Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1990 SCMR 319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-07
  criminal appealmurderconvictiondeath sentencecommutation of sentenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Iqbal, was tried and convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Amir Abbas by the Sessions Judge, Mianwali, and sentenced to death. On appeal and reference, the High Court confirmed the conviction and death sentence. Subsequently, pursuant to a Presidential Order dated 6-12-1988, the petitioner's death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life. The petitioner nonetheless sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court through a jail petition. The Supreme Court perused the judgments and held that the prosecution had fully established its case through motive, ocular account, recoveries, and medical testimony. The Court concluded that no further alteration in the conviction or sentence was warranted, as the petitioner had already benefited from the commutation of his death sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the petitioner's guilt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the prosecution successfully established the case against the petitioner through motive, ocular account, recoveries, and medical testimony?
  • Is any further alteration in conviction or sentence warranted after the commutation of a death sentence by presidential order?
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• Muhammad Iqbal vs The Divisional Commissioner, D.I.Khan and others1990 SCMR 1282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  student admissionmedical collegefuture careersupreme court petitionhumanitarian consideration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition filed by Muhammad Iqbal against the Divisional Commissioner, D.I. Khan and others. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not press the main petition but requested that the petitioner, who has already completed his First Year and is currently studying in the Second Year at Bolan Medical College, not be ousted due to the admission of Mast Ali Khan, in order to protect his future career. The core legal question concerned whether the court could issue a direction to the college authorities to accommodate the petitioner. The court held that no such direction could be issued as a matter of right, but expressed a desire that the college authorities favorably consider the petitioner's predicament and try to accommodate him as far as possible. The key principle laid down is that while the court cannot compel educational institutions by issuing mandatory directions to accommodate students outside regular rules, it may urge authorities to consider humanitarian aspects regarding a student's academic future.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court issue a direction to college authorities to accommodate a student outside regular admission rules?
  • Whether a student who has completed the first year of studies can claim reinstatement as a matter of right when displaced by another admission?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and anothers vs Muhammad Alamgir and others1990 SCMR 1377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-22
  limitation periodfraud and misrepresentationcivil procedurearbitration awardremand of case
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arose from an application filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to resolve an apparent conflict between various High Court decisions concerning the applicable period of limitation for filing such applications—specifically whether Article 173 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 applies. The Supreme Court examined the precedents and concluded that no real conflict existed, holding that Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 correctly applies to an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 providing a three-year limitation period. The Court declined to pre-empt the merits of the case regarding the competency of section 12(2) in matters governed by the Arbitration Act, as the matter was properly remanded to the trial court for a decision on merits. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • What is the applicable period of limitation for filing an application under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether Article 173 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act 1908 governs an application filed under section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can the Supreme Court pre-empt the merits of a case and examine matters that have been remanded to the trial court for disposal?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and another vs Additional District Judge and another1990 SCMR 957 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  evictionlandlord and tenantdemarcationrent controllerexclusive jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, claiming to be tenants, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed their constitutional petition challenging an eviction order. The dispute originated from a demarcation of property by Settlement Authorities, which allocated the disputed shop portion to the respondent's predecessor-in-interest. Based on this demarcation, the respondent successfully initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioners. While the Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction application, the appellate authority reversed this decision, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition, citing the involvement of a controverted factual question. The Supreme Court, relying on the principle established in Raunaq Ali's case (PLD 1973 SC 236), held that a tribunal with restricted jurisdiction, such as a Rent Controller, cannot sit in judgment over the adjudication of another tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, the Rent Controller could not challenge the validity of the demarcation order. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate authority's decision, noting that the Rent Controller was bound by the demarcation order, and refused leave to appeal, clarifying that the petitioners remained free to pursue other legal remedies against the underlying demarcation order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Rent Controller sit in judgment over the adjudication of a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction?
  • Is a demarcation order passed by Settlement Authorities subject to challenge before a Rent Controller in eviction proceedings?
  • Does the existence of a controverted factual question regarding property demarcation preclude a Rent Controller from establishing a landlord-tenant relationship?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and 3 others vs The State1990 SCMR 1268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-06
  leave to appealcommon intentionSection 34 PPCmurdercommutation of death sentencemedical evidencevicarious liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners under Sections 302 and 323 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while commuting their death sentences to imprisonment for life and altering the imposed fines. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners, armed with soti, knife, and revolver, jointly attacked the deceased and an injured eyewitness. Medical evidence revealed that the deceased suffered one sharp-edged stab wound alongside blunt-weapon injuries, while the surviving victim suffered simple injuries caused by blunt weapons. The core legal issue before the Supreme Court of Pakistan is whether the element of common intention was established so as to attract vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the applicability of Section 34 P.P.C. under the circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the element of common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arises when multiple accused inflict injuries using different types of weapons?
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• Muhammad Iqbal and 2 others vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 7 others1990 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-18
  consolidation of holdingswrit petitiondiscretionary jurisdictionboard of revenueleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioners' writ petition by the High Court in a case concerning the consolidation of holdings. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in considering a report submitted by the Board of Revenue during the constitutional proceedings, which stated that the petitioners held land in excess of their entitlement, rather than restricting its review solely to the impugned orders. The Supreme Court held that no inconsistency existed between the impugned order and the official report, and concurred with the High Court that the petitioners failed to make out a case for the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that a court may consider official reports submitted by administrative authorities in constitutional petitions when evaluating discretionary relief in consolidation matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can take note of facts stated in a report submitted by the Board of Revenue in response to a constitutional petition?
  • Does holding land in excess of entitlement preclude a petitioner from invoking discretionary writ jurisdiction in consolidation matters?
  • Is there any inconsistency between an order of consolidation and a subsequent report confirming excess land possession?
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• Muhammad Ilyas vs Chairman, Area Electricity Board WAPDA,1990 SCMR 559 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-22
  service tribunaldepartmental inquiryhonourable acquittalsuspension periodpenaltycorruptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant in the Revenue office of WAPDA, was arrested in a corruption case and subsequently tried and acquitted by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption. Following his acquittal, he was reinstated in service, but the department determined his acquittal was not honourable. After issuing a show-cause notice, the department imposed a penalty of stoppage of annual increments for two years without future effect, ordered that he receive no salary beyond the suspension allowance, and treated the suspension period as leave without pay. His departmental appeal and subsequent appeal before the Service Tribunal were dismissed. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in upholding the departmental penalty following a non-honourable acquittal where the petitioner admitted to handling tainted money. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner admitted to holding the tainted money for safe custody, making him an accessory after the fact, the departmental authorities were justified in finding his conduct objectionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing that departmental action can lawfully follow an acquittal where the employee's own admissions reflect blameworthy conduct.

  Questions settled

  • Whether departmental authorities can impose a penalty following an acquittal in a criminal trial?
  • Does an acquittal by a criminal court bar departmental action if the acquittal is not honourable?
  • Can the period of suspension be treated as leave without pay upon reinstatement following a corruption charge?
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• Muhammad Ikram Shah vs Member (Customs), Central Board of Revenue and another1990 SCMR 1701 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-04
  service lawnatural justiceenquiry reportprejudicemajor penaltyunauthorized absencecivil servantaudi alteram partem
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns whether the failure to provide a civil servant with a copy of an Enquiry Report vitiates the imposition of a major penalty. The appellant, an Inspector of Central Excise and Land Customs, was penalized for unauthorized absence from duty and signing blank gate passes. The Supreme Court examined whether the non-supply of the Enquiry Report violated principles of natural justice. The Court held that the supply of an enquiry report is not a mandatory statutory requirement but a principle of natural justice. Consequently, an order is not automatically vitiated by its absence unless the aggrieved party demonstrates actual prejudice. In this case, the appellant's absence was factually established and admitted, and he failed to show how the non-supply of the report prejudiced his defense. The Court further clarified that leave is subject to the exigencies of service and the discretion of the competent authority, and that an Enquiry Officer is not required to recommend specific punishments. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to supply a copy of an Enquiry Report to a civil servant automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Is the supply of an Enquiry Report a mandatory statutory requirement in disciplinary proceedings against civil servants?
  • Does the grant of leave to a civil servant constitute an absolute right or is it subject to the exigencies of service?
  • Must an Enquiry Officer recommend a specific punishment in their report during disciplinary proceedings?
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• Muhammad Ijaz alias Jajji and another vs The State1990 SCMR 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  criminal petitionmurdercommon intentionreduction of sentenceyouthful offenderocular testimonyreappraisal of evidencelimitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the petitioners for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while altering the death sentence of the first petitioner to life imprisonment due to his youthful age of sixteen years and indirect connection to the motive. The core legal question involved the sustainability of the conviction based on ocular testimony, medical evidence, motive, and recovery of a weapon. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the concurrent findings of fact based on reliable ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, motive, and recovery could not be interfered with, especially when the petition was also barred by limitation. The Court laid down that concurrent factual findings supported by consistent evidence will not be reappraised by the apex court, and dismissed the petition on merits as well as limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will reappraise evidence in a criminal petition against concurrent findings of fact?
  • Can youth at the time of the offence and indirect connection to the motive serve as mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence to life imprisonment?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence, motive, and recovery is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• Muhammad Idrees vs Tanveer alias Teru and others1990 SCMR 1113 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  criminal appealsuppression of injuriesunpremeditated incidentappreciation of evidencechance encounterculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that convicted the respondents under Section 304, Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased, rather than under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 as requested by the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its appreciation of evidence regarding the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused, which led the court to conclude that the incident was an unpremeditated chance encounter rather than a premeditated murder. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, noting that the inference drawn by the High Court—that the injuries received by the respondents occurred during the same incident and were suppressed by the prosecution—was a reasonable and possible conclusion based on the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conviction or enhance the sentence, holding that the High Court's assessment of the facts and the resulting application of Section 304, Part I, P.P.C. was justified in the circumstances. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court infer that an incident was an unpremeditated chance encounter when the prosecution suppresses injuries sustained by the accused?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in refusing to interfere with a High Court's factual finding regarding the nature of an occurrence when that finding is based on a reasonable inference from the evidence?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim and others vs Khairati and another1990 SCMR 1249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-21
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionnon-joinder of necessary partyestoppelmartial law regulationcivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a pre-emption suit. The respondents, sons of the vendor, filed a suit claiming a superior right of pre-emption regarding agricultural land purchased by the appellants. A dispute arose regarding the non-joinder of one vendee whose name was omitted from the certified copy of the sale-deed, leading to an application under Order I, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to implead him as a party, which was allowed by the trial court. The trial court eventually decreed the suit in favor of the respondents. An appeal by the appellants was successful before the Additional District Judge, but the Lahore High Court restored the trial court's decree. In the Supreme Court, the appellants challenged findings on issues relating to estoppel, the transaction being hit by Martial Law Regulation No. 115, and the respondents' superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to prove estoppel or tenancy under MLR 115, and the respondents' relationship as sons of the vendor was admitted. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with costs.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit is liable to be dismissed for failing to implead a vendee whose name was omitted from the certified copy of the sale-deed?
  • Does inconsistent and contradictory evidence regarding the presence of pre-emptors at the time of sale establish estoppel?
  • Whether the sons of a vendor possess a superior right of pre-emption based on their relationship?
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• Muhammad Ibrahim and another vs Allah Ditta and another1990 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-04-30
  pre-emptionZare Panjumextension of timecondonation of delayleave to appealplaint rejection
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendees against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed their first appeal and upheld the lower appellate court's order condoning the delay in the deposit of Zare Panjum by the pre-emptors under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The trial court had initially rejected the plaint for non-deposit of Zare Panjum within time, but the District Court set aside this order on the ground that the pre-emptors' application for extension of time was not disposed of prior to the target date, thereby depriving them of an opportunity to make the deposit. The Supreme Court considered the old nature of the matter, noting the possibility that the suit had already been decided on merits. The Court held that the approach of the lower appellate court and the High Court regarding the extension of time was based on sound reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that a decree passed in favour of the respondents should not be set aside merely on the ground that the delay ought not to have been condoned, and accordingly dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the first appellate court is justified in condoning the delay in the deposit of Zare Panjum under section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act when the trial court failed to dispose of the extension application before the target date?
  • Should an existing decree passed in favour of the pre-emptors be set aside merely on the ground that the First Appellate Court should not have condoned the delay in the deposit of the Zare Panjum?
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• Muhammad Hussain vs Mirza Muhammad Saghir and another1990 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20
  specific performanceconsolidated suitscivil revisionleave to appealprocedural lawappellate procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court in a case involving specific performance. The petitioner had originally succeeded in a trial court where two suits were consolidated. However, the respondents successfully appealed this decision to the District Court. The petitioner's subsequent Civil Revision was dismissed, leading to the current petition. The core legal question presented is whether a single appeal filed by the respondents against a consolidated judgment involving two suits is legally sufficient, or if separate appeals were required. The Supreme Court, noting that leave to appeal had already been granted on this specific issue in a connected matter (Siraj Din v. Rajada), determined that the question requires further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the procedural validity of the single appeal filed against the consolidated suits and ordered the matter to be heard alongside the connected case, while maintaining the existing stay order.

