Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Mst. Akbar Jan Through Legal Heirs And 2 Others vs Deputy Settlement1991 S CM R 1740 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  constitutional petitionsettlement matterauction-purchaserwrit jurisdictiondelay and lachessupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a constitutional writ petition arising from an urban settlement case regarding a shop auctioned in 1960. The core legal question examined the validity of the auction by Settlement Authorities, the acceptance of delayed balance deposits made through compensation books after fraud by associates, and the extension of time for payment despite earlier threats of resumption. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion to refuse interference in writ jurisdiction due to the considerable inactivity, laches, and lack of bona fide legal recourse by the appellants, alongside the lawful transfer of property and accrual of valuable rights to the auction-purchaser who deposited the purchase money. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional writ jurisdiction will not be exercised in favor of a party showing prolonged inactivity and failing to challenge settlement proceedings in time, nor will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent legal orders of settlement authorities where time extensions for deposit were competently granted under exceptional circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise constitutional writ jurisdiction against settlement proceedings where the petitioner showed prolonged inactivity and failed to seek timely judicial recourse?
  • Do Settlement Authorities possess the power to extend the time for depositing purchase money in favor of an auction-purchaser under exceptional circumstances despite earlier orders of presumptive resumption?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere in a discretionary field where the lower forums and the High Court have concurrently upheld the legality of property transfer orders?
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• Mrs. Zohra Sultana And Others vs Imam Din1991 SCMR 1808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  settlement schemetransfer of propertymissing recordauction-purchaserleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and ruled in favor of the respondent occupant. The core legal question concerned whether a claimant's pending transfer application under Settlement Scheme No. VI could be dismissed merely because the original physical form was untraceable in the official records, despite the claimant producing an official receipt and certificate of its submission. The Supreme Court held that citizens cannot be made to suffer due to the failure of public authorities to maintain or safely custody official records. The ratio established is that an official receipt and certificate from relevant authorities constitute sufficient proof of the filing of a form, and lack of record availability cannot be used to defeat a valid claim or justify auctioning property already in lawful occupation under a pending application. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transfer application under Settlement Scheme No. VI be dismissed solely because the original physical form is untraceable in official records?
  • Does the production of an official receipt and certificate from relevant authorities suffice to prove the filing of a settlement form?
  • Can citizens be made to suffer for the failure of public authorities to safely custody documents filed in public offices?
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• Mrs. T.P. Bhandara vs Excise and Taxation Officer (Capital Gain Tax)1991 SCMR 1830 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-20
  capital gain taxfair market valuetax liabilityvaluation of propertywrit jurisdictiontax evasion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court regarding the assessment of capital gain tax. The core legal question was whether capital gain tax should be assessed based on the prevalent market value of the property or based on the specific status of the vendor and the vendee. The petitioner argued for a valuation based on a comparison with other properties in the vicinity. The Supreme Court observed that the subject plot was commercialized and possessed distinguished features compared to neighboring properties. The Court upheld the departmental authorities' determination that the declared sale price was an undervaluation intended to reduce tax liability, thereby justifying the authorities' decision to determine the fair market value for tax imposition. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition, holding that departmental authorities are justified in determining the fair market value when declared sale prices do not accurately reflect the transaction, particularly to prevent tax evasion.

  Questions settled

  • Is the determination of fair market value by departmental authorities justified when the declared sale price is found to be an undervaluation?
  • Should capital gain tax be assessed based on the prevalent market value of the property or the status of the vendor and vendee?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court decision regarding tax valuation when the property possesses distinguished commercial features?
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• Mrs. Shaukat Khalid vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi And 21991 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-17
  minor custodyfoster mothernatural parentswelfare of minorleave to appealIslamic law custody
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from the dismissal of a constitutional petition regarding the custody of a minor female. The petitioner, the widow of the minor's paternal uncle, claimed custody as a foster mother who raised the child. The core legal question was whether the custody of a minor should remain with a foster mother or be handed over to her natural parents, and whether such a transfer of custody is contrary to the welfare of the minor. The Supreme Court held that the welfare and natural right of the child lie in the custody of her real parents rather than a foster mother, which is fully in accordance with Islamic injunctions derived from the Quran and Sunnah. The Court concluded that transferring custody to the natural parents is natural and lawful, and accordingly, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the custody of a minor female should remain with a foster mother or be given to her natural parents?
  • Is the transfer of custody from a foster mother to natural parents considered unnatural under the law and Islamic injunctions?
  • Does the welfare of a minor girl during adolescence lie with her natural parents rather than extended relatives or foster parents?
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• Mrs. Riaz Akhtar Latif vs The Chief Administrator Auqaf1991 SCMR 1223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-27
  Waqf propertylimitationleave to appealChief Administrator Auqafinterim reliefFirst Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioner's First Appeal by the High Court, which upheld the District Judge's order dismissing the petitioner's application under section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 as time-barred. The core legal question concerns the determination of limitation regarding applications filed to challenge notifications issued by the Chief Administrator Auqaf assuming administrative control of disputed Waqf properties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the question of limitation and the other points raised in the petition, while directing that the case be linked with a similar pending matter. Furthermore, the request for interim relief was refused subject to the condition that the respondent maintain full accounts to facilitate potential future reimbursement or compensation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application filed under section 7 of the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 is barred by limitation?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted to examine the question of limitation in Waqf property disputes?
  • Is interim relief granted against the assumption of administrative control of Waqf property by the Chief Administrator Auqaf?
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• Mrs. Munawar Sanni vs Director, Army Education1991 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-08-24
  reinstatementarrears of salaryillegal terminationconstitutional petitionmoney claimservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a constitutional petition challenging an order of the Director of Army Education that modified a previous reinstatement order and denied the appellant her arrears of salary for the period she was kept out of service due to an illegal termination. The High Court had dismissed the petition, holding that the claim was a money claim for which the appropriate remedy lay with a Civil Court or the Service Tribunal. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that when an employee's termination is declared unlawful, the authorities are under a bounden obligation to satisfy the claim for arrears of salary without driving the litigant to unnecessary litigation. The Deputy Attorney-General conceded that the appellant was legally entitled to the arrears of pay for the disputed period. In light of this legal position, the appellant's counsel chose not to press the appeal further, opting to pursue the matter directly with the departmental authorities. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee whose termination is declared unlawful is entitled to arrears of pay for the period they were kept out of service?
  • Whether the state authorities are obligated to satisfy a valid claim for arrears of salary without forcing the employee to seek recourse in a Civil Court or Service Tribunal?
  • Can a department modify a reinstatement order to deny arrears of salary after the termination has been declared illegal by a court of competent jurisdiction?
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• Mrs. Hussan Ara Bugti vs The Government of Balochistan Through Secretary, Education Department, Quetta1991 SCMR 802 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-20
  service tribunaldismissal from servicecompulsory retirementwilful absencegrant of leavecivil servantright of hearinghusband and wife policy
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to examine whether departmental action and subsequent dismissal of a civil servant were vitiated because she was allegedly condemned unheard and remained under a bona fide impression regarding her leave entitlement for inter-provincial transfer to join her spouse. The appellant, an employee of the Education Department of Baluchistan, remained absent from duty after her application for earned leave was not accepted, leading to disciplinary proceedings and dismissal, which was later converted into compulsory retirement by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question centered on whether her absence from duty was wilful and whether proper opportunity of hearing was afforded. The Supreme Court held that the grant of leave is subject to the exigencies of service at the discretion of the competent authority, and a civil servant cannot simply relax without securing leave approval. The Court ruled that her absence was wilful and that sufficient notice via telegram and press publication was given, satisfying procedural requirements. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental action against a civil servant is vitiated if the leave application remains pending and the civil servant stays away from duty without permission?
  • Does the grant of leave to a civil servant depend on the exigencies of service and the discretion of the competent authority?
  • Whether the absence from duty of a civil servant who assumes leave will be treated as wilful when the leave has not been sanctioned?
  • Is publication of a notice in the press sufficient for disciplinary proceedings when direct communication fails?
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• Mrs. Haliman Hanif Moonno O vs Mst. Ismat Kamal And 2 Other1991 SCMR 1729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-27
  auction-purchasernecessary partyremand of casepermanent injunctionex parte decreede novo trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a long-standing property dispute concerning the allotment and subsequent auction of a plot in Murree. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in permitting the plaintiffs to delete the name of the appellant, an auction-purchaser of the disputed plot, as a party to the proceedings and deciding the appeal in her absence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in striking off the appellant's name and proceeding with the appeal without her, noting that the appellant was a necessary party whose title and interest would be directly affected by any enforcement of the plaintiffs' alleged title. The Court laid down the principle that where a suit for injunction and subsisting title directly conflicts with a pre-existing title vested in a third-party auction-purchaser, such purchaser is a necessary party in whose absence the suit cannot proceed, and matters requiring factual inquiry must be tried de novo with their active participation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction-purchaser whose title vests prior to the institution of a suit is a necessary party to a suit for permanent injunction concerning the property?
  • Can the High Court permit the deletion of a necessary party after the Supreme Court has remanded the case specifically for a decision with that party impleaded and served?
  • Does a suit for permanent injunction based on subsisting title proceed in the absence of a third party whose competing title and interest would be completely ousted by the decree?
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• Mrs. Freni A. Cavina vs Mrs. Dhunmai Phiroze Dalal1991 PLD Supreme Court 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-29
  sublettingejectmentrent restriction lawretrospective application of lawwaivertacit consentwritten permissionpleadings in rent caseslandlord-tenant disputerent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that allowed an ejectment application on the ground of subletting, overturning the First Appellate Court's decision. The core legal question was whether the High Court could maintain an eviction order on grounds not explicitly pleaded by the landlady and the retrospective application of the requirement for prior written permission for subletting. The Supreme Court held that the strict rules of pleading are not applicable to rent proceedings, but sufficient facts must be pleaded. Crucially, the Court ruled that the requirement of prior written permission for subletting, introduced by amendments in 1962, could not be applied retrospectively to subletting that occurred in 1958, when only oral or tacit permission was sufficient. The Court found that the landlady's inaction for over 13 years after purchasing the property constituted a waiver of her right to seek ejectment on the ground of subletting. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the First Appellate Court's judgment, which had set aside the ejectment order, was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can an ejectment order be maintained on a ground not explicitly pleaded by the landlady in the eviction application?
  • Does the requirement of prior written permission for subletting apply retrospectively to subletting that occurred before its statutory enactment?
  • Can a landlord's prolonged inaction constitute a waiver of the right to seek ejectment on the ground of unauthorized subletting?
  • Are strict rules of pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to rent proceedings?
  • Does an act that was legal at the time of its commission become illegal retrospectively due to subsequent changes in rent restriction law?
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• Mrs. Faiz Muhammad And 3 Others Haji Noor Din vs Widow of Late Syed1991 SCMR 1994 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-06Read full judgment →
• Mrs. Aqeela Asghar Ali and others vs Miss Khalida Khatoon Malik and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 1118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-05
  Service Tribunal jurisdictionpro forma promotionadverse remarks expunctionseniority vested rightcompetent authority powersreview of executive orderscivil service lawpromotion rulesrecord production
  Summary & questions settled

