Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Shahadat and others vs Muhammad Hayat and others1989 SCMR 1680 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-17
  declaration of titleinheritancepaternityconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' civil revision regarding a suit for declaration of title over disputed land. The petitioners, claiming to be the sole sons of the deceased owner, Allah Dad, sought to exclude the respondents, Muhammad Hayat and Sikandar, from the inheritance. The core legal question was whether the respondents were the legitimate sons of Allah Dad, or if they were the sons of another man, Fattu, as the petitioners alleged. The trial court, the District Judge, and the Lahore High Court all concurrently found as a matter of fact that the respondents were indeed the sons of Allah Dad and Mst. Bibi, following her divorce from Fattu and subsequent marriage to Allah Dad. The Supreme Court held that since there was a unanimous finding of fact by the three lower courts regarding the respondents' paternity, there was no ground for interference. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are generally not disturbed in appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding paternity?
  • Does the acknowledgment of paternity by a deceased father hold legal weight when the mother was previously married to another man?
  • Is a civil revision maintainable against concurrent findings of fact regarding title and inheritance?
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• Shahab Din through Legal Heirs vs Mst. Khudija Begum and others1989 SCMR 1872 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-18
  consolidation proceedingsunauthorized representationwrit petitionconsent decreeapprobate and reprobateconsolidation scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a consolidation matter where the petitioner challenged the Lahore High Court judgment dismissing his writ petition against orders of consolidation authorities. The core legal question is whether a party can challenge a consolidation scheme and claim unauthorized representation after his authorized agent and son actively participated, consented to, and signed the consolidation resolutions and settlement throughout the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is bound by the conduct of his son who represented him with his implicit authority, especially since the petitioner never appeared personally and had previously accepted similar settlements. The ratio laid down is that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging consolidation proceedings and claiming unauthorized representation when he has accepted benefits under a compromise and when his authorized agent consented to the scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party can challenge consolidation proceedings on the ground of unauthorized representation when his agent actively participated and signed the settlement?
  • Can a petitioner agitate grievances regarding land entitlement that contradict his own conduct and consent given during consolidation proceedings?
  • Whether High Court findings based on a minute examination of the consolidation record warrant interference under leave to appeal?
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• Shah Muhammad vs Pervaiz Hussain1989 SCMR 789 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-13
  civil disputepossession of propertyconcurrent findingsregular second appealappraisal of evidencepetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a civil dispute over a residential plot, where the respondent filed a suit for possession alleging the petitioner took unauthorized possession. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, a decision that was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge and subsequently affirmed by the Lahore High Court through the dismissal of the petitioner's regular second appeal. The core legal question concerns the proper appraisal of evidence regarding ownership and possession of the disputed property. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the respondent's ownership, supported by documentary evidence including sale-deeds, and the absence of cogent evidence from the petitioner establishing ownership or ancestral right, were unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence will not be interfered with lightly.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below regarding property ownership?
  • Is oral assertion of ancestral ownership sufficient without cogent documentary evidence in a suit for possession?
  • Whether a regular second appeal can be dismissed when the appellant fails to establish title or lawful possession?
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• Shah Muhammad Patel vs Haji Waliuddin1989 SCMR 220 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-15
  leave to appealdefault in payment of rentsecond appealconcurrent findings of facturban rent restrictionmunicipal taxes adjustment
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which allowed a second appeal filed by a landlord, set aside the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the appellate court, and ordered the tenant to hand over vacant possession of the premises. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal, and whether the tenant had legally established default in the payment of rent and lawful adjustment of municipal taxes. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the statutory provisions regarding the adjustment of municipal taxes against rent were not attracted to the facts of the case and that the payment of rent for the disputed period was not proved, thereby making out a clear case of default. The Court affirmed that the High Court was fully competent to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact where the lower courts committed an error in the evaluation of evidence and law. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the payment of municipal taxes by a tenant automatically absolve them from liability to pay rent without fulfilling the conditions of Section 14 of the Urban Immovable Property Act 1958?
  • Whether the acceptance of rent for a subsequent month by money order confirms the payment of rent for preceding periods?
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• Shah Muhammad and another vs Haji Muhammad and 6 others1989 SCMR 1420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-28
  leave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtmurderre-appraisal of evidencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 26-6-1986, which acquitted the six respondents of charges under sections 148, 302, and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Trial Court had earlier convicted the respondents for murder and causing injuries, sentencing them to various terms of imprisonment including life imprisonment. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its re-appraisal of the evidence and in extending the benefit of the doubt to the acquitted respondents. The Supreme Court held that the reasons recorded by the High Court for the acquittal were sound and that the counsel for the petitioners failed to point out any flaw in the appraisal of evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an acquittal order by the High Court when the appraisal of evidence is sound and no material flaw or legal error is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal order when the High Court's appraisal of evidence is sound?
  • Does the failure to point out any flaw in the High Court's evaluation of prosecution witnesses warrant the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Is an acquittal based on the benefit of the doubt liable to be set aside without establishing a legal error in the reasoning?
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• Shah Jahan vs Secretary, Finance Department, N.W.F.P. and 32 others1989 SCMR 1797 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  service appeallimitationtime-barred appealleave to appealservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a service appeal by the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal on the grounds of limitation and merits. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner's service appeal before the Tribunal was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the appeal was indeed time-barred and correctly dismissed on that sole ground, rendering any examination of the merits unnecessary. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that when an appeal before a tribunal is established to be time-barred, the tribunal's dismissal on that ground alone is legally sufficient, obviating the need to enter into the merits of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a service appeal dismissed by a Service Tribunal on the ground of limitation warrants interference when found to be time-barred?
  • Is it necessary for an appellate court to examine the merits of a case after determining that the underlying appeal was barred by limitation?
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• Shah Jahan and 3 others vs Nisar Khan and 7 others1989 SCMR 1110 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-10-12
  adverse possessionleave to appealconcurrent findings of factdeclaration and injunctionestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiff side against the dismissal of their Revision Petition by the High Court in a suit for declaration and injunction based on a claim of adverse possession. The core legal questions involve whether concurrent findings of fact regarding adverse possession can be reopened on the grounds of unformatted issues, ostensible gifts, or non-execution of a prior decree by the opposing party. The Supreme Court held that none of the pleas raised justified the grant of leave, finding that the initial entry was not hostile, subsequent possession was never adverse, and the non-execution of an earlier decree by respondents does not establish adverse possession. The court reaffirmed the finality of concurrent findings of fact by lower courts and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding adverse possession be reopened on the ground that an issue regarding estoppel was not properly framed?
  • Does the non-execution of a decree by the respondent automatically render the petitioner's continued possession hostile and adverse?
  • Whether possession originating from an ostensible gift that was later annulled constitutes adverse possession without a distinct hostile assertion?
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• Shagufta Begum vs The Income-Tax Officer, Circle-XI, Zone-B, Lahore1989 PLD Supreme Court 360 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  writ jurisdictionexhaustion of remediesincome tax assessmentre-opening assessmentdepartmental remediesjurisdictional challenge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged a notice issued by an Income-tax Officer under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance for re-opening an assessment. The core legal question was whether a taxpayer can bypass departmental remedies and directly invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction to challenge a notice of assessment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while theoretically, a party might approach the High Court directly if a tribunal lacks jurisdiction, in practice, departmental remedies are often more expeditious. The Court emphasized that litigants should first exhaust normal departmental channels of appeal, revision, and reference unless there is a clear case of mala fides or prejudice. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to raise their objections before the Income-tax Officer, who is expected to decide the jurisdictional issue dispassionately. The Court further clarified that the High Court's previous remarks should not prejudice the departmental proceedings, which are to be decided on their own merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a taxpayer bypass departmental remedies to challenge an income tax notice directly via a writ petition?
  • Does the existence of a jurisdictional challenge allow a party to circumvent the statutory hierarchy of appeal and revision?
  • Under what circumstances may a court entertain a writ petition despite the availability of alternative departmental remedies?
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• Shagufta Begum vs The Income-Tax Officer, Circle XI, Zone `B', Lahore1989 PTD 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-19
  re-assessmentjurisdictionwrit petitionexhaustion of remediesincome taxdepartmental remedymala fides
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court's dismissal of a writ petition challenging a notice issued by the Income-tax Officer under Section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 for re-opening an earlier assessment. The petitioner contended that the notice was issued without lawful authority and that an aggrieved party could directly invoke the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction when a tribunal's lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that except in cases involving mala fides or systemic prejudice, litigants must first exhaust their speedier departmental remedies before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. The Court emphasized that jurisdictional objections can and should be raised before the departmental officer in the first instance. To prevent prejudice, the Court clarified that the High Court's writ petition shall be deemed dismissed solely on the ground of non-exhaustion of departmental remedies, rendering any other observations in the impugned order non-existent.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner directly invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge an assessment notice without first exhausting available departmental remedies?
  • Under what exceptional circumstances, such as allegations of mala fides, is a litigant permitted to bypass departmental remedies and directly approach the High Court?
  • How should a departmental officer treat a jurisdictional objection raised by a litigant in response to a statutory notice?
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• Shagufta Begum vs The Income Tax Officer Circle-XI, Zone B, LahorePTCL 1989 CL. 695 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-19
  writ petitionexhaustion of remediesincome tax assessmentjurisdiction of tribunalre-assessment noticedepartmental remediesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition challenging a notice issued by the Income Tax Officer under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance for reopening an assessment. The core legal question concerns whether an aggrieved party can bypass departmental remedies and directly approach the High Court via a writ petition upon the issuance of a notice where jurisdiction is questioned. The Supreme Court held that litigants must first exhaust normal departmental remedies rather than invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, except in cases of proven mala fides or lack of institutional independence. The Court laid down the principle that premature invocation of constitutional jurisdiction against administrative notices leads to unnecessary delays, and departmental authorities should be allowed to independently and dispassionately examine all objections, including those pertaining to their own jurisdiction, in the first instance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an aggrieved person can directly approach the High Court through a writ petition against the issuance of a notice without first exhausting departmental remedies?
  • Does the requirement to exhaust departmental remedies apply in cases where there are allegations of mala fides or prejudice against the departmental authorities?
  • Can a departmental authority examine an objection regarding its own jurisdiction when a party appears before it pursuant to a notice?
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• Shafique Ahmad vs The State1989 SCMR 1505 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-12
  rash and negligent drivingconcurrent sentencescriminal negligenceleave to appealappreciation of evidencetraffic accident
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence for rash and negligent driving resulting in death. The petitioner was convicted under sections 304-A and 279 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for an incident involving a trolley collision with a motorcyclist, which resulted in the death of the victim. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts regarding the petitioner's identity as the driver and his culpability for rash and negligent driving warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding no merit in the petitioner's defense that another individual was driving the vehicle. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings that the petitioner was indeed driving the trolley rashly and negligently at high speed. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, maintaining the sentences while noting that the High Court had already directed the sentences for the two charges to run concurrently and that the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 had been granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact by trial and appellate courts regarding the identity of a driver in a fatal accident case warrant Supreme Court interference?
  • Can a sentence for rash and negligent driving be ordered to run concurrently with a sentence for driving a vehicle in a rash or negligent manner?
  • Is the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to sentences imposed for rash and negligent driving?
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• Shadi Khan vs Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) and others1989 SCMR 1942 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  locus standitransfer of propertysettlement authorityleave to appealwrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court regarding the transfer of a plot by the Settlement Authority. The petitioner challenged the decision on the grounds that he was denied an adequate opportunity of hearing, that he was in possession of the plot, and that the respondent was not entitled to the transfer of the plot. The Supreme Court observed that the first two contentions were matters of fact already concluded by the High Court's findings. Regarding the third contention, the Court held that if the petitioner himself was not entitled to the transfer of the plot, he lacked the necessary locus standi to challenge the transfer of that same plot to another party. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming that a party without a valid claim to property cannot challenge the property's transfer to a third party.