  Questions settled

  • Is a single appeal sufficient against a judgment rendered in consolidated suits?
  • Does the consolidation of suits require separate appeals to be filed by the aggrieved party against each suit?
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• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Niaz Ahmad and others1990 SCMR 18 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-16
  ejectment petitionlandlord and tenantwrit jurisdictionremand of casefinding of factadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an ejectment petition filed by the appellants against respondent No. 1 concerning a room in a property in Lahore, wherein the appellants claimed the status of landlords following transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and default in rent. The trial court and the district judge both found in favor of the appellants and ordered ejectment. However, the High Court accepted a writ petition filed by the respondent, set aside the orders of the lower tribunals, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for fresh decision after recording additional evidence and appointing a local commissioner. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court could interfere in findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, and whether remand was appropriate in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the order of remand was unexceptionable as a correct decision regarding the transferred properties necessitated determining the genuineness of documents and areas through additional evidence. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court could have interfered in a rent matter on the question of finding of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant?
  • Whether it was a fit case for remand in the exercise of writ jurisdiction for recording additional evidence?
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• Muhammad Hassan vs Muhammad Asghar and 6 others1990 SCMR 669 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-07
  criminal appealacquittalbenefit of doubtocular testimonymedical evidencerecovery evidencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby respondents were acquitted of charges under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the assessment of ocular testimony, recovery evidence, and motive in a criminal trial resulting in acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's findings regarding discrepancies in recoveries, interested ocular testimony conflicting with medical evidence, unnatural conduct of eye-witnesses, and weak motive were well-founded and warranted the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that interference with an acquittal order is unwarranted where the trial and appellate evaluations of evidence are sound. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order based on sound appreciation of evidence, including discrepancies in recoveries and conflicts between ocular and medical testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an appellate court judgment acquitting the accused based on the benefit of the doubt?
  • Does a discrepancy in the dates of recoveries as stated by attesting witnesses and police officers undermine the genuineness of the recoveries?
  • Can interested ocular testimony conflicting with medical evidence sustain a conviction?
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• Muhammad Hasham vs Inspectorgeneral of Police, Punjab and 21990 SCMR 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  service lawlimitation periodcondonation of delaydepartmental representationservice tribunalpolice service
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a former Police Constable, challenged his dismissal from service following a departmental inquiry. After his departmental appeals to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and a subsequent representation to the Inspector General of Police were unsuccessful, he approached the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground of limitation, refusing to condone the delay caused by the time spent pursuing a representation before the Inspector General of Police. The petitioner sought leave to appeal this decision before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing a departmental representation, which was not a statutory right, could be excluded for the purpose of limitation. The Supreme Court held that since the order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was final and no right of representation to the Inspector General of Police existed, the Tribunal correctly refused to condone the delay. The petition was dismissed, affirming that time spent pursuing non-statutory remedies does not extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time spent pursuing a departmental representation, which is not a statutory right, count towards the limitation period for filing an appeal before a Service Tribunal?
  • Is an order passed by a Deputy Inspector General of Police in a departmental appeal considered final for the purpose of limitation?
  • Can a Service Tribunal condone delay based on time spent pursuing non-statutory remedies?
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• Muhammad Hanif vs Province of Punjab and another1990 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-20
  leave to appealGrow More Food Schemeallotment of State landminority of allotteecompetency of minorcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil revision by the High Court, which upheld the dismissal of his suit for a declaration regarding the subsistence and continuance of a lease of State land under the Grow More Food Scheme. The core legal question concerns whether a minor is legally competent to obtain an allotment of land under the said scheme, either by fulfilling conditions through a guardian ad-litem or agent, and whether departmental instructions prohibiting minors from such allotments are ultra vires the general legal provisions governing the competency of minors. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions and related legal points, directing that status quo continue in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a minor is competent to obtain an allotment of State land under the Grow More Food Scheme?
  • Can a minor fulfil the conditions of a land allotment scheme through a guardian ad-litem or agent?
  • Whether departmental instructions or rules prohibiting the allotment of land to a minor are ultra vires the general legal provisions relating to the competency of minors?
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• Muhammad Hanif and others vs Muhammad and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 859 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-19
  regular second appealcivil revisionconversion of proceedingscourt-fee deficiencylimitationprocedural hypertechnicalitysupply of copies
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellants' regular second appeals, which were initially filed as regular second appeals, erroneously converted into civil revisions due to a High Court office objection, and later sought to be reconverted. The core legal questions involved the propriety of converting civil revisions back into regular second appeals, the effect of deficient court fees on limitation, and procedural requirements regarding the supply of copies of lower courts' judgments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that procedural hypertechnicalities and mistakes originating from the court's own office should not prejudice a litigant. It ruled that litigants are entitled as of right to at least one chance to make good any deficiency in court fees, that conversion of a civil revision into a second appeal relates back to the original institution date, and that procedural defects regarding copies can be exempted under amended procedural rules. The Supreme Court accordingly allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the matters for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil revision be converted into a regular second appeal and vice versa?
  • What is the relevant date of institution when a civil revision is converted into a second appeal?
  • Is a litigant entitled to an opportunity to make good a deficiency in court-fee?
  • Whether procedural defects regarding the late supply of copies of lower courts' judgments can bar the processing of an appeal?
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• Muhammad Hadi vs The Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Agriculture and Cooperative Department, Quetta and two others1990 SCMR 799 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-26
  expunction of remarksadverse remarksjudicial observationstermination of serviceservice lawconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Balochistan High Court, which dismissed the appellant's Constitution Petition challenging the termination of his services. The appellant sought the expunction of adverse remarks made by the High Court, which attributed the discontinuation of an agricultural research programme to his misconduct, misbehaviour, and inefficiency. The core legal question was whether these judicial observations were extraneous, unsupported by the record, and unwarranted. Upon reviewing the documentary evidence, including internal reports from the Project Incharge and communications between the Provincial Government and the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, the Supreme Court found that the record substantiated the High Court's findings regarding the appellant's performance and conduct. The Court held that the remarks were based on material produced before the High Court and were within the scope of judicial discretion given the context of the termination. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that no grounds existed for the expunction of the remarks and dismissed the appeal, affirming the principle that judicial observations supported by the record are not subject to expunction.

  Questions settled

  • Can adverse remarks made by a High Court in a judgment be expunged if they are supported by the record?
  • Is a court justified in making observations about a petitioner's conduct when such conduct is relevant to the termination of their employment?
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• Muhammad Fazal vs Tariq Javed and others1990 SCMR 975 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-22
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentstruck off defencedetained in jailservice of noticenext friend
  Summary & questions settled

  Respondents filed an ejectment application against the petitioner, who was confined in jail, through his minor son represented by his mother as next friend. The Rent Controller ordered the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent and future rent at an enhanced rate under section 13(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Upon non-compliance, the petitioner's defence was struck off and his ejectment was ordered. After unsuccessful appeals and a dismissed writ petition, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined contentions that the petitioner, being detained in jail, was not served with notice and that representation through a next friend while alive and reachable in jail was legally incompetent. The Court found that the contentions required consideration, granted leave to appeal, and issued interim directions regarding security and continued deposit of rent at the earlier rate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an ejectment application against a tenant confined in jail is legally valid when the tenant is not personally served with notice in jail?
  • Is it competent to implead a tenant who is alive and in jail through a next friend?
  • Can a tenant's defence be struck off for non-compliance with a rent deposit order when the tenant was condemned unheard?
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• Muhammad Farooq Imam vs Abdul Wahid and 2 others1990 SCMR 981 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-07
  Agreement of AssociationCompensation BookPermanent Transfer Deedpublic auctionleave to appealsettlement authoritiesstatus quo
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a shop acquired through public auction. The core legal question involves the enforceability of an Agreement of Association between the petitioner and the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. Under this agreement, the petitioner provided funds from his Compensation Book to cover the auction price, with a stipulation that if the loan remained unpaid after 1.5 years, the transfer documents would be issued in the petitioner's name. Although the petitioner's claim was initially declared bogus, it was later restored by the Supreme Court. The petitioner sought the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) based on the agreement, but the authorities rejected this, and the High Court affirmed the rejection. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the High Court's factual findings regarding the payment method and the terms of the agreement required further examination. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Agreement of Association providing for the transfer of property upon default of loan repayment is enforceable against the Settlement Authorities?
  • Does the restoration of a previously cancelled claim entitle a party to the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed based on a prior Agreement of Association?
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• Muhammad Doraiz vs The State1990 SCMR 583 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-24
  Hudood lawsappellate jurisdictionretrospective operationcriminal appealZinastatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the petitioner's conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 while reducing his sentence. The core legal question was whether the Lahore High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, given that the appellate forum for Hudood cases had been shifted to the Federal Shariat Court by subsequent amendment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the amendment to Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, which transferred appellate jurisdiction, was not retrospective. Because the criminal occurrence took place on September 5, 1979, the right of appeal had accrued prior to the June 21, 1980 amendment. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the lower courts correctly exercised jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The judgment establishes the principle that jurisdictional amendments regarding appellate forums in Hudood cases do not apply retrospectively to cases where the right of appeal accrued before the amendment's effective date.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amendment to Section 20 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 regarding appellate jurisdiction apply retrospectively?
  • Did the Lahore High Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal for a Hudood offence committed before the 1980 amendment to the Ordinance?
  • When does the right of appeal in a criminal case accrue?
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• Muhammad Din vs The Settlement Commissioner and others1990 SCMR 1656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-22
  evacuee propertyunattractive propertysettlement schemetransfer of propertyauctionlocal occupantdisplaced person
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of an unattractive evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether a local occupant could be transferred an unattractive shop that had failed to fetch a reasonable price in two open auctions, particularly in light of policy decisions regarding such properties. The appellant, a claimant displaced person, had been transferred the shop via negotiation, while the respondent, a local in possession, claimed entitlement based on his prior occupation and subsequent policy directives. The Supreme Court held that the transfer to the respondent was valid. The Court found that the Settlement Authorities' policy decision dated 18-9-1964 specifically mandated that houses and shops failing to fetch reasonable prices in two auctions should be transferred to their occupants if they agreed to pay at least 25% of the reserve price, allowing for the acceptance of belated application forms. The key principle laid down is that where specific policy instructions exist for the disposal of unattractive evacuee property, they override irregular transfers made through private negotiation, prioritizing the rights of the occupant.