  This Supreme Court judgment addresses appeals against a Service Tribunal decision concerning the expunction of adverse remarks and pro forma promotions of civil servants. The core legal questions revolved around the Service Tribunal's jurisdiction regarding promotion matters, the nature of seniority as a vested right, the power of the competent authority to entertain subsequent representations for expunction of adverse remarks, and the conditions for granting pro forma promotions. The Court held that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction over the principles of promotion and seniority assignment, but not over the question of fitness for promotion. It reaffirmed that seniority is a vested right in Punjab, distinguishing it from other provinces. While a civil servant's right to represent against adverse remarks is limited to one, the competent authority's power to review or reconsider executive decisions is not similarly restricted. However, pro forma promotion is only justified if supersession was based entirely on adverse remarks that were subsequently and fully expunged. The Court found the expunction of remarks and subsequent pro forma promotion in this case to be without lawful authority due to the absence of proper record and the influence of political appeals, setting aside the pro forma promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over questions of fitness for promotion?
  • Is seniority a vested right for civil servants in Punjab?
  • Can a competent authority entertain subsequent representations for expunction of adverse remarks after an initial rejection, even if the civil servant's right to represent is limited to one?
  • Under what conditions can a civil servant be granted pro forma promotion?
  • What is the impact of a government department failing to produce relevant service record when challenged before a Service Tribunal or higher court?
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• Mistri Allah Din vs Fazal Muhammad and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  rent controlejectmentlocus standisecond appeallimitationlandlord and tenantjurisdiction of Rent Controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that entertained a second appeal by a third party against an ejectment order passed in rent control proceedings. The core legal questions concerned whether a non-party to rent proceedings has the standing to file an appeal, whether such an appeal is maintainable after an inordinate delay, and the scope of the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's entertainment of the appeal was erroneous. The Court affirmed that the Rent Controller exercises limited, exclusive jurisdiction confined strictly to disputes between a landlord and a tenant. Consequently, the right of appeal under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance is restricted solely to the parties to the proceedings. The respondent, not being a party to the original ejectment application, lacked the legal standing to challenge the order. Furthermore, the Court noted the respondent's inconsistent positions regarding his interest in the property and the significant delay in filing the appeal without justification. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, declaring the respondent's appeal incompetent and not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is not a party to rent control proceedings file an appeal against an ejectment order?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller limited exclusively to disputes between a landlord and a tenant?
  • Does the right of appeal under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance extend to persons who were not parties to the original proceedings?
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• Miss Sumaeea Zareen vs Selection Committee, Bolan Medical College, Quetta And Other1991 SCMR 2099 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-21
  medical college admissiondomicile certificateselection committee jurisdictionres judicatafundamental rightsinterpretation of statutes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges the dismissal of a Constitution Petition concerning the rejection of the appellant's application for admission to Bolan Medical College. The Selection Committee had rejected the application, citing alleged forgery in the appellant's father's service book and questioning the family's domicile status in Lasbella. The High Court had dismissed the petition, applying the principle of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 does not apply to proceedings before the Selection Committee as they are not judicial proceedings. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Committee's jurisdiction under the prospectus is limited to determining whether a candidate belongs to a specific district, not to adjudicate the genuineness of domicile certificates or the family's history. The Court emphasized that 'belonging' to a district should be interpreted broadly to include residency and habitation. Finding that the appellant had established her connection to Lasbella and that the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction by considering extraneous factors, the Court allowed the appeal and directed the Committee to consider the appellant's application on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to proceedings before a Selection Committee for medical college admissions?
  • Does a Selection Committee have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the genuineness of a domicile certificate or the family history of a candidate?
  • What is the scope of the term 'belong' when determining a candidate's district for admission purposes under the prospectus?
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• Miss Razia Sattar vs Medical Superintendent, Mayo Hospital, Lahore1991 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-04
  disciplinary proceedingsdelegation of powersservice tribunalcompetent authoritystatutory interpretationremandstaff nurses
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against the dismissal of service by staff nurses at Mayo Hospital, Lahore. The appellants challenged their removal from service, arguing that the Chief Nursing Superintendent, who passed the removal orders, lacked the requisite jurisdiction under the Punjab Health Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1971. The appellants contended that the rules mandated the 'officer next below the Head of the Institution' to exercise such disciplinary authority, a position they claimed the Chief Nursing Superintendent did not hold. The Service Tribunal had previously upheld the removal, relying on an order by the Medical Superintendent designating the Chief Nursing Superintendent as the competent authority. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Tribunal failed to adequately address whether the Medical Superintendent possessed the legal power to delegate disciplinary authority or which specific rules governed the matter at the relevant time. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh determination, directing the Tribunal to resolve the applicability of conflicting rules and the validity of the purported delegation of power.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Head of an Institution delegate disciplinary powers to a subordinate officer in the absence of explicit statutory authority?
  • Which rules govern the disciplinary authority over staff nurses when multiple sets of service rules are potentially applicable?
  • Does the designation of an officer as an 'authority' by a superior validate disciplinary actions if that designation contradicts the statutory delegation of powers?
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• Misri Khan vs Iftikhar Ahmad And Other1991 SCMR 1768 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-27
  pre-emptionco-sharersuperior right of pre-emptionconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner's suits for possession through pre-emption. The petitioner claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on being a collateral of the vendor and a co-sharer in the land sold in Village Ban Kotal, Tehsil Murree. The trial court dismissed the suits primarily due to the petitioner's failure to pay the required court-fee, and the High Court affirmed this, finding that the petitioner failed to establish the status of a co-sharer. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its factual findings regarding the petitioner's status as a co-sharer and his consequent right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding was supported by the petitioner's own admission in evidence that he was not a co-sharer. Consequently, the Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, ruling that the petitioner lacked a preferential right, and dismissed the petitions as no point of law was involved.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emptor have a superior right of pre-emption if they are not a co-sharer in the land?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained when there are concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the status of a pre-emptor?
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• Mirza Khan and another vs Muhammad Ilyas1991 PLD Supreme Court 383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-19
  pre-emptionsecond appealconcurrent findings of factburden of proofstatement on oathIslamic jurisprudence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in a pre-emption matter, whereby the regular second appeal of the respondent was allowed and his suit for pre-emption was decreed on the ground that he is the son of the vendor. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in second appeal by reversing concurrent findings of fact, and whether the respondent could be granted a decree for pre-emption based on his relationship after the rule laid down in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah. The Supreme Court held that the deposition on oath by a party in their own favour constitutes valid legal evidence, and findings of fact supported by such evidence cannot be set aside merely on technical objections regarding the procedure of proof when the relationship is substantially not denied. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a party's statement on oath constitutes valid evidence, and technical challenges to the manner of proof of a fact which is not genuinely disputed are untenable under Islamic jurisprudence and the constitutional setup.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court exceeds its jurisdiction in second appeal when reversing concurrent findings of fact?
  • Does a deposition on oath by a party in their own favour constitute valid legal evidence?
  • Can a finding of fact be set aside merely because it was reached through an improper or illegal procedure when the core fact is not genuinely contested?
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• Mirza Ghulam Hussain and another vs Ch. Iqbal Ahmad1991 PLD Supreme Court 290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-07
  adverse possessionoral agreement of salecontradictory pleaspossessionlandlord and tenanttitleprescriptioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a revision petition in a suit for possession. The core legal questions concerned the validity of an alleged oral agreement of sale and whether the appellants had perfected title through adverse possession. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming concurrent findings that the oral sale agreement was not established. The Court held that the pleas of lawful title via sale and adverse possession are contradictory and cannot be maintained simultaneously. A party claiming ownership through a lawful transaction cannot simultaneously claim adverse possession, as the latter requires an open, hostile, and notorious disavowal of the owner's title. The Court emphasized that possession is not adverse if its origin can be referred to a lawful title. Furthermore, adverse possession requires strict proof and cannot be established where possession was initially permissive or based on a failed claim of lawful title. The Court clarified that a claim of adverse possession only arises if a party abandons the claim of lawful title and openly asserts hostile possession against the true owner.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party simultaneously claim ownership through a lawful agreement of sale and adverse possession?
  • Does possession originating from a claimed lawful title qualify as adverse possession?
  • What are the constituent conditions required to establish a plea of adverse possession?
  • Can a person who fails to prove a claim of lawful title immediately rely on the period of possession during that failed claim to establish adverse possession?
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• Mirza Bashir Muhammad and others vs Muhammad Ali and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-17Read full judgment →
• Mirza Anwar Ud Din Akmal Represented By Legal Heirs And 3 Others vs Sh.1991 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-29
  writ jurisdictionquestion of factsettlement lawremand orderextraordinary jurisdictionevacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two appeals arising from a dispute over the transfer of a rural property in District Sheikhupura under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, acted correctly by re-examining disputed questions of fact—specifically the occupancy status of the house and its valuation—after the Settlement Commissioner had remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for further inquiry and determination. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in its approach. The Court determined that the High Court should not have recorded findings on questions of fact that required investigation and inquiry, as these matters fell within the domain of the relevant settlement authorities. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the order of the Settlement Commissioner, which had directed a remand for a fresh decision based on proper assessment. The key principle laid down is that the High Court, in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, should not interfere with or substitute its own findings on disputed questions of fact that require investigation by the competent administrative authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, record findings on disputed questions of fact that require further investigation?
  • Is it appropriate for the High Court to substitute its own findings for those of a settlement authority when the matter has been remanded for a factual inquiry?
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• Mirwas Khan vs Additional Secretary And Other1991 SCMR 1893 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-08
  pre-emptionJirgatribal areasconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsleave to appealspecial provisions regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which set aside an order passed by the Additional Secretary, Home Department, Government of N.-W.F.P. The dispute originated from a pre-emption suit filed under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1975, which was adjudicated by a Jirga, resulting in a decree in favor of the respondents. While the Additional Commissioner upheld this decree, the Additional Secretary later reversed it in revision. The High Court, exercising its constitutional jurisdiction, restored the initial concurrent findings of the lower forums. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly restored these findings. The Court held that the High Court’s decision was correct, noting that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any defect or irregularity in the proceedings as required under Section 12 of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1975. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that concurrent findings based on a valid Jirga report should not be disturbed absent procedural illegality.

  Questions settled

  • Can a revisional authority set aside concurrent findings of fact based on a Jirga report without establishing a defect or irregularity under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1975?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to restore concurrent findings of lower forums when exercising constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Mira Jan vs The State1991 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1998-05-25
  Petition for leave to appealExplosive Substances ActArms OrdinanceConvictionSentence reductionRe-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal but reduced his sentences for offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The petitioner, along with another, was arrested for possessing explosive powder slabs, a time device, and a detonator. The trial court convicted the petitioner, and the High Court, upon re-appraisal of the evidence, confirmed the finding of guilt while reducing the sentences for offences under Section 4 and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The Supreme Court, after hearing counsel and reviewing the record, found no exception on facts and law with the view taken by the High Court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court re-appraise evidence in an appeal and confirm a conviction while reducing the sentence?
  • What is the standard for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against a High Court's judgment affirming a conviction and reducing a sentence?
  • Is a conviction under the Explosive Substances Act 1908 for possession of explosive materials sustainable upon evidence of recovery and admission of ownership?
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• Mir Zaman vs Sahib Khan And Other1991 SCMR 822 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-06
  pre-emptionconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findingscultivating possessionwrit jurisdictionforcible dispossessionrevenue tribunals
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment that set aside concurrent findings of three Revenue Tribunals in a pre-emption suit. The appellant, a tenant, claimed pre-emption rights over agricultural land, which the Revenue Tribunals upheld based on evidence of his cultivating possession. The High Court, however, interfered with these findings, relying on a specific revenue entry to favor the respondents. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could properly exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to overturn concurrent findings of fact. The Court held that the High Court erred in re-evaluating evidence to substitute its own findings for those of the Tribunals, as no error of law was committed by the lower forums. Furthermore, the Court clarified the law of pre-emption, ruling that while a pre-emptor must maintain a preferential right at the stages of sale, suit, and decree, they cannot be non-suited if forcibly dispossessed by the vendee during the pendency of the suit, as they retain de jure possession. The appeal was allowed, and the Tribunals' findings were restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction interfere with concurrent findings of fact by Revenue Tribunals?
  • Does a pre-emptor lose their right to pre-emption if forcibly dispossessed by the vendee during the pendency of the suit?
  • Is a pre-emptor deemed to remain in de jure possession of land if dispossessed during the pendency of the suit?
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• Mir Ahmad and others vs Attaullah alias Atta Muhamma,D and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-19
  pre-emptionrule of sinkersuperior right of pre-emptionstrangerco-vendeedivisible sale
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon appeals referred to a larger Bench to examine the application of the "rule of sinker" in pre-emption suits, specifically whether a vendee possessing an equal or superior right of pre-emption who associates a stranger having an inferior right sinks along with his co-vendee. The core legal question concerns the effect of associating a stranger in a pre-emption transaction upon the vendee's superior or equal pre-emptive rights. The Court, following its earlier precedent in Muhammad Ismail and others v. Karamat Ali (PLD 1989 SC 474), holds that the doctrine of sinker applies in such cases, rendering the sale pre-emptible and decreeing the pre-emptor's suit, unless the impugned sale is divisible wherein the share and price paid by each vendee are specifically designated. The key principle laid down is that a vendee with superior or equal pre-emption rights who associates a stranger loses that protective standing and sinks to the level of the stranger, causing the transaction to be vulnerable to pre-emption unless specific divisibility of shares and prices is established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the rule of sinker apply when a vendee having an equal or superior right of pre-emption associates a stranger with an inferior right?
  • Under what circumstances does the association of a stranger not trigger the rule of sinker in a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a pre-emption suit succeed against co-vendees if the impugned sale is divisible in terms of shares and specified prices?
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• Mir Afzal Khan vs Ejaz Akbar1991 PLD Supreme Court 215 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-06
  pre-emptionrepugnancy to Quran and SunnahFederal Shariat Court jurisdictionconstitutional interpretationstatutory exemptionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a pre-emption suit. The petitioner's suit was dismissed because a government notification exempted the specific sale transaction from the right of pre-emption. The petitioner challenged this notification, arguing that Section 29 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, was ultra vires and repugnant to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah, and that the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction to declare it as such. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the High Court lacks the jurisdiction to declare a statutory provision repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah. The Court held that, under the constitutional framework, specifically Chapter 3-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, such jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Federal Shariat Court. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, emphasizing the separation of judicial and legislative functions and the constitutional mandate regarding the determination of repugnancy to Islamic injunctions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the jurisdiction to declare a provision of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, as repugnant to the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah?
  • Which forum possesses the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan?
  • Is a notification exempting a transaction from pre-emption under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, subject to challenge on the grounds of repugnancy to Islamic injunctions by the High Court?
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• Mian Shafiuddin, Deputy Director And 4 Others vs Surat Khan Marri, Director Regional Information Office, Islamabad And 41 Other1991 SCMR 2216 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-15
  service matterseniorityad hoc appointmentregularizationcivil servantService Tribunalvested rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This service matter appeal arose from a decision by the Federal Service Tribunal, which had granted the respondent seniority in Grade-18 from the date of his initial ad hoc appointment. The Supreme Court examined whether the appeal before the Tribunal was time-barred and whether the Government or the Tribunal possessed the authority to regularize an ad hoc appointment with retrospective effect, particularly when such action would affect the seniority of others. The Court held that the respondent’s initial Grade-18 appointment was a stopgap arrangement and that the competent authority’s decision regarding the date of regularization was not unjust. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's order, ruling that the Tribunal erred in granting a regularization date that adversely affected the vested seniority rights of other civil servants. The Court reaffirmed that, under Section 8(4) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, seniority in a post takes effect from the date of regular appointment, and the Tribunal cannot exercise powers to override this principle to the detriment of third-party rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government have the power to regularize an ad hoc appointment with retrospective effect from the date of original induction?
  • Can the Service Tribunal exercise the power to regularize an ad hoc appointment with retrospective effect if the Government lacks such authority?
  • Does seniority in a post, service, or cadre take effect from the date of regular appointment under the Civil Servants Act, 1973?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Rashid Ahmad vs Syed Azeem Shah And Another1991 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-08-21
  murderacquittal appealmisreading of evidencejudicial confessionocular evidencecriminal appeallife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, who was initially convicted by the trial court for the murder of the deceased under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a correct appreciation of the evidence or if it resulted from a misreading of the record. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had indeed misread material evidence, including the relationship between the eye-witness and the deceased, the proximity of the recovery site, and the circumstances surrounding the judicial confession. The Court held that the prosecution had established the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt through consistent ocular evidence, recovery of the weapon, and a voluntary confession. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and sentenced the respondent to life imprisonment, noting that Presidential amnesty precluded the original death sentence. The judgment reaffirms that appellate courts may interfere with acquittals where the lower court has disregarded or misread material evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal if the High Court misread material evidence?
  • Does a delay of five days in recording a judicial confession necessarily imply coercion or inducement?
  • Is the absence of blood at the scene of a stabbing incident sufficient to discredit ocular testimony?
  • Can a conviction be sustained based on a judicial confession and recovery of a weapon despite the High Court's finding of doubt?
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• Mian Muhammad Saeed vs Muhammad Mansoor Ali Khan And Other1991 SCMR 1209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-17
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantdefault in payment of rentownership of propertyconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the orders of ejectment passed against the petitioner-tenant for default in payment of rent. The core legal question was whether ownership of the rented property by the landlord is a prerequisite for seeking ejectment, specifically when the land vests in the Provincial Government. The Supreme Court held that ownership is not a prerequisite for seeking ejectment, as section 2(c) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 permits a person who is entitled to receive rent to file such a petition. The key principle laid down is that once the relationship of landlord and tenant is established through the consistent payment of rent, the landlord is entitled to seek ejectment for default regardless of absolute ownership of the underlying land.

