Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Khan and 2 others vs Muhammad and 6 others1989 SCMR 1714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  consolidation of holdingswrit jurisdictionfindings of factleave to appealBoard of Revenue
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition concerning a consolidation of holdings matter. The dispute originated from a modification made by a Member of the Board of Revenue to an order previously passed by an Additional Commissioner. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the order issued by the Member, Board of Revenue, was passed without jurisdiction or was otherwise illegal, and whether the High Court erred in its assessment of the merits. Upon hearing the petitioner's counsel, the Supreme Court noted that the counsel admitted the order was neither without jurisdiction nor illegal. The petitioner's argument regarding the alleged disregard for consolidation principles and the deprivation of property possession was found to be a matter of fact and merit, which the High Court had already adequately addressed. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that it found no justification to interfere with the High Court's findings of fact. Leave to appeal was refused, affirming that the Supreme Court will not re-examine findings of fact properly decided by lower forums.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with findings of fact made by the High Court in a consolidation of holdings matter?
  • Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable when the petitioner concedes that the impugned order is neither illegal nor without jurisdiction?
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• Muhammad Khan alias Muhammad vs The State1989 SCMR 696 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  leave to appealcriminal petitionnighttime identificationocular and medical discrepancymurderre-appraisal of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition from jail arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction and sentence for murder and related offenses. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner could be reliably identified during a nighttime occurrence by the light of lightning, and whether discrepancies between the eye-witness account and the medical evidence regarding the number of shots fired and injuries sustained warrant a re-appraisal of evidence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to re-appraise the evidence in the case. The key principle laid down is that where material discrepancies exist between ocular testimony and medical evidence, alongside issues regarding nighttime identification, leave to appeal may be granted to thoroughly examine and re-evaluate the evidentiary record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused can be reliably identified during a nighttime occurrence by the flash of lightning?
  • Does a material discrepancy between the eye-witness account of the number of shots fired and the medical evidence warrant the granting of leave to appeal?
  • Whether the absence of corroborative blunt weapon injuries on the complainant's person affects the credibility of the ocular testimony?
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• Muhammad Khalid Khan alias Khalid Javed Khan and 3 others vs Sher1989 SCMR 1629 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-13
  pre-emptioncourt-feerevisional jurisdictioncontumacyleave to appealprecedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a vendee challenging the High Court's refusal to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in pre-emption cases. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the pre-emptors' case regarding the payment of court-fee was governed by the principles established in the precedent of Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another (PLD 1984 SC 289). While the petitioner's counsel initially argued that the issue of 'contumacy' required further examination by the Court, relying on the leave-granting order in Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Abdul Hamid (1986 SCMR 333), the Court rejected this contention. The Supreme Court held that the case was indeed covered by the Siddique Khan ruling. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the judgment in Iqbal's case was distinguishable because the Siddique Khan precedent had not been brought to the Court's attention at that time. On the merits, the Court found no evidence of 'contumacy' as defined in Siddique Khan, and consequently, leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the precedent established in Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakur Khan and another govern the payment of court-fee in pre-emption cases?
  • Does the failure to bring a relevant precedent to the Court's notice in a prior case affect the binding nature of that precedent in subsequent matters?
  • What constitutes 'contumacy' in the context of court-fee payment in pre-emption litigation?
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• Muhammad Khalid and others vs Messrs at.M. Corporation Ltd. and others1989 SCMR 1537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  special leave to appealcompany disputesarbitration awardreferee reportwinding up of companyrectification of registercivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for special leave to appeal arise from disputes among the shareholders of a private limited company, Messrs. A.T.M. Corporation Limited, involving civil litigation, arbitration proceedings, and multiple petitions under the Companies Ordinance. Differences arose regarding company management and shareholding, leading to a civil suit, subsequent appeals, revisions, and company petitions in the High Court. During the proceedings, a deed of settlement was filed under which a former High Court Judge was appointed as a Referee to resolve the disputes. The Single Judge in the High Court treated the Referee's report as an award, rejected objections, and disposed of all pending civil revisions and company petitions accordingly. The core legal question is whether the High Court was justified in disposing of the matters on the basis of the Referee's report when not all parties had agreed to refer their disputes to the Referee and whether valid grounds existed to challenge the report. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding the lack of unanimous agreement among all parties to refer the disputes and the validity of disposing of the matters based on the report required examination, and consequently granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court dispose of civil revisions and company petitions on the basis of a referee's report when not all affected parties agreed to the reference?
  • Whether a report submitted by an appointed referee can be treated as a binding award without unanimous consent of all litigating parties?
  • Are there sufficient grounds to set aside a High Court order that disposes of company and civil proceedings based on a disputed settlement report?
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• Muhammad Javed vs Asghar Ali and another1989 SCMR 677 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-14
  leave to appealcriminal revisionsentencing discretionreduction of sentencecompensationjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had reduced the sentence of the respondent in a criminal case registered under Section 308 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner challenged the reduction of the sentence and the adequacy of the compensation awarded, citing the gravity of the injury inflicted by an iron bar. The High Court had exercised its discretion to reduce the sentence based on the respondent's tender age at the time of the occurrence and the specific circumstances of the case, despite the trial court's failure to formally record the respondent's age. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court's exercise of discretion was legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction and that no principle of law had been violated. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that the sentencing decision was a matter of judicial discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have the discretion to reduce a sentence based on the age of the accused when the trial court failed to record the age?
  • Is the reduction of a sentence a matter of judicial discretion that warrants interference by the Supreme Court in the absence of a violation of law?
  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely on the grounds of dissatisfaction with the quantum of sentence and compensation awarded by the High Court?
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• Muhammad Jamil alias Kala vs The State1989 SCMR 993 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-07
  leave to appealsentence reductionspur of the momentlack of motivemitigating circumstancescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. The petitioner sought a reduction in his sentence, contending that the trial court's observations indicated the absence of a motive against the deceased. Specifically, the trial court noted that the altercation leading to the fatal injury occurred at the spur of the moment during a conciliatory meeting, rather than being a premeditated act. The petitioner argued that the High Court failed to properly apply its mind to the question of sentencing, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Upon reviewing the arguments and the evidence on record, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. The core legal question to be determined is whether the circumstances surrounding the incident, particularly the lack of prior motive and the spontaneous nature of the occurrence, warrant a reduction in the sentence imposed upon the petitioner. The Court will examine if the High Court's failure to adequately address these mitigating factors constitutes a legal error requiring appellate intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a prior motive for a crime constitute a valid ground for the reduction of a sentence?
  • Can a sentence be reduced if the offence occurred at the spur of the moment during a conciliatory effort?
  • Does a failure by the High Court to properly consider mitigating factors in sentencing amount to a miscarriage of justice?
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• Muhammad Jamil (deceased)through Legal Heirs vs Ahmad Zaman Khan1989 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1987-12-20
  brick-kiln allotmentindustrial concernevacuee propertysettlement commissionerremandkatchi abadi
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a dispute concerning the allotment and transfer of a brick-kiln situated in Khasra No. 396 in village Qutabpur, Multan, claimed by Muhammad Jamil (now represented by legal heirs) as an industrial concern and by Ahmad Zaman Khan as part of land confirmed to deserving allottees. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in construing an earlier order dated April 3, 1963, of the Additional Settlement Commissioner as conclusively confirming the entire Khasra number in favor of the allottees and thereby precluding the pending claim for the transfer of the industrial concern. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misconstrued the order, ruling that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had left open the question of the brick-kiln's transfer to be dealt with in due course. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the Notified Officer to determine the appellants' entitlement to the transfer of the brick-kiln and to examine whether any portion fell within the notification issued under the relevant statute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for the transfer of an industrial concern can be deemed rejected by a general order confirming land in favor of temporary allottees?
  • Can an appellate court's interpretation of a settlement authority's ambiguous order be set aside when the text preserves pending applications?
  • Whether the size of an industrial concern's area must be determined upon remand when conflicting revenue records exist?
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• Muhammad Jameel vs Peer Bakhsh and others1989 SCMR 1564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-11
  evacuee agricultural landSettlement Scheme No. VIItransfer of housesubservient to agricultureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court accepting a writ petition filed by the respondent regarding a house situated within the area of evacuee agricultural land transferred to the petitioner. The core legal question was whether the house in dispute stood transferred to the respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VII or whether it constituted property subservient to agriculture passing to the agricultural land transferee. The Supreme Court held that since findings of fact established the house was in possession of the respondent as a tenant since before 1947 and lacked any factual basis showing it was subservient to agriculture, the High Court correctly ruled it stood transferred to the respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VII. The key principle laid down is that the transfer of a house under Settlement Scheme No. VII to a pre-1947 occupant tenant prevails unless there are concrete factual findings that the structure serves purposes subservient to agriculture.

  Questions settled

  • Does a house in possession of a tenant since before 1947 stand transferred under Settlement Scheme No. VII?
  • Can a house claimed as subservient to agriculture be excluded from Settlement Scheme No. VII without supporting factual findings?
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• Muhammad Jaffar Toor vs Superintending Engineer, Headquarters, Irrigation, Sargodha and 4 others1989 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-17
  compulsory retirementdisciplinary proceedingsleave to appealService Tribunalmisconductfactual findingscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a Sub-Engineer, sought leave to appeal against an order of compulsory retirement from service, challenging the decision of the Service Tribunal which upheld the disciplinary action taken against him. The petitioner had been charge-sheeted on four grounds, leading to his compulsory retirement following a departmental inquiry. The Service Tribunal, after reviewing the record, concluded that the petitioner had removed government store articles in the early hours of the morning, rejecting his defense that the removal was for official work, particularly noting the suspicious timing involving his wife. The Tribunal further affirmed that the Authorised Officer was justified in proceeding against the petitioner under the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the disciplinary procedure was inappropriate and that his explanation warranted consideration. The Supreme Court held that the issues raised were primarily factual and had been thoroughly addressed by the Tribunal. Finding no substantial question of law requiring further examination, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court required to re-examine factual findings made by a Service Tribunal in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a compulsory retirement order on the basis of factual disputes already adjudicated by a Service Tribunal?
  • Does the initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 constitute a question of law?
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• Muhammad Izharul Ahsan Qureshi vs Messrs P.Ia. Corporation1989 SCMR 486 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-21
  dismissal from servicemisconductforged documentsgrievance petitionlabour courtconstitutional petitionemployment termination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition filed by the petitioner, a former employee of the respondent Corporation. The petitioner, a former Technical Librarian, had been dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of misconduct, specifically the submission of forged educational certificates and fraudulent misrepresentation of employment details, including his date of birth. After his dismissal, the petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the termination through a grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the Labour Court and subsequently before the Sind Labour Appellate Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in dismissing the constitutional petition challenging the concurrent findings of the lower labour forums. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had correctly examined and rejected the petitioner's pleas for cogent and proper reasons. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition, finding no merit in the challenges raised against the disciplinary action and the subsequent judicial findings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a constitutional petition be maintained against concurrent findings of labour forums regarding employee dismissal?
  • Does the submission of forged educational certificates constitute valid grounds for dismissal from service?
  • Is a grievance petition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance the appropriate remedy for challenging dismissal from service?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Naseer Ahmad and another1989 SCMR 1085 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-27
  pre-emptionleave to appealsuperior right of pre-emptiontenant in possessioncivil revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a pre-emption case where the petitioner, a vendee/defendant, challenged the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court which had upheld the pre-emption decree originally granted in favour of the respondents on 30th October 1984. The core legal question concerned whether the decree was hit by the rule laid down in Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 287) and whether the petitioner's plea of a superior right of pre-emption as a tenant was properly considered. The Supreme Court held that since the decree was passed prior to 31st July 1986, the intervening remand order did not affect the matter under the cited rule, and the findings of fact regarding tenancy could not be reopened. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that decrees passed before the critical date are protected despite intervening remands, and concurrent findings of fact on tenancy in pre-emption suits will not be revisited.