  Questions settled

  • Can an unattractive evacuee shop be transferred to a local occupant who was in possession of the property?
  • Does a policy decision regarding the disposal of unattractive property allow for the acceptance of belated application forms?
  • Is a transfer of evacuee property through private negotiation valid when specific policy instructions mandate transfer to the occupant?
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• Muhammad Din vs Noor Alam and 6 others1990 SCMR 959 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-19
  allotment of landfirst allotteecivil revisiondeclaration and injunctionleave to appealproperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court, which had upheld a decree in a suit for declaration and injunction. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the first allottees of land, sought to invalidate an alienation made by a co-defendant based on a subsequent illegal allotment. The petitioner, a defendant in the original suit, challenged the jurisdiction of the courts and argued that the plaintiffs' failure to complete documentation within a reasonable time caused the subsequent complications regarding the property. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's jurisdictional challenge, noting the High Court's correct reliance on established precedent. Regarding the merits, the Court held that the petitioner could not benefit from the alleged inaction or delay of the respondents in finalizing their documentation. Affirming the trial court's reliance on precedent concerning re-allotment, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner's plea regarding entitlement and refused leave to appeal, thereby maintaining the lower courts' findings in favor of the first allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Can a subsequent allottee benefit from the alleged delay of a first allottee in completing documentation?
  • Is a challenge to jurisdiction sustainable when the High Court has correctly relied on established precedent regarding the matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs MRs, Z. A. Malik and others1990 SCMR 207 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  leave to appealcriminal complaintproduction of evidenceanti-corruptiondismissal of complaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's challenge to the dismissal of his criminal complaint. The petitioner had filed a complaint under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 against the respondents, alleging misconduct. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the High Court affirmed this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that he should have been permitted to produce further evidence to substantiate his allegations. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the petitioner failed to provide any foundational documentation, such as an appointment letter, proof of employment, or a service book, to support his claims. The Court held that allowing further evidence would have served no purpose given the complete lack of initial evidence to support the petitioner's assertions. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court refuse to allow the production of further evidence if the petitioner fails to establish a basic evidentiary foundation for their claims?
  • Is an appellate court justified in dismissing a petition for leave to appeal where the petitioner failed to substantiate allegations in the trial court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs The State1990 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-18
  transfer of criminal caseleave to appealtrial Magistrateoath on Holy Quranquashal of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Muhammad Bashir, alongside another accused, was tried by a Magistrate under sections 379 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. During the trial, the petitioner filed an application under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which remained undecided, and subsequently sought a transfer of his case before the Sessions Judge, which was dismissed. His subsequent criminal miscellaneous petition before the Lahore High Court was also dismissed. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether grounds existed for the transfer of the criminal case from the trial court. The Supreme Court held that no valid or sufficient ground for the transfer of the case was advanced by the petitioner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower court's stance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether sufficient grounds exist for the transfer of a criminal trial from one court to another?
  • Can a criminal miscellaneous petition be maintained against the refusal to transfer a case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir and another vs Syed Altaf Hussain Shah through his1990 SCMR 3 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-23
  pre-emptioncourt-fee deficiencysecurity bondZar-e-Panjumrejection of plaintleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendees against the dismissal of their Regular First Appeal by the High Court, which had upheld a pre-emption decree in favour of the respondents. The core legal questions concern whether an alleged deficiency in court-fee warrants the rejection of a plaint under the principles established in Siddique Khan's case, and whether the acceptance of a security bond without a prior order for the deposit of Zar-e-Panjum or a specific direction to submit such a bond justifies non-suiting the plaintiffs under subsection (4) of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, along with the issue of security adequacy. The Supreme Court held that since the exact amount of court-fee deficiency was not determined, there was no default or contumacious act, and the High Court correctly relied on Siddique Khan. Furthermore, in the absence of a specific direction by the court for deposit or furnishing of security, no contravention of law occurred to attract penalties under section 22(4). The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the deficiency in court-fee can be made a ground for rejection of plaint when the exact amount of deficiency has not been determined?
  • Whether the acceptance of a security bond without any order of deposit of Zar-e-Panjum or direction for submission can be made a ground for non-suiting the plaintiffs under subsection (4) of section 22 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  • Does the absence of a specific direction by the court for deposit or furnishing of security prevent the application of penalties under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Banaras vs The Superintendent of Police, Attock and 31990 SCMR 1551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-12
  leave to appealrestoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutiongeneral adjournmentservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal refusing to restore the petitioner's service appeal, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question revolves around whether the general adjournment obtained by the petitioner's counsel on the ground of serious illness implied the adjournment of all his cases, rendering the fixing of the appeal for hearing improper without recalling the general adjournment order, and whether the absence of the petitioner, his junior, or clerk was justified under such circumstances. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding the effect of a general adjournment and the necessity of separate explanations for the absence of the party or juniors require detailed examination. The Court laid down that an order granting a general adjournment to counsel prima facie covers the fixing of cases during that period unless formally recalled.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general adjournment granted to a counsel on the ground of illness imply the adjournment of all his cases during that period?
  • Can a service appeal be fixed for hearing during an active general adjournment granted to the counsel without recalling the said order?
  • Is it necessary to separately explain the absence of a party, junior counsel, or clerk when the lead counsel's absence is already excused due to a general adjournment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh vs The State1990 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  leave to appealculpable homicideself-defenceconvictioncriminal appealappellate review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Bakhsh against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld his conviction and sentence for culpable homicide. The petitioner, along with co-accused, was originally tried for murder and attempted murder. While the trial court acquitted one co-accused and convicted the others, the petitioner remained the sole appellant before the Supreme Court. The core legal questions addressed were whether the petitioner's plea of self-defence was substantiated and whether his conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code was legally sound or should have been reduced to Section 325. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to substantiate the plea of self-defence, and the prosecution's case was proven. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the conviction should be altered to Section 325, finding no evidentiary basis for such a reduction. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision that the conviction was in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a plea of self-defence can be accepted when it is not substantiated by evidence or the prosecution's case?
  • Is a conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when the defence fails to prove circumstances warranting a reduction to Section 325?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding a plea of self-defence when the prosecution case is proven to the hilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim vs Faqir Bakhsh and 23 others1990 SCMR 305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-02
  inheritanceself-acquired propertycustom versus shariatmutationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which set aside the appellate court's decree and restored the trial court's dismissal of a suit for possession through inheritance. The petitioner sought possession of property measuring 20 kanals 4 marlas originally belonging to the last male owner, Bakhshu. The primary question before the court involved determining whether the parties were governed by custom or by the law of Shariat in matters of succession, particularly regarding the share of a daughter, Mst. Hori, in self-acquired property. Upon examining the documentary evidence, including mutations, the Supreme Court observed that the parties were governed by Shariat rather than custom. Holding that the legal points involved are of public importance requiring further consideration by the Court, leave to appeal was granted subject to questions of limitation, requiring the appeal to be made ready on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the parties are governed by custom or by the law of Shariat in matters of succession to self-acquired property?
  • Is a daughter entitled to inherit her share from the self-acquired property of the last male owner under Shariat?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azeem alias Muhammad Azam vs The Additional District1990 SCMR 459 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-16
  interim custodyminorcompromisevisitation rightsguardian judgesurety bond
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition converted into an appeal regarding the interim custody of a minor. The parties reached a compromise during the proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning the interim custody arrangements. The court recorded the terms of the compromise, ordering that the custody of the minor remain with the mother, Mst. Shahnaz Kausar, subject to specific visitation rights for the father, Muhammad Azeem alias Muhammad Azam, to be conducted on alternate Fridays at the office of an Advocate Supreme Court in Multan. Furthermore, the mother and her father executed a surety bond to ensure compliance with the agreed arrangement. The interim arrangement is directed to continue until the final decision of the case by the Guardian Judge, Muzaffargarh, before whom the minor must be produced as directed. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of in terms of the compromise without any order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition regarding the interim custody of a minor be converted into an appeal based on an arrangement between the parties?
  • What provisions can be made for a father's visitation rights during the interim custody of a minor by the mother?
  • Is a surety bond required for the due performance of an interim custody arrangement arrived at between parties?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azam and others vs The State1990 SCMR 1319 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-26
  post-arrest bailunlawful assemblymurderpolice investigationinnocence of co-accusedcriminal conspiracy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a petition for leave to appeal seeking post-arrest bail in a case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the fact that police found several co-accused innocent during investigation renders the case against the remaining named petitioners doubtful, thereby entitling them to bail. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that some persons named in the first information report were found innocent by the police is not sufficient at the bail stage to doubt the active participation of the petitioners, whose names are expressly mentioned in the report and supported by eyewitnesses. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that individual assessment of evidence at the bail stage prevails over police findings regarding other co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finding of innocence by police regarding some co-accused make the case against remaining named accused doubtful for bail?
  • Are petitioners entitled to post-arrest bail when their names are expressly mentioned in the first information report alongside supporting eyewitness accounts?
  • Does police exoneration of certain suspects in the first information report constitute sufficient ground to grant bail to other co-accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub vs The State1990 SCMR 1302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-10
  illegal gratificationanti-corruptiontrap witnessleave to appealcriminal breachconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ayub against the dismissal of his appeal by the Peshawar High Court, which had upheld his conviction and sentence under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The petitioner, a junior arms licence clerk, was tried and convicted by the Special Judge Anti-Corruption for demanding and accepting illegal gratification in the form of tainted currency notes during a trap laid by the anti-corruption staff. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of guilt and the sentence imposed warranted interference and the grant of leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacked merit as the accused had admitted the finding of facts establishing his guilt, and the sentence awarded was appropriate. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that leave to appeal will be denied where factual guilt is admitted and concurrent findings of lower courts are sound.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the accused admits the finding of facts establishing guilt?
  • Is a sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 considered inadequate?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and the High Court be interfered with where the petitioner admits the guilt?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Water and Power Development Authority1990 SCMR 1486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-20
  service matterleave to appealdirect recruitmentretrospective appointmentdeputationnotional promotion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his claim for direct appointment and notional promotion to the post of Senior Officer (Stores) in Grade 18 in WAPDA. The core legal questions involve whether an employee whose interview for direct recruitment was deferred due to being on deputation can claim retrospective direct appointment and notional promotion from the date his colleagues were appointed. The Supreme Court held that since no appointment letter was ever issued to the petitioner pursuant to the 1978 interview and he could not be directly appointed retrospectively, the Tribunal's judgment suffered from no illegality. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine. The key principle laid down is that a candidate cannot claim retrospective direct appointment to a post when no formal appointment letter was issued at the relevant time, notwithstanding that their interview was deferred due to deputation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee can claim retrospective direct appointment when no formal appointment letter was issued at the relevant time?
  • Is a candidate whose interview for direct recruitment was deferred due to deputation entitled to be treated as directly appointed from an earlier date?
  • Whether notional promotion can be granted to a post of direct recruitment for which no appointment order was issued?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs The State and another1990 SCMR 1290 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-09
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationconcurrent jurisdictionmurderleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court recalling the bail granted to the petitioner by the Additional Sessions Judge in a murder and dacoity-related property dispute. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court in setting aside bail granted under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and whether the High Court is precluded from probing the merits when the Sessions Court exercises jurisdiction under the said provision. The Supreme Court held that the High Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction and is not precluded from examining the facts and merits of the case even if bail was granted under Section 497(2), and found no reason to interfere with the High Court's sound reasons for recalling bail. The key principle laid down is that superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of a bail matter on a tentative assessment and may set aside a Sessions Court's bail order under Section 497(2) where justified.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is precluded from probing the facts of a case when bail is granted by the Court of Session under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the practice of superior courts not deciding bail applications on merits when a murder case is fixed for hearing apply where the trial has not started and has been delayed?
  • Can the High Court recall an order of bail granted by an Additional Sessions Judge under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for sound reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and another vs The State1990 SCMR 506 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  commutation of sentencedeath sentencelife imprisonmentbenefit of section 382-Bcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by petitioners convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, who were sentenced to death and fine. During the pendency of the petition, the President of Pakistan commuted the death sentences of all convicts to life imprisonment. Consequently, the petitioners' counsel did not press the petition on merits, requesting only the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the computation of their sentence. The Supreme Court found this request reasonable and held that the petitioners shall be granted the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. in computing the sentence they have yet to undergo. The petition was accordingly dismissed with the said observation, establishing that convicts whose death sentences are commuted to life imprisonment are entitled to the benefit of section 382-B for sentence computation.