  Questions settled

  • Is ownership of the rented property a prerequisite for seeking the ejectment of a tenant under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a person entitled to receive rent maintain an ejectment application against a tenant without being the owner of the land?
  • Does the payment of rent by a tenant to a respondent establish the relationship of landlord and tenant for the purposes of ejectment?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad And 3 Others vs Falak Sher And 4 Other1991 SCMR 1691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-13
  pre-emptionlimitationtime-barred appealprecedentright of remedy
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants filed a direct appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside a pre-emption decree previously granted in their favour and dismissed their suit. The appeal before the Supreme Court was time-barred by 32 days. Furthermore, the appellants' counsel conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Suo Motu Shariat Review Petition No.1-R of 1989 (PLD 1990 SC 865), Mst. Aziz Begum v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 899), and Muhammad Yasin v. Khan Muhammad (PLD 1990 SC 1060), he had no substantive arguments to advance against the High Court's decision. The appellants sought clarification regarding their ability to pursue remedies under the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1991. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of limitation and the binding effect of the aforementioned precedents. However, the Court explicitly observed that the dismissal of the appeal did not preclude the appellants from seeking any other legal remedy that might be available to them under the law, specifically referencing potential relief under the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1991.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a pre-emption suit based on subsequent Supreme Court rulings preclude a party from seeking alternative remedies under the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1991?
  • Can an appeal be dismissed solely on the grounds of being time-barred when the appellant also concedes the lack of substantive arguments?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Muhammad And 10 Others vs Additional Commissioner1991 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-14
  fraudlimitation actcondonation of delaywrit jurisdictionevacuee landbona fide purchasersettlement commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a land settlement dispute where the appellants, claiming to be bona fide purchasers, challenged the restoration of land to the original allottee, Sardar Ali. The land had been cancelled from the respondent's name through a fraudulent process, leading to its subsequent allotment to the appellants' predecessor. The core legal question was whether the delay in the respondent's appeal could be condoned under the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the High Court should protect the appellants' interests despite the underlying fraud. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that courts will not exercise discretion to preserve benefits obtained through fraud, regardless of whether the appellants were personally involved in the fraudulent act. The Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner possessed the authority to condone delay, and the High Court correctly declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction to perpetuate a fraudulent transaction. The key principle laid down is that no court should permit a party to obtain or retain benefits derived from a fraud committed against an innocent person, as equitable relief is unavailable to beneficiaries of such acts.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court exercise writ jurisdiction to protect benefits derived from a fraudulent act?
  • Does the commission of fraud justify the condonation of delay in filing an appeal under the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is a Settlement Commissioner empowered to condone delay in filing an appeal even if the applicability of specific statutory provisions is contested?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Akbar Hussain vs Mst. Aishabai and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-21
  limitation periodexecution of decreeoriginal civil jurisdictionDistrict Court jurisdictionHigh Court of SindhLimitation Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside a Single Judge's order dismissing an execution application as time-barred. The core legal question concerned the correct interpretation of Article 183 of the Limitation Act regarding the execution of decrees passed by the High Court of Sindh in its civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, relying on its Full Bench decision in Province of Sindh v. Haji Abdul Razzaq, held that the High Court of Sindh, when entertaining civil suits, exercises 'District Court jurisdiction' rather than 'ordinary original civil jurisdiction.' Consequently, Article 183, which applies to the latter, is inapplicable to such decrees. The Court determined that either Article 181 or 182 of the Limitation Act governs these cases, both prescribing a three-year limitation period. Since the execution application was filed beyond this period, the Court allowed the appeal, restored the Single Judge's order, and dismissed the execution application. The key principle established is that the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Sindh determines the applicable limitation period for executing its decrees.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court of Sindh exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction when entertaining civil suits?
  • Is Article 183 of the Limitation Act applicable to the execution of decrees passed by the High Court of Sindh in civil suits?
  • What is the applicable limitation period for the execution of a decree passed by the High Court of Sindh in its District Court jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Abdul Malik vs Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddioui And 4 Other1991 SCMR 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  review petitionjurisdictionService Tribunalcivil court jurisdictioneligibility for promotionfitness for promotionterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a matter regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts versus Service Tribunals in civil service promotion disputes. The core legal issue was whether a civil court possesses jurisdiction to determine a civil servant's eligibility for promotion, or if such matters fall exclusively within the ambit of the Service Tribunal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that while questions of fitness or suitability for promotion involve subjective evaluation reserved for the competent authority, the determination of eligibility and qualification relates directly to the terms and conditions of service. Consequently, Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act does not bar the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal over eligibility disputes, thereby barring civil courts from entertaining such suits. The Court laid down the principle that civil courts lack jurisdiction over matters relating to the terms and conditions of service, including eligibility for promotion, as jurisdiction rests with the Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the eligibility of a civil servant for promotion under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act?
  • Is a civil court barred from exercising jurisdiction in matters concerning a civil servant's eligibility for promotion?
  • What is the distinction between fitness for promotion and eligibility for promotion regarding the jurisdiction of Courts and Service Tribunals?
  Read full judgment →
• Metalex Corporation Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax1991 PTD 1018 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26
  sales taxlicensed manufacturerraw materialsretrospective applicationcharging sectiontax exemptionpartly manufactured goods
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment regarding the levy of sales tax on raw materials used by a licensed manufacturer. The core legal question was whether raw materials, imported tax-free under a manufacturer's license, became liable to sales tax upon the subsequent exemption of the finished product, and whether the insertion of clause (e) to section 3(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, by the Finance Act, 1967, could be applied retrospectively to justify such a levy. The Supreme Court held that the tax could not be levied. It determined that the charging provision, section 3(1)(e), was not retrospective and could not apply to the period in question. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the taxable event for the raw materials had already passed, and once the end-product was exempted, there was no legal basis to revive tax liability on the raw materials in the absence of express statutory language. The Court affirmed that taxation statutes must be interpreted strictly, and liability cannot be imposed retrospectively or by implication where the specific charging event has passed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a charging provision in a tax statute be applied retrospectively in the absence of express legislative intent?
  • Does the exemption of a finished product from sales tax retroactively revive the tax liability of raw materials previously imported tax-free?
  • Is the stage of taxability for raw materials imported by a licensed manufacturer considered passed once the materials are assimilated into the production process?
  Read full judgment →
• Metalex Corporation Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax1991 SCMR 2475 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-26
  sales taxlicensed manufacturerraw materialstax exemptionretrospective operationcharging sectionpartly manufactured goods
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a licensed manufacturer of electric fans, challenged the assessment of sales tax on raw materials used in the production of fans. These raw materials were initially purchased without sales tax under a valid manufacturing license. Subsequently, the finished electric fans were exempted from sales tax. The tax authorities sought to levy tax on the raw materials held in stock, in process, or already used, relying on clause (e) of section 3(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, introduced by the Finance Ordinance, 1967. The core legal question was whether the exemption of the end product revived the taxability of raw materials previously exempted at the time of purchase and whether the new charging provision applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that the raw materials were not taxable. The Court ruled that the stage for taxability had passed at the time of import or purchase, and the subsequent exemption of the end product did not revive tax liability. Furthermore, the Court determined that the amendment introducing clause (e) was not retrospective. The principle established is that tax liability must be clear and express, and cannot be implied or revived once the taxable event has passed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the exemption of a finished product from sales tax revive the tax liability on raw materials previously purchased tax-free by a licensed manufacturer?
  • Is clause (e) of section 3(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, as inserted by the Finance Ordinance, 1967, retrospective in its application?
  • Can sales tax be levied on raw materials after the taxable event or stage for such levy has already passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Sub: Major1991 SCMR 4 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-20
  leave to appealconstitutional jurisdictionjurisdictional objectionpayment of wagesexhaustion of remediesstatutory authority
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its constitutional petition. The respondent, a retired Subedar Major, had successfully claimed unpaid wages before the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act 1936. The Authority awarded the respondent the claimed wages plus a penalty. The petitioner challenged this order in the High Court, arguing lack of jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the petitioner failed to raise the jurisdictional objection before the Authority and failed to exhaust the statutory remedy of appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the jurisdictional objection was indeed raised before the Authority at the time of framing issues, and that constitutional jurisdiction is appropriate when a question of jurisdiction is involved, bypassing the cumbersome appellate process. The Supreme Court found that the record supported the petitioner's claim that the jurisdictional objection was raised and decided by the Authority. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the Authority's order pending final disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge an order on the basis of jurisdiction without first exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal?
  • Does the failure to raise a jurisdictional objection in a written statement preclude a party from raising it during the framing of issues before the Authority?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Saco Furniture (Regd.) vs Messrs Modern Food Industries Ltd.1991 SCMR 405 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  temporary injunctionleave to appealcivil procedureexpeditious disposalconsent order
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court regarding the grant of a temporary injunction in a commercial dispute between Messrs Saco Furniture (Regd.) and Messrs Modern Food Industries Ltd. The core question before the Supreme Court related to the propriety of the interim injunction and the expeditious resolution of the underlying suit. Upon hearing the parties, the Supreme Court noted that both contesting parties prayed for a direction to the trial court to decide the main suit within six months. Consequently, in view of the agreement reached between the parties, the Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and directed the trial court to dispose of the pending suit within the stipulated period of six months, thereby disposing of the appeal accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court can convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal by consent of the parties?
  • Can the trial court be directed to conclude proceedings within a specific timeframe upon disposal of an injunction matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs R.H. Ghani vs Assistant Collector of Customs And Other1991 SCMR 90 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-09
  customs dutyFinance BillProvisional Collection of Taxesstatutory interpretationtax impositiontax reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged a demand by the Customs authorities for the recovery of short-levied customs duty on imported moulding compound. The core legal question was whether a declaration issued under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, which grants immediate effect to provisions of a Finance Bill, applies to a reduction in customs duty. The petitioners argued that the reduced rate of duty should have been applied immediately upon the presentation of the Finance Bill. The Supreme Court held that the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, specifically authorizes the immediate enforcement of provisions relating to the imposition or increase of duties, not their reduction. Since the Finance Bill proposed a decrease in the duty rate rather than an imposition or increase, the declaration could not be invoked to give immediate effect to the reduction. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the statutory mechanism for immediate effect is restricted to the imposition or increase of taxes and duties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a declaration under the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, apply to the reduction of customs duties?
  • Can the provisions of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, be invoked to give immediate effect to a decrease in tax rates?
  • Is the immediate effect provision of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, limited to the imposition or increase of duties?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Qaiser Brother (Pvt.) Limited vs Government of Pakistan and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 884 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-15
  regulatory dutycustoms dutyvested rightsimport licenceletter of creditpromissory estoppelbill of entry
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh which dismissed a constitution petition challenging the levy of a regulatory duty on imported Caustic Soda. The core legal question was whether the petitioners acquired a vested right to pay customs and regulatory duties based on the rates obtaining at the time of establishing a letter of credit or obtaining an import licence, thereby barring the subsequent imposition of a regulatory duty. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the issuance of an import licence does not constitute an express representation or promise that new duties would not be levied or existing rates increased, thus distinguishing cases governed by promissory estoppel. The Court laid down the principle that the levy of a new customs duty or an increase in its rate is a normal incident of business transactions, and under section 30 of the Customs Act, 1969, the rate applicable is determined by the date of the Bill of Entry for home consumption, while any additional burden can be adjusted under section 64-A of the Sales of Goods Act, 1930.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of an import licence create a vested right precluding the subsequent levy of a regulatory duty or increase in customs duty?
  • Is the levy of a regulatory duty under section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, subject to the date of the establishment of a letter of credit?
  • Whether the imposition of a new customs duty or increase in its rate can be treated as a violation of an importer's vested rights in the absence of an express government representation?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Punjab Engineering Company, Faisalabad vs Muhammad Yaq00b1991 PLD Supreme Court 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-21
  trade mark registrationlikelihood of confusiondeceptionagricultural implementstrade mark oppositioncounsel authorityintellectual property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the registration of a trade mark comprising the words 'Kung Fu' for agricultural implements, which the appellant opposed, citing its own registered mark 'King'. The core legal question was whether the respondent's mark was likely to cause deception or confusion under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the necessity of applying tests regarding visual and phonetic similarity, the nature of the goods, and the sophistication of the target consumer base, found that the potential for confusion could be eliminated through modifications. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal after the respondent agreed to change the trade mark to 'Kung Fu Toka' and incorporate a significantly enlarged visual representation of a Kung Fu expert. The Court held that these modifications sufficiently addressed the appellant's apprehensions. Additionally, the Court laid down the principle that counsel have the authority to act in the best interests of their clients during proceedings and criticized the tendency of litigants to exert undue pressure on their legal representatives.

