cancellation unjustified. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the respondents' claim, predicated solely on a Mukhabari application, could override the finality of the original allotment and whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the respondents' preferential rights. The principle at issue involves the finality of land settlements and the validity of cancellation proceedings initiated by third-party informers.

  Questions settled

  • Can a land allotment be cancelled based solely on a Mukhabari application alleging duplicate claims?
  • Does a Mukhabari applicant possess a preferential right to land previously allotted to a claimant?
  • Under what circumstances can a final land allotment made to a displaced person be reopened and cancelled?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Mehrun Nisa vs Zainulabidin and 5 others1995 SCMR 1139 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-19
  criminal breach of trustdowry recoveryquashment of proceedingscivil nature of disputeabuse of processmatrimonial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that quashed criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents for criminal breach of trust regarding dowry articles. The petitioner, the former wife of the deceased, alleged that her dowry remained with the respondents after her husband's death and that they refused to return it despite a prior agreement. The core legal question was whether a dispute regarding the recovery of dowry articles, where the marriage status and divorce are contested, constitutes a criminal offense under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, or if it is purely a civil matter. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to quash the proceedings, holding that the dispute was essentially civil in nature and that criminal courts were not the appropriate forum for such recovery claims. The Court further clarified that observations made by the High Court regarding the factum of divorce were not binding on the civil forum, which remains the competent authority to adjudicate the underlying dispute between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute regarding the recovery of dowry articles constitute a criminal offense under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed when the underlying dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
  • Are observations made by a High Court regarding a disputed fact, such as divorce, binding on a future civil court adjudicating the same matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Jameela Begum vs Muhammad Ali and 5 others1995 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-24
  leave to appealprivate partitioninheritanceconcurrent findingscivil revisionownership of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated May 19, 1993, which dismissed a civil revision petition. The core legal question involved whether the petitioner established her exclusive ownership of the suit property through a private partition and whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the lack of evidence were sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to produce reliable documentary or oral evidence to prove the alleged private partition among the legal heirs, and that the mere receipt of nominal rental amounts did not establish her exclusive ownership or entitlement. The court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, laying down the principle that assertions of private partition and exclusive ownership of inherited property must be substantiated by concrete documentary or reliable oral evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the lack of evidence for a private partition can be interfered with in civil revision?
  • Does the receipt of nominal rent by a co-heir establish exclusive ownership of inherited property through private partition?
  • What is the evidentiary requirement to prove a private partition of property among legal heirs?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hamidan and 9 others vs Mst. Nathi1995 SCMR 484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  pre-emption suitconsent decreeSection 12(2) CPCtarget dateremandfresh decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of land. The trial court initially decreed the suit based on a consent offer accepted by the plaintiff's attorney. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the decree, alleging lack of authority. The trial court set aside the consent decree and proceeded with the trial, ultimately dismissing the suit, citing a legal bar against passing fresh decrees in pre-emption cases after a specific target date, as established in Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali (PLD 1988 SC 287). The Appellate Court upheld this dismissal. However, the High Court, relying on subsequent Supreme Court precedents (Ghulam Rasool v. Faiz Bakhsh and Bahadur Khan v. Muhammad Yousuf), set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for a decision on all issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the alleged bar against passing fresh decrees in pre-emption suits after the target date was inapplicable, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is there a legal bar against passing a fresh decree in a pre-emption suit after the target date of 31-7-1986?
  • Can a consent decree be set aside under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the attorney lacked authority to accept the offer?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Hafeezan Bibi vs Muhammad Tufail and others1995 SCMR 256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  leave to appealreduction of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentmitigating circumstancespaternal influence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dated 28-2-1993, whereby the respondents' sentence of death under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was reduced to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life based on the mitigating circumstance that the convicts acted in obedience to their father's evil wish following a dispute over ancestral land. The Supreme Court held that the High Court advanced sound reasons and that there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The key principle laid down is that acting under paternal influence or obedience to a father's desire in the context of family land disputes can serve as a mitigating circumstance warranting the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether obedience to a father's wish in a family land dispute constitutes a mitigating circumstance for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in sentencing when sound reasons have been advanced?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ghafooran vs Abdul Ghafoor and others1995 SCMR 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-15
  leave to appealacquittalrevision petitionspeaking ordercriminal breach of trustappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court whereby the petitioner's revision petition against the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 7—who had been initially convicted by the trial court under sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but acquitted in appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge—was dismissed. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in dismissing the revision petition through a non-speaking order without discussing the evidence on record. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to discuss the evidence and pass a speaking order despite the availability of sufficient evidence recorded by the trial court. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that an appellate or revisional court must examine the evidence and render a speaking order when evaluating concurrent or conflicting findings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is required to pass a speaking order discussing the evidence while dismissing a revision petition against acquittal?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the High Court dismisses a revision petition without proper evaluation of the evidence on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Daulan vs Sardara and 5 others1995 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-02
  gift deedleave to appealmisreading of evidencemutation of landvalidity of giftinheritance dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that invalidated a gift of land made by the late Nizamuddin in favor of his daughter, the petitioner. The gift was executed on April 25, 1977, registered on December 5, 1977, and mutated on June 11, 1978. Following the donor's death in 1983, the respondents, who were the donor's nephews, challenged the validity of the gift. While the trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, the lower appellate court set aside that decision. Subsequently, the High Court allowed the respondents' revision petition, reinstating the invalidation of the gift. The core legal question before the Supreme Court concerned whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically the testimony of the Advocate who prepared and registered the gift deed. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court had potentially misread the evidence provided by the Advocate regarding the execution and registration of the gift, thereby necessitating a deeper review of the validity of the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of an Advocate who prepared and registered a gift deed constitute sufficient evidence to establish the validity of the gift?
  • Can a High Court's decision in revision be challenged if it is based on a misreading of the evidence presented before the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Bhagan vs The State and others1995 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-19
  murdersentence mitigationlife imprisonmentdeath penaltyacquittalleave to appealcriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Mst. Bhagan against the acquittal of a co-accused, Abdul Rahman, and the sentencing of the primary convict, Maqbool Ahmad, in a murder case. The trial court had convicted both individuals under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the petitioner's son, sentencing them to life imprisonment without providing reasons for withholding the death penalty. The High Court acquitted Abdul Rahman, finding his involvement doubtful, and upheld Maqbool Ahmad's conviction while also failing to justify the imposition of the lesser penalty. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal regarding Abdul Rahman's acquittal, finding no grounds to interfere with the High Court's assessment of the evidence. However, the Court granted leave to appeal concerning Maqbool Ahmad to determine whether the normal penalty of death should have been awarded, given the trial and appellate courts' failure to provide reasons for opting for life imprisonment instead of the capital sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory for trial and appellate courts to provide reasons for awarding life imprisonment instead of the death penalty in a murder case?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal when the High Court has found the prosecution's case against a co-accused to be doubtful?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to examine the adequacy of a sentence imposed by lower courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Ayesha Bibi vs Muhammad Sajid and another1995 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  pre-emptionrejection of plainttalabsco-sharercollateralpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the rejection of the petitioner's pre-emption suit for possession of land. The core legal question concerns whether a pre-emption suit filed in 1980 could be maintained and decreed on the basis of being a collateral or co-sharer without pleading Talabs under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, and absent a pre-emption decree before 31 July 1986. The Supreme Court held that the petition was liable to be dismissed because no decree for possession by pre-emption had been passed in favour of the petitioner before 31 July 1986, rendering it impossible to decree the suit on the basis of being a collateral of the vendor and co-sharer in the estate. The key principle laid down is that pre-emption suits filed prior to the relevant cutoff and lacking a decree by 31 July 1986 cannot be sustained on grounds no longer recognized by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit can be decreed on the basis of being a collateral and co-sharer without a pre-emption decree having been passed in favour of the plaintiff before 31 July 1986?
  • Can a plaint be rejected for failure to disclose Talabs as envisaged by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 in a suit filed in 1980?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Allah Rakhi and anothers vs Additional Settlement Commissioner, Multan and 4 others1995 SCMR 1017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-16
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertyagreement of associationSettlement Scheme No. VIIIDisplaced Persons Compensation Actleave to appealsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the disputed transfer of an evacuee shop in Multan. The core legal question concerns the validity of the subsequent transfer of the property to the first petitioner under Settlement Scheme No. VIII when the property had already been validly transferred to the third respondent under section 10(a) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, following an agreement of association. The Supreme Court held that once the property was lawfully transferred and the transferee had complied with the requirements through an agreement of association and adjustment of compensation, the property ceased to be available for subsequent transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. Consequently, the subsequent allotment orders in favour of the first petitioner were without lawful authority and jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that evacuee property already validly transferred and acted upon under the settlement laws cannot be re-allotted to a subsequent claimant under later schemes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether evacuee property validly transferred under section 10(a) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 is available for subsequent transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII?
  • Does an agreement of association and adjustment of compensation finalize the transfer process for a lawful transferee under settlement laws?
  • Are subsequent allotment orders issued in ignorance of a prior valid transfer order deemed to be without lawful authority and jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Aksar Jan vs Rehmat Din and another1995 SCMR 1136 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  bail grantcancellation of bailmurderambushexercise of discretionleave to appealcriminal law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner (complainant) challenged the judgment of a Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which granted bail to respondent No. 1 in a case registered under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code involving a double murder. The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court improperly or illegally exercised its judicial discretion in granting bail to the accused. The Supreme Court observed that although the accused was named in the FIR, the factual allegations indicated that the assailants had ambushed themselves in shrubs during the actual firing and emerged only afterward firing in the air, at which point they were allegedly seen by the complainant and witnesses. Finding that the High Court had considered the overall circumstances of the case and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any illegality or improper exercise of discretion, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's discretionary order granting bail in the absence of improper or illegal exercise of discretion?