  Questions settled

  • Does an intervening remand order affect the protection of a pre-emption decree passed prior to 31st July 1986 under the rule in Sardar Ali's case?
  • Will the Supreme Court reappraise evidence regarding a claim of superior right of pre-emption based on tenancy that has been concluded by concurrent findings of fact?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Muhammad Rafique and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-02
  post-arrest bailmurder casefurther inquirypolice opinion of innocencestatutory right to bailbail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to a respondent involved in a murder case. The core legal questions examined were whether superior courts should decline bail in murder cases when trial is imminent, and whether the dismissal of a prior bail application on merits bars a subsequent grant based on a subsequent police finding of innocence under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that once the conditions of Section 497(2) are met, an accused is entitled to bail as of right, which cannot be withheld on the ground of judicial practice regarding imminent trials, as statutory right supersedes discretionary practice. The key principle laid down is that the mandatory right to bail under Section 497(2) overrides the general practice of declining bail when a trial is about to commence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is an established practice of superior courts not to grant or cancel bail in a murder case when its trial is to commence within a short time?
  • Whether the dismissal of an earlier bail application on merits is a bar to the grant of bail on a subsequent application supported by a subsequent investigating officer's opinion of innocence?
  • Does an accused become entitled to bail as of right when the conditions under subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are satisfied?
  • Would subsection (2) of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 operate notwithstanding the practice of refusing bail when a trial is imminent?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Muhammad Rafiq and another1989 SCMR 997 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-27
  bail cancellationmurder casesuccessive bail applicationfurther inquirypolice investigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed seeking the cancellation of bail granted to respondent No. 1 in a murder case registered under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions raised concern whether superior courts follow an established practice of not granting or cancelling bail when a trial is set to commence shortly, and whether the dismissal of an earlier bail application on merits by a High Court judge bars a subsequent bail grant based on a subsequent investigating officer's opinion finding the accused innocent, particularly under subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these questions, holding that the matter requires detailed consideration and directing the appeal to be fixed for hearing before May 1989. The key principle relates to the evaluation of successive bail applications and the weight to be attached to differing police investigation reports alongside prior judicial determinations on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether it is an established practice of the superior courts not to grant or cancel bail in a murder case when its trial is to commence within a short time and the date has been fixed?
  • Whether the dismissal of the earlier bail application of an accused on merits by the same judge acts as a bar to the grant of bail on a subsequent application?
  • Whether the view of a subsequent police investigator finding the accused innocent should prevail over earlier considerations for the purposes of subsection (2) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Khurshid Hussain1989 SCMR 463 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-25
  pre-emptionwaiverTehreer Tark-i-Shufaleave to appealfindings of factvendee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a vendee challenging the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal in a pre-emption matter. The petitioner contended that the lower courts erred in their decision regarding the plea of waiver raised against the respondent/pre-emptor. Specifically, the petitioner challenged the appreciation of evidence concerning the authenticity of the 'Tehreer Tark-i-Shufa' (a document purportedly waiving the right of pre-emption) and argued that the material on record regarding the waiver was not correctly assessed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no legal error or infirmity in the findings of the lower courts. The Court held that the findings of fact against the petitioner were unexceptionable and did not warrant interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed. The judgment reinforces the principle that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a pre-emption case where no legal infirmity is demonstrated.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a pre-emption matter where no legal infirmity is shown?
  • Is a document of waiver (Tehreer Tark-i-Shufa) subject to re-appreciation of evidence in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Muhammad Ismail vs Additional District Judge, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 1228 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-15
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentpersonal needfindings of factpetition for leave to appealrent controller
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the concurrent findings of fact regarding the ejectment of a tenant. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court and appellate court erred in appreciating evidence regarding default in rent payment and personal bona fide need of the landlord. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that findings of fact concurrently recorded by the appellate court and upheld by the High Court regarding default and personal need do not warrant interference under extraordinary constitutional or appellate jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that findings of fact concurred in by lower forums will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of any misreading or non-reading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the appellate court and upheld by the High Court in an ejectment matter can be interfered with by the Supreme Court?
  • Does misreading of evidence on the issue of rent default invalidate findings on personal need?
  • What is the scope of interference by the Supreme Court in factual determinations made by rent tribunals and High Courts?
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• Muhammad Ismail and others vs Member (Consolidation), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  consolidation schemesuo motu revisionwrit jurisdictionland revenueright holdersadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a writ petition against a decision by the Member, Board of Revenue. The underlying dispute concerned a consolidation scheme sanctioned in 1972, which was later set aside by an Additional Commissioner exercising suo motu revisional powers due to alleged errors. The Member, Board of Revenue, subsequently set aside the Additional Commissioner's order, reasoning that revising a scheme after ten years, during which right holders had settled, was unjustified. The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that the Member's order affected numerous right holders without notice, that the proceedings were improperly initiated under the Land Revenue Act rather than the Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960, and that the order was conjectural. The Supreme Court held that since these specific grounds were not raised before the High Court, no case for interference was established. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the High Court's refusal to interfere with the administrative decision regarding the long-settled consolidation scheme.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new grounds in a petition for leave to appeal that were not argued before the High Court?
  • Is a consolidation scheme subject to revision after a significant lapse of time where right holders have already settled?
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• Muhammad Ismail and others vs Kara Ma T, Ali1989 PLD Supreme Court 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-27
  doctrine of sinkerpre-emptionindivisible salestranger vendeeco-vendeejudicial precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Court arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court affirming the dismissal of the appellants' second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The appellants purchased land via a single, indivisible sale deed. Appellant No. 2 possessed pre-emptive rights equal to the plaintiff/respondent, whereas Appellant No. 1 was a stranger to the land. The suit for pre-emption was decreed against them by the trial court, Additional District Judge, and High Court on the application of the doctrine of sinker. The core legal question was whether the doctrine of sinker applies to pre-emption cases in Punjab despite the absence of an explicit statutory provision in the regional pre-emption law, particularly in light of conflicting precedent. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that long-standing judicial precedent over 56 years in Punjab established the doctrine of sinker as valid judge-made law. By associating with a stranger in an indivisible transaction, a co-vendee sinks to the stranger's status and forfeits any preferential pre-emptive right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the doctrine of sinker apply to pre-emption sales in Punjab despite the absence of an explicit statutory provision?
  • Can a vendee with a right of pre-emption protect their share of purchased land if they join a stranger in an indivisible sale transaction?
  • Does long-standing judicial practice and precedent acquire the status of enforceable law in the absence of conflicting legislation or Sharia principles?
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• Muhammad Ismail and 3 others vs The State1989 SCMR 1000 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-03-01
  pre-arrest bailbail cancellationcriminal appealsurety bondsprosecution rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for pre-arrest bail filed by Muhammad Ismail and three others, which the Supreme Court of Pakistan converted into an appeal. The core legal question addressed was whether the petitioners were entitled to the grant of pre-arrest bail in the circumstances presented. Upon consideration, the Court allowed the appeal and granted pre-arrest bail to the petitioners, subject to their furnishing surety in the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 each and executing personal bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court. The Court established the principle that while bail is granted, the prosecution retains the right to apply for its cancellation should sufficient evidence against the petitioners emerge. In such an event, the trial Court is empowered to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law. The petitioners were granted a ten-day period to furnish the required sureties, maintaining their existing bail status in the interim.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petition for pre-arrest bail be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the grant of pre-arrest bail preclude the prosecution from seeking its cancellation if new evidence arises?
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• Muhammad Islam vs Abdul Majid and others1989 SCMR 1659 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-21
  Permanent Transfer Deedstatus quo orderfunctus officiosettlement authoritiesauction purchaserremand orderresumption of propertyconstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court that accepted a constitutional petition and set aside a remand order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The dispute involved property originally transferred to the appellant's predecessor, subsequently alleged to have been surrendered through a forged deed, resumed without notice, and auctioned to respondent No. 1. While the appellant's appeal was pending before the Additional Settlement Commissioner with a subsisting status quo order, a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) was issued to the auction purchaser. The High Court held that following the issuance of the PTD and relevant rule amendments, settlement authorities were functus officio. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that because an unvacated and unmodified status quo order was in operation, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner lacked competence to issue the PTD. Consequently, the appellate authority was not debarred from deciding the appeal on the merits or ordering a remand.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Deputy Settlement Commissioner competent to issue a Permanent Transfer Deed while an unvacated status quo order issued by an appellate authority is in operation?
  • Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed in violation of an active stay order render settlement authorities functus officio from deciding a pending appeal on the merits?
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• Muhammad Ishtiaq vs Pakistan and another1989 SCMR 496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-17
  service tribunaldismissal from servicemisconductconfession of guiltleave to appealdepartmental inquiry
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal upholding the dismissal of the petitioner, an ex-Assistant Sub-Postmaster, from service on the charge of misconduct relating to the use of used postage stamps on registered letters. The core legal questions concern whether the proceedings were vitiated because the same officer conducted the raid, issued the show-cause notice, and passed the dismissal order, and whether the prescribed procedure under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules was violated. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit, noting that the petitioner had voluntarily confessed his guilt in a written statement dated 15-9-1982. The key principle laid down is that a voluntary and true confession of guilt in writing obviates procedural objections regarding departmental inquiries.

  Questions settled

  • Does a voluntary and written confession of guilt by a civil servant cure procedural defects in a departmental inquiry?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be maintained against a Service Tribunal order when the employee has confessed to the charge of misconduct?
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• Muhammad Ishfaque vs Asghar Ali and others1989 SCMR 1315 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-06
  ejectmentbona fide personal needsecond ejectment applicationrent restrictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had remanded an ejectment application to the Rent Controller for a decision on merits. The landlord, Asghar Ali, initially sought the ejectment of his tenant, Muhammad Ishfaque, on the ground of bona fide personal need, but that application was dismissed. Subsequently, the landlord filed a second ejectment application on a different ground of personal need, which was dismissed by the Rent Controller under section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, a view upheld by the appellate court. However, the High Court set aside these orders and remanded the matter. The core legal question was whether a second ejectment application on the ground of personal need is maintainable shortly after the dismissal of the first, and whether it is barred under section 14 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that no fixed time limit or period of limitation can be prescribed for a change of circumstances regarding personal need, and that the second application was maintainable as it was founded on a fresh cause of action. The key principle laid down is that changes in personal circumstances may occur abruptly depending on the facts of each case, and section 14 does not bar a subsequent application supported by a fresh cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a second ejectment application be filed on the ground of personal need shortly after the dismissal of the first application?
  • Whether section 14 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance bars a second ejectment application filed on a fresh cause of action?
  • Is any fixed period of limitation or time limit prescribed for a change of circumstances regarding a landlord's personal need?
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• Muhammad Ishaq through his Legal Heirs vs S. Khurshid Alam1989 PLD Supreme Court 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-02
  landlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantregistered gift deeddefault in payment of rentbona fide personal requirementlocus standi of tenantSind Rented Premises Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent-landlord against the original tenant under the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on grounds of default and personal bona fide requirement. Although the Rent Controller decided the issue of default against the landlord, he ordered eviction based on personal requirement, which was upheld by the High Court. Upon the tenant's demise, his legal heirs appealed to the Supreme Court, contending inter alia that the Rent Controller failed to frame a preliminary issue regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant, that no notice under section 18 of the Ordinance was served, and that the registered gift deed in favor of the landlord was invalid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that since the tenant had expressly admitted his tenancy in the written statement and the landlord had produced a registered gift deed establishing ownership, no preliminary issue on the landlord-tenant relationship was required. The Court further held that a tenant lacks the locus standi to challenge the validity of a registered gift deed executed in favor of the landlord.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller is bound to frame a preliminary issue regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant when the tenancy is admitted in the written statement?
  • Does a tenant have the locus standi to question the validity of a registered gift deed through which the landlord acquired the property?
  • Whether the failure to serve a notice under section 18 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 renders an eviction order unsustainable when eviction is not granted on the ground of default?
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• Muhammad Irshad and another vs Akozai and 4 others1989 SCMR 645 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  leave to appeallimitationpre-emptiondeclaratory suitconstitutional petitionPATA Regulation
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court dated 12-1-1987, which had set aside the decisions of revenue authorities and the Secretary Home regarding a property dispute. The core legal question concerns whether the declaratory suit filed by respondent No. 1 under the PATA Regulation of 1975 was barred by limitation, given that the petitioners had held possession of the suit property since 1952 following a pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the suit was barred by time required detailed consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, suspended the operation of the High Court's order, and directed that the appeal be heard on an early date. The key principle laid down is that the question of limitation in suits governed by the PATA Regulation warrants a full hearing by the appellate court when conflicting findings have been rendered by subordinate tribunals and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a declaratory suit filed under the PATA Regulation of 1975 is barred by limitation?
  • Did the High Court act in excess of its jurisdiction by holding the suit to be within time?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when the question of limitation requires consideration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs The State1989 SCMR 952 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-07
  criminal breach of trustmisappropriationbank cashierexclusive custodyreappraisal of evidenceleave to appealburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a conviction under Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 regarding the criminal breach of trust of prize bonds by a bank cashier. The core legal question was whether the evidence sufficiently established the petitioner's guilt for the misappropriation of assets while under his exclusive custody, and whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the prosecution provided overwhelming evidence that the prize bonds were in the petitioner's exclusive custody during the relevant period. The Court found the petitioner's explanation for the disappearance implausible and noted his failure to report the shortage immediately. The key principles laid down are that where an accused has exclusive custody of property that goes missing, the burden lies on them to provide a reasonable explanation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court generally declines to undertake a reappraisal of evidence when lower courts have reached concurrent findings based on sufficient material, and an accused's subsequent conduct does not necessarily negate guilt if the evidence of misappropriation is otherwise established.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court undertake a reappraisal of evidence when lower courts have reached concurrent findings of guilt?
  • Is a bank cashier in exclusive custody of assets liable for their disappearance if no reasonable explanation is provided?
  • Does the reporting of a loss by an accused person necessarily negate the evidence of criminal misappropriation?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Muhammad Suleman and another1989 SCMR 1227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-21
  specific performancespecial oathcosts of suitsleave to appealdiscretion of trial court
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions for special leave to appeal arising out of suits filed by the petitioner for the specific performance of an agreement of sale of agricultural land, which were decreed in his favour on the basis of a special oath. The core legal question concerns the entitlement to costs of the suits where the trial court exercised its discretion not to award costs, and the subsequent failure of the petitioner's appeals and revision petitions before the Additional District Judge and the High Court. The Supreme Court held that no case for interference with the concurrent judgments of the subordinate courts regarding the refusal of costs was made out, and accordingly dismissed the petitions. The key principle laid down is that the award of costs is within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate or revisional courts will not lightly interfere with such exercise of discretion unless compelling grounds are shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretion of subordinate courts regarding the award of costs?
  • Can a party claim costs as a matter of right following a decree based on a special oath?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Muhammad Shafi1989 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-15
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencydiscretionary powerrevisional jurisdictionextension of timeCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption suit where the plaintiff failed to deposit the full court-fee within the time granted by the trial court. The trial court, noting that the plaintiff had neglected to pay the deficit for over four years despite a prior order, dismissed the suit. The appellate court subsequently allowed the plaintiff's appeal, exercising its discretion under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to permit the deficiency to be made up. The High Court dismissed the petitioner's revision petition, holding that the appellate court's exercise of discretion was neither arbitrary nor capricious and thus not subject to interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that the plaintiff had already been granted one opportunity to pay the deficit and was not entitled to a second extension. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the question of whether a second enlargement of time for making up a court-fee deficiency is permissible requires further judicial consideration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court grant a second extension of time to make up a deficiency in court-fee under Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is the exercise of discretion by an appellate court to allow a deficiency in court-fee to be made up subject to interference by the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal vs Fazal Muhammad1989 SCMR 1602 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  oral giftconcurrent findingsleave to appealejectmentcompensation for use and occupationlicensee
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent findings of lower courts regarding rival claims of oral gifts concerning a residential property. Three consolidated suits were initially instituted involving claims of ownership by way of oral gift, a claim for recovery of compensation for use and occupation, and a suit for ejectment of a licensee based on an oral gift. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's suit and decreed the suits of the respondents, which decisions were largely upheld in appeals and subsequent regular second appeal and civil revisions. The core legal question concerned the validity of the rival oral gifts and the concurrent factual determinations made by the lower forums. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the valid oral gift in favour of the respondent were unexceptionable, and the petitioner failed to prove his ownership. Consequently, the petitions for leave to appeal were dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact based on proper appraisal of evidence will not be interfered with.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts regarding the validity of an oral gift?
  • Is a licensee liable to pay compensation for use and occupation of the property to the rightful owner?
  • Whether an oral gift of immovable property is established when the donor himself corroborates the transaction in favor of the donee?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Khan vs Mst. Hussaina Begum and others1989 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  leave to appealregular second appealinheritancegiftconcurrent findingsappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant against the dismissal of his Regular Second Appeal by the High Court, which upheld the concurrent decrees in favour of the respondents granting them a share in their deceased father's inheritance as daughters. The petitioner's defense rested upon an alleged gift made solely in his favour by the father. The core legal question concerned the sustainability of concurrent findings of fact regarding the disputed gift and the scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal on questions of fact and appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings against the petitioner's claim of a gift suffered from no legal or other infirmities and were rightly maintained by the High Court. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift and appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with in second appeal unless vitiated by a legal infirmity, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a gift can be set aside in a Regular Second Appeal?
  • Are concurrent findings on the appreciation of evidence liable to interference in the absence of a legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal Khan and 2 others vs Deputy Director, Food, Gujranwala and 9 another1989 SCMR 1777 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  service appealdepartmental proceedingsinfructuous appealservice tribunalleave to appealprocedural law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three petitions for special leave to appeal against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The petitioners, employed as Foodgrain Supervisors/Inspectors, faced departmental proceedings and service termination following the discovery of a wheat stock shortage at their centre. After filing departmental appeals which remained undecided for 90 days, the petitioners approached the Punjab Service Tribunal. During the pendency of these appeals, the departmental authorities dismissed the departmental appeals. The petitioners requested the Tribunal to allow them to challenge these subsequent dismissal orders within their existing pending appeals. The Tribunal rejected this request and dismissed the appeals, holding that the departmental dismissal rendered the pending appeals infructuous. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the Tribunal's view appeared to conflict with the precedent established in S.A. Mukarim v. Government of Sind (1988 SCMR 826). The Court determined that the legal contention regarding the maintainability and procedural handling of the pending appeals in light of subsequent departmental orders required further examination.