  Questions settled

  • Does a petitioner have locus standi to challenge the transfer of a plot to another party if the petitioner themselves is not entitled to the transfer?
  • Are findings of fact by the High Court regarding the opportunity of hearing and possession conclusive in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Shabbir Hussain and others vs The State1989 SCMR 248 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-02-29
  post-arrest bailcriminal liabilityappreciation of evidenceFirst Information Reportbail refusalSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's order refusing bail to the petitioners in a criminal case involving charges under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and section 13-D of the Arms Ordinance. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail given the circumstances of the occurrence, the specific allegations in the First Information Report, and the alleged misappreciation of medical evidence by the High Court regarding the number of injuries sustained by the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal of bail was justified. The Court found that the contention regarding the alleged roping in of an entire family lacked prima facie evidence, and that the High Court's assessment of the overall features of the case, rather than just the medical evidence, was sound. Consequently, the petition for bail was dismissed, affirming the principle that bail is not a matter of right when the overall circumstances of the case, as considered by the High Court, do not support it.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere allegation that an entire family has been roped into a criminal case constitute sufficient grounds for the grant of bail?
  • Is the High Court's assessment of the overall features of a criminal case sufficient to sustain a refusal of bail, even if there is a dispute regarding the interpretation of medical evidence?
  • Can a petition for bail be granted when the petitioners fail to provide prima facie evidence to support their claims of innocence?
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• Sh. Nazir Ahmad vs Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others1989 SCMR 1217 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  service appealdepartmental remedyleave to appealexhaustion of remediesservice tribunalwilful absence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal on the grounds that he failed to exhaust departmental remedies and that he had not obtained sanction for his leave. The Supreme Court examined the record and found that the Tribunal's own previous orders acknowledged the petitioner had indeed filed an appeal before the appellate authority, contradicting the finding that he had not availed of departmental remedies. Furthermore, regarding the merits of the case, the Court noted that the petitioner had produced documentary evidence, specifically an order from the Deputy Education Officer, which appeared to grant him leave on private affairs, thereby contradicting the Tribunal's conclusion that his leave was unsanctioned. Finding that these factual discrepancies necessitated a re-examination of the Tribunal's findings, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The Court held that where a Tribunal's findings on exhaustion of remedies and merits are directly contradicted by the record, the matter requires further judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Service Tribunal dismiss an appeal for failure to exhaust departmental remedies when the record indicates such an appeal was filed?
  • Does the existence of an order granting leave on private affairs contradict a finding of unauthorized absence from duty?
  • Is leave to appeal justified when a Service Tribunal's findings are contradicted by the record?
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• Sh. Muhammad Sharif and another vs Province of Punjab1989 SCMR 1783(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-11
  execution of decreepublic auctionpossession of landleave to appealcivil revisiongovernment property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Civil Revision by the High Court concerning the execution of a decree for possession of urban land. The petitioners, having purchased a plot of land at a public auction, initiated a suit for possession of a disputed portion of that land, which they successfully obtained a decree for. During execution proceedings, the Government resisted, arguing the disputed area was part of a bungalow occupied by the Superintending Engineer of the Irrigation Department and had been excluded from the auction. The High Court upheld this objection, leading to the dismissal of the petitioners' Civil Revision. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioners retained the vast majority of the auctioned land and that the price for the disputed portion was being refunded. Consequently, the Court held that it was not a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal, as enforcing the decree would improperly require the dispossession of a government-occupied structure. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Is a decree for possession of land executable when the disputed portion comprises a government-occupied structure?
  • Can a court refuse leave to appeal when the petitioners have already received a refund for the disputed portion of the auctioned land?
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• Sh. Manzoor Ahmad and others vs Mst. Iqbal Begum and others1989 SCMR 949 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  landlord and tenantevictionpart performancespecific performanceregistered sale deedtransfer of propertyrent restriction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, successors-in-interest of the property owner, sought the eviction of the respondent on the grounds of default in rent payment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The respondent denied the landlord-tenant relationship, claiming possession based on part performance of a contract of sale with the previous owner. The Rent Controller ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the District Judge and the High Court subsequently ruled against them, citing the need to establish title in a civil court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the petition. The Court held that the petitioners' title was established via a registered sale deed, and the respondent's mere agreement to sell did not create an interest in or charge on the property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not protect a party who has not filed a suit for specific performance against a subsequent transferee for consideration. The eviction order was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement of sale regarding immovable property create an interest in or charge on such property?
  • Can a tenant rely on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to resist eviction without having filed a suit for specific performance?
  • Does a registered sale deed establish title sufficient to maintain an eviction petition under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Under what circumstances must a landlord be directed to establish title in a civil court before seeking eviction?
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• Sh. Mahmood Ahmad vs Secretary to Government of Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-28
  constitutional petitionwrit jurisdictionco-operative societiesfinding of factmortgage security
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge an award made against him under the Co-operative Societies Act in favour of the Khanewal Central Co-operative Bank Limited, alleging that the Bank had misappropriated the sale proceeds of his mortgaged factory and immovable property given as security for a loan. The departmental authorities had previously rejected this contention after evaluating the evidence, and the High Court declined to interfere with this concurrent finding of fact in writ jurisdiction. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's refusal to interfere with the factual findings of the departmental authorities. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that findings of fact determined by departmental authorities and upheld by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction will not be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact determined by departmental authorities under writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether a petitioner can challenge an award made under the Co-operative Societies Act by raising disputed questions of fact in constitutional jurisdiction?
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• Sh. Haneefurrehman vs Muhammad Jalaluddin1989 SCMR 1593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-06
  compromiseamicable settlementejectment orderconsent decreeappeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a compromise application filed by the learned counsel for the parties in an appeal arising from an ejectment proceeding. The core legal question concerns whether an appeal against an ejectment order can be disposed of in terms of an out-of-court amicable settlement wherein the respondent undertakes not to execute the ejectment order and consents to setting aside the impugned orders. The Supreme Court accepted the compromise between the parties, allowing the appeal and setting aside both the impugned judgment of the High Court and the impugned order of the Rent Controller directing the eviction of the appellant. The key principle laid down is that appellate proceedings involving ejectment orders can be resolved and disposed of by the consent of the parties based on a lawful out-of-court compromise.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal against an ejectment order be allowed by consent based on an out-of-court compromise between the parties?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can set aside impugned judgments and eviction orders pursuant to a settlement reached between the parties outside the Court?
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• Sh. Asghar Ali vs District Judge, Sahiwal and others1989 SCMR 783 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-18
  ejectmentrent controlstriking off defenceleave to appealconstitutional jurisdictiondefault in rent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as an ejectment application filed by the respondent against the petitioner regarding a shop, based on grounds of default and personal need. The Rent Controller struck off the petitioner's defence under Section 13(6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance due to the petitioner's failure to deposit rent arrears for May and June 1983. This order was upheld by the District Judge in appeal, and subsequently, the Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition challenging these orders. The petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner merely reiterated contentions already repelled by the High Court and failed to raise any new grounds. Finding that no substantial question of law of public importance was involved in the petition, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The judgment affirms the finality of the concurrent findings of the lower courts in the absence of any significant legal question requiring Supreme Court intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to deposit rent arrears as ordered by a Rent Controller justify the striking off of a tenant's defence?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when it merely reiterates contentions already rejected by the High Court?
  • What constitutes a substantial question of law of public importance sufficient to grant leave to appeal in a rent matter?
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• Settlement Commissioner (L) and anothers vs Mauj Din and others1989 SCMR 1351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-09
  Intra-Court AppealEvacuee PropertyCompensation PoolCriminal TribesLand SettlementRehabilitation SchemeConstitutional Petition
  Summary & questions settled