  • Whether bail may be granted where the accused is named in the FIR but the circumstances show that the assailants allegedly fired while hidden in shrubs and were seen only subsequent to the firing?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal challenging a grant of bail succeed without establishing that the discretion exercised by the High Court was arbitrary or contrary to law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Tahira Dilawar and 6 others vs Ghulam Samdani and 4 others1995 SCMR 246 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-30
  acquittal appealdouble presumption of innocencefabrication of recordMashirnamasecondary evidencepolice misconductleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's acquittal of police officials charged under Section 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for fabricating a Mashirnama (recovery document). The trial court had initially convicted the respondents, but the High Court overturned this. The Supreme Court examined whether the charge of framing an incorrect record could be sustained without the production of the document itself. The Court held that the prosecution failed to produce the original Mashirnama or justify secondary evidence under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984. Consequently, the Court could not verify the alleged fabrication. The Court emphasized that in cases of acquittal, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and interference is only warranted if the judgment is perverse or based on artificial reasoning. Finding no such infirmity, the Court upheld the acquittal, ruling that the failure to produce the document forming the subject matter of the charge was fatal to the prosecution's case. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction under Section 218 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be sustained if the document alleged to be fabricated is not produced in court?
  • What are the evidentiary requirements for proving a document under the Qanun-e-Shahadat 1984 when the original is not produced?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused by a competent court create a double presumption of innocence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Shahnaz Begum vs Mrs. Daulat Roshan Ali1995 SCMR 317 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-18
  ejectmentbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantburden of proofrented premiseseviction order
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, whereby an order of eviction against the respondent tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need was set aside. The landlady sought eviction under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, stating she lived temporarily in her father-in-law's house, which was being sold, and required her own flat. The Rent Controller allowed eviction, but the High Court reversed it, holding that the landlady failed to prove the sale agreement of her father-in-law's house and thus lacked good faith. The Supreme Court held that the production of a formal written sale agreement of the father-in-law's house was unnecessary, as an owner or relative is under no legal obligation to accommodate a daughter-in-law indefinitely, and the landlady sufficiently established her temporary residence and the compulsion to vacate. Furthermore, the tenant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the landlady owned other vacant flats in the building. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Rent Controller's eviction order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-production of a written sale agreement regarding a third party's house renders a landlady's claim of bona fide personal need for her own property mala fide?
  • Does a father-in-law have a legal obligation to accommodate his daughter-in-law so as to negate her personal need for eviction?
  • Where a tenant alleges that a landlady owns alternative accommodation in the same building, upon whom lies the burden to prove such ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Kishwar Malik vs Lt.Col. M. Sadiq Malik1995 PLD Supreme Court 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-13
  benami transactionbenamidarconcurrent findingscivil court jurisdictionbar of jurisdictionownership of propertyhusband and wifemisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a suit for declaration filed by the respondent-husband claiming to be the real owner of a residential bungalow in Islamabad, alleging that the appellant-wife was merely a benamidar. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court and High Court successively dismissed the appellant's appeal and revision, upholding the concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the concurrent findings suffered from misreading of evidence and whether the civil court's jurisdiction was barred under the Capital Development Authority law. Upon independent assessment, the Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings were well-founded on evidence, noting that the purchase price was paid entirely from the respondent's bank account and that the appellant possessed no independent source of income. The Court further ruled that Section 49-E of the Capital Development Authority Act did not bar the civil court's jurisdiction because the suit involved a private dispute determining the true ownership and nature of the transaction rather than questioning the legality of any action taken by the Authority. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a benami transaction can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction without proof of material misreading of evidence?
  • Does Section 49-E of the Capital Development Authority (Amendment) Act, 1966 bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to determine the true ownership and benami nature of a property between private parties?
  • What are the determinative factors for establishing whether a property purchased in the name of a spouse is a benami transaction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Akhtar Usman vs Accountantgeneral, Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others1995 SCMR 964 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-07
  house rent allowancefederal government employeeautonomous bodyservice tribunallimitationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Headmistress in a Federal Government school, surrendered her official accommodation in March 1981 and began drawing a house rent allowance while living in a house provided to her husband by his employer, the Pakistan Science Foundation. The Accountant General Pakistan Revenue objected and ordered recovery of the allowance. After exhausting departmental remedies and a civil suit, the petitioner approached the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal in limine on the ground of delay. The petitioner then sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of a federal government employee to house rent allowance when residing in accommodation provided to their spouse by an autonomous body, and whether the service appeal was time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the issue of limitation in light of the applicable Office Memorandum regulating house rent allowances for spouses employed by the government and autonomous bodies respectively.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Federal Government employee entitled to house rent allowance when residing in accommodation provided to their spouse by an autonomous body?
  • Whether an appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal can be dismissed in limine on the ground of delay without examining the merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Akhtar Usman vs Accountant-General, Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-07
  house rent allowanceservice lawlimitation periodfederal government employeeautonomous bodyservice tribunal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Headmistress in a Federal Government school, challenged an order by the Accountant-General, Pakistan Revenue, directing the recovery of house rent allowance she had received. The petitioner had been living in accommodation provided to her husband, an employee of an autonomous body, while simultaneously drawing house rent allowance. After exhausting departmental remedies and failing before the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed her appeal in limine due to delay, she sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner was entitled to the house rent allowance under the prevailing government policy regarding spouses employed by different entities, and whether the Service Tribunal correctly dismissed her appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the specific provisions of Office Memorandum No. F.3(32)-R-13/79, which allows a Federal Government employee to claim house rent allowance even if their spouse, employed by an autonomous body, receives housing benefits. The Court held that the matter requires further examination regarding the limitation period applied by the Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Federal Government employee entitled to house rent allowance if their spouse is employed by an autonomous body and provided with accommodation?
  • Does the receipt of housing benefits by a spouse employed in an autonomous body disqualify a Federal Government employee from claiming house rent allowance?
  • Can a service appeal be dismissed in limine solely on the ground of delay without considering the underlying entitlement?
  Read full judgment →
• Momeen Khan and anothers vs Supreme Appellate Court, Peshawar and 5 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  speedy trialssupreme appellate courtconstitutional petitionmaintainabilityacquittal set asidejurisdiction barcompromise
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a direct petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, challenging the judgment of the Supreme Appellate Court, Peshawar, which had set aside the petitioners' acquittal by the Speedy Trials Court and convicted them under sections 302/34 and 337-A(i)/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death and other terms. The core legal question was whether a direct petition under Article 184(3) is maintainable against a final judgment of the Supreme Appellate Court rendered pursuant to the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1991 and Article 212-B of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Article 212-B of the Constitution places a complete bar on the jurisdiction of any other court, including the Supreme Court, in respect of proceedings and judgments of Speedy Trial Courts and the Supreme Appellate Court, rendering such judgments final. The key principle laid down is that judgments of the Supreme Appellate Court under the constitutional framework of Article 212-B and the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1991 are final and immune from challenge in ordinary or direct constitutional proceedings before the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a direct petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is maintainable against a judgment of the Supreme Appellate Court?
  • Does Article 212-B of the Constitution bar the Supreme Court from entertaining challenges against proceedings of Speedy Trial Courts or the Supreme Appellate Court?
  • Can a judgment rendered by the Supreme Appellate Court under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance be challenged in any other court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mola Bakhsh vs Mian Muhammad Hussain1995 SCMR 909 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-29
  pre-emptionpartial pre-emptionagricultural landShamilat Dehsuit for pre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit concerning the sale of agricultural land. The petitioner challenged the decree granted to the respondent, arguing that the suit was barred by the doctrine of partial pre-emption because the respondent allegedly failed to seek relief regarding the vendor's share in the Shamilat Deh and irrigation rights. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and found that the vendor possessed no share in the Shamilat Deh nor any independent irrigation rights. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondent had offered to pay the full consideration amount paid by the vendee, negating any intent to exclude portions of the property. The Court held that even if there were an omission, it was unintentional and did not constitute partial pre-emption, as the respondent sought the entire bargain. Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that a suit for pre-emption is not defeated by an unintentional omission where the pre-emptor offers the full consideration for the entire property sold.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unintentional omission to include certain rights in a pre-emption suit constitute partial pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be defeated when the pre-emptor offers the full consideration paid by the vendee?
  • Is a suit for pre-emption maintainable if the vendor had no actual share in the claimed rights like Shamilat Deh?
  Read full judgment →
• Mohibullah, Chief Officer, Town Committee, Amangerh and others vs Mansoor Khan, Planning Officer, District Council, Mardan and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 96 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-29
  seniority listservice lawLocal Council ServiceBPS-16combined seniorityadministrative servicepromotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' challenge to a combined seniority list of Local Council Service (LCS) officers. The core legal question was whether the department erred in placing the private respondents, who were appointed as Planning Officers in the Integrated Rural Development Programme and subsequently absorbed into the LCS, above the petitioners in the combined seniority list. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the posts occupied by the respondents were explicitly designated as part of the Administration Branch of the service under the relevant notification. Consequently, the Court held that the combined seniority list was prepared correctly. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondents held BPS-16 positions as of 1984, whereas the petitioners were promoted to BPS-16 significantly later, justifying the respondents' superior placement. The key principle laid down is that where posts are statutorily or administratively designated as part of a specific service branch, the seniority of officers holding those posts must be determined according to that unified service structure, regardless of departmental sub-specializations.