  Questions settled

  • Does the dismissal of a departmental appeal during the pendency of an appeal before the Service Tribunal render the pending appeal infructuous?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a subsequent departmental appellate order within the scope of an already pending appeal before the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Muhammad Manzoor and others1989 SCMR 1539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-04
  ejectmenttenancydefault in rentrevenue courtsjurisdictiontime-barredcause of action
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns three connected civil petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the ejectment of the petitioners from agricultural land due to default in rent payments. The core legal question was whether the ejectment order passed by the Collector was illegal and without jurisdiction because it was allegedly decided beyond the statutory time limit prescribed by the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners failed to raise the objection regarding the time-barred nature of the proceedings before the lower revenue authorities or the High Court. Consequently, the Court could not conduct a factual inquiry into whether the case was transferred to the Collector on the date alleged by the petitioners. The Court further distinguished the present case from the cited precedent, noting that in the precedent, the objection regarding the time limit had been raised at the initial stage, whereas here, it was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed that every default in rent payment provides a fresh cause of action.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a plea of limitation for the first time before the Supreme Court when it was not raised before the lower revenue authorities or the High Court?
  • Does every default in the payment of rent by a tenant provide a fresh cause of action for an ejectment suit?
  • Can a court conduct a factual inquiry into the timing of the transfer of a case between revenue officers if the issue was not agitated in the lower forums?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Fazal Muhammad1989 SCMR 1970 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-30
  oral giftconcurrent findingsleave to appealejectmentcompensation for use and occupationcivil litigation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent findings of lower courts in three consolidated suits concerning the ownership of a house and claims for compensation and ejectment. The core legal question involved the validity of competing claims of oral gifts asserted by the petitioner and a respondent, alongside issues of compensation for use and occupation. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of the oral gift in favour of the respondent and the failure of the petitioner to substantiate his claim were well-founded and warranted no interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts unless there is a jurisdictional defect or palpable misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the validity of an oral gift?
  • Is a licensee liable to be ejected upon a valid transfer of the property by way of an oral gift?
  • Can a party claim ownership of a property through an alleged oral gift without sufficient corroborative proof?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iqbal and others vs Faiz Alam1989 SCMR 915 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-18
  pre-emptionvillage residentexemption from pre-emptionmisreading of evidencepending appealscivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave arises from a pre-emption suit wherein the vendees challenged the concurrent dismissal of their civil revision by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal question examined was whether the lower courts had misread the evidence regarding whether the appellants were residents of the village where the disputed land is situated, thereby entitling them to claim exemption under section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact were indeed vitiated by a misreading of the cross-examination of the plaintiff and the statement of the appellants' attorney, which clearly established that the appellants were permanent residents of the village in question. The Court further affirmed that despite the relevant pre-emption law becoming ineffective pursuant to the Shariat Appellate Bench's ruling in Said Kamal Shah's case, it continued to apply to pending appeals in accordance with Sardar Ali v. Muhammad Ali. Consequently, the appeal was allowed with costs and the impugned judgments and decrees were set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact based on a misreading of evidence regarding village residency can be set aside by the Supreme Court?
  • Does the pre-emption law declared ineffective continue to apply to pending appeals?
  • What constitutes sufficient proof of residency for claiming exemption under section 5(c) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act 1950?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iq Bal vs Muhammad Safeer and others1989 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-02
  bail cancellationspecial leave to appealmurderattempt to murdercriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the order of the Lahore High Court granting bail to the respondents in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether bail granted to the accused persons should be cancelled. The Supreme Court held that no useful purpose would be served by cancelling the bail at this stage, particularly as the trial case was already fixed for arguments. Consequently, the petitions for special leave to appeal were dismissed. Additionally, the Court evaluated the explanation provided by the Station House Officer regarding official conduct and determined that no action was required against him. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court may decline to interfere with an order granting bail when the trial has progressed to the stage of final arguments, rendering cancellation impractical or unnecessary.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court cancel bail when the case is already fixed for arguments?
  • Whether bail granted by the High Court should be interfered with at the final argument stage?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Iobal and others vs Hafiz Ghulam Yasin1989 SCMR 1760 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-22
  pre-emptionprinciple of sinkersuperior right of pre-emptionstrangerscivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Circuit Bench, D.I. Khan, which dismissed the civil revision of the petitioners and upheld the pre-emption decree granted in favor of the respondent. The core legal question involves the application of the principle of sinker where vendees with pre-emptive rights join strangers in a land purchase, thereby losing their superior right of pre-emption. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts rightly applied the principle of sinker against the petitioners because some of the vendees joined in the sale did not possess pre-emptive rights in the respective khatas, making them strangers and rendering the entire transaction vulnerable to pre-emption. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums, ruling that joining strangers in a joint sale sinks the rights of co-vendees who might otherwise have had a superior right, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does joining strangers in a sale transaction sink the pre-emptive rights of co-vendees?
  • Whether the principle of sinker is correctly applied when vendees without pre-emptive rights are included in a land mutation?
  • Can co-vendees with superior pre-emption rights be deprived of those rights by associating with non-pre-emptors?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ilyas and another vs The Pakistan Water and Power1989 SCMR 610 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-20
  service appealdifference of opinionFederal Services Tribunalleave to appealtermination of service
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions filed against the disposal of service appeals by the Federal Services Tribunal where a difference of opinion between two members led to the matter being referred to a third member as Chairman. The core legal question concerns whether the third member properly and legally disposed of the appeals when agreeing with one member while simultaneously suggesting amendments to the impugned termination orders due to dissatisfaction with their wording. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the submissions regarding the improper disposal of appeals without sufficient reasoning and potential contradiction carried force. The key principle laid down is that a member acting as a referee in a tribunal must dispose of matters with clear reasoning and consistent conclusions in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Federal Services Tribunal is properly disposed of when a referee member agrees with one view while suggesting amendments to the impugned order?
  • Does a difference of opinion among tribunal members require clear and reasoned conclusions when referred to a third member?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Illyas vs Muhammad Siddique and others1989 SCMR 1496 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-18
  consent decreeminorityguardian ad litemregular second appealcompromise decreelegal representation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a Regular Second Appeal concerning the validity of a consent decree. The core legal question was whether a consent decree passed against the petitioner was voidable on the grounds that he was a minor at the time of the suit's institution and was not represented by a guardian ad litem. The Supreme Court held that the petition was meritless because, even if the petitioner were a minor at the institution of the suit, he had attained the age of majority by the time the compromise was reached and the consent decree was passed. Furthermore, the petitioner was represented by his own counsel during the compromise proceedings, and he had signed the written statement in the original suit without raising the issue of minority. The Court affirmed that a consent decree is not invalid when the party, though potentially a minor at the suit's inception, is a major and legally represented at the time the decree is actually passed.