  These connected appeals arise from a long-standing dispute concerning land previously held by non-Muslim members of criminal tribes, which was subsequently occupied by Muslim members of the said tribes and later allotted to refugees. The core legal questions examined the competency of Intra-Court Appeals against orders passed under repealed laws, whether the disputed property was properly acquired and formed part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and whether the land vested in the Provincial Government under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. The Supreme Court held that the Intra-Court Appeal before the High Court was incompetent because the notified authority decided the matter under a repealed law that provided for specific remedies, precluding an Intra-Court Appeal pursuant to settled jurisprudence. On the merits, the Court held that the land in question had been validly treated as evacuee property and covered by the acquisition notifications under the land settlement laws. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the judgment of the High Court's Appeal Bench was set aside, and the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the constitutional petitions was restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Intra-Court Appeal is competent against an order passed by a notified authority under a repealed law where no provision for such appeal exists?
  • Whether land abandoned by non-Muslim members of criminal tribes constitutes evacuee property forming part of the compensation pool under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958?
  • What is the effect of a notification under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 on evacuee land occupied by members of criminal tribes?
  • Whether long-standing possession by Muslim members of criminal tribes exempts land from being treated as evacuee property for rehabilitation and settlement purposes?
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• Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. and another vs Sardar Abdur1989 SCMR 1560 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-15
  service tribunalpromotionseniorityjurisdiction of service tribunalannual confidential reportsexpunction of adverse entriesdepartmental examination committee
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, whereby the respondent's service appeal concerning promotion and seniority was allowed. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by directly ordering the promotion and seniority of the respondent instead of remanding the matter for consideration by the competent departmental authority. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by usurped the function of the competent authority, particularly when the department had agreed to consider the respondent's case for promotion and the respondent had merely prayed for his case to be placed before the Departmental Examination Committee. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and allowed it, modifying the Tribunal's order to direct the consideration of the respondent's case by the relevant departmental committee.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal can directly order the promotion of a civil servant instead of remanding the matter to the competent authority?
  • Does the Service Tribunal exceed its jurisdiction by determining seniority and granting promotion when the prayer in the departmental appeal was only for consideration of eligibility?
  • Can the Service Tribunal usurp the functions of the departmental promotion committee?
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• Sattu Khan and anothers vs The State1989 SCMR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-05
  private defencedefence of propertyland disputeforcible ousterpossessioncriminal appealmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning convictions under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, originating from a fatal land dispute. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the appellants acted in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence of person and property without exceeding it. The core legal question was whether the complainant party or the appellants held lawful possession of the disputed land at the time of the occurrence and whether the appellants were entitled to the right of self-defence after sustaining injuries during an attempt to forcibly oust them. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established that the appellants were in possession of the property and were attacked first by the complainant party, thus vesting the right of private defence in the appellants rather than the trespassers. The Court laid down that mere temporary ploughing by a trespasser does not confer a right of private defence upon them or extinguish the owner's right to defend their property and person against forcible ouster.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere temporary ploughing of land by a trespasser constitute effective possession so as to confer a right of private defence upon the trespasser?
  • Whether an owner in possession of land retains the right of private defence of person and property when confronted with a forcible attempt to oust them.
  • Does receiving multiple injuries prior to firing establish that an accused acted in the valid exercise of the right of self-defence without exceeding it?
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• Sarwar Sultana and 5 others vs Ilam Din and 3 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-27
  restorationdismissal for non-prosecutionreview applicationcondonation of delaylimitationabsence of counselleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a High Court order restoring a writ petition that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The High Court had accepted a review application filed by the respondents, condoned the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908, and restored the writ petition for regular hearing. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the High Court erred in condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 and whether a counsel's genuine mistake in estimating the time required to reach a court constitutes sufficient cause for recalling a dismissal order passed in their absence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's exercise of discretion in condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 was free from legal error. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the principle that where a counsel commits an innocent, genuine mistake in estimating timings while attending to another bench within the same court premises, such absence constitutes a valid and sufficient reason to recall the dismissal order and restore the case.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a counsel's genuine mistake in estimating timings while appearing before another bench of the same court constitutes sufficient cause for restoring a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretionary power of the High Court to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 in the absence of an error of law or principle?
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• Sardar Muhammad vs Muhammad Hafiz and another1989 SCMR 1941(1) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-25
  Lambardari appointmentwrit jurisdictionjudicial restraintleave to appealadministrative appointments
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter came before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction in a dispute regarding the appointment of a Lambardar. Upon examining the merits of the case, the Supreme Court determined that the High Court had correctly declined to interfere in the matter. The Supreme Court upheld the decision, noting that the High Court's refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction in the context of a Lambardari appointment was consistent with established legal precedents, specifically citing the principle laid down in Sharaf Din v. Qazi Abdul Jalil and another (1986 SCMR 1368). Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, thereby affirming the High Court's stance that such administrative appointments generally fall outside the scope of writ jurisdiction. The judgment reinforces the principle of judicial restraint regarding the interference of superior courts in administrative appointments of this nature.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to exercise writ jurisdiction in matters concerning the appointment of a Lambardar?
  • Is the appointment of a Lambardar a suitable subject for interference by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction?
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• Sardar Muhammad and others vs Member (Cons.), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-02
  leave to appealconsolidation caseevacuee propertySettlement Scheme No. VIIautomatic transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court in a consolidation case. The core legal question concerns whether the Haveli in dispute, being originally an evacuee property in the possession of the petitioners, stood automatically transferred to them under Settlement Scheme No. VII without requiring a formal order or payment. The Supreme Court held that the contentions raised regarding the automatic transfer of the evacuee property under Settlement Scheme No. VII require deeper examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine the legal aspects surrounding the automatic disposal of evacuee property and directed that the appeal be heard along with other similar cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an evacuee property in possession of a party stands automatically transferred under Settlement Scheme No. VII without a formal order or payment?
  • Can a Haveli claimed as evacuee property be included in the consolidation pool?
  • Does Settlement Scheme No. VII dispense with the need for making payment for the transfer of evacuee property?
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• Sardar Khan vs Muhammad Hanif and others1989 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  petition for leave to appealacquittalframing of chargeretrialrevisional jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 7th October 1984, which accepted the respondents' writ petition. The respondents had been acquitted of charges under Sections 307, 109, 148, 149, and 506 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by a Magistrate. The complainant filed a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, who set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for retrial on the ground that the trial was vitiated due to the omission to frame a charge. The Lahore High Court accepted the respondents' writ petition challenging that order. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine questions regarding whether an omission to frame a charge alone warrants setting aside an acquittal at the instance of a complainant, whether the Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to set aside an acquittal and order retrial under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and whether the High Court judgment should be disturbed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether by omission to frame a charge, alone the acquittal could have been set aside on the asking of the complainant party?
  • Whether the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to set aside acquittal and order retrial under section 439-A, Cr.P.C.?
  • Whether the High Court judgment notwithstanding any legal defect should be disturbed?
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• Sardar Khan vs Mst. Irshad Begum and others1989 SCMR 1374 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-16
  petition for leave to appealacquittalmisreading of evidenceprivate complaintcriminal trial
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's challenge to the acquittal of the respondents. The core legal question concerns whether the concurrent findings of acquittal recorded by the courts below warranted interference by the Supreme Court on grounds of alleged misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that both lower courts properly appraised the evidence on record, found no misreading of the record, and declined to order a retrial nearly nine years after the alleged occurrence. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal based on a proper appraisal of evidence where no misreading of the record is established.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal based on an appraisal of evidence?
  • Does a misreading of the record justify setting aside an acquittal and ordering a retrial?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be maintained against the dismissal of a special leave petition by the High Court in a criminal matter?
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• Sardar Khan and others vs The State1989 SCMR 624 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  criminal petitionmurderdeath sentencelife imprisonmentocular testimonyrecoveryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Three criminal petitions were filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction of the petitioner Sardar Khan under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while altering his sentence of death to life imprisonment. The prosecution case alleged that the convict inflicted fatal hatchet blows on the deceased due to previous enmity and a recent altercation regarding trespassing cattle. The core legal question concerned the reliability of ocular testimony, the corroboration through weapon recovery, and the appropriateness of the sentence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the eye-witnesses provided a consistent version, the recovery of the blood-stained hatchet corroborated the prosecution case, and the High Court had exercised valid discretion in commuting the death sentence based on strained relations and background enmity. The petitions for leave to appeal were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by the recovery of a weapon is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can long-standing enmity and strained relations serve as a mitigating circumstance to alter a sentence of death to life imprisonment?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the sentence reduction discretion exercised by the High Court when the sentence awarded is legal and adequately reasoned?
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• Sardar Khan and others vs Abdur Rahim and others1989 SCMR 569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  ejectmentbona fide requirementleave to appealwrit jurisdictionlandlord and tenantmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant of urban property against a High Court judgment that allowed the landlords' constitutional petition and restored an ejectment order originally passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal questions addressed were whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the landlord's bona fide requirement and whether an agreement to sell, executed between the landlord and a third party during the pendency of the writ petition, should invalidate the ejectment order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's judgment contained no legal infirmity or jurisdictional error. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in evaluating the evidence regarding the landlord's bona fide requirement and in determining whether to consider subsequent developments, such as the alleged agreement to sell, during the writ proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with the High Court's decision and refused leave to appeal, thereby upholding the ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Does an agreement to sell executed during the pendency of a writ petition automatically invalidate a prior ejectment order?
  • Is it within the discretionary power of the High Court to ignore or notice developments occurring during the pendency of a writ petition?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court judgment on the basis of alleged misreading of evidence regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Jahangir Khan and others vs Nasrullah1989 SCMR 752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-06
  settlement lawstransfer of propertyauction-purchaserwrit jurisdictionvested right
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arises from a dispute over the transfer of a house under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Nasrullah, had validly filed a transfer form entitling him to the disputed property, which had otherwise been validly auctioned and confirmed in favor of the predecessor of the appellants. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the findings of the departmental authorities, as the record clearly established that the respondent's alleged transfer form was undated, unrecorded in the official register, and surreptitiously placed on the file at a later stage, whereas a vested right had already accrued to the auction-purchaser. The ratio decidendi is that a party cannot claim entitlement to the transfer of property based on a dubious, unrecorded form introduced belatedly after the property has been lawfully auctioned to a third party. The court laid down the principle that concurrent departmental findings regarding the absence of a validly filed application in official registers cannot be lightly interfered with in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court can interfere with findings of settlement authorities regarding the validity of a transfer form when supported by official registers?
  • Does an auction-purchaser acquire a vested right that cannot be defeated by a belatedly introduced transfer form?
  • Whether the absence of an entry in the official receipt register undermines the authenticity of a settlement transfer form?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Ali vs The State1989 SCMR 628 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  death sentencemitigating circumstancescriminal appealmurder convictionleave to appealprovocation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Sardar Ali, for the murder of Muhammad Ismail. The petitioner was originally convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, alongside charges under Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to a reduction in his death sentence based on the argument that the motive for the crime arose from a sudden altercation regarding the disposal of foul water, which allegedly provoked the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the deceased was not involved in the prior dispute and had merely intervened to stop the petitioner from abusing women. The Court found no extenuating circumstances to justify a lesser punishment, affirming that the petitioner's actions were unprovoked by the deceased. The principle laid down is that a sudden, minor altercation involving third parties does not constitute a mitigating factor for reducing a death sentence when the victim was not a participant in the initial dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does a prior altercation between third parties regarding a minor dispute constitute a mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a death sentence?
  • Can a petitioner claim provocation for a murder when the deceased was not a party to the initial dispute?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to grant leave to appeal when the lower court has properly evaluated the evidence and found no extenuating circumstances?
  Read full judgment →
• Sardar Ali and others vs Muhammad Ali and others1989 SCMR 1079 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-25
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionprinciple of sinkerinheritancecause of actioncivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal concerns a pre-emption suit involving land purchased by the appellants. The core legal question is whether the respondents (pre-emptors) possessed a superior right of pre-emption at the time of the sale, and whether the principle of sinker applies when a qualified pre-emptor joins with non-qualified persons in a suit. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption must vest in the pre-emptor at the time of the sale. Because the respondents were not owners in the estate at the time of the sale and only acquired interest through inheritance afterward, they lacked the necessary superior right. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that when a qualified pre-emptor joins with strangers in a suit, the entire suit is defeated by the principle of sinker. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the trial and appellate courts' dismissal of the suit. The key principle laid down is that a pre-emptor cannot improve their status after the sale through subsequent inheritance, and the joinder of non-qualified persons with qualified ones in a pre-emption suit results in the failure of the entire claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does a pre-emptor have a superior right of pre-emption if they acquire ownership of the estate through inheritance after the date of the sale?
  • Does the principle of sinker apply when a qualified pre-emptor joins with non-qualified persons in a pre-emption suit?
  • Is the right of pre-emption heritable such that a successor can exercise the right if the original owner did not exercise it during their lifetime?
  Read full judgment →
• Samiuddin Qureshi vs Collector of Customs1989 PLD Supreme Court 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-25
  misconductdismissal from serviceno evidenceconjecture and suspiciondisciplinary proceedingscivil servantburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal filed by a Preventive Officer of Customs challenging his dismissal from service on charges of corruption and misconduct under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973. The core legal question was whether disciplinary proceedings and an order of removal could be sustained in the absence of positive evidence, solely on the basis of presumptions, conjectures, and suspicions. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of dismissal, and reinstated the appellant. The Court held that an order of dismissal of a civil servant for misconduct, being a serious matter that ruins a career, must be based on tangible and positive evidence rather than mere surmise or suspicion. The key principle laid down is that a finding in disciplinary proceedings is vitiated and liable to be quashed if it is based on 'no evidence', and conjecture or suspicion can never take the place of legal proof.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of dismissal for misconduct against a civil servant can be sustained when it is based on mere conjecture, surmise, or suspicion rather than positive evidence?
  • Does a finding in administrative disciplinary proceedings based on no legal evidence warrant interference by the superior courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Samandar Khan vs Nawab Khan and others1989 SCMR 760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-03
  pre-emptionconditional decreeZar-e-Panjamwithdrawal of depositattorney authorityabandonment of claimdismissal of suit
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court which had upheld a revision order restoring a pre-emption decree in favour of the respondent. The respondent had initially filed a pre-emption suit, which was decreed conditionally, requiring the deposit of the balance sale price by a specific date, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. Subsequently, the respondent’s attorney withdrew the deposited 'Zar-e-Panjam' (one-fifth of the sale price), effectively abandoning the decree. Although the respondent later claimed this withdrawal was fraudulent and collusive, seeking to deposit the full amount, the Additional Commissioner had dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was bound by the actions of his attorney and counsel, who had signed the withdrawal application. The Court determined that by unconditionally withdrawing the deposit and failing to fulfill the condition of the decree by the specified date, the respondent had expressly abandoned his rights. Consequently, the suit stood dismissed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order and restoring the Additional Commissioner’s order dismissing the suit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of the 'Zar-e-Panjam' deposit by a pre-emptor after a conditional decree has been passed result in the dismissal of the suit?
  • Is a party bound by an application filed and signed by their attorney and advocate?
  • Can a pre-emptor who has withdrawn the 'Zar-e-Panjam' deposit and failed to comply with the terms of a conditional decree subsequently seek to deposit the full amount to revive the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Salimullah Khan and 10 others vs Raqib Khan and 15 others1989 SCMR 1879 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-23
  seniority listservice rulescivil servantsstatutory forceencadrizationpromotionN.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the determination of seniority among Executive Engineers in the N.-W.F.P. Irrigation and Public Health Engineering Department. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal correctly invalidated the seniority list and whether the N.-W.F.P. Engineering Service Rules, 1973, were validly enacted and applicable. The Supreme Court held that the 1973 Rules were competently framed by the Provincial Government, as the Chief Minister and Ministers were authorized to act in the Governor's name under the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Governor’s order of 17-5-1972, which encadrized various categories of engineers, possessed statutory force. The Court ruled that the Service Tribunal erred in its approach by ignoring these validly framed rules and the Governor's orders. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment, directing that the seniority list be redrawn in accordance with the 1973 Rules, which provided specific seniority benefits to Assistant Executive Engineers but did not displace the appellants who had entered service significantly earlier. The principle established is that validly framed service rules govern seniority, overriding claims of vested rights based on previous, superseded rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the N.-W.F.P. Engineering Service Rules, 1973, were validly framed and possessed statutory force despite not being published in the official gazette?
  • Does a civil servant have a vested right to a particular seniority in a service or cadre?
  • Can the Governor's order regarding the encadrization of engineers be considered to have statutory force under the Constitution?
  • Does the promotion of an officer in an officiating capacity constitute a regular appointment for the purpose of determining seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Salehon Muhammad and another vs Allah Yar1989 SCMR 540 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-29
  leave to appealcivil revisionpre-emptionestoppelprocedural irregularityconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by vendees challenging the dismissal of their Civil Revisions by the High Court. The petitioners raised two primary contentions: first, a procedural objection regarding the trial court's practice of recording evidence in one case and copying it into a connected matter, and writing a judgment in one case while reproducing it in another; and second, a substantive argument regarding the bar of estoppel against the respondent pre-emptor, citing the precedent of Naseer Ahmad v. Arshad Ahmad (PLD 1984 SC 403). The Supreme Court held that regarding the procedural objection, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that they objected to the trial court's mode of recording evidence at the time, and further noted that technical irregularities in judgment writing do not warrant leave to appeal where the questions involved are identical. Regarding the estoppel argument, the Court found the facts of the present case distinguishable from the cited precedent. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does the practice of copying evidence and judgments between connected cases constitute a sufficient ground for granting leave to appeal?
  • Can a party challenge the mode of recording evidence if no objection was raised before the trial court?
  • Are concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the applicability of estoppel subject to re-examination by the Supreme Court if the facts are distinguishable from precedent?
  Read full judgment →
• Salamat Ali vs Tariq & Company1989 SCMR 1349 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  civil revisioncompromise decreecounsel authorityremand of caseleave to appealfailure to produce evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld a trial court decree. The trial court had originally decreed the respondent's suit due to the petitioner's failure to produce evidence, applying Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Subsequently, the parties entered into a compromise during the appellate stage, wherein the petitioner agreed to deposit the decretal amount and costs in exchange for the case being remanded for the presentation of his evidence. Upon the petitioner's failure to fulfill the deposit condition, he sought to challenge the compromise, alleging his counsel lacked authority to enter into it. The Supreme Court found that the High Court had adequately addressed this factual contention and that no error was present in the lower court's approach. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that a party cannot avoid a compromise agreement by belatedly questioning their counsel's authority when the factual basis for such a claim is unsubstantiated.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge a compromise agreement on the grounds of lack of counsel authority after failing to fulfill the agreed conditions?
  • Does the failure to produce evidence at the trial stage justify the application of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a High Court's finding on the factual authority of counsel to enter into a compromise subject to interference in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin Butt and others vs Punjab Service Tribunal and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 597 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-01
  service tribunalenhancement of penaltydisciplinary proceedingsappellate powercivil servantCode of Civil Proceduredepartmental appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, Excise and Taxation Inspectors, were initially penalized with the withholding of two increments for inefficiency and misconduct. Following departmental appeals, the Punjab Service Tribunal, during the hearing of their appeals, issued show-cause notices for the enhancement of this penalty. The Tribunal subsequently dismissed their appeals and enhanced the penalty to dismissal from service, relying on its powers under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal, in an appeal filed by a civil servant, possesses the authority to enhance a penalty imposed by the departmental authority in the absence of a cross-appeal or a grievance by the department. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal erred in enhancing the penalty. It ruled that the power under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is intended to be exercised beneficially to adjust rights and prevent injustice, not to impose harsher penalties upon an appellant. Consequently, the Court set aside the Tribunal's enhancement order and restored the original minor penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Service Tribunal have the authority to enhance a disciplinary penalty imposed on a civil servant during the pendency of an appeal filed by that civil servant?
  • Can the power of an appellate court under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 be exercised to impose a harsher penalty on an appellant?
  • Is the power of a Service Tribunal to vary or modify an order under the Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974 unfettered?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahuddin and 16 others vs Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education and 38 others1989 SCMR 552 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-09
  service seniorityprovincializationministerial staffdepartmental advicestatutory interpretationservice tribunalcontinuous officiation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a service matter regarding the determination of seniority for ministerial staff transferred from Local Councils to the Provincial Government. The core legal question was whether the appellants were entitled to count their seniority in their respective grades from the date of their continuous officiation, or from the date of their merger into the Government Education Department on 1st July 1962. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Service Tribunal. The Court held that the appellants' seniority must be reckoned from the date of their provincialization (1-7-1962) rather than their prior continuous officiation. The Court established that administrative advice or departmental opinions cannot override statutory provisions or formal government decisions made by the competent authority. Furthermore, service rendered under a previous employer cannot be counted as Government service for seniority purposes unless specifically provided for by law. The governing Ordinance did not authorize seniority based on continuous officiation, rendering the appellants' claim legally unsustainable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether ministerial staff transferred from Local Councils to the Government are entitled to count seniority from the date of their continuous officiation in their grades?
  • Can departmental advice or opinion override a formal government decision or statutory provision regarding seniority?
  • Does the West Pakistan Primary Education Ordinance 1962 authorize the counting of prior service for seniority purposes upon provincialization?
  Read full judgment →
• Salahud Din vs Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Education and 84 others1989 SCMR 1210 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-11
  service appealseniority disputeleave to appealservice tribunalprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a Lecturer challenging an order of the Service Tribunal, N.-W.F.P., which dismissed his service appeal regarding a dispute over seniority. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is to determine the impact and applicability of the precedent established in the case of Muhammad Rahim, Lecturer and 28 others v. Muhammad Aurangzeb, Lecturer and 94 others (1986 SCMR 873) on the petitioner's seniority claim. The Supreme Court, upon hearing the counsel, granted leave to appeal, holding that the case requires a detailed examination of the aforementioned precedent in relation to the petitioner's circumstances. The Court directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, with liberty granted to the parties to submit any additional documents deemed necessary for the final adjudication of the dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the judgment in Muhammad Rahim v. Muhammad Aurangzeb (1986 SCMR 873) govern the seniority dispute of the petitioner?
  • Is a service appeal regarding seniority subject to further review by the Supreme Court upon the grant of leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Hussain vs The State1989 SCMR 627 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  leave to appealquantum of sentencemitigating circumstancesdeath sentencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Sadiq. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether mitigating circumstances existed to warrant a reduction of the sentence of death to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that no extenuating circumstances existed, noting that the petitioner had no right to object to the marriage of his niece to the deceased in the presence of her father and had inflicted seven fatal injuries upon the deceased. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and the death sentence confirmed. The key principle laid down is that the absence of mitigating circumstances, coupled with the brutal nature of the attack and lack of justification for the offender's grievance, justifies the confirmation of the death penalty.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the absence of mitigating circumstances justifies the confirmation of a death sentence for murder?
  • Can a paternal uncle claim a right to object to the marriage of his niece when her father has consented?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Hussain vs Musarat Hussain Shah and others1989 SCMR 1826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-05
  consent decreelimitation pleaestoppelcompetency of appealremand orderpre-emption suitwaiver of limitation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns the validity of an appellate court's decision to remand a suit for consideration of a limitation plea after a consent decree had already been passed by the trial court. The core legal question was whether a defendant, having entered into a compromise agreement in the trial court, is estopped from subsequently challenging the suit as time-barred in appeal, and whether such an appeal is competent under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's judgment was a consent decree, and under Section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal lies against such a decree. The Court emphasized that parties who enter into a compromise, thereby inducing the other side to act (such as depositing pre-emption money), are estopped from later raising a limitation plea to invalidate the agreement. The Court ruled that the High Court erred in remanding the case, as the appeal itself was incompetent. The principle laid down is that a consent decree precludes an appeal, and a party cannot approbate and reprobate by challenging a compromise on grounds of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie against a decree passed by a court with the consent of the parties?
  • Can a defendant who enters into a compromise in the trial court subsequently challenge the suit as time-barred in appeal?
  • Is a plea of limitation a pure question of law that can be raised for the first time in appeal despite a prior consent decree?
  • Does the appellate court have the authority to remand a case to allow a party to amend pleadings to include a limitation defense after a consent decree has been recorded?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Haider Malik vs Collector (Revisional Authority), Lahore and 21989 SCMR 1787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  maintenanceleave to appealfamily lawchild maintenancedivorced wife
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a maintenance matter involving a dispute over maintenance awarded to a divorced wife and children, and the determination of the quantum of maintenance. The core legal questions addressed relate to whether maintenance for children could be awarded on the application of their mother who was subsequently divorced, whether admitted payments made by the husband during the default period were accounted for, and whether the maintenance amount was correctly determined. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the maintenance granted to the wife already took into account her liabilities including the expenses of bringing up the children in her custody, and with the respondent counsel's categorical statement that no separate application for the children's maintenance would be moved, coupled with the agreement for the adjustment of Rs. 9,100 against realized maintenance, the petition lacked force. The Court accordingly refused leave to appeal, laying down that adjustments of admitted payments made during default must be factored into maintenance realization and that composite maintenance determinations covering children's expenses preclude separate subsequent claims.