  Questions settled

  • Can officers from different departmental branches be placed on a combined seniority list if their posts are designated as part of the same service branch?
  • Does the date of promotion to a specific pay scale determine seniority relative to officers who held that scale at an earlier date?
  • Is a combined seniority list valid if the underlying posts were created as part of the same administrative service structure?
  Read full judgment →
• Moazam Shah vs Mohsan Shah and another1995 SCMR 1190 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-01
  reduction of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentmotivefire arm expertleave to appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the judgment of the High Court, whereby the respondent's sentence for murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was reduced from death to life imprisonment. The High Court had discarded the Fire Arm Expert's report due to the delayed dispatch of crime empties and found the prosecution's immediate motive unproven given a five-month hiatus without incident. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment by the High Court was in conformity with established case-law and guidelines regarding corroborative evidence of motive and expert findings. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the propriety of the sentence reduction and directed both the appeals to be heard together. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will examine whether appellate courts properly evaluate corroborative material, such as expert reports and admissions regarding motive, when altering sentences in capital punishment cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in discarding the Fire Arm Expert's report on the ground of delayed dispatch of crime empties?
  • Does an admission in a statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding a previous scuffle constitute satisfactory corroboration of motive?
  • Whether the reduction of a sentence from death to life imprisonment was in conformity with the guidelines enunciated in judicial precedents?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Shamila Iftikhar vs Selection Committee and 2 others1995 SCMR 415 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  medical college admissiondomicile certificatebona fide residentselection committeeresidency inquiryreserved seat
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the dismissal of a Constitution petition concerning the rejection of the appellant's application for admission to Bolan Medical College against a seat reserved for the bona fide residents of District Killa Saifullah. The core legal question was whether a domicile certificate serves as conclusive proof of permanent residency for admission purposes and whether the Selection Committee possesses the authority to verify such claims. The Supreme Court held that a domicile certificate is not conclusive proof of permanent residency. The Court affirmed that the Selection Committee is competent to conduct independent inquiries, including referring matters to local authorities, to satisfy itself regarding a candidate's actual residency. The Court found no error in the Committee's decision, which was based on evidence that the appellant's family did not reside in the district and that the appellant had previously declared a different permanent address. The key principle established is that admission authorities may look behind a domicile certificate to determine the bona fide nature of a residency claim.

  Questions settled

  • Is a domicile certificate conclusive proof of permanent residency for the purpose of admission to a medical college?
  • Does a Selection Committee have the authority to verify the actual residency of a candidate despite the production of a domicile certificate?
  • Does the mere ownership of land in a district establish a candidate's permanent residency for admission purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Sakina Begum- vs The Selection Committee for Bolan Medical1995 SCMR 334 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-05
  medical college admissionbolan medical collegediscretionary powerdiscriminationeducational prospectusconstitutional petitionsupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal with leave of the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition regarding the refusal of admission to the First Year of Bolan Medical College, Quetta, for the academic year 1989-90. The core legal question was whether the appellant suffered discrimination when other candidates educated outside Balochistan were granted admission, and whether the Selection Committee properly exercised its discretion under Article 30 of the Prospectus. The Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to show cogent reasons for not studying within Balochistan as required by the Prospectus, and that mere fact of studying outside the province does not establish discrimination unless identical reasons were presented and treated differently. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that discretionary exemptions from educational qualification rules require proof of cogent reasons, and claims of discrimination necessitate proof of identical factual positioning.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with the discretionary refusal of admission by a Selection Committee under an educational prospectus without showing perversity?
  • Does obtaining education outside the province create a presumption of discrimination in college admissions when other similarly situated candidates are granted exemptions?
  • What constitutes a case of discrimination based on differential treatment in administrative selections?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss Ghazala Saeed vs Secretary, Labour and Manpower Department1995 SCMR 1218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-14
  Intra-Court Appealwithdrawal of petitionnot pressedalternative remedyHigh Court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel requested to withdraw the petition, stating an intention to pursue an Intra-Court Appeal in the High Court instead. The counsel explained that the Intra-Court Appeal remedy had not been previously availed due to the court's vacation period, which had since concluded. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not pressed, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue the appropriate legal remedy available under the law in the High Court. The judgment establishes the principle that a petitioner may withdraw a petition before the Supreme Court if they intend to exhaust alternative, more appropriate remedies, such as an Intra-Court Appeal, which were previously unavailable due to procedural circumstances like court vacations.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner withdraw a Supreme Court petition to pursue an Intra-Court Appeal in the High Court?
  • Is a petition dismissible as 'not pressed' when the petitioner intends to pursue an alternative legal remedy?
  Read full judgment →
• Misbahullah Khan vs Mst. Memoona Taskinuddin1995 SCMR 287 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-22
  tentative rent orderstriking off defenceevictionCantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963deposit of renttechnical defaultwilful defaultremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from an order of the Rent Controller, upheld by the High Court, striking off the tenant's defence and granting eviction under Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 for failing to deposit rent in the National Bank of Pakistan by the 5th of the month, as directed in a tentative rent order.