  Questions settled

  • Can a convict whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment by the President be granted the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Whether the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applies in the computation of remaining sentence after commutation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and 3 others vs The State1990 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  impersonationfraudulent sale deedcriminal convictionsentencingconcurrent sentencesspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners were convicted by the trial court for offences under sections 419, 420, 423, 468, 471, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, involving the fraudulent execution of a sale deed through impersonation of the complainant. The trial court sentenced each petitioner to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine. On appeal, the Sessions Judge maintained the convictions but reduced the sentence under section 423 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to two years, as the maximum prescribed punishment for that offence was two years, while maintaining the other sentences and ordering them to run concurrently. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent criminal revision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners challenged the sentence, arguing for leniency and noting that the maximum punishment for the offence under section 419 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 was three years at the time of the offence, though it was later increased. The Supreme Court found the established guilt and the sentences awarded to be adequate, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a sentence imposed for an offence under section 423 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 exceed the statutory maximum of two years?
  • Is a sentence of three years for an offence under section 419 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 legally permissible if the maximum punishment at the time of the offence was three years?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and 2 others vs Fateh Muhammad through Legal Heirs1990 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-18
  abatement of appealcustomary lawremand orderpecuniary jurisdictionlegal heirsShariat lawalienation of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a Regular Second Appeal against an order of remand. The plaintiffs had sued for a declaration of ownership based on a gift, challenging a subsequent sale by their father to two defendants. The trial court decreed the suit, but the appellate court remanded the case due to issues regarding pecuniary jurisdiction. During the pendency of the second appeal, one respondent died, and the application to bring his legal heirs on record was time-barred. The High Court dismissed the entire appeal, ruling that the abatement was total rather than partial. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether the abatement was indeed total or partial. However, during proceedings, the Court noted that intervening changes in the law, specifically the enactment of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1983, rendered suits based on customary law liable to abate. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the remand order remained in effect, while noting that the trial court must consider the impact of the new legislation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the death of one respondent in a suit involving co-vendees result in the total abatement of the appeal or only partial abatement?
  • What is the effect of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act (Amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1983 on pending suits for the annulment of alienations based on customary law?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs The State1990 SCMR 199 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-17
  petition for leave to appealanti-corruptionbribesanction for prosecutionconfessiontime-barred petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's appeal against his conviction under section 165-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. The petitioner, a Naib Qasid, was convicted of accepting a bribe with the promise of securing a favourable outcome in an appeal. The trial court and the High Court found him guilty based on the testimony of advocate witnesses, the Additional District Judge, and the petitioner's own confession. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the conviction and the belated objection regarding the lack of sanction for prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the objection regarding sanction, not having been raised before the lower forums, could not be raised for the first time before the apex court. Furthermore, the petition was barred by limitation. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred and on merits, laying down the principle that procedural objections not raised at earlier stages cannot be entertained at the leave to appeal stage.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the absence of sanction for prosecution be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether a petition filed beyond the period of limitation without a satisfactory explanation is liable to be dismissed?
  • Is the testimony of judicial and advocate witnesses sufficient to maintain a conviction under anti-corruption laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Khan vs The State1990 SCMR 1574 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  bailZina-bil-JabrHudood Ordinancediscretionary powermedical evidenceNikah
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioner's bail application in a case registered under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The petitioner was accused of committing Zina-bil-Jabr against the complainant. The petitioner's counsel argued that the First Information Report (FIR) was at variance with the complainant's subsequent statement, medical evidence indicated she was accustomed to sexual intercourse, and she had executed an affidavit stating she voluntarily married the petitioner. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that these arguments had already been considered and rejected by the High Court. Holding that no case was made out to interfere with the discretionary power exercised by the High Court in refusing bail, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between an FIR and a victim's subsequent statement are sufficient grounds for granting bail in a Zina-bil-Jabr case?
  • Does an affidavit of voluntary marriage by the victim automatically entitle an accused of Zina-bil-Jabr to bail?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by the High Court in bail matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf Asghar vs Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1990 SCMR 437 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-10
  service tribunalleave to appealconfirmationcivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Muhammad Ashraf Asghar, a Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Collector, challenging the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 15-6-1981, which had dismissed his service appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal committed any legal error in upholding the service decision concerning the petitioner's confirmation status, particularly in light of a letter dated 13-5-1978 from the Secretary, Board of Revenue Punjab, indicating that he was not yet matured for confirmation. The Supreme Court held that no satisfactory explanation could be offered by the petitioner's counsel to counter the contents of the said letter, and finding no legal error in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal in the absence of any legal error?
  • Does a government servant have an enforceable right to confirmation when considered not yet matured for confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashiq vs The State1990 SCMR 286 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-25
  petition for leave to appealmurdergrievous hurtcriminal appealsentence reductionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, along with two others, was tried for the murder of Abdul Jabbar. The trial court convicted the petitioner under Section 325, Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced him to five years rigorous imprisonment with a fine, while the co-accused were convicted under Section 323, Pakistan Penal Code. On appeal and revision, the Lahore High Court dismissed the appeals and the revision, while adjusting the sentences of the co-accused. The petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the petitioner's conviction and the propriety of the sentence and concessions granted by the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that the petition was entirely devoid of merit, noting that the petitioner had in fact been granted undue concessions by the trial court to which he was not entitled. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed, upholding the concurrent findings and convictions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent convictions for grievous hurt resulting in death is maintainable without substantial grounds?
  • Can the High Court withdraw the benefit under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 while deciding criminal appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Asghar vs Muhammad Ashraf and others1990 SCMR 119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-02
  criminal appealacquittalself-defensemedical evidencecorroborationbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment acquitting the respondents of charges related to a violent altercation that resulted in the death of one individual and injuries to several others. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence and its acceptance of the respondents' plea of self-defense. The Supreme Court, upon re-examining the testimony of the injured prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, found that the respondents' version of events—that the complainant party initiated the aggression and the respondents acted in self-defense—was more probable. The Court noted that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient corroboration for the eye-witness testimony, which contained significant improvements, and that the number of injuries sustained by the deceased did not align with the number of accused persons. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's acquittal was based on a reasonable assessment of the evidence and did not warrant interference. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that where a defense plea appears reasonably possible, the benefit of the doubt must be extended to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court's acquittal can be upheld when the defense version of self-defense appears reasonably possible?
  • Does the failure of the prosecution to provide corroborative evidence for eye-witness testimony justify an acquittal?
  • Is an appellate court required to interfere with an acquittal if the trial court's assessment of the evidence is found to be reasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Superintendent of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 937 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  service tribunaldismissal from servicelimitation periodcondonation of delaypolice constableefficiency and discipline rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner police constable's appeal against his dismissal from service as barred by time. The petitioner was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police for releasing bad characters after receiving illegal gratifications. His departmental appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General was dismissed, and a subsequent second appeal before the Inspector-General was filed as incompetent. The core legal question revolved around whether the time spent pursuing the incompetent second appeal before the Inspector-General warranted condonation of delay for filing the service tribunal appeal, given the revision powers under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. The Supreme Court held that since the rules provide for only one final appeal against an order of dismissal, the limitation period commenced upon communication of the Deputy Inspector-General's appellate order, and the availability of revision powers by the Inspector-General provided no legal justification to condone the delay. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the Tribunal's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does the pendency of an incompetent second departmental appeal justify the condonation of delay for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal?
  • When does the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal commence following the dismissal of a departmental appeal?
  • Does the power of revision vested in an authority under the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 extend the limitation period for approaching the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif vs Mst. Amina Begum and anothers1990 PLD Supreme Court 288 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-27
  rent restrictionconstitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionright of appealsummary ejectmentstatutory interpretationlandlord and tenant
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a rent restriction matter where the High Court dismissed the appellant’s Constitutional Petition, holding that an adequate remedy by way of appeal under Section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was available against an order passed under Section 13-B. The core legal question was whether a final order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 13-B of the Ordinance is appealable under Section 15. The Supreme Court held that Section 13-B constitutes a self-contained code for specific eviction cases, and since the legislature intentionally omitted Section 13-B from the list of appealable orders in Section 15, no appeal lies against such orders. The Court established the principle that where a specific provision like Section 13-B creates a summary procedure for hardship cases without being included in the appellate provisions of Section 15, the omission is deliberate, and the appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party is to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court rather than filing an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is a final order passed by a Rent Controller under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, appealable under Section 15 of the same Ordinance?
  • Does the omission of Section 13-B from the list of appealable orders in Section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, constitute a legislative oversight or a deliberate policy choice?
  • What is the appropriate legal remedy for a party aggrieved by an order passed under Section 13-B of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Arif Chaudhary vs Election Tribunal and others1990 SCMR 547 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-17
  leave to appealelection petitionrecount of votesrecriminationconsistent pleadings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing his Constitution Petition, which challenged an order of the Election Tribunal (Additional District Judge) limiting a previously ordered recount of votes. The Election Tribunal had initially ordered a complete recount of votes from an electoral unit, but subsequently allowed an application by a respondent restricting the inspection and recount, excluding the ballot papers of the petitioner on the ground that no recrimination had been claimed in the written statement. The core legal question concerned whether the omission of a recrimination plea precludes the recounting or inspection of votes initially ordered. The Supreme Court observed that in pleading the correctness of the count, a petitioner could not simultaneously plead its incorrectness as the pleas would be mutually destructive and inconsistent, explaining the absence of a recrimination ground. Finding merit in examining the full implications of the matter, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order for recounting of votes once passed can be subsequently limited or made conditional?
  • Can a party plead the correctness of a count and simultaneously claim its incorrectness without seeking recrimination?
  • Does the absence of a recrimination plea bar the inspection and recounting of ballot papers in an election petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The State1990 SCMR 1283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-15
  criminal petitionsupreme court appealdismissal of petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from criminal proceedings where Muhammad Anwar challenged a lower court decision before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of the petitioner's conviction or sentence as determined by the lower forums. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the impugned judgment. The key principle governing the matter relates to the exercise of the apex court's discretionary jurisdiction under appellate review where no substantial question of law or miscarriage of justice is made out to warrant interference with concurrent findings or lower court orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts when no substantial question of law is made out?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Anwar vs The Deputy Commissioner, Okara1990 SCMR 1457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  disciplinary proceedingsunauthorized absenceservice lawshow-cause noticemisconductdismissal from servicemedical leave
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from the dismissal of a government servant, a Reader in a Magistrate's Court, following disciplinary proceedings initiated for habitual late attendance and failure to reside at his station of posting. The core legal question concerns whether the disciplinary action, including the removal from service, was justified given the petitioner's prolonged unauthorized absence and failure to comply with departmental directives to appear before a Medical Superintendent for verification of medical leave claims. The petitioner had repeatedly failed to respond to show-cause notices, necessitating publication in newspapers, and remained untraceable despite providing an address. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner, and the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Court held that the petitioner's conduct constituted gross indiscipline, noting that he had purposely become untraceable to delay proceedings. The principle laid down is that a government servant cannot evade disciplinary inquiries by remaining willfully untraceable or failing to comply with official directives regarding medical verification, and such conduct justifies dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Does a government servant's failure to appear before a medical authority for verification of leave constitute gross indiscipline?
  • Can a disciplinary authority proceed with dismissal when a government servant remains willfully untraceable to avoid service of notices?
  • Is a finding of gross indiscipline by a service tribunal subject to interference by the Supreme Court when based on factual findings of unauthorized absence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ansar and 3 others vs Ghulam Fatima and 9 others1990 SCMR 1339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-03-25
  pre-emptionleave to appealowner of the estateland revenuecustomary lawIslamic constitutional set-upRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the successors-in-interest of a pre-emptor against the High Court's judgment accepting the respondents' Regular Second Appeal and setting aside the lower courts' concurrent decrees in favor of the plaintiff. The core legal question concerns whether a plaintiff owning land 'in' an estate but not assessed to land revenue qualifies as an 'owner of the estate' for pre-emption purposes under modern Islamic constitutional principles, notwithstanding historical colonial and Hindu legal concepts distinguishing classes of estate inhabitants. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised concerning the applicability of old authorities in the changed Islamic constitutional framework require formal examination, particularly in light of the Shariat court system superseding customary laws and practices. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the evolving concept of the owner of an estate.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an owner of land in an estate who is not assessed to land revenue qualifies as an owner of the estate for pre-emption?
  • Do historical colonial and Hindu concepts regarding class distinctions in rural estates apply under the Islamic constitutional framework of Pakistan?
  • Whether customary law and practices regarding estate ownership survive the introduction of the Shariat court system?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amir vs Additional District Judge and others1990 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-28
  evictionlandlord and tenantadverse possessionrent deedrent controllerejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an eviction application filed by the respondent against the petitioners, who were successors-in-interest of the original occupant of a haveli. The petitioners contested the eviction, denying the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and asserting ownership through adverse possession. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, finding no such relationship existed. However, the Additional District Judge, upon appeal, reappraised the evidence, upheld the validity of a rent deed executed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, and ordered their ejectment. The High Court subsequently declined to interfere with this order. The core legal question was whether the existence of a valid rent deed precludes a claim of adverse possession and establishes the landlord-tenant relationship. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's decision, affirming that the execution of a rent deed by a predecessor-in-interest effectively negates a claim of adverse possession. The court held that once the validity and genuineness of a rent deed are established by the appellate authority, the occupant cannot claim ownership through adverse possession, thereby justifying an order of eviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the execution of a rent deed by a predecessor-in-interest preclude a claim of adverse possession by the successor?
  • Can an appellate court reappraise evidence to overturn a Rent Controller's finding regarding the landlord-tenant relationship?
  • Is a tenant who executes a rent deed estopped from claiming ownership of the premises through adverse possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs The State1990 SCMR 103 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-10
  commutation of sentencedeath penaltypresidential orderlife imprisonmentrevival of appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the grant of leave to appeal specifically regarding the sentence imposed on the appellant. During the pendency of the appeal, a general order issued by the President of Pakistan in December 1988 commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment. Consequently, the appellant was transferred from the death cell to the general section of the jail to serve a life sentence. In light of this development, counsel for the appellant did not press the appeal but requested that the appeal be kept alive, with liberty to revive it on merits should the President's commutation order be modified or the death sentence restored due to pending constitutional challenges in the High Court. The Court found this request reasonable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while granting the appellant explicit liberty to reactivate the proceedings if the legal status of the commutation order changes, thereby preserving the appellant's right to challenge the original sentence should the commutation be revoked.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed while granting the appellant liberty to reactivate the matter if the underlying basis for the commutation of sentence is challenged?
  • Does a general order by the President of Pakistan commuting death sentences to life imprisonment render an appeal against the sentence of death non-pressing?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Syed Tassadaq Hussain Shah and another1990 SCMR 903 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-29
  evacuee trust propertycompensation poolprovisional transfer orderejectmentjurisdictionsettlement laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the ejectment of the appellant from property claimed by respondent No. 1 as a transferee. The core legal question was whether the property in question, having been declared evacuee trust property, was available for transfer under the settlement laws, thereby invalidating the respondent's Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.). The Supreme Court held that the property, being evacuee trust property, never formed part of the compensation pool and was thus not available for transfer. Consequently, the P.T.O. issued to the respondent was without jurisdiction and legally void, as it had been recalled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Court emphasized that the status of the property as evacuee trust property precluded any valid transfer to private individuals. The appeal was accepted, setting aside the lower courts' judgments, as the respondent lacked the legal standing to seek the appellant's ejectment based on an invalid transfer document.