  Questions settled

  • Is a consent decree invalid if a party was a minor at the time of the suit's institution but had attained the age of majority when the decree was passed?
  • Does the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor defendant invalidate a consent decree if the defendant was a major at the time of the compromise?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ibrahim vs The Settlement Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and others1989 SCMR 507 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-10
  Settlement Scheme No. VIIIevacuee propertytransfer of shoplocal occupantauction listlocus standiconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a constitutional petition regarding the transfer of a shop (Shop No. 5 in Property No. H/1190, Akbari Mandi, Lahore) under settlement laws. The appellant, a local occupant and old tenant of the shop, applied for transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner had initially recommended placing the shop on the auction list as an untransferred unit, but subsequent settlement proceedings failed to evaluate the appellant's entitlement or the shop's status as an independent unit, ultimately rejecting his remedies for lack of limitation and locus standi. The Supreme Court observed that settlement authorities and the High Court completely overlooked the critical fact that the shop had not been transferred to anyone else and remained available. The Court held that in the absence of any competing applicant with a superior right, the local occupant in possession could not be denied transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII. The appeal was accepted, ordering the property transferred to the appellant at the prescribed price.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a local occupant in possession of an untransferred evacuee property is entitled to its transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VIII in the absence of any applicant with a superior right?
  • Does the failure of settlement authorities to consider an occupant's possession and the availability of an independent unit vitiate their orders denying transfer?
  • Can an occupant be denied locus standi to seek transfer of a settlement property when no prior transfer of that unit has been lawfully made to any other party?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs The Province of Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1092 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-13
  State landproprietary rightsallotmentpermanent schemewrit petitionleave to appealJammu and Kashmir Refugees
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed the petitioner's writ petition regarding the refusal of proprietary rights over State land. The petitioner, an allottee, contended that he had satisfied the necessary conditions for the grant of proprietary rights and sought a mandatory injunction against the respondents. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to proprietary rights under the notification dated 3-9-1979, given that the land in question had been reserved for Jammu and Kashmir Refugees under a permanent scheme. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, noting that the notification specifically excluded lands reserved for permanent schemes from the grant of proprietary rights. Finding no infirmity in the High Court's factual determination that the land was indeed reserved for such a scheme, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle affirmed is that where land is reserved for a permanent scheme, it falls outside the scope of notifications granting proprietary rights to general allottees.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notification granting proprietary rights to allottees of State land apply to land reserved for permanent schemes?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding land reservation status?
  • Are lands reserved for Jammu and Kashmir Refugees considered part of a permanent scheme for the purpose of excluding them from proprietary rights grants?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Lahore1989 SCMR 633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-16
  Ejected Tenants Schemeproprietary rightsprohibited zonemunicipal limitslease conversionBoard of Revenuewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petition. The core matter involves the denial of proprietary rights to land originally allotted to the petitioner under the Ejected Tenants Scheme in 1956, which was subsequently resumed in 1965 because it fell within the prohibited belt of a first class municipal committee. Although the prohibited zone was temporarily reduced in 1972 allowing the petitioner to apply for conversion of his lease, the municipal committee was upgraded to a corporation in June 1975, extending the prohibited zone back to 10 miles before the petitioner's pending application was decided, leading to its rejection by the revenue authorities. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner lost his status as an allottee in 1965 when the land was resumed and the transaction became closed, and that the authorities were legally competent to alter the limits of prohibited zones. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does an allottee retain a right to proprietary rights under the Ejected Tenants Scheme after the land is lawfully resumed due to falling within a prohibited zone?
  • Can the alteration of municipal limits and prohibited zones by the competent authorities defeat a pending application for conversion of a lease?
  • Does the delay in disposal of an application by revenue staff create a vested legal right in favor of an applicant against subsequent statutory or administrative changes?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain vs Ahmed Din and others1989 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-26
  pre-emptionproof of relationshipappreciation of evidenceoral testimonyleave to appealwitness credibility
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil pre-emption suit wherein the petitioner challenged the Lahore High Court's judgment setting aside the first appellate court's decision and restoring the trial court's judgment in favour of respondent No. 1, a rival pre-emptor. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency and appreciation of evidence regarding the proof of relationship between the vendor and the pre-emptor. The Supreme Court held that the first appellate court committed a material misdirection by rejecting witnesses on the basis of their social status—such as being a beggar or a labourer—rather than evaluating the quality and special knowledge of their testimony. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court committed no error of law or fact in re-appraising the evidence and restoring the trial court's finding. Consequently, the Court laid down the principle that oral testimony regarding family relationship given by a person possessing special knowledge of the pedigree should be weighed on its intrinsic quality rather than the socioeconomic status of the witness, and accordingly refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court reject the testimony of a witness regarding family relationship solely on the ground of his occupational status or lack of social standing?
  • Whether the High Court can interfere with findings of fact by a first appellate court if the appellate court's decision is based on a misdirection and ignores material aspects of evidence?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a vendor's testimony regarding his relationship with a pre-emptor claiming to be a co-heir?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Tahir vs Ashfaq Hussain and another1989 SCMR 258 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-07
  evictiontenantdefault in payment of rentexecution proceedingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Sind High Court which dismissed an appeal concerning execution proceedings of an eviction order. The core legal question involves whether the petitioner, who intervened at the execution stage alleging he was the true tenant and that the eviction proceedings were collusive, established his tenancy. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to produce any cogent evidence such as rent receipts or independent affidavits to substantiate his claim of tenancy, and that the documents produced merely indicated occupation rather than tenancy. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that an application filed at a belated execution stage without proof of tenancy is merely intended to defeat the ejectment order.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an intervening party can challenge an eviction order at the execution stage without proving regular tenancy?
  • Do utility bills and identity cards alone establish tenancy for the purpose of recalling an eviction order?
  • Can an application filed at the execution stage to recall an eviction order be dismissed as collusive when no rent receipts are produced?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Shah vs Rashid Bibi and others1989 SCMR 1454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  leave to appealcivil revisionsuit for possessionjurisdiction of civil courtnecessary partyfindings of factmisreading of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal filed by a defendant challenging the dismissal of his civil revision by the High Court, which had affirmed a decree for possession granted in favor of the respondents. The petitioner sought to raise several contentions before the Supreme Court, including the failure of the trial court to frame necessary issues, the non-joinder of the Province of Punjab as a necessary party, the applicability of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and the alleged misreading of documentary evidence by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the petition and observed that none of these arguments had been raised before the High Court during the revision proceedings. Consequently, the Court held that the petitioner failed to establish a case on merits. The petition for leave to appeal was refused, reaffirming the principle that appellate courts generally will not entertain new arguments or grounds not raised before the lower forums, especially when the petitioner lacks a substantive case on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new legal arguments or grounds in a petition for leave to appeal that were not presented before the High Court?
  • Does the failure to raise specific legal contentions before the High Court preclude their consideration in a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain Shah and others vs Sajjad Hussain and another1989 SCMR 1752 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-20
  review petitioncivil procedurecompromise decreeappellate jurisdictionjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 5-2-1989. The petitioners sought to challenge the previous decision by relying on the Lahore High Court judgment in Ghulam Hussain and others v. Khan Muhammad and others (PLD 1954 Lah. 655), arguing that the strict requirements of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 were not satisfied, thereby rendering the appeal against the defect maintainable. The Supreme Court, in its review jurisdiction, examined the contentions raised by the petitioners. The Court held that the arguments presented had already been adequately considered and addressed in paragraphs 8 and 13 of the original judgment sought to be reviewed. Finding that no valid grounds for review were established, the Court dismissed the petitions. The judgment reaffirms the principle that a review petition cannot be used to re-argue matters that have already been adjudicated and addressed in the original decision, particularly when the legal precedents relied upon were previously noted and evaluated by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a review petition lie when the grounds raised were already considered and addressed in the original judgment?
  • Are the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 satisfied when a court has already evaluated the relevant legal precedents in its judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Muhammad Khan1989 SCMR 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-15
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptioncollateralsburden of proofpedigree-tableevidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from a pre-emption suit where the appellants claimed a superior right of pre-emption based on their status as collaterals of the vendor, Rahmat, a descendant of Fazal Din. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the appellants, relying solely on a pedigree-table they produced. However, the Additional District Judge reversed this decision, finding no evidence to connect the pedigree-table to the appellants. The Lahore High Court affirmed this dismissal in second appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellants had sufficiently established their superior right of pre-emption through the evidence presented. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate courts were justified. The Court emphasized that the mere production of a document without testimony linking it to the parties involved is insufficient to prove a claim. The key principle laid down is that a party asserting a right must provide evidence that specifically connects the documentary proof to their own family lineage to satisfy the burden of proof in pre-emption cases.

  Questions settled

  • Is the mere production of a pedigree-table sufficient to establish a relationship for a pre-emption claim without evidence connecting it to the claimants?
  • Can a court rely on a document in evidence if there is no testimony linking that document to the parties asserting the claim?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Miran Bakhsh and others1989 SCMR 1064 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-21
  pre-emptionrevisional jurisdictionnature of transactiongift vs salefinding of factHigh Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court, which had reversed the findings of the District Judge in a pre-emption suit. The respondents had originally filed a suit asserting that a transaction labeled as a gift was, in reality, a sale subject to pre-emption. While the trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, the District Judge reversed this decision on appeal, concluding the transaction was a genuine gift. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, re-examined the evidence, set aside the District Judge's finding, and restored the trial court's decree. The core legal question was whether the High Court was competent to interfere with the District Judge's finding of fact regarding the nature of the transaction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court was justified in its interference. The Court reasoned that the District Judge had failed to consider critical evidence—specifically, the lack of connection between the donor and the petitioners, the donor's large family, and the donor's small landholding—which were essential to determining the true nature of the transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a District Judge in revisional jurisdiction when critical evidence has been overlooked?
  • Is a transaction labeled as a gift subject to pre-emption if it is proven to be a sale?
  • Does the failure of an appellate court to consider material circumstances regarding the parties' relationship and financial status justify revisional interference?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hussain and others vs Khuda Bakhsh1989 SCMR 1563 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-27
  revenue recordpresumption of truthfraud and misrepresentationagricultural landcivil suitsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises out of a civil suit concerning agricultural land, which was dismissed by the trial court and whose decrees were successively maintained by the Additional District Judge in first appeal and the High Court in second appeal. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could successfully challenge longstanding revenue record entries dating back to 1907 on the basis of alleged fraud and misrepresentation when the original record had been destroyed. The Supreme Court held that the petition must be dismissed, reasoning that a presumption of truth is attached to revenue records, which becomes significantly strengthened when entries remain unchallenged for over half a century. The key principle laid down is that the heavy onus to rebut the strong presumption of truth attached to long-standing revenue entries rests upon the party alleging fraud, and mere assertions without substantiating evidence are insufficient to dislodge such entries.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a presumption of truth is attached to revenue record entries that remain unchallenged for more than half a century?
  • How is the onus discharged when challenging long-standing revenue entries on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation?
  • Does the destruction of the original revenue record automatically invalidate entries maintained consistently over decades?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hayat Khan and another vs The Settlement Commissioner1989 SCMR 1087 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  constitutional petitionwrit petitionlachessuccessive petitionsdiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appealsettlement department
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their second constitutional petition regarding the allotment of a Khasra number. Their first constitutional petition was dismissed on 26 March 1983, against which no further appeal or challenge was pursued. Instead, the petitioners filed a second constitutional petition, which the High Court dismissed in limine on the grounds of laches, discretionary nature of constitutional jurisdiction, and the considerable delay of over ten years in challenging the impugned order dated 5 September 1972, as well as the finality attached to the prior dismissal. The Supreme Court considered the arguments and held that the view taken by the High Court was unexceptionable, noting there was no legal justification for reopening the matter when the petitioners had previously acquiesced in the earlier decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the principle that successive constitutional petitions on the same subject are barred, particularly where the prior dismissal is accepted and the subsequent petition suffers from gross laches.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a second constitutional petition is maintainable on the same subject-matter after the dismissal of the first constitutional petition has attained finality?
  • Can the High Court refuse to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction on the ground of laches and delay in challenging an administrative order?
  • Is a delay of ten years in challenging an allotment order passed by the Settlement Department sufficient ground to decline relief in writ jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan vs Muhammad Asghar and 6 others1989 SCMR 1155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-07
  petition for leave to appealacquittalbenefit of doubtocular testimonymedical evidencerecovery evidencemotive
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby respondents Nos. 1 to 6 were acquitted of the charges against them. The respondents were originally tried for offences under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where the trial court had convicted them, but the High Court acquitted them by giving them the benefit of the doubt due to discrepancies in recovery evidence, interested ocular testimony in conflict with medical evidence, unnatural conduct of eye-witnesses, and weak motive evidence. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court's appreciation of evidence resulting in acquittal warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the arguments advanced by the petitioner lacked substance in light of the High Court's findings and the record, making it an unfit case for interference. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts will not lightly interfere with orders of acquittal based on a plausible appraisal of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court based on a reappraisal of evidence?
  • Does discrepancy in the dates of recoveries as stated by attesting witnesses and police officers weaken the prosecution case?
  • Whether interested ocular testimony in conflict with medical evidence can form the basis of a conviction?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan and others vs Mst. Fatima (Widow) and others1989 SCMR 1160 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-10
  leave to appealinheritancegiftpower of attorneypresumption of deathconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a suit for declaration regarding inheritance and the validity of a gift of land, where the plaintiffs' regular second appeal and prior lower court suits were dismissed. The core legal question concerns the validity of a gift executed by a son on the strength of a power of attorney given by his father, where the petitioners claimed the father had predeceased the gift based on a presumption of death having not been heard of for seven years. The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the High Court to interfere with concurrent findings of fact was proper, as there was no concrete material establishing the exact date of death, and further noted that even if the father had predeceased the gift, the son as the sole successor could lawfully dispose of the property in favor of his wife. The key principle laid down is that presumptions regarding the date of death without concrete evidence cannot upset concurrent factual findings, and a sole heir is competent to gift inherited property.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact on the validity of a gift can be interfered with in regular second appeal without concrete material?
  • Can a presumption of death under the-not-heard-of rule establish the precise date of death for invalidating a transaction without concrete evidence?
  • Whether a sole successor inheriting property is legally competent to gift the same to his wife?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hassan and another vs Ghulam Shah and another1989 SCMR 1278 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-18
  exchange deedundue influencefraud and misrepresentationconcurrent findings of factleave to appealrestitution of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal regarding the validity of certain exchange deeds. The petitioners claimed they had acquired land from the deceased owner, Mst. Mastooran, in exchange for two houses. The respondents, including the deceased's husband and daughter, successfully challenged the exchange in the trial court and the first appellate court, alleging that the deeds were procured through fraud and misrepresentation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the invalidity of the exchange deeds were sustainable. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the concurrent findings of fact—that the deeds were procured by undue influence—were supported by the record and that the petitioners' allegations of misreading of evidence were unsubstantiated. The Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions but directed that if the respondents remained in possession of the petitioners' houses, they must surrender such possession to the petitioners, ensuring equitable restitution.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of an exchange deed?
  • Is a party entitled to the restitution of property exchanged under a deed subsequently declared void due to undue influence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Refu and others1989 SCMR 1705 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  consolidation of holdingswrit jurisdictionBoard of Revenueleave to appealnew plealand ownership
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition concerning a consolidation dispute. The petitioner challenged the restoration of specific land to the respondent, arguing that the land was incorrectly classified as urban and that the petitioner had planted a garden on the property, which the Board of Revenue had allegedly overlooked. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the Board of Revenue's decision to restore the land to the respondent, who had owned and possessed it prior to consolidation. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was unexceptionable. It reasoned that the land's urban status was irrelevant given the respondent's prior ownership and possession, and that the petitioner's claim regarding the garden was not raised before the Board of Revenue. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that a plea not raised before the lower forum cannot be entertained for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction, particularly when it requires factual inquiry. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise a new plea in a writ petition that was not urged before the lower forum?
  • Does the urban or rural classification of land affect the restoration of land in consolidation proceedings where prior ownership is established?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to entertain a plea requiring factual inquiry that was not presented to the Board of Revenue?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif vs Deputy Inspectorgeneral of Police and another1989 SCMR 810 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-12
  service appealdepartmental inquirypolice misconductforfeiture of servicediscriminatory treatmentservice recorddisciplinary proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a service appeal filed by a police official, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (A.S.I.), challenging the dismissal of his appeal by the Punjab Service Tribunal regarding departmental disciplinary action. The appellant was punished with the permanent forfeiture of one year of approved service for grave misconduct after failing to take action against an alleged kidnapper brought to him by the public. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to relief on the ground of discriminatory treatment, as another A.S.I. named in the same show-cause notice was exonerated. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that each disciplinary case must be decided on its own merits. The Court found that the appellant’s service record, which contained eight adverse entries, justified the punishment imposed, and that the appellant had admitted to the incident. The key principle laid down is that the doctrine of parity or equal treatment does not apply automatically in disciplinary proceedings where the individual service records and merits of the cases differ significantly.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant claim parity in punishment based on the exoneration of a co-accused in the same disciplinary proceedings?
  • Does the doctrine of equal treatment apply to disciplinary actions where individual service records differ?
  • Is a service tribunal's decision regarding departmental punishment subject to interference if the official has a poor service record?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hanif and others vs The State1989 SCMR 1221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1986-10-04
  vicarious liabilitycommon intentioncriminal appealocular testimonymurderleave to appealsentence commutation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of four individuals for murder and murderous assault under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involve the determination of vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, specifically whether the fatal act could be attributed to the group when the motive was allegedly directed at a different individual, and whether the ocular testimony was consistent with medical evidence and prior statements. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the convictions and sentences were decided in accordance with established principles for the dispensation of criminal justice, particularly regarding the application of common intention and vicarious liability in cases where the prosecution's narrative regarding the primary target and the nature of injuries was challenged. The Court dismissed the petition regarding the acquitted co-accused but admitted the petitions for the convicted parties to review the propriety of their convictions and sentences in light of the evidentiary record.