  The core legal questions concerned whether a tentative rent order can be issued when eviction is not sought on the ground of default, where tentative rent must be directed to be deposited under Section 17(8), and whether a technical non-compliance arising from ambiguity or confusion amounts to a wilful default justifying striking off of defence.

  The Supreme Court held that tentative rent orders are mandatory in all eviction proceedings regardless of whether default is alleged. However, Section 17(8) strictly mandates deposit 'in his office' (the Rent Controller's office). Where the Controller deviates by ordering bank deposit, leading to bona fide confusion and a technical delay, striking off defence is unwarranted. The appeal was allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller pass a tentative rent order under Section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 even if eviction is not sought on the ground of default?
  • Does Section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 require the Rent Controller to direct deposit of rent specifically in his office rather than a bank?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off under Section 17(8) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act 1963 for a non-wilful, technical failure to deposit rent caused by confusion over bank deposit instructions?
  Read full judgment →
• Mirza Afzal Baig vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another1995 PLC (C.S.) 102 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-11-30
  service appeallimitation periodcondonation of delaypromotionjurisdiction of service tribunalad-hoc appointment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Section Officer, sought leave to appeal against a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that dismissed his service appeal regarding a claim for promotion to BPS-18. The petitioner, who had voluntarily retired, contended he was entitled to promotion retrospectively from 1986, similar to his colleagues. The Tribunal had dismissed his appeal on two primary grounds: first, that the appeal was filed well beyond the statutory limitation period of 120 days following his departmental representation, with no sufficient grounds for condonation of delay; and second, that the matter related to the 'determination of fitness for promotion,' which is barred from the Tribunal's jurisdiction under the proviso to the Service Tribunals Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no legal infirmity or error in the Tribunal's judgment and determined that no question of public importance was involved. Consequently, the Court held that the petition lacked merit and dismissed it, affirming the Tribunal's decision regarding both the limitation bar and the jurisdictional exclusion concerning promotion matters.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters relating to the determination of fitness for promotion?
  • Is an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal maintainable if filed after the expiration of the 120-day period following a departmental representation?
  • Can a service appeal be entertained if it lacks sufficient grounds for the condonation of delay?
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• Mir Muhammad vs The State1995 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-30
  murderocular evidencerelated witnessesmedical jurisprudencefire-arm expert reportcriminal appealimprisonment for life
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Balochistan upholding the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of imprisonment for life for murder. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony, given by related witnesses and challenged on grounds of discrepancies regarding firing distance and absence of blackening on wounds, was sufficient to sustain a conviction without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that minor discrepancies in estimating distance among eye-witnesses are natural, that medical jurisprudence confirms the absence of blackening is consistent with shots fired from beyond three feet, and that positive forensic reports regarding recovered weapon and empties provide sufficient corroboration. The key principle laid down is that related eye-witness testimony, when consistent and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, is fully reliable to sustain a murder conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies among eye-witnesses regarding the distance from which a firearm was discharged are fatal to the prosecution's case?
  • Does the absence of blackening around gunshot wounds necessarily contradict eye-witness testimony regarding firing distance?
  • Can related eye-witnesses be relied upon to sustain a murder conviction in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Does a positive firearm expert report matching recovered empties with an accused's weapon provide sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Ranjha vs The State1995 SCMR 1806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  murderjail petitionleave to appealocular evidencerecovery of weapontampering of recordbroad daylight occurrence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal from jail was filed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and his sentence of life imprisonment for the murder of his relative. The petitioner raised three main contentions: the non-recovery of empty cartridges from the crime scene, an alleged delay in lodging the First Information Report, and a claim that a key eye-witness was present in Bahawalpur rather than at the crime scene in Khushab. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that the First Information Report was lodged promptly and that, in a broad-daylight occurrence involving a single accused, minor delays are inconsequential. The Court ruled that the non-recovery of incriminating material from the spot does not render the prosecution case doubtful if it is otherwise proved by credible ocular evidence. Furthermore, the Court rejected the challenge to the eye-witness's presence, finding that the alleged admission was a subsequent, unauthorized insertion in the trial record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-recovery of empty cartridges or other incriminating material from the crime scene render the prosecution case doubtful if credible ocular evidence is available?
  • What is the legal effect of a minor delay in lodging a First Information Report in a broad-daylight occurrence involving a single accused?
  • How should a court treat an alleged admission of absence by an eye-witness in a trial record where there are indications of subsequent unauthorized additions to the text?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad Tufail vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 21995 SCMR 1197 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-20
  ejectment proceedingsconsent orderjudicial coercionrent controlleave to appealconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging an ejectment order. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's consent to vacate the premises, recorded during ejectment proceedings before the Rent Controller, was voluntary or obtained through judicial coercion. The petitioner alleged that the Rent Controller pressured him into a compromise to expedite the disposal of the case. The Supreme Court reviewed the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller, the Appellate Court, and the High Court, all of which had rejected the petitioner's claim of coercion. The Supreme Court held that the ejectment order, being based on the petitioner's own consent, was valid and that there was no evidence of judicial coercion. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The principle laid down is that a consent-based order in rent proceedings, where the tenant voluntarily agrees to vacate, is binding and cannot be set aside on unsubstantiated allegations of judicial coercion.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ejectment order based on a tenant's consent be challenged on the grounds of judicial coercion?
  • Does a concurrent finding by lower courts regarding the voluntariness of a compromise warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Gul Jan vs Muhammad Ali Jan and another1995 SCMR 1103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-21
  post-arrest bailappreciation of evidenceleave to appealcriminal liabilitydying declarationbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which had refused post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Mian Gul Jan, while granting bail to his co-accused in a case involving charges under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the lower courts' refusal of bail, arguing that the prosecution's version of events, specifically regarding the manner of firing and the site plan, was implausible and inconsistent with the physical evidence. The Supreme Court addressed whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on these evidentiary contentions. The Court held that the petitioner's arguments required a deep appreciation of evidence, which is impermissible at the bail stage. Noting that the deceased had specifically charged the petitioner with firing in the First Information Report, the Court concluded that the lower courts had correctly exercised their discretion in refusing bail. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming that bail cannot be granted where the accused is specifically implicated by the victim's dying declaration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court appreciate evidence regarding the plausibility of a site plan at the bail stage?
  • Is a specific charge of firing in a First Information Report sufficient grounds to refuse bail?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal when the lower courts have exercised discretion in refusing bail based on the victim's statement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Ghulam Muhammad Ahmed Khan Maneka vs President of Islamic1995 SCMR 571 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-16
  disqualification for membershipmisconductabuse of powerforfeiture of franchisecivil proceedingsparliamentary disqualificationstrict construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment by the Special Court disqualifying the appellant from parliamentary membership for seven years under the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977. The core legal question was whether the appellant, a former Federal Minister, committed misconduct by abusing his official position to secure loans and interest waivers for a private company. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Special Court’s findings were based on a disregard of material evidence. Specifically, the evidence demonstrated that the loans were obtained with proper institutional approval and that no interest waivers or concessions were actually granted to the company. The Court clarified that proceedings under the Order are civil in nature, not quasi-criminal. Furthermore, it established that provisions regarding the forfeiture of franchise must be strictly construed, and a finding of misconduct requires positive evidence. A mere request for the consideration of financial relief does not, per se, constitute misconduct.