  Questions settled

  • Whether maintenance for children can be awarded on the application of their mother who has since been divorced?
  • Whether admitted payments made by the husband to the wife during the default period must be taken into account and adjusted?
  • Whether the determination of the amount of maintenance is essentially a question of fact?
  Read full judgment →
• Sajjad Ahmad Khan vs The Director, Agricultural Engineering and others1989 SCMR 1247 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisuse of government propertypetition for leave to appealdepartmental inquirydrilling supervisor
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Sajjad Ahmad Khan, an Ex-Drilling Supervisor, challenging the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 10-7-1984, which upheld his dismissal order passed by the Director of Agriculture. The petitioner had been charge-sheeted and held responsible for misusing the government's drilling/boring plant and causing shortages of lining pipes. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Service Tribunal's factual findings and dismissal of the appeal warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the judgment of the Tribunal was not subject to any exception, as the Tribunal had duly examined the relevant record, considered the factual position, and ensured compliance with applicable rules and instructions. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, establishing that factual findings of the Service Tribunal regarding departmental misconduct and misuse of machinery will not be interfered with where no legal infirmity or rule violation is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the factual findings of the Punjab Service Tribunal in a service matter?
  • Does the misuse of official machinery and shortage of departmental material constitute valid grounds for dismissal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Saifur Rehman and others vs S.E. Haveli and others1989 SCMR 785 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  extra water supplyCanal and Drainage Actadministrative authorityprocedural fairnessshareholder rightsIntra Court Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed an Intra Court Appeal concerning the sanctioning of extra water supply for gardens. The core legal questions were whether the Superintending Engineer possessed the authority to sanction extra water supply given the alleged repeal of Rule 9 of the Canal and Drainage Rules, and whether the procedural requirements for such sanctioning, specifically regarding notice and hearing of shareholders under the Canal and Drainage Act, were met. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Superintending Engineer acted within his authority as Rule 9 remained valid following its amendment in 1976. Furthermore, the Court found that the procedural requirements were satisfied because the Superintending Engineer had provided notice to the shareholders and heard their objections before deciding the matter. The judgment affirms that administrative authorities may exercise powers under validly amended rules and that procedural fairness, such as hearing affected parties, validates the exercise of such administrative discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Superintending Engineer have the authority to sanction extra water supply for gardens?
  • Is Rule 9 of the Canal and Drainage Rules currently in force?
  • Must a Superintending Engineer hear shareholders before sanctioning extra water supply under the Canal and Drainage Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Muhammad vs Muhammad Akram and another1989 SCMR 1940 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-30
  civil revisionconcurrent findings of factcancellation of sale-deedforged power of attorneyleave to appealattesting witness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts regarding a suit for the cancellation of a registered sale-deed. The petitioner's core contention was that the power of attorney, which served as the basis for the execution of the sale-deed, was a forgery. Furthermore, the petitioner challenged the reliance placed by the trial court on the testimony of an attesting witness, Muhammad Hassan. The Supreme Court examined the petitioner's arguments regarding these findings of fact. Upon review, the Court determined that the findings of the lower courts did not suffer from any legal infirmity or error. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact established by the courts below. The petition for leave to appeal was refused, affirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not typically disturb concurrent findings of fact unless they are shown to be legally infirm.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court, appellate court, and High Court?
  • Is the testimony of an attesting witness sufficient to uphold the validity of a sale-deed executed through a power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Muhammad ano others vs M. Sardar and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 532 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-18
  Order XLI Rule 20 CPCnecessary partylimitation periodcondonation of delaybona fide mistakeinherent powersarbitration award
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal concerning the refusal of lower appellate courts to implead a necessary party, Abdul Ghafoor, under Order XLI, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, in an appeal filed against a judgment and decree making an arbitration award a rule of the court. The core legal question was whether an appellate court can utilize Order XLI, Rule 20, read with section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 or its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, to add a necessary party as a respondent after the period of limitation has expired, particularly when the omission was due to an inadvertent or bona fide mistake. The Supreme Court held that the rigid view—that a party against whom limitation has run out can never be added under Order XLI, Rule 20—is incorrect. The Court ruled that the provision is not exclusively restricted to suo motu action, and courts possess the discretion to add omitted parties upon application when the omission is a bona fide mistake, as procedural laws are designed to advance justice rather than defeat it. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the case remanded.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court implead a necessary party as a respondent under Order XLI, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 after the period of limitation for filing an appeal has expired?
  • Whether the power under Order XLI, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can only be exercised by the court suo motu or whether it can be invoked upon an application by a party?
  • Does a party against whom the right of appeal has become time-barred cease to be interested in the result of the appeal for the purposes of Order XLI, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Karim Shah vs Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. and 21 others1989 SCMR 1625 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  pre-emptionleave to appealtenancy qualificationwrit petitionmisreading of record
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a pre-emptor against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court. The petitioner's pre-emption suit had been initially decreed in part by the Collector on the ground that the petitioner was a tenant. Subsequently, appellate and revisional forums, including the Member, Board of Revenue and the High Court, dismissed the suit, relying on the applicability of the judgment in Said Kamal's case and holding that no prior decree protected the petitioner. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court committed a prima facie error in appreciating the facts, as a decree had indeed been passed in favour of the petitioner prior to the relevant cutoff date. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to seek restoration of the pre-emption decree to the extent granted, in accordance with the principle established in Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others. Leave to appeal was accordingly granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor is entitled to the restoration of a pre-emption decree passed prior to 1-7-1986?
  • Does a High Court commit a reviewable error when it misreads the record regarding the existence of a prior decree in a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Said Ali Shah vs Muhammad Shah1989 SCMR 1594 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  specific performanceagreement to sellAbadkari Schemeproprietary rightscolony landcivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was directed against an order of the Lahore High Court which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision. The dispute arose from an agreement to sell land allotted to the petitioner under the Abadkari Scheme. The petitioner agreed to sell the land to the respondent for consideration, with the stipulation that the transfer would occur after the petitioner acquired proprietary rights. After receiving the consideration and subsequently obtaining proprietary rights, the petitioner instead transferred the land to a third party. The respondent filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding the agreement illegal and void. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the agreement was legal as it merely undertook to complete the sale after the acquisition of proprietary rights, rendering Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 inapplicable. The High Court upheld this appellate decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that an agreement to sell colony land after acquiring proprietary rights is valid and enforceable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an agreement to sell colony land allotted under the Abadkari Scheme is enforceable after the vendor acquires proprietary rights?
  • Does Section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 bar the specific performance of an agreement to sell executed before proprietary rights are acquired but to be completed after such acquisition?
  Read full judgment →
• Sahib Din and others vs Noor Muhammad and others1989 SCMR 1424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-14
  leave to appealbar of alienationMartial Law Regulation 64jurisdictioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the acceptance of a civil revision by the High Court in a suit for declaration regarding the bar of alienation under Martial Law Regulation 64. The core legal question involves the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions of Martial Law Regulation 64, specifically including those relating to jurisdiction and the bar of certain alienations under Paragraph 25. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the High Court rightly interpreted these provisions, directed the furnishing of security, ordered the preparation of the appeal on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents, and directed that status quo shall continue.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Martial Law Regulation 64 relating to the bar of certain alienations and jurisdiction have been rightly interpreted by the High Court?
  • Does a suit for declaration regarding the bar of alienation under Martial Law Regulation 64 warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Saghir Ahmad vs Riaz Ahmad and another1989 SCMR 1522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-04
  leave to appealacquittalright of private defenceinterested witnessocular testimonycriminal appealself-defence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the complainant against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondent, Riaz Ahmad, of charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The prosecution alleged that the respondent murdered the deceased following a prior dispute. The trial court had initially convicted the respondent, but the High Court overturned this, disbelieving the prosecution's ocular testimony, which it deemed interested and uncorroborated, and rejecting the alleged motive. The respondent had raised a plea of private defence, asserting that the deceased had trespassed into his house and assaulted his sister, necessitating the respondent's actions to protect her. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's findings, noting that the ocular evidence was unreliable and that the respondent's version of events was supported by evidence of injuries on his sister and the broken door of their house. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's acquittal, holding that no interference was warranted as the lower court's conclusions regarding the insufficiency of evidence and the validity of the self-defence plea were correct.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction be sustained based solely on the testimony of interested witnesses when such testimony is uncorroborated?
  • Does the presence of injuries on the accused's family member and physical evidence of a broken door support a plea of private defence?
  • Is the Supreme Court justified in upholding an acquittal where the High Court has correctly analyzed the evidence and rejected the prosecution's version?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Muhammad vs Zulfiqar and 5 others1989 SCMR 690 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  enhancement of sentencereduction of sentencesimple and grievous hurtcriminal revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's criminal revision seeking enhancement of sentences of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 and modified their convictions and sentences under sections 325, 147, and 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involves the appropriateness of the sentence reduction and whether the High Court committed any legal defect in modifying the sentences to already undergone plus enhanced fines. The Supreme Court held that given the medical evidence showing mostly simple injuries, the lack of an X-ray to confirm the grievous nature of a metacarpal fracture, and the absence of intention to kill, the High Court took a judicious view in modifying the sentence. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the period already undergone in prison alongside enhanced fine provisions met the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentences of the respondents to the period already undergone?
  • Does the absence of an X-ray cast doubt on the grievous nature of a bone fracture injury?
  • Whether the evidence established an intention to kill or merely to cause bodily harm?
  Read full judgment →
• Saeed Ahmad vs Abdul Qadeer and others1989 SCMR 514 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-24
  review petitionlachesconstitutional petitionproperty valuationurban property tax
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition filed against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 17-4-1988, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal. The core legal questions involved whether the court omitted to consider the leave grant order concerning laches and representations made to authorities, and whether the claim pertained to correct assessment of property price rather than reduction. The Supreme Court held that the review petition is devoid of merit, affirming that the petitioner's conduct after 2-12-1971 suffered from unexplained laches and that futile representations to the same authorities on identical facts do not excuse delay, while also clarifying that the challenge was indeed directed at the valuation decision of the Excise and Taxation Officer for urban property tax. The key principle laid down is that repeated representations on the same facts without additional material cannot explain laches, and no case for review is made out when determinative findings are already rendered on all factual and legal points.