  Questions settled

  • Can vicarious liability under Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be established when the motive for the crime is directed at a person other than the deceased?
  • Does the infliction of a single fatal blow by one accused preclude the application of vicarious liability to co-accused in a murder trial?
  • Is the propriety of a criminal conviction and sentence subject to review when ocular testimony conflicts with medical evidence and prior dying declarations?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Hameed Darwesh vs The Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and 21989 SCMR 617 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-21
  service tribunalefficiency and discipline rulesremoval from servicevested rightsecond show-cause noticeprocedural rulesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was filed by a Senior Engineer against the Federal Service Tribunal's order upholding his removal from service by WAPDA. The petitioner, initially proceeded against under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules of 1975, had his inquiry transferred to and completed under the new Efficiency and Discipline Rules of 1978, resulting in his removal. The core legal question was whether pending disciplinary proceedings must continue under superseded procedural rules, whether a right to a second show-cause notice constitutes a vested right, and whether the omission of such notice or the handling of the inquiry by a single competent authority vitiated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that procedural rules govern pending proceedings unless a vested right is affected, that there is no vested right in a second show-cause notice, and that without proof of actual prejudice, the omission of such notice does not invalidate the penalty. The petition was dismissed as no question of law of public importance arose.

  Questions settled

  • Whether pending disciplinary proceedings are governed by new procedural rules introduced during their pendency?
  • Does a government servant have a vested right in a second show-cause notice under superseded disciplinary rules?
  • Whether the absence of a second show-cause notice vitiates disciplinary proceedings in the absence of actual prejudice?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil vs The State1989 SCMR 1712 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  criminal leave to appealmurderreduction of sentenceprivate defenseappreciation of evidencecapital punishment
  Summary & questions settled

  These are two petitions for special leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained the conviction of the respondent under sections 302 and 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 while reducing his sentence from death to imprisonment for life. The prosecution alleged that following an exchange of abuses and a dispute over a land pre-emption suit, the respondent fired a gun from his roof, killing two persons and injuring a third. The respondent admitted to the firing but raised a plea of private defense, claiming the deceased and injured persons had trespassed into his house to abduct his daughter. The trial court and the High Court both rejected the defense version and accepted the ocular testimony presented by the prosecution. Upon evaluation of the petitions filed by both the convict and the complainant, the Supreme Court considered that the reasons provided by the High Court for rejecting the defense version and commuting the death sentence required closer examination. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted in both petitions to examine these legal and factual aspects.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence of death to imprisonment for life under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can the plea of private defense be accepted when supported by the testimony of the accused person's daughter and the surrounding circumstances?
  • Whether the evidence of interested and chance witnesses is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder without corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil vs Muhammad Sharafuddin and 10 others1989 SCMR 851 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-16
  leave to appealevictionlandlord and tenantcantonment areaconstitutional petitionamalgamated shops
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant in a Cantonment area against the dismissal of his Constitutional petition by the High Court, which upheld his eviction order on the ground of personal requirement by the landlord. The petitioner and his brother Sadiq occupied twin shops that were proceeded against for eviction. While the petitioner's litigation underwent remands and a second round of dismissal, the High Court had factored in the finality of an ejectment order against Sadiq in shop No. 616, reasoning that conflicting outcomes would make execution impossible. The core legal question concerned whether the finality of the eviction order against the co-occupant was correctly ascertained and how it impacted the petitioner's case. The Supreme Court held that leave to appeal should be granted because the factual premise regarding the finality of Sadiq's eviction was contested, and the success of Sadiq in his separate challenge would create a reciprocal reverse situation. The key principle laid down is that leave to appeal is warranted to prevent conflicting judicial outcomes in interconnected eviction proceedings concerning amalgamated properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted when interconnected eviction proceedings risk producing conflicting outcomes?
  • Does the finality of an ejectment order against a co-occupant justify the dismissal of a tenant's constitutional petition regarding an amalgamated property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil Kiani vs Raja Shahbaz Khan1989 SCMR 1106 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-11
  leave to appealejectmentpersonal requirementlandlord and tenantbona fidescantonment area
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a landlord in a Cantonment area against the High Court's judgment setting aside the eviction of the tenant, which had been ordered on the ground of personal requirement. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court erred in requiring the landlord to establish his personal requirement as "indispensable," and whether the landlord's offer of a security undertaking to shift into the premises demonstrates bona fides. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's standard of "indispensable" requirement went beyond the legal requirement, and accepted the landlord's offer of a written security undertaking to occupy the premises within the statutory period as prima facie evidence of bona fides. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal subject to the petitioner submitting the written undertaking.

  Questions settled

  • Does requiring a landlord to establish personal requirement as indispensable exceed the legal requirement for eviction?
  • Can a landlord's offer of a security undertaking to occupy the premises establish bona fides in an ejectment matter?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fazil and others vs A.C., Ferozewala and others1989 SCMR 99 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-07
  electoral rolltransfer of votewrit jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefleave to appealelection matter
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court in an election matter concerning the transfer and correction of an entry in the Electoral Roll. The core legal question revolved around whether the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked to set aside a transfer of vote and thereby restore an incorrect or wrong entry in the Electoral Roll. The Supreme Court held that the discretionary writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in aid of injustice or to restore an incorrect entry. The Court affirmed the findings that the application in question was competently made for the transfer of a vote under section 11 of the Electoral Rolls Act rather than for correction under sections 10 or 12, and dismissed the petition in limine. The key principle laid down is that extraordinary writ jurisdiction will be withheld by courts if granting relief would result in the restoration of a factual error or the perpetration of an injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to restore an incorrect entry in an electoral roll?
  • Can an application for the transfer of a vote from one electoral unit to another be treated as an application for the correction of an electoral roll under the Electoral Rolls Act?
  • Is there any time limit prescribed for filing an application for the transfer of a vote under section 11 of the Electoral Rolls Act 1974?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Fareedun vs The State1989 SCMR 992(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-26
  leave to appealstatements under section 164perjuryoathcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, Circuit Bench Abbottabad, which refused leave to appeal against the Sessions Judge's rejection of the petitioner's application in the second round of litigation. The core legal question concerns the evidentiary value of statements not recorded under oath and whether witnesses whose statements were recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or otherwise not on oath can be proceeded against for perjury. The Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit because none of the witnesses gave statements in Court under oath, notably those of Bara Khan and Mst. Samina which were recorded under section 164 or without solemn affirmation, meaning they cannot be prosecuted for perjury. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can witnesses whose statements are recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without oath be proceeded against for perjury?
  • What is the evidentiary status of witness statements not given under oath in court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Essa vs Mst. Haseena Begum through Legal Heirs1989 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-09-15
  amendment of plaintcivil suitlicenseeousternecessary partiesmesne profitsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a pending civil suit where the petitioner sought to amend his plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The petitioner, claiming ownership of a plot, had initially sued the respondents' predecessor-in-interest for possession of a portion of the property occupied as a licensee. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner was allegedly ousted from the remaining portion of the property, prompting him to seek an amendment to claim possession of the entire property, revalue the suit, and claim mesne profits for shops let out by the respondents. The High Court rejected the amendment on the grounds that it would change the nature of the suit and that the tenants occupying the shops were not impleaded. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the rejection, holding that while physical enlargement of the subject-matter does not necessarily alter the nature of a suit based on ouster, the failure to implead the necessary parties (the tenants in occupation of the shops) was fatal to the amendment request. Leave to appeal was refused, with liberty granted to seek a lawful amendment impleading all necessary parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does the physical enlargement of the subject-matter of a suit due to subsequent dispossession alter the fundamental nature of a suit based on ouster?
  • Can an amendment to a plaint seeking possession and mesne profits of leased shops be allowed without impleading the tenants in occupation?
  • Is an oral request to delete certain portions of a proposed amendment sufficient to overcome objections of non-joinder of necessary parties without a formal written application?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din vs Mst.Naziran and others1989 SCMR 2037 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-07
  review petitionSettlement Scheme No. 1Settlement Scheme No. VIIIproperty transferNCH FormDisplaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958
  Summary & questions settled

  This review petition arises from a dispute over the transfer of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The petitioner, Muhammad Din, sought a review of the Supreme Court's previous finding that he had failed to establish the filing of an NCH Form under Settlement Scheme No. 1, which would have entitled him to the transfer of the upper floor of the subject property. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could claim entitlement to the entire upper floor in preference to the respondents, who were occupants and applicants under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, despite the absence of the original NCH Form or a duplicate copy in the record. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that without the NCH Form, it was impossible to ascertain the specific property the petitioner sought to acquire. The Court established the principle that in the absence of evidence affirmatively showing an applicant sought specific property, proceedings cannot be deemed 'pending' under the relevant settlement scheme, and transfer rights cannot be asserted over portions not in the applicant's occupation.

  Questions settled

  • Can an applicant claim entitlement to property under Settlement Scheme No. 1 without producing the NCH Form or a duplicate copy to prove the scope of their application?
  • Does the mere submission of an NCH Form create a pending proceeding for property not in the applicant's occupation?
  • Is a finding regarding the non-filing of an NCH Form reviewable when the petitioner cannot produce evidence of the specific property claimed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Din and 6 others vs Allah Lok and 3 others1989 SCMR 323 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  temporary allotmentcompensation poolland settlementjurisdiction of Chief Settlement CommissionerJammu and Kashmir refugeeswrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the cancellation of a temporary land allotment originally granted to a Jammu and Kashmir refugee for maintenance purposes. The petitioners had sought to cancel the temporary allotment, arguing the allottee had already received permanent land elsewhere. The Chief Settlement Commissioner initially cancelled the allotment and transferred the land to the petitioners. However, the High Court set aside this order, finding that the land had been sold by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in 1960, thereby excluding it from the compensation pool. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner retained jurisdiction to cancel and re-allot land that had already been excluded from the compensation pool. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that once land is excluded from the compensation pool, the Chief Settlement Commissioner lacks the jurisdiction to transfer it. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, confirming that the property was not available for allotment to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Chief Settlement Commissioner have jurisdiction to cancel and re-allot land that has been excluded from the compensation pool?
  • Does the sale of land by the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs effectively remove that land from the compensation pool?
  • Can land temporarily allotted to Jammu and Kashmir refugees for maintenance purposes be transferred to third parties after it has been excluded from the compensation pool?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota vs Mst. Amanat Bibi1989 SCMR 568 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-08
  civil revisionjurisdiction of civil courtrecovery of goodsfamily court jurisdictiondowerleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's civil revision arising from a suit for the recovery of money. The respondent, the ex-wife of the petitioner, filed a suit for the recovery of Rs. 18,300 representing the price of her goods and property left in the house of the petitioner following her divorce. The trial court decreed the claim to the extent of Rs. 4,000, which the District Judge enhanced to Rs. 14,600 on appeal, and the High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's civil revision. The core legal question was whether the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the contention that the claim involved dower falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Family Court. The Supreme Court held that the civil court had proper jurisdiction because the suit was strictly for the recovery of the price of the respondent's personal property rather than a claim for dower. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that concurrent findings of fact regarding the price of the goods warrant no interference.