  Questions settled

  • Can property declared as evacuee trust property be transferred under the settlement laws?
  • Does a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) confer valid title if the underlying property is subsequently determined to be evacuee trust property?
  • Does the Deputy Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to transfer property that is not part of the compensation pool?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Ghulam NAB! and 2 others1990 PLD Supreme Court 1201 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-09-01
  striking off defencetentative rent ordersection 13(6)leave to appealrent restrictioneviction orderdefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition seeking leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing the tenant's constitutional writ petition against an eviction order. The eviction was ordered on the ground that the tenant failed to comply with a tentative pre-trial rent deposit order under section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, resulting in the striking off of his defence. The core legal questions involved whether a tentative rent deposit order can be challenged in an appeal against eviction, whether a subsequent finding of no default on merits invalidates the pre-trial order, and whether the Rent Controller retains discretion once non-compliance with section 13(6) is established. The Supreme Court held that while a tenant can challenge a tentative rent deposit order upon final eviction, a subsequent favorable finding on merits does not invalidate a validly passed approximate rent order based on summary inquiry. Furthermore, compliance with section 13(6) is mandatory; upon default without a valid excuse such as impossibility beyond control, striking off the defence is obligatory. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant challenge a tentative pre-trial rent deposit order when appealing against an ultimate eviction order?
  • Does a subsequent finding in the tenant's favor on the main issue of default render a previous tentative rent deposit order invalid or improper?
  • Does the Rent Controller have discretion to refrain from striking off a tenant's defence once default in complying with an order under section 13(6) is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Amin vs Divisional Forest Officer and another1990 SCMR 1484 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-13
  service lawresignationtermination of servicedisciplinary proceedingsFederal Service Tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which upheld the termination of the petitioner, a Junior Clerk, from service. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal erred in its factual and legal assessment by holding that the petitioner’s resignation, submitted on July 3, 1988, and accepted on July 9, 1988, to take effect on August 3, 1988, precluded him from challenging his subsequent removal from service on July 31, 1988. The Supreme Court found that the Tribunal’s reasoning was factually inconsistent and legally unsound, as the petitioner had been removed from service via disciplinary proceedings prior to the effective date of his resignation. The Court held that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the legal implications of the removal order preceding the resignation's effective date. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the Tribunal's reliance on the resignation to dismiss the appeal was erroneous, thereby necessitating further consideration of the legality of the removal order in light of the conflicting timelines.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant's resignation be validly accepted after they have already been removed from service through disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the acceptance of a resignation with a future effective date preclude a government servant from challenging a prior removal from service?
  • Is a Service Tribunal's finding of fact binding when it is based on a chronological impossibility regarding the termination of employment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ameen Shah vs The State1990 SCMR 1121 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  post-arrest bailmurderalibifalse implicationleave to appealcriminal proceduretentative assessment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which declined to grant post-arrest bail to the petitioner, Muhammad Ameen Shah, in a murder case. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail based on his plea of alibi and allegations of false implication due to enmity. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's contention that he was at a different location during the occurrence, supported by claims of police investigation findings, and that he was falsely named in the FIR at the instance of a rival. Upon reviewing the record and the High Court's reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's tentative assessment of the evidence and circumstances was proper. The Court found no sufficient grounds to interfere with the High Court's order and consequently dismissed the petition. The judgment reaffirms the principle that at the bail stage, courts must rely on a tentative assessment of the available material and circumstances rather than conducting a mini-trial on the merits of the defense's alibi or motive claims.

  Questions settled

  • Is a plea of alibi sufficient to grant bail in a murder case where the High Court has already conducted a tentative assessment of the evidence?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's order refusing bail if the High Court's reasoning is based on a proper appraisal of the available record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs The State1990 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-03
  criminal appealHudood lawsZina Ordinanceleave revocationservice reinstatement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the partial acceptance by the Federal Shariat Court of the appellant's appeal, wherein his conviction and sentence under section 10(2) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979 were upheld. The appellant, a former Foot Constable in the Police, challenged his remaining conviction primarily to seek reinstatement in service, having already served out his substantive sentence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan heard the learned counsel for the appellant and examined the matter. The Court held that the case no longer merited re-examination. Consequently, the Court withdrew the leave granting order and dismissed the appeal. The key principle laid down is that where a sentence has been fully served and the primary remaining grievance relates to service matters, the Court may decline to re-examine concurrent findings of lower appellate forums on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal against a criminal conviction should be re-examined when the appellant has already served out the sentence and seeks the appeal solely for reinstatement in service?
  • Can the Supreme Court withdraw a leave granting order upon re-evaluation of the merits or circumstances of a case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Sakina Bibi and others1990 SCMR 1180 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-01
  leave to appealmortgage redemptionsub-mortgageacknowledgementlimitationcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  Muhammad Ali seeks leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 18-2-1987, which dismissed his civil revision against the concurrent findings of the lower courts in favour of the respondents. The dispute originates from a mortgage created in 1891, where the original mortgagee transferred rights to the respondents' predecessor. The petitioner's second application for redemption before the Collector was initially decreed in 1968, prompting the respondents to file a successful declaratory suit that the order was void, as they had become owners. The lower courts and the High Court dismissed the petitioner's challenges. The core legal question concerns whether the creation of a sub-mortgage by a mortgagee in favour of another constitutes an acknowledgement under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that this raises a question of public importance requiring consideration, and accordingly granted leave to appeal, directing status quo to be maintained in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the creation of a sub-mortgage by a mortgagee in favour of another mortgagee constitutes an acknowledgement within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act?
  • Is a second application for redemption maintainable after the dismissal of the first application by the Collector?
  • Whether an order of the Collector allowing redemption subsequent to a dismissal is void when the mortgagees have acquired ownership rights over time?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali vs Mukhtar and others1990 SCMR 282 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  leave to appealacquittalocular evidenceappreciation of evidencecriminal revisiondefense witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The respondents had been convicted by the trial court, but the High Court subsequently set aside the conviction and acquitted them. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence, specifically by failing to consider the testimony of a defense witness, Mst. Hanifan Bibi, who allegedly implicated the accused, and whether the ocular account of the prosecution was properly evaluated. The Supreme Court found merit in the petitioner's contention that the High Court had improperly ignored the testimony of the defense witness by summarily dismissing it as irrelevant to the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to re-examine the ocular evidence and the specific testimony of the witness in question. The key principle established is that a High Court must engage with and properly evaluate all material evidence, including defense testimony, rather than dismissing it without consideration when determining the validity of a conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal if the High Court failed to consider material evidence?
  • Is it legally permissible for a High Court to dismiss the testimony of a defense witness without evaluating its relevance to the case?
  • Does the failure of the High Court to refer to specific ocular evidence in its judgment constitute a ground for granting leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ali and others vs The State and others1990 SCMR 582 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-05
  quashment of criminal proceedingscriminal procedureleave to appealremand of caseframing of charge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had partly accepted a petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for the quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 325/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 arising from case 'State v. Muhammad Ali and two others'. The core legal question concerned whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the entire proceedings and instead remanding the case to the trial court for framing a fresh charge against two of the petitioners. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court was unexceptionable as the remand order directed the trial court to proceed in accordance with law. Consequently, the Court laid down that where criminal proceedings do not warrant total quashment, a partial remand for framing fresh charges and proceeding according to law is legally sound. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can criminal proceedings be partly quashed while remanding the matter to the trial court for framing fresh charges?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order remanding a criminal case to the trial court to proceed in accordance with law?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an order refusing full quashment of criminal proceedings under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad AKSARPetit loner vs The State1990 SCMR 1053 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-14
  culpable homicideself-defencestatement of accusedsplitting of confessionadmissionacquittalSection 342 CrPC
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the conviction of the petitioner, Muhammad Aksar, for culpable homicide. The petitioner was initially convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, based largely on his own statement under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, wherein he admitted to part of the occurrence but claimed self-defence. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in splitting the petitioner's statement, accepting the incriminating portion while rejecting the exculpatory plea of self-defence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court deviated from the established legal principle that an accused's statement or confession cannot be split up to use only the incriminating part against them. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction, allowed the appeal, and acquitted the petitioner. The key principle laid down is that an admission or statement made by an accused, whether amounting to a confession or not, must be accepted as a whole and cannot be dissected to selectively incriminate the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court split an accused's statement made under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to accept only the incriminating portion?
  • Is it legally permissible to use only the incriminating part of an accused's admission while rejecting their plea of self-defence?
  • Does the principle that a confession cannot be split up apply to statements made by an accused under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram vs Additional District Judge and 2 others1990 SCMR 8 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  tenancy disputeeviction ordercompromise deedvacation of premisesstatutory periodappellate jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an appeal by a tenant against eviction orders, which had been previously upheld by the High Court. Upon the grant of leave to appeal, the parties presented a deed of compromise before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The compromise agreement, signed by both the appellant and the respondent along with their respective legal counsel, stipulated that the appellant would vacate the disputed shop by a specific date. Furthermore, the respondent undertook to occupy the premises and commence business within the statutory period, with a default clause providing that failure to do so would result in the immediate restoration of the appellant's tenancy under the existing terms and conditions. The Supreme Court, having reviewed the compromise and finding it to be genuine, determined there were no legal impediments to its acceptance. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal in terms of the compromise, effectively disposing of the matter without an order as to costs, thereby affirming the validity of private settlements in tenancy disputes when voluntarily entered into by the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court dispose of an appeal based on a compromise deed presented by the parties?
  • Is a compromise agreement regarding the vacation of a tenanted shop enforceable when signed by both parties and their counsel?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akram and others vs Khan Muhammad1990 SCMR 1699 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-03
  pre-emption suitpreliminary issuepreliminary decreeorder of remandrevision petitioncivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court partially accepting the respondent's appeal against an order of remand passed by the District Court. The core legal question was whether the decision of a trial court on a preliminary issue regarding the nature of a transaction (sale versus exchange) in a pre-emption suit could be treated as a preliminary decree. The Supreme Court held that the decision on the preliminary issue by no means constituted a preliminary decree, nor did challenging it through a revision petition convert it into one. The Court ruled that the appellants were entitled of right to challenge the preliminary issue finding along with the final judgment and decree, and that the High Court erred in treating it as a final preliminary decree. The appeal was accordingly allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the order of remand passed by the District Court was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decision of a trial court on a preliminary issue be regarded as a preliminary decree?
  • Whether a revision petition against a preliminary issue finding becomes infructuous upon the final decision of the suit?
  • Are parties entitled of right to challenge a preliminary issue finding when appealing the final judgment and decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar vs The State and 2 others1990 SCMR 301 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  criminal revisionacquittalappreciation of evidencesolitary statementleave to appealinterested witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which accepted a criminal revision petition and acquitted respondents Nos. 2 and 3 of charges under section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, setting aside their convictions and sentences previously awarded by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question involved the propriety of the High Court's re-appraisal of evidence in revision, particularly regarding the reliance on a solitary statement of an interested complainant with a background of enmity, and the discrediting of eye-witness testimony. The Supreme Court held that the findings recorded by the High Court were unexceptional and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court in revision when the appreciation of evidence regarding the unreliability of eye-witnesses and the interested nature of the complainant's testimony is sound and free from legal defect.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court judgment setting aside a conviction and acquitting the accused in revision?
  • Is the conviction of an accused sustainable on the solitary statement of an interested complainant with a background of enmity when eye-witnesses have been disbelieved?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akhtar Bajwa vs Federal Government of Pakistan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 998 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-06-13
  civil servantjurisdictionfederal service tribunalliendeputationsenioritytransferred employee
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court arose from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction because the appellant was not a civil servant of the Federal Government and remained an employee of the Punjab Police. The core legal question was whether the appellant, having been transferred from the Provincial Railway Police to the newly constituted Pakistan Railways Police upon the promulgation of the Pakistan Railways Police Ordinance, 1976 and the subsequent Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977, had become a permanent employee of the Federal Government. The Supreme Court held that while statutory transfer under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 does not automatically terminate a provincial employee's lien without confirmation or formal termination of lien, the Tribunal erred in failing to determine whether the appellant had lost his lien over his substantive post and whether he had been confirmed as a Federal civil servant. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision after impleading the Punjab Government and examining the relevant records.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the transfer of personnel from the Provincial Railway Police to the Pakistan Railways Police under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 automatically terminates their lien in the provincial police?
  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have jurisdiction over an appeal filed by an employee whose status as a Federal civil servant remains undetermined regarding the termination of his provincial lien?
  • Whether personnel transferred under Section 5 of the Pakistan Railways Police Act, 1977 are to be treated as permanent employees or deputationists prior to confirmation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar vs The State and another1990 SCMR 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  bail cancellationZina Biljabrchemical examiner reportcriminal petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court Multan Bench, which cancelled the post-arrest bail previously granted to the petitioner. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner under sections 10 and 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, on the allegation of committing Zina Biljabr. The Additional Sessions Judge had initially granted bail to the petitioner due to the non-receipt of the chemical examiner's report. Upon receipt of the report, the High Court cancelled the bail upon an application by the complainant. The petitioner challenged this cancellation before the Supreme Court, raising grounds such as delay in lodging the F.I.R., absence of violence marks, the complainant being used to sexual intercourse, and the solitary nature of the statement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in cancelling the bail based on the subsequent chemical report and the circumstances of the case, declining to interfere. The petition was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail granted by a lower court be cancelled upon the subsequent receipt of an incriminating chemical examiner report?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretion in cancelling bail under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the absence of marks of violence and a delay in the F.I.R. warrant maintaining bail in a Zina Biljabr case?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Akbar and another vs The State1990 SCMR 1129 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-04
  bail bond forfeituresurety liabilitynon-appearance of accusedmilitary dutypenalty reductioncriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that had reduced, but not eliminated, the penalty imposed on sureties for the non-appearance of an accused person. The core legal question was whether sureties should be held liable for the forfeiture of bail bonds when the accused, a member of the Army's Special Services Group, failed to appear in court due to being deployed on classified operational duty in the national interest. The Supreme Court held that the sureties were not liable for the absence of the accused, as his failure to appear was beyond their control and did not constitute abscondence. The Court set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, ruling that the bail bonds were not liable to forfeiture. The key principle laid down is that where an accused's non-appearance is due to legitimate, unavoidable circumstances such as military service in the national interest, and not due to the fault or connivance of the sureties, the sureties cannot be penalized for the breach of the bond.