  Questions settled

  • What factors must be considered to determine if two trade marks are likely to cause confusion or deception?
  • Can a court order the modification of a trade mark to resolve an opposition dispute?
  • Does a client have the authority to control the conduct of their counsel during court proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Warranted Warehouse Ltd. vs Messrs Sindh Industrial1991 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-25
  easement of necessityright of wayindustrial plot allotmentalternative accessleasehold rightscivil revisionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Sindh High Court dismissing a civil revision against the concurrent dismissal of the appellant's suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The appellant, lessee of three industrial plots used as warehouses from Sindh Industrial Trading Estates Limited (SITE), claimed a right of way as an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act over an L-shaped disputed area between the plots, which SITE had allotted to another party. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed land was a public road, and whether the appellant established an easement of necessity. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact established that the disputed area was an independent industrial plot rather than a public road, and that the appellant had alternative access to its plots from a 66-foot wide metalled road. The Court affirmed that an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act requires proof of absolute necessity rather than mere convenience or ordinary necessity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an easement of necessity under section 13(a) of the Easements Act 1882 requires proof of absolute necessity or mere reasonable enjoyment?
  • Can a lessee claim a right of way over adjacent land of the transferor as an easement of necessity when alternative access to the property exists?
  • Whether unallotted land within an industrial estate constitutes a public road or an independent plot available for industrial allotment?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Mumtaz Industries through Haji Karim Bakhsh and 2 others vs Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 729 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-21
  leave to appealwrit jurisdictioncontractual liabilityObjectives Resolutionrecovery of loandiscretionary reliefpenal interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of an Intra Court Appeal by the High Court, wherein the petitioner, a borrower, sought to restrain the respondent creditor from recovering outstanding loan amounts. The petitioner primarily argued that, pursuant to Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, which incorporates the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitution, the recovery of interest was impermissible. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner had utilized the loan since 1974 and failed to discharge the liability by 1987. While acknowledging the petitioner's contention regarding the scope of Article 2-A, the Court noted this issue was pending in other matters and did not necessitate leave in this specific case. The Court held that mere inability to discharge a contractual liability does not justify interference under discretionary writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that public institutions require loan recoveries to function. Ultimately, the Court refused leave to appeal, advising the petitioner to seek administrative resolution or government assistance regarding the hardship of penal interest rather than invoking constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inability to discharge a contractual liability constitute sufficient grounds for interference under the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court?
  • Can a borrower invoke Article 2-A of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to prevent the recovery of interest on a loan contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Latif Carpet Industries vs Central Board of Revenue (Judicial), Islamabad And Another1991 SCMR 1819 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  export rebatecustoms valuationleave to appealadministrative findingdue processconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition regarding a dispute over export performance rebate benefits. The petitioners challenged the Customs Authorities' decision to limit the rebate to approximately Rs. 23 lacs, despite a declared and received export value of nearly Rs. 36 lacs. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners were denied a proper opportunity of hearing and show cause, and whether there was sufficient evidentiary basis for the Customs Authorities' determination. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' claim regarding a lack of hearing was factually unsupported, noting that a final finding was rendered after due opportunity was provided. Furthermore, the Court found that the advice of the Art Silk Valuation Committee, combined with the examination of material and assessment of prevailing market sale values by the Customs Authority, constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding of fact against the petitioners. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that the administrative findings were based on adequate material and procedural fairness.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tentative finding by an administrative authority, followed by a final finding after a hearing, violate the requirement of due process?
  • Is the advice of a specialized valuation committee and market assessment sufficient evidence for customs authorities to determine export value?
  • Can a constitutional petition succeed where the petitioner fails to demonstrate a lack of factual support for administrative findings?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khawaja Auto Cars Limited vs Muhammad Yousuf And Other1991 SCMR 2223 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-16
  statutory tenancyevacuee propertydistinct legal entitylicenseelocus standimandatory injunctionpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a suit for mandatory and prohibitory injunctions filed by the appellant, a private limited company, seeking to restrain the respondent-landlords from obstructing a passage to the suit premises. The appellants claimed to be statutory tenants under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, having occupied the premises since 1956 after their Managing Director, who was the original individual allottee, converted his business into a limited company. The respondents contended that only the individual allottee was the statutory tenant and the company was a mere licensee. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit, holding that the company was a distinct legal entity and had no locus standi. The Supreme Court, by a majority decision, dismissed the appeal, holding that the extended definition of 'possession' under the notification dated 13 October 1959 did not apply to licensees or unauthorized occupants. The Court laid down that a company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders or directors, and an allottee's permission to let a company occupy the premises makes the company a licensee, which does not confer statutory tenancy rights under Section 30 of the Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private limited company acquire statutory tenancy rights under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 merely because its Managing Director was the original individual allottee of the premises?
  • Can the extended definition of 'possession' under the notification dated 13 October 1959 be availed of by a licensee or unauthorized occupant to claim statutory tenancy?
  • Does the mere acceptance of rent cheques by a landlord from a company occupy the premises create a tenancy in favor of that company when the original allotment was in the name of an individual?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Khanzada Muhammad Abdul Haq Khan Khattak & Co. vs WAPDA Through Chairman WAPDA And Another1991 SCMR 1436 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-12
  liquidated damagesbreach of contractpenalty clauseproof of actual lossContract Actpre-estimate of damages
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a contract dispute where the appellant contractor failed to complete the construction of residential buildings within the stipulated timeframe. Consequently, the respondent (WAPDA) deducted Rs. 5,08,000 from the appellant's bills as liquidated damages pursuant to Clause 46 of the contract. The appellant challenged this deduction, arguing that the clause was penal and that the respondent was required to prove actual loss under Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's suit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Section 74 of the Contract Act dispenses with the requirement of proving actual loss or damage when a specific sum is named in the contract as liquidated damages, provided it represents a genuine pre-estimate of loss and is not oppressive or penal. The Court established that where parties agree on a reasonable pre-estimate of damages to avoid future calculation difficulties, the aggrieved party is entitled to recover it upon breach without proving actual loss.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party required to prove actual loss or damage to recover a sum named as liquidated damages under Section 74 of the Contract Act?
  • How does Section 74 of the Contract Act, 1872 distinguish between a penalty and a genuine pre-estimate of liquidated damages?
  • Can a court reduce or refuse to grant the amount stipulated as liquidated damages in a contract if it is found to be oppressive or penal in nature?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs K.S.B. Electrical Industries vs Messrs K.B.S. (Pumps) Company1991 SCMR 1818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-23
  trademark registrationpassing offhonest concurrent uselikelihood of confusionintellectual propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that affirmed the Registrar of Trade Marks' decision to reject the petitioner's application for the registration of the trademark 'KSB'. The respondent-company, the registered owner of the 'KSB' trademark for water pumps and related electrical apparatus, successfully opposed the petitioner's application for the same mark, intended for use on electric fans and desert coolers. The Registrar found that the petitioner's adoption of an identical mark for goods of a similar description was likely to cause confusion and deception among the public and purchasers, amounting to passing off. Furthermore, the Registrar determined that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of honest concurrent use under the relevant statute, characterizing the adoption as mala fide. The High Court upheld these findings, concluding that customers would likely be misled into believing the petitioner's goods were manufactured by the respondent. The Supreme Court, finding no infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact, refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the adoption of an identical trademark for goods of a similar description constitute grounds for rejection of a registration application?
  • Can an applicant claim the benefit of honest concurrent use under the Trade Marks Act 1940 if the adoption of the mark is found to be mala fide?
  • Is the likelihood of confusion among the general public a sufficient basis to deny the registration of a trademark?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Humayun Ltd. vs Pakistan and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-19
  central excise dutyexcisable servicesexemption notificationannual turnoverassessment yearinterpretation of fiscal statutesstrict constructionpenalties
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Sindh High Court regarding the levy of central excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The core legal issue was whether the withdrawal of an excise duty exemption for restaurants—contingent upon achieving an annual turnover exceeding Rs. 4 lacs as determined by the Income Tax Officer under S.R.O. 557(1)/72—takes effect from the relevant assessment year in which the turnover limit was crossed, or only from the subsequent date on which the income tax assessment order was physically passed. Dismissing the appeal with a minor modification regarding penalty, the Supreme Court held that liability to excise duty attaches from the assessment year in which the annual turnover crosses the base limit, rather than the date of the assessment order. The Court re-affirmed that grants of tax exemption in fiscal statutes must be rigidly interpreted against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority to ensure uniform application and prevent arbitrary advantages resulting from delayed administrative assessments.

  Questions settled

  • Does liability for excise duty under an exemption notification take effect from the relevant assessment year or from the date the income tax assessment order is actually passed?
  • How are tax exemption provisions and notifications construed under fiscal statutes?
  • Is a penalty for procedural breach under central excise rules sustainable where there is no wilful evasion of tax duty?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hudaybia Textile Mills Limited And 8 Others vs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited And 7 Other1991 SCMR 1756 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-21
  Review petitionSpecial CourtExecution of decreeBanking Companies (Recovery of Loans) OrdinanceAuction confirmationInterim injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two review petitions arising from a previous judgment regarding the execution powers of a Special Court constituted under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioners challenged the previous finding that the procedure for executing a decree in the Special Court was governed strictly by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, arguing that this ignored the specific powers of confirmation of auction vested in the Special Court under Section 8(3) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court found that a valid case for review was established, noting that the previous judgment may have failed to give due effect to the express reservations and powers of confirmation retained by the Special Court in its earlier orders. Consequently, the Court admitted the review petitions for hearing, directed that notices be issued to the respondents, and ordered the matters to be placed before a larger bench. Additionally, the Court imposed an interim injunction restraining the parties from transferring or encumbering the property in dispute pending the final outcome of the review proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 possess powers of auction confirmation distinct from the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a review petition be entertained where the previous judgment allegedly failed to give effect to statutory powers of the court?
  • Is a party who was not an appellant in the original proceedings entitled to file a review petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Friend Engineering Corporation, the Mall, Lahore vs Government of Punjab And 4 Other1991 SCMR 2324 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-31
  rendition of accountspreliminary decreefinal decreelimitationjurisdictionwaivervoid ordercontractual relationship
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a suit for rendition of accounts filed by the appellant contractor against the Government of Punjab. The trial court had passed an ex parte preliminary decree, followed by a final decree based on a Local Commissioner's report. The High Court, in an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, set aside both decrees and remanded the matter, holding that a suit for rendition of accounts was not maintainable as the relationship was contractual. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether a party who failed to appeal a preliminary decree could challenge its validity in an appeal against the final decree. The Court held that under Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree who does not appeal from it is precluded from disputing its correctness in an appeal against the final decree. The Court further ruled that an incorrect decision on the form of a suit does not render the decree void or without jurisdiction, and restored the trial court's decrees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who fails to appeal against a preliminary decree challenge its validity or correctness in an appeal preferred against the final decree?
  • Does an error in determining the maintainability of a suit for rendition of accounts render the resulting preliminary decree void and without jurisdiction?
  • Can a party waive an objection regarding the form of a suit where no question of public policy is involved?
  • Is a suit for rendition of accounts maintainable between parties whose relationship is purely contractual and where the plaintiff has knowledge of the work performed?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bata Shoe Company And 2 Others vs Muhammad Arshad Siddiou11991 SCMR 1775 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-14
  ejectmenttenantdefault in rentleave to appealrent controllerconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were tenants facing ejectment, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing their first appeal under the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act. The respondents had purchased the property in 1981, and subsequently sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, personal need, and damage to the property. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, and the High Court maintained the order. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had committed default in the payment of rent and whether sufficient ground existed to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower forums. The Supreme Court examined the record and found no evidence supporting the petitioners' claim that rent had been tendered and refused. Furthermore, the court held that having voluntarily closed their evidence, the petitioners could not claim a right to reopen the case for producing further witnesses. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding default cannot be interfered with without substantiating evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant claim absence of default when there is no documentary or oral evidence on record showing that rent was tendered and refused?
  • Whether a party who has voluntarily closed its evidence is entitled to reopen the case for producing additional witnesses as a matter of right?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and the High Court regarding default in rent payment without substantiating proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asad Brothers vs Ibadat Yar Khan1991 SCMR 986 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-06
  rent evictiontentative rent orderstriking off defencejurisdiction of Rent Controllerdefinition of rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinanceappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an eviction order against tenants for alleged default in paying water charges and Betterment Tax, which the landlord claimed as rent. The Rent Controller, acting under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, ordered the deposit of these charges and subsequently struck off the tenants' defense for non-compliance. The core legal question was whether a tenant can challenge the validity of a tentative rent order in an appeal against the final eviction order, and whether the Rent Controller must determine if disputed charges constitute "rent" before ordering their deposit. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by refusing to examine the legality of the Rent Controller's tentative order. The Court ruled that a tenant is entitled to challenge the validity of a tentative rent order during an appeal against the final eviction order. The key principle laid down is that a tribunal of limited jurisdiction must perform a summary inquiry to determine if disputed amounts qualify as "rent" under the statute before exercising its power to penalize a tenant for non-compliance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge the validity of a tentative rent order passed under Section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 in an appeal against the final eviction order?
  • Must a Rent Controller determine whether disputed charges constitute 'rent' as defined by the Ordinance before ordering their deposit under Section 16(1)?
  • Does the Rent Controller have the authority to order the deposit of future monthly dues even if the landlord's application only explicitly prayed for the deposit of arrears?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Asad Brothers vs Ibadat Yar Khan1991 PLD Supreme Court 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-17
  evictionnuisancelease agreementunauthorized alterationrent restrictioncommercial premisesimpairment of property value
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an eviction order against the appellants (tenants) from two shops used as a snack bar. The landlord sought eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, alleging that the tenants had unauthorizedly altered the premises by cutting a hole in the wall to install a large exhaust fan, which caused vibrations, noise, and obnoxious fumes, thereby constituting a nuisance to residential tenants in the building and impairing the property's value. The core legal questions were whether the tenants had obtained the requisite permission for the structural alterations and whether their business activities amounted to a nuisance under the Ordinance. The Court held that the tenants failed to prove they obtained the necessary written consent for the alterations and that their conduct, specifically the creation of a nuisance, justified eviction. The Court affirmed that even in commercial areas, tenants are bound by contractual and statutory obligations to avoid causing nuisance to other occupants, and that the landlord's evidence of material impairment to the property's value and utility was sufficient to warrant eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the installation of an exhaust fan without written consent constitute a violation of a lease agreement prohibiting structural alterations?
  • Can a tenant be evicted from commercial premises for causing a nuisance to residential occupants in the same building?
  • Does the failure to obtain written consent for structural changes, despite alleged verbal permission, justify an order of eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Is a landlord required to prove material impairment of property value to succeed in an eviction claim based on nuisance?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Ark Industrial Management Ltd. vs Messrs Habib Bank Limited1991 PLD Supreme Court 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  summary suitleave to defendpromissory notesconditional leaveOrder XXXVII C.P.C.commercial litigationtriable issuejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court order granting conditional leave to defend a summary suit filed under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. The appellants argued that their defense, involving allegations of duress and lack of consideration for promissory notes, raised triable issues entitling them to unconditional leave. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court’s discretion to impose conditions, such as furnishing security, was exercised correctly. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. It clarified that, unlike the Indian Civil Procedure Code, the Pakistani provision does not mandate unconditional leave merely upon the disclosure of a triable issue. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the summary procedure is the expeditious disposal of commercial litigation. Consequently, where a defendant’s plea appears aimed at prolonging proceedings or lacks sufficient substantiation at the leave stage, the court may validly impose conditions. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the trial court’s discretion remains unfettered and is not restricted to granting unconditional leave solely because a triable issue is raised.

  Questions settled

  • Does the existence of a triable issue in a summary suit under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. automatically entitle a defendant to unconditional leave to defend?
  • Is the trial court's discretion to impose conditions for leave to defend under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. unfettered?
  • Can a court impose conditions for leave to defend if the defendant's plea appears designed to prolong litigation?
  • Are Indian judicial precedents regarding unconditional leave to defend applicable to the Pakistani Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C.P.C.?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Amir Weaving Factory And Others vs Messrs United Bank Ltd:1991 SCMR 1737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-29
  ex parte decreebanking loan recoverypost-decretal interestsufficient causemandatory interestbanking law
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute between a banking institution and borrowers regarding the recovery of a loan and the imposition of post-decretal interest. The appellants, having initially confessed judgment in a Special Court (Banking), were granted payment in installments without interest. The respondent-Bank appealed this decision to the Lahore High Court, which subsequently granted an ex parte decree awarding interest. The appellants unsuccessfully sought to set aside the ex parte decree via a miscellaneous petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the application to set aside the ex parte decree and whether the mandatory provisions of banking law required the imposition of interest. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish sufficient grounds for rehearing the ex parte appeal. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that Section 8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, imposes a mandatory requirement to grant interest to a decree-holder, rendering the rehearing of the matter futile.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 8(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance 1979 mandate the grant of interest to a decree-holder?
  • Can an ex parte decree be set aside if the applicant fails to show sufficient cause for non-appearance?
  • Is a direct appeal maintainable against an order dismissing a miscellaneous petition filed under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited vs Super Electric Industries1991 SCMR 2319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-31
  recovery of loansexecution of decreestay of executionappellate powersbanking companiestemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a suit filed by the appellant-Bank against the respondent for recovery of money under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, which was decreed by the Lahore High Court. The respondent filed an appeal under Section 12 of the Ordinance and obtained an order suspending the execution of the decree. The appellant subsequently sought vacation of the stay order, contending that under Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the stay ceased to have effect after six months. The High Court rejected the application, holding that the stay was governed by Order XLI, Rule 5 rather than Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the power of an appellate court to suspend the execution of a decree is an ancillary and incidental power tied to its jurisdiction to hear appeals, and is not governed by the six-month limitation imposed by Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A. The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed the appeal, upholding the continuation of the stay under the court's ancillary powers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order suspending the execution of a decree passed by an appellate court is governed by Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A or Order XLI, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the six-month time limit imposed on certain injunctions under Order XXXIX, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to stay orders issued during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Is the power to suspend the execution of a decree an ancillary and incidental power attached to the appellate jurisdiction under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Aftab Soap Factory Ltd. vs Mujahid Soap Factory, Rawalpindi1991 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-11-13
  trade mark registrationdeceptive similaritymisrepresentationfraud on the courtunwary customerappellate proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute regarding the registration of a trade mark for washing soap, where the appellant challenged the respondents' application on the grounds of deceptive similarity under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. The appellant contended that the respondents' use of a 'Billi' (cat) device was deceptively similar to their own registered 'Milan Soap' mark, potentially misleading unwary customers. During the appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court examined the original wrappers and materials submitted by the parties. The Court discovered that the appellants had misrepresented the respondents' actual trade mark and packaging in their submissions to the Court, presenting materials that differed drastically from the original records. Upon comparing the actual wrappers, the Court found the differences so obvious that no customer could be misled. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's case was undermined by their own misrepresentation and fraudulent conduct during the proceedings. The Court granted both parties liberty to pursue legal action against each other for any fraud or misrepresentation committed during the litigation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the presentation of misrepresented evidence by a party during appellate proceedings warrant the dismissal of their appeal?
  • Can a party be held liable for misrepresentation or fraud committed during the course of court proceedings?
  • Is the visual similarity of a trade mark device sufficient to prove deceptive similarity when the actual packaging differs significantly?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs A.D. Surgico (Pvt.) Ltd. vs Chairman Central Board of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad And 2 Other1991 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-02-27
  leave to appealimport licencecustoms penaltyexpert evidencefinding of factconstitution petitionold and used machinery
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Constitution Petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the imposition of penalties on the petitioner for importing old and used machinery contrary to the import licence under the guise of new equipment. The core legal question concerned whether reliance could be placed on the expert opinion of engineering professors who inspected the machinery. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the administrative tribunals and the High Court—supported by expert evidence and opportunity for cross-examination—were well-founded and involved no substantial point of law of public importance. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that factual determinations based on properly tested expert evidence by administrative authorities will not be interfered with absent legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether expert evidence examined in the absence of a party is vitiated if the expert is subsequently made available for and subjected to extensive cross-examination?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by administrative tribunals and the High Court based on material evidence?
  • Whether the importation of old and used machinery under an import licence restricted to new goods attracts penal consequences under the Customs Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehrzad Khan vs The State1991 PLD Supreme Court 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-02
  Court-witnessmaterial witnessdiscretionary powermandatory dutygiven up witnesscriminal trialjust decision
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the dismissal of the appellant's application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to summon two eye-witnesses as Court-witnesses, who had been given up by the prosecution on the ground of being won over. The trial court and the High Court had dismissed the application on the basis that the court's power under Section 540 was discretionary. The Supreme Court analyzed the statutory language and established that Section 540 Cr.P.C. consists of two distinct parts: the first part, using the word 'may', is discretionary, while the second part, employing the word 'shall', is mandatory. The Court held that if the evidence of a witness appears essential to the just decision of the case, the trial court has no discretion and is legally bound to summon them. Finding that both lower courts failed to determine whether the testimony of the given-up eye-witnesses was essential for a just decision, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the matter to the trial court for a fresh determination on this specific question.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains both a discretionary and a mandatory part?
  • Is a trial court obligated to summon a witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if their evidence is essential to the just decision of the case?
  • What criteria must a trial court use to determine whether a given-up prosecution witness should be summoned as a Court-witness under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  Read full judgment →
• Meher Muhammad And Others vs Ahmed Khan And Other1991 SCMR 72 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-03
  settlement of landdisplaced personssurrendered landsitting tenantscompensation poolMartial Law Regulationwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the allotment of surrendered agricultural land previously held by a displaced person. The core legal question was whether land surrendered by a displaced person under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 reverted to the compensation pool or vested in the Provincial Government, and consequently, whether sitting tenants held a superior right to such land. The High Court had determined that the surrendered land vested in the Provincial Government and that, under the relevant settlement scheme, sitting tenants were entitled to priority in allotment. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings and concluded that the lower court's exercise of writ jurisdiction and its interpretation of the law were legally sound and free from error. The Supreme Court upheld the decision, affirming that the entitlement of sitting tenants must be prioritized. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the land must be offered to the sitting tenants first, with any remaining land thereafter available for the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does land surrendered by a displaced person under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 vest in the Provincial Government or revert to the compensation pool?
  • Are sitting tenants entitled to priority in the allotment of land surrendered by displaced persons under the relevant settlement scheme?
  • Can a High Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, remit a matter to the Deputy Commissioner to determine the entitlement of sitting tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Hussain Shah vs Syed Muhammad Iqbal Gilani And Other1991 SCMR 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  ejectment proceedingsdeclaratory suitthird-party objectorstay of executionleave to appealpossessionlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a High Court judgment concerning the interplay between ejectment proceedings and a separate declaratory suit filed by a third-party objector. The core legal question is whether a third party, who was not a party to the ejectment proceedings, can be legally compelled to surrender possession of the disputed property as a condition precedent to contesting a declaratory suit regarding title. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the High Court’s direction requiring the petitioner to deliver possession before the suit could proceed was unwarranted and unjustified. The Court established the principle that a person not party to ejectment proceedings is not bound by the Rent Controller's order, and imposing a condition of surrendering possession to contest a title suit is legally unsustainable. Consequently, the Court vacated the High Court's order that had set aside the stay of execution, allowing the petitioner's suit to proceed on its merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a third party who is not a party to ejectment proceedings be compelled to surrender possession as a condition to contest a declaratory suit?
  • Is a person who is not a party to ejectment proceedings bound by the order of a Rent Controller?
  • Can a High Court impose a condition of delivering possession on a plaintiff before allowing their declaratory suit to proceed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehboob Ali Sani vs Additional District Judge And Other1991 SCMR 1880 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  election disputetampering of ballot papersElection Tribunalreappraisal of evidencefinding of factleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding an election dispute for membership of the Municipal Committee, Toba Tek Singh, Ward No.16, held in November 1987. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court or the Supreme Court can reappraise factual findings of an Election Tribunal regarding the tampering of ballot papers. The Supreme Court held that the finding of tampering with ballot papers is a finding of fact and that the High Court rightly declined to reappraise the evidence recorded by the Election Tribunal. The key principle laid down is that superior courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by a competent tribunal based on an inquiry into election matters such as the tampering of ballot papers.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court reappraise evidence recorded by the Election Tribunal in an election dispute?
  • Is a finding regarding the tampering of ballot papers considered a finding of fact?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings of an Election Tribunal and the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mechanised Construction of Pakistan Ltd. Through Usman Shah Afridi1991 SCMR 1747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  deputation allowancecivil servant statusjurisdiction of AuthorityPayment of Wages ActWAPDA employeesterms and conditions of service
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondents, former WAPDA employees transferred on deputation to the petitioner company, filed an application before the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation and Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, seeking deputation allowance. The Authority asserted jurisdiction, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging this jurisdiction. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the respondents are civil servants based on the precedent in WAPDA v. Saeed Ahmed Butt (1987 SCMR 298). Consequently, the petitioner argued that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate matters concerning terms and conditions of service, including deputation allowance. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the respondents qualify as civil servants and whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, possesses the jurisdiction to grant the relief of deputation allowance to such employees. The Court directed the petitioner to deposit the claimed amount, which is to be invested pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Are employees transferred on deputation from WAPDA to a company considered civil servants?
  • Does the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act 1936 have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for deputation allowance by employees who are civil servants?
  Read full judgment →
• Mazharul Islam and another vs Mst. Mafia1991 PLD Supreme Court 835 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-03
  rent defaultejectment proceedingstransfer of propertyarrears of rentactionable claimlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment maintaining ejectment orders against tenants based on alleged rent default. The core legal question was whether a new property owner is entitled to seek ejectment for rent defaults occurring prior to the property's purchase, absent an express assignment of such arrears in the sale deed. The Supreme Court held that the right to recover rent arrears is an actionable claim that does not automatically pass with the property transfer. Consequently, a transferee cannot maintain ejectment proceedings for default regarding the period preceding the transfer. The Court established that without an express covenant in the sale deed assigning the right to recover pre-transfer arrears, such arrears are not legally due to the new owner, and their non-payment does not constitute a default under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. As the High Court failed to adequately address whether a default occurred specifically after the purchase, the case was remanded for re-hearing on that limited issue.

  Questions settled

  • Can a transferee of property maintain ejectment proceedings for rent default occurring prior to the transfer of ownership?
  • Is the right to recover arrears of rent an actionable claim that requires express assignment in a sale deed?
  • Does the non-payment of rent for a period prior to the transfer of property constitute default under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Maulana Riazul Hassan vs Muhammad Ayub Khan And Another1991 SCMR 2513 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-09-09
  revisional jurisdictionevacuee propertyusufructuary mortgagealienation of landsettlement departmentbona fide purchasercustodian of evacuee property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a civil suit concerning the possession of land purchased by the plaintiff at a public auction conducted by the Settlement Department. The trial court and the first appellate court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. However, the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, reversed this decision, holding that the original sales to non-Muslims were prohibited under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900, and thus the property could not be treated as evacuee property after 1957. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could introduce new grounds in revision and the legal effect of the prohibited alienations. The Supreme Court held that under Section 14 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900, such unauthorized alienations take effect as usufructuary mortgages. Consequently, the property vested in the Custodian under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance 1949. The Court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to possession as a mortgagee unless legal sanction is obtained or further proceedings occur, setting aside the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in revisional jurisdiction introduce new grounds not raised by the parties?
  • What is the legal effect of a permanent alienation made without the required sanction under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900?
  • Does property subject to an unauthorized alienation vest in the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
  • Does the limitation period for redeeming property run against the Custodian of Evacuee Property?
  Read full judgment →
• Maula Bakhsh and others vs The Custodian of Evacuee Property and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-18
  evacuee propertyadverse possessionBasiga MalguzariPunjab Land Revenue Actpermissive possessioncustodian of evacuee propertyland ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a Lahore High Court judgment concerning the status of land measuring 1,741 kanals, previously held by the appellants' predecessors, which was declared non-evacuee property by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The core legal question was whether the possession of land transferred under "Basiga Malguzari" pursuant to Section 71 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, could ripen into adverse possession against the original owners, thereby extinguishing their title. The Supreme Court held that possession acquired under Section 71 is permissive and subservient to the real owner's title. The Court ruled that the Collector’s failure to restore possession after the statutory term does not prejudice the true owner's rights or convert the transferee's possession into a hostile one. Consequently, the High Court’s finding of adverse possession was set aside, restoring the Custodian’s order. The key principle laid down is that possession commencing under statutory authority is presumed to continue as permissive, and cannot transform into adverse possession without a clear, positive disclaimer of the real owner's title, which was absent in this case.

  Questions settled

  • Can possession of land transferred under Section 71 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, ripen into adverse possession against the original owner?
  • Does the failure of a Collector to restore possession of land after the expiry of the statutory term under Section 71 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, extinguish the title of the true owner?
  • Is possession that commences under statutory authority considered permissive or hostile?
  Read full judgment →
• Mauj Din vs Mst. Bang Through Legal Heirs And Other1991 SC M R1556 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  civil suitdeclarationperpetual injunctionregular second appealsale mutationfraudulent transactionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a civil suit for declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction regarding land located in Tehsil Vehari, which was initially dismissed by the trial court. On appeal, the Additional District Judge accepted the appeal and decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner. Upon a regular second appeal, the Lahore High Court set aside the first appellate court's judgment and restored the trial court's dismissal, concluding upon re-appraisal of the evidence that the sale mutation in favor of the plaintiff was fraudulently and collusively secured and rightly cancelled by the Collector. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question involved the re-appraisal of evidence and the validity of the sale mutation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's conclusion, reached after re-appraising the evidence, was in accordance with law and subject to no exception. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that no case for leave to appeal was made out and dismissed the petition, laying down that concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of evidence regarding fraudulent transactions warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can re-appraise evidence in a regular second appeal to set aside findings of the first appellate court?
  • Does a clandestine and collusively sanctioned sale mutation confer valid ownership rights?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the impugned judgment is based on a proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Matli Town Committee vs Abdul Majeed And Other1991 SCMR 878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30
  octroi taxsaving clauserepeal of statutestatutory interpretationlocal governmentdelegated legislationthings done
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court decision declaring a notification for octroi tax revision invalid following the repeal of the Sindh People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner’s approval of the tax schedule, granted under the 1972 Ordinance, remained valid and enforceable after the enactment of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979, and whether the subsequent publication of the notification was protected by the saving provisions of the new Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the notification was valid. The Court reasoned that Section 120 of the 1979 Ordinance, which contained a broad saving clause for "things done" and "proceedings commenced," preserved actions initiated under the repealed law, provided they were not inconsistent with the new enactment. Since the revision process was substantially matured upon the Commissioner's approval, the subsequent publication was a procedural continuation of a "thing done." Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment, affirming that the saving clause and the Sindh General Clauses Act, 1956, effectively preserved the validity of the tax revision process.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a notification for the revision of an octroi schedule issued under the Sindh People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972, remains valid after the repeal of said Ordinance?
  • Does the saving clause in Section 120 of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979, preserve actions and proceedings commenced under the repealed Sindh People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972?
  • Is the publication of a tax schedule after the repeal of the enabling statute a 'thing done' protected by the saving provisions of the successor legislation?
  Read full judgment →
• Mastak vs Lal and others1991 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-22
  Frontier Crimes RegulationShariat Applicationprocedural lawrevisional jurisdictiontransfer of casesretroactive applicationtribunalQazi court
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that declined to interfere with a Commissioner's order regarding a civil dispute adjudicated under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The core legal question was whether the Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976, which mandated the transfer of pending civil suits and appeals to Qazi courts or Majalis-e-Shura, also encompassed revision petitions pending before the Commissioner. The Supreme Court held that the term 'appeal' in remedial and procedural statutes should be interpreted broadly to include revision petitions, as both serve the same essential purpose of invoking a superior authority to rectify errors of a lower tribunal. Consequently, the Court ruled that the pending revision proceedings were liable to be transferred to the Qazi court for adjudication in accordance with Shariat law. The Court established that procedural statutes altering forums for trial are generally retroactive, and that the legislative intent to shift substantive law to Shariat necessitated the transfer of all pending matters, including revisions, to the newly established competent forums to ensure justice and procedural regularity.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'appeal' in a procedural statute include revision petitions for the purpose of transferring pending cases to a new forum?
  • Are procedural statutes that alter the forum of trial and mode of adjudication generally applicable to pending proceedings?
  • Does the Commissioner under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901, function as a 'Tribunal' for the purposes of transferring pending cases under the Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976?
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• Masood Khan vs Settlement Commissioner And Other1991 SCMR 1304 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-08
  evacuee propertyauction purchaserprovisional transfer orderresumption of propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a dispute over Shop No. 835 in Bahawalpur Town, which was evacuee property purchased by the petitioner through a public auction in 1960. A Provisional Transfer Order was issued in his favour after he deposited his compensation book. Subsequently, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner resumed the shop and transferred it to another party on a negotiation basis, citing non-payment or discrepancies in adjustments, without providing notice to the petitioner. The petitioner's departmental appeals were dismissed on limitation grounds, and his subsequent writ petition before the High Court also failed. The core legal question concerns the legality of the resumption order passed without notice and despite the deposit of the demanded price by the auction purchaser. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the legality and lack of notice in the resumption order require detailed examination, and ordered that status quo regarding possession be maintained during the pendency of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property transferred through a Provisional Transfer Order can be legally resumed without notice to the auction purchaser?
  • Does the deposit of the demanded price by a purchaser invalidate a subsequent order of resumption passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmed Chaudhari, T.G.T., F.G. Boys Middle School, Barakau, District Islamabad vs Director General, Federal Government Educational Institutions, Islamabad And Other1991 SCMR 1851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-12
  leave to appealservice tribunal jurisdictionpromotionselection gradeunsatisfactory service recordadverse remarks
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed his appeal as incompetent. The petitioner, a teacher in Grade-15, was superseded for the selection grade (B-17) while his juniors were promoted. The Government maintained that the petitioner's service record was unsatisfactory and he was not considered suitable. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in holding the appeal incompetent and declining to interfere with the promotion matter involving selection and suitability. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any supplementary statement or challenge before the Tribunal regarding uncommunicated adverse remarks or factual controversies, the matter pertained to selection and suitability, and the Tribunal's jurisdiction did not extend to substituting its own judgment for that of the Departmental Promotion Committee. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, laying down the principle that factual controversies and challenges to service records must be raised before the Tribunal, and the assessment of suitability for promotion by a departmental committee cannot be substituted where no such foundation was laid.

  Questions settled

  • Does the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal extend to matters of selection and suitability for promotion?
  • Can a petitioner raise a new factual controversy regarding adverse ACRs for the first time before the Supreme Court without raising it before the Service Tribunal?
  • Does the judgment of the Departmental Promotion Committee regarding suitability prevail when no supplementary statement is filed to challenge uncommunicated adverse remarks?
  Read full judgment →
• Masood Ahmad Malik vs Mst. Fouzia Farhana Quddus And Other1991 SCMR 681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-12-06
  jurisdictionfamily courtcivil courtjactitation of marriagedivorcetalaqconflict of lawsprivate international lawmuslim family laws ordinancepakistani citizenship
  Summary & questions settled

  This case concerns the jurisdictional competence of Pakistani courts to adjudicate a matrimonial dispute between parties who are Muslim but have acquired American citizenship. The petitioner pronounced Talaq on respondent No.1 in Islamabad, subsequently initiating proceedings for finalization of divorce and later a suit for jactitation of marriage or declaration. The High Court ruled that neither the Civil Court nor the Family Court had jurisdiction, reasoning that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, applied only to Muslim citizens of Pakistan, and the Family Courts Act, 1964, was subject to it. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, holding that the Family Courts Act, 1964, has a wider scope. The Court clarified that the phrase "subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961" in Section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, means that the Ordinance prevails in case of inconsistency, but does not restrict the Family Court's jurisdiction solely to cases where the Ordinance applies. Consequently, the Senior Civil Judge/Judge, Family Court, Islamabad, had jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the parties resided and the cause of action arose within its limits. The suit, however, would be adjudicated by the proper law applicable to the parties, determined by principles of Conflict of Laws, not the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Pakistani Family Court exercise jurisdiction over a suit for jactitation of marriage where the parties are Muslim but not Pakistani citizens?
  • Does the phrase "subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961" in Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, limit the Family Court's jurisdiction exclusively to cases where the Ordinance applies?
  • What law governs a matrimonial dispute between non-Pakistani Muslim citizens when adjudicated by a Pakistani court?
  • Can a Senior Civil Judge, also exercising powers as a Judge Family Court, entertain a suit for jactitation of marriage for parties to whom the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, does not apply?
  Read full judgment →
• Market Committee, Kanganpur Through Administrator vs Rayyat Ali And Other1991 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-10-22
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensationpost-notification salesseverance of propertystatutory average
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a land acquisition matter where the High Court enhanced the compensation for acquired land from Rs.372.60 per kanal to Rs.150 per marla. The Supreme Court examined the legality of the compensation determination under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly determined the market value by relying on post-notification sales and future potential uses resulting from the acquisition itself. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed multiple legal errors, notably by taking into consideration post-acquisition enhancements in land value and subsequent post-notification sales mutations contrary to express statutory prohibitions. The Court laid down that statutory averages of preceding sales cannot be ignored without valid reasons, post-notification transactions are inadmissible, and future profits or value increases from the specific public use of the acquired land must be excluded when determining compensation under Section 23 and Section 24 of the Act. The appeal was accepted and compensation was modified to Rs.50 per marla.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court rely on post-notification sale mutations to determine the market value of land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?
  • Whether an increase in land value resulting from the specific public use to which the acquired land is put can be factored into the initial compensation assessment?
  • Is it permissible to discard a one-year pre-notification average of sales without finding any deficiency or flaw in it?
  • What factors constitute valid plus and minus factors when evaluating the market value and potential of acquired land?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbool Hussain vs The Managing Director, Piac And Another1991 SCMR 1764 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-19
  Service Tribunalpromotionminor penaltycensureservice lawleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an employee of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC), challenged his exclusion from promotion consideration following a penalty of censure imposed in 1980. While posted in Abu Dhabi, the petitioner alleged that junior colleagues were promoted over him. After his departmental appeal against the censure failed, he approached the Service Tribunal, seeking the setting aside of the penalty and a direction to be considered for promotion with effect from August 1982. The Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the technical ground that no appeal lies before it against the imposition of a minor penalty. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the Tribunal failed to address the petitioner's core grievance regarding his entitlement to be considered for promotion during the period he served abroad, irrespective of the minor penalty issue. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the Tribunal erred in failing to adjudicate the promotion claim, emphasizing that the merits of the promotion eligibility required judicial consideration beyond the technical dismissal concerning the minor penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie before the Service Tribunal against the imposition of a minor penalty?
  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an entire appeal on technical grounds without addressing the merits of a promotion claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ullah vs Sabir Zameer Siddiqui And Another1991 SCMR 1127 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-03-20
  review petitionservice senioritydirect recruitillegal promotiondepartmental promotion committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed by Manzoor Ullah seeking a review of a previous judgment, raising grievances regarding the omission of his appearance in the judgment copy and the denial of his seniority against appellant Sabir Zamir Siddiqui. The core legal question concerns the petitioner's entitlement to seniority in both lower and higher grades against a direct recruit and regularized promotees. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the review petition is misconceived on merits, noting that the petitioner's lower grade seniority was already determined by a prior judgment, while in the higher grade, he could not claim seniority over a direct recruit because earlier promotions in the department were held to be in violation of the rules and subject to revision and proper regularization. The key principle laid down is that a promotee whose promotion is found to be in violation of rules and pending regularisation cannot claim seniority over a direct recruit in a higher grade.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is maintainable to claim seniority against a direct recruit when previous promotions have been found to violate applicable rules?
  • Can a government employee claim seniority over a direct recruit in a higher grade pending the regularisation of their promotion?
  • Does a clerical omission in recording a party's presence in a judgment copy warrant a review of the case on merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain vs Talib Hussain And Other1991 SCMR 1894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-21Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Hussain And 9 Others vs Malik Karam Khan And 2 Other1991 SCMR 2451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-26
  correction of decreeSection 152 CPCincorporation by referencedescription of propertyexecution of decreetitle deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court judgment that rejected an application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, seeking the correction of a decree due to discrepancies in the description of suit property. The plaintiffs' claim for possession of land and water rights was founded on a specific written agreement, which was incorporated by reference in the plaint. However, the description of the property in the plaint title differed from the description in the underlying agreement. The core legal question was whether a court can correct a decree under Section 152, C.P.C. to align it with the title deed when the plaint incorporated that deed by reference. The Supreme Court held that where a claim is founded on a deed incorporated by reference, incorrect specifications in the plaint can be resolved by referring to the deed. The Court established that such discrepancies, even if discovered at the execution stage, allow for the correction of the decree under Section 152, C.P.C. to bring it into conformity with the title deed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree be corrected under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to align it with the title deed when the plaint incorporated that deed by reference?
  • Does the principle of incorporation by reference allow for the resolution of discrepancies between a plaint's property description and the underlying title deed?
  • At what stage of proceedings can a court permit the correction of a decree to bring it into conformity with the title deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mansha Ullah And Others vs Allah Ditta1991 SCMR 1296 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-28
  shamilat-e-dehforcible dispossessionrevenue courtscivil suitstatus quospecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for special leave to appeal concerning a land dispute over approximately 14 kanals and 13 marlas of shamilat-e-deh land in village Natha, Tehsil Nankana Sahib. The core legal question involves the propriety of civil proceedings instituted by estate owners to retain possession after forcibly ousting a non-owner possessor, while concurrent revenue proceedings regarding the restoration of possession were actively pending before the revenue hierarchy. The Supreme Court held that the civil suit appeared to be a device to frustrate the orders of the Revenue Authorities, and since the revenue orders directing restoration of possession to the dispossessed occupant had been affirmed by the Commissioner and were awaiting final adjudication before the Board of Revenue, the High Court committed no infirmity in dismissing the civil revisions. The key principle laid down is that civil suits cannot be utilized as a collateral mechanism to circumvent or frustrate lawful proceedings and orders of Revenue Authorities concerning the forcible eviction and restoration of possession of land.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil suit be maintained to retain possession obtained through the forcible ouster of a person when proceedings for restoration of possession are pending before revenue authorities?
  • Do Revenue Authorities possess the jurisdiction to restore possession to a tenant or occupant in the event of their forcible eviction?
  • Whether the High Court's dismissal of a civil revision against concurrent findings in such circumstances suffers from any legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Zafar Ali vs Malik Khalid Aziz And Other1991 SCMR 1362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-19
  ejectmentpublic documentsanctioned planmode of proofreconstructionpresumption of genuineness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner based on the reconstruction of a property. The core legal question was whether a sanctioned plan from a Municipal Committee, relied upon to justify ejectment, required formal proof or if the courts below erred in dispensing with the standard mode of proof for such a document. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a plan duly sanctioned by a Municipal Committee constitutes a public document. Consequently, the Court affirmed that such a document is deemed genuine unless proven otherwise, and there is no legal bar to dispensing with the formal mode of proof for such public records. The decision reinforces the principle that public documents, such as sanctioned municipal plans, carry a presumption of genuineness, thereby streamlining evidentiary requirements in ejectment proceedings where such documents are central to the claim of reconstruction.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plan sanctioned by a Municipal Committee considered a public document?
  • Can the formal mode of proof be dispensed with for a public document in ejectment proceedings?
  • Does a sanctioned municipal plan carry a presumption of genuineness?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Sultan Mahmood Through Legal Heirs vs Muhammad Arshad Khan1991 SCMR 1542 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-25
  pre-emptionco-sharerKhatasuperior right of pre-emptionspecific field numbersKhasra numbers
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a suit for pre-emption filed by the petitioner, which was initially dismissed by the trial court but subsequently decreed in the petitioner's favor by the Additional District Judge, Multan. The respondent challenged this decision through a revision petition in the High Court, which set aside the appellate decree and restored the trial court's judgment. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, having purchased specific field numbers from the sole owner of a Khata, could be considered a co-sharer in the remaining Khasra numbers of that same Khata, thereby establishing a superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the petitioner, as a purchaser of specified field numbers from the sole owner, did not qualify as a co-sharer in the remaining property purchased by the respondent. The Court affirmed the principle that the purchase of specific field numbers from a sole owner does not confer the status of a co-sharer in the remaining portions of the Khata for the purposes of pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Does the purchase of specific field numbers from a sole owner of a Khata make the purchaser a co-sharer in the remaining Khasra numbers of that Khata?
  • Can a purchaser of specific field numbers claim a superior right of pre-emption over the remaining property in the same Khata?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Nasim Ahmad vs Additional District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan And 31991 SCMR 1877 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  leave to appealdismissal for defaultrestoration of suitwrit jurisdictiondiscretionary power
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petitions by the High Court, which had upheld the orders of the lower forums restoring a suit that was previously dismissed for default. The core legal question concerned the justification for setting aside the dismissal of the suit for default and whether the date of dismissal constituted a date of hearing. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court in its discretionary writ jurisdiction suffered from no infirmity of law or principle. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings regarding the restoration of a suit dismissed for default, when properly arrived at without legal infirmity, will not be interfered with in discretionary writ jurisdiction or leave to appeal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction can be invoked to interfere with the restoration of a suit dismissed for default?
  • Does a date of dismissal for default constitute a date of hearing requiring specific notice?
  • When will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the restoration of suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muzaffar vs Muhammad Sher And Other1991 SCMR 1865 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-27
  mortgageevacuee propertycustodiandeclaration of titlecivil revisioncause of actionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the dismissal of his suit for a declaration of title. The petitioner claimed ownership of the suit property based on his status as a mortgagee, asserting that his rights had matured through the efflux of time. The High Court, however, found that the property was subject to an earlier mortgage in favour of a non-Muslim, which subsisted post-1947/48, thereby creating evacuee interest. Consequently, the Custodian was deemed to be in possession of the land in place of the evacuee mortgagee. The High Court further observed that the petitioner obtained his mortgage in 1959 from a mortgagor who lacked the legal right to transfer possession. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, holding that the petitioner possessed no valid mortgage rights and lacked a cause of action. The suit was correctly dismissed as misconceived, and the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mortgagee acquire ownership rights through efflux of time if the mortgagor lacked the legal right to transfer possession?
  • What is the legal status of possession when a mortgage involves evacuee property?
  • Can a suit for declaration of title be maintained if the plaintiff lacks an existing mortgage right?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Kabir vs Haji Shah Jehan1991 SCMR 1331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  limitationstatutory tenancysuit for possessionDisplaced Persons ActPermanent Transfer Deedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of three lower courts which dismissed the petitioner's suit for possession of a plot on the grounds of limitation. The petitioner, having acquired the property via a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) in 1962, initiated a suit for possession in 1970. The core legal question is whether the suit was barred by time, specifically considering the statutory relationship between a transferee and an occupant under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner argued that if the occupant's possession was long-standing, a statutory landlord-tenant relationship was created upon the transfer, and the occupant's repudiation of this title necessitated a decree for possession. Alternatively, if the occupant entered possession after the 1962 transfer, the 1970 suit was timely. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the legal implications of the statutory relationship created by the Act and the timing of the occupant's possession require further examination to determine if the suit was indeed time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 automatically create a statutory landlord-tenant relationship between the transferee and the occupant?
  • If an occupant repudiates the statutory title of a landlord created under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, is the landlord entitled to a decree for possession?
  • Does the limitation period for a suit for possession differ depending on whether the occupant's possession predates or postdates the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Muhammad Kabir And Others vs Haji Shah Jehan And Another1991 SCMR 2022 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  limitationevacuee propertystatutory tenancydisplaced personsadverse possessionpermanent transfer deedpossession
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the judgments of the High Court holding his suits for declaration and possession to be time-barred. The appellant had obtained Permanent Transfer Deeds for evacuee property in 1962 and instituted suits in 1970 against occupants setting up adverse claims. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the suits as barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, finding that the plaintiff was out of possession for more than 12 years. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the issue of limitation. The Court held that the property in question was evacuee land transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and section 30 thereof established a statutory relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee and the occupant. Consequently, the ordinary rules regarding dispossession and limitation did not apply, and the burden was on the occupants to prove effective repudiation of the statutory tenancy, which they failed to do. The appeals were accordingly allowed and the suits decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the statutory relationship created under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 affect the application of the ordinary law of limitation regarding dispossession?
  • Whether the burden lies on the transferee of evacuee property to prove continuous possession or on the occupant to show repudiation of title?
  • Are suits filed by a transferee of evacuee property against occupants barred by time under Article 142 of the Limitation Act when a statutory tenancy exists?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Iftikharul Haoue vs Abdur Rashid1991 SCMR 1940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-07-24
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal bona fide needlandlord and tenantquestion of factcross-examination
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed his first appeal in limine and maintained the ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller. The respondent landlord had sought ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that the residential property was required in good faith for his personal occupation. The Rent Controller evaluated the evidence and ruled in favor of the landlord, finding the personal need proved, which decision was affirmed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the landlord's need was not bona fide and real, pointing out that the landlord's uncle owned other properties and that the landlord was already residing with him. The Supreme Court observed that these factual aspects were not put to the landlord during cross-examination in the witness-box. Holding that no question of law arose for further examination, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can dismiss a first appeal against an ejectment order in limine by a detailed order?
  • Does the failure to cross-examine a landlord on crucial factual assertions preclude a tenant from raising those points on appeal?
  • Whether a concurrent finding of fact regarding personal bona fide need by the Rent Controller and the High Court warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ibrar Sharif vs The State1991 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-28
  customs smugglingrecovery of goldleave to appealappraisal of evidenceexpert report
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal and upholding his conviction. The petitioner was intercepted at Karachi Airport by Customs officials upon arriving from Abu Dhabi, and a search of his baggage led to the recovery of twenty-nine slabs of gold concealed within household appliances. The core legal question concerned whether the prosecution sufficiently established the recovery of contraband from the petitioner's possession and whether the absence of a formal expert report rendered the proof of the recovered metal as gold legally deficient. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was based on a proper appraisal of evidence, noting that the petitioner admitted material facts regarding his travel and arrest, and that an evaluation certificate had been produced without challenge from the defense. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, affirming that admissions and uncontested evaluation certificates suffice to prove recovery and identity of contraband when corroborated by official testimony and circumstance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an expert report is strictly essential to prove the nature of contraband when an evaluation certificate is produced and goes unchallenged by the defence?
  • Can the admissions of an accused person regarding travel and arrest be used to corroborate the recovery of contraband from his baggage?
  • Whether concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the identification of baggage and recovery of gold warrant interference by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Haji Nazar Muhammad and another vs WAPDA and another1991 PLD Supreme Court 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-04-10
  jurisdictioncompensationtransmission linespecial statuteWAPDADeputy CommissionerDistrict Judge
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal addresses the question of whether a District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of compensation for damage caused by the installation of a 500 K.V. Transmission line by WAPDA over the appellants' land. The appellants argued that WAPDA, as a licensee under the Electricity Act, 1910, attracted the provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the District Judge under section 16 of the Telegraph Act. The Supreme Court held that section 14 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, provides a specific mechanism and forum—namely, the Deputy Commissioner of the district—to resolve disputes concerning the sufficiency of compensation for damage done on land, and attaches finality to his decision. The Court reasoned that section 51 of the Electricity Act does not provide a forum or mechanism for awarding compensation and that the WAPDA Act constitutes a special provision prevailing over general provisions. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the decision that the District Judge lacked jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of compensation for damage caused by WAPDA's transmission lines?
  • Does section 51 of the Electricity Act, 1910 provide a forum or mechanism for the award of compensation?
  • Are the provisions relating to the determination and award of compensation under the WAPDA Act, 1958 of a special nature compared to general provisions?
  • Does section 14 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958 apply exclusively to the preparation stage of a scheme or does it extend to damage and compensation issues?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Sabir And Another vs Qazi Rehmatullah And 7 Other1991 SCMR 1261 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-04
  official dutysanction for prosecutionpublic servantcriminal omissionCode of Criminal Procedurejudicial cognizancemagistrate
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the criminal prosecution of two public servants (magistrates) who were present during a political procession that resulted in violence and property damage. The core legal question was whether the magistrates could be prosecuted for alleged criminal omissions (failure to disperse an unlawful assembly or prevent violence) without the prior sanction of the Provincial Government as required by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The High Court had directed their trial, reasoning that their failure to act was not connected to their official duties. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that the alleged omissions were directly related to the performance of the appellants' official duties as magistrates deputed to the scene. The Court established the principle that the protection afforded by Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, applies equally to acts of commission and omission, provided the conduct is reasonably connected to the discharge of official duties. Consequently, in the absence of the mandatory government sanction, the trial court could not take cognizance of the offences against the public servants.

  Questions settled

  • Does the protection of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to criminal omissions as well as acts of commission?
  • Is a public servant entitled to the protection of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 if the alleged offence is an omission to perform an official duty?
  • Can a court take cognizance of an offence against a public servant acting in the discharge of official duties without the sanction of the appropriate government?
  • What is the test for determining whether an act or omission by a public servant is connected to their official duties for the purpose of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ghulam Haider And Others vs Deputy Commissioner/District1991 SCMR 1485 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  temporary injunctioncommercial licencepolice interferenceassurance by statewithdrawal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit filed by tea shop and restaurant owners against state respondents for declaration and permanent injunction, alongside an application for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioners had obtained commercial licences to operate televisions and VCRs on their premises but alleged unlawful police interference and seizures. The trial court refused the temporary injunction, and subsequent appeals before the Additional District Judge and the High Court of Baluchistan were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the core legal question concerned whether the police could interfere with the petitioners' business or seize equipment without a violation of law. During proceedings, the Assistant Advocate-General assured the Court that the respondents would not close the shops or seize equipment unless the petitioners operated them in breach of the relevant law, in which case action would be taken strictly in accordance with law. Relying on this assurance, the petitioners chose not to press the petition, and it was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Can the police interfere with a licensed business or seize apparatus in the absence of a violation of relevant law?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Azharul Haq vs Director of Food, Punjab, Lahore And Another1991 SCMR 209 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-02
  civil servicewrongful dismissalreinstatementcriminal acquittaldepartmental inquiryback benefitsEfficiency and Discipline Rules
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, a Senior Clerk, was dismissed from service following his conviction by a Special Judge. Subsequently, the Lahore High Court allowed his appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted him. The departmental authorities refused his reinstatement, citing that the acquittal was not honourable. The Punjab Service Tribunal upheld this decision. The Supreme Court examined whether the dismissal, predicated solely on a conviction that was later overturned, could be sustained. The Court held that Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, which allows for dismissal without inquiry upon conviction, is inapplicable once the conviction is set aside. The Court emphasized that when a conviction is reversed, the foundational basis for the removal order disappears. Furthermore, the Court clarified that departmental action following a criminal acquittal must adhere to established inquiry procedures unless specific exemptions apply. Consequently, the Court set aside the dismissal and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with full back benefits, ruling that the order of removal could not be maintained after the underlying conviction was vacated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil servant be dismissed under Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules if their underlying criminal conviction has been set aside?
  • Does an acquittal on the benefit of doubt preclude a civil servant from reinstatement if the dismissal was based solely on a conviction that was later overturned?
  • Is a formal departmental inquiry mandatory for a civil servant if the summary dismissal procedure under Rule 9 is inapplicable?
  • Does the reversal of a criminal conviction automatically invalidate a dismissal order based exclusively on that conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Amir Khan vs Muhammad Ishaque And Other1991 SCMR 1483 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-22
  declaratory suitconsequential reliefpossessionrevenue recordleave to appealKhatedar
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of a civil suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents seeking a declaration of being the sole Khatedar of the suit-land along with a permanent injunction. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the respondents were in possession for over 16 years, had paid the price of the land, had mutations attested in their favour, and that the suit for mere declaration without seeking consequential relief of possession was not maintainable. The District Judge and the High Court concurrently dismissed the petitioner's appeal and revision respectively. Upon a petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the respondents were in occupation as tenants and had been allowed transfer of the property by Colonization Authorities, and furthermore, since the petitioner was out of possession for over 15 years, the suit in its declaratory form without a prayer for consequential relief of possession was barred under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a suit for mere declaration maintainable when the plaintiff is out of possession and fails to seek the consequential relief of possession?
  • Does a declaratory suit fail under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 if the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property for over fifteen years?
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• Malik Aman vs Khawaja Abdul Aziz Through Legal Heirs1991 SCMR 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-25
  ejectment proceedingsstriking off defenserent depositdefault in payment of rentSindh Rented Premises Ordinancesubstantial compliancetenancy dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from an order of the Sindh High Court upholding the striking off of the appellant-tenant's defense in an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question was whether the tenant's deposit of rent in a separate Miscellaneous Rent Case, initiated due to a tenancy dispute, constituted sufficient compliance with the Rent Controller's order to deposit rent in the ejectment proceedings, thereby precluding the striking off of the defense under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court. The Court held that the tenant had made a genuine effort to pay the rent, and the failure to transfer the funds from the separate case account to the ejectment case was not a willful default but an administrative irregularity. The principle established is that where a tenant has deposited rent in court with the clear intention of payment, technical errors in the specific case account number or failure to transfer funds due to procedural hurdles do not constitute willful non-compliance warranting the penal striking off of the defense.

  Questions settled

  • Does the deposit of rent in a separate miscellaneous rent case constitute compliance with a Rent Controller's order to deposit rent in an ejectment proceeding?
  • Can a defense be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order when the tenant has already deposited the funds in court under a different case number?
  • Is the failure to transfer deposited rent funds from one case account to another due to administrative hurdles sufficient grounds for striking off a tenant's defense?
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• Malik Altaf Sikandar, Advocate vs Zohra Bano And Other1991 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-17
  dissolution of marriagehabitual crueltyfamily courtwrit jurisdictionexpunction of remarksletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the dissolution of marriage on the ground of habitual cruelty. The respondent had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage before the Family Court, which was decreed in her favor after finding the appellant's conduct to be habitually cruel. The appellant challenged the decree through a writ petition and subsequently a Letters Patent Appeal, both of which were dismissed. Upon the hearing of the present appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal subject to the expunction of certain remarks concerning his mental state made in the judgment of the Family Court. The Supreme Court held that there was no objection to expunging the specified words while maintaining the findings on habitual cruelty and the decree for dissolution of marriage. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the expunction of the objectionable remarks, making no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether findings of a factual nature rendered by a Family Court can be disturbed in writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
  • Can objectionable remarks regarding a party's mental state be expunged from a judgment while maintaining the decree for dissolution of marriage?
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• Malhi Khan vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 824 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-06-29
  pre-emptiontenant pre-emptionMartial Law Regulation 115Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913cantonment area exemptionconstitutional repugnancyfederal and provincial laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment disposes of two civil appeals arising from judgments of the Lahore High Court concerning pre-emption suits filed by tenants under paragraph 25(3)(d) of Martial Law Regulation 115 (M.L.R. 115). The core legal question was whether the superior right of pre-emption granted to tenants under M.L.R. 115 can be defeated, controlled, or limited by provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, specifically exemptions or exclusions under section 8 of the said Act, or by requirements to hold the right on the date of the suit and decree. The Supreme Court held that paragraph 25(3)(d) of M.L.R. 115 creates a substantive, overriding socio-economic right for tenants that prevails over provincial legislation pursuant to Article 143 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that restrictions such as section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act cannot frustrate or destroy the tenant's right of pre-emption, and that procedural or limitation matters continue to be governed by the 1913 Act while substantive tenancy pre-emption rights remain paramount. Both appeals were accordingly accepted and the tenants' suits were decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of pre-emption granted to a tenant under paragraph 25(3)(d) of M.L.R. 115 override conflicting provisions and exemptions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
  • Can a notification issued under section 8 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, defeat a tenant's right of pre-emption provided by M.L.R. 115?
  • Whether the provisions of M.L.R. 115 prevail over provincial enactments to the extent of repugnancy under Article 143 of the Constitution of Pakistan?
  • Must a tenant exercising pre-emption under M.L.R. 115 maintain their tenant status on the date of the suit and the date of the decree as required by the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913?
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• Major, General (Retd.) Sher Ali Khan vs Commissioner of Incometax and Gift Tax1991 PLD Supreme Court 422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-01-30
  gift taxvaluation of agricultural landassessment yearcharging sectionretrospective operationfiscal statutestax liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the valuation of agricultural land for gift tax purposes. The appellant gifted land on April 28, 1971, falling within the assessment year 1971-72. The Gift Tax Officer valued the land based on market price, rejecting the appellant's request to apply Rule 9(3B) of the Gift Tax Rules, 1963, which was notified on July 29, 1971. The High Court upheld the assessment, reasoning that the rule could not apply retrospectively to the date of the gift. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that Section 3 of the Gift Tax Act, 1963, is the charging section, not Section 6, which merely prescribes valuation methods. Because the tax is chargeable for the assessment year commencing July 1, 1971, the law in force at the start of that assessment year governs the valuation. Consequently, the Court held that the valuation must be determined in accordance with Rule 9(3B). The appeal was accepted, setting aside the lower authorities' orders and directing the valuation to be recalculated under the specified rule.

  Questions settled

  • Is Section 6 or Section 3 of the Gift Tax Act, 1963, the charging section for the purpose of determining tax liability?
  • Does the valuation of a gift made during a previous year depend on the law in force at the time of the gift or the law in force at the commencement of the assessment year?
  • Can Rule 9(3B) of the Gift Tax Rules, 1963, be applied to determine the value of agricultural land gifted prior to the notification of the rule but falling within the relevant assessment year?
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• Major (Retd.) Wazir Ahmad And Another vs Federation of Pakistan1991 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  seniority fixationsecondmentAirport Security Forceadministrative decisionleave to appealvested rightsservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals regarding the determination of their seniority. The petitioners, formerly Majors in the Pakistan Army, were seconded to the Airport Security Force (A.S.F.) as Assistant Directors. Initially, the Establishment Division approved a seniority fixation placing the petitioners above officers promoted to Assistant Director after the petitioners' secondment. However, the A.S.F. subsequently issued a memorandum disturbing this seniority by counting it only from the date of their permanent induction into the A.S.F., contrary to the earlier approved decision. The petitioners challenged this change, arguing that the initial seniority determination, having been approved by the competent authority, could not be unilaterally altered without notice. The Supreme Court observed that the conflicting views regarding the petitioners' seniority raised significant legal questions, particularly regarding the finality of administrative decisions and the propriety of altering seniority without notice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the initial seniority determination could be lawfully disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a competent authority unilaterally alter a previously approved seniority determination without providing notice to the affected civil servants?
  • Does the permanent absorption of seconded officers into a new service allow for the retrospective disturbance of seniority rights previously established by the competent authority?
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• Major (Retd.) S.A. Qayyum vs Secretary (Urban) And Other1991 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-24
  settlement disputeevacuee propertyconstitutional jurisdictionfactual findingspermanent transfer deedleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of 20 marlas of land, which the petitioner claimed was part of a property known as 'Chappar' previously transferred to his predecessors-in-interest. Conversely, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had transferred the same land to respondent No. 3 via a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD), who subsequently sold it to respondent No. 4. The petitioner challenged the High Court's dismissal of his constitutional petition, which had declined to interfere with the Settlement Authorities' findings. The core legal question was whether the disputed land constituted part of the 'Chappar' property or remained available for transfer as evacuee property. The Supreme Court observed that the Settlement Authorities had thoroughly examined the factual record and determined the land was not part of the 'Chappar' property. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with these factual findings in its constitutional jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not re-examine concurrent findings of fact made by specialized Settlement Authorities when exercising constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings made by Settlement Authorities in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is a dispute regarding whether a specific plot of land is part of a previously transferred property a question of fact?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition that relies on concurrent findings of fact by lower authorities?
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• Major (Retd.) Iftikhar Aziz Ahmad vs Government of Pakistan Through Secretary, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi And 71 Other1991 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-22
  civil serviceinductionsenioritylocus poenitentiaeFederal Public Service Commissionvoid orderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a retired army officer selected for induction into the civil service in 1979, sought leave to appeal against the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment dismissing his appeal. His initial induction notification was subsequently revoked by the Government and his date of induction was deferred from 19-12-1979 to 9-8-1981, altering his seniority. The core legal question was whether the President had the locus poenitentiae to revoke the earlier induction notification and whether the initial induction bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission was lawful. The Supreme Court held that in 1979 the President lacked the power to bypass the Federal Public Service Commission, rendering the initial induction ab initio void and a nullity in law. The Court ruled that the subsequent revocation was not an exercise of locus poenitentiae but a lawful correction of a void order and an error. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the Service Tribunal's decision and establishing that void administrative actions lacking statutory backing can be corrected without invoking the doctrine of locus poenitentiae.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the President possessed the power in 1979 to induct officers into the civil service by bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission?
  • Can the revocation of an illegal and void induction order be challenged on the basis of the doctrine of locus poenitentiae?
  • Whether an initial induction order that is ab initio in conflict with the law can be treated as a nullity and corrected subsequently?
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• Mahr Sakhi Muhammad vs Board of Arbitrators And Another1991 SCMR 1511 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-10
  arbitration awardintra-court appealterritorial jurisdictionmarket committeeleave to appealprocedural validitydealer and grower dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court in an Intra-Court Appeal, which had set aside an arbitration award regarding a cotton sale/purchase contract. The dispute was initially adjudicated by the Arbitration Board of the Market Committee, Khanewal, which ruled in favor of the petitioner. The High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, declared the award without lawful authority, citing two primary grounds: that the dispute was between two dealers rather than a dealer and a grower, and that the Market Committee lacked territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that the findings were factually and legally erroneous regarding the nature of the parties' relationship and the territorial scope of the Committee's authority. Additionally, the petitioner raised a procedural objection regarding the validity of the High Court's judgment, noting it was signed by only one of the two judges who heard the Intra-Court Appeal. Finding that the contentions raised by the petitioner required further examination, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these substantial questions of law and procedure.

  Questions settled

  • Does an Intra-Court Appeal judgment signed by only one of the two judges who heard the case constitute a valid judgment?
  • Does the Arbitration Board of a Market Committee have jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between two dealers?
  • What constitutes a proper reference to arbitration under the rules governing Market Committees?
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• Mahni And 2 Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner And Another1991 SCMR 1326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  leave to appealauction cancellationconstitutional jurisdictionquestion of factwrit petitionsettlement authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition against the order of the Settlement Authorities regarding the cancellation of an auction. The dispute concerns land measuring 25 kanals and 10 marlas, which was auctioned to the petitioners after being recovered as Darya Burd land. Upon an application by villagers alleging a lack of publicity and proclamation for the auction, the Deputy Commissioner cancelled the auction proceedings. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition, holding that the adequacy of publicity is a question of fact not warranting interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court considered the record and concluded that the finding of fact was properly reached by the Deputy Commissioner after appreciating the evidence, and no legal defect existed in the findings of the courts below. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of proper publicity and proclamation of an auction constitutes a question of fact?
  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact regarding auction proceedings in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent factual findings of lower forums regarding auction cancellation?
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• Mahmood Khan vs Muhammad Hasan And 7 Other1991 SCMR 1566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-29
  declaratory suitlimitationtime-barred suitminorityconcurrent findingssale deedcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision regarding a declaratory suit. The petitioner sought a declaration of ownership and joint possession of disputed land, challenging a sale deed executed on his behalf by his uncle in 1947, claiming it was void against his interest. The respondents contested the suit, raising defenses of limitation, insufficient court-fee, and estoppel, noting the petitioner's long-standing silence since 1947. The trial court, the Additional District Judge, and the High Court concurrently dismissed the petitioner's suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner, who was a minor at the time of the 1947 sale, attained the age of majority in 1964. However, the suit was not filed until 1984. Consequently, the Court held that the suit was clearly barred by the law of limitation. Finding no substance in the petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the time-barred nature of the claim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit challenging a sale deed executed during the plaintiff's minority is maintainable if filed twenty years after attaining the age of majority?
  • Does a suit filed decades after the cause of action accrued, where the plaintiff attained majority long before filing, constitute a time-barred claim?
  • Can a civil revision be maintained against concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding the limitation period?
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• Maheea and 5 others vs Shaiya and 7 others1991 PLD Supreme Court 724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-05-08
  inheritancemurderer exclusionsuccessionQisas and Diyat OrdinanceMuslim law of inheritancedebarment from succession
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arises from a judgment of the High Court which dismissed the appellants' Regular Second Appeal in an inheritance dispute. Appellant No. 1 was convicted of the culpable homicide of his father, Ramzan, which conviction was altered on appeal to section 304 Part-II, Pakistan Penal Code. Both the appellant and his progeny (appellants Nos. 2 to 6) were excluded from inheriting the deceased's property based on the Muslim law principle that a murderer and his descendants are disqualified from inheriting from the victim. The core legal question was whether the heirs of a murderer are also excluded from inheriting the victim's estate. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the controversy has been statutorily settled by the promulgation of Ordinance I of 1991 (Qisas and Diyat Ordinance), which introduced amended provisions into the Pakistan Penal Code barring persons who commit certain homicides from succession. The key principle laid down is that under statutory provisions incorporating Islamic injunctions, a person who commits culpable homicide is debarred from succession to the estate of the victim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a murderer is excluded from inheriting the property of his victim under Muslim law?
  • Are the descendants of a murderer also debarred from inheriting the estate of the victim?
  • How does the enactment of the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance affect the succession rights of a person committing homicide and their progeny?
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• M. Muhammad Sadiq And Another vs Punjab Road Transport Board, Lahore Through Managing Director1991 SCMR 2321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1991-08-11
  fatal accidentsex parte decreedismissal for defaultappellate procedurecivil procedurenon-appearance of appellantdecision on merits
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for damages under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855, filed by the appellants following the death of their daughter in a road accident caused by the respondent's driver. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte against the respondent. The respondent appealed to the High Court, but failed to appear on the date of hearing. Despite the respondent's absence, the High Court proceeded to decide the appeal on merits, partially modifying the trial court's decree. The appellants challenged this, arguing that the High Court lacked the authority to decide the appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant. The Supreme Court held that under Order 41, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while the court has discretion to dismiss an appeal for default or adjourn it when the appellant is absent, it possesses no authority to render a decision on merits in the appellant's absence. A decision on merits requires the hearing of both sides as a condition precedent. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside and the trial court's decree restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court decide an appeal on merits when the appellant fails to appear at the hearing?
  • Is the dismissal of an appeal for non-appearance under Order 41, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 mandatory or discretionary?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 permit a court to pass a judgment on merits in the absence of the appellant?
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