  Questions settled

  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the recovery of personal property left in a former husband's house after divorce?
  • Whether a claim for the price of goods left behind constitutes a claim for dower falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a Family Court?
  • Can findings of fact regarding the price of goods be interfered with in civil revision or leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Boota and others vs Inayatullah and others1989 SCMR 1876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-17
  forma pauperisconcurrent findings of factcivil revisionmutation of saleleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a civil dispute concerning the possession of land and the validity of a mutation. The respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sher Muhammad, had challenged a mutation of sale, alleging it was without consideration and ineffective against his rights. The trial court decreed the suit in his favor, a decision upheld by the appellate court and subsequently by the Lahore High Court in civil revision. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the respondents' second suit, filed in forma pauperis after an earlier similar application was rejected for non-payment of court fees, was legally barred under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court, however, declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts, which established that no sale had actually occurred and no consideration was paid. Consequently, the Court held that the technical objection regarding the maintainability of the second suit did not warrant disturbing the concurrent factual findings, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court in civil revision interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the absence of sale consideration?
  • Does the rejection of an application to sue in forma pauperis bar a subsequent suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Muhammad Shafi and another1989 SCMR 310 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-07-19
  leave to appealcondonation of delaylimitation periodtime-barred petitionsufficient cause
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had previously declined to restore a petition and refused to condone the delay in filing. Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that the petition before it was also barred by a period of six days. The Court directed the petitioner's counsel to provide a satisfactory explanation or show sufficient cause for the delay to justify condonation. The counsel failed to provide any satisfactory explanation or demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a valid explanation for the delay, the petition could not be entertained. The Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was time-barred. This judgment reinforces the principle that the condonation of delay is not a matter of course and requires the petitioner to demonstrate sufficient cause for the failure to file within the prescribed limitation period, failing which the petition is liable to be dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide sufficient cause for a delay in filing a petition warrant its dismissal?
  • Is the condonation of delay in filing a petition a matter of right or discretion?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others1989 SCMR 1095 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-23
  back benefitsreinstatementindustrial relationsgrievance petitiongainful employmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a writ petition dismissed by the Lahore High Court regarding the entitlement of a reinstated workman to back benefits. The petitioner, a Boiler Engineer, was dismissed from service and subsequently reinstated by the Punjab Labour Court with full back benefits under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. On appeal by the management, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld the reinstatement but modified the order to exclude back benefits. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's writ petition against this exclusion. The core legal question raised before the Supreme Court is whether back benefits can be withheld from a workman whose termination is found to be illegal, in the absence of proof that he was gainfully employed during the period he remained out of service. Holding that the plea raises a question of general public importance, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can back benefits be withheld from an illegally terminated workman without proof that he was engaged in gainful employment during the period he was out of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir vs Bagga alias Sardar Khan1989 SCMR 1140 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionorder of successionvendeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a vendee's petition for leave to appeal arising from a pre-emption matter. The core legal question revolves around whether a pre-emptor, who is the real brother of the vendor, possesses a superior right of pre-emption compared to the petitioner-vendee, who is a real nephew. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a real brother is higher in the order of succession than a real nephew under the applicable statutory provisions. Consequently, the petition was found to be without substance, and leave to appeal was refused. The key principle laid down is that the right of pre-emption under the relevant statute is determined strictly according to the order of succession, wherein a brother holds a superior position to a nephew.

  Questions settled

  • Does a real brother of the vendor have a superior right of pre-emption compared to a real nephew?
  • Is a real brother higher in the order of succession than a real nephew under the Punjab Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bashir and 6 others vs Abdul Razzaq and 6 others1989 SCMR 1860 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-24
  leave to appealevacuee propertyredemption of mortgagepossession suittransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court which decreed a suit for possession of the suit-property in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. The property in question was originally owned by the plaintiffs' predecessor, mortgaged to a non-Muslim evacuee in 1932, and later redeemed through an order of the Custodian Evacuee Property in 1954 subject to payment for the cost of any superstructure. Subsequently, the settlement authorities transferred portions of the property, leading to competing claims between the occupant-allottees and the original owners. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit for possession, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' appeal. The Supreme Court considered whether the transfer in favour of the respondents was a nullity and whether possession could be sought without determining the superstructure's value. The Supreme Court held that the Custodian's order established the plaintiffs' title and the petitioners lacked locus standi to make the plaintiffs' title conditional, as the superstructure's value was never determined or defaulted upon. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an owner-mortgagor is entitled to possession of redeemed evacuee property when the value of the superstructure has not been determined by the Custodian?
  • Does an occupant-allottee have the locus standi to challenge the title of the owner-mortgagor whose property was redeemed by a competent authority?
  • Can a civil suit for possession succeed when the plaintiff's title is established through a lawful redemption order of the Custodian Evacuee Property?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh vs Muhammad Waryam and 2 others1989 SCMR 1157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-06
  leave to appealconviction alterationculpable homicideintent to killblunt weapon injurysentence reduction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a Lahore High Court judgment that altered the respondents' convictions from Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing their sentences from death to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The respondents were convicted for the murder of Wali Muhammad, involving injuries caused by blunt weapons, including the blunt side of a hatchet. The High Court reasoned that because the respondents used the blunt side of the hatchet, they lacked the specific intent to cause death, thereby bringing the offence under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner argues that the nature of the injuries, specifically those to the head, does not justify this reduction in conviction. The Supreme Court condoned the delay in filing, granted leave to appeal, and ordered that if the respondents have not yet completed their sentences, they shall remain in custody pending the disposal of the appeal, or if released, they must provide bail to ensure their presence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the use of the blunt side of a hatchet in a fatal assault negates the intent to cause death under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Does the infliction of multiple head injuries with a blunt weapon warrant a conviction under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh and others vs The State1989 SCMR 1473 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  criminal appealdelay in judgmentremand of caseappraisal of evidenceleave to appealtrial magistrateconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the conviction and sentences of the petitioners for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioners were initially convicted by a trial Magistrate, and their subsequent appeal was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners raised two primary contentions: first, that there was an unreasonable delay of one year in the announcement of the High Court judgment after the conclusion of arguments; and second, that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the case following a remand order that had previously resulted in the acquittal of several co-accused. The Supreme Court held that while judgments should be announced within a reasonable period, the delay did not vitiate the conviction as the High Court had duly considered the evidence. Regarding the second contention, the Court found that the issue was not raised before the High Court and that the trial Magistrate was entitled to independently appraise the evidence upon remand. Finding no question of law of public importance, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in the announcement of a judgment after the conclusion of arguments automatically vitiate a conviction?
  • Is an appellate court obliged to consider a legal argument that was not raised before the lower court?
  • Can a trial court, upon remand, reach a conclusion contrary to a previous judgment that was set aside by an appellate court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Bakhsh and others vs Muhammad Miskeen1989 SCMR 1428 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-12
  leave to appealpossessionownershipconcurrent findingsrevisional jurisdictionencroachment
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed their revision petition and confirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts against them. The dispute arose over a plot of land allegedly encroached upon by the respondent, a contiguous owner. The petitioners originally filed a suit for possession, which went through various stages of appeals, remands, and revisions. The lower appellate court and the High Court ultimately found that the respondent was the owner in possession of the suit land by virtue of a valid purchase and continuous possession, and that the petitioners failed to prove their possession within the statutory period of twelve years. The Supreme Court considered whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction. Holding that the findings were based on a thorough adjudication of facts and supported by evidence, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, establishing that concurrent findings of fact on possession and ownership will not be disturbed unless shown to be perverse or contrary to law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding possession and ownership can be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is a plaintiff required to prove possession of the disputed land within twelve years of filing the suit for possession?
  • Does a continuous entry in the Khasra Girdawari suffice to prove long-standing physical possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Badar Ul Munir vs Chairman, Arbitration Council and 21989 SCMR 1097 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-08
  civil petitioncompromise agreementchild custodymaintenancedowerTalaq-e-Mubaratsettlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning family and custody disputes. During the proceedings, the parties presented a memorandum of agreement reflecting a comprehensive out-of-court settlement addressing child custody, maintenance claims, dower amounts, return of dowry, dissolution of marriage via Talaq-e-Mubarat, withdrawal of pending criminal proceedings, and related matters. The core legal question addressed is whether a pending civil petition and underlying family disputes can be disposed of in terms of a mutually agreed compromise between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the agreement is genuine, entered into without coercion, and lawful, and consequently converted the petition into an appeal and disposed of it in terms of the agreed compromise. The key principle laid down is that the court may dispose of matters in accordance with lawful compromises reached freely between parties in family and civil disputes.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil petition for leave to appeal be disposed of in terms of a compromise agreement reached between the parties?
  • Whether an agreement involving child custody, maintenance waiver, and divorce can be acted upon by the court when entered into without coercion?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim Malik vs The Government of Pakistan, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 2 others1989 PLD Supreme Court 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-19
  extraditionfugitive offenderwarrant of custodyextradition treatyspecialty principlemagisterial inquiryconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a challenge to extradition proceedings initiated against a fugitive offender. The petitioner, the brother of the fugitive, sought to set aside a warrant of custody and removal issued by the Federal Government. The core legal question was whether the warrant was legally valid when it cited a statutory provision (Section 952 of the U.S. Code) that differed from the offense for which the fugitive was charged, requisitioned, and inquired into by the Magistrate (Section 963 of the U.S. Code). The Supreme Court held that the warrant was without lawful authority and of no legal effect because it failed to correspond to the requisition, the charge, or the inquiry report. The Court emphasized that such discrepancies are fatal to the validity of extradition proceedings, particularly given the treaty obligation that a surrendered person cannot be tried for offenses other than those for which extradition was granted. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, declared the warrant void, and directed that the inquiry report remain pending for the Federal Government to pass a lawful order.

  Questions settled

  • Does an extradition warrant remain valid if it cites an offense different from the one for which the fugitive was requisitioned and inquired into?
  • What is the effect of a discrepancy between an extradition inquiry report and the final warrant of custody and removal?
  • Is the Federal Government required to ensure that an extradition warrant strictly conforms to the underlying charge and inquiry report?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim Malik vs Government of Pakistan and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-04
  extraditionfugitive offenderextradition treatymagisterial inquiryconspiracydangerous drugshashishadmissibility of evidencejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition seeking leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional and statutory challenge regarding extradition proceedings initiated against a fugitive offender, Muhammad Saleem Malik, under the Extradition Act, 1972. The core legal questions involved the existence and applicability of the Extradition Treaty between Pakistan and the United States, whether conspiracy to import hashish constitutes an extraditable offence, the territorial jurisdiction of foreign courts over a conspirator physically absent from that country, the admissibility of evidence under special extradition laws vis-à-vis general laws, the competence of a First Class Magistrate to conduct the inquiry, and the procedural requirements of the Federal Government under section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the extradition treaty was validly in existence, that offences relating to dangerous drugs and conspiracy in connection therewith are extraditable, that physical presence is not a prerequisite in conspiracy charges, and that special provisions of the Extradition Act regarding evidence and magisterial inquiry prevail. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the non-publication of an extradition treaty in the official Gazette impairs its existence and efficacy under the Extradition Act, 1972?
  • Does an extradition offense relating to dangerous drugs include a conspiracy to import and distribute hashish?
  • Is physical presence within the demanding state a necessary prerequisite for exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case of conspiracy?
  • Do the special evidentiary provisions under Section 9 of the Extradition Act, 1972 prevail over the general provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984?
  • Whether a First Class Magistrate has jurisdiction to conduct an extradition inquiry for an offense otherwise triable exclusively by a Court of Session?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azim Malik vs A.C. & S.D.M. Preedy (South), Karachi and others1989 PLD Supreme Court 266 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-19
  extradition proceedingspersona designatajurisdictional defecthabeas corpusArticle 199 jurisdictionmagisterial inquirydelegation of power
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged the validity of extradition proceedings conducted by an A.C./S.D.M. instead of the District Magistrate, who was the officer specifically nominated by the Federal Government under Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1972. The core legal question was whether the nomination of a specific Magistrate under the Act constitutes a persona designata role that is non-delegable. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Government’s power to nominate a Magistrate First Class is exclusive, and the designated officer is the only competent authority to conduct the inquiry. Consequently, the proceedings conducted by unauthorized magistrates were declared without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. The Court further ruled that this jurisdictional defect was not curable under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Establishing the principle that in detention matters under Article 199(1)(b) of the Constitution, the Court bears an unconditional duty to ensure the legality of detention, the Court rejected arguments regarding estoppel or acquiescence, affirming that jurisdictional requirements in such sensitive matters cannot be waived.