  Questions settled

  • Are proceedings under the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977, civil or quasi-criminal in nature?
  • Does a request by a public official for the consideration of financial relief for a company constitute misconduct under the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, 1977?
  • How should provisions regarding the forfeiture of franchise be interpreted by a court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Ejaz Shafi vs Syed Ali Ashraf Shah and 11 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 43 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-06
  election petitionrecount of votesinvalidated ballot papersElection TribunalRepresentation of the People Actscrutiny of votesremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an election dispute concerning the National Assembly seat NA-184, Karachi West I. The Election Tribunal had previously set aside the appellant's election and declared the respondent the winner, relying on a recount report submitted by the Deputy Election Commissioner. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal could delegate the authority to invalidate ballot papers to an official without personally verifying the validity of those votes. The Supreme Court held that the Election Tribunal erred by acting upon the recount report in its totality without independently checking or examining the ballot papers declared invalid during that process. The Court emphasized that under the Representation of the People Act, 1976, specifically the proviso to subsection (2) of section 46, the power to invalidate votes lies with the Tribunal itself, which must satisfy itself regarding the invalidity of ballot papers. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned decision and remanded the case to the Election Tribunal to conduct a fresh scrutiny of the invalidated ballot papers in the presence of the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Election Tribunal have the authority to delegate the power to invalidate ballot papers to an official during a recount?
  • Is an Election Tribunal required to personally examine ballot papers declared invalid during a recount before relying on them to decide an election petition?
  • What is the scope of the Election Tribunal's power under section 46 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, regarding the inspection of ballot papers?
  Read full judgment →
• Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others vs Khan Muhammad1995 SCMR 968 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  leave to appealproprietary rightsejected tenants schemelease schemewrit jurisdictionState land
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court passed in a writ petition, whereby the respondent was granted proprietary rights in respect of certain State land held under a 15 years lease scheme. The respondent had previously been conferred proprietary rights under the ejected tenants scheme in 1967 and later obtained lease land in 1971. After portions of the land were resumed for a graveyard and his challenges failed, he applied for proprietary rights over the remaining leased land based on a notification dated September 3, 1979. The revenue authorities declined the request, citing his prior acquisition of proprietary rights. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court could competently exercise its writ jurisdiction to grant proprietary rights contrary to the provisions of paragraph 4(b) of the scheme promulgated under the notification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction can competently grant proprietary rights contrary to the provisions of a notification scheme?
  • Does the prior acquisition of proprietary rights under the ejected tenants scheme bar a lessee from obtaining proprietary rights under the 15 years lease scheme pursuant to the notification dated 3-9-1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Gul vs Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, Peshawar and another1995 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-06
  service appealtermination of servicetemporary employeepensionary benefitsleave to appealAfghan Refugees Organization
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, a former Store Keeper in the Afghan Refugees Organization, challenging the dismissal of his service appeal by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad. The petitioner's services were terminated on January 1, 1994, and the Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground that he was a temporary employee in a temporary organization. The core legal question raised is whether an employee with more than ten years of service in the Afghan Refugees Organization is entitled to pensionary benefits under Rule 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations upon termination. The Supreme Court of Pakistan granted leave to appeal to consider this question of law of public importance, noting the petitioner's reliance on a previous unreported judgment of the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of a temporary organization with over ten years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under Rule 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations?
  • Does the termination of a temporary employee in a temporary organization bar claims for pensionary benefits after long service?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehrban and 3 others vs The State1995 SCMR 259 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-29
  criminal appealmurderleave to appealappraisal of evidencemedical evidenceeyewitness testimonyblind murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction of the petitioners for murder. The core legal question was whether the lower courts committed any legal error, misreading, or non-reading of evidence in convicting the petitioners, particularly given the defense's contention that the crime was a 'blind murder' and that the deceased had other enemies. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court and the High Court had properly appraised the evidence. The Court found that the presence of other potential enemies does not inherently cast doubt on the veracity of prosecution witnesses, nor did the medical evidence regarding the deceased's stomach contents contradict the eyewitness accounts of the occurrence. The key principle laid down is that appellate interference is not justified where the lower courts have correctly appreciated the evidence and no material misreading is demonstrated. The Court affirmed that the prosecution's case remains credible despite defense theories regarding the timing of the attack and the deceased's other rivalries.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of other potential enemies of the deceased automatically render the prosecution's case doubtful?
  • Can a court interfere with a conviction based on arguments regarding the medical condition of the deceased's stomach at the time of death?
  • Is the testimony of eyewitnesses rendered unreliable solely because they did not intervene to rescue the victim during an attack?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Akhtar and anothers vs Haji Nazir Ahmad and 4 others1995 SCMR 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-27
  post-arrest bailcancellation of bailcross-casefurther inquirymurderfacilitation of crimecriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two criminal petitions arising from a Lahore High Court order regarding bail in a murder case registered under F.I.R. No. 127. One petition sought the cancellation of bail granted to three accused, while the other sought bail for a fourth accused, Rehmat Hussain, whose application was previously declined. The core legal questions were whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in granting bail to the three accused in a cross-case scenario where they were allegedly empty-handed, and whether the fourth accused, alleged to have facilitated the crime by holding the deceased, was entitled to bail. The Supreme Court upheld the bail granted to the three accused, noting the cross-case nature and lack of specific injury attribution. Furthermore, the Court granted bail to the fourth accused, determining that the role of "facilitating" a crime requires further inquiry, consistent with established precedent. The judgment affirms that bail may be granted in cross-case scenarios where specific roles are not clearly attributed, and that allegations of facilitating a murder require further inquiry, thus entitling an accused to bail pending trial.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused person entitled to bail when the incident is a cross-case and no specific injuries are attributed to them?
  • Does the allegation of facilitating a murder by holding the deceased require further inquiry for the purpose of bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretion in granting bail if the order is based on a proper assessment of the cross-version of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others vs The State and another1995 SCMR 127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-18
  criminal appealidentification parademurder convictionevidentiary valuerecovery proceedingsinterested witnessappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the High Court's conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for murder. The core legal questions concern the reliability of eye-witness testimony, the validity of an identification parade, and the evidentiary value of weapon recoveries witnessed solely by interested parties. The Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court established that an identification parade is legally infirm and lacks evidentiary value if the witness merely identifies the accused without attributing specific roles played in the crime. Furthermore, the Court ruled that recovery proceedings conducted in the presence of only interested relatives, without independent local witnesses, are "sham" and inadmissible. Additionally, the Court emphasized that while the testimony of an injured witness carries weight, it must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny for consistency and credibility, particularly when corroboration is absent. Unexplained delays in recording statements and inconsistencies in the FIR further weaken the prosecution's case, rendering the conviction unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Does an identification parade have evidentiary value if the witness identifies the accused without specifying their role in the crime?
  • Can a recovery of weapons be considered valid if witnessed only by close relatives of the deceased without independent local witnesses?
  • Should the testimony of an injured witness be accepted without corroboration if there are material contradictions in their statement?
  • What is the effect of unexplained delay in recording the statement of an injured witness on the prosecution's case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob-Ul-Hassan vs The State1995 SCMR 1013 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-07
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencyidentification paraderecovery of stolen propertyleave to appealcriminal law
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a police constable, sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of his bail application in a criminal case registered under Section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner argued for the grant of bail based on the principle of consistency, noting that a co-accused, Farooq, had been granted bail by the Allaqa Magistrate. The Supreme Court examined the record and distinguished the petitioner's case from that of the co-accused. It noted that the co-accused was granted bail because no recovery was made from him and the complainant had filed an affidavit asserting his innocence. Conversely, the petitioner was positively identified during an identification parade, and the robbed property was recovered from his possession. Consequently, the Court held that the principle of consistency did not apply, as the evidentiary basis for the co-accused's bail was absent in the petitioner's case. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of consistency automatically entitle a co-accused to bail if another co-accused has been granted bail?
  • Is the recovery of robbed property from an accused a valid ground for refusing bail?
  • Can bail be denied if an accused is correctly identified during an identification parade?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulvi Muhammad Umar vs Haji Pir Bakhsh and 7 others1995 SCMR 50 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-20
  pre-emptionsubsequent vendeesuperior right of pre-emptiondoctrine of lis pendensimprovement of status
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a revision petition in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a subsequent vendee, who acquired the pre-empted property prior to the institution of the suit but lacked a superior right of pre-emption at the time of the initial sale, could defeat the pre-emption claim by subsequently acquiring such a right through a gift before the suit was filed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's argument regarding the improvement of status was inapplicable to a subsequent vendee in this context. The Court determined that for a subsequent vendee to defeat a pre-emption claim, the transfer must be in recognition of a pre-existing superior right of pre-emption. Since the petitioner lacked this right at the time of the initial transfer, the transaction was a simple transfer subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. Consequently, the claim of the original vendee, rather than the subsequent assignee, remained the relevant benchmark against the pre-emptor. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent vendee defeat a pre-emption claim by acquiring a superior right of pre-emption after the initial sale but before the institution of the suit?