  Questions settled

  • Whether repeated representations to authorities on the same facts constitute a sufficient explanation for delay and laches in filing a constitutional petition?
  • Does a challenge to the valuation of property by an Excise and Taxation Officer for urban property tax purposes warrant a review of an appellate judgment?
  • What constitutes sufficient grounds for entertaining a review petition against a judgment of the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Hussain vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi and another1989 SCMR 650 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  disciplinary proceedingspolice servicereduction in rankmisconductinefficiencyservice tribunaldepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an officiating Sub-Inspector of Police, challenged his reduction in rank to foot constable following disciplinary proceedings initiated after he failed to conduct an inquest or arrange a post-mortem examination regarding an unnatural death. A preliminary inquiry by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer found the petitioner negligent in his duties, leading to charges of gross misconduct, inefficiency, and burking. After departmental appeals to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Service Tribunal were unsuccessful, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the disciplinary proceedings suffered from any legal infirmity or denial of due process. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had been provided sufficient opportunity to defend his position before the Superintendent of Police. The Court found no question of law of public importance and concluded that the departmental proceedings were conducted without legal infirmity, thereby affirming the penalty imposed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure of a police officer to conduct an inquest or arrange a post-mortem for an unnatural death constitute grounds for disciplinary action?
  • Can a disciplinary penalty of reduction in rank be upheld if the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to clear their position?
  • Does a departmental inquiry into police misconduct necessarily raise a question of law of public importance for the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Sadiq Ali and another vs Mst. Asia Bibi1989 SCMR 1599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-15
  inheritanceMuslim Family Lawspredeceased songranddaughter inheritancemutationconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal regarding an inheritance dispute. The core legal question concerned the entitlement of a granddaughter to inherit from her grandfather, Fareed, whose son (the granddaughter's father) had predeceased him. The petitioners, the grandfather's surviving son and daughter, had initially excluded the respondent from the inheritance mutation. The respondent successfully challenged this exclusion in civil court, obtaining a decree that was upheld through the appellate stages. The Supreme Court examined the claim and affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, which established that the respondent was indeed the daughter of the predeceased son. The Court held that the respondent was entitled to inherit from her grandfather under the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the respondent's right to inheritance as a granddaughter of the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Is a granddaughter entitled to inherit from her grandfather if her father predeceased him?
  • Do civil courts have the jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance claims arising under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961?
  Read full judgment →
• Sabir Hussain vs Conservator of Forests and another1989 SCMR 707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemalicebiasinquiryleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated August 16, 1984, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner from his post as Block Officer. The petitioner alleged that his dismissal by the Divisional Forest Officer was actuated by personal animosity and malice following an incident where the petitioner filed a criminal case against the said officer. The core legal questions involve whether dismissal from service without holding a proper inquiry as required by law is sustainable, and whether the entire disciplinary proceeding vitiated due to bias and personal grudge of the punishing authority. The Supreme Court held that the case required further consideration regarding the legality of the dismissal without an inquiry and the role of the authorities, consequently granting leave to appeal to examine the matter on the existing and additional records.

  Questions settled

  • Whether dismissal from service without conducting an inquiry as required by law is legally sustainable?
  • Does personal animosity and grudge by a punishing authority vitiate disciplinary proceedings?
  • Can an appellate authority act as an inquiry officer to cure defects in original proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Sa Diq Ali and 10 otherss vs Mst. Aisha and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 518 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-14
  leave to appealgiftTamleekfamily arrangementinheritance disputeMuslim lawpower of attorney
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the dismissal of the petitioners' civil revision by the High Court, concerning a dispute over the inheritance and property left by Karim Bakhsh. The core legal question involves the validity of an alleged gift (Tamleek) made by the deceased in favour of two sons, and the competence of an attorney to surrender the rights of another beneficiary during proceedings before revenue authorities, leading to a subsequent family settlement. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly rejected the petitioners' plea, emphasizing that a bona fide family arrangement arrived at among the heirs to resolve a dispute regarding a one-sided disposition of property—and which results in a devolution in accordance with Islamic law—should not be interfered with. The key principle laid down is that courts will uphold a mutual family settlement and distribution of property that rectifies an unequal gift, provided the resulting arrangement strictly accords with Islamic law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an attorney can surrender the rights of a principal in a property dispute before revenue authorities?
  • Can a one-sided gift of property to certain heirs be superseded by a subsequent mutual family settlement?
  • Whether a family arrangement resulting in a devolution of property according to Islamic law warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Nazir vs National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation, Lahore and 2 others1989 SCMR 1869 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-26
  debt recoverywrit jurisdictionfindings of factleave to appealbanking practicesinterest waiver
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a debtor challenging the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court concerning debt recovery proceedings. The petitioner sought to contest findings of fact regarding liability and requested relief concerning interest payments. The Supreme Court observed that the findings of fact were against the petitioner and did not warrant interference under writ jurisdiction. However, during the hearing, the parties engaged in discussions regarding potential concessions on interest and payment terms. The Court held that while it could not issue a positive direction to waive interest, it was permissible for the respondent authority to grant such relief if consistent with legitimate banking practices. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, contingent upon the parties reaching an agreed payment formula within 48 hours. If no such undertaking is provided to the Court, the leave granting order shall be deemed withdrawn. This case underscores the Court's limited scope in interfering with factual findings in writ jurisdiction while facilitating potential settlements between parties in debt recovery matters.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact in writ jurisdiction?
  • Is the Court empowered to issue a positive direction to a creditor to waive interest on a debt?
  • Under what conditions can a leave to appeal order be deemed withdrawn if an undertaking is not provided?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Nazir vs National Industrial Cooperative Finance Corporation1989 SCMR 1500(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  leave to appealundertakingstay orderfraudrecovery of fundsimpleadmentfinancial liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal involving a dispute over financial liability and alleged fraud. The petitioner sought leave to appeal on the condition of providing an undertaking regarding the repayment of funds allegedly withdrawn from the respondent's account. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioner's submitted undertaking satisfied the court's prior conditions for granting leave and whether the previously granted stay order should continue. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had substantially complied with the conditions, overruling the respondent's objections to the form of the undertaking. Consequently, the court ordered the continuation of the stay order without conditions until the final disposal of the appeal. Furthermore, the court directed that the manager and other parties involved in the alleged fraud be impleaded in the proceedings. The court established the principle that in cases involving multiple parties in a fraud, the parties are at liberty to argue whether recovery should be sought from all involved individuals and whether the failure to pursue others affects the bona fides of the recovery claim.

  Questions settled

  • Does an undertaking submitted by a petitioner satisfy the conditions for leave to appeal if it substantially complies with the court's requirements?
  • Can a stay order granted with conditions be continued without conditions upon the grant of leave to appeal?
  • In cases of alleged fraud involving multiple parties, is it necessary to implead all individuals involved to determine liability for recovery?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Iqbal vs S.M. Azim and others1989 SCMR 1488 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-30
  civil revisionarbitration awardlimitationcondonation of delaynullity of awardleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the dismissal of the petitioner's civil revision by the High Court, which arose from the dismissal of an appeal as time-barred in an arbitration matter. The trial court had made an award a rule of the court on 31-1-1978, and the petitioner's appeal was filed on 9-7-1978 along with an application for condonation of delay filed years later. The core legal question was whether an allegedly belated award constitutes a nullity that can override the bar of limitation. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances of the case did not justify treating the award as a nullity, nor could the belated appeal be entertained without valid grounds for condonation of delay. The Court established that an award is not rendered a nullity merely due to alleged delay in its making where extension of time and proper circumstances are not challenged, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an arbitration award made after the prescribed time is a nullity?
  • Can a time-barred appeal against an arbitration award be entertained without sufficient grounds for condonation of delay?
  • Does the making of an award a rule of the court warrant interference by the Supreme Court when the lower courts dismissed the appeal on limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• S.M. Hayat vs Federal Service Tribunal and 3 others1989 SCMR 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-01
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductdepartmental inquirycontradictory statementsillegal gratification
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal by leave against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's service appeal concerning his dismissal from government employment. The core legal question considered was whether the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the appellant was allegedly exonerated of the original charges and convicted of irrelevant charges of misconduct. The Supreme Court examined the departmental inquiry records and found that the appellant had made contradictory statements regarding material facts, thereby demonstrating a guilty conscience and establishing his culpability beyond doubt. The Court held that the findings of the Federal Service Tribunal were based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and record, disclosing no legal infirmity. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the validity of the departmental proceedings and the Tribunal's judgment upholding the dismissal from service.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be held guilty of misconduct based on contradictory statements made during the course of an inquiry?
  • Did the Federal Service Tribunal fail to appreciate that the appellant was exonerated of charges by the Inquiry Officer?
  • Is a finding of fact recorded by the Federal Service Tribunal liable to interference by the Supreme Court when based on proper appreciation of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Iqbal Hussain Shah and anothers vs Mst. Akhtari Begum and others1989 SCMR 1441 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  condonation of delaylimitationtime-barred appealsufficient causecivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the appellants' second appeal regarding a suit for possession and permanent injunction. The primary legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal should be condoned based on the appellants' claim of ignorance regarding the High Court's judgment, which was announced during summer vacations. The Supreme Court rejected the appellants' explanation, noting that the mere occurrence of summer vacations does not excuse ignorance of a judgment's announcement. The Court emphasized that established practice ensures advocates are notified of judgments even during vacations. Furthermore, the Court observed that the appellants failed to provide any explanation for the period between receiving the certified copies and filing the petition. Consequently, the Court held that the appellants failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The appeal was dismissed as time-barred, affirming the principle that a party seeking condonation of delay must provide a clear, sufficient, and continuous explanation for the entire period of delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does the announcement of a judgment during summer vacations constitute sufficient grounds for condoning a delay in filing an appeal?
  • Is a vague assertion of ignorance regarding the date of a judgment's announcement sufficient to satisfy the requirement of 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay?
  • Must a petitioner provide a continuous explanation for the entire duration of a delay to justify condonation?
  Read full judgment →
• S. Ijaz Hussain vs The Government of the Punjab through Secretary1989 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-20
  service appealleave to appealdisciplinary actionPunjab Service Tribunalquestion of lawpublic importance
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his service appeal. The petitioner contended that he was unfairly singled out for disciplinary action while his superiors, who allegedly committed serious illegalities, were exonerated due to their official positions. The Supreme Court examined the petition and found that the Tribunal had reached its decision after duly considering the relevant facts and providing cogent reasons for the dismissal. The Court held that the petitioner's argument regarding the culpability of his superiors did not constitute a valid ground for granting leave to appeal. Emphasizing that the Court's jurisdiction to grant leave is contingent upon the existence of an error of law or a question of public importance, the Supreme Court determined that no such grounds were present in this case. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming the finality of the Tribunal's decision in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allegation that superiors were not punished for similar illegalities constitute a sufficient ground for granting leave to appeal against a service tribunal decision?
  • What are the criteria for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against a judgment of a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Rozi Khan vs Taj Muhammad Khan and others1989 SCMR 1643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  Provincially Administered Tribal Areaswrit jurisdictionremand of casetribunal awardrevenue recorddamages suit
  Summary & questions settled