  Questions settled

  • Is the power of the Federal Government to nominate a Magistrate under Section 7 of the Extradition Act, 1972, a non-delegable power?
  • Can a jurisdictional defect in an extradition inquiry be cured under Section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does the High Court have an unconditional duty under Article 199(1)(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to satisfy itself regarding the legality of detention regardless of the parties' conduct?
  • Is a District Magistrate always considered a Magistrate of the First Class for the purposes of the Extradition Act, 1972?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Azeem alias Jeemo vs The State1989 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-11
  leave to appealquantum of sentenceculpable homicidesentence reductioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the petitioner's conviction from section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to section 304, Part I, of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing him to imprisonment for life for the murder of Muhammad Ilyas and causing injuries to others. The petitioner, Muhammad Azeem, challenged the quantum of the sentence imposed by the High Court, while not contesting the conviction itself. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence of life imprisonment, as modified by the High Court, was excessive given the circumstances of the case. Upon reviewing the record and hearing counsel, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal specifically to examine the quantum of the sentence. The Court held that the appropriateness of the sentence imposed required further judicial consideration, thereby allowing the petition to proceed on the limited question of sentencing severity.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal solely to examine the quantum of a sentence?
  • Is a conviction under section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 subject to review regarding the severity of the sentence imposed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub vs Inspectorgeneral of Police, Islamabad and another1989 SCMR 646 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-29
  compulsory retirementdepartmental appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayservice tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for restoration of a dismissed civil petition and an underlying challenge concerning the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The petitioner was compulsorily retired from service and failed to file a departmental appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, delaying it for over a year and a half. The sole explanation offered for the substantial delay was the petitioner's apprehension that no relief would be granted by the appellate authority, specifically the Inspector-General of Police under whose tenure the retirement order was passed, until that official was transferred. The Service Tribunal rejected this explanation as unsatisfactory and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The core legal question concerned the sufficiency of subjective apprehensions regarding bias or lack of relief as a valid ground for condoning prolonged delay in filing departmental remedies. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Service Tribunal, holding that subjective expectations or personal apprehensions regarding an authority's attitude do not constitute a sufficient or lawful excuse for failing to pursue statutory remedies within the stipulated limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Does an apprehension that an appellate authority will not grant relief constitute a sufficient ground for condoning delay in filing a departmental appeal?
  • Can failure to challenge a compulsory retirement order within the prescribed limitation period result in the dismissal of the appeal as time-barred?
  • Whether subjective expectations regarding the attitude of an administrative authority justify bypassing statutory limitation rules?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub represented by Legal Heirs and others vs Ghulam1989 SCMR 1078 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-06
  pre-emptionlimitationpetition for leave to appealsuperior right of pre-emptionrevision
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Circuit, dated 2-4-1988, which reversed the appellate court's decision and restored the trial court's decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question concerned the limitation period and whether the suit was barred by time. The Supreme Court held that the findings of the trial and revisional courts regarding limitation and the merits were based on a correct appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, and affirmed that a valid decree had already been passed in favour of the respondent by the trial court on 17-3-1981, which was properly maintained by the High Court. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact supported by proper evidence regarding limitation and pre-emption rights will not be interfered with, and a pre-emption decree passed prior to relevant target dates remains valid and executable.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit filed and decreed prior to the target date of 31st July 1986 remains valid?
  • Can the High Court in revision reverse the finding of the appellate court on the question of limitation if it is based on a proper appraisal of evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub and others vs The Province of Punjab1989 SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-14
  evacuee propertycompensation poolallotment validityForest Departmentpossessory titleChief Settlement Commissioner
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over the ownership and possession of evacuee land. The petitioners claimed ownership through a chain of title originating from an allotment to a displaced person in 1966. However, the trial court found that the petitioners never held physical possession, as the land was under the supervision of the Forest Department. Furthermore, the courts below held that, pursuant to a specific administrative directive (Memorandum No. 65/775-RL), evacuee lands in the possession of the Forest Department were excluded from allotment to refugee claim holders. The petitioners contended that once land entered the Compensation Pool, it could not be excluded by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the administrative directive did not remove land from the Compensation Pool but merely regulated the method of disposal for lands already held by the Forest Department. The Court held that the initial allotment was invalid, and the petition was dismissed, affirming the lower courts' decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Can evacuee land in the possession of the Forest Department be validly allotted to refugee claim holders under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Does an administrative directive excluding specific evacuee lands from allotment constitute an unlawful removal of property from the Compensation Pool?
  • Is a claim of ownership and possession maintainable where the land in question is under the established supervision of a government department?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ayub and others vs Mst. Nusrat Begum1989 SCMR 1379 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-14
  ejectmentbona fide personal useleave to appealappreciation of evidencerent controllerfirst appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 15-10-1988, whereby the High Court accepted the landlady's appeal and ordered the ejectment of the tenants from the disputed shop on the ground of bona fide personal use. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Rent Controller's finding on the issue of personal bona fide need. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of evidence fell within the proper scope of the High Court in a first appeal, and no misreading or non-consideration of evidence was established to warrant interference. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the judgment of the High Court and granting the tenants four months to vacate the premises. The key principle laid down is that the appellate court is competent to re-examine and re-appreciate evidence in a first appeal, and its findings on questions of fact such as bona fide personal need will not be disturbed by the apex court unless misreading or non-consideration of evidence is shown.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court in a first appeal is competent to reverse the finding of a Rent Controller regarding bona fide personal need?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the appreciation of evidence by the High Court in rent matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs The State1989 SCMR 544 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-11
  leave to appealmurder convictionland disputeevidentiary discrepancyright of private defensesuppression of injuriescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a criminal conviction for murder and related offenses involving a land dispute between two parties. The petitioner, Muhammad Aslam, and others were charged under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 following an altercation over a disputed boundary that resulted in the deaths of two individuals and injuries to several others. The trial court convicted the petitioner and others, sentencing the petitioner to death. On appeal, the Lahore High Court maintained the petitioner's conviction for murder but modified the conviction of a co-accused. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the prosecution's evidence was discrepant, that injured prosecution witnesses were unreliable, that the prosecution suppressed injuries sustained by the accused party, and that the accused party acted in defense of their lawful possession of the land. Finding that the petitioner's submissions regarding the evidentiary inconsistencies and the potential for the accused party to have been the victims of aggression merited further judicial review, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the validity of the conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the suppression of injuries sustained by the accused party in a cross-case scenario undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the prosecution evidence is found to be significantly discrepant regarding the initial aggressor in a land dispute?
  • Is a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 appropriate when the evidence suggests the accused party may have been acting in defense of lawful possession?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Philips Electrical Co. of Pakistan and others1989 SCMR 1479 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-06
  special leave to appealconstitutional petitiontermination of serviceresignationlimitation barlabour appellate tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition against the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner's services with respondent No. 1 were terminated following a resignation he allegedly tendered. The Labour Court initially reinstated the petitioner, but upon appeal, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the reinstatement, holding that the resignation was voluntary and that the petitioner's application before the Labour Court was time-barred. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the voluntary nature of the resignation and the limitation bar suffered from any legal infirmity. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the findings of the Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, the petition was found to be without merit and was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the findings of the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the voluntary nature of a resignation can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is an application before the Labour Court maintainable if it is barred by time?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam vs Mst. Gulraj Begum1989 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-10-09
  pre-emption suitpower of attorneyadmissibility of evidencemode of proofwaiver of objectionappellate procedureCode of Civil ProcedureEvidence Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a pre-emption suit where the defendant challenged the authority of the plaintiff's attorney to institute the suit. The Trial Court initially rejected the plaint, finding the general power of attorney insufficient and the subsequent special power of attorney (Ex. P/7) ineffective. The High Court reversed this, holding the suit properly instituted. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant could challenge the admissibility and mode of proof of the special power of attorney for the first time in appeal, having failed to object at the trial stage. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that objections regarding the mode of proof of a document must be raised at the trial when the document is tendered. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver, precluding such objections in appellate proceedings. The Court further clarified that Section 33 of the Registration Act 1908 pertains specifically to registration requirements, and Section 85 of the Evidence Act 1872 is not exhaustive regarding the proof of execution of powers of attorney.

  Questions settled

  • Can an objection regarding the mode of proof of a document be raised for the first time in appeal if it was not raised at the trial stage?
  • Does the requirement of authentication under Section 33(1)(c) of the Registration Act 1908 apply to all powers of attorney or only those presented for registration?
  • Is Section 85 of the Evidence Act 1872 exhaustive regarding the methods for proving the execution of a power of attorney?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Uns, Advocate vs Rashid Ahmed and anothers1989 PLD Supreme Court 612 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-25
  Urban SettlementAuction-purchaserTransfer of propertyLachesSettlement AuthoritiesWrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in an urban settlement dispute between an auction-purchaser and a transferee in possession. The core legal question was whether the auction of the disputed property was lawful given that the transferee had been in possession and had a pending application for the reduction of the transfer price before the competent Settlement Authority. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the auction was without lawful authority because the Settlement Authorities failed to properly determine the property's value before proceeding with the auction. The Court reasoned that the respondent, as the transferee in possession, could not be penalized for the Settlement Authorities' failure to decide the pending application regarding the transfer price. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument of laches, noting that the respondent had actively pursued the matter. The key principle established is that an auction of property conducted by Settlement Authorities without first resolving pending applications regarding the valuation or transfer price is legally flawed and cannot be sustained, particularly when the transferee is in possession.

  Questions settled

  • Can an auction of property by Settlement Authorities be sustained if the transferee's application for price reduction remains pending?
  • Does a delay in litigation constitute laches where the party has been actively agitating the dispute before the relevant authorities?
  • Can a transferee in possession be penalized for a default caused by the Settlement Authorities' failure to determine the property's value?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Shah vs Habib Khan and 11 others1989 SCMR 1642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-05-15
  pre-emptioncivil revisionconcurrent findings of factpre-emption priceleave to appealagreement to sell
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by a pre-emptor against a High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision. The core legal question presented was whether the pre-emption amount had been correctly fixed and decreed by the lower courts. The petitioner contended that an agreement to sell, executed within a year of the actual sale transaction, indicated a significantly lower price than what was ultimately paid, suggesting an inflated sale price. Conversely, the respondent argued that the discrepancy was adequately explained by evidence on the record, which the trial and appellate courts had concurrently accepted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error of law or principle in the concurrent findings of fact reached by the lower courts. Consequently, the Court held that there was no justification to interfere with the High Court's refusal to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the finality of the concurrent factual determinations regarding the pre-emption price.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to exercise revisional jurisdiction when concurrent findings of fact exist regarding the pre-emption price?
  • Can a court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a pre-emption suit where no error of law or principle is demonstrated?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Khan vs Muhammad Yasin Khan and 2 others1989 SCMR 2028(2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-09
  cancellation of bailpre-trial investigationdefence versiondiscretion of trial courtcriminal procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns a petition seeking the cancellation of bail granted to the respondents. The core legal question addressed by the Court was whether the circumstances warranted the immediate cancellation of bail at the pre-trial stage. Upon reviewing the arguments presented by counsel and examining the record provided by the investigating officer, the Court observed that the defence version of the case had not yet been fully investigated. Consequently, the Court held that it was not a fit case for the cancellation of bail at that specific stage of the proceedings. The Court dismissed the appeal but provided a significant qualification: the trial court retains the discretion to cancel the bail granted to the respondents at a later stage, provided that the trial court records essential evidence and determines that a sufficient case for cancellation has been established. This decision reinforces the principle that bail cancellation requires a thorough evaluation of the evidence, and premature cancellation is inappropriate when the defence case remains uninvestigated.

  Questions settled

  • Is it appropriate to cancel bail when the defence version of the case has not yet been fully investigated?
  • Can a trial court cancel bail after recording essential evidence even if an initial petition for cancellation was dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam Baig vs Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others1989 SCMR 1122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-08-10
  horse-breeding grantresumption of tenancydiscretionary grantvested rightSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan via a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's writ petition challenging the resumption of his horse-breeding grant. The core legal question concerns whether the petitioner acquired a vested right in the discretionary horse-breeding tenancy grant and if the concurrent findings regarding the breach of tenancy conditions warrant interference. The Supreme Court held that horse-breeding grants are discretionary in character and do not create a vested right in favor of the grantee. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the concurrent orders of the revenue authorities and the High Court. The key principle laid down is that government grants of a horse-breeding nature are purely discretionary and confer no vested rights upon the tenant, rendering discretionary administrative resumption decisions unassailable in the absence of legal right.