  • Is a transfer to a subsequent vendee who lacks a superior right of pre-emption at the time of sale subject to the doctrine of lis pendens?
  • Does the right to improve status before a pre-emption decree apply to a subsequent vendee who was not a party to the original sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed Changwani vs Directorgeneral, Bureau of Emigration1995 SCMR 958 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  service appealleave to appealseniority listpromotionFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's service appeal pursuant to section 4(1) proviso (b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could maintain a service appeal challenging the promotion of respondents Nos. 4 to 7 and seeking his own promotion when his seniority relative to those respondents remained undetermined and pending decision before the departmental authority. The Supreme Court held that until the petitioner's claim of seniority over the respondents is finalized and allowed by the department, he cannot claim promotion over them on the basis of seniority, and therefore the Tribunal's dismissal of the appeal was proper. The key principle laid down is that a civil servant cannot bypass departmental determination of a provisional seniority list to claim promotion over allegedly junior colleagues through a service tribunal appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can claim promotion over allegedly junior colleagues when their relative seniority is still provisional and pending determination before the departmental authority?
  • Does the bar under section 4(1) proviso (b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 apply to a service appeal where promotion is sought without a finalized determination of seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed Changwani vs Director-General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment Islamabad and 4 others1995 PLC (C.S.) 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-21
  service appealpromotionseniority listleave to appealjurisdiction of service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed in limine the petitioner's service appeal pursuant to Section 4(1) proviso (b) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973. The core legal question concerns whether a civil servant can maintain an appeal challenging the promotion of juniors and seeking his own promotion when his departmental representation regarding a provisional seniority list showing him as junior remains pending. The Supreme Court held that until the petitioner's claim of seniority over the respondents is formally determined by the department, he cannot claim promotion over them on the basis of seniority, and therefore the Service Tribunal rightly dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that a service appeal challenging promotions and seeking consequential promotion is barred or premature when it is contingent upon a disputed and undetermined seniority status pending before departmental authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can maintain an appeal before the Service Tribunal regarding promotion while his representation against a provisional seniority list is still pending?
  • Does a service appeal challenging the promotion of alleged juniors lie when the petitioner's own seniority has not yet been determined by the departmental authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Masihullah and anothers vs The Deputy Settlement Commissionerii, Board of Revenue, Punjab1995 SCMR 914 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-10
  excess areasettlement authoritieswrit petitionres judicatafresh round of litigationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners assailed a judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed in limine their writ petition against an order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner refusing to correct or increase the transferred excess area. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could initiate a fresh round of litigation for the same relief and on the same cause of action after their prior challenges before settlement authorities, the High Court, and the Supreme Court had already been conclusively dismissed. The Supreme Court held that having previously exhausted all remedies up to the apex court without success, the petitioners were barred from initiating fresh litigation on the same matter. The court laid down the principle that a party cannot re-litigate a settled grievance through successive proceedings when prior challenges regarding the same cause of action and relief have reached finality.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can initiate a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action after prior challenges before settlement authorities and superior courts have been dismissed?
  • Are petitioners entitled to re-litigate the quantum of transferred excess area once their earlier petitions for leave to appeal have been rejected by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Market Committee, Multan through its Administrator and anothers vs Muhammad Sabir1995 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-13
  public propertyencroachmentrule of consistencyequitable reliefconstitutional jurisdictionlandlord-tenant relationshipclean-up operation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the occupation of land in the New Grain Market, Multan, by an affectee of a clean-up operation. The petitioner, the Market Committee, challenged an Intra-Court Appeal judgment that granted the respondent, Muhammad Sabir, the status of a tenant, similar to other affectees previously accommodated by the Committee. The core legal question was whether the respondent, an identified affectee of the clean-up operation, was entitled to equal treatment and regularization as a tenant, given that the Market Committee had already settled with similarly situated individuals in a prior writ petition. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing the rule of consistency and the principle that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction should be exercised to advance justice. The Court held that the respondent should be treated as a tenant on terms consistent with previous settlements, provided he vacated excess land, thereby ensuring equitable treatment among similarly situated parties without encouraging illegal encroachment on public property.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of consistency require a public authority to treat similarly situated affectees of a clean-up operation equally regarding the regularization of land occupation?
  • Can a court exercise discretionary constitutional jurisdiction to grant tenancy status to an encroacher if it advances justice and prevents discriminatory treatment?
  • Is a party entitled to equitable relief when they are an identified affectee of a government clean-up operation and the authority has already settled with others in the same category?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed vs The State1995 SCMR 1146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-06
  murder convictionleave to appealconcurrent findingscorroborative evidencefirearms expert reportsentence computationocular evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal matter where the petitioner, Maqsood Ahmed, challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld his conviction and life imprisonment sentence for the murder of Bostan Khan under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court regarding the petitioner's guilt were supported by sufficient evidence, specifically addressing the reliability of eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution successfully established the petitioner's guilt through strong corroborative evidence, including the petitioner's immediate apprehension at the crime scene with the murder weapon, forensic matching of the recovered empty cartridge to the petitioner's gun, and the testimony of police officials. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact, when free from misreading or non-reading of evidence, do not warrant interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, though the Court granted the petitioner the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of his sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of a murder weapon and forensic matching of an empty cartridge provide sufficient corroboration for eyewitness testimony in a murder trial?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts if there is no evidence of misreading or non-reading of evidence?
  • Is the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a convict seeking leave to appeal against a conviction for murder?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmed vs Mahmood Khalid, Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and another1995 SCMR 1225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-20
  minor custodywelfare of minorsleave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionfamily law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Maqsood Ahmed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his writ petition in limine, which had challenged concurrent orders of the lower courts denying him the custody of his minor children. The core legal question concerned the welfare of the minors regarding their custody between the divorced parents. The Supreme Court held that no interference was warranted with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had determined that the welfare of the minors lay in remaining with their mother, noting they were receiving proper education in an English Medium School and that the petitioner had delayed seeking custody for over seven years after separation. The key principle laid down is that the paramount consideration in matters of minor custody is the welfare of the children, and concurrent factual determinations by lower courts will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of legal flaw or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Is the welfare of the minors the primary consideration in determining custody disputes between divorced parents?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding minor custody in the absence of a legal flaw?
  • Does an unexplained delay in filing a custody application weigh against the petitioner seeking custody?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad/ vs The State1995 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-29
  sudden and grave provocationsentence reductionculpable homicidecriminal appealquantum of sentenceconcurrent sentences
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the petitioner’s conviction under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, instead convicting him under section 304, Part I, and section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had rejected the prosecution's case in its entirety, finding the petitioner's version of events—that he acted under sudden and grave provocation—to be more probable. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the High Court was excessive given the circumstances of the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and affirmed the conviction. However, the Court held that the sentence was disproportionate to the circumstances. Consequently, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment for life under section 304, Part I, to rigorous imprisonment for seven years on each count, while maintaining the fines and the sentence under section 308. The Court further directed that the substantive sentences run concurrently and granted the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed term of years upon finding it excessive?
  • Does the acceptance of a plea of sudden and grave provocation by the High Court necessitate a reduction in the quantum of sentence?
  • Are sentences for multiple counts of culpable homicide required to run concurrently?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad vs The Accountant-General Pakistan, Revenue, Islamabad and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 637 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  pension enhancementleave to appealService Tribunalretrospective applicationpension rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions seeking leave to appeal against orders of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which dismissed the petitioner's appeals regarding pension enhancement. The petitioner, who retired on 25-7-1970, claimed payment of pension at an enhanced rate pursuant to an Office Memorandum dated 3-10-1991. His request was denied by the respondent and the Service Tribunal, which interpreted paragraph 4 of the memorandum—providing that pension shall be calculated for all pensioners from time to time in accordance with latest rules—as referring only to the pension rules applicable at the time of an individual's retirement. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal's interpretation of the memorandum runs contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the correct interpretation of the Office Memorandum and whether the Service Tribunal erred in failing to follow the binding precedent established in I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan.