  Rozi Khan sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had allowed the writ petition filed by Taj Muhammad Khan and set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the revenue forums under the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Regulation No. II of 1975 regarding a claim for damages for cutting a tree and closing a water course. The High Court had remanded the case for the appointment of a fresh tribunal because the original tribunal members had remained absent and failed to determine the factual controversy properly based on revenue records. The Supreme Court of Pakistan evaluated the contentions and held that the High Court rightly exercised its constitutional jurisdiction in remanding the matter since the crucial bone of contention regarding land and water course ownership had not been legally ascertained from the revenue record by the tribunal, which had instead relied on personal knowledge. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, upholding the remand order for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can remand a case to the Deputy Commissioner for the appointment of a fresh tribunal when the previous tribunal failed to decide the matter in accordance with law?
  • Can a tribunal's award be based on personal knowledge without ascertaining facts from the revenue record?
  • Does the High Court act within its constitutional jurisdiction when setting aside orders of lower forums that suffer from material irregularity?
  Read full judgment →
• Roshan Ali Bhimjee vs Standard Insurance Company Ltd.1989 SCMR 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-04
  rent controlevictionsublettingparting with possessionleave to appealbona fide requirement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld an eviction order issued by a Rent Controller. The respondent-company had sought the petitioner's eviction on two grounds: bona fide personal requirement and unauthorized subletting of the premises to the Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company. While the Rent Controller rejected the claim of bona fide requirement, he ordered eviction based on the finding of unauthorized subletting. The High Court affirmed this decision, concluding that the petitioner had parted with possession of the premises. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that his role as Chairman of the insurance company did not constitute subletting or parting with possession, as he remained in personal possession of the premises. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's contention regarding the legal interpretation of 'parting with possession' in the context of his corporate role deserved further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal and stayed the eviction order pending the final decision of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's professional association with a company and the display of that company's signage on the premises constitute 'parting with possession' or 'subletting' under rent control laws?
  • Can a tenant be evicted for subletting if they remain in personal possession of the demised premises while acting as an officer of a company using the same space?
  Read full judgment →
• Roman Catholic Church vs Province of the Punjab through Secretary1989 SCMR 1955 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-18
  constitutional petitionnationalizationmartial law regulationalternative remedyouster of jurisdictioneducational institutionsproperty ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from an appeal against the Lahore High Court's dismissal in limine of a Constitution Petition filed by the Roman Catholic Church regarding the nationalization of educational institutions under Martial Law Regulation No. 118. The appellant challenged the government's attempt to change the revenue records and claim ownership over properties attached to these institutions, arguing that the regulation required interpretation, the term 'property attached' was undefined, and the institutions did not own the underlying property. The High Court had dismissed the petition, holding that the dispute required factual inquiry unsuitable for constitutional jurisdiction and that an alternative remedy via a civil suit existed. The core legal question was whether a constitutional petition was maintainable given the ouster of jurisdiction and availability of alternative remedies. The Supreme Court held that Article 14 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 effectively barred ordinary civil courts from determining property titles, leaving the appellant without an adequate or efficacious alternative remedy. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, established that constitutional jurisdiction could be invoked to interpret the regulation and assess the nature of the property rights, and remanded the matter back to the High Court for proper inquiry and decision in light of previously declared precedents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Constitution Petition is maintainable for the interpretation of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 when ordinary civil court jurisdiction is barred?
  • Does Article 14 of Martial Law Regulation No. 118 oust the jurisdiction of High Courts and civil courts in matters relating to actions taken under the regulation?
  • Whether an alternative remedy of a civil suit or revenue appeal can be considered adequate when statutory bars prevent the determination of property title by ordinary courts?
  Read full judgment →
• Riazuddin Qureshi vs Director (Esti%) Pakistan National Centre, Directorate General,Islamabad and another1989 SCMR 466 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-08
  service lawlimitation periodcivil servantdepartmental appealservice tribunalleave to appealtime-barred appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, filed by a civil servant against a judgment of the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service, ruling it time-barred. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed within the statutory limitation period, considering his departmental representation and subsequent appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly determined the appeal was time-barred. The Court reasoned that whether the petitioner's initial communication was treated as a representation or an appeal, the limitation period commenced on May 22, 1983. Consequently, the appeal filed on October 6, 1983, was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal's factual findings regarding the limitation period were not erroneous and that no question of law of public importance existed to warrant granting leave to appeal. The petition was dismissed accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does a departmental representation made by a civil servant constitute the starting point for limitation if no right of appeal exists?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 if no question of law of public importance arises?
  • Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if it is filed beyond the statutory limitation period without a request for condonation of delay?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz vs Muhammad Salim and 4 others1989 SCMR 1491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-11
  civil revisiondismissal in defaultlimitationconcurrent findingssuit for possessiontitle dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil suit for possession of land. The respondent claimed ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a purchase from the previous owner, alleging that the petitioner had unauthorizedly and forcibly taken possession. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, finding that he had successfully proved his title, a decision upheld on appeal. The petitioner's subsequent civil revision in the High Court was dismissed in default for non-prosecution. Instead of seeking restoration, the petitioner filed a second civil revision after the expiry of the unprescribed 90-day limitation period, which was dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that a second revision could be entertained after 90 days upon showing sufficient cause. The Supreme Court declined to resolve the procedural conflict, holding that the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts regarding the respondent's ownership and the petitioner's illegal possession were based on sound oral and documentary evidence and could not be interfered with in revision. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding ownership of property be interfered with in a civil revision?
  • Whether a second civil revision can be filed and entertained after the expiry of the 90-day limitation period if the first revision was dismissed in default?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Akhtar vs Deputy Inspectorgeneral of Police and others1989 SCMR 1578 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  disciplinary proceedingsmisconductpolice serviceshow-cause noticedepartmental inquiryadministrative discretionunauthorized absence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, challenged his removal from service following an incident where he was caught accepting illegal gratification by a raiding Magistrate. Upon being confronted, the petitioner allegedly maltreated the Magistrate and absconded, later being charged with misconduct. A show-cause notice was issued, and after a hearing, the Superintendent of Police removed him from service, citing misconduct, maltreatment of the Magistrate, and unauthorized absence from duty. The petitioner's appeals to the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Provincial Service Tribunal were dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the allegation of maltreatment required a formal inquiry rather than a summary procedure and that his absence from duty was not part of the original show-cause notice. The Supreme Court held that the decision to dispense with a formal inquiry was a matter of administrative discretion. Furthermore, the Court found no grounds for interference, noting the petitioner's admitted unauthorized absence. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming that departmental authorities possess discretion regarding the necessity of formal inquiries in disciplinary proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Is it mandatory to hold a formal inquiry into allegations of misconduct in police disciplinary proceedings, or can the authority exercise discretion to dispense with it?
  • Can an authority consider grounds for removal from service that were not explicitly included in the initial show-cause notice?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with the administrative discretion of departmental authorities regarding the necessity of a formal inquiry?
  Read full judgment →
• Riaz Ahmad vs The State1989 SCMR 626 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  jail petitionmurderdeath sentencemedical evidenceocular testimonyleave to appealcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a jail petition filed by Riaz Ahmad against his conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for the murder of his mother-in-law, Mst. Noor Sain, arising from a dispute over sending his wife back to his house. The core legal question revolves around whether the prosecution case is free from doubt, considering contentions regarding an unsupportive eye-witness and alleged discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence concerning the firearm injuries. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the arguments, holding that the submissions regarding the reliability of the prosecution case require further examination. The principle laid down is that material discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony, along with unsupportive eye-witness accounts, necessitate a deeper review of the conviction in capital punishment cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony regarding firearm injuries create sufficient doubt to warrant a re-examination of a murder conviction?
  • Does the failure of an alleged eye-witness to support the prosecution case affect the reliability of the conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmatullah through Legal Heirs vs Haji Muhammad Akram and another1989 SCMR 1801 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-14
  leave to appealres judicatapossession suitcivil revisionadverse possessionconcurrent findings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 3-12-1988, which accepted the respondents' civil revision and decreed their suit for possession against the petitioner. The core legal question is whether the respondents' suit for possession of land was barred by the principle of res judicata under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in light of previous litigation between the parties. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions raised regarding the applicability of res judicata and the reversal of factual findings by the High Court made the case arguable and merited a detailed examination. The key principle laid down is that an arguable question regarding the misapplication of res judicata and interference with concurrent findings of fact warrants the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent suit for possession is barred by the principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a previous suit regarding the same land was dismissed?
  • Can the High Court reverse findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two courts below in civil revision?
  • Does the failure to execute a previous decree within the prescribed time limit extinguish the title and prevent a fresh suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Shah and others vs Bad Shah Khan and others1989 SCMR 1727(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  pre-emption suitleave to appealabatement of suitsuperior right of pre-emptionShariat Appellate Court judgmentstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding a pre-emption suit. The respondents had filed a suit based on superior rights of participators in immunities and appendages and ownership of contiguous property. The trial court decreed the suit, and the District Judge subsequently upheld the exemption findings while modifying the market value determination. The petitioners challenged the High Court's dismissal of their revision petition, arguing that the suit was decided after the target date of 31-7-1986, established by the Shariat Appellate Court of the Supreme Court, rendering the plaintiffs ineligible for a decree. Furthermore, the petitioners contended that under section 35(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, the case should have abated, extinguishing the pre-emptive right. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the legal arguments raised by the petitioners regarding the impact of the Shariat Appellate Court's judgment and the subsequent statutory enactment required detailed judicial consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these substantial questions of law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit decided after the target date of 31-7-1986 is maintainable in light of the Shariat Appellate Court judgment?
  • Does section 35(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1987 cause the abatement of pending pre-emption suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Khan vs Muhammad Ikramul Haq and 2 others1989 SCMR 1984 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  concurrent findings of factconsent decreepower of attorneyproprietary rightscivil revisionland ownership dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the ownership of land originally allotted to one Umra under the Thal Development Authority Abadkari Scheme. Following Umra's death, his legal heirs acquired proprietary rights and subsequently sold the land to the petitioner in 1976. However, the respondents asserted ownership based on a 1965 consent decree, which the petitioner challenged as fraudulent and collusive, alleging that the original owner had died prior to the purported sale. The core legal question was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of the power of attorney and the resulting consent decree could be disturbed in revision. The Supreme Court held that since the trial court and appellate court had concurrently found that the original owner had validly appointed an attorney who executed the sale, and because the decree had never been challenged, there was no basis for interference. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a power of attorney and a consent decree, when supported by evidence, are generally not subject to interference in revisional or appellate jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a power of attorney be disturbed in civil revision?
  • Is a consent decree immune from challenge if the underlying power of attorney was never contested?
  Read full judgment →
• Rehmat Ali and another vs Muhammad Munir Ali Khan and 4 others1989 SCMR 1422 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-04
  pre-emptionleave to appealabatement of suitsrepeal of pre-emption lawcivil revisionfirst regular appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, who were pre-emptors and plaintiffs in two separate cases, sought leave to appeal against two judgments of the Lahore High Court that dismissed their Civil Revision and First Regular Appeal respectively. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether a pre-emption decree could be passed in pending suits where the law under which the suits were instituted had ceased to have effect. The Supreme Court held that since the governing law ceased to have effect on 31st July 1986 by virtue of the judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah, no decree for pre-emption could now be passed for the first time in favour of the petitioners. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that pending pre-emption suits cannot culminate in a decree once the underlying statutory law has ceased to be effective.

  Questions settled

  • Can a decree of pre-emption be passed for the first time after the law under which the suit was instituted has ceased to have effect?
  • What is the effect of the judgment in Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Malik Said Kamal Shah on pending pre-emption suits?
  Read full judgment →
• Reference No.1 of 1988, Made by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan vs Not1989 PLD Supreme Court 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-24
  alternative remedywrit petitionincome tax assessmentleave to appealFederal Ombudsmandepartmental highhandedness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed in limine a writ petition challenging an income tax assessment under the Income Tax Ordinance, on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The core legal question concerns the availability of constitutional writ jurisdiction when an alternative remedy exists, and the appropriate forums for redressing departmental highhandedness. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly refused relief under Article 199 of the Constitution due to the existence of an adequate alternative remedy. However, the Court observed that where departmental authorities act arbitrarily, aggrieved persons may seek prompt and effective redress before alternative quasi-judicial forums such as the Federal Ombudsman, which do not suffer from the procedural technicalities and bars applicable to constitutional courts. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal while outlining the availability of alternative grievance redressal mechanisms.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court is justified in dismissing a writ petition in limine when the petitioner has already filed an appeal before an appellate authority?
  • Can a petitioner invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan when an adequate alternative remedy exists?
  • What alternative forums are available to a taxpayer to seek redress against arbitrary taxation actions when technical hurdles bar access to the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Raza Muhammad Khan and others vs Government of N.W.F.P. and others1989 SCMR 1305 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-11
  land acquisitionmarket valuecompensation awardParta formulacompulsory acquisitionTarbela Dam Project
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired for the Tarbela Dam Project. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in applying the 'Parta' formula—a method based on land productivity and revenue—to determine the market value of acquired land, rather than utilizing the average sale price method. The Supreme Court held that the 'Parta' formula is not a recognized or statutory mode for assessing the market value of land, as it relates solely to productivity and profitability rather than actual market price. The Court affirmed that the evaluation of land for compensation purposes should prioritize the most equitable method, specifically favoring the use of average sale prices (such as a two-year average if more beneficial to the landowner) over executive instructions that might restrict the valuation to a one-year average. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the compensation rates determined by the Additional District Judge, which were found to be more equitable.