  Questions settled

  • Does a horse-breeding grant create a vested right for the grantee?
  • Can concurrent orders of revenue authorities regarding the breach of tenancy conditions be interfered with when the grant is discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and others vs Kala Khan Represented by his Legal1989 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-29
  pre-emptiontenantcultivating possessioncross-examinationattorney statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the pre-emption decree granted in favour of the respondent, Kala Khan, on the ground of his cultivating possession as a tenant. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the statement of the respondent's attorney in cross-examination—stating the respondent was in possession as an owner—contradicted the claim of tenancy so as to disentitle him from pre-empting the sale. The Supreme Court held that upon a proper reading of the record and the attorney's statement in its true perspective, the respondent's continuous possession as a tenant since 1948 was duly established and did not contradict his stand. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower forums that the pre-emptor established valid tenancy for pre-emption.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a statement by an attorney in cross-examination referring to possession as an owner defeats a pre-emption claim based on tenancy?
  • Does continuous possession as a temporary allottee establish tenancy for the purpose of pre-emption?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Aslam and anothers vs Mst. Sardar Begum alias Noor1989 SCMR 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-06
  minoritysale of landbirth and death registerpublic recordadmissibility of evidencewaiver of objectionidentity of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the core legal questions of whether the respondent was a minor at the time of executing a sale-deed and whether an extract from the register of births and deaths sufficiently linked her to the transaction. The respondent had filed a suit for the cancellation of a sale-deed conveying her land, alleging that she was a minor and that impersonation had occurred. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court decreed in favour of the respondent, finding she was a minor, which was upheld by the High Court in revision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that municipal registers of births and deaths are public records under the Evidence Act, 1872, rendering certified copies admissible in evidence and presumed genuine. Furthermore, procedural objections to documents produced during evidence are waived if not raised at the appropriate time, and concurrent findings regarding identity and minority status of a party based on unchallenged evidence are binding.

  Questions settled

  • Are certified copies of municipal registers of births and deaths admissible in evidence as public records?
  • Can an objection to the admission of a document produced during the recording of evidence be raised if not objected to at the trial stage?
  • Whether a finding of fact regarding minority or majority status can be easily disturbed in revision proceedings?
  • Does a birth entry recorded shortly after birth prevail over oral evidence regarding age?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad ASHRAFPctitioner vs Mst. Sakina and 2 others1989 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-18
  child custodywelfare of minorsguardian judgecustody disputeleave to appealconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed in limine the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding the custody of his minor children. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in upholding the Guardian Judge's decision to grant custody of the minors to their mother, Mst. Sakina. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the challenge. The Court held that the High Court had correctly exercised its jurisdiction by confirming the findings of the Guardian Judge after a comprehensive review of all relevant facts. The ratio of the decision emphasizes that in matters of child custody, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the children. The Court specifically noted that the petitioner's remarriage and the existence of children from that subsequent union were significant factors supporting the lower courts' determination that the mother was the appropriate custodian. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts, affirming the custody arrangement based on the best interests of the minors.

  Questions settled

  • Is the remarriage of a father a relevant factor in determining the custody of minor children?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts regarding child custody when the welfare of the minor is considered?
  • Can a High Court dismiss a constitutional petition in limine regarding a custody dispute if the welfare of the minor has been properly assessed by the Guardian Judge?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Ghulam Safdar and others1989 SCMR 1944 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-21
  leave to appealacquittalcriminal appealappellate interferencere-appraisal of evidencedeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had acquitted the respondent, Ghulam Safdar, of charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent had originally been convicted and sentenced to death by the Additional Sessions Judge, Attock. The petitioner challenged the High Court's acquittal, arguing that the reversal of the trial court's conviction and sentence was erroneous and unjustified based on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the arguments and the evidence on record. The Court held that where two reasonable views of the matter are possible, and the view adopted by the High Court is a plausible one, an order of acquittal cannot be interfered with or set aside by the appellate court. Consequently, the Supreme Court determined that there were no sufficient grounds to disturb the acquittal. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, affirming the principle that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal if the High Court's assessment of the evidence constitutes a possible and reasonable view.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appellate court set aside an order of acquittal when the view taken by the High Court is a possible one?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an acquittal judgment passed by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Executive Engineer, Upper Gugera Division, SHEIKHUPURAand others1989 SCMR 1244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-04-08
  service tribunalremoval from servicemisconductabsence from dutysubstituted servicecanal patwarileave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service. The petitioner, serving as a canal patwari, remained absent from duty without leave for over a year, prompting disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. After attempts to serve him via registered mail failed, notices were published in two Urdu newspapers, to which he did not respond, leading to his removal by the departmental authorities and the subsequent dismissal of his departmental and service tribunal appeals. The core legal question was whether the removal from service due to prolonged unauthorized absence and substituted service was justified. The Supreme Court held that the departmental authorities were fully justified in removing the petitioner given his unexplained absence for over a year, finding no legal infirmity in the removal order. The key principle laid down is that prolonged unauthorized absence constitutes misconduct warranting removal from service, and substituted service through newspapers is valid when personal service cannot be effected due to the employee's default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether prolonged absence from duty without leave constitutes misconduct warranting removal from service?
  • Is substituted service through newspapers valid when a notice sent by registered cover remains undelivered due to the employee's failure to respond?
  • Does an order of removal from service based on unexplained absence suffer from any legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Muhammad Ashraf vs Bahadur Khan and others1989 SCMR 1390 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-02-20
  Muslim giftgift deedconcurrent findings of factrevisional jurisdictionfraudulent transactioninterested witnessesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a civil revision regarding a disputed Muslim gift deed. The petitioner claimed ownership of land based on a gift deed executed by his aunt, while the respondents, the aunt's husband and minor children, contested its validity. The trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court concurrently found against the petitioner. The Supreme Court examined the evidence, noting that the marginal witnesses were interested parties and that their testimony regarding the timing of the execution contradicted the date on the deed. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to produce the scribe of the deed, and the court found the transaction suspicious given the exclusion of the donor's own children in favor of a nephew. The Supreme Court held that the gift deed was fictitious and fraudulently obtained. It affirmed that the High Court correctly declined to interfere with concurrent findings of fact, as the petition raised only factual disputes, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in its revisional jurisdiction?
  • Can a gift deed be considered valid when the marginal witnesses provide testimony contradicting the date on the document?
  • Is the failure to produce the scribe of a contested gift deed a relevant factor in determining its authenticity?
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• Muhammad Ashraf vs Arshad Mahmood and others1989 SCMR 923 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-25
  family maintenanceex parte decreeconstitutional jurisdictiondiscretionary reliefservice of summonsminor's maintenance
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld concurrent findings of lower courts regarding a family maintenance decree. The petitioner, a former husband and father, challenged an ex parte decree for maintenance awarded to his minor son and former wife, claiming lack of service of summons. The trial court had rejected his application to set aside the ex parte decree as time-barred under the Family Courts Rules, a decision affirmed by the District Judge and subsequently the High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. The Court held that the lower courts had correctly adjudicated the factual dispute regarding service and maintenance. It emphasized that jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is discretionary and should be exercised cautiously. Finding that the petitioner had failed to provide maintenance for his minor son for four years, the Court concluded the High Court exercised its discretion judiciously in refusing relief, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Is the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 discretionary in nature?
  • Can a High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts in a constitutional petition?
  • Does the failure to provide maintenance to a minor child influence the court's exercise of discretionary relief?
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• Muhammad Ashraf Chaudhry vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others1989 SCMR 750 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-12-14
  service lawpromotionservice tribunaljudicial reviewannual confidential reportsdepartmental discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the decision of the Service Tribunal regarding the non-promotion of the petitioner to a Grade-19 post. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in concluding that the petitioner's request for promotion had been considered and rejected simply because no reply was received to his application, and whether the department was required to take a conscious decision on his promotion before considering outsiders. Upon reviewing the official departmental files, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner's service record was marked as "average" and that his Annual Confidential Reports for the preceding three years explicitly stated he was "not fit for promotion." Furthermore, the Court was satisfied that the department had indeed taken a conscious decision not to recommend the petitioner for promotion. Consequently, the Court held that there was no ground for interference with the departmental decision. The petition was dismissed, affirming that where a conscious administrative decision regarding promotion is supported by the service record, judicial interference is not warranted.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of a reply to a promotion application necessarily imply that the request was considered and rejected?
  • Is a department required to take a conscious decision regarding an employee's promotion before considering outside candidates?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with a departmental decision regarding promotion when the official record indicates the employee is not fit for promotion?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs Muhammad Akram Khan and others1989 SCMR 732 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-11-28
  withdrawal of suitpermission to file fresh suitamendment of plaintcivil court jurisdictionagricultural landPunjab Land Revenue Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave arises from a civil suit for possession through partition of land, wherein the trial court and the first appellate court held that the civil court lacked jurisdiction because the land was agricultural under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and ordered the return of the plaint. During revision before the High Court, the plaintiffs were permitted to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one due to defects in the drafting of the plaint. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the formal defects and lack of proper description in the plaint could be remedied by allowing an amendment of the plaint at any stage, rather than permitting the withdrawal of the suit. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the suit to the trial court, granting the plaintiffs permission to amend the plaint and append a site plan, while permitting the defendants to file an amended written statement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit should be allowed to be withdrawn with permission to file a fresh suit when its defects can be remedied by an amendment of the plaint?
  • Can an amendment of the plaint be allowed at the revisional stage to cure formal defects and properly describe the suit property?
  • Whether a civil court has jurisdiction in a partition suit involving land alleged to be agricultural in character under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and others vs Mst. Sardaran1989 SCMR 1972 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-05-03
  petition for leave to appealgiftdelivery of possessionmutationconcurrent findings of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of the lower appellate court regarding the validity of a gift of land. The core legal question concerns the validity of the gift made by the deceased father of the petitioners in favor of their aunt, specifically regarding the factum of the making of the gift and the delivery of possession. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court and the High Court regarding the valid execution of the gift and the delivery of possession based on revenue records and admissions of the parties were unexceptionable. The Court laid down the principle that findings of fact concurrently arrived at by lower forums, supported by evidence on record, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court under appellate jurisdiction when no substantial question of law is raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of a gift and delivery of possession can be interfered with when no point of law is raised?
  • Does an admission of the making of a gift and delivery of possession before a Revenue Officer suffice to prove the validity of a gift?
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• Muhammad Ashraf and anothers vs Mst. Niamat Bibi1989 PLD Supreme Court 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-03-15
  leave to appealdismissal for defaultprocedural compliancecontumacious conductSupreme Court Rulesdiscretionary relief
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed in 1981, which remained pending for nearly eight years due to the petitioners' persistent failure to comply with mandatory filing requirements. The core legal question was whether the petition should be dismissed for default given the petitioners' failure to provide necessary documentation despite multiple adjournments and specific court directions. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners' conduct was contumacious and that the default was not condonable. The Court emphasized that while the Advocates-on-Record were not at fault, the petitioners themselves were responsible for the failure to supply the requisite documents, which rendered the petition incomplete and unready for adjudication. Consequently, the Court refused the request for further adjournment and dismissed the petition for default. The key principle laid down is that a party seeking discretionary relief from the Supreme Court must strictly adhere to procedural rules regarding documentation; persistent failure to do so, especially over an extended period, constitutes contumacious conduct that disentitles the petitioner to further leniency or consideration on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Does the persistent failure of a petitioner to file necessary documents as required by the Supreme Court Rules warrant the dismissal of a leave to appeal petition?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be dismissed for default when the delay is attributable to the client rather than the legal counsel?
  • Is a party who fails to comply with procedural documentation requirements entitled to discretionary relief from the Supreme Court?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs The State1989 SCMR 1858 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-06-24
  leave to appealpublic servanthurtcommon intentionappraisal of evidencecriminal liabilitydischarge of duty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed by a convict challenging his conviction under Section 332 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which had been upheld by the High Court. The petitioner raised two primary contentions: first, that the complainant, a public servant, was not performing his official duties at the time of the occurrence, thereby rendering Section 332 inapplicable; and second, that the petitioner did not directly cause injury, challenging the application of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arguments regarding the complainant's status were essentially questions of fact rather than law. The Court examined the evidence and determined that the complainant was indeed in the act of discharging his duties as a public servant while taking cattle to the pound. Furthermore, the Court held that the arguments regarding the appraisal of evidence and the application of Section 34 did not reveal any legal infirmity or error of principle. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the act of a Forest Guard taking cattle to a pound constitute the discharge of duty as a public servant under Section 332 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a challenge to the factual findings regarding the discharge of official duty by a public servant be entertained as a question of law in a petition for leave to appeal?
  • Is the application of Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in cases of shared criminal liability a question of fact or law when it pertains to the appraisal of evidence?
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• Muhammad Ashfaq vs Mst. Hedayat Bibi and others1989 SCMR 863 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1988-06-12
  inheritance mutationwrit jurisdictionquestion of factsettlement authorityremand
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a dispute over the inheritance property left by one Jhandoo, who died in 1947. Mst. Hedayat Bibi filed an appeal in 1972 claiming to be a daughter of Jhandoo omitted from the mutation of inheritance. After her appeal was dismissed on limitation grounds by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, she filed a writ petition in the High Court, which allowed the petition and directed the revision of the mutation to give her a share. The appellant, a grandson of Jhandoo, challenged this order on the ground that the High Court improperly recorded a finding of fact regarding paternity in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in determining a question of fact in writ jurisdiction without affording an opportunity to contest the relationship. The Court accordingly set aside the High Court's writ, remanded the case to the Notified Officer for a fresh factual determination on whether Mst. Hedayat Bibi is the daughter of Jhandoo, and directed a speedy disposal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can record a finding on a disputed question of fact regarding paternity in writ jurisdiction?
  • Can a writ petition be used to bypass factual inquiry into inheritance claims?
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