  Questions settled

  • Whether paragraph 4 of Office Memorandum No. F.6(4)/Reg.(6)/91 applies to all pensioners or only according to rules in force at the time of retirement?
  • Whether the Service Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the Office Memorandum dated 3-10-1991 contrary to Supreme Court precedent?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqsood Ahmad vs Accountantgeneral, Pakistan Revenue, Islamabad1995 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-09
  pension benefitsservice lawpension calculationinterpretation of office memorandumleave to appealfederal service tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against orders passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's claim for pension payments at an enhanced rate. The petitioner, who retired on 25 July 1970, sought the benefit of an Office Memorandum dated 3 October 1991, specifically relying on paragraph 4, which stipulates that pension calculations for all pensioners should be made in accordance with the latest rules. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the Federal Service Tribunal erred in its interpretation of this Memorandum by restricting its application to the pension rules in force at the time of an individual's retirement, rather than applying the latest rules as the Memorandum suggests. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine if the Tribunal's interpretation contradicts the principles established in the precedent of I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041). The Court's holding focuses on resolving the conflict between the Tribunal's restrictive reading of the pension policy and the broader interpretation required by the cited precedent regarding the calculation of pension benefits for retirees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Office Memorandum dated 3rd October 1991 require pension calculations to be based on the latest rules regardless of the date of retirement?
  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal err in interpreting paragraph 4 of the Office Memorandum dated 3rd October 1991 as being limited to pension rules applicable at the time of retirement?
  • Is the interpretation of the Office Memorandum dated 3rd October 1991 by the Federal Service Tribunal contrary to the decision in I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan?
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• Maqbool Ahmed vs Superintending Engineer (E), WAPDA, 2ND Circle, Faisalabad and another1995 PLC (C.S.) 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-11-17
  service appeallimitationacquittalfinancial duesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal. The core legal questions concern whether the petitioner's departmental appeal before the Tribunal was barred by limitation and whether the petitioner was entitled to certain claimed financial dues following his acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions in detail, thereby setting the stage for a comprehensive review of limitation principles in service appeals and the consequential financial entitlements of acquitted civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the appeal of the petitioner before the Federal Service Tribunal was barred by time?
  • Whether an employee is entitled to claimed dues after securing an order of acquittal from a court of competent jurisdiction?
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• Maqbool Ahmad and anothers vs Munir Ahmad and 3 others1995 SCMR 482 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-08
  adverse possessionco-sharersjoint possessionland partitionconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from concurrent judgments of the lower courts, including a Civil Revision, which upheld a decree for the partition of land. The petitioners, who were co-sharers in the suit land, had contested the partition suit by asserting ownership of the entire property through adverse possession. The core legal question was whether a co-sharer can successfully claim adverse possession against other co-sharers regarding joint property without prior partition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the petitioners failed to establish their claim. The Court held that a co-sharer cannot set up a plea of adverse possession against other co-sharers in the absence of a formal partition and the acquisition of exclusive possession of their respective shares. The key principle laid down is that co-sharers are legally considered to have joint possession of the property, and for one co-sharer to claim adverse possession, their entry into the shared portion must be demonstrably hostile and adverse, which was not proven in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a co-sharer claim adverse possession against other co-sharers regarding joint property without a formal partition?
  • Is the possession of co-sharers legally considered to be joint possession?
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• Manzoor Masih vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 307 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-13
  murdersudden fightfree fightindividual liabilityappraisal of evidenceright of private defencehostile witnesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal, arising from a petition for leave to appeal, addresses a case of two competing versions involving a sudden free fight where both sides sustained injuries and a murder was committed. The core legal question revolved around the appraisal of conflicting evidence, the existence of common intention, and individual criminal liability in a sudden affray. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that where both parties conceal the genesis of the incident and engage in a sudden free fight resulting in injuries to both sides, individual liability attaches to each participant for their specific acts, and the prosecution version—supported by the nature and gravity of injuries sustained by the deceased and the complainant party—is to be believed over a concocted plea of self-defence. The key principle laid down is that in a sudden free fight between hostile parties where the exact origin is obscured, the right of private defence is excluded, and each participant is held responsible solely for their individual criminal acts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether participants in a sudden free fight where both sides sustain injuries are liable only for their individual acts?
  • Can the plea of right of private defence be sustained when both parties conceal the actual genesis of the incident and engage in a sudden affray?
  • Does a hostile witness's testimony regarding the obscurity of the incident due to darkness override the corroborated medical and circumstantial evidence of the prosecution?
  • Whether the absence of a premeditated attack and the presence of a sudden flare-up warrant the reduction of a death sentence to life imprisonment?
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• Manzoor Hussain vs Government of N.-W.F.P. through Chief Secretary1995 PLC (C.S.) 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-02-07
  service promotionleave to appealseniority versus meritannual confidential reportprovincial selection boardcivil defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the promotion of respondent No. 4 to the post of Assistant Director, Civil Defence (BPS-17). The core legal question concerns the validity of the promotion made by the Provincial Selection Board, where the petitioner claimed superior qualifications, better confidential records, and a departmental recommendation, despite the respondent being senior in service. The Supreme Court held that the promotion of the senior respondent was made strictly in accordance with the rules and merits upon clearance by the Provincial Selection Board, and that a departmental recommendation or a stopgap acting arrangement creates no vested right to out-of-turn promotion. The Court laid down the principle that average integrity remarks do not constitute adverse entries, and departmental recommendations are not binding when promotions are lawfully determined on merit and seniority by the competent selection board. Consequently, the leave to appeal was refused and the petition dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a stopgap or acting arrangement creates any right in favour of an employee for out-of-turn promotion?
  • Does a departmental recommendation for promotion have a binding effect on the Provincial Selection Board?
  • Whether average remarks regarding an officer's integrity in an Annual Confidential Report are to be construed as adverse remarks?
  • Can a promotion made strictly in accordance with rules and merits by a selection board be successfully challenged through a writ petition without proof of mala fides?
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• Manzoor Ahmad vs Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Department of Education, Quetta and 4 others1995 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-09-08
  educational admissionreserved seatsdomicile requirementsadmission policy waiverengineering college admissionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of a Constitution petition by the High Court of Balochistan, challenging the rejection of the appellant's application for admission against a reserved seat at Balochistan Engineering College, Khuzdar. The Selection Committee rejected the application under clause 2.12 of the Admission Policy because the appellant completed his Matriculation and F.Sc. examinations in Sindh rather than Balochistan, refusing to grant a waiver of this requirement. The legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the grounds advanced by the appellant constituted reasons beyond his control to justify a waiver under clause 2.12 of the Admission Policy. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that studying outside the province merely for personal convenience and better transport facilities does not amount to a condition beyond the candidate's control. The Court laid down that statutory or administrative admission conditions regarding territorial educational qualification cannot be relaxed unless the candidate establishes circumstances genuinely beyond their control.