  Questions settled

  • Is the 'Parta' formula a legally recognized method for determining the market value of acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act?
  • Should compensation for acquired land be based on land productivity or the actual market value of the land?
  • Can executive instructions restricting the evaluation of land to a one-year average be overridden if a longer average is more beneficial to the affected landowners?
  Read full judgment →
• Ratallun and another vs Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies), West1989 SCMR 1666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  State land allotmentWell Sinking Schemecancellation of allotmentcommanded landleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  Civil petitions for leave to appeal were filed against the orders of the Lahore High Court dismissing writ petitions regarding the cancellation of State land allotments made under the Well Sinking Scheme. The core legal question involved whether the revenue authorities rightly cancelled the allotments of State land on the ground that the allotted land was commanded and thus outside the scope of the scheme, and whether an arbitration clause applied to void initial allotments. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact by the revenue authorities regarding the commanded nature of the land were based on fair departmental interpretation and could not be interfered with, and that the arbitration clause could not be invoked where the basic allotment was initially void and outside the ambit of the scheme. Furthermore, the 20-year lease period for the allotments had expired. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. The key principle laid down is that allotments made contrary to the provisions of a scheme ab initio as void can be lawfully resumed by the competent authority without resorting to arbitration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether revenue authorities are justified in cancelling an allotment of State land if it is found to be commanded and contrary to the Well Sinking Scheme?
  • Does an arbitration clause in the statement of conditions apply when the basic allotment itself is initially void?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding the nature of land be interfered with in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Rasool Khan and 13 others vs Mst. Khurshid Begum and 7 others1989 SCMR 1820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-13
  ex parte decreesetting aside decreeleave to appealprecedentcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the setting aside of an ex parte decree at the instance of the respondents/defendants. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerned the validity of the order setting aside the ex parte decree. Upon hearing arguments from the counsel for the petitioners, the Court found that the petitioners were unable to distinguish or overcome the legal precedent established by this Court in the case of Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory (Regd.) Bahawalnagar v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 21). The Court held that the rule laid down in that cited authority was directly applicable and adverse to the petitioners' position. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, determining that it lacked any legal force or merit. The judgment reinforces the principle of stare decisis, affirming that established precedents regarding the setting aside of ex parte decrees must be followed by lower courts and litigants, thereby precluding the petitioners' challenge in the present circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Is a petition for leave to appeal against an order setting aside an ex parte decree maintainable when it contradicts established Supreme Court precedent?
  • Does the rule laid down in Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory (Regd.) Bahawalnagar v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 21) govern the setting aside of ex parte decrees?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashidurrehman vs Akram Khan and 2 others1989 SCMR 1982 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-27
  sale deed interpretationland disputeleave to appealcontractual interpretationproperty boundaries
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed his civil revision regarding a land dispute. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner, as the seller, was entitled to retain a portion of a plot of land sold to the respondents, based on a calculation of the area of a 'marla' (260 square feet versus 272 square feet) despite the sale deed specifying the total area as 5 Kanals and defining the site's boundaries. The Supreme Court examined the sale deed in its entirety and determined that the petitioner had sold the entire plot, leaving no scope to retain any part based on selective calculations. The Court held that where a sale deed specifies both the area and the boundaries, the document must be read as a whole, and the petitioner could not rely on a specific measurement calculation to contradict the clear intent of the sale. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower appellate court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a seller retain a portion of land sold when the sale deed specifies both the total area and the boundaries of the plot?
  • Should a sale deed be interpreted by reading the entire document together or by focusing on specific measurement calculations?
  • Does a discrepancy in the calculation of a 'marla' allow for the retention of land already conveyed in a sale deed?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid vs The State1989 SCMR 260 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  post-arrest bailheinous offenceineffective firingbail refusalcriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the refusal of bail by the High Court of Sind in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 307 and 353 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner, apprehended with a Klashankov after allegedly firing at a police party, sought bail on the grounds that the firing was ineffective and disputed his possession of the weapon, suggesting it might have belonged to an absconding companion. The High Court denied bail, noting the absence of enmity between the complainant and the accused, the heinous nature of the offence, and the timing of the incident. The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court's order and affirmed the decision, holding that the reasons provided by the High Court were sufficient to disentitle the petitioner to bail at the current stage of proceedings. The Court upheld the High Court's direction allowing the petitioner to repeat the bail application before the trial court only after the examination of the complainant and two eye-witnesses, thereby maintaining the established judicial discretion regarding bail in heinous offences.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of enmity between the complainant and the accused justify the refusal of bail in cases involving heinous offences?
  • Can a bail application be repeated before the trial court after the examination of key prosecution witnesses?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon at the time of arrest a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding on a bail application?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmad vs Muhammad Jamil and another1989 SCMR 1383 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-10
  culpable homicidesudden fightabsence of motiveleave to appealcriminal appealsentencing reductionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had altered the conviction of the respondent from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The petitioner, the complainant in the original criminal case, challenged the High Court's decision to reduce the sentence and modify the conviction under Section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the evidence regarding the absence of motive, the sudden nature of the fight, and the lack of cruel or unusual conduct by the accused. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, noting that the evidence established the incident arose from a sudden quarrel without previous enmity, and the accused caused only a single injury, demonstrating no intention to cause death. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no illegality in its reappraisal of the facts and sentencing, and accordingly dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be altered to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when the incident arises from a sudden fight without previous enmity?
  • Does the infliction of a single injury during a sudden quarrel negate the intention to cause death?
  • Is the High Court's assessment of motive and the nature of the fight a valid ground for altering a conviction under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashid Ahmad vs Messrs Friends Match Works1989 PLD Supreme Court 503 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-13
  landlord and tenantagreement of saledefault in rentpart performancespecific performanceeviction petitiontermination of contract
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from an eviction application filed by the appellant-landlord under section 13 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, against the respondent-tenants on the ground of default in rent payment. The respondents resisted the application by setting up an Agreement of Sale and invoking the protection of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Rent Controller, appellate courts, and the High Court dismissed the appellant's case. The core legal question was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant was restored upon the failure of the respondents to complete the sale within the stipulated time, and whether the respondents were entitled to the protection of part performance under section 53-A. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that since the respondents failed to pay the balance consideration and complete the sale as per the agreement, the agreement stood terminated, earnest and part payments were validly adjusted towards rent in accordance with the contract, and the relationship of landlord and tenant was restored. The Court laid down that a party who is not ready and willing to perform its part of the contract, or who falsely claims full payment of consideration, cannot claim the protection of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant is restored when a prospective vendee fails to complete the sale within the agreed timeframe under an agreement to sell?
  • Can a party who fails to pay the balance sale consideration claim the protection of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act 1882?
  • Whether service of notice sent by registered post is presumed under section 26 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act 1956 when properly addressed?
  Read full judgment →
• Rashad Ehsan and others vs Bashir Ahmad and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 146 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-03
  execution proceedingsauction saleActus Curiae Neminem Gravabitdeposit of purchase moneyconfirmation of saleOrder XXI Rule 85banking liquidation
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from execution proceedings initiated following money decrees obtained in 1957. In an auction sale conducted pursuant to execution proceedings transferred to the High Court under the Banking Companies Ordinance 1962, the first respondent was the successful auction-purchaser. Although 25% of the purchase price was paid immediately and the sale was confirmed by the High Court, the remaining balance was not deposited within fifteen days of confirmation as prescribed under Order XXI Rule 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Instead, the balance was deposited immediately after the case file was received by the Collector's office. The legal heirs of the judgment-debtor challenged the sale as null and void for non-compliance with mandatory provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench's ruling, holding that the auction notice issued by the court functionary explicitly stated the balance was payable upon confirmation, thereby inducing the delay. Applying the maxim 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit', the Court held that a party acting in reliance on an erroneous court direction cannot be penalized.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to deposit the balance of the purchase money within fifteen days under Order XXI Rule 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 invalidate an auction sale when the delay was caused by an erroneous court direction?
  • Can the judicial maxim 'Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit' protect an auction-purchaser who complies with an erroneous public notice issued by an officer of the court?
  • Whether non-compliance with the mandatory time limit under Order XXI Rule 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be excused if a party acts pursuant to orders or notices issued by the court itself?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Mahmood Ahmad vs Water and Power Development Authority1989 SCMR 1707 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-07
  service appeallimitationtime-barredWAPDAleave to appealcondonation of delay
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an ex-Line Superintendent, sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed his appeal against removal from service under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. The Tribunal had rejected the petitioner's appeal on the grounds that it was time-barred and declined to exercise discretion in his favour, citing the principle that ignorance of law is no excuse. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner's counsel failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in invoking the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that in the absence of a valid justification for the delay, the court would not interfere with the Tribunal's refusal to condone the limitation period. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly declined.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation?
  • Is ignorance of law a valid ground for condoning delay in filing an appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a Tribunal's refusal to exercise discretion regarding limitation when no satisfactory explanation for the delay is provided?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Bashir Ahmad vs The Directorgeneral, Excise & Taxation, Punjab, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 1141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  departmental inquiryremoval from servicecivil servanttampering with recordservice tribunalleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a former Inspector in the Excise and Taxation Department who was removed from service after being found guilty of tampering with official records. The core legal question concerns whether the departmental proceedings and subsequent removal under the disciplinary rules were lawfully conducted and whether any substantial question of law of public importance warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the departmental action against the petitioner was taken strictly in accordance with the relevant disciplinary rules following a regular inquiry and opportunity of hearing, and that no substantial question of law of public importance arose. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The key principle laid down is that where departmental proceedings under civil servant efficiency rules are conducted in accordance with law and provide adequate opportunity of defense, concurrent findings by departmental authorities and the Service Tribunal will not be interfered with in the absence of a substantial question of law of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether tampering with official record warrants removal from service under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975?
  • Does an appeal against removal from service under disciplinary rules raise a substantial question of law of public importance when regular inquiry procedures have been duly followed?
  Read full judgment →
• Rana Abdul Ghaffar Khan vs The Punjab Government1989 SCMR 1238 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  annual confidential reportadverse remarksservice tribunalexpunction of remarksjudicial performanceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Magistrate, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his service appeal by the Service Tribunal, which had upheld the rejection of his representation for the expunction of adverse remarks recorded in his annual confidential report by the District and Sessions Judge regarding his judicial work and persistence in wrong views. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in refusing to expunge the adverse remarks based on the assessment of the judicial head of the district. The Supreme Court held that the assessment made by the District and Sessions Judge, founded on orders and judgments reviewed in appeals and revisions, constituted an honest assessment of the petitioner's work that warranted no interference. The court established the principle that a judicial head of a district's honest assessment of a subordinate judicial officer's performance, based on concrete judicial review, carries credence and will not be lightly interfered with by appellate tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Whether adverse remarks recorded in the annual confidential report of a judicial officer can be expunged when based on the assessment of the District and Sessions Judge?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have the authority to interfere with an honest assessment of a judicial officer's work by the judicial head of a district?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the Service Tribunal regarding adverse ACR remarks?
  Read full judgment →
• Ramzan Khan and others vs Mst. Janno and others1989 SCMR 1325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  leave to appealcivil revisiongift in lieu of dowerdeed of conveyanceconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  The defendants sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their civil revision by the High Court, which had upheld the first appellate court's decision in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration regarding the alienation of land through a gift made by her deceased husband in lieu of her dower, accompanied by delivery of possession. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but the appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners' counsel contended that the deed of conveyance should be treated merely as an agreement, or that necessary legal formalities were lacking. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact could not be successfully assailed, and that the arguments regarding the legal nature and formalities of the deed of conveyance were contrary to established precedent law. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be successfully assailed in a petition for leave to appeal without strong legal grounds?
  • Whether a deed of conveyance executed for a gift in lieu of dower lacks legal validity if necessary formalities are absent?
  Read full judgment →
• Rajab Ali vs Mst. Aisha and others1989 SCMR 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  land allotmentThal Development Authoritytransfer prohibitionpari delictospecific performancepossession of landagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the possession of land allotted under the Well Sinking Scheme by the Thal Development Authority. The petitioner, the original allottee, sought possession of the land from the respondent, claiming the land had only been leased for two years. The respondent contended that the petitioner had sold the land to her in 1963, and she had fulfilled all payment obligations. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could rely on statutory prohibitions against the transfer of allotted land to reclaim possession after having voluntarily sold the land and received consideration. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which restored the trial court's judgment in favor of the respondent. The Court held that the petitioner, having received consideration and voluntarily parted with possession, could not invoke statutory prohibitions against transfer to non-suit the purchaser. The key principle laid down is that a party who enters into an agreement to sell and receives consideration cannot rely on statutory restrictions on transfer to invalidate the transaction and reclaim property from the purchaser.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allottee of land under the Thal Development Authority who has received consideration and parted with possession rely on statutory transfer prohibitions to reclaim the land?
  • Is a purchaser of land in possession entitled to defend a suit for possession by relying on an agreement to sell, even if the transfer was technically prohibited by statute?
  • Does the principle of pari delicto prevent a seller from challenging a land transfer agreement they voluntarily entered into?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Sher Ali vs District Judge, Jhelum and another1989 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  tenantforcible occupationreconstructionSpecific Relief Actleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal seeking to challenge concurrent findings of lower judicial forums regarding the forcible reoccupation of a shop by a tenant. The petitioner was a tenant who vacated the shop for reconstruction by the landlords but reoccupied it without consent before reconstruction was complete. The landlords filed a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, which was decreed by the trial court, and subsequent revision and writ petitions were dismissed. The core legal question concerned whether the tenant could lawfully reoccupy the property prior to completion based on an alleged undertaking. The Supreme Court held that forcible reoccupation of the premises while reconstruction was still incomplete was unlawful, and any alleged undertaking to relet was to take effect only after completion. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of fact against the tenant.

  Questions settled

  • Can a tenant forcibly reoccupy leased premises before the completion of reconstruction based on an alleged undertaking to relet?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding forcible occupation recorded by the trial court?
  • Does a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 lie against a tenant who reoccupies property without consent?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Javed Ahmad and 3 others vs Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala and another1989 SCMR 1837 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-13
  police strikedismissal from serviceservice tribunalspecial police proceedingsshow-cause noticestatutory rules violationdisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 examined the legality of the dismissal of police officers who went on strike. The core legal questions involved the effect of non-compliance with Rule 9 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, concerning special police proceedings for striking officers, and whether the proviso dispensing with show-cause notice was properly invoked. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal orders were unsustainable due to a manifest breach of mandatory statutory rules, as the competent authority failed to provide a written show-cause notice and grounds of action as required under Rule 9, and the proviso regarding the security of Pakistan was neither invoked nor applicable to exempt the written notice requirement. The Court laid down the principle that the proviso in Rule 9 of the 1975 Rules is an exception that must be strictly construed, extending only to the dispensing of a personal hearing or opportunity to show cause in specific security-related situations, but it does not absolve the authority from the mandatory statutory requirement of communicating the charges and proposed action in writing and obtaining an explanation.

  Questions settled

  • What is the effect of non-compliance with Rule 9 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 regarding striking police officers?
  • Can the proviso to Rule 9 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 dispense with the requirement of giving notice in writing and obtaining an explanation from the accused officer?
  • Whether an authority other than the competent authority can invoke or claim the benefit of the proviso under Rule 9 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975?
  • Does summary police procedure under Rule 6(2) of the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 permit the imposition of dismissal from service?
  Read full judgment →
• Raja Ghulam Hussain vs The Additional District Judge and another1989 SCMR 1658 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-03
  Section 12(2) CPCfraudulent decreeadmissibility of documentsstamp dutyconstitutional jurisdictionimpounding documentsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute involving a house in Rawalpindi. The petitioner claimed ownership through a gift from his grandmother, Mst. Bano Bibi, which resulted in a consent decree in 1973. In 1986, the grandmother filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alleging the decree was obtained through fraud. During trial, the grandmother sought to introduce a lease agreement as evidence, but the trial court impounded it for lack of stamp duty, requiring payment of a penalty. The Additional District Judge set aside this order, allowing the document to be exhibited. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition, reasoning that the petitioner could challenge the admissibility later in appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting the petitioner's argument that once a document is admitted into evidence, its admissibility cannot be challenged in higher forums, thereby necessitating immediate judicial review. The Court stayed trial proceedings pending the final appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the authority to decline constitutional jurisdiction on the ground that an alternative remedy exists when the admissibility of a document is at stake?
  • Can a party challenge the admissibility of an impounded document in a higher forum once it has been admitted into evidence by the trial court?
  • Is a revision petition maintainable against an order of a trial court regarding the impounding of an unstamped document?
  Read full judgment →
• Railway Workers' Union Open Line Establishment vs National1989 SCMR 1490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-22
  Collective Bargaining AgentReferendumConstitutional jurisdictionVoter listStatus quoWrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a Constitutional petition concerning a referendum held to determine the Collective Bargaining Agent (C.B.A.) for the Pakistan Railways' Open Line Establishment. The petitioner challenged the referendum results, alleging the exclusion of legitimate voters. The High Court had previously declined to issue a writ, noting the significant margin of votes between the parties. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner acknowledged the practical difficulties in conducting the referendum and the impending nature of the next one, opting not to disturb the status quo. The core legal question concerned the criteria for voter list preparation and the effect of vote margins on the validity of a referendum. The Supreme Court disposed of the petition by consent, establishing that voter lists must be updated to include entries up to three to six months prior to the referendum, given the logistical challenges of the Open Line Establishment. Furthermore, the Court clarified that whether a referendum should be set aside due to defects depends on the specific circumstances of each case, rather than being governed by a universal rule regarding vote margins.

  Questions settled

  • Must voter lists for a referendum be updated to include fresh entries prior to the election?
  • Does a wide margin of votes between winning and losing parties automatically preclude a court from setting aside a referendum?
  • Is the determination of whether a defect warrants setting aside a referendum dependent on the specific circumstances of each case?
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• Rahim Bakhsh vs Mst. Allah Javai (deceased) through her Legal Heirs and others1989 SCMR 1312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  leave to appealpartition of landsubsistence holdingmartial law regulationcivil court jurisdictionancestral property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's suit regarding the partition of ancestral land. The original owner's property devolved through successive generations, leading to a partition via Mutation No. 1732 dated 30-7-1962. The petitioner challenged the mutation alleging fraud and misrepresentation. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner, and the Additional District Judge dismissed the respondents' appeal. However, the High Court accepted the respondents' regular second appeal, set aside the lower courts' decrees, and dismissed the suit. Before the Supreme Court, the core legal question concerned whether the partition of 45 kanals of land contravened paragraph 23 of Martial Law Regulation No. 64, and the effect of Notification No. SR2104/59/3194-LC dated 28th July, 1959, on the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Supreme Court held that the case raised a question of public importance regarding the statutory bar on partitioning joint holdings equal to or less than a subsistence holding, and consequently granted leave to appeal while ordering status quo.

  Questions settled

  • Does the partition of a joint holding with an area equal to or less than a subsistence holding violate Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
  • What is the effect of Notification No. SR2104/59/3194-LC dated 28th July, 1959, on the jurisdiction of civil courts regarding land partition under Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
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• Rahim Bakhsh and 4 others vs The State1989 SCMR 161 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-26
  murdercommon intentionself-defencebenefit of doubtocular testimonycriminal appealdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  These connected criminal appeals arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning the murder of Khuda Bakhsh. The prosecution alleged that the appellants intercepted the deceased and fired at him, resulting in his death, due to a previous motive involving a marriage dispute and criminal litigation. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. The High Court confirmed the death sentence of one appellant, dismissed appeals for others, and reduced the sentence of a co-accused to life imprisonment by giving him the benefit of the doubt regarding his pistol shot. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the defence version of self-defence was plausible and whether the sentences of life imprisonment warranted enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt through credible ocular and medical evidence, while the belated plea of self-defence by the accused was uncorroborated and untruthful. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the convictions and sentences upheld by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a belated and uncorroborated plea of self-defence raised by the accused can be accepted without independent medical or eyewitness corroboration?
  • Can the benefit of the doubt be extended to an accused regarding the fatal nature of a specific gunshot wound where multiple assailants fired at the deceased?
  • Whether ocular testimony corroborated by medical evidence is sufficient to prove a murder charge beyond reasonable doubt?
  • When should a sentence of life imprisonment not be enhanced to death upon a complainant's appeal?
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• Raham Din and others vs Mst. Fatima Bibi1989 SCMR 1430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  inheritance mutationrejection of plaintdelay and lachesagricultural propertycollateralscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioners, claiming to be collaterals of the deceased Allauddin, seeking a share in his agricultural property after remaining silent for over twenty-six years. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of a civil suit challenging inheritance mutations and allotments after an extensive delay, where alternative remedies before rehabilitation authorities were available. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petition lacks merit due to the prolonged delay of more than twenty-six years in raising the claim and the failure to pursue remedies before the appropriate rehabilitation and resettlement authorities. The court affirmed the concurrent decisions of the lower courts, which had rejected the plaint, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil suit claiming inheritance rights is maintainable after an unexplained delay of over twenty-six years?
  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the claimants failed to agitate the matter before the appropriate rehabilitation and resettlement authorities?
  • Is leave to appeal to the Supreme Court warranted against concurrent dismissal of a suit by the lower courts and the High Court?
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• Rafiq Ahmad Khan and another vs Mahbub Ahmad and others1989 SCMR 1576 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-25
  inheritancelegitimacyrevenue proceedingscivil court jurisdictionestoppelmutationquestion of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that affirmed a decree granting the respondent possession of property as the son of the deceased, Rajab Khan. The core legal question was whether the respondent was estopped from claiming inheritance in civil court after previously withdrawing his claim during revenue mutation proceedings based on an oath taken by community elders. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was indeed the legitimate son of the deceased, supported by evidence including witness testimony regarding the marriage of the deceased to the respondent's mother and school admission records. The Court ruled that revenue proceedings are independent and their findings do not bind civil courts regarding inheritance disputes. Furthermore, the Court determined that the matter involved questions of fact that were correctly adjudicated by the lower appellate court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the findings of the civil courts regarding legitimacy and inheritance take precedence over prior revenue mutation proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Are findings or orders of revenue courts binding on civil courts regarding inheritance disputes?
  • Does a withdrawal of a claim in revenue proceedings based on an oath operate as an estoppel against filing a civil suit for inheritance?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts?
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• Rabnawaz and others vs Akbar Ali and others1989 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-12
  restoration of appealdismissal for non-prosecutioncondonation of delayco-shareralienation of joint propertydiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arose from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' application for restoration of a Regular Second Appeal, which had been dismissed for non-prosecution, alongside an application for condonation of delay. The core legal questions were whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to restore the appeal after a delay of over two years, and whether a co-sharer in a joint holding could validly alienate more than their specific share. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's refusal to exercise discretion in favor of the petitioners was well-reasoned and warranted no interference. On the merits, the Court affirmed the established legal principle that a co-sharer is not legally entitled to alienate more than their own share in a joint holding, thereby upholding the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court's refusal to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution can be interfered with when the restoration application is filed with significant delay?
  • Can a co-sharer in a joint holding validly alienate more than their own share of the joint property?
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• Rab Nawaz and others vs Lt.Col. Raja Shaukat Mahmood and another1989 SCMR 598 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-14
  land settlementP.I. Unitsland allotmentleave to appealIntra-Court Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' Intra-Court Appeal in a land settlement dispute. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its determination that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, one Hari Singh, had already received his full entitlement of land units, thereby precluding further allotment in the village of Sahjra. The Supreme Court reviewed the petitioners' contentions regarding the calculation of the predecessor's P.I. Units. Upon consideration, the Court found no legal error in the High Court's reasoning, which concluded that the predecessor's total entitlement had been satisfied by prior allotments in Dehh Punnun. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's dismissal of the appeal was justified. The key principle affirmed is that where a party's total land entitlement has been fully satisfied through verified claims in a specific area, they are not entitled to further allotments elsewhere, and appellate courts will not interfere with factual findings regarding unit satisfaction absent a demonstrable legal error.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party seek further land allotment if their total entitlement in P.I. Units has already been satisfied by prior allotments?
  • Does the dismissal of an Intra-Court Appeal by the High Court regarding land settlement require interference if no legal error is demonstrated?
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• Qutab Din and 4 others vs Mst. Rahim Bibi1989 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  gift validitydelivery of possessionpleadingsrevenue recordscustomary lawRegular Second Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the validity of a gift of land made by the deceased, Barkat Ali, in favor of his daughter, Mst. Rahim Bibi. The petitioners, legal heirs of the deceased's brother, challenged the gift, claiming entitlement to a share of the estate on the grounds that the deceased was governed by custom and that the gift was illegal. The core legal question was whether the gift could be declared void due to the alleged non-delivery of possession. The Supreme Court observed that the plea regarding non-delivery of possession was neither raised in the original pleadings nor framed as an issue during the trial proceedings. Furthermore, the Court noted that the land was in the possession of tenants, and the respondent's name was duly recorded as the owner in the revenue records. Consequently, the Court held that the issue of non-delivery of possession could not be raised for the first time at the Regular Second Appeal stage. The petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plea regarding non-delivery of possession be raised for the first time at the stage of a Regular Second Appeal?
  • Is a gift of land valid where the property is in possession of tenants and the donee's name is recorded in revenue records?
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• Qazi Inamul Haq vs Heavy Foundry and Forge Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd.1989 SCMR 1855 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-11
  temporary injunctionpremature retirementirreparable lossbalance of convenienceservice mattercivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a revision application against the vacation of a temporary injunction. The petitioner, an employee of Heavy Foundry and Forge Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd., was prematurely retired and sought to restrain the company from enforcing this retirement. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner was entitled to a temporary injunction against the retirement order. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the retirement order had already taken effect prior to the institution of the suit. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the petitioner failed to establish the essential requirements for a temporary injunction, specifically the balance of convenience and the existence of irreparable loss. The Court clarified that personal hardships, such as vacating company-provided housing or the disruption of a child's education, constitute mere inconvenience rather than irreparable loss. The judgment reaffirms the established principle that a temporary injunction requires a prima facie case, a balance of convenience in the plaintiff's favor, and proof of irreparable loss, none of which were satisfied in this instance.

  Questions settled

  • Does the vacation of company-provided housing and the disturbance of a child's education constitute irreparable loss for the purpose of granting a temporary injunction?
  • What are the three essential factors that must be satisfied for the grant of a temporary injunction?
  • Can a temporary injunction be granted against an order of retirement that has already taken effect?
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