  Questions settled

  • Are sureties liable for the forfeiture of bail bonds if the accused fails to appear due to military service?
  • Can a court impose a penalty on sureties when the accused's absence is beyond the control of the sureties?
  • Does the failure of an accused to appear due to operational military duty constitute abscondence for the purpose of bond forfeiture?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal vs The State1990 SCMR 267 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  amendment of chargetheftOffences Against Propertyappellate forumalteration of chargecompetence of trial courtdelay of proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the trial court's rejection of an application for amendment of charge. The petitioners, facing trial before an Additional Sessions Judge under Sections 302, 307, 379, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought at the arguments stage to amend the theft charge under Section 379 to Section 13 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979, contending that Section 3 of the Ordinance rendered Section 379 inapplicable and altered the appellate forum. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, refusing leave to appeal. The Court held that the trial judge was competent to take cognizance under both statutes, the trial was incomplete, and the court retains power under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to alter charges prior to judgment. Furthermore, questions regarding the appellate forum were premature at the argument stage and the application appeared designed to prolong proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a trial court alter or amend a charge under Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 at any time before the announcement of judgment?
  • Does an objection regarding the potential appellate forum warrant interference with charge framing before the conclusion of trial and pronouncement of sentence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable against an interlocutory order refusing to amend a charge where the trial court possesses jurisdiction under both competing penal statutes?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal Shah vs Mazhar Hussain and others1990 SCMR 245 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-22
  leave to appealacquittalre-appraisal of evidenceinterested witnessesrecovery of weaponscriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a Lahore High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The prosecution alleged that the respondents, along with others, attacked the deceased, Nazar Shah, resulting in his death, with the motive being a long-standing enmity. The trial court had convicted the respondents under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing them to death. The High Court subsequently acquitted them. The petitioner challenged this acquittal, arguing that the eye-witness testimony, though from interested witnesses, was corroborated by the recovery of weapons at the respondents' pointation and the prompt filing of the F.I.R. The Supreme Court observed that the arguments raised a substantial question regarding the re-appraisal of evidence to determine if the High Court's decision aligned with established legal principles for criminal justice. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased required a thorough review of the evidence to ensure justice was served.

  Questions settled

  • Does the recovery of weapons at the pointation of the accused provide sufficient corroboration to sustain a conviction based on the testimony of interested witnesses?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment rendered by the High Court?
  • Is the re-appraisal of evidence permissible in a petition for leave to appeal when the High Court's acquittal is challenged on the grounds of misreading of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Afzal and 19 others vs Board of Revenue, Punjab through Secretary (Colony) and 3 others1990 SCMR 551 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  interim reliefwrit petitionleave to appealsupreme court practiceinterim order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an interim order passed by the High Court during the pendency of the petitioners' writ petition, whereby the High Court declined to grant interim relief to the petitioners in connection with the recovery of a certain sum of money. The core legal question concerns whether interference is warranted against a discretionary interim order passed by the High Court refusing interim relief while the main writ petition remains pending. The Supreme Court held that there is no justification to modify the interim order of the High Court as it is neither contrary to any law nor departs from any established legal principle. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that discretionary interim orders of the High Court will not be lightly interfered with by the apex court unless tainted by illegality or perversity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an interim order of the High Court refusing interim relief during the pendency of a writ petition?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted against an interim order when the main writ petition is still pending before the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah vs The Inspectorgeneral of Police and 2 others1990 SCMR 1007 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  service appealdismissal from servicesummary proceduredepartmental inquirycriminal acquittalpolice constableleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Constable dismissed from service following summary proceedings for dereliction of duty, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the dismissal of his appeal by the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned whether summary proceedings and the omission of a formal inquiry vitiated the dismissal when facts were controverted, and whether a subsequent acquittal in a criminal case based on similar facts warranted setting aside the departmental dismissal. The Supreme Court held that where a public servant is apprehended pari delicto by a superior, shorter inquiry procedures are legally permissible under established precedent, and that an acquittal in a criminal trial does not invalidate departmental proceedings when the departmental charges encompass broader and more serious derelictions not forming the subject-matter of the criminal trial. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that summary departmental inquiries are justified under appropriate factual circumstances and remain distinct from criminal prosecutions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether summary departmental proceedings can be adopted instead of a formal inquiry when a public servant is apprehended in the act of committing a dereliction of duty?
  • Does an acquittal in a criminal case automatically invalidate a departmental dismissal based on similar facts?
  • Can broader charges in departmental proceedings prevent an acquittal under criminal law from reacting in favour of the accused employee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Abdullah and others vs Mumtaz Begum and 5 others1990 SCMR 691 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-04
  leave to appealspecific performancerevisional jurisdictionbona fide purchaserIslamic lawdisclosure of defect
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the acceptance of a civil revision by the High Court in a suit for specific performance. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact rendered by the two lower courts in favour of the petitioners. The Court also considered the applicability and effect of established judicial precedents regarding specific performance, as well as the provisions of section 27(h) of the Specific Relief Act in conjunction with Islamic law principles requiring vendors to disclose defects in title or property to subsequent vendees, and how such principles impact the plea of bona fides and lack of notice raised by second vendees. The Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions in detail, directing the preparation of the appeal on the existing record with security fixed at Rs. 5,000.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the case was fit for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court when the two courts below had rendered findings in favour of the petitioners?
  • Whether it was necessary for the courts below to apply principles of Islamic Law requiring vendors to disclose defects in title or property to the second vendees under section 27(h) of the Specific Relief Act?
  • What is the effect of the disclosure principle on the plea of the second vendees regarding their bona fides and lack of notice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aalam vs Chiragh Din1990 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  compromiseout-of-court settlementcivil appealpermanent injunctionsuit for declaration
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a plaintiff in a civil suit concerning a declaration and permanent injunction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the parties could settle the dispute through an out-of-court compromise at the appellate stage and whether such a compromise could be formally recorded and made part of the court's order. Upon representation by learned counsel for both parties that a genuine compromise deed had been executed and that no legal impediments existed to its implementation, the Court accepted the compromise. The Court held that the petition for leave to appeal should be converted into an appeal and disposed of in accordance with the terms of the compromise deed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court possesses the authority to record and give effect to a compromise reached between parties during appellate proceedings, thereby disposing of the matter in terms of the settlement, provided the compromise is verified as genuine and legally permissible.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal to give effect to a compromise between parties?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to dispose of a matter in terms of a compromise deed reached between parties during appellate proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhamamad Dawood vs Superintending Engineer, Operation Circles, WAPDA, Quetta and 2 others1990 SCMR 1252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-25
  dismissal in defaultnon-prosecutionadditional evidenceremand of caseofficial witnesscivil procedureelectricity charges
  Summary & questions settled

  The plaintiff filed a civil suit challenging exorbitant electricity installation and consumption charges levied by WAPDA for a tube-well. During trial, after examining three witnesses, the plaintiff's evidence was closed by the court due to the non-attendance of an official witness from WAPDA, and the suit was subsequently dismissed in default for the plaintiff's non-appearance. The appellate court upheld the dismissal and declined an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to produce additional evidence. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the record and held that the plaintiff had fulfilled his legal responsibility regarding the summoning of the official witness, and the courts below erred in penalising the plaintiff for the non-appearance of the official witness whose summons had unserved status without explanation. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, remanded the matter to the High Court for disposal as a pending appeal, and permitted the production of additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution is proper when sufficient evidence exists on the record?
  • Whether a case should be remanded for examining an official witness whose summons remained unserved without fault of the plaintiff?
  • Is there justification for admitting additional evidence in appellate proceedings when the failure to produce the witness in the lower court was due to court or official omission rather than plaintiff's negligence?
  Read full judgment →
• Mubashir Hussain vs Punjab Province through Secretary, Finance1990 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-07-31
  civil servantservice tribunalpremature appealfinal orderleave to appealpay revisionrelaxation of rules
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a civil servant against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his service appeal as premature. The core legal question was whether the departmental letters and the refusal of a relaxation in rules constituted a final appealable departmental order under the relevant service laws. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the service appeal was indeed premature as the challenged communications were merely seeking clarifications or refusing discretionary relaxations rather than being final determinative orders affecting the petitioner's terms and conditions of service. The Court affirmed that an appeal before the Service Tribunal is incompetent when the departmental authorities have yet to pass a final adverse order. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused, establishing that civil servants cannot maintain a service appeal against non-final correspondence or the refusal of discretionary rule relaxations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is competent against a departmental communication seeking clarifications regarding service records?
  • Does the refusal of a relaxation in service rules constitute a final appealable order for a civil servant?
  • Can a civil servant maintain a service appeal when the departmental authorities have yet to pass a final adverse order concerning their terms and conditions of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubatda vs The State1990 SCMR 895 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-06
  ZinaLeave to appealTrial court dutyCriminal procedureMiscarriage of justiceEvidence examinationBail suspension
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction for the offence of Zina. The core legal question was whether the trial court failed to perform its mandatory duty to examine relevant evidence and reconcile conflicting versions of the accused's marital status, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and Section 165 of the Evidence Act 1872 to summon and examine crucial documents, specifically conflicting Nikahnama records, which were essential to the defence's case. The Court emphasized that a trial judge has an active duty to ensure justice is done, particularly when the defence is inadequately presented due to counsel's negligence or the accused's lack of resources. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and suspended the petitioner's sentence pending the final outcome. The principle laid down is that a trial court must actively marshal evidence and cannot remain a passive observer when material documents on record could resolve fundamental issues of guilt or innocence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a trial court have a duty to summon and examine material evidence on record even if the defence fails to highlight it?
  • Can a conviction for Zina be sustained if the trial court fails to reconcile conflicting evidence regarding the validity of a marriage?
  • Is a trial court's passive participation in a criminal trial considered a ground for potential miscarriage of justice?
  • Under what circumstances can a trial court exercise its powers under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zubaida Mumtaz Begum and others vs Mst. Ikram Jan and another1990 SCMR 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-25
  restoration of appealdismissal for defaultnon-appearanceaffidavit as evidencepartition suitleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision petition by the High Court, which had upheld the District Judge's order restoring a partition appeal that was earlier dismissed for default. The core legal question is whether the affidavit submitted by a counsel in support of an application for restoration can be treated as valid evidence to explain non-appearance, and whether the District Judge was competent to rely upon it. The Supreme Court held that the District Judge was fully competent to consider and act upon the affidavit of the counsel detailing the reasons for his absence, especially when the restoration application was filed on the very day of dismissal. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that an affidavit sworn by a counsel detailing reasons for non-appearance constitutes valid material upon which a court may exercise its discretion to restore a dismissed matter.

  Questions settled

  • Can an affidavit submitted by a counsel in support of an application for restoration be treated as evidence to explain non-appearance?
  • Is a District Judge competent to act upon the affidavit of a counsel in preference to a counter-affidavit when considering the restoration of an appeal dismissed in default?
  • Whether satisfactory cause for non-appearance is established when a restoration application is filed on the very day the appeal was dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zohra Bibi vs Additional District Judge and others1990 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-12-17
  ejectmentpersonal needbona fideconstitutional jurisdictionrent restrictionfindings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the appellant's Constitution petition in limine against the appellate order setting aside her ejectment petitions. The appellant, a widow, had sought the ejectment of the respondents from her shop on grounds including personal need for her son to start a business. The Rent Controller ordered ejectment, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding the plea of personal need lacking in bona fides because the appellant had previously rented out another vacated shop to a third party instead of using it and because newly constructed shops were vacant. The core legal question was whether the appellate authority's finding of fact regarding lack of bona fide personal need warranted constitutional interference. The Supreme Court held that the finding of fact by the appellate authority was neither fanciful nor arbitrary and could not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. The principle laid down is that findings of fact on the bona fides of personal need rendered by a competent rent appellate forum, based on tangible evidence, are final and immune from interference under constitutional jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the bona fides of personal need recorded by a rent appellate authority can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does the subsequent letting out of a previously vacated shop affect the bona fides of a landlord's claim for personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zaitun Begum and others vs Agha Qasim Ali and others1990 SCMR 1613 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-05-16Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab vs Kamal Khan alias Kamla1990 PLD Supreme Court 1051 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-07-12
  inheritanceMuslim Family Laws Ordinanceper stripespredeceased sonIslamic law of inheritancesuccessionpropositus
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns the interpretation of Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, specifically regarding the inheritance rights of children of a predeceased son or daughter of a propositus. The core legal question was whether Section 4 entitles such grandchildren to the entire share their parent would have inherited, or if it merely provides an opportunity to obtain their Islamic Law shares, without increasing them or excluding other legal heirs. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 does not grant grandchildren a larger share than what they would be entitled to under Islamic Law through their parents. The Court ruled that the provision is intended to protect the interests of grandchildren without depriving other legal heirs of their rightful inheritance. The ratio decidendi is that the distribution must be made per stripes, meaning the estate is divided based on the share the predeceased parent would have received, which is then distributed among the grandchildren according to Islamic Law. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Section 4 cannot be interpreted to exclude other legal heirs or to grant grandchildren more than their Islamic entitlement.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, entitle the children of a predeceased son to inherit the entire share their parent would have received if alive?
  • Can Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, be interpreted to exclude other legal heirs of the propositus from their share of inheritance?
  • Is the distribution of inheritance under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, subject to the principles of Islamic Law of Inheritance?
  • Does the principle of 'per stripes' under Section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, allow grandchildren to receive a larger share than they would be entitled to under Islamic Law?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zainab Bibi vs The State and another1990 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-05
  culpable homicideintention vs knowledgesentence enhancementcriminal revisionleave to appealfatal injuriesnon-vital parts
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a criminal revision filed by the petitioner, the wife of the deceased, seeking the enhancement of the respondent's sentence from life imprisonment to death following his conviction for the murder of his brother. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in acquitting the respondent of the charge under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and instead convicting him under Section 304, Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the respondent lacked the specific intention to kill, as evidenced by the fact that the fatal blows were inflicted on non-vital parts of the body (forearm and leg) despite the absence of anyone to intervene. The Court held that the respondent acted with the knowledge that his actions could cause death, rather than the intent to kill, thereby justifying the conviction under Section 304, Part-II. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, affirming the lower court's reasoning regarding the distinction between intention and knowledge in homicide cases.

  Questions settled

  • Does the infliction of injuries on non-vital body parts negate the intention to commit murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • When does an act of homicide fall under the purview of Section 304, Part-II of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 302?
  • Is the absence of intervention by third parties a relevant factor in determining the intention of an accused in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Zahida alias Zubeda Zahoor vs Deputy Director, Health Services, Bahawalpur Division and another1990 SCMR 1504 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-01
  service appeallimitationcondonation of delaytermination of serviceleave to appealwilful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging a judgment of the Service Tribunal which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner's services were terminated on 30-5-1985 due to willful absence from duty, and her departmental appeal was dismissed on 3-6-1986. She subsequently filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 2-9-1986 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908. The petitioner contended that she was not timely informed of the departmental appellate order and had applied for an attested copy. However, the Service Tribunal rejected these grounds, finding that the decision was dispatched to her recorded address, the allegation regarding the attested copy was contradicted by the filing of a mere photocopy, and no valid explanation was provided for the delay. The Supreme Court affirmed the Service Tribunal's decision, holding that there was no legal infirmity in the Tribunal's exercise of discretion regarding condonation of delay. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide a sufficient explanation for delay in filing a service appeal justify the refusal of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution where the Service Tribunal has lawfully exercised its discretion in dismissing an appeal as time-barred?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Umme Khatoon vs Mst. Umme Salam1990 PLD Supreme Court 755 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-16
  rent evictionpersonal bona fide requirementlandlord and tenantstatutory noticerent restrictionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment setting aside an eviction order granted by a Rent Controller. The appellant, a landlady, sought eviction of the respondent on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement of the premises. The High Court had overturned the Controller's order, citing the absence of personal requirement grounds in the statutory notice, inconsistencies in the landlady's affidavit, and a lack of proof regarding the pendency of a rent case against the landlady's son. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the High Court's reasoning was flawed. The Court ruled that a statutory notice under the relevant rent ordinance does not require the mention of personal requirement to establish bona fide need. Furthermore, the Court established that where a landlord resides in a rented house or with a son who occupies a rented house, this is sufficient to establish good faith for personal requirement unless mala fides are proven. The Court restored the Controller's eviction order, emphasizing that the landlady's right to occupy her own property is not negated by temporary stays with family members.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to mention the ground of personal requirement in a statutory notice issued under Section 13-A of the Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Does a landlord's temporary residence with family members negate their claim of personal bona fide requirement for their own property?
  • Is the fact that a landlord resides in a rented house sufficient to establish good faith for an eviction application based on personal need?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tahira vs Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and others1990 SCMR 852 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-02-18
  guardians and wardscustody of minorhizanatvested right of motherleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining concurrent findings of lower courts that the respondent mother, being the real mother of the minor girl, possessed a vested right of 'hizanat'. The core legal questions involve whether section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 applies when custody of a minor was obtained by an agreement, and whether the non-joinder of the paternal-grandmother renders the custody application incompetent. The Supreme Court held that section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 is attracted where custody is denied to a mother based on a disputed agreement, and that a real mother possessing no disqualifications holds a superior vested right of 'hizanat' over a paternal-grandmother. The petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 apply to a case where custody of a minor was obtained on the basis of an agreement?
  • Does a real mother have a superior vested right of hizanat over a paternal-grandmother when she is otherwise qualified?
  • Does the failure to implead a paternal-grandmother render a custody application under section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 incompetent?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Tabbasum Tarar vs Shabbir Hussain Chowdhry and others1990 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-01-09
  ejectmentexecution proceedingstenancy rightspartnership deedrent controllerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Sindh High Court, which had set aside an order of the Rent Controller dismissing an execution application. The petitioner, a landlord, had obtained an ejectment order against the first respondent for default in rent payment. Subsequently, other respondents (partners of the first respondent) obstructed the execution of the ejectment order by filing separate civil suits claiming tenancy rights, which were dismissed. The Rent Controller initially held that these partners did not acquire independent tenancy rights and were liable to be ejected under the original order. However, the High Court allowed the respondents' appeal. The Supreme Court, noting the conflicting judgments rendered by various courts regarding the status of the partners and the enforceability of the ejectment order against them, determined that the matter required further judicial consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the legal controversy surrounding the execution of the ejectment order against third parties claiming tenancy through a partnership arrangement.

  Questions settled

  • Can partners of a tenant claim independent tenancy rights to obstruct the execution of an ejectment order against the primary tenant?
  • Does a partnership deed involving the tenant and third parties automatically confer tenancy rights upon those third parties?
  • Can an ejectment order passed against a primary tenant be executed against partners who claim to be in possession of the premises?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sughran Bibi and others vs Member, (Consolidation), Board of Revenuf, Punjab, Lahore and others1990 SCMR 399 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-30
  consolidation schemeboard of revenuewrit petitionleave to appealland classificationconsent
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' writ petition regarding a consolidation scheme dispute in village Mundranwala, Tehsil Daska, District Sialkot. The consolidation scheme was originally confirmed in 1966, following which the petitioners litigated alleging a reduction in their entitlement. Their revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, was dismissed because the scheme had been confirmed pursuant to their written consent given on 29 October 1966. The High Court subsequently dismissed their writ petition, noting that the petitioners actually obtained more area in class III land than their previous holding and that no reduction occurred when calculated by land classification. The Supreme Court addressed whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding land entitlement and written consent warranted interference. Holding that the findings of fact called for no interference, the Court dismissed the petition, establishing that concurrent factual determinations regarding land classification and consent in consolidation proceedings shall not be disturbed by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding land entitlement in consolidation proceedings can be interfered with?
  • Does a consolidation scheme confirmed pursuant to written consent bind the parties?
  • Whether obtaining more area in class III land negates claims of reduction in entitlement?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamshad Begum vs Muhammad Amin and 13 others1990 SCMR 638 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-19
  dismissal in defaultrestoration of appealleave to appealdeclaratory suitabsence of counselprocedural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a declaratory suit where the petitioner's appeal was dismissed in default by the District Court, and a subsequent application for restoration was also rejected. The High Court affirmed the dismissal, primarily reasoning that the petitioner failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the absence of her engaged counsel on the date of the hearing. The petitioner contends that she intended to appear personally to pursue the appeal but was prevented by an unfortunate incident, arguing that her personal presence would have precluded the dismissal for default regardless of her counsel's absence. The core legal question concerns whether the dismissal of an appeal for default is sustainable when the litigant offers a plausible explanation for their personal absence, potentially mitigating the absence of legal counsel. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the petitioner's explanation regarding her absence and related issues, including limitation, require further examination. The Court ordered the maintenance of the status quo pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal be dismissed for default if the appellant is absent but provides a valid explanation for such absence?
  • Does the absence of legal counsel justify the dismissal of an appeal if the litigant is prepared to appear personally?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Shamim Akhtar Aurangzaib and others vs Minhajul Abidin Khan1990 SCMR 777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-09-28
  rent restrictionbona fide personal needevictionjoint landlordco-ownershipforfeiture of right to evictMuslim Family Laws
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involved appeals concerning the eviction of tenants from commercial premises based on the personal bona fide need of the landlords. The central legal question, initially framed by the lower courts, was whether the term 'children' in the Rent Restriction Ordinance included a 'step-son' for the purpose of establishing personal need for eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had misconstrued the facts. In both appeals, the individuals for whom the premises were required were not mere step-sons but were, in fact, co-owners and joint landlords of the properties in question. Consequently, the legal question regarding the definition of 'children' and the status of step-sons became academic and irrelevant to the resolution of the cases. The Court held that since the requirement was that of the joint landlords themselves, the eviction applications were maintainable. The Court further rejected arguments regarding the forfeiture of the right to evict due to the alleged re-letting of other premises, noting that the statutory provisions regarding forfeiture were not attracted in these circumstances. The appeals were allowed, and eviction was ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'children' in the Rent Restriction Ordinance exclude a step-son for the purpose of establishing personal bona fide need?
  • Can a joint landlord seek eviction of a tenant for their own personal bona fide use and occupation?
  • Does the re-letting of previously vacated premises by a landlord automatically trigger forfeiture of the right to seek eviction under the Rent Restriction Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Sakina and 2 others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Vehari and another1990 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  revisional orderrehabilitation commissionerallotment of landverified claim-holdervested rightinter partes
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a Constitution petition filed by the successors-in-interest of a verified claim-holder seeking protection of land allotments made in 1951-52 against a general revisional order passed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on 23-11-1956. The core legal question was whether the appellants could challenge the implementation of the 1956 revisional order—which had annulled prior allotments and directed de novo allotments and which was upheld by the Supreme Court in earlier litigation—and whether the appellants had any vested right in the land. The Supreme Court held that the general revisional order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, having been preceded by a hearing and upheld by the superior courts, operated of its own force to annul previous allotments without requiring individual cancellation notices. Furthermore, decisions rendered inter partes in prior litigation bound the parties. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the appellants could not reopen settled matters where no vested right existed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a general revisional order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner operates of its own force to annul previous allotments without individual notices of cancellation?
  • Whether allottees who were not parties to earlier litigation challenging a revisional order can claim the benefit of judgments quashing such orders when a subsequent inter partes decision has attained finality?
  • Does an allottee acquire a vested right in land prior to the final implementation of de novo allotments under a valid revisional order?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Saeeda Khatoon vs Muhammad Ahmed Latifi1990 PLD Supreme Court 389 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-11-05
  tenancy agreementsecurity depositrent defaultevictionstatutory tenancyrent restrictionadjustment of deposit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a High Court judgment dismissing an eviction application against a tenant. The core legal question was whether a security deposit held by a landlord under a tenancy agreement could be adjusted against unpaid rent to absolve a tenant of default, particularly after the initial tenancy agreement expired. The Supreme Court held that the security deposit could not be adjusted against current rent arrears, as the agreement specifically prohibited such adjustment and mandated the deposit be held until the premises were vacated. The Court affirmed that covenants regarding security deposits remain enforceable even after the expiry of the initial lease term, as they do not conflict with rent restriction laws. It was established that security deposits are governed by the specific terms of the tenancy agreement and cannot be unilaterally adjusted by a Rent Controller or court to cover rent defaults. Despite the High Court's legal error regarding the adjustment of the deposit, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the eviction application, noting that the Rent Controller had validly exercised discretion in favor of the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a security deposit held under a tenancy agreement be adjusted against current rent arrears to absolve a tenant of default?
  • Do the terms of a tenancy agreement regarding security deposits survive the expiry of the initial lease term?
  • Does the expiration of a tenancy agreement render the covenant concerning the non-adjustment of a security deposit unenforceable?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rehmoon Mai and 21 others vs Mst. Rasool Bibi and 7 others1990 SCMR 390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  specific performanceagreement to sellconsiderationleave to appealcivil revisionmodification of relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff side against the dismissal of their Civil Revision by the High Court in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The core legal question concerns whether payments of government dues andabadkari done by the petitioners can be treated as valid or adequate consideration for the sale agreement, and whether the court can modify relief or pass a decree upon payment of remaining consideration or partial relief. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the questions raised regarding consideration and potential modification of relief require detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that where an agreement to sell is found genuine, the adequacy and nature of consideration involving collateral acts like payment of government dues and development work require judicial examination for potential relief modification.

  Questions settled

  • Whether payments of government dues and abadkari can be treated as valid consideration for an agreement to sell?
  • Can a court modify the relief sought in a suit for specific performance to grant partial relief or return of consideration?
  • Whether a Civil Revision should be dismissed solely on the ground of lack of consideration when the agreement to sell is found genuine?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others vs Kaneez Fatima and 3 others1990 SCMR 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-28
  leave to appealbar of suitcause of actionrejection of plaintdeclaration and possessionsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of a Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, which had affirmed the lower appellate court's decision holding the petitioners' suit for declaration and possession to be barred under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 due to the rejection of the plaint in an earlier suit. The core legal question concerns whether Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applies when an earlier suit's plaint was rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, and whether the cause of action in both suits was identical. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the applicability of Order II, Rule 2 and the nature of the cause of action require detailed examination. The key principle established is that questions regarding the bar of Order II, Rule 2 following the rejection of a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 merit formal appellate review by the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit when the plaint in the earlier suit was rejected under Order VII Rule 11?
  • Can the subject-matter and cause of action of two successive suits be treated as the same for the purposes of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Rashid Begum vs Abdul Rashid and others1990 SCMR 579 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-23
  cancellation of bailmurder casecircumstantial evidenceconcession of bailexpeditious trialcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from an application filed by Mst. Rashid Begum before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent, Abdul Rashid, who was accused of murder. The core legal question before the Court was whether the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent, in a case involving circumstantial evidence, satisfied the established judicial standards for bail in murder cases. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence, including recovery of a weapon and witness statements regarding the disposal of items in a canal. The Court held that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary value should be left for the trial court to determine. Finding that the respondent was not entitled to the concession of bail under the circumstances, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, cancelled the respondent's bail, and dismissed his separate application for bail. The Court further directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings, emphasizing that bail is not appropriate where circumstantial evidence warrants a full trial examination.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail should be granted in a murder case resting primarily on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to cancel bail granted by the High Court if the discretion was not exercised in accordance with established practice?
  • Is it appropriate for the appellate court to evaluate the evidentiary value of circumstantial evidence at the bail stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Raj Bibi and others vs Ghulam Sarwar and another1990 SCMR 362 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-06
  specific performancepre-emptionagreement to sellprivity of contractleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal regarding the specific performance of an agreement to sell back land. Briefly, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sold land to a respondent who simultaneously executed an agreement to reconvey a portion of the land upon payment within a specified period. Subsequently, that initial sale was successfully pre-empted by another respondent, who was substituted in place of the original vendee. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, but the appellate court reversed it, and the High Court upheld that dismissal. The core legal question is whether an agreement to reconvey land executed by a vendee is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who has been substituted for the vendee by a pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court held that the claim for specific performance is not enforceable against the successful pre-emptor because there is no privity of contract between the pre-emptor and the vendor. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a pre-emptor substituted through a successful pre-emption decree is not bound by an agreement to reconvey entered into by the original vendee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to reconvey land is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who is substituted for the original vendee?
  • Does a pre-emptor who successfully pre-empts a sale become bound by a separate agreement to sell executed by the original vendee?
  • Is there privity of contract between a pre-emptor and the vendor under an agreement executed by the original vendee?
  Read full judgment →
• Mst. Qamar Sultan vs Mst. Lofrin Begum and 2 others1990 SCMR 1646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1990-04-16
  dowerKabin-Namacollusionadverse inferencesecondary evidencecivil revisionproperty disputeconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership of a house, claimed by the appellant (mother-in-law) against the respondent (daughter-in-law) who had been awarded a share in the property as dower. The core legal question was whether the appellant could establish her superior title based on an old Kabin-Nama, despite the respondent’s prior successful litigation against the appellant’s husband and son. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court held that while a certified copy of a document over thirty years old is admissible under Section 90-A of the Evidence Act 1872, the failure to produce the original document without reasonable explanation, combined with the suspicious timing of the suit—filed shortly after the appellant’s family lost the previous litigation—supported a finding of collusion. The Court affirmed that high probabilities and conduct can be considered in determining the genuineness of a claim, and that the appellant failed to prove her case against the respondent’s established interest in the property.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court draw an adverse inference from the non-production of an original document even if a certified copy is admissible?
  • Does the filing of a suit shortly after the failure of related family litigation support a finding of collusion?
  • Under what circumstances can a court reject a claim based on a Kabin-Nama despite the production of a certified copy of the deed?
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• Mst. Nooran vs Altaf Hussain and others1990 SCMR 413 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-20
  enhancement of sentencemurdermitigating circumstancesdeath penaltyimprisonment for lifeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the complainant Mst. Nooran seeking the enhancement of the sentence of respondents Altaf Hussain and Muhammad Sadiq from imprisonment for life back to the death penalty originally awarded by the trial court. The respondents were tried and convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Maqbool Ahmad alias Maloo, which conviction and modified sentence of life imprisonment were upheld by the Lahore High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether mitigating circumstances existed to justify the reduction of the death penalty to imprisonment for life. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in altering the sentence, noting that the respondents acted under the influence of their 80-year-old uncle who was lying ambushed with them. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts may sustain lesser penalties where mitigating factors such as familial influence are present.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the reduction of a death sentence to imprisonment for life when mitigating circumstances are present?
  • Does acting under the influence of an elder co-accused constitute a mitigating circumstance for the quantum of sentence in a murder case?
  • Can a complainant maintain a petition for leave to appeal for the enhancement of a sentence?
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• Mst. Noor Fatima and another vs Begum Bibi and another1990 SCMR 629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  inheritance rightsco-sharerlimitationadverse possessionmutationousterwidow's share
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a civil revision regarding inheritance rights. The core legal question was whether the respondent, a widow of the deceased, was barred by limitation from claiming her share in the property of her late husband, Raj Muhammad, who died in 1954. The petitioners argued that the suit filed in 1976 was time-barred. The Supreme Court upheld the lower appellate court's finding that the respondent's alleged divorce was not proved, establishing her status as a widow and co-sharer. The Court held that in the absence of proof of ouster or adverse possession, the possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be the possession of all co-sharers. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a mutation entry does not, by itself, confer title. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, finding no merit in the challenge, and upheld the respondent's entitlement to her 1/8th share of the inheritance, emphasizing that co-sharers are not subject to limitation when adverse possession is not established.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mutation entry in land records confer title or ownership rights?
  • Is the possession of one co-sharer deemed to be the possession of other co-sharers in the absence of a plea of ouster?
  • Can a claim for inheritance by a co-sharer be defeated by limitation if adverse possession or ouster is not proven?
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• Mst. Noor Bibi and others Inayatullah and anothers vs Abdul Ghani Haji1990 SCMR 1373 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-03-24
  pre-emptionexemption from pre-emptionagricultural landvillage immovable propertyjoint vendeesstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two civil appeals arising out of pre-emption suits involving the interpretation of section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act. The core legal question was whether a sale of land measuring more than two kanals purchased by a village resident qualifies for pre-emption exemption if the area exceeds the statutory limit, and whether a single sale involving multiple vendees can be split up to claim cumulative exemptions. The Supreme Court held that since the area purchased in both cases exceeded the statutory limit of two kanals and the sales could not be broken up into separate transactions per vendee in the absence of evidence of specific individual shares and separate price payments, the exemption was inapplicable. The Court concluded that the sales were not protected from pre-emption, and accordingly dismissed the appeals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale of land exceeding two kanals qualify for exemption under section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
  • Can a single sale involving multiple vendees be broken up into separate sales for the purpose of claiming cumulative exemptions under the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act?
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• Mst. Nigar Bibi and others vs Salahuddin Khan and others1990 PLD Supreme Court 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-22
  ex parte orderservice of summonsinherent powersreview of orderlimitation periodtemporary injunction
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by leave against an order of the Lahore High Court arising from a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction. The core legal question involved the propriety and jurisdiction of recalling an ex parte order passed against respondents who were not duly served with notice for the date of hearing, and whether a judge of the High Court could review an order passed by another judge. The Supreme Court held that a court is duty-bound to recall an ex parte order passed without service of notice upon the affected party, as such an order is without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that another judge is competent to recall such an order under Section 12(2) read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. when the original judge is unavailable, and that an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to set aside an ex parte order is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act providing a three-year period, rather than Article 162. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a court duty-bound to recall an order passed on a date when parties were not duly served?
  • Can another judge of the High Court recall or review an ex parte order passed by a former judge who is no longer on the Bench?
  • Which article of the Limitation Act governs an application under Section 151 C.P.C. to recall an ex parte order?
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• Mst. Naziran vs The Collector, Sialkot and 2 others1990 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-31
  constitutional petitiondivorce noticemaintenance allowanceeffective divorceUnion Council
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had allowed a constitutional petition and quashed maintenance proceedings pending before a local authority. The core legal question revolved around the effectiveness of a notice of divorce sent by the respondent husband to the Chairman of the Union Council, and whether the wife's application for maintenance filed after the expiration of ninety days from the notice was legally maintainable. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the notice of divorce was duly served and its genuineness was not denied by the husband at any stage, the divorce became effective upon the expiry of ninety days under the law. Consequently, the Chairman had no jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with the application for maintenance filed by the appellant after the divorce had taken effect. The key principle laid down is that upon the statutory lapse of ninety days following a valid and undisputed notice of divorce, the divorce becomes effective, divesting the Union Council authorities of jurisdiction to award maintenance to the former wife.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be allowed when factual controversies are raised?
  • Can a Union Council authority award maintenance to a wife after divorce has become effective?
  • Does a notice of divorce become effective after ninety days if its service and genuineness remain undisputed?
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• Mst. Nazeeran and others vs Ali Muhammad and others1990 SCMR 400 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-08-20
  civil revisionmutationproperty ownershiprevenue recordpossessionconcurrent findings of factleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision regarding a property dispute. The respondents/plaintiffs had originally filed a suit for a declaration of ownership and permanent injunction, claiming possession of specific land and challenging the legality of a mutation (Mutation No. 74) in favor of the petitioners. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the Additional District Judge accepted the respondents' appeal, declaring them owners in possession based on an earlier mutation (Mutation No. 162) and finding the petitioners' mutation illegal. The High Court upheld this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the respondents failed to prove the purchase of the property. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, found that the respondents' possession and ownership were established by Mutation No. 162 and consistent revenue records since 1955-56. The Court held that the validity of Mutation No. 162 was a question of fact concurrently decided by the lower courts, and thus, no grounds existed for interference. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a mutation?
  • Does a mutation entry supported by revenue records and oral testimony constitute sufficient proof of ownership and possession?
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