  Questions settled

  • Does personal convenience in attending an educational institution outside a province qualify as a reason beyond a candidate's control to warrant a waiver of educational qualification requirements under an admission policy?
  • Can an appellate court refuse to remand a matter to an administrative selection committee if the candidate's stated grounds fail to meet the objective criteria for waiver under the relevant rules?
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• Mamraiz Khan vs Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 4 others1995 PLD Supreme Court 512 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  enhancement of sentenceappellate jurisdictionSpecial Courts for Speedy Trialsconstitutional petitionSupreme Appellate Courtfundamental rightscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This constitutional petition, filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenged the judgment of the Supreme Appellate Court which had enhanced the petitioner's sentence from life imprisonment to death. The petitioner had been convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by a Special Court for Speedy Trials. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Appellate Court, established under the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1992, possessed the authority to enhance a sentence upon a petition filed by a private party (the deceased's father) rather than by the state. The Supreme Court held that the Supreme Appellate Court, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction, is vested with all powers conferred on an appellate court under Chapter XXXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Supreme Appellate Court is empowered to enhance sentences, regardless of the competency of the private petition, as it functions with the full scope of appellate authority, including the power to alter the nature of a sentence to ensure justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Appellate Court have the authority to enhance a sentence from life imprisonment to death?
  • Can the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction under Article 184(3) to review an order of the Supreme Appellate Court?
  • Does the Supreme Appellate Court possess the powers of an appellate court under Chapter XXXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is the Supreme Appellate Court empowered to enhance a sentence even if the petition for enhancement was filed by a private party rather than the state?
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• Malik Sabih Hussain vs The State1995 SCMR 1148 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  bail conditionssuretiesmodification of bailcriminal appealbail bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which had declined a request to modify the terms of bail regarding the number of sureties required. The core legal question concerned the appropriateness of the bail conditions imposed by the High Court, specifically the number of sureties. Upon review, the State counsel consented to an increase in the number of sureties. Consequently, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, modifying the bail order to permit the petitioner to furnish four sureties, each in the sum of Rs. 250,000, in lieu of the single surety previously ordered. The judgment affirms the principle that bail conditions, particularly regarding the number and nature of sureties, may be adjusted by the appellate court, especially when the State does not oppose such modification to ensure the effective securing of the petitioner's attendance.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court modify the number of sureties required for bail if the State does not object?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against a bail condition order maintainable if the State consents to the requested modification?
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• Malik Muhammad Yousafullah Khan vs The State and another1995 PLD Supreme Court 58 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-29
  post-arrest bailmedical groundsbail cancellationmedical boardexpert opinionradial nerve injurymurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the Peshawar High Court's refusal to grant post-arrest bail on medical grounds to an accused charged under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court had initially granted bail based on a Standing Medical Board report indicating that the accused's severe radial nerve injury required specialized surgical intervention unavailable in jail or local hospitals, and recommended treatment abroad to avoid permanent disability. However, the Sessions Court and High Court cancelled the bail, questioning the authenticity of the medical report and noting the absence of a bone fracture. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and set aside the High Court's order. The Court held that judges are not medical experts and cannot lightly brush aside a technical report from a properly constituted Medical Board without summoning the doctors or obtaining a counter-opinion. The key principle laid down is that the criteria for medical bail under Section 497 Cr.P.C. is whether the ailment cannot be properly treated in custody and continued detention is hazardous to the accused's health, regardless of whether the injury involves a bone fracture.

  Questions settled

  • What is the correct legal criteria for granting bail to an accused on medical grounds under Section 497 of the Cr.P.C.?
  • Can a court disregard or brush aside the technical opinion of a properly constituted Medical Board in the absence of a counter-medical opinion?
  • Does the absence of a bone fracture preclude an accused from being granted bail on the ground of sickness or infirmity under Section 497 Cr.P.C.?
  • What steps must a court take if it doubts or suspects the authenticity of a Medical Board's report regarding an accused's health?
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• Malik Muhammad Ramzan and others vs Punjab University, Lahore1995 SCMR 338 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-12
  student expulsionunconditional apologyuniversity disciplinereinstatementacademic misconduct
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition challenging the expulsion of students from the Punjab University, Lahore. The core legal question concerned whether the expulsion orders could be set aside upon the petitioners' submission of an unconditional apology. The Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted the written unconditional apology tendered by the petitioners. In this undertaking, the petitioners committed to refraining from engaging in political activities or any conduct detrimental to the prestige of the institution, the Vice-Chancellor, or the university faculty. Consequently, the Court held that the expulsion orders were to be withdrawn, effective from the original date of expulsion. The principle laid down is that where students acknowledge their misconduct and provide a formal, unconditional apology coupled with an undertaking of future good conduct, the court may exercise its discretion to allow for the withdrawal of disciplinary expulsion orders, thereby facilitating the students' reinstatement. This decision reflects the court's approach to balancing institutional discipline with the educational interests of the students involved in such disciplinary disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can an expulsion order against university students be withdrawn upon the submission of an unconditional apology?
  • Does an undertaking to refrain from political activity in an educational institution justify the reversal of disciplinary expulsion?
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• Malik Muhammad Mukhtar vs Province of Punjab through Deputy1995 SCMR 462 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15
  Intra-Court AppealmaintainabilityLaw Reforms Ordinancerevisional jurisdictioncooperative societies loan repaymentauction proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) as non-maintainable, which had been filed challenging an order passed in writ proceedings concerning property auction conducted by the Assistant Registrar under Martial Law Order 241 and the West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966. The core legal question revolves around the maintainability of the ICA under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, specifically whether the statutory bar under the proviso to section 3(2) concerning revisions applied at the time the writ petition was instituted, given that the inclusion of revisions to bar ICAs was added by an amendment subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that arguable questions regarding the temporal application of the amendment introduced by Act VI of 1975 to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, required detailed examination, subject to verification of the exact date of filing of the writ petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is barred under the proviso to section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, where the governing statute provides for a revision rather than an appeal?
  • Does the amendment adding revision and review to the proviso of section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, apply retrospectively to writ petitions filed prior to its promulgation?
  • Whether an auction conducted by the Assistant Registrar under Martial Law Order 241 is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction when alternative remedies are allegedly available?
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• Malik Moeenuddin Khan vs United Bank Ltd., Quetta1995 SCMR 450 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-29
  forma pauperisappeal as pauperrecovery of loanleave to defendbanking company
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's order rejecting his application to file an appeal in forma pauperis. The respondent bank had filed a recovery suit against the petitioner under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance for a secured loan. The trial court initially granted leave to defend conditionally, but realizing no formal application for leave to defend had been filed, corrected the order and decreed the suit in favor of the bank. The petitioner's application under Order XLIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to appeal as a pauper was dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Order XLIV, Rule 1, noting the statutory condition that an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be rejected unless the court finds the impugned judgment and decree to be contrary to law or erroneous. Finding no illegality or infirmity in the decree—given that the petitioner defaulted on installment payments and failed to substantiate claims of interest waiver—the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for permission to file an appeal in forma pauperis requires the court to examine the legality of the impugned judgment and decree?
  • Can an application to appeal as a pauper be maintained if the decree is not shown to be contrary to law or erroneous?
  • What is the effect of failing to establish a waiver of interest on a loan recovery decree in proceedings for leave to appeal as a pauper?
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• Malik Khuda Bakhsh vs The State1995 SCMR 1621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  stay of criminal proceedingscivil suit and criminal trialadmissibility of civil judgment in criminal proceedingsleave to appealcriminal revisionfraud and forgery
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal of his criminal revision petition, which had upheld a Special Judge's refusal to stay criminal proceedings against him pending the disposal of his civil suit. The petitioner, an Overseas Employment Promoter facing criminal charges under the Emigration Ordinance and Passport Act for allegedly defrauding four complainants, argued that the central receipt forming the basis of the criminal case was fraudulent and currently challenged in a civil suit, necessitating a stay of the criminal trial to avoid conflicting decisions. The core legal question was whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of a related civil suit concerning the same document. The Supreme Court held that the criminal proceedings should not be stayed, reasoning that unlike cases where criminal liability wholly depends on civil title, the criminal trial involves ocular testimony from multiple witnesses and the trial court is fully competent to independently determine the genuineness of the document and the guilt of the accused. The key principle laid down is that civil court judgments are not admissible in criminal proceedings to establish the truth of underlying facts, and criminal courts must independently determine guilt based on evidence produced before them.

  Questions settled

  • Whether criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the final disposal of a related civil suit involving the same subject matter?
  • Is a judgment of a Civil Court admissible in a criminal proceeding to establish the truth of the facts upon which it is rendered?
  • Does a trial court have the competence to independently determine the genuineness of a document and the guilt of an accused notwithstanding a pending civil challenge to that